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Labor1 Digest Part4

Labor1 Digest Part4

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Labor Law 1
A2010 - 142 -
299 SCRA 24DAVIDE JR; November 20, 1998
Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside an NLRC decision andresolution denying a motion for reconsideration
- National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union is the certifiedbargaining agent of the rank and file employees of respondentCollege. Petitioner Juliet Arroyo was the president of the SanIldefonso College Association of Faculty and Personnel, anaffiliate of NAMAWU. Private respondent Lloren is the directressof the College.- In February, 1991, ARROYO, a “tenured teacher” who laterbecame a part-time teacher, asked that she be allowed to teachon a full-time basis. The COLLEGE denied her request for herfailure to “make use of the privilege” of her study leave in thetwo years she was allowed to do so. The next month, the otherindividual petitioners, who were issued yearly appointment,were informed of the non-renewal of their respective contracts.- In April, 1991, the SICAFP was formalized into a labor unionaffiliated with NAMAWU.- The petitioners and NAMAWU filed a complaint for illegaldismissal, unfair labor practice, forced resignation, harassment,underpayment of wages, non-payment of service incentiveleave pay, and violation of Waeg Order No. IV-1. Theydemanded reinstatement and payment of back wages.- The Labor Arbiter held private respondents guilty of illegaldismissal, unfair labor practice interfering with the organizationof the labor union. The contracts of employment were notbilateral agreements, but letters of appointment. When theCollege opted not to renew the appointments it merely invokedthe expiration of the period fixed in the appointments withoutgiving any other reason or granting the teachers concerned anopportunity to explaint heir side. The probationary employeeswere not even informed of their performance rating when theywere denied renewal of their appointment. The non-renewalwas timely made while individual petitioners were in theprocess of organizing themselves into a union. These acts of the College amounted to union busting.- The Office of the Solicitor General moves for the dismissal of the petition except as to ARROYO; that all petitioners exceptARROYO were legally dismissed. The reason why she failed tocomplete her master’s degree could not be solely attributed toher. She initially requested a leave of absence, but theCOLLEGE suggested that she teach on a part-time basisbecause it was in need of teachers at that time. Also, herdismissal was without due process.
 1. WON ARROYO was legally dismissed2. WON the other petitioners were permanent employees
1. NO
- it is undisputed that Arroyo had been teaching in the COLLEGEsince 1965 and had obtained a permanent status; she becamea part-time teacher, however, from June 1988 to March 1991.- She did not lose her permanent status when she requested toteach on a part-time basis. The reason for the request was thatshe wanted to pursue a master's degree. The COLLEGEapproved the request, and the study leave was extended foranother year. It would have been unjust and unreasonable toallow ARROYO to pursue her master's degree, from which theCOLLEGE would have also benefited in terms of her higherlearning and experience, and at the same time penalize herwith the loss of permanent status. It would as well be absurdand illogical to maintain that by teaching on a part-time basisafter obtaining the permission to take up a master's degree,ARROYO relinquished her permanent status.- When ARROYO subsequently requested that she continueteaching on a full-time basis, private respondents in its letter of 27 March 1991 refused, citing as reason her failure "to makeuse of the privilege granted [her] by the administrationregarding [her] study leave in the past four semesters." Thisletter served as notice of ARROYO's termination fromemployment. No further notice was served. It must beemphasized that the letter did not indicate that a master'sdegree was necessary for ARROYO to continue her service, asnow claimed by the COLLEGE. In fact, apart from its mereallegation, the COLLEGE failed to prove that a master's degreewas a pre-requisite for ARROYO's teaching position. ARROYO, apermanent teacher, could only be dismissed for just cause andonly after being afforded due process, in light of paragraph (b),Article 277 of the Labor Code.- Arroyo’s dismissal was substantively and procedurally flawed.It was effected without just cause and due process. Thus, hertermination was void. She is therefore entitled to reinstatementto her former position without loss of seniority rights and otherprivileges, full backwages inclusive of allowances, and otherbenefits computed from the date of her actual dismissal to thedate of reinstatement2. NO
 - On the issue of whether the individual petitioners werepermanent employees, it is the Manual of Regulations forPrivate Schools, and not the Labor Code, which is applicable. This was settled in
University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC
, where weexplicitly ruled that for a private school teacher to acquirepermanent status in employment and, therefore, be entitled tosecurity of tenure, the following requisites must concur: (1) theteacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must haverendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and (3) suchservice must have been satisfactory.- Eleven of the individual petitioners were full-time teachersduring the school year 1990-1991, but only two, namely, Odisteand Buan had rendered three consecutive years of service. There is no showing, however, that the two were on a full-timebasis during those three years and that their services weresatisfactory. Evidently, not one of the said teachers can beconsidered to have acquired a permanent status.
the decision of the National Labor RelationsCommission in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-4-3710-91-RI isAFFIRMED, subject to the modification that private respondentSan Ildefonso College is DIRECTED to (1) reinstate petitioner JULIETA ARROYO to her former position at the time of herdismissal, or to any equivalent position if reinstatement to suchposition is no longer feasible, without of loss of seniority rightsand benefits that may be due her; and (2) pay her back wagesfrom the date of her actual dismissal to the date of her actualreinstatement.
193 SCRA 410CRUZ; January 28, 1991
Petition for certiorari to review decision of NLRC setting asidedecision of Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement with backwagesof Zosimo Cielo.
Henry Lei Trucking hired Zosimo Cielo as a truck driver under 6-month Agreement with stipulations that the term is can beearlier terminated at the option of either party. The Agreementalso stipulated that there was no employer-employeerelationship between the parties and that the nature of therelationship is merely contractual. Lei asked Cielo to sign anaffidavit of having received full payment of wages, which Cielorefused to sign. A week before the Agreement was supposed toend, Lei notified Cielo of the termination of his services.
Labor Law 1
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Apparently in the Agreements with the drivers, Lei merely fillsin the blanks with the corresponding data such as the driver’sname and address, etc.
WON the Agreement was valid 
Where from the circumstances it is apparent that theperiods were imposed in order to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck downor disregarded for being contrary to public policy, morals,etc.
- The Agreement is void ab initio for having a purpose contraryto public policy. The agreement was a clear attempt to exploitthe employee and deprive him of the protection of the LaborCode by making it appear that the stipulations are governed bythe Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions. In reality theagreement was a contract of employment into which were readthe provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice policy of the Constitution. That Cielo refused to sign the affidavit was nota just cause for his termination as he was only protecting hisinterest against unguarded waiver of the benefits due himunder the Labor Code. Said affidavit which stipulated paymentof wages even suggested that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship.
NLRC decision set aside. LA decision reinstated.
196 SCRA 215FELICIANO; April 22, 1991
Petition for certiorari review.
- DOLE NCR issued Alien Employment Permit in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as sportsconsultant and assistant coach for GMC. GMC and Cone enteredinto a contract of employment whereby the latter undertook tocoach GMC's basketball team. Board of Special Inquiry of theCommission on Immigration and Deportation approvedpetitioner Cone's application for a change of admission statusfrom temporary visitor to prearranged employee.- On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also requestedthat it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. TheDOLE Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request. AlienEmployment Permit was issued.- Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of thePhilippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of said alienemployment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor whoissued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone'semployment permit on the ground that there was no showingthat there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, ableand willing to perform the services required nor that the hiringof petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest.
1. WON Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion whenhe revoked petitioner Cone's alien employment permit2. WON Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus RulesImplementing the Labor Code is null and void as it is in violationof the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empowerrespondent Secretary to determine if the employment of analien would redound to national interest
1. NO- Petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretionor any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision,revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.- The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed byprivate respondent BCAP was cured when petitioners wereallowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration beforerespondent Secretary of Labor.2. NO- The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondentSecretary to make a determination as to the availability of theservices of a "person in the Philippines who is competent, ableand willing at the time of application to perform the services forwhich an alien is desired." In short, the Department of Labor isthe agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers.- Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seekingemployment of an alien must first obtain an employment permitfrom the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choosewhom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutoryrequirement of an alien employment permit.- Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, nocomparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr.Norman Black as the latter is "a long time resident of thecountry," and thus, not subject to the provisions of Article 40 of the Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In anycase, the term "non-resident alien" and its obverse "residentalien," here must be given their technical connotation under ourlaw on immigration.- Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision would amount to animpairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of theLabor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulationsrequiring alien employment permits were in existence longbefore petitioners entered into their contract of employment. Itis firmly settled that provisions of applicable laws, especiallyprovisions relating to matters affected with public policy, aredeemed written into contracts. Private parties cannotconstitutionally contract away the otherwise applicableprovisions of law.- In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of localworkers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions grantingsuch jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of theposition involved, cannot be seriously questioned.- Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor isnot authorized to take into account the question of whether ornot employment of an alien applicant would "redound to thenational interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer tosuch assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly toconcede that the relationship of basketball coaching and thenational interest is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In thefirst place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]heemployment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or tothe applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, ableand willing at the time of application to perform the services forwhich the alien is desired."-
The permissive language employed in the Labor Codeindicates that the authority granted involves theexercise of discretion on the part of the issuingauthority
. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor Codesets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Laborshould, and indeed must, take into account in exercising hisauthority and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code.
Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition forCertiorari for lack of merit.
91 PHIL 625PARAS; July 16, 1952
Labor Law 1
A2010 - 144 -
- Manila Terminal Co undertook arrastre service in Port Area,under control of US Army. It hired watchmen on 12 hr shifts.- Manila Terminal began post-war operation of arrastre serviceunder control of Bureau of Customs. The watchmen continuedin the service, with salary raise.A member of the Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual AidAssociation wrote to Dept of Labor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated, but nothing happened.- Members of the Association filed demand with Department of Labor, including overtime pay, but nothing happened.- Manila Terminal Company instituted system of strict 8 hrshifts.- The Association was organized for the first time, and anamended petition was filed with CIR praying that the petitionerbe ordered to pay its watchmen or police force overtime pay.- The petitioner’s police force was consolidated with the ManilaHarbor Police of the Customs Patrol Service, a govt agencyunder Commissioner of Customs and Secretary of Finance.- CIR, while dismissing other demands, ordered the petitioner topay its police force regular or base pay and overtimecompensation. With reference to overtime pay after thewatchmen had been integrated into the Manila Harbor Police,the judge ruled that court has no jurisdiction because it affectsthe Bureau of Customs.- In a separate opinion, Judge Lanting ruled:> decision should be affirmed in so far as it grantscompensation for overtime on regular days> as to compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays,petitioner should pay compensation that corresponds to theovertime at the regular rate only> watchmen are not entitled to night differential
WON overtime pay should be granted to the workers
 YES- Petitioner stressed that the contract between it and theAssociation stipulates 12 hrs a day at certain rates includingovertime, but the record does not bear out these allegations.- In times of acute employment, people go from office to officeto search for work, and the workers here found themselvesrequired to render 12 hrs a day. True, there was an agreement,but did the workers have freedom to bargain much less insist inthe observance of the Eight Hour Labor Law?- We note that after petitioner instituted 8 hr shifts, noreduction was made in salaries which its watchmen receivedunder the 12 hr agreement.- Petitioner’s allegation that the Association had acquiesced inthe 12 hr shifts for more than 18 mos is not accurate. Only oneof the members entered in September 1945. The rest followedduring the next few months.- The Association can’t be said to have impliedly waived theright to overtime pay, for the obvious reason that it could nothave expressly waived it.- Estoppel and laches can’t also be invoked against Association.First, it is contrary to spirit of the Eight Hour Labor Law.Second, law obligates employer to observe it. Third, employeeis at a disadvantage as to be reluctant in asserting any claim.- The argument that the nullity of the employment contractprecludes recovery by the Association of overtime pay isuntenable. The employer may not be heard to plead its ownneglect as exemption or defense.- Also, Commonwealth Act 444 expressly provides for paymentof extra compensation in cases where overtime services arerequired.- The point that payment of overtime pay may lead to ruin of the petitioner can’t be accepted. It is significant that not allwatchmen should receive back overtime pay for the wholeperiod, since the members entered the firm in different times.- The Eight-Hour Labor Law was designed not only to safeguardthe health and welfare of the laborer or employee, but in a wayto minimize unemployment by forcing employers, in caseswhere more than 8-hour operation is necessary, to utilizedifferent shifts of laborers or employees working only for eighthours each.
323 SCRA 258GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
 January 22, 1991 by way of a resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO it allowed the temporary holding of officeat Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan upon the recommendation of Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, then project supervisor, on the groundthat the office at Lezo was dangerous and unsafe.- Majority of the employees including the herein complainants,continued to report for work at Lezo, Aklan and were paid of their salaries. The complainants claimed that transfer of officefrom Lezo, Aklan to Kalibo, Aklan was illegal because it failed tocomply with the legal requirements under P.D. 269, thus thethey remained and continued to work at the Lezo Office untilthey were illegally locked out therefrom by the respondents.Despite the illegal lock out however, complainants continued toreport daily to the location of the Lezo Office, prepared tocontinue in the performance of their regularduties.Complainants who continuously reported for work atLezo, Aklan were not paid their salaries from June 1992 up toMarch 18, 1993.- LA dismissed the complaints- NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s decision and held thatprivate respondents are entitled to unpaid wages from June 16,1992 to March 18, 1993
- Petitioner claims
:> compensable service is best shown by timecards, payslipsand other similar documents and it was an error for publicrespondent to consider the computation of the claims for wagesand benefits submitted merely by private respondents assubstantial evidence.
WON private respondents are entitled to payment of wages forthe period of June 1992 up to March 18,1993 (what is theirproof)
NO- NLRC based its conclusion on the following: (a) the letter of Leyson, Office Manager of AKELCO addressed to AKELCO'sGeneral Manager, Atty. Mationg, requesting for the payment of private respondents' unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March18, 1993; (b) the memorandum of said Atty. Mationg in answerto the letter request of Leyson where he made an assurancethat he will recommend such request; (c) the privaterespondents' own computation of their unpaid wages.- We find that the foregoing does not constitute substantialevidence to support the conclusion that private respondents areentitled to the payment of wages from June 16, 1992 to March18, 1993.
- Substantial evidence is that amount of relevantevidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to justify a conclusion
. These evidences reliedupon by public respondent did not establish the fact that

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