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Militia Tactics PDF

Militia Tactics PDF

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Published by Franke Schein
How Militia Units face the coming battles with U.N. peacekeeping forces/
Alasla, Franke Schein, Militia, Patriot, NWO, New Wolrd order, Tactical, Survival, Book
How Militia Units face the coming battles with U.N. peacekeeping forces/
Alasla, Franke Schein, Militia, Patriot, NWO, New Wolrd order, Tactical, Survival, Book

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Published by: Franke Schein on Jul 06, 2010
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01/07/2013

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Militia Tactics:
By Franke Schein
 — 
July 2010What will be the indicators that will cause the militias to rise up inangry defiance?1.) Legislation that prohibits or restricts private firearms owner-ship.2.) Forced compliance with unconstitutional laws.3.) The establishment of new legislation or laws that further erodeor dismantle civil liberties.4.) The introduction of United Nations peacekeeping forces ontoAmerican soil.5.) Sweeping political arrests based upon quelling the voices of dissent of grassroots political parties or activists.Everybody has their limit. Everybody reaches a point when enough is enough. That goes without saying, and holds true for nearly everything in our lives.For members of a militia unit, and their commanders, it becomes imperative that everyone under-stands that there are certain indicators that will create a call to action. Whether that call to action ispurely a political response, or an armed response, will be dictated by whatever action created thecall to arms itself. It also hinges upon the units preconceived ideas of what an attack represents totheir ideologies.In a politically motivated response, the militia units take to the streets in a very public protest that attracts worldwide attention. Such protest must be part of a national effort that is embraced byevery militia unit operating in the country. Images of camouflaged clothed and armed citizens onthe streets of America will certainly attract the attention of every news agency in the world. It wouldbe akin to the Hells Angels showing up at a bar mitzvah .Imagine the surprise and shock of the average Joe Blow american awaking to news reports that allacross the United States, militia units have rallied in front of their respective state capitols to de-
nounce a new federal regulation. It’s never happened in this country, and that one single act would
send shockwaves across the country.On the tactical front, a national calls to arms, or perhaps even a localized call toarms is an entirely different matter.
I’ve spent a great deal of time attempting to answer the question— 
what wouldhappen if all of the militia units arose (as one) against whatever threat causedthem to activate their alarm tree? [ For example, and of the indicators that I previ-ously discussed. ]On a local level we would probably see the activation of State National Guardunits that are augmented by law enforcement officers. States that have activeduty military bases would probably call on these resources as well. Since this ad-ministration has shown time and time again that the Posse Comitatus Act is nowmeaningless.On a national level we could expect the same outcome, but definitely with activeduty military intervention. For the purposes of clarification-lets assume that any-
time that I use the word “Military”— 
it denotes United Nations peacekeepingForces..That leaves the question on how these battles would go down.
It’s apparent from the onset that small militia units would be hard pressed to en-
gage in any head-to-head confrontation with organized military units. The out-come would be pretty horrific
 — 
considering that the technology available to activeduty military/law enforcement, far exceeds what is available to militia units.So, in essence, militia units would have to conduct hit and run type of battles,much like what the insurgents in the Mideast are doing. Small unit penetrations,ambush and counter ambush operations, convoy ambushes, tactical operationsthat would generally be relegated to the role of guerilla warfare.
That doesn’t mean that all military units are unbeatable, in fact, it’s their technol-
ogy that makes them weak. The over reliance on all the fancy gizmos that canblindside them.The threats faced in this type of battle would include unmanned (drones) aircraft 
that can be used both as an “eye in the sky” and as offensive weapons. We have
watched this technology reap havoc on the Taliban in Afghanistan time after time.Special Operations units that operate outside of the military contstrains, and deepinside of militia territory.
 
Armored cavalry units that sweep through an area, usually accompanied by air assets, and air-borne weapons platforms. These are the key strategies that will be used against militia units.If one takes the time to analyze and comprehend the counter-insurgency strategies used over-
seas, we can clearly see that the tactic of “Hammer & Anvil” is being used, time after time.
 Counter ambush strategies dictate that a force upon force confrontation be met with equally dev-astating firepower, rapid movement out of the ambush zone, and massive multi-weapons fire that 
breaks the ambusher’s continuity itself.
 
Once having broke through the ambush, the tables are then tuned against the ambusher’s
-bydriving them back against a natural obstacle, such as a river, a forested tract of land, or a certainlandmark. That is the Hammer aspect of the counter ambush operations. The Anvil segment en-tails that a ready action force takes up position along the proposed strategic area, (as described
above) and results in the ambusher’s being driven against a wall of withering gunfire while they
are being pushed into the area.
The Hammer & Anvil” strategy was used very successfully in Vietnam and Korea. The
Soviets also used it very effectively during the spring 1944 offensive against the Ar-mies of Germany.In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the H & A is being utilized with damned good results.A small unit is sent into a village, and when it is taken under fire, a reaction force isquickly sent to their aid.Air assets, when they are available, are brought into the fight, and all three elements
maneuver the ambusher’s backwards towards a selected landmark/location.
 Another element is positioned at this landmark, with orders to hold the position, pre-vent the enemy from effecting a breech through the area, and kill as many of the en-emy as can be accomplished. As the original unit, along with the reaction forces, pushand drive the ambushers into the wall of weapons platforms among hastily preparedpositions.The only way to counter this counter-ambush strategy, is to immediately disperse inseveral directions. That mans even squad sized units must quickly disappear into thecrowds and become nearly invisible.But rest assureds, that once he gunfire dies down, the enemy military units will sealoff the area in order to prevent any escape and evasion by the original ambushingunits.
This is also another common tactics being used today. It’s the most primitive form of 
warfare in the streets
 — 
house to house, and room to room searches that round uplikely enemy fighters. Every male over 21 is interrogated, apprehended, and often
times placed into “protective custody” until his whereabouts can be determined.
 A team of forensic analysts use Ultraviolet lights to determine if there is gunpowderresidue on the hands, face, or clothing of the suspect. Even K-( dogs are utilized to
sniff out weapons and explosives, as well as electronic “sniffing” of gun powder,
chemical, and explosives compounds.During the initial engagement, the reaction force usually attempts to control not onlythe immediate area/street that they are fired upon, but the streets adjacent to the am-bush area as well.This allows them better security and control of the immediate area, and if the tacticalsituation allows it, to encircle the ambushing forces rather quickly. Usually squad orplatoon sized elements are used, as well as heavy weapons platforms such a crewserved weapons on vehicles. Deployment of units in this manner allows for a bettercontrolled battle areas, mutual force protection, and rapid response to changing bat-tlefield conditions. The basis for military operations in urban environments. This strat-egy dictates the control of at least 1-3 block continuous area around the maneuverelement engaged in the hardest fighting.

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