Sensitive Security Information
FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft
OnSeptem berllt h,2 0 0 1
Background
Prior to9 / 1 1 the FAAm a i n t a i n e d a 24 hour Washington Operations Center (WOC)s t a f f e d by
personnel trainedi n communicationsa n d operationso f f i c e r duties.
When informationw a s received indicatingah i j a c k i n g o r other serious aviation security
incident, the WOC operationso f f i c e r s wouldn o t i f yo n call aviation security executives,w h o would respond to the FAA Aviation Command Center (ACC), whichw a s established nextt o theW O C .
Asenior aviation security executive would overseet h es t a f f which assembled in the ACC and
direct actions with respect to an ongoing hijacking. One of the actions which couldb e takenw a s
to requestt h e National Military Command Center(N M C C )f o r airborne surveillance of the
hijackeda i r c r a f t .
Such requests did not contemplate asking the DoD to interdictt h e hijackeda i r c r a f t, o n l yt o
locatea n dm o n ito r i t sm o v e m e n t s .
Part of the standard protocol for the WOCo p e r a t i o n so f f i c e r s was then o t i f i c a t i o n of the
National Military Command Center (NMCC)o f hijacking incidents but the DOD was not
expectedt o provide airborne surveillance assistance untila n d unless it was requested by the
FAA.
Another part of the standard protocol was the creation of an aviation security telephone
bridge or net in the ACC tol i n k allentitiesconcernedw i t h ah i j a c k i n gincident.Th is was
referred to as the"P rim ary "n e t ; aS e c o n d a r y , or tactical net, could also bee s t a b l i s h e d for
coordinationo fi n t e r n a l F A A aviation security information a n da c t i o n s .
Separatef r o mt h e ACC, FAA AirT r a f f i c Operations maintainedaf u l l ys t a f f e d A i rT r a f f i c
Control System Command Centeri nHem do n, Virginia, which monitoredt h e national airspace
system2 4 hoursp e r day,7 daysa week.In the event of a hijacking thisf a c i l i t y couldb e placed
inc o m m u n ic a tio nw ith theA C C .
Thisd o c u m e n t c o n t a i n s S e n s i t i v e S e c u r i t y I n f o r m a t io n d e s i g n a t e di n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
49 CFR Part 1520. Disclosure isp r o hi b i t e d w i t ho u t thep e r m i s s i o n of theA d m i n i s t r a t o r of
theF e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the A d m in is t r a t o r of the T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S e c u r i t y
Administration
Sensitive Security Information
i
SensitiveSecurity In format i on
Inaddition to the"n ets" described above, it wasnormalpractice for theDirector of AirT r a f f ic
Operationst o convene operational telcons connectinga l l concerneda i rt r a f f i c elements when
there was a significant developmentor accident. These telcons were part of the normal
operation of the AirT r a f f i c Control System and not intended, before9/11,a s part of a hijacking
incidentmanag emente f f o r t .
OnSeptemberl l t h
•
On9 /1 1 as the incidents occurred during a normal weekday, members of the aviation security
staff quickly responded to the ACC upon notification of a possible hijackinga n d began setting
upoper ations.
•
Separatef r o mt h e ACC, within a few minutes of the report thata n aircraft had hit the World
Trade Center, the Director of AirT r a f f i c convenedan AirT r a f f i c operational teleconferencet o
connect the FAA AirT r a f f i c facilities concerned.
•
As theseconda i r c r a f t impac ted the second World Trade Center tower and other reports began
tof l o win, this telcon wasexpanded inscope toinclude all of the actual hijackings andcrashes
andvarious bogus reportsof hijackingsand crashesas well.
•
Some timea f t e r the AirT r a f f i c operational teleconferencew a s established, the US Air Force
liaison to the FAA joinedt h e conference. Military personnel working in the AirT r a f f i c Services
Cell of the FAA AirT r a f f i c Control System Command CenterinHerndon, VA, coordinated
actions with respectt o militarya n d other special flights which were allowed to flya f t e r the shut
downof the national airspace later in the morning.
•
During the AirT r a f f i c operational teleconference, the FAA shared real-time information about
theu n f o l d i n gevents, including information about loss of communication witha i r c r a f t , loss of
transponder signals, unauthorized changesi n course,a n d other actions being taken by all the
flights of interest, including AAL77. These telcons were notr ec or ded nor was a logk ept.
•
The initial information concerningAAL77 was the possibility that thisf lig h t was now an
aircraft accident.T h ea ir c r a f t h a d stopped sendingi t s transponder code, turnedl e f t with-
out authorization,did not communicate, lost altitude rapidlya n d shortly thereafter
disappeared entirelyf r o m radar.Priorto9/11, this sequenceofevents would leadthe
FAA tobelieve thea ir c r a f t was indistr ess and had possibly crashed, triggering Search and
Rescue procedures.
This document contains Sensitive Security Information designatedi n accordancew i t h
49 CFRPart 1520. Disclosure isprohibited without thepe rmission of theAdmi n i s t rat or of
theF ederal A v i a t i o n Admin istration and the Admi n i s t rat or of the Tran sportation S e curi t y
Administration
Sensitive Security Information
2
Sensitive Security Information
In additiont o communications processesa n d networks already described, the FAAO f f i c e of Intelligence maintained communications with the US Intelligence Communityo f whicht h e Departmento f Defense in a part. Information about this activityn o w resides witht h eT S A Assistant Administratorf o r Intelligence.
SinceS e p t e m b e rl l t h
•
Since9 /1 1 , the AirT r a f f i c operational teleconferenceh a s evolved intot h e Domestic EventN e t
(DEN), a 24 hourp e r day,7 daysa week, ongoing teleconference connectingF A A
headquarters, all FAA En RouteA irT r a f f i c Control Centers,m a j o rA irT r a f f i c Control
Facilities in the Washington area,N O R A Da n d their regionala i r defense sectors, Customs,
Secret Service, Departmento f Homeland Security, TSA,U S CapitolPo lice,a n d other
governmentagencies asneeded. The DENprovides a venuef orim m ediatecoordin ation on
suspiciousa i r c r a f t activity anywhere in the National Airspace System.
•
Additionally, NO RAD regions have direct communications with FAA AirT r a f f i c Control
Centers in the field.
•
The DEN isr e c o r d e d .
This document contains Sensitive Security Information designatedi n accordance with
49 CFRP a r t1 5 2 0 . D i s c lo s u r e isp ro hib itedw i t ho u t thep e r m i s s i o n of theA d m in is t r a t o r of
the Federal Aviation Administration and the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration
Sensitive Security Information
3
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