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Editorial Board
Marie Gillespie – The Open University, UK
Noha Mellor – University of East London, UK
Gareth Stanton – Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
Basyouni Hamada – Cairo University, Egypt
Hamed Quisay – Zayed University, Dubai, UAE
Ahmed Ali Al-Mashaikhi – Sultan Kabus University, Oman
Mohammed Ayish – University of Sharjah, UAE
Soek-Fang Sim – Macalester College, USA
Ibrahim M. Saleh – American University in Cairo, Egypt
Mohammed Ibahrine – Al-Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco
Adel Jendli – Zayed University in Dubai, UAE
Orayb Najjar – Northern Illinois University, Illinois
Naila Nabil Hamdi – American University in Cairo, Egypt
Gregory Kent – Roehampton University, UK
Wail Ismail AbdelBari – University of Sharjah, UAE
Mohammad Sahid Ullah – Chittagong University, Bangladesh
Khaled Al-Hroub – Cambridge Arab Media Project, UK
Bala Muhammad – Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria
Amin Alhassan – York University, Canada
Contents
Editorial
Noureddine Miladi 5
Articles
Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN
and Al-Jazeera’s Middle East reporting
Leon Barkho 11
Book Reviews
New Media and the New Middle East, Philip Seib (ed.), (2007)
Olivia Allison 93
Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Editorial. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.5/2
Editorial
Noureddine Miladi
For several decades public opinion in the Arab and Islamic world has been
of strategic importance to the western powers due to its huge oil and gas
resources, in addition to other cultural and political interests. Arab audi-
ences have been at the receiving end of foreign Arabic-speaking radio
broadcasting such as Radio Monte-Carlo Arabic service, Radio France
Internationale, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America,
Radio Moscow and the German Deutsche Welle Radio. As recently as
1999, ‘Arabic [remained] second only to English as an international
broadcasting language’ (Boyd, 1999: 5). However, the phenomenal mush-
rooming of Arab independent satellite TV channels in the region and the
mass production of reasonably cheap satellite dishes and decoders have
transformed the relationship between Arab audiences and western media.
Suddenly state-owned television channels have also found themselves
grappling with very fierce competition in catering for viewers’ appetite for
more accurate and comprehensive news and information.
Given this reality, there has been a growing concern recently about
commercial/’independent’ Arab satellite TV, headed by the Al-Jazeera
channel, and its potential in mobilizing the public, and power in taking
audiences away from state broadcasters who are perceived as obstacles to
the free flow of information. One would have expected a radical change in
Arab state broadcasting because of the pressure from satellite TV, which is
winning ground day by day. Yet compared to the transformation taking
place in other developing countries, very little improvement in the freedom
of expression and objective reporting has taken place in Arab state broad-
casting. The main changes seen in state broadcasters’ practices have not
been to open up to opposing opinions, or to decrease their biased stance in
favour of ruling parties, but an intensification of their entertainment pro-
grammes in a multitude of genres. Most of such channels are still not
viewed as sites of public debates or sources of information about national
and global affairs, but sources of non-stop entertainment. Genres like con-
tinuous musical performances, sitcoms, soaps and game-shows remain
dominant in the schedule of most state television channels in the region.
Although Arab viewers have little input into the content of satellite TV,
many broadcasters have found it appropriate to maintain active links with
the transnational Arab community. The popularity of Direct Broadcasting
via Satellite (DBS) systems amongst diasporic communities, for instance,
in Europe has become a symbol of community self-assertion. Unlike
Internet services, which is still restricted to the affluent and educated
among these communities, satellite TV services have been more popular
and adopted by people from different strata of society. Such an opportunity
has provided Arab audiences with the ability to assess and criticize their
political leaders. This obvious impact of the non-stop news cycle is to push
politicians towards increasing their PR work and increasing their effi-
ciency in dealing with the media. For the first time, Arab governments
have found themselves engaged in an endless process of responses to satel-
lite TV and new media’s challenging messages.
Another important feature of this evolving media sphere has been the
growing sense of a pan-Arab solidarity; a rising transnational support to
various causes of concern in the Arab/Muslim world. Satellite TV has
brought the sufferings of Palestinian people, the war in Afghanistan, the
plight of people in Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sudan and the war on Iraq into
people’s homes. A common Arab understanding of these causes is being
shaped up thanks to the continuous investigative journalism, and 24-hour
rolling news programmes of pan-Arab satellite TV. Local and distant
events, like the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) have been transformed into
mass experiences lived by tens of millions of viewers around the world.
Images from war zones have penetrated people’s private spheres and linked
the local to the regional and international. In light of the slow communi-
cation process in the Arab world, only satellite TV has managed to build
such bridges between this pan-Arab sphere.
Although this constant emphasis on issues of concern to Arab audi-
ences does not normally generate immediate responses, it seems to have
left its marks on people’s frustrations and reactions as reflected in many
TV discussion programmes. Thanks to new technologies, the concept of
diaspora no longer means a small ghettoized migrant community in a for-
eign country. Diaspora has evolved into a supportive body to transnational
causes. Former homes do not mean the same anymore. Instead, the new
meaning of a home has come to signify a global pan-Arab community
connected through global communication means where diaspora commu-
nities contribute to the welfare of the ‘home-countries’.
Therefore, after decades of western domination on the global informa-
tion flow, the Arab region has become less reliant and trusting of what
comes from western media at least in term of news and current affairs
programmes. Al-Jazeera catapulted pan-Arab media into the international
spotlight. A challenge to the well-established western tradition of journal-
ism has been posed by Al-Jazeera and other Arab channels due to its dar-
ing reporting of wars and conflicts. Through their peculiar coverage of the
war in Afghanistan, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the invasion of
Iraq Arab media unquestionably took over the Arab street. For the first
time, western media have lost not only their credibility in the Arab world
but the fight for the Arab and Muslims hearts and minds. The increasing
interest in public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world from western
powers comes in this atmosphere of a changing world of information
flows. The launch of Arabic services funded by the governments of France,
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Germany and Russia
raises legitimate questions about the real intentions of such endeavours.
Another growing influence in the region is the Internet: a significant
escape from state censorship and a space of arguably uncensored inter-
connectivity, information exchange, resistance to mainstream media dis-
course and possible radicalization. Although access to the World Wide
6 Noureddine Miladi
JAMMR_1.1_01_edt_Miladi.qxd 12/18/07 3:30 PM Page 7
Web is still slow in the region, it has been making steady progress among
the middle class. Various governments in the region have attempted to pre-
vent this ‘liberating’ force from ‘plaguing’ the flow of information. In spite
of this, the fast development of information technologies has helped
Internet users to break codes and bypass restrictions imposed by their gov-
ernments. During the late 1990s, uninterrupted access to the World Wide
Web made it possible for the Arab public to access not only newspapers
and censored material from around the world, but also to bypass the ban,
on satellite dishes. This meant that people could watch satellite TV on
their laptops with the click of a mouse wherever they were. Bloggers are
also in the increase and have succeeded in reaching out to the outside
world with their stimulating accounts of news reporting.
In this changing world of communication flow, and exciting field of
academic research, the Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research offers a
distinctive international platform for discussion and research about the
evolving scene in communication, culture and society in the Arab and
Muslim world that has been under-researched for a long time. This journal
is open to debates, research reports and reviews about this fascinating
development that is not only spanning the Arab region but in indeed the
rest of the world. By the Muslim/Islamic world we here refer to majority
Muslim countries. Thus what distinguishes this new journal is its wider
scope related to media, communication and culture in not only the
Muslim majority countries in Africa and Asia, but the 23 Arab countries
spanning two continents, with a combined population of some 325 mil-
lion people and the Arabic language forming a unifying feature. Here it
looks beyond the ‘Middle East’ as a political construct.
Apart from this, this journal will also be interested in diasporic media
like television, radio and the Internet especially in Europe and North
America. It looks at the thriving diasporic communication spaces. It will
be interested to know who their audiences are, how influential those
media outlets can be, how they are consumed and what impact do they
have on their audiences’ sense of identity and belonging. It is also inter-
ested in studies about minority media in the Arab and majority Muslim
countries like religious media outlets owned by Christian groups and other
minority cultures as forms of resistance and identity formation.
Finally, two points can be offered as part of the raison d’être for this
journal: first is the contention that the Arab region is under-researched
partly due to the lack of resources and partly due to government censor-
ship. Social science research is very much controlled by official bodies, and
serves their agenda. Funding is very much restricted to projects commis-
sioned by those bodies. With varying degrees, academic institutions have
hardly the freedom their counterparts enjoy in other parts of the world.
Even with the proliferation of television satellite channels since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, audience research has been marked by various finan-
cial limitations, but most of all by the lack of freedom in social science
research in most of the Arab countries. Critical studies in the field, which
may affect the political debates or offer an analytical academic view that
questions the role of the media in society, are not normally encouraged.
Arab satellite channels, I would argue, as well as the well-established
international broadcasters, such as the BBC, know little about their Arab
Editorial 7
JAMMR_1.1_01_edt_Miladi.qxd 12/18/07 3:30 PM Page 8
viewers in the Arab and Muslim world. The interesting reality is that,
overall, the television industry knows very little about its viewers.
Something described by Lewis (1991: 21) as doomed to face the unknown:
Once it has passed out of the hands of the programme makers and onto the
screen, television passes into the world of the unknown. Programme makers
are the modern cultural equivalent of Dr Frankenstein: they have created a
monster that, once unleashed into the outside world, they can no longer
control or comprehend.
References
Ayish, Mohammad (2001), ‘Changing Face of Arab Communications’, in Hafez
Kai (ed.), Mass Media, Politics and Society in the Middle East, Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
—— (2003), ‘Beyond Western Oriented Communication Theories: A Normative
Arab-Islamic Perspective’, in The Public, 10: 2, pp. 79–92.
Boyd, Douglas (1999), Broadcasting in the Arab World, Ames: Iowa State University
Press.
8 Noureddine Miladi
JAMMR_1.1_01_edt_Miladi.qxd 12/18/07 3:30 PM Page 9
Suggested citation
Miladi, N. (2007), ‘Editorial’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 5–9,
doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.5/2
Contributor details
Noureddine Miladi obtained an MA and Ph.D. in Communication from the
University of Westminster (UK) where he taught journalism and mass communi-
cation. His research interests are about Arab and diasporic media, satellite TV and
the construction of public opinion, media and war coverage, and new media and
social change. He is currently Lecturer in Media Studies and Sociology at the
University of Northampton (UK), founder of the Centre for Arab and Muslim Media
Research (http://www.cammro.com), and associate editor of the Journal of African
Media Studies. His works have been published in various journals and books: War
and the Media (edited by Daya Thussu and Des Freedman), Contemporary World
Television, (edited by John Sinclair), Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and
Question de Communication (in French).
He has appeared on various television and radio current-affairs programmes in
the United Kingdom and beyond. To name a few: BBC World Service, Al-Jazeera,
Sky News, Islam Channel, ChannelS, Al-Majd, Al-Hewar TV, CNN and CNBC
Arabia.
Editorial 9
JAMMR_1.1_01_edt_Miladi.qxd 12/19/07 7:46 PM Page 10
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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.11/1
Abstract Keywords
To understand the language of journalism in relation to the moments of why and BBC
how news is differently structured and patterned, English online stories tackling CNN
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, issued by the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera, were Al-Jazeera
critically analysed following Fowler and Fairclough’s seminal texts. The results of Palestine
the findings were discussed in interviews with the editors of the three interna- Israel
tional networks in order to see what links these linguistic features have with the critical discourse
interviewees’ social assumptions, ideologies and economic conditions. The article analysis
finds first that the discourse within the news pyramid is composed of four major online news
layers: quoting, paraphrasing, background and comment. Second, it demonstrates that
there are marked differences in the discourse structures and layers that the three
networks employ in the production of the news stories they issue in English.
Third, Al-Jazeera English exhibits marked differences in the discursive features
and their social implications at the four layers of discourse to report the conflict
when compared with both the BBC and CNN. Fourth, the article shows that the
differences in linguistic patterns largely reflect and respond to each network’s
social and political assumptions and practices as well as economic conditions.
Introduction
In this article I mainly follow Fowler and Fairclough (Fairclough 1989,
1995, 1998; Fowler 1985, 1991; Fowler et al. 1979) to uncover whether
online hard news stories from the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera reveal what
journalists and their institutions call ‘impartiality and even-handedness’,
which from a journalistic code of ethics must be represented in the bal-
anced selection of structures like quotes, paraphrases, background infor-
mation, comment, choice of lexical items and grammatical structures,
among others. Journalists are supposed to have at their disposal the means
and devices that enable them to provide a balanced and factual account of
events through an even-handed representation of the sides to the dispute.
Why is it then that their selection is usually framed in a manner that legit-
imates the actions and deeds of one side at the expense of the other?
Using Halliday’s (1970, 1971, 1973) systemic and functional linguistics
as a guideline, pioneer critical linguists have shown how the presence or
absence of certain grammatical structures can be indicative of authority,
power and status (cf. Kress 1994; Kress and Hodge 1979; Bell 1991; Van Dijk
1988). The influence of Halliday is not confined to the functions of lexical or
‘Discourse’ is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values
and categories which it embodies; these beliefs (etc.) constitute a way of look-
ing at the world or organization or representation of experience – ‘ideology’ in
the neutral, no-operative sense.
(cited in Hawthorn 1992: 48)
12 Leon Barkho
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To shed some light on the business, and social dimensions of the discourse
practices of the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera, the author conducted in-depth
interviews with their editors and executives (see Appendix A). Some of the
interviewees were directly involved in the online news production of their
networks.
Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s… 13
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Analysis
This study concentrates only on the English online news discourse of the
BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera as the inclusion of other digital dimensions
would have made it excessively long and complicated its methodological
approach. The source of discourse chosen for analysis is the hard political
news type in which the reporters of the 30 online stories – 10 from each
network (see Appendix B) – selected for analysis mainly rely on sources
from the two protagonists to turn the material they gather into a news
report. All the stories report heavy Palestinian casualties from Israeli
incursions into the Gaza Strip in the period following the capture of
Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006. The stories share the tra-
ditional inverted pyramid structure of news in which they start with
what journalists believe to be the most important (the headline and the
lead) and move on to back it up through satellite paragraphs. This entails
a patterned movement from the headline and lead paragraphs, through
episodes or statements by witnesses or commentators ranked in an
implicit order of priority (Van Dijk 1988).
The transformation of the material by the reporters into news dis-
course is carried out in four major ways or layers: (1) quoting, (2) para-
phrasing, (3) background and (4) comment. Of the four layers of hard
news discourse, journalists generally try to avoid adding ‘comment’ as far
as possible in a bid to show independence and impartiality. They ostensibly
refrain from expressing their opinion or attitude vis-à-vis the ongoing
struggle between the two protagonists. Opinions and attitudes are usually
expressed in opinion, leader or comment articles.
The analysis dwells on the four layers within the inverted pyramid
structure, their intertextual relations and the way they relate to the social
context beyond the pyramid’s parameters. The structures, whether gram-
matical, lexical or intertextual, will fail to provide proper understanding if
they are analysed in isolation from their social world. One way to analyse
the four layers is to examine what Fairclough (1995) calls the target dis-
course, a term he employs to see how media consume the discourse of
their sources.
How do the three networks exploit the four layers of discourse that are
normally available for reporters transforming material into hard political
news within the inverted pyramid framework? What social implications
can be discerned from their discursive patterns and structures? The
following sections examine the three networks separately, pointing out
how the three broadcasters divide their content along the four discourse
layers. The sections seek to find out the kind of language structures these
layers include and the social functions they perform.
The BBC
The BBC relies heavily on paraphrasing and background (see Table 1). Of
the 195 paragraphs in the ten stories selected for analysis (see Appendix B),
142 are paraphrases and 32 background information. There are only 12
quotations. There are 9 paragraphs that provide comment or opinion and
are framed in a way that legitimates the Israeli attacks as they transform
the official Israeli discourse into news:
14 Leon Barkho
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(1) The attacks come at a time of extraordinary tension in Gaza with Israeli
troops mounting a two-week offensive following the capture of Corporal
Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants during a raid on an Israeli border post
on 25 June.
(2) The massive Israeli operation is aimed at releasing a captured soldier
and halting Palestinian attacks.
The two samples above are not the only indication of how the BBC article
reveals a trend of what Hall et al. (1978: 61) describe as a general tendency
in media of transforming ‘official viewpoint into public idiom’ as part of
the attempt of making official discourse more palatable to the public at
large. But shifting the official stance into public parlance is done to benefit
one side of the story (the Israelis). The Israeli attacks and often massive
military operations are in response to what the BBC normally describes as
militants, activists or Islamists. These expressions, which abound in BBC
discourse, are not inserted between inverted commas, indicating that the
BBC’s discursive patterns are closer to Israel’s official viewpoint and its
interpretation of events:
(1a) The raids come amid Israeli efforts to release a soldier captured by
Palestinian militants last month.
(2a) Israeli forces have made regular incursions into Gaza and the West
Bank following the capture of an Israeli soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, in a
cross-border raid by Palestinian militants on 25 June.
Paragraphs (1) and (2), and (1a) and (2a) legitimate not only the reported
offensive but also previous attacks. Note the use of the simple present tense in
(1) and (1a) which is normally reserved to what Quirk et al. (1985) call habit-
ual actions and truths and note how what originally looks like a paraphrase
particularly in (2) and (2a) has been transformed into a statement of truth
with the verbs ‘is aimed’ and ‘have made’ indicating how the writer intrudes
into the event via what amounts to an evaluative comment by almost sanc-
tioning the Israeli operation. Had the writer opted for a paraphrase of (2), for
example, he or she might have mitigated the strong message the paragraph
delivers to suppress or eliminate one side of the conflict at the expense of the
other by revealing the agent or source and using a reporting verb:
(3) The Israelis say the massive operation is aimed at releasing a captured
soldier and halting Palestinian attacks. (Author’s rewrite of (2))
Nowhere does the BBC provide an unattributed context to the Pales-
tinians in order to explain why they resort to violence. Whenever there is
pro-Palestinian context, the source providing it is mentioned plus a
reporting verb:
(3a) For their part, groups like Hamas say that their attacks are a response
to Israeli military actions – not just attacks in Gaza – but raids, arrests and
killings in the occupied West Bank as well.
Transforming (3a) from a paraphrase to a comment, by removing the
source and reporting verb, will clearly illustrate how loaded (1, 1a and 2)
are in their bid to turn the official Israeli discourse into statement of truth.
Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s… 15
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16 Leon Barkho
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and injured) are given the subject or agent position in the passive sen-
tence while the participants performing the action (Israelis) are part of
the circumstance in the discourse. The reversal of the role of the partici-
pants in discourse is even clearer in the headline (6). The use of the
noun combination Gaza air strike as the agent participant hides those
launching the strike and the use of the politically loaded lexical item
militant without inverted commas ‘naturalizes’ the ideology of the agent
participant.
There are few quotations in BBC stories (see Table 1) to support leads
and in the story carrying the headline in (6) there is only one paraphrase
in the 21-paragraph story to back it up:
(8) According to Palestinian medical sources, the six dead included two
women and two children.
The paucity of full quotations is matched with the preponderance of par-
tial quotes, but many of these lack balance as they are inserted to support
one side:
(9) However, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has ruled out any
negotiations with the Hamas-led Palestinian government, calling the mili-
tant group a ‘terrorist bloody organization’.
There is no single word in double inverted commas from the Palestinian
side to counterbalance Olmert’s partial quote in the story. The BBC
rewrites the same story fourteen hours later. The update carries a different
headline and a different lead:
(10) Deaths mount in attacks on Gaza (headline of update)
(11) An Israeli air strike on the Gaza City home of a member of the
Palestinian militant group Hamas has killed nine members of the same
family. (Lead of update)
The headline leaves the identity of the agent participant unknown and the
only reference to the agent is ‘circumstantial’ wrapped in two preposi-
tional phrases in attacks on Gaza. The lead has a 17-word noun phrase all
belonging to the agent participant which though clearly identified An Israeli
air strike the head noun air strike is modified (tempered) by three preposi-
tional phrases and one of them includes an over-lexicalization where the
affected participant the Palestinian militant group Hamas is classified negatively
as a group with militant or aggressive ideology.
Unlike CNN and other commercial networks, British licence-fee payers
in effect subsidize the online service even for people outside Britain. Only
very recently (BBC 2007a) has the BBC moved to slightly commercialize
the service for users outside Britain with short commercials attached
to some video items. So the service is still not under intense competitive
conditions to maximize advertising revenues. Therefore, it may not
be appropriate to attribute the discourse characteristics to purely eco-
nomic conditions for the way the BBC covers the conflict. The discursive
features outlined above show that as far as the broadcaster is concerned
the Israelis and Palestinians cannot be treated equally due to the dispar-
ity in their social, economic, political, military and media conditions
Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera’s… 17
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CNN
The ten CNN stories (see appendix B) are composed of 215 paragraphs of
which 150 indirectly report sources and 33 are direct quotations. The
short paragraphs and sentences and the frequent use of paraphrasing and
quoting give CNN discourse some affinity with conversational language
whose ideological function, according to Fowler (1991: 57), ‘naturalizes
the terms in which reality is represented’. The remaining 32 paragraphs
provide background or comment, which is designed in a way to legitimate
the Israeli actions and show that the Palestinians are to blame (see Table 1).
There is nothing at the background or comment layers of discourse that
attempts to explain the context of violence on the Palestinian side, while
Israeli violent actions are amply clarified and more or less justified:
(12) The attack comes in the midst of increased Israeli strikes designed to
suppress rocket launches from Gaza.
(12a) The military campaign is aimed at securing Cpl. Gilad Shalit’s release
and ending Palestinian attacks against Israel.
(13) The popular Resistance Committees and Hamas are designated terrorist
organizations by the United States, the European Union and Israel.
(14) Islamic Jihad is also considered a terrorist group by the United States.
Paragraphs (12) and (12a) are a good example of how the broadcaster
transforms Tel Aviv’s official discourse into matter of fact through the
use of the simple present tense and the absence of attribution. The cir-
cumstance of the attack represented in the immediately following prepo-
sitional phrase and the reduced wh-clause in the passive in (12) is
designed to give a positive context to the Israeli actions while the
Palestinian actions are denied such treatment. (12) and (12a) transform
the official Israeli discourse in (15) into CNN discourse by transferring
the past tense came into a habit that looks ‘timeless’ through the use of
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the present tense comes and the present passive form is aimed as well as
the removal of attribution:
(15) The attack came hours after Palestinian militants launched four rock-
ets from northern Gaza on Wednesday morning and hit the Israeli town of
Sderot, killing one woman and wounding a man, Israeli police and medical
sources said.
The absence of agent participant or attribution in the reduced clauses
Israeli strikes designed to and is aimed at in (12) and (12a) shows that the
writer or the network shares the Israeli viewpoint of why the strikes are
launched. The reduced clauses modify and qualify the main noun phrases
Israeli strikes in (12) and The military campaign in (12a). Note the difference
in meaning in (16) and (17) when the subject or agent participant (source)
as well as the reporting verb is introduced by adding the emphasized bits to
(12) and (12a):
(16) The attack comes in the midst of increased Israeli strikes which Israel
says are designed to suppress rocket launches from Gaza. (Author’s rewrite
of (12))
(17) The military campaign, Israel says, is aimed at securing Cpl. Gilad
Shalit’s release and ending Palestinian attacks against Israel. (Author’s
rewrite of (12a))
Paragraphs (13) and (14) bring the affected participants to the initial or sub-
ject position of the sentence pushing the agent participants into the circum-
stance part. The transformation highlights that these groups fall under the
category of ‘terrorists’ and that is the most important part the reader must
know and the fact that they are only called so by certain countries is rather
irrelevant. Bringing the agent participants to the beginning and introducing
a reporting verb (e.g. ‘say’) and placing ‘terrorists’ inside inverted commas
would drastically shift the focus of (13) and (14) as in (18) and (19):
(18) The United States, the European Union and Israel say the popular
Resistance Committees and Hamas are ‘terrorist’ organizations. (Author’s
rewrite of (13))
(19) The United States says Islamic Jihad is also a ‘terrorist’ group.
(Author’s rewrite of (14))
CNN pursues a distinctive discursive policy with regard to headlines. Attributed
headlines are a characteristic of CNN headline discourse but without single or
double inverted commas (20a and 20c). The headline may be followed by a
smaller print size, but usually longer, secondary headline that gives a bit more
information (20d). But (20) and (20a) at least put the Israeli strikes into what
can be described as a ‘rational’ context by clearly expressing the cause that
prompted Israel to launch them. The adjective deadly used twice in the same
story to describe the launch of rockets by Palestinians and the loaded word
terrorist in fact legitimate the Israeli action while the context prompting the
Palestinians to fire crude missiles is not mentioned rendering their actions
‘irrational’. In (20b) the victims or objects of attack occupy the initial or the-
matic position in the headline while the perpetrators or agents are the
circumstance of the prepositional phrase by Israeli sniper fire.
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(20) Israeli air strikes follow deadly rocket launch from Gaza (headline)
(20a) Israel: Palestinian terrorist target hit in Gaza (headline)
(20b) Palestinian girl, 12, killed by Israeli sniper fire (headline)
(20c) Palestinians: Israelis kill 19 in Gaza (headline)
(20d) Israel hits Gaza with new strikes (headline)
At least 8 Palestinians dead, 16 wounded in Gaza attacks (secondary
headline)
While CNN deploys lexical items that make Palestinian actions rather
unacceptable, e.g. deadly in (20) and (22) and terrorist in (20a), Israeli
actions are not described negatively. For example, the killing of 18
Palestinians – mainly women and children (21) has no adjective to modify the
noun phrase a barrage of artillery fire but the Israeli interpretation or context
immediately follows Israel blamed the misfire on a ‘technical failure’ with the
word misfire not placed between inverted commas indicating that CNN
goes with the Israeli viewpoint. The only discursive layer available for the
Palestinians to have their say is quoting as in (21a):
(21) Israel was hit with a global backlash of harsh statements last week
after a barrage of artillery fire into the northern Gaza town of Beit Hanoun
resulted in the death of 18 Palestinians – mainly women and children.
Israel blamed the misfire on a ‘technical failure’.
(21a) ‘The occupation hasn’t stopped attacking Palestinians before or after
Beit Hanoun, so we say resistance is a right of Palestinians,’ Hamas
spokesman Fawzi Barhoum told The Associated Press.
(22) Israel earlier condemned the deadly Wednesday morning rocket strike
on Sderot.
Of course there are more samples in the CNN pieces that attempt to legiti-
mate Israel’s official discourse. Besides reporting that the United States and
Israel view these Palestinian groups as terrorists, the discourse at the four
layers of writing describes the Palestinians as militants and occasionally as
terrorists. Appellations like these give the impression that Palestinians in
general are ‘aggressive’. CNN’s lexis is almost an echo of Israeli official
discourse. Throughout Corporal Gilad Shalit is described as an abducted or
kidnapped soldier and the Israeli army is given the official Israeli designation
Israel Defense Forces or IDF.
CNN’s discursive strategy, according to Caroline Faraj, Editor-in-Chief,
CNN online, is not to describe people, but events and then leave it to the
audiences to attach the label they want to the participants in the story. ‘This
is not a place for us to put our own ideas or observations,’ she says. She sees
little difference in the social assumptions of a headline or lead in which the
agent is hidden or is part of the circumstance or clearly identified in its
‘normal’ subject position. Kevin Flower, CNN Bureau Chief, Jerusalem,
believes the global reach of CNN makes it necessary to use terms that are
‘understandable’ to its English-speaking audiences particularly in America
and is aware that many English words coined to express sensitive Arabic
terminology are inaccurate. Both agree that it is extremely difficult to
balance a story internally with regard to the four layers of discourse.
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Al-Jazeera
The ten Al-Jazeera pieces (see appendix B) designated for analysis include
157 paragraphs of which 112 are paraphrases and 17 direct quotations (see
Table 1). There are 28 paragraphs that provide context in the form of back-
ground and comment which, as we shall see, tilt towards the Palestinian side
of the conflict. One major linguistic feature of Al-Jazeera’s paraphrasing and
background layers of discourse is the active voice in which the Israelis by
name or otherwise are normally specified as the agent participants:
(23) Israeli tanks have killed at least 18 Palestinians in Gaza, including
sleeping women and children …
(24) … tank shells struck and demolished at least four houses in the attack.
(25) Israeli troops shot dead four armed Palestinians and a civilian early on
Wednesday …
(26) Soldiers killed eight Palestinians in separate incidents in Gaza on
Tuesday.
The affected participants occupy their object position in the above para-
graphs while in the BBC and CNN stories they normally are given the sub-
ject position with the agent participant either removed or part of the
circumstance. Seldom is there an attempt by Al-Jazeera to hide the agency
in the headline (27, 27a, 27b). Unlike the BBC headlines (6 and 10), the
perpetrators of the act and the victims are clearly identified. Palestinian vic-
tims are positively modified by an adjective sleeping in (27) and the Israeli
act negatively modified by deadly in (27b), the adjective CNN (20 and 22)
uses twice to negatively describe a Palestinian act:
(27) Israeli tank fire kills sleeping families
(27a) Israel kills women at mosque
(27b) Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks
Al-Jazeera paraphrasing and quoting, mainly citing Palestinian eyewitnesses
and officials, make the discourse the closest to conversation among the three
networks. One striking feature of Al-Jazeera’s quotations is their immediacy,
urgency and personalization. First pronoun, whether singular and plural,
with their subject and object forms, dominate these quotations:
(28) ‘We saw legs, we saw heads, we saw hands scattered …’
(29) ‘I saw people coming out […] I started screaming.’
(30) ‘We are going to fight …’
(31) ‘We are going to launch our rockets, our martyrs are going to sacrifice
their life …’
The quotations are most probably aimed at Arabs, Muslims or Palestinian
sympathizers who are well versed in English. That is at least what one can
surmise from their inter-personalization; the quotations speak directly to
readers in an obvious bid to rally their support and sympathy.
There are fewer background paragraphs in Al-Jazeera than in the BBC
and CNN (see Table 1). The broadcaster puts the violence on the part of
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Palestinians into context (33a and 33b), though it also tries not to over-
look the Israeli interpretation of events (33c). The discursive feature of
these background paragraphs, some of which border on comment, is the
presence of source and reporting verb which the BBC and CNN overlook in
their discursive practice:
(32) Israeli troops completed their largest military operation in Gaza in a
year on Tuesday after killing 60 fighters and civilians in a week-long incur-
sion in the Beit Hanoun area that Israel said was designed to stop rocket
attacks on Israeli cities.
(33) Israel had pulled its forces out of Gaza last year after a 38-year occu-
pation, however it has repeatedly raided the territory since one of its sol-
diers was captured there in June.
(33a) Palestinian fighters say the launching of missiles into Israel is a
response to continued Israeli army assaults against Palestinians in the
occupied territories.
(33b) Israel has bombed metal workshops in the past, alleging that they
produce rockets fired at Israel.
(33c) The assault is one of the biggest since Israel launched an offensive in
Gaza to try to force the release of the captured soldier and halt the rocket fire.
Al-Jazeera’s quotations and paraphrases shift the official Palestinian dis-
course into public language while, as we have seen, the BBC and CNN
attempt the opposite. Compare, for example, the wh-clause in (32), which
Al-Jazeera employs to identify the subject and reporting verb and distance
itself from the official Israeli parlance, with (2) and (12) where the wh-
clause is reduced to omit the subject and the reporting verb, transforming
the discourse from background into comment or opinion.
Al-Jazeera’s lexis likewise toes the Palestinian line by avoiding attempts
by the BBC and CNN to over-lexicalize and recontextualize the Palestinian
context. Words like militant, activist and terrorist do not surface in describ-
ing Palestinian groups and their members or those who are killed or
injured in the conflict with Israel. They are described as fighters or simply
armed Palestinians and civilians.
But it is worth noting that Al-Jazeera’s English online service refrains
from using ‘emotional’ words like ‘martyr’ and its derivatives for the
Palestinians who fall in fighting Israel at the three discourse layers of para-
phrasing, background and comment. Here, Al-Jazeera departs from its
reporting in Arabic where vocabulary with emotive and historical context
is employed widely (Barkho 2006). However, such words still surface in
Al-Jazeera quotations, which of course even the BBC and CNN cannot
avoid if they opted to cite:
(34) ‘Our martyrs are going to sacrifice their lives …’
(35) ‘All of us are martyrs in waiting.’
The choice of vocabulary and other language structures in Al-Jazeera ‘nat-
uralizes’ the Palestinian side by bringing it to what the network sees as the
horizon within which the understanding of the target discourse occurs.
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Social implications
The presence of what is ostensibly viewed as background information partic-
ularly in BBC and CNN stories gives way to pass evaluative comments by
publicly embracing one side of the conflict and vilifying the other. The BBC
and to a larger extent CNN ‘enshrine’ Israeli actions as rational and legiti-
mate through the use of ‘presumptuous’ words, phrases and grammatical
structures, leaving those of its adversaries (the Palestinians) to be viewed as
irrational. In Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s words (1999) the two networks
recontextualize the context of the conflict particularly through what Fowler
(1991) calls over-lexicalizations that depict actions of Israel’s foes as negative
or discouraging. Al-Jazeera strives to rid itself of what it sees as the hege-
monic ‘Anglo-Saxon’ discourse that normally equates anti-Western and anti-
Israeli groups and states with ‘terrorism, militancy or extremism’. It strives
to distance itself from the discursive practices and patterns prevalent in the
BBC and CNN. Critical studies attempt to help us understand media texts by
relating their linguistic characteristics, among others, to their social
assumptions in a logical way. But this logic remains ‘intersubjective’ due to
the different ways societies view each other. Here are two examples:
A1. The results of democratic elections must be respected
A2. Kadima won the elections in Israel
A3. Therefore, a Kadima-formed government must be respected
B1. The results of democratic elections must be respected
B2. Hamas won the elections in Palestine
B3. Therefore, a Hamas-formed government must be respected
On a purely formal linguistic level both propositions are equal. Even on a
generative connotative level there should be no differences between them.
But the social assumptions and the social practices they generate are con-
troversial, divergent and conflicting. The three networks construct a bifur-
cation of the conflict in which one side is represented as malign and the
other as benign. Examples of malignant discourse are evident in the
recontextualization and over-lexicalization dominant in the BBC and CNN
stories when representing the Palestinians and to a lesser degree in Al-Jazeera
when representing the Israelis. Examples of benign discourse are evident
in the BBC and CNN stories when representing the Israelis and Al-Jazeera
when representing the Palestinians. In the discursive patterns that the
BBC and CNN follow the first proposition is sound and the second
unsound. In Al-Jazeera’s discursive patterns both are sound.
Future research
There has been little written about Halliday’s textual metafunction of lan-
guage, especially in relation to journalism. Regarding the hard news
discourse, the four layers specified and analysed in this article still remain
an area that needs much greater attention. Each layer of the hard news
discourse deserves a special study in order to unpack it critically and see
whether its discursive practices reflect the reporters’ and editors’ social
environment or – as BBC’s Richard Porter argues – whether it is practical in
24 Leon Barkho
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Table 1: The frequency of the four layers of hard news discourse in the BBC,
CNN and Al-Jazeera.
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References
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Who Does Journalism Right’, American Communication Journal, 8: 1 (Fall).
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Bell, A. (1991), The Language of the News Media, Oxford: Blackwell.
Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999), Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking
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Crisis, London: Macmillan.
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Appendix A
The following list gives names and titles of the editors and executives that the
author interviewed as well as the dates and locations of these interviews.
1. Russell Merryman, Editor-in-Chief, Web and New Media (Al-Jazeera English,
Doha, June 2006)
2. Gaven Morris, Head of Planning (Al-Jazeera English, Doha, June 2006)
3. Mostefa Souag, Director, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies (Doha, 2006)
4. Caroline Faraj, Editor-in-Chief (CNN online, telephone interview, June 2006)
5. Kevin Flower, CNN Bureau Chief (Jerusalem, telephone interview, June 2006)
6. Jerry Timmins, BBC Head of Region, Africa and Middle East (London, May
2006)
7. Adam Curtis, BBC World Editor, News Interactive (London, May 2006)
8. Richard Porter, Head of News, BBC World Service (London, May 2006, plus
e-mail exchange)
Appendix B
The following are the Internet links to the articles used in the analysis. They were
all last accessed in September 2007.
BBC
1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5171148.stm
Now available at: http://www.venice-hotels-apartments.com/
article-213713-en.html
2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5171148.stm
3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6115830.stm
4. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6176156.stm
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5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6127250.stm
6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5247566.stm
7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5240746.stm
8. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5215608.stm
9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5209964.stm
10. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5153036.stm
CNN
1. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/15/mideast.rockets/index.html
2. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/03/israel.soldier/index.html
3. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/04/mideast/index.html
4. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/11/mideast/index.html
5. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/08/israel.gaza/index.html
6. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/03/mideast.violence/index.html
7. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/01/mideast.violence/
index.html?eref=edition world
8. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/10/23/gaza.violence/index.html
9. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/10/14/mideast/index.html
10. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/21/israel.gaza/index.html
Al-Jazeera
1. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24604
2. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/94D08027-0F99-46BD-B2EF-
44192178479E.htm
3. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27CE1930-8A37-4F11-B3B1-
6B19A4BB0AE7.htm
4. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38344
5. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38002
6. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38367
7. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C3769CC6-833A-4F9C-A5DB-
67B680119F4D.htm
8. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24420
9. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=35512
10. http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=38344
Suggested citation
Barkho, L. (2007), ‘Unpacking the discursive and social links in BBC, CNN and
Al-Jazeera’s Middle East reporting’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1,
pp. 11–29, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.11/1
Contributor details
Leon Barkho taught English and translation at Iraq’s Mosul University, before leav-
ing for Reuters News Agency in 1991. He also spent three years covering for the
Associated Press. His reports as a journalist appeared in major world newspapers.
Since 2001, he has been working at Sweden’s Jönköping University. As an acade-
mic he has written several papers on both linguistics and translation. His most
recent publications include Nordic Television at the Turn of the Century: An Overview
28 Leon Barkho
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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.31/1
Abstract Keywords
This article examines the way in which the popular American television series West Wing
The West Wing represents the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the way in which Arabs
Middle Eastern audiences responded to that depiction. This fictional and highly Islam
idealized portrayal of the American presidency has frequently used ‘real’ story- Middle East
lines that reflect contemporary political discourse to its primary domestic audi- orientalism
ence. However, the programme is also shown outside the United States where its Abu Dhabi
storylines – and the time of broadcast – may give an episode an entirely different Palestinians
meaning. This article looks at audience responses to the episode ‘Isaac and
Ishmael’ and the story arc that begins at the end of Season 5 and continues at the
beginning of Season 6. This centres on an attempt to settle the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict. Placing The West Wing within a broad political and historical frame-
work, the article uses the idea of American exceptionalism as the basis from
which to argue that The West Wing presents ‘real’ as well as idealized American
political stances and in that sense has to be read, in certain contexts, as contribut-
ing to audience perceptions of the ‘real’ world. The article questions whether the
asynchronous transmissions of the programme in the domestic US and Middle
Eastern markets contribute to this perception. Using the responses of audiences of
varying ages, education levels and origins, the article concludes that although it
sometimes portrays Arabs negatively, it is usually well intentioned and makes
genuine, if occasionally clumsy, attempts to portray Arabs in a favourable light.
While episodes of The West Wing are the article’s main source, I have also
drawn heavily on academic and non-academic articles to provide background to
mainstream audience reaction and some of the issues – religious, political and
historical – addressed by the series.
1. Of more recent films, This examination of audience reaction began more or less as an acci-
students who had
seen it were very
dent with the screening of the ‘9/11 special’ ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. The
positive about Syriana, depth of student reaction to that episode prompted me to screen it to a dif-
which was partly shot ferent audience and then to seek an audience reaction to the story arc
in Dubai.
centring on Israel and Palestine. When re-screening ‘Isaac and Ishmael’
.
2. Shaheen’s stereotypi- and the Palestinian episodes I let the audience view the programmes on
cal Arab is a
fabulously wealthy,
their own and then sought detailed, written reactions, from which I have
sex mad barbarian quoted.
with a penchant for The West Wing was originally available to Abu Dhabi audiences via the
terrorism.
satellite channel America Plus on the Saudi-owned Orbit platform. The
3. This has actually programme was shown with Arabic subtitles and appeared to be run
happened in some intact, although one episode critical of Saudi Arabia appeared to have
unexpected places.
Alexander Siddiq been censored when shown. The West Wing was subsequently repeated on
played ‘Dr Bashir’ Dubai One and each season was rapidly made available on video or DVD.
the station doctor Anecdotal evidence, largely gathered through surveys of student media
on Star Trek: Deep
Space Nine. Siddiq usage by communication students at Zayed University, indicates that many
later appeared in female students watch little English-language drama on television, dislike
Syriana, an extremely subtitles and in any case have their viewing choices severely controlled
sympathetic portrayal
of the complexities by male relatives. Discussions of representations of Arabs by the western
of politics and oil in media are one of the staples of communications classes, although these
the Gulf. tend to focus on the cinema. That western media will portray Arabs nega-
tively seems to be taken as a given, although some students praised older
films like Lawrence of Arabia and Lion of the Desert/Omar Mukhtar.1
Although the hypothesis is untested, it may be that many students are
actually far more familiar with western cinema than television, preferring
to watch Arabic television.
Shaheen’s pioneering work on the representation of Arabs on American
television (Shaheen 1984: 4–54) is nearly a quarter of a century old, but
his thesis that Arabs and other minorities are generally portrayed imper-
fectly still holds.2 Arabs have continued to hold attention as television
villains, especially at times of crisis. According to Gladstone-Sovell and
Wilkerson (2002) 40 per cent of dramas aired during the 2001–02 televi-
sion season in the United States referred to the attacks on New York in
their storylines.
At the end of The TV Arabs, Shaheen (1984: 126–34) suggests that
with good will and understanding, it would be possible to produce more
accurate and sympathetic images of Arabs on television.3 The West Wing’s
portrayals of Arabs are not always positive, but they are not restricted to
the hostile stereotypes listed by Shaheen. In fact, as I discuss later, the pro-
gramme attempted to give a balanced, even positive portrayal in certain
episodes. As we shall see, however, there are several questions about the
ability of non-American domestic audiences to perceive this.
The West Wing is a linear descendant of Frank Capra’s films about the
perfectibility of the American political system by the good will and under-
standing of decent men and women. In such a world anybody should be
capable of redemption, but The West Wing also attempts to portray reality
and so not everybody can be saved. On the one hand, The West Wing is, in
the words of The Economist, ‘essentially a fairy story about a benign ruler’
(The Economist 2002a). Others have ascribed its appeal to its reinforcement
of faith in the American political system:
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it seems clear that the fundamental attraction of The West Wing for
Americans is its promise that, despite our failings and lapses, our system is
still [...] a lighthouse. Such an appeal to our better selves is both refreshing
and chastening.
(Rollins and O’Connor 2003: 13)
And yet it is debatable whether The West Wing really is such a liberal fan-
tasy. The fictional President Bartlett’s behaviour is in fact closer to the
realities of twenty-first-century global politics. Writing in her monumental
study of the Versailles Conference, Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan
depicts the United States as a country that has always believed that it is
exceptional. She goes on to argue that such a fervent belief in its own sys-
tem has led to an equally fervent belief in its special place in the world.
This, she says, has its dangers:
American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the one eager to set the
world to rights; the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message
should be ignored. Faith in their own exceptionalism has sometimes led to a
certain obtuseness on the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other
nations rather than listen to them, a tendency to assume that American
motives are pure where those of others are not.
(MacMillan 2002: 22)
4. Andrew Stuttaford Each country has its own myths and powerful nations seek to present
(2003) begins a
profile of actor Martin
those myths to the world through culture or other projections of power.
Sheen, who plays the The West Wing is clearly a cultural product designed to reinforce and
fictional president, bolster the myth of the supremacy and superiority of the American
with ‘If there is
anyone more
political establishment. To a non-American audience, the first and
sanctimonious than major contradiction is that Bartlett is presented as ‘liberal’, an
the West Wing’s Jed American code word for left wing. He certainly seems to be accepted as
Bartlett.’
such by right-wing commentators in the United States (Leo 2002;
5. Fred McKissack Stuttaford 2003).4 By the standards of much of the rest of the world,
(2000) presents a
dissenting view from
however, he is nothing of the sort (McKissack 2000).5 He is a pro-
the American left: capitalist and considers that free enterprise is the best solution to every
‘Let’s drop the problem. The series’ creator, Aaron Sorkin, clearly conceived Jeb Bartlett
pretence that this is
somehow a pro-lefty,
as a liberal character and compared to George Bush Jnr, he is. If this
commie-lovin’ represents a state of ideological false consciousness on the part of
roll-a-doobie.’ Sorkin, the writers who replaced him and, one must presume, many
viewers, then we must accept it, at least within the parameters of the
series.
The West Wing represents an idealization of the American system, not a
critique of it. Idealization would be fine if the programme concentrated
wholly on domestic issues, but it does not. From time to time it stumbles
into the arena of world politics and falls flat on its face. The programme
often reflects an astonishing ignorance of the non-American world and a
mocking, hostile attitude to it. One is forced to wonder whether the world
is portrayed in this way because that is how The West Wing’s writers see it,
how they think President Bartlett would see it, or how they think
American viewers see it.
But who are The West Wing’s viewers? Within the United States the pro-
gramme was immensely popular, winning a number of Emmy awards and
garnering a sizeable part of the market (The Economist 2002b). The pro-
gramme continues to be shown outside the United States on terrestrial
television and on satellite. It has been more successful in some markets
than others, being praised by critics but ignored by audiences (The
Economist 2003). Craciun (2004) argues that:
The West Wing […] has the obvious limit that it covers only the American
political system. If [a television programme or film touches on] foreign policy
issues it becomes substantially more interesting for the non-American
viewer. Although very informative and insightful, The West Wing sheds little
light on other [political systems] than the American one.
Aaron Sorkin has written that he did not intend The West Wing to mirror
reality, but the way in which people see a programme may be quite differ-
ent to what was intended, depending on local cultural and political condi-
tions. A programme that was ‘fictional’ when it was transmitted to a
domestic audience may be shown at a later date to an audience in another
country where the fictional events may be perceived by another audience
to have quite definite parallels with real events in their lives. The West Wing
has aired its final episode in the United States, but it will continue to be
shown in other countries for years to come, when its stories will have
acquired entirely different levels of significance.
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11. ‘Enemies Foreign and 121 people last year for robbery, rape and drug trafficking, they have no free
Domestic’, The West press, no elected government, no political parties. And the Royal family allows
Wing, 3: XIX. To the
best of my knowledge, the religious police to travel in groups of six carrying nightsticks and they
Orbit censored this freely and publicly beat women, But ‘Brutus is an honourable man.’ Seventeen
portion of the schoolgirls were forced to burn alive because they weren’t wearing the proper
programme. Most
dialogue quotations clothing. Am I outraged? No […] That is Saudi Arabia, our partner in peace.11
in this article are from
the unofficial West Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger (2005) argue that this blurring of the real
Wing continuity guide
found at and the fictional is part of Sorkin’s attempt to pin the blame for all prob-
http://westwing.bewa lems with Arab countries on Islamic fundamentalism. However, while
rne.com this episode explicitly referred to an incident in Saudi Arabia, most of the
12. ‘We killed Yamamoto’ fictional West Wing’s problems have been with the equally fictitious Gulf
and ‘Posse Comitatus’, state of Qumar, which is depicted as having an American base and being,
The West Wing, 3:
XXI–XXII. on the surface, friendly to the United States. Why create a fictional coun-
try? I suggest that if a country is fictional, its leaders can be safely assas-
13. ‘Abdul Shareef ’ is a
most unlikely name sinated and its people bombed or invaded as required. In a cycle of stories
for a Gulf Arab. One that begins at the end of Season 3 and reaches into Season 5, Bartlett and
of my Arab colleagues his advisers decide to assassinate the Qumari Defence Minister, Abdul
said that at best it
sounded vaguely Shareef, who, it is revealed, is secretly backing terrorist organizations
Egyptian. plotting against the United States. After some debate, President Bartlett
14. ‘We Killed decides to have Shareef assassinated on British territory in the
Yamamoto’, The West Caribbean.12 The repercussions of this event, the cover-up and the
Wing, 3: XXI. involvement of Israel are all designed to show the consequences of taking
what Bartlett believes to be a reprehensible, but necessary stand.
The underlying message of this story arc is that the Arabs simply cannot
be trusted. America offers its friendship and its bases and the Arabs try to
blow up the Golden Gate bridge. It is only in this episode that some of the
moral certainty of The West Wing slips. Assassination is, at best, morally
ambiguous. We see the presidential staff struggling with the question, but it is
Admiral Fitzwallace who justifies what they are planning by citing the shoot-
ing down of the Japanese commander Admiral Yamamoto over Bougainville
in 1943. Ultimately, it is the knowledge that such assassination has been car-
ried out before that is used to justify the shooting of Abdul Shareef.13
Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘Can you tell when it’s peacetime and wartime any more?’
Leo McGarry: ‘No.’
Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘I don’t know who the world’s leading expert on war-
fare is, but any list has got to include me and I can’t tell when it’s peacetime
and wartime any more.’
Leo McGarry: ‘Look, international law has always recognized certain pro-
tected persons who you couldn’t attack. It’s been this way since the
Romans.’
Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘In peacetime…’
Leo McGarry: ‘I don’t like where this conversation’s going.’
Admiral Fitzwallace: ‘We killed Yamamoto. We shot down his plane.’
Leo McGarry: ‘We declared war...’14
Moral ambiguity is always a useful dramatic device, but it does not really
answer the really serious questions raised by this story arc. Why would the
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Qumari Defence Minister plot against the United States? And how much 15. The title of the
programme is drawn
effort has been expended by the United States to keep him in power until from the story of
now? These are difficult questions, but The West Wing sidesteps such issues Ishmael (Ismail in
and concentrates on matters that appear to be more easily resolvable. Arabic), the son of
Abraham by the slave
Nowhere was this more apparent than in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, the spe- woman Hagar, and
cial episode that appeared at the beginning of Season 3.15 ‘Isaac and Isaac, Abraham’s son
Ishmael’ was the first programme to self-consciously deal, albeit indirectly, by Sarah. The story of
the two sons has been
with the horrifying and cowardly attacks on New York on September 11, used in the past as a
2001 and to educate viewers about the issues surrounding the events metaphor for the
(Gladstone-Sovell and Wilkerson 2002). Arab-Israeli conflict.
The story of Isaac and
The programme was severely criticized by many parts of the American Ishmael/Ismail can be
media, although it had its supporters as well. USA Today called it ‘A crash- found in Genesis, 16:
ing and condescending bore’ (BBC Online 2001), while the New York Post I–XVI and 21: I–XX
(The New American
said it ‘came across as pretentious and pietistic hubris’ (Shales 2001). Bible 1971: 15–16,
Time castigated the episode but admitted that it was important ‘that it was 20–21). The union of
attempted at all’ (Poniewozik 2001). Abraham, Ismail and
Isaac and their
Outside the United States, the Sydney Morning Herald described it as descendants through
‘an encouraging example of American television running on the best of Islam is highlighted in
intentions’ (Oliver 2001). That it was well intentioned is not in doubt. Sura 21, ‘Al Baqarah’
(‘The Calf ’) 16:
That it tried to deal honestly with the sensitive topic of how Muslims in CXXXIII (Yusuf Ali
America are treated is obvious. Yet somehow the programme was gut- 1991). Some modern
less, a well-intentioned but empty polemic made by well-meaning people Jewish scholars have
contended that the
appalled by, but too nice, to know how to react to, such a horrific event. Biblical text ‘does not
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ would have been more effective if it had tackled the seem to support the
events of September 11 head on. Perhaps it would have been more honest notion of a necessary,
ongoing enmity’
if it had shown how honest and patriotic police, military and intelligence between Arabs and
officers had tried desperately to warn their superiors that something Jews (Zucker 1990).
dreadful was about to happen, but had been ignored. Perhaps it might 16. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’,
have shown how ordinary Arabs, appalled by the attack, offered their sym- The West Wing, 3: I.
pathy to westerners living in their countries. Or, perhaps, it was simply too 17. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’,
early and too painful to deal with the issue fully. The West Wing, 3: I.
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ is so desperate to be even-handed that it does not
know what to do with itself and flounders even as it gets under way. The
episode begins with a security alert at the White House. Everybody is
locked in and a group of visiting high-school students is taken to the base-
ment cafeteria. Here the character Josh Lyman and other staff members
lead the students through what is essentially a classroom lesson on terror-
ism and Islamic fundamentalism. The episode’s intention is to teach, not
entertain. While this impromptu civics class is going on, the security ser-
vices are interrogating a Muslim White House staffer who has the same
name as a wanted terrorist. The fictional chief of staff, Leo McGarry, sits in
on the interrogation and is quite hostile. Josh tells the students that the
security problems are due to extremists, but explains that he does not
mean ordinary Muslims. He writes on the blackboard: ‘Islamic extremism
is to Islam as ___ is to Christianity.’16 He fills in the space with the letters
‘KKK’, the initials of the Ku Klux Klan and says:
‘It’s the Klan gone medieval and global. It couldn’t have less to do with
Islamic men and women of faith of whom there are millions and millions.
Muslims defend this country in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
National Guard, Police and Fire Department.’17
18. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, Later, a student asks staffer Sam Seabourne:
The West Wing, 3: I.
And what do you call
a country where ‘What do you call a society that has to just live every day with the idea that
Israeli tanks arrive at the pizza place you are eating in could blow up without any warning?’
4 a.m. to blow up your
‘Israel,’ Sam answers.18
house? It was not a
question anybody
asked, or answered. Ultimately, the only answer that Josh, Sam and the others can offer the
19. Armstrong describes students is pluralism, the pious notion that people will stop being fanatics
fundamentalism as if they are confronted with a variety of religious, political, ethical and
‘an embattled faith
(that) sees itself
moral options. Alas, history has shown that it is precisely to such things
fighting for survival in that religious fundamentalists are opposed.19 The attempt in ‘Isaac and
a hostile world. This Ishmael’ to offer a rational, pluralistic, even-handed solution to the prob-
effects and sometimes
distorts vision.’ She
lem of global terrorism is what makes the episode so weak. As The West
argues that Australian commented:
fundamentalism can
sometimes be seen as
This balanced, non-inflammatory approach to the terrorist attacks makes it
a rational and even
modernizing response a stillborn drama – preachy, self-important and pulling its punches so often
to particular social that it’s hardly surprising the episode has…angered both left and right in
and historical develop-
the US.
ments and that it does
not necessarily lead to (Naglazas 2001)
fanaticism and
violence. ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was shown with Arabic subtitles in the United Arab
‘Fundamentalist faith,
be it Jewish, Christian Emirates on Orbit’s America Plus satellite channel early in 2003, eighteen
or Muslim, fails […] if months after the attack on New York. By this time the war in Afghanistan
it becomes a theology had been fought and the invasion of Iraq was on everybody’s minds. Thus,
of rage or hatred’
(Armstrong 2001: ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ had lost the immediate significance it had when it was
322). However, as transmitted to a domestic US audience, but was now being seen in the
Huntington notes, in United Arab Emirates against a background of even more troubled
his discussion of the
twentieth-century US–Arab relations. In the intervening period the attack had been endlessly
Islamic resurgence: debated in the Arabic and English-language media in many countries.
‘[…] religions give Students from Zayed University were involved in these debates as well. In
people identity by
positing a basic mid 2003, Abu Dhabi Television hosted a live satellite debate between stu-
distinction between dents of Zayed University and the Higher Colleges of Technology in Abu
believers and non- Dhabi and James Zogby and Thomas Friedman in New York.20
believers, between a
superior in-group and Critical thinking is one of the learning outcomes emphasized across
a different and Zayed University’s curriculum and a number of staff in the university’s
inferior out-group.’ seminar department decided that, with careful preparation, the episode
This makes it easier to
justify acts against could be shown to students as a stimulus for debate about global issues.
non-believers The students involved were new to the university, mostly straight out of
(Huntington 1996). school and with, in some cases, a limited command of English. The semi-
20. The debate was nar instructors discussed the episode with students before it was shown
shown on Abu Dhabi and afterwards reinforced this by distributing a written outline of the
TV as a follow-up to
Friedman’s episode, a summary of its contents and an explanation of its intentions.
programme ‘The The instructors explained to the class that it was an attempt to highlight the
Roots of 9/11,’ which problems caused by stereotyping people because of their religion and race.
was aired in the
United States on the At this point there was only curiosity from the class, but as soon as the
Discovery Channel on episode got under way, there was a discernable negative reaction from
26 March 2003. some students. This appeared to be caused by the debate about the nature
of Islam begun by Josh. Students began to call out that Islam was being
insulted and Arabs attacked. A handful of the most vociferous students
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left. Those students who stayed said that they understood and applauded
the episode’s intentions.
Clearly, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was well intended and tried to be sympa-
thetic to ordinary Muslims caught up in larger events. It laboured the point
that ordinary Muslims should not be equated with terrorists. However, in
order to understand this, students would have to have watched the entire
programme and listened carefully to the dialogue. Instead, it appears that
the instant the subject of Islam was broached, some students felt they were
being insulted and began the protest that led to the walkout.
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was not screened to test the students’ reactions,
but as part of their normal exposure to other ideas and discussions of
global issues. However, the way the students reacted prompted a number
of questions and led to the programme being evaluated by their instruc-
tors. It also led to the decision to seek a reaction to the Palestinian story
arc when it was aired. Was the students’ reaction to ‘Isaac and Ishmael’
the result of religious over-sensitivity, a reaction to the crisis in Iraq and a
general anti-American feeling, or because they were simply unwilling to
believe that an American programme could attempt to be even-handed?
Some time later, a small group of students asked to see the episode as part
of a group project. These students were generally better academically and
had a higher level of English. They reported positively on ‘Isaac and
Ishmael’ and discussed the episode in a way that showed that they had
understood its intentions. However, it was decided not to show the episode
again. I believe that the reaction to the programme was affected by the
students’ level of English, their willingness (or ability) to listen to another
point of view and their exposure to western ideas.
Reaction from Arabic and Muslim seminar staff was mixed. One female
staff member, an American who had converted to Islam, said that she did
not like the episode because of its slick presentation, use of stereotypes and
what she called its ‘We know all about this’ attitude. Others felt the
episode was fair, but that some students were too politically unsophisti-
cated to grasp its intentions.
A number of the seminar faculty watched the episode later without stu-
dents present. They suggested that it contained a number of points that may
have acted as triggers for the negative reaction of the students. These included:
• The use of the Hebrew ‘Ishmael’ instead of the Arabic ‘Ismail’. Sensitive
Muslims would interpret this as a subtle indication of bias.
• The use of the word ‘Islamics’, instead of Muslims. ‘Islamics’ is not a
word they recognized. Islamists are Muslims with a particular political
agenda.
• They found the analogy with the Ku Klux Klan offensive. They pointed
out that contrary to what Josh Lyman says, fundamentalist Christians do
carry out murders in the United States on such targets as abortion clinics.
• The use of the term ‘medieval’. They point out that organizations like
Al-Qaeda are very much part of modernity.
• The reference to women not being allowed to attend soccer matches in
Afghanistan under the Taliban. They felt this trivialized more impor-
tant questions about the denial to Afghani women of the right to edu-
cation and work.
21. As Roger Scruton • The name of the Muslim character, Rakeem Ali, is not a proper Arabic
(2002: 128) puts it:
‘[…] the techniques
name. They suggested that it might be a name derived from the
and infrastructure on American ‘Black Muslim’ movement, the Nation of Islam.
which Al Qa’eda • There are two references to the Holocaust that could be taken as equat-
depends are the gifts
of the new global
ing Muslims with Nazis.
institutions. It is Wall • They said the reference to the Hashashins was historically incorrect,
Street and Zurich that simplistic and ignored the extremely complicated circumstances from
produced the
networks of
which the group emerged. They felt that Brutus’s murder of Caesar
international finances would have been a far better example.21
that enables Osama
bin Laden to conceal
his wealth and to
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was clearly not written for our students, but intention-
deploy it anywhere in ally or not, they are part of The West Wing’s international market. Because of
the world. It is its inconsistencies and its insistence on choosing a particular, limited view-
Western enterprise
[…] that produces the
point, it failed to connect with some of the very people outside the United
technology that bin States who needed to understand that, however clumsily, a sincere effort was
Laden has exploited being made to show an America that rejected prejudice and violence.
so effectively against
us.’
The West Wing ended its fifth season with a series of stories showing
President Bartlett bringing the Israeli and Palestinian leadership together
22. ‘Gaza’, The West Wing,
5: XXI.
for peace talks at Camp David. Despite the strenuous objections of his
chief of staff, Bartlett succeeds. This story arc continued at the beginning
of Season 6. It was shown on Orbit after Yasser Arafat’s death, which
gave it a strange atmosphere, since the Palestinian leader in The West
Wing was clearly meant to be him. The story arc begins with a group of
American politicians, including, for some reason, the character Admiral
Fitzwallace and Donna Moss, Josh Lyman’s secretary, touring Gaza. A
mine explodes and destroys one of their vehicles. Admiral Fitzwallace is
killed and Donna is seriously injured. The Israelis surround Palestinian
leader Chairman Farad’s compound, Josh flies to the American base in
Germany to which Donna has been evacuated and President Bartlett
decides that the only solution is to stop the Palestinians and Israelis fight-
ing each other.
It is clear from the beginning that as with ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, the
scriptwriters had decided that they must be fair and even-handed. Having
Donna along on the fact-finding mission allows her – the sweet, blonde,
slightly goofy girl from the Mid-West – to ask questions and receive highly sim-
plified answers about the situation in the Occupied Territories. Some examples:
Israeli soldier: ‘It’s an Israeli’s most sacred duty. Nothing I will ever do is
more important…’
Donna: ‘Colin [the Irish photographer] says you have strong feelings about
serving here.’
Israeli soldier: ‘Is no good. Gaza… 7500 settlers surrounded by 1.3 million
Palestinians who do not wish them here and we in the middle.’
Donna: ‘In Israel there’s talk of giving up these settlements?’
Female settler: ‘God wants us in this place. It is our divine, moral obligation
to be here.’
Her husband: ‘If we give in to the Arabs they’ll take more and more and we’ll
all end up in Tel Aviv. And then they’ll take that.’22
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Much of what Donna learns is picked up from an Irish photographer sym- 23. ‘Memorial’, The West
Wing, 5: XXII.
pathetic to the Palestinian cause. Donna is blown up shortly after she has
sex with him. 24. ‘NSF Thurmont’, The
West Wing, 6: I.
President Bartlett, driven by guilt over the death of Fitzwallace and
Donna’s near-fatal injuries, decides to bring peace to the region. His
chief of staff, Leo McGarry (played by the late John Spencer, who bore
an uncanny resemblance to Donald Rumsfeld) strenuously opposes his
efforts. The McGarry character has been portrayed earlier as pro-Israeli
and was the one interrogating the Muslim suspect in ‘Isaac and
Ishmael’. Leo’s opposition, however, is shown as stemming as much
from his fear that Bartlett will fail, as anything else. Screened in the
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, this story arc draws on a number of
elements outside the immediately obvious one of the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict. In Donna’s injuries there are clear links with the case of
Private Jessica Lynch, the American soldier captured by the Iraqis, sub-
sequently rescued and then exploited by the Bush administration
(Takacs 2005). In The West Wing story arc, the character of Donna is
similarly used as an emotional prop to justify the hostile reactions of
Josh and Leo. Bartlett’s new intelligence advisor, Kate Harper, takes a
neutral, or even pro-Palestinian stance. However, she is constantly
rebutted by Leo:
Leo: ‘This isn’t the UN. He’s not the Secretary General. He’s President of the
United States, and our job is to make sure his priorities are clear. Today’s pri-
ority is not world peace.’23
The story arc continues at the beginning of Season 6, with Leo still argu-
ing violently with Bartlett, demanding that he take action against the fic-
tional terrorist group responsible for the mining of the convoy, the Sons of
the Sword.
Leo: ‘Mr President, please, Congress, the Joint Chiefs, the American public,
your own staff, EVERYONE disagrees with your assessment of this situation.’
Bartlett: ‘Killing Palestinians isn’t going to make us feel safer. They’ll kill
more of us, then we’ll have to kill more of them. It’s Russian roulette with a
fully loaded gun.’
Leo: ‘We can’t allow terrorists to murder our citizens…’
Bartlett: ‘Why would they do it? Why would Palestinians murder American
government officials they never have before? They’re deliberately provoking us,
Leo. They know we have to retaliate. They’ve studied us. They want us to over-
react. This isn’t over-reacting. It’s the appropriate, balanced […]’
Bartlett: ‘Tell me how this ends, Leo. You want me to start something that
will have serious repercussions on American foreign policy for decades, but
you don’t know how it ends.’
Leo: ‘We don’t always KNOW how it ends. The Lincoln will be in position in
a few hours and then you are going to have to give the go-ahead for the
bombings.’
Bartlett: ‘Or what?’24
25. As we shall see, at Bartlett manages to convince the Palestinians and Israelis to come to
least one member of
the Abu Dhabi
America and once they have landed safely he orders the US military to
audience who destroy a camp belonging to the faction that mined the convoy. Thus the
watched this episode scriptwriters manage to present him as a peacemaker, but one who is pre-
disagreed with me
completely on this
pared to blow people up to make them peaceful. This reflects what Haine
point. (2003) calls:
26. As yet another
indicator of the The specific and ambiguous American way of dealing with world problems
omnipresence of [which] combines the privilege of power and the innocence of ideals […] [the]
American television
permanent ingredients of American exceptionalism.
in a global culture,
the audience watched
the programmes on However, while the script shows Bartlett trying desperately to make the
perfectly copied DVDs
from a beautifully
Israelis and Palestinians talk and even sacrifice his friendship with Leo, the
presented boxed set images on the screen tell a different story. The depiction of the Palestinians
bought for a few and Israelis at the peace talks is revealing. Both sides arrive on a Friday
dollars in a Shanghai
market.
and on the Muslim holy day and the eve of the Jewish one, both delega-
tions pray. The Jews, however, are seen sitting around a table, in the light,
looking relaxed and civilized. The Palestinians are shown praying outside
in the gathering dark, against a background of tangled undergrowth. The
dichotomy could not be clearer. Here are the civilized Israelis, ready, how-
ever reluctantly, to talk and out there in the wild woods are the
Palestinians, afraid to come in to the light.25 The light, of course, comes
from President Bartlett. Bartlett succeeds in bringing the two sides
together, but by then the focus of the story has switched to the clash
between Bartlett and Leo, who has a heart attack while wandering, dis-
traught after an argument with the President, in the woods around Camp
David. With peace at hand the audience is free to ignore the Palestinians
and Israelis and concentrate on Leo’s recovery and the run-up to the elec-
tion that dominates the rest of the season.
One can be quite cynical about the intentions of this four-part story
and it can be shown to have all sorts of barely hidden resonances with
contemporary events. However, when shown to different groups of people
in Abu Dhabi, the response was far more positive than for ‘Isaac and
Ishmael’ and certainly more positive than expected. One of the viewers
had been in the original group of the Zayed University faculty who
watched ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. Another is of Palestinian descent. Also
included were another American convert to Islam, a Somali and a Yemeni
woman. The audience was typical of the diverse population of Abu
Dhabi.26 The response to the programme was quite positive. There were
questions about where some of the ‘Palestinian’ actors really came from,
but the general feeling was that an effort had been made to present both
sides of the story. The fact that the Palestinian side was presented by the
character Kate Harper was certainly noted. The audience was certainly
more positive towards the way issues were presented than the group that
watched ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. One of the viewers said that the depiction of
the Muslims and Jews praying at sunset had not seemed divisive to her, but
had shown how much the two religions had in common.
The response to the Gaza story arc differed from that to the ‘Isaac and
Ishmael’ episode largely, I think, because the audience was older, largely
western-educated and more aware of political realities and knew how to
42 Philip Cass
JAMMR_1.1_03_art_Cass.qxd 12/17/07 7:53 PM Page 43
read an American media discourse. This does not necessarily mean that
they accepted the parameters of that discourse, but they were able to put
it into context and draw their own, often oppositional, meaning from it.
One must also admit the simple fact that when you have four episodes in
which to deal with a complex situation, the results are invariably better
than when you try to cram everything into the 44 minutes of script that
American commercial networks allow. The Gaza cycle may therefore be
described, however warily, as a more successful attempt to deal with
international episodes than any of its previous episodes.
Perhaps the most measured response came from the Palestinian viewer.
It is worth quoting at length:
If I was asked to describe the four episodes of the fifth and sixth seasons of
The West Wing in one word, that word would be ‘real’. Of course real in a
sense that it was like it would appear to me on TV from watching the news.
That does not in any way imply that it being ‘real’ means that the reality of
the situations portrayed is good, just that it’s real and it happened, and it will
keep on happening until someone comes to their senses.
The sad part about all this is that the majority of Arabs, or people of the
Middle East, believe in conspiracy theories and that the West is working in
conjunction with Israel to get ‘us’. There is no conspiracy theory; there are
only agendas, and no hidden ones.
I think that the producers/writers made a great effort for these episodes to be
balanced […] too balanced actually. I don’t think that the Palestinian and the
Israeli parties would have been too easily fooled with ‘promises’ and ‘deals’
made with the American government. I also think that great effort was
made to show the greatness of Judaism and Islam as religions. The scenes
where the Palestinian government officials are performing the ‘Salla’ while
the American president and his entourage were invited to celebrate the
beginning of the Jewish Sabbath by the Israeli Prime Minister showed how
similar everyone, and everything is. I thought that was great.
As a Palestinian, I’m usually ashamed of how Arabs and specifically
Palestinians are portrayed in western movies. I was not ashamed while
watching the four episodes. I was pleased to see that there were two sides to
the whole story, which makes it a lot easier for the next ‘Joe Blow’ on any of
the streets of the US or Israel to understand that there are sane people on the
other side who simply ask for the minimum of their rights to live.
References
Armstrong, K. (2001), The Battle for God, New York: Ballantine Books.
BBC Online (2001), ‘West Wing terror show criticised’, 4 October.
—— (2002), ‘Saudi police “stopped” fire rescue’, 15 March.
Cooper, R. (1997), ‘Is there a New World Order?’, in G. Mulgan (ed.), Life After
Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century, London: Fontana/Demos.
Craciun, C. (2004), ‘Teaching Political Science at the Movies,’ paper presented to
the EPSNET plenary conference, Prague.
Fattah, M. (2006), Democratic Values in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO and London:
Lynne Reiner.
Fukuyama, F. (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin.
Gans-Boriskin, R. and Tisinger, R. (2005), ‘The Bushlet Administration: Terrorism
and War on The West Wing’, The Journal of American Culture, 28: 1.
Gladstone-Sovell, T. and Wilkerson, W. (2002), ‘Inclusion, Education and Avoidance:
The prime time response to September 11’, Harvard Symposium: Restless
Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism.
Haine, J.-Y. (2003), ‘The Imperial moment: A European view’, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 16: 3.
Holbert, R.L., Pillion, O., Tschida, D.A., Armfield, G.G., Kinder, K., Cherry, K.L. and
Daulton, A.R. (2003), ‘The West Wing as endorsement of the US Presidency:
Expanding the bounds of priming in political communication’, Journal of
Communication, 53: 3.
Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Jones, R. (2004), ‘Scripting a Tragedy: The Isaac and Ishmael episode of The West
Wing as Parable’, in Popular Communication, 2: 1.
Kayyali, R. (2006), The Arab Americans, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Leo, J. (2002), ‘Left Side Story’, US News and World Report, 7 October.
MacMillan, Margaret (2002), The Peacemakers, London: John Murray.
McKissack, F. (2000), ‘The West Wing is not a Wet Dream’, Progressive, May.
Mulgan, G. (ed.) (1997), Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century,
London: Fontana/Demos.
Naglazas, M. (2001), ‘Lame Duck West Wing’, in The West Australian, 16 October.
Oliver, R. (2001), ‘A contemplative time for The West Wing: Egos set aside as real life
events hit home’, in The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October.
Poniewozik, J. (2001), ‘West Wing: Terrorism 101’, Time, 4 October.
Robie, D. (1998), ‘From Monicagate to Mahathir’, Wansolwara, 3: 4.
Rollins, P. and O’Connor J. (eds) (2003), The West Wing: The American Presidency as
Television Drama, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Sardar, Z. and Davies, M. (2003), Why Do People Hate America? Cambridge: Icon.
Scruton, R. (2002), The West and the Rest, London: Continuum.
Shaheen, J. (1984), The TV Arabs, Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State
University Popular Press.
Shafik, V. (1998), Arab Cinema, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
Shales, T. (2001), ‘The West Wing assumes the role of moral compass’, The New York
Post, 5 October.
Sheffield, R. (2000), ‘President Sheen and the politics of TV’, Rolling Stone,
7 December.
Sorkin, A. (2002), The West Wing Script Book, New York: Newmarket Press.
Stuttaford, A. (2003), ‘The President of the Left’, National Review, 24 March.
Takacs, S. (2005), ‘Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity’,
Feminist Media Studies, 5: 3.
The Economist (2002a), ‘Unreality TV’, 6 July.
—— (2002b), ‘You’ve got trouble’, 30 November.
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The New American Bible (1971), Catholic Biblical Association of America/Thomas
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44 Philip Cass
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Wood, D. (2001), ‘Act II: Hollywood waves the flag – and is redeemed’, Christian
Science Monitor, 21 December.
Yusuf Ali, Abdullah (1991), The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, Brentwood, MD: Amana.
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Judaism, 39: 1.
Websites
http://westwing.bewarne.com
This is the ultimate West Wing site, compiled by people who are truly fanatical
about the show.
http://www.televisionwithoutpity.com
For unfettered discussion and vituperation about The West Wing and other cult pro-
grammes.
Suggested citation
Cass, P. (2007), ‘The never-ending story: Palestine, Israel and The West Wing’,
Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 31–46, doi: 10.1386/
jammr.1.1.31/1
Contributor details
Philip Cass is Assistant Dean in the College of Communications and Media Science
at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. A former journalist, he has worked in Australia,
the Pacific, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates.
A specialist in Pacific media history, he has also published on the media in the
Middle East and is interested in the connections between the two regions. Contact:
Zayed University, P.O. Box 4783, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
E-mail: Philip.Cass@zu.ac.ae
46 Philip Cass
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Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.47/1
Abstract Keywords
In the summer of 2003, a Turkish confectionery and cookie company glocalization
launched a major television advertising campaign through the Young & identity
Rubicam agency in Istanbul. The goal of the campaign was to compete aggres- gender
sively with the market leaders, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, by adopting some of nationalism
the strategies used by those colas in dominating the world’s soft-drink sales commodification
and reversing those strategies to suit the Turkish consumers. This study com- advertising
bines textual analysis of the primary television advertisements for Cola Turka Turkey
along with interviews with two of the account managers for the campaign.
The analysis is based on the concept of glocalization of the national, gender
and sports themes of the campaign. In appealing to potential consumers of the
soft drink, the advertisers exploit the local cultural stereotypes to convince the
audience that those who adopt the product will achieve the American dream –
to become Turkish. American actors, including Chevy Chase, are used in that
effort as they try to live out that dream by adopting Turkish customs, eating
Turkish foods and following Turkish soccer stars. Advertising agency execu-
tives denied they created anti-American themes, though one of the commer-
cials suggests that if US soldiers drank Cola Turka, they would abandon their
goal to win the war in Iraq. The authors argue that the commoditization of
nation-making practices has wide implications and real-world effects on public
opinion.
When the creative people at Young & Rubicam in Istanbul were visited by
the representatives from Ülker, a Turkish confectionery and cookie com-
pany that produces a range of food products for domestic and interna-
tional markets, with an idea for creating and marketing a cola to compete
with Coke and Pepsi in the domestic market, the agency was concerned
about how they would position this product. After all, Coke then con-
trolled 70 per cent of the Turkish cola market, while Pepsi held 17 per
cent, and all the other colas took up the remainder. Where could a new
Turkish cola fit and how could it possibly compete, they wondered.
The first problem they needed to address was what to call the new cola.
Ülker already sold a soft drink called Çamlica, so Çamlica Cola was an
option. Using the company’s name and labelling it Ülker Cola was also a
1. Alaturka, meaning possibility. Focus group research that tested out the two names along with
‘the Turkish way’, is a
common phrase used
the Cola of Turkey (which distinguished it from the American Coke and
in Turkish to show it Pepsi brands) appealed to most of the focus group members. That idea was
is not the ‘western’ refashioned slightly to become Cola Turka.1
way (alafranga). So
Cola Turka
From there Young & Rubicam turned to the problem of positioning
represented a the soft drink and settled on an approach of ‘positive nationalism’,
Turkish-style cola that according to Yasemin Sümer, who was an account manager at the time.
was not Coke or the
American cola.
After brainstorming advertising concepts every evening for two weeks,
the group came up with a list of Turkish cultural stereotypes that carried
2. We chose not to
examine the many
a positive connotation. These traits were then turned into a set of humor-
additional ous commercials that juxtaposed Cola Turka and its Turkish cultural
commercials that roots against the United States and its cultural icons, Coke and Pepsi.
merely contained
images of the Cola
And just as they thought coke that was associated with the American
Turka can accompa- dream and youth culture, the advertising campaign was meant to be
nied by a jingle or associated with the Turkish dream. ‘Those who drink Cola Turka will
other very short
messages.
aspire to be Turkish and they will also adopt Turkish cultural features,’
said Eda Gökkan, who headed the Cola Turka account at Young &
Rubicam. As Williamson (1978: 13) said, advertising campaigns are
made so that people learn to ‘identify themselves with what they con-
sume’ instead of what they produce. So in the campaign, which Sümer
described as one that was ‘the antithesis of Coke’, the goal was to get
consumers to identify themselves with drinking Cola Turka and becom-
ing Turkish – rather than continuing to drink Coke or Pepsi and being
like Americans.
The advertising campaign, which featured a mix of American and
Turkish actors, a blend of US and Turkish settings, and a combination of
English and Turkish, rolled out on eleven channels at precisely 9 p.m. on
5 July 2003 – the same day that coincidentally eleven Turkish soldiers
were captured by the American military in northern Iraq to the anger of
the Turkish government. And though the campaign was never meant to
be anti-American, and Ülker insisted on keeping political statements out
of the text, Gökkan admitted that the ads were trying to sell Turkish
imperialism.
3. According to Yasar Turka in hand and is singing ‘Take me out to the ball game’ (a popular
Özturk, a TRT news
anchor who lived in
American baseball song). Upon sipping their Cola Turka the family break
exile in Switzerland into a Turkish patriotic song.3 Only when Chase himself tries the drink
after the 1980 coup does he get it as he smiles and joins in singing the Turkish song. Later the
d’état in Turkey, Dag
Basini Duman Almis
in-laws depart and the younger members of the family kiss the hands of
(the song Chase and the grandparents; water is thrown after the car as it departs, (both Turkish
the family sing) is in cultural practices) and at the end Chevy Chase turns to face the camera as
reality a Swedish folk
tune. A scholar, who
a transformed man complete with the stereotypically Turkish moustache.
studied in Switzerland These and other commercials in the series reverse the usual approach
after the establishment in media produced in developing countries. Instead of adopting behaviours
of Turkish Republic in
1923, brought the
to become more western, the westerners are adopting behaviours and
song with him back using products produced in Turkey in order to become more Turkish, an
to Turkey and wrote identity that most people in the commercial aspire to. Part of the jingle
Turkish lyrics to it. If
correct, this gives us
calls the Cola ‘the famous American dream’ and says that those who drink
yet another example it become ‘Turkified’. At the end of Chase’s moustached transformation
for successful Turkish the singer tells us that once he became Turkified, there was no
hybridization of a
foreign product, a
Americanness left in him. The short film ends by announcing this as ‘the
song in this case, still mutlu end’ (‘happy ending’). In another commercial a man in a Turkish
much like Cola Turka. bath is teaching David Brown to sing a variation on the jingle, ‘Let them
come to Turkey. Let them see where Cola is. Let them drink Cola Turka.
America’s dream. Let them drink Cola Turka.’
The Cola Turka advertising campaign attracted national and interna-
tional attention for several months. Many observers misinterpreted the
messages and the cola itself as being anti-American – largely because of
the timing of its release and the disagreements that the Turkish govern-
ment had with the United States over Turkey’s role in the Iraq war.
Coincidentally, other Middle Eastern countries had also introduced colas to
compete with Pepsi and Coke around the same time. Mecca Cola and Arab
Cola were created to fight the American brands while Iran makes a soft
drink called Zam Zam that is likened to holy water from Mecca. All of these
soft drinks made claims at promoting their products to combat American
imperialism and/or Zionism.
Representatives from Young & Rubicam (where the account was initi-
ated) and Alametifarika (where the account moved in January 2004 when
the chief executive officer at Young & Rubicam left with fourteen others to
form a new independent advertising agency) agreed that Cola Turka was not
created to express either an anti-American or a pro-Muslim attitude.
Because the Ülker company has Muslim roots (the owner is a devout
Muslim) and the profits from the products are perceived to go to support
Islamic causes, a percentage of the population always buys Ülker products
and another percentage of the population will never buy Ülker products, said
Sümer. For that reason the agency wanted to distance the campaign and
Cola Turka from Islamic connections. Though the goal of the campaign may
not have been distinctly anti-American or pro-Muslim, many viewers and
our own analysis do not accept that the outcome achieved that goal.
(visual or textual) may not have carried the same meaning as intended.
So to effectively market the global product – whether it was automobiles or
tennis shoes, a process of adaptation occurred. The actual term ‘glocaliza-
tion’ was developed by businessmen in Japan and was later described by
Roland Robertson in an edited volume called Global Modernities (Ohmae
1990; Robertson 1995). As Maynard (2003: 60) describes it, ‘glocalization
is sometimes reported to be a reaction to globalization, or a reinforcement
of cultural identity at the local community level’. Robertson sees it as an
‘interpenetration’ of the global and the local. But the way the concept is
generally applied relates to marketing a product produced by a multinational
corporation by appealing to local cultural cues. So McDonald’s sells no
pork in Saudi Arabia, a teriyaki McBurger in Japan, and Curry Pie in Hong
Kong. And Ikea makes furniture smaller when it is sold in Japan and Hong
Kong because people live in smaller spaces (Baker and Sterenberg 2002).
And Google offers its search engine in China minus the availability of sites
found offensive by the Chinese government.
The company may also alter its advertising messages. For example,
Nescafe uses local citizens in its ads in India but places the actors in inter-
national settings. Coca-Cola and Colgate-Palmolive issue a prototype ad
with instructions for acceptable changes by the media in the local market
(Milovanovic 1997: 72).
But when we refer to glocalization for the Cola Turka ad campaign, the
process is flipped. Though Ülker markets to a large number of countries, it
is not a global company in the way that Nike or Coke or Pepsi are. And the
vast majority of people in the world will never taste Cola Turka. Ülker only
dreams about this level of distribution of its products. The advertising cam-
paigns are aimed at Turks and use the New York/American setting and
the combination of English and Turkish to pretend that Americans are
dying to drink Cola Turka with aspirations of becoming cosmopolitan and
cool (in Turkish cultural terms) by drinking this new beverage. The irony
is that they are using a western vehicle (the Hollywood film) with
American actors (Chevy Chase and David Brown, etc.) and an American
product (a cola) to send that message to the Turks. The double articulation
of Americans aspiring to be Turkish within their own geographic and cul-
tural framework diminishes the value of the Cola Turka product some-
what, because it suggests that Cola Turka, like the Hollywood film, the US
setting and the product it copied can be reduced to mere imitation of the
US original. And the Turkifying attempts simultaneously validate Coca-
Cola and America at the very moment that they try to undermine both.
Hence the simultaneous presentation of cola (kola is the actual Turkish
spelling) and turka, (not even originally Turkish, rather coming from the
French word a la torque). Thus, the translation is: I am an American product
that pretends to be Turkish.
Garcia Canclini (1997) named this process ‘cultural reconversion’,
whereby local cultures adapt to global influences without being destroyed
because tradition is rearticulated in the modern processes. Here the tradi-
tional cultural practices are played out through the use of the Hollywood
film format with Hollywood icon Chevy Chase playing the lead actor, as if
to legitimize the local campaign and the looking to the West. The advertising
campaign associated with Cola Turka is glocalized but aims not to sell a
global product within the context of a local market. Instead it aims to lend
prestige to the product by associating it with the people and the cultural
features of a global power.
Kraidy (1999) points out that since all contemporary cultures are
hybrid we need to accept that if we are to ‘understand the micro-politics of
local/global interactions’. In his view, ‘hybridity is thus construed not as
an in-between zone where global/local power relations are neutralized in
the fuzziness of the mélange but as a zone of symbolic ferment where
power relations are surreptitiously re-inscribed’ (Kraidy 1999: 460). This
seems to be exactly what is occurring in the interpenetration of US (global)
and Turkish (local) culture and the marketing of Cola Turka through
these television commercials.
The answer is mostly no. To better understand this issue, we will need 4. See Geert Hofstede
(1980), Culture’s
to examine the household shopping patterns of Turks and how that Consequences, Beverly
matches up with the target audience for Turkish television commercials. Hills, CA: Sage for a
Milner and Collins’s study (1998) identifies Turkey as a ‘feminine’ detailed description of
his classification of
country when it comes to advertising. They use Hofstede’s4 definition of countries as collectivist
feminine society, which identifies non-materialistic, family-oriented soci- or individualist.
eties where gender roles are distinct as feminine as opposed to masculine
countries, which are more materialistic and where there is more overlap in
gender roles. More specifically, Milner and Collins argue that in masculine
cultures, more men are used for voice-overs and lead characters. Women
are shown mostly indoors and promote those products that are considered
feminine such as beauty products, cooking and cleaning items. Men are
shown doing outdoor activities and in power positions.
However, Milner and Collins also write that gender representation in
Turkish TV commercials is more egalitarian. Based on their comparative
analysis of Turkish, American, Australian and Mexican commercials, they
concluded that ‘in the context of television commercials in the feminine
country of Turkey, there are few differences between gender while in mascu-
line countries these differences are quite marked’. Their study shows that
70 per cent of the people in Turkish commercials are women, which
means that Turks are used to seeing more female roles in television adver-
tising than male. This leads the authors to find that ‘the lack of significant
differences among the sex role portrayal variables does suggest that the
dominant approach is rather egalitarian’ (Milner and Collins 1998: 22).
They advise advertisers to avoid ‘masculine values such as employment/
productivity’ and to promote feminine values, such as relationships (Milner
and Collins 1998: 24).
If Milner and Collins’s findings still hold for current television advertis-
ing practices in Turkey, it raises an important question about the legiti-
macy of Young & Rubicam’s decision to define coke as a masculine
product in a feminine country and their conclusion that men would not
pay attention to female leads/role models. The agency might have consid-
ered the case of the United States, a masculine country, where both Coca-
Cola and Pepsi-Cola featured Britney Spears and Cindy Crawford in their
TV commercials, not only for their fame but because of their feminine
attributes. Instead of invoking practices of the United States as the global
power, they reverted to a local stereotype based on Turkish gender rela-
tionships from the past. And despite the large number of female celebrities,
the agency chose to focus on soccer players as leads in several of their
commercials.
But Young & Rubicam would not have been all that much different in
adopting gender stereotypes in the ad campaign as found by Uray and
Burnaz (2003) in their study of 314 Turkish TV commercials. In that
study the authors found that women appeared in the home and promoted
body products while men appeared in automobile, food/drink products
and outdoor advertising. Men were used for more voice-overs and more
middle-aged men appeared as lead characters while most lead women
characters were young. Furthermore, Uray and Burnaz’s study identified
women as the ‘important traditional buying unit’ who ‘have been keeping
their dominant gender in Turkish television advertisements for the past
ten years’ (Uray and Burnaz 2003: 85). They write that the gender repre-
sentation on Turkish TV commercials has changed considerably (Uray and
Burnaz 2003). Because of the increase in well-educated working women
in Turkey who consequently have increased buying power, along with
helping to spread the influence of western consumer values, Turkey has
experienced a change in consumption and shopping patterns. They point
out that even though social pressure is still there to keep traditional gender
roles, ‘the impact of the changes in the demographic legal and economic
environment has been felt especially in the big cities’ (Uray and Burnaz
2003: 78). Also, the influence of western consumer values along with ‘the
shift from traditional large families toward small nuclear-type families’
contributed considerably to the change in shopping patterns and gender
roles in Turkey (Uray and Burnaz 2003: 78). At the same time, women
have taken on more responsibility in the workplace and in society generally,
and they have inevitably helped to effect a change in the role of men in
Turkish society as well.
Women are not only identified by Durakbasa and Cindoglu (2002) as
the traditional buying unit in Turkey since the 1960s but also as the taste
setters of the Turkish household in all classes in Turkish culture. The rise
of the new malls around the country is one of major reasons for women of
all classes taking part in what is now a more individualistic and material-
istic Turkish culture. According to Durakbasa and Cindoglu, the new mall
provides a safe place, a sort of outside–inside in place of the çarsi or bazaar
which was traditionally a masculine domain in Ottoman times. The
women can stroll and shop freely in the new mall, without having a man
to accompany them as they would in the old days when going to the
çarsi/bazaar and without worrying about being harassed. One of the main
outlets of the globalized market is the mall because it functions as a place
where both men and women consumers can make regular purchases. So
the mall has increased the consumer base in Turkey.
If the Cola Turka ad campaign aimed to tell the West that its citizens
should adopt a Turkish identity, it is not a message that would likely
appeal to most Americans. The message in the various commercials
(under the umbrella of ‘positive nationalism’) is that Turks put women in
their place – in the kitchen – and that men are the decision-makers in the
family while women serve them. The ‘local’ that Americans should aspire
to in the commercials does not represent the reality of the ‘local’ in fact.
The local of today’s Turkey – at least the local of the urban centres – is a
local that looks a lot more like America’s local. It is a site of emancipated
Turkish women who make most consumer decisions for the household
and who may well be combining work with family – as most Americans
are. But the commercials presume otherwise.
The commercials may be assuming that Americans, who dominate the
world with their language and culture while ignoring the languages and
cultures of other countries, really have a desire to return to a life that is
more like that of the Turks (or the Turks in a romanticized past).
Globalization has led them to this terrible state where they cannot appre-
ciate family and neighbourhoods, but they can rediscover a simpler, more
hospitable environment in an authentic Turkish folk culture. As with the
notions of the role of women in Turkish society, other parts of this ‘folk’
5. There is a decade- In setting the commercials outdoors and involving physical activity,
long debate in the art
world related to the
they reinforce the typical portrayal of males in television commercials. As
work and masculinity a graphic designer, Yücel would normally spend the majority of his time in
of Jackson Pollack and an office behind a computer, but the agency chose not to feature him in
Roy Lichtenstein.
Pollock was celebrated
this way. Instead he is taken outside of his office and placed in a field full of
as being more mascu- pencils where he selects one that functions as a weapon. This renders him
line than Lichtenstein, more masculine than he might be in his professional setting.5 The target of
because he worked at
home in his office;
Yücel’s pencil appears to be Umma Thurman, on the Kill Bill poster
hence he was (which Yücel designed). Although the pencil Yücel hurls ends up striking
perceived as being the poster next to Thurman, even if for only a few seconds, the pencil
domesticated and
feminine.
functions as a phallic object that has the potential to conquer Hollywood,
as well one of Hollywood’s female icons. There are no commercials cele-
brating female achievements, Turkish or otherwise, in any of the series of
Cola Turka advertisements to date.
The global sport of soccer/football is an ideal choice for the branding of
Cola Turka. Almost every culture uses sports as a key vehicle for market-
ing a variety of products. Cola Turka is no exception. As described earlier,
the first commercials in the series that were shot in New York, a car full of
Turks waving Turkish flags and shouting ‘Champion Turkey/Sampiyon
Türkiye’ passes Chevy Chase in Times Square. The scene is meant to depict
a national soccer victory. When Chase sits at the diner counter drinking
his coffee, David Brown asks him about Besiktas, a popular Turkish soccer
team and Sergen, one of its famous players. In the next commercial set in
Chevy Chase’s home we have already noted that the grandparents sing a
song that originates in the American baseball culture. A later series of soccer-
focused commercials highlights Pierre van Hooijdonk.
In Turkey, as in many countries, soccer is the sport of men and boys
and an arena where women are excluded. The common stereotype is that
women not only do not like the game, but they cannot understand it. So it
was probably not unusual that women were not featured in the part of the
advertising campaign that used a soccer theme. That might be considered
especially odd since both account managers (Sümer and Gökkan) are
women. But given that soccer is not associated with women – as players or
as fans – it is not unusual that women were excluded from the ads that
carried a soccer theme.
That said, the game of soccer is a global game that according to
Giulianotti and Robertson (2004: 545) includes 250 million direct partici-
pants, an additional 1.4 billion with an interest in the game and a global tele-
vision audience of 33.4 billion (sic) for the World Cup finals. The authors
argue that football ‘constitutes a vital site for the theorization and empirical
exploration of the multidimensional and long-term process of globalization’
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 546). And they further argue that global-
ization of the game is ‘marked culturally by processes of “glocalization”,
whereby local cultures adapt and redefine any global cultural product to suit
their particular needs, beliefs and customs’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004:
546). Robertson, who was the first to apply the term ‘glocalization’ to glob-
alization theory, writes that the global game becomes the glocal game at
international tournaments where ‘thousands of different supporter groups
commingle, with each nation displaying distinctive kinds of dress, song,
music and patterns of behaviour’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 547).
The authors analyse various aspects of the game from a glocal perspective but
the one of most interest to this article is the ‘transnational circulation of
labour, information, capital and commodities that can underpin non-national
forms of cultural particularity’ (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 549).
It is this flow of labour that brought Pierre van Hooijdonk to the
Istanbul team, Fenerbahçe. And the Alametifarika agency saw in him a
way to sell Cola Turka. To the Turks soccer is a serious matter (Holland
2001: 37; also noted by Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 546) Holland
says that as in Britain or in Latin America, each match is either a national
battle or an identity issue (with a particular team). Bora and Erdogan
(1993: 223) argue that the construction of Turkish ‘national’ identity and
the beginning of the history of soccer in Turkey are simultaneous. And
soccer can also be thought of as a commodity whose commodification is
supported by the globalization process.
Within this context, soccer and Cola Turka, both global commodities,
are supplementary aspects of world capitalism. The explicit relationship
between Coca-Cola and capitalism, or American imperialism, as the ulti-
mate extension of capitalism, was adopted as part of the Cola Turka cam-
paign perspective. Thus Cola Turka, or the Cola of Turkey, was the central
concept of the commercials (Gökkan 2004).
So it is fitting that van Hooijdonk is transformed into a Turk, much like
Chevy Chase. But in the reversal of the usual glocalization process, the Dutch
national player represents the Turkish culture and identity in the commer-
cials. Aktay (1999) says that soccer players belong to their teams and
represent a collective identity, not their individual identities. Therefore all
Turkish players who play for European soccer teams are referred to as the
representatives of Turkey in Europe (Futbolda Avrupa’daki Temsilcimiz).
And the slogan for Cola Turka in the commercials featuring van
Hooijdonk is ‘the only Turkish star in the European league’. Van
Hooijdonk represents the local. Or as Sümer said, ‘We can’t go to the Cup
but we can send someone, the Dutch (now also Turkish) player.’ The
Turkish team was eliminated from the European Cup competition but this
was a way for the country to participate. And van Hooijdonk represented
the collective Turkish identity as a hybrid Turk/Dutch player when he
played for the Dutch national team.
Aktay (1999: 5) claims that ‘soccer is in the service of national, ethnic,
gender and even religious identities’. With the transformation of a gavur
(non-Muslim) to a Turk, the psychology of Turkish society is satisfied
while we are shown that culture is a more important tie than kinship
or biological heritage. The internalizing of Turkish culture is sufficient for
becoming a Turk or feeling like a Turk. In this process a foreign soccer
player becomes ‘one of us (bizden biri)’ in the ads.
Though the ads that featured van Hooijdonk may have appealed to
male consumers, women saw them as overly macho (Sümer 2004).
Subsequent ads featured a young girl and her grandmother and a couple
in a romantic mood in a New York apartment. It is not known how suc-
cessful these ads were with the women who were put off by soccer-themed
commercials, however. But in 2005 a second soccer star, Emre Belezoglu,
a star player for Galatasaray team, was featured in the commercials
described previously where the local hero made good globally.
United States have shown a near steady decline from a high of 52 per cent
in 2000 to a low of 9 per cent in 2007. A slightly higher favourability rat-
ing was given to the American people (13 per cent), while a more positive
rating was given to US movies, music and television (22 per cent) in the
2007 poll. These negative views of the United States and of Americans most
surely derive from opposition to the war in Iraq and its consequences for
Turkey’s security and economic well-being. But when advertising capital-
izes on these feelings, the message that buying Cola Turka will help bring
an end to the war and allow Turks to act on their anti-American feelings
through the purchase of a soft drink, the concept of national identity
becomes conflated with consumerism. The more favourable opinion of US
media expressed in the poll is also reflected in the use of American actors as
stars in the narratives of the commercials for Cola Turka. This analysis
demonstrates that advertising may have a wider impact than just promot-
ing higher levels of consumerism in the viewing public. It may well extend
to the defining of nationhood in the global market.
References
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Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Aktay, Y. (1999), ‘Formanin Rengi Sermayenin Rengine Karisirsa: Futbol
Dünyasinin Metalasmasinda Son Durumlar ve Sponsorluk’, http://www.
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Accessed April 2005.
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Tribune, 15 February, p. 4.
Askew, K. and Wilk, R. (2002), The Anthropology of Media, Malden, MA: Blackwell
Press.
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Finkel, A. (2003), ‘Made in Turkey: Mix soda, a star, nationalism and stir’, The New
York Times, 10 August, p. B01.
Foster, R.J. (2002), Materializing the Nation: Commodities, Consumption and Media in
Papua New Guinea, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Giulianotti, R. and Robertson, R. (2004), ‘The Globalization of Football: A Study
in the Glocalization of the “Serious life”’, The British Journal of Sociology, 55: 4,
pp. 545–68.
Gökkan, Eda (2004), personal interview, July, Young & Rubicam, Istanbul.
Hofstede, Geert (1980), Culture’s Consequences, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Holland, B. (2001), ‘Bir Futbol ülkesi Disardan Bakis. Evet. . . Maalesef ’ in T. Bora,
(ed.) Takimdan Ayri Duz Kosu. Istanbul: Iletisim, pp. 37–45.
Kraidy, M. (1999), ‘The Global, the Local and the Hybrid: A Native Ethnography of
Glocalization’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 16, pp. 456–76.
Maynard, M. (2003), ‘From Global to Glocal: How Gillette’s SensorExcel
Accommodates to Japan’, Keio Communication Review, 25, pp. 57–75.
Milovanovic, G. (1997), ‘Marketing Dimensions of Global Advertising’, Facta
Universitatis, 1: 5, pp. 71–78.
Milner, L.M. and Collins, J.M. (1998), ‘Sex Role Portrayals in Turkish Television
Advertisement: An Examination in an International Context’, Journal of
Euromarketing, 7: 1, pp. 1–28.
Ohmae, K. (1990), The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked
Economy, New York: Harper Business.
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Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey, 27 June, Pew Global Attitudes
Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf
Accessed 9 October 2007.
Robertson, R. (1995), ‘Glocalization: Time-Space Homogeneity-Heterogeneity’, in
M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds), Global Modernities, London:
Sage, pp. 27–44.
Sümer, Y. (2004), personal interview, July, Alametifarika, Istanbul, Turkey.
Uray, N. and Burnaz, S. (2003), ‘An Analysis of the portrayal of gender roles in
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Suggested citation
Ogan, C.L., Çiçek, F. and Kaptan, Y. (2007), ‘Reverse glocalization? Marketing a
Turkish cola in the shadow of a giant’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media
Research 1: 1, pp. 47–62, doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.47/1
Contributor details
Christine Ogan is Professor of Journalism and Informatics at Indiana University
where she teaches courses in international communication and social informatics.
She conducts research on Turkish migrants in western Europe and their uses of
traditional and new media, and on gender and IT higher education. She is the
author of Communication and Identity in the Diaspora: Turkish Migrants in Amsterdam
and their Use of Media and numerous articles in communication journals. Contact:
970 E. 7th St., School of Journalism, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408.
E-mail: ogan@indiana.edu
Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.63/1
Abstract Keywords
This article examines US mainstream press coverage given to the aftermath of the Camp David
Camp David negotiations in July 2000, offering a critical perspective on the events critical theory
and reactions to the failed summit. In doing so the article is able to identify and negotiations
highlight the detrimental effects of inaccurate reporting of the Israeli–Palestinian Palestine
conflict in the US press. It demonstrates how this misrepresentation of failure at Israel
Camp David has contributed to the ever-decreasing prospects for a just and Israeli–Palestinian
viable solution to the conflict. This important snapshot of the long-standing conflict
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, it argues, accurately encapsulates the flawed nature of media
many dominant ‘truths’ of the debate over the conflict. Consequently it can provide occupied territories
a critical lens through which to draw broader conclusions about the issues that Oslo accords
continue to impede and undermine the prospects for balanced negotiations and peace process
peace in the region.
The conclusions reached through the analysis of mainstream US press reactions
to the Camp David summit are subsequently contextualized through an exploration
of the largely neglected issue of water sharing in the Palestinian Territories. The
celebrated water-sharing agreements in the Oslo period are shown to have failed to
bring about any meaningful change from the discriminatory water-distribution
policies pursued by Israel in the occupied territories between 1967 and 1993.
The article thus demonstrates how US mainstream press reactions to the failed
Camp David summit simply reinforced the misleading impression of Israeli coop-
eration and compromise which masks a historically grounded policy of domina-
tion over the Palestinians. It concludes that only an approach grounded in critical
theory, emphasizing different conceptions of security in the region, can offer its
people a brighter and more peaceful future.
Explanations for and coverage of what happened at the Camp David nego-
tiations in 2000 have been subject to greatly differing accounts. Due to
the verbal, rather than written nature of the negotiations in July 2000,
apportioning the blame for failure has often been a highly subjective exer-
cise. However, with the benefit of hindsight and the growing number of
works detailing the ‘generous offer’ proposed at Camp David, it is possible
to paint an accurate picture. More importantly, an accurate assessment of
the deal offered at Camp David can be directly compared with the discourse
that has dominated newspaper editorials in the United States. Such a com-
parative analysis is a crucial component for helping to discard some of the
‘myths’ that continue to exacerbate the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and
shape the United States’ role in Israel/Palestine.
1. For a representative This article will begin, therefore, by highlighting dominant strands of
sample of this
growing literature
thought about the Camp David summit and subsequent events within
see: Wolfsfeld, Media newspaper editorials in the United States. This will provide the foundation
and Political Conflict, by which to construct my critique, which will contrast these dominant
especially chapters 3,
5 and 6; Bennett,
discourses with a more balanced and detailed assessment of the then Israeli
W. Lance and Paletz, Prime Minister, Ehud Barak’s offer. It is important, furthermore, to contex-
David L. (eds), Taken tualize the summit in the background of Barak’s premiership and the entire
by Storm. The Media,
Public Opinion, and US
peace process. A critical examination of the Oslo process, primarily using
Foreign Policy in the evidence of ‘cooperation’ on water resources, will highlight how Camp
Gulf War (Chicago, David encapsulates a continuation of the Israeli policy of domination under
University of Chicago,
1994); Chomsky,
the guise of cooperation and compromise. The juxtaposition of dominant
N., Herman, E.S., United States press narrative and critical analysis of the Oslo ‘peace process’ –
Manufacturing encapsulated by the Camp David summit – demonstrates that dominant
Consent. The Political
Economy of the Mass
opinions in the newspapers denote a significant gap between myth and
Media. Second Edition reality concerning the nature of the conflict.
(New York: Pantheon
Books, 2002).
The United States media
The news media provides its readers/viewers/listeners with a window into
issues and events taking place in the world. Like any window, however, it
only provides its audience with a limited perspective and interpretation of
events. These media ‘frames’ are, according to W.A. Gamson, ‘a central
organising idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is
at issue’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 31). In the United States, and indeed in any coun-
try, the framing of an issue by the news media is an extremely powerful way
of defining relevant ‘truths’. Warren P. Strobel has argued, with some force,
that ‘[…] CNN […] can be an awesomely powerful, even frightening, tool
[…] even in a democratic society’ (Strobel 1997: 6). A burgeoning literature
attesting to the potential importance of the media, in all its forms, to issues
such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, presents a strong reason for investi-
gating its possible impact on the prospects for peace in the Middle East.1
According to Iyengar and Simon, ‘research has shown that individuals
habitually refer to issues or events “in the news” when diagnosing current
social and political ills’ (Iyengar and Simon 1994: 169). The ability of the
mainstream media to put certain issues ‘on the agenda’, whilst marginalizing
or ignoring other perspectives, offers a powerful case for taking seriously the
potential impact of dominant frames about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
The importance of dominant media frames in shaping public opinion is not
absolute. However, it does suggest that the media has a potentially important
role to play in creating dominant terms of reference about particular issues.
The newspaper media will be the central object of reference in this
article. Although it is only one aspect of the modern media, the printed
word and photographs ‘continue to have a distinct impact of their own,
notwithstanding the growing dominance of television and the emergence of
CNN and its brethren’ (Strobel 1997: 15). I intend to use the work of
Chomsky and Herman as a precedent to focus on articles from the New York
Times and the Washington Post. In their important work on the mass media,
Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and Herman set out to look at the United
States mass media as a whole. They quickly illustrate that the mass media is
increasingly subject to a centralizing process, with the result that at present
‘two dozen firms control nearly the entirety of media experienced by most
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US citizens’ (Herman and Chomsky 2002: xiii). Also, with the ‘reduction of 2. Edward Said has
undoubtedly been
resources devoted to journalism’ in the modern age (Herman and Chomsky the most prominent
2002: xiii), large international newspapers like the New York Times and the of those who draw
Washington Post arguably play a major part in constructing dominant media attention to the
tendency of the ‘West’
frames for international affairs such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. to misrepresent and
Seemingly as a result of these factors, the authors repeatedly use the stereotype ‘the
Washington Post and the New York Times as their main source for analysis. Orient’. See: Said,
Edward W.1978,
The US mass media is a particularly interesting case study as it is located 1994, 1997.
within, and partly representative of, a well-documented tendency for cul-
3. The contention I
tural stereotyping of Islam by the West.2 While all media framing ‘tells the make about the US
story’ in a particular way, it is my contention here that the dominant and media here is not
unyielding stance of the US mass media towards a particular framing of the an absolute claim.
Resistance to the
failure at Camp David has constituted an obstacle to a US approach that pro-Israeli lobby
could promote a just and lasting solution in Israel/Palestine.3 It is crucial, does exist, just as
however, to recognize that the representation of the Camp David failure in challenges to the
dominant media
the American press is only one aspect, albeit an important one, of the per- frame exist. It is
ception and presentation of the Middle East in America. simply my contention
that certain
discourses in the
Creating the myth of Camp David United States enjoy
Adopting the narrative offered by President Clinton and Prime Minister wider acceptance and
Barak, the United States press was quick to confirm that Yasir Arafat legitimacy than other
discourses.
was guilty of not ‘taking the extra steps’ necessary for peace with Israel. A
New York Times editorial published only the morning after the summit
ended, assured its readers that ‘The larger burden lies with Mr Arafat’,
and that ‘If there is ever to be a durable peace, Mr Arafat must reconsider
his unyielding approach to Jerusalem’ (New York Times Editorial Desk
2000). The Washington Post editorial on the same day offered similar
analysis, lamenting Mr Arafat’s ‘inflexibility’ and unwillingness to compro-
mise (Washington Post Editorial 2000a). On the issue of Jerusalem the edi-
tors explained that, in order to ‘appreciate the magnitude of this tragedy,
one has to first appreciate the scope of the proposed Israeli compromise on
Jerusalem – the issue over which the talks foundered’ (Washington Post
Editorial 2000a). This strongly suggested a ‘compromise’ of far-reaching
and unprecedented concessions by the Israeli side.
As the stability of the region disintegrated in the months following the
summit, culminating in the September outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada,
newspaper editorials habitually looked back on the Camp David summit
seeking to explain what had gone wrong. As Seth Ackerman (2001) has
pointed out, the Washington Post on 11 October 2000 editorialized that the
peace process had rested on two premises: ‘first, that Israel would be prepared
to relinquish control over Palestinian land and lives; and, second, that the
Palestinian leadership would be willing to attain its independence alone’.
However, for Washington Post editors, ‘The deep compromises Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak offered at the Camp David summit proved the first
assumption correct’, while the new intifada of September 2000 ‘proved’
that ‘The second premise […] has now been shattered’ (Washington Post
Editorial 2000b). Ackerman proposes that Barak’s generosity (and Arafat’s
ingratitude) was encapsulated in a Washington Post headline on 9 October
that read, ‘Barak’s Open Hand Now a Clenched Fist’ (Ackerman 2001: 68).
For the article’s author, ‘even in the view of the most dovish Israelis, Barak
4. See, for example, made Arafat a good deal at the US-brokered Camp David talks in July, and
Hass (2001) and
Ibish (2001).
Arafat has repaid a serious effort at negotiations with attacks on Israeli
positions’ (Ackerman 2001: 68).
New York Times regular columnists Thomas Friedman (chief diplomatic
correspondent of the New York Times) and William Safire regularly assured
their readers that Arafat was to blame for the rejection of Barak’s ‘generous’
offer at Camp David and for the subsequent slide into violence in the
Middle East. On 27 July 2000, Safire was unequivocal in his explanation
of the failure to reach agreement at Camp David. In a column entitled
‘Why is Arafat Smiling?’, Safire maintained that Arafat was smiling
‘because [he] gave up nothing’, while ‘Israel’s leader, prodded by a
US president, made concessions that broke pledges Barak made in his election
campaign a year ago’ (Safire 2000). Thus, Safire concluded, ‘You have to
sympathise with Barak […] He offered Arafat virtually all of the West
Bank, and was scorned […]’ (Safire 2000). Thomas Friedman has frequently
offered his interpretation of the disintegrating situation between Israel
and the Palestinians. For example, on 13 October 2000, he stated that
‘Mr Clinton pointedly, deliberately and rightly stated that the Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak had offered unprecedented compromises at the summit’
(Friedman 2000). Such praise for the efforts of Barak was complemented
by the familiar formula of contrast with the ingratitude of the Palestinians:
‘But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to acknowledge is that today’s
Israeli prime minister was offering them a dignified exit’ (Friedman 2000).
Friedman repeatedly emphasized this view, using such phrases as
‘offer[ing] Palestinians the unthinkable’ (Friedman 2001a), and ‘historic
compromise proposal’ (Friedman 2001b).
Washington Post columnists Richard Cohen and Charles Krauthammer
offered similar analysis. In reflecting on the Camp David summit, Cohen
complained that ‘With Arafat, it is hardly clear that he even wants peace.
After all, he rejected a dream offer […] that would have given him almost
everything short of the conversion of the Jews to Islam’ (Cohen 2001).
Krauthammer is less sparing of Arafat, displaying hostility even towards
Barak, who ‘is down to his last chip’, having ‘given away […] all his other
bargaining chips […] at Camp David in a fit of shocking preemptive conces-
sions’ (Krauthammer 2000). The ‘generosity’ in the Camp David talks, for
Krauthammer, bordered on stupidity as Barak ‘[refuted] for all time the
Jews’ reputation for shrewd bargaining’ (Krauthammer 2000). Other
Washington Post columnists have also been firm in their conclusions. For
example, Lally Weymouth stated that ‘an intransigent Arafat turned down
a deal’, while ‘a courageous Barak risked everything for a peace agreement’
(Weymouth 2000).
Despite the overwhelming number of editorial columns supporting the
‘generous offer’ narrative of Camp David, the counter-narrative refuting
these claims has found some expression in US newspapers. Perhaps the best
example of this ‘revisionist’ viewpoint is found in Deborah Sontag’s special
report for the New York Times, on 26 July 2001 entitled ‘Quest for Middle
East Peace: How and Why it Failed’. Indeed, one-off opinion columns in the
Washington Post and New York Times by critics such as Amira Hass and
Hussein Ibish testify to variations on the dominant themes found in the
US press.4 In spite of the isolated nature of ‘revisionist’ articles in the press,
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Ackerman highlights the existence of heated debate questioning the impar- 5. For example,
Ackerman testifies to
tiality of the US press. For Ackerman, ‘while the American press is per- angry letters, formal
ceived abroad as being unambiguously sympathetic to Israel, the most complaints, cancelled
visible form of media criticism in the United States takes the opposite view – subscriptions and
even alleged sale
that the US press is constantly propagandising for the Palestinian cause’ of CNN stock by
(Ackerman 2001: 70–71). Widespread pro-Palestinian coverage, however, American Jews to
is unlikely in an environment where a strong pro-Israeli lobby exerts con- protest against
coverage of
siderable pressure on media companies, which criticize Israel.5 Israel/Palestine
Nevertheless, it is clear that the narrative holding the Palestinians (although this was
(and especially Arafat) to blame for the failure at Camp David has taken later denied by CNN).
See Ackerman
a firm hold. Writing for the Washington Post a year after the summit, Lee (2001).
Hockstader provided a neat summary of the dominant American discourse
6. The most difficult
about Camp David: ‘It may be too little too late to change any minds, but issues to resolve in the
the Palestinians have begun making an impassioned case that they are Israeli–Palestinian
not to blame for the collapse of the US-mediated peace talks last year at conflict include the
status of Jerusalem,
Camp David and the subsequent descent into 10 months of violence’ the Palestinian
(Hockstader 2001). As the title of this article suggests (‘A Different Take refugee problem and
on Camp David Collapse: Palestinian Disputes Conventional Wisdom on the ‘right of return’,
borders and
Breakdown of US-Led Peace Talks’), a whole year had passed of almost settlements.
unchallenged ‘conventional wisdom’ in the American press. I must
7. There are ample
therefore turn a critical eye on this ‘conventional wisdom’ with a historical accounts of
detailed account of the Camp David proposals and the difficulties that the difficulties
surrounded it. experienced by both
peoples during the
Oslo years, which
‘The brilliant offer Israel never made’ largely use standard
After a problematic interim period of seven years, final status negotiations accounts of settlement
were undertaken at Camp David. The logic of the Oslo ‘peace process’ – to expansion, the
deteriorating
enact confidence-building measures between Israel and the Palestinians economic situation
while putting off the most difficult issues that represented the major obsta- of Palestinians, and
cles to peace6 – had not enjoyed the success that was hoped for when Arafat difficulty of movement
between Palestinian
and Rabin famously shook hands on the White House lawn in 1993. towns and cities to
Throughout the interim period militant Palestinians continued to attack illustrate their point.
Israeli settlements. For its part, Israel pursued its expansion of illegal settle- See, for example,
Shlaim (2000:
ments in the West Bank and Gaza, reneged on promises to redeploy out of 546–95); Giacaman
Palestinian towns and villages, enacted curfews and border closures in the and Lonning (1998).
occupied territories often making everyday life for Palestinians difficult and
miserable.7
Barak’s personal record since becoming Israel’s Prime Minister in
1999 also left doubts over his ability to find a just resolution to the con-
flict. From the very beginning his words to the Israeli electorate did not
promise a generous peace:
The time for [making] peace has come. Not peace from a position of weakness
but peace in strength and security […] We will move quickly toward a sepa-
ration from the Palestinians by drawing four lines in the sand: once and for all
a unified Jerusalem, under our sovereignty, as the eternal capital of Israel; in
no case will we withdraw to the 1967 borders; no foreign army on the west
bank of the Jordan; most of the settlement dwellers in Judea-Samaria to be
housed in settlement units under our sovereignty.
(Enderlin 2002: 112)
8. Resolutions 194 These pledges to the Israeli people, made on 17 May 1999, aptly demon-
(General Assembly),
242 and 338
strated that the ‘minimum demands’ of the Israelis directly contradicted the
(Security Council) long-held Palestinian ‘minimum demand’ of peace based on UN resolutions.8
stipulated a full Israeli Moreover, Barak’s questionable priorities built an atmosphere of mistrust
withdrawal from the
territories illegally
and indignation amongst the Palestinians. For example, the head of the
occupied in 1967, Israeli delegation to the Palestinians, Oded Eran, raised concerns over
and a just solution Barak’s prioritization of peace with Syria over peace with the Palestinians:
to the Palestinian
refugee problem.
‘Frankly, I didn’t like this idea of according priority to Syria […] I told him
[Barak] it was the Palestinian problem that was at the centre of the
9. For example
see Enderlin (2002:
Israeli–Arab conflict’ (Enderlin 2002: 135). For Deborah Sontag, Barak’s
231–32). Enderlin ‘peacemaker’ credentials were belied by his choice of the settlers’ representa-
describes an incident tives, the ultra right-wing National Religious Party (NRP), in his coalition
where the Palestinian
delegation received a
(Sontag 2001). Having been offered the housing ministry, the NRP quickly
proposal twice in the moved to expand the settlement enterprise in the occupied territories.
same evening. Once Additional delays in addressing core Palestinian concerns such as the imple-
directly from the
Israelis and again as
mentation of the 1998 Wye Agreement (which Barak chose to renegotiate),
a ‘suggestion’ from again suggested quite the opposite of the early reassuring signs that the
the US mediators. Palestinians were looking for (Agha and Malley 2001).
Thus, it was in this atmosphere of mutual distrust and disillusionment
that the Camp David summit was convened. Eyewitness accounts of the
summit strongly suggest that even the intimate setting of the President’s
private retreat in Maryland was not enough to dissipate the atmosphere
between the two most important negotiators, Arafat and Barak. Charles
Enderlin recounted that, ‘To avoid having the Palestinians transform Israeli
positions into a firm commitment, his [Barak’s] proposals will be submitted
to the Palestinians through American mediation. He himself will not have
any face-to-face meetings with Arafat, who might seize on some minor
verbal discrepancy and have it influence the talks’ (Enderlin 2002: 178). Cold
personal relations between Arafat and Barak invited further commentary by
Enderlin, who described a meal at the summit in which Barak was seated
between Arafat and Clinton’s daughter, Chelsea: ‘During the two hours that
the meal lasts, he [Barak] does not once turn toward the head of the PLO’
(Enderlin 2002: 214). For Robert Malley, who was present at the summit,
Barak’s unconventional tactics at Camp David proved confusing and often
misleading. Selby maintains that there was no direct negotiation between
Arafat and Barak, ‘with most of the ideas being confusingly passed on by
American mediators’ (Selby 2003a: 185). Therefore, ‘it was often unclear to
the Palestinians whether they were being handed US or Israeli proposals’
(Selby 2003a: 185). In some cases it is clear that Israeli proposals were actu-
ally being suggested as US plans fostering mistrust amongst the Palestinian
delegation.9 Furthermore, Barak was unwilling to reveal his final position on
any issue unless the ‘endgame’ was in sight. As a consequence, ‘each Israeli
position was cast as unmovable’, only to be continually ‘reassessed’ as the
talks progressed (Agha and Malley 2001). Bottom lines, which turned out to
be false bottoms, and a lack of personal contact between the negotiators
caused confusion, tension and ambiguity. Thus Malley and Agha conclude
that ‘The final and largely unnoticed consequence of Barak’s approach is
that, strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer’ (Agha and Malley
2001). A close look at individual Israeli proposals during the summit further
corroborates the absence of a ‘golden’ Israeli offer in any form.
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that were supposed to compensate the Palestinians for the loss of prime agricul-
tural land [and access to most of the precious water aquifiers in the West Bank]
in the West Bank merely added insult to injury. The only territory offered to
Palestinian negotiators consisted of stretches of desert adjacent to the Gaza Strip
[the Halutza Sand Region] that Israel currently uses for toxic waste dumping.
(Clark 2002)
Therefore, not only were the proposed territorial swaps of unequal qualita-
tive value, but, by all accounts, Barak never offered swaps of equal quanti-
tative value either. One proposal suggested that 9 per cent of land annexed
by Israel for settlements would be compensated with only 1 per cent of
land from Israel (Enderlin 2002: 232). With regard to the settlements
themselves, Barak’s annexation proposals included the area between the
settlements in anticipation of natural growth which, as Tanya Reinhart
highlights, contained countless Palestinian villages and ‘approximately
120,000 Palestinian residents’ (Reinhart 2002: 33).
On the sensitive issue of the Jordan Valley, the New York Times and the
Washington Post were particularly misleading. Rather than having ‘surren-
dered the Jordan Valley […] that buffers Israel from the Arab tank armies to
the east’ (although given Israel’s overwhelming military superiority in the
10. The suggested terms region and the backing of the world’s only superpower the ‘threat from the
for the future of the
Jordan Valley are
east’ is more rhetorical than real) (Krauthammer 2000), Barak insisted on
illustrated in Enderlin numerous measures, intent on securing Israeli interests.10 Barak proposed a
(2002: 248). ‘re-evaluation’ of the Jordan Valley problem after six to twelve years. However,
the historical record of Israel during the Oslo years deemed this re-evaluation
improbable. Israel had consistently cited ‘vital security concerns’ for reneging
on many of the promises made during the interim period. At Camp David,
Barak asked for trust in the good intentions of Israel of which, for the
Palestinians, there was little historical precedent. In return for this trust
Barak was unwilling to afford any trust in the intentions of the Palestinians.
On the refugee issue, Arafat would later say that there was no ‘serious
discussion’ at Camp David (Sontag 2001). Of what was discussed, it is clear
that Barak refused to accept Israel’s moral or historical responsibility for the
creation of the refugee problem. In an interview with Benny Morris after
Camp David, Barak maintained that, ‘We cannot allow even one refugee
back on the basis of the “right of return”, and we cannot accept historical
responsibility for the creation of the problem’ (Morris 2002). This opinion
reflects a long-standing concern in Israeli politics. According to Benvenisti,
successive Israeli governments have claimed that an admission of responsi-
bility for the refugee problem would legitimize a ‘right of return’ under
which Israel would be overwhelmed with demands that ‘would threaten the
Jewish nature of the Jewish state’ (Benvenisti 2000: 324). The myth that
the refugee problem was created by the Arab armies ‘who ordered the
Palestinians to leave their homes to clear the way for a victorious campaign’
(Benvenisti 2000: 324), although substantially discredited by existing
Israeli literature, is a central belief that Barak was unable to overcome at
Camp David. Although full implementation of the ‘right of return’ is unre-
alistic, it has rightly been argued that a genuine Israeli admission of moral
responsibility for the injustice to the Palestinians would greatly improve the
chances of reconciliation (Benvenisti 2000: 329). However, the family
reunification scheme proposed at Camp David, allowing some 10,000
refugees back to their homes, was offered not as a Palestinian ‘right’ but as
an Israeli gesture. Barak’s proposal that the refugees be compensated by
money paid by the international community, simply confirmed Israel’s
reluctance to accept responsibility. By the end of the summit the ‘generous’
offer consisted of an unspecified ‘satisfactory solution’ to the refugee problem,
suggested by Clinton, not Barak (Enderlin 2002: 232).
On Jerusalem, reports from the Camp David summit have proved
unclear. Undoubtedly, Barak did come closer to Palestinian demands than
any previous Israeli leader. However, editorial columns in the American
press have fostered a substantial misunderstanding about the nature of
Barak’s proposal. The overall impression made by editorials in the New York
Times and the Washington Post is that the proposed Palestinian state would
have sovereignty or ‘control’ over Arab East Jerusalem. Closer inspections of
the proposal’s details suggest something altogether less generous. First, as
Seth Ackerman correctly highlights, ‘none of [the] accounts reminded
readers that East Jerusalem is among the occupied territories from which
Israel was required to withdraw under UN Resolution 242, the resolution
officially governing the Oslo process and therefore the Camp David talks’
(Ackerman 2001: 68). Thus, he continues, ‘any parts of East Jerusalem
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that would remain under Israeli sovereignty in a final settlement would rep- 11. Pressman lists all the
resent Palestinian concessions, not the other way around’ (Ackerman outlying areas that
would have been
2001: 68). Though clearly a contemptible offer, it was the Palestinians who under full Palestinian
received the blame for turning down Israel’s ‘concessions’. sovereignty. See
Barak’s Jerusalem proposal was fractured and convoluted, offering a mix- Pressman (2003: 18).
ture of full sovereignty in some areas but only ‘functional autonomy’ in oth- 12. In fact, during the
ers. Furthermore, large blocs of land in East Jerusalem would remain under Oslo period, Israel
repeatedly made the
Israeli sovereignty. According to Pressman only the outlying areas of Old City ‘off-limits’ to
Jerusalem, such as Abu Dis, Al-Asawiyah and Samir Amis, would be Palestinian
afforded full Palestinian sovereignty.11 On the other hand, the core Arab non-residents in the
name of security.
neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem – al-Shaykh Jarrah, al-Suwwanah, al-Tur,
Salah-al-Din Street, Bab al-Amud (Damascus Gate), Ra’s al-Amud, and 13. See, for example New
York Times Editorial
Silwan would be under Palestinian ‘functional autonomy’ but remain under Desk (2000).
Israeli sovereignty. ‘Functional autonomy’, as the interim years of Oslo had
14. It is plausible to
proved, was not the same as sovereignty. For example, Israeli sovereign con- assume (as Arafat did
trol over the West Bank and Gaza had enabled them to enact repeated border at Camp David) that
closures and restrictive travel arrangements making everyday life extremely Arafat did not have
the authority from
difficult for the Palestinians. Many of the residents in the functionally the Muslim world to
autonomous Palestinian areas of Jerusalem would have to pass through give permanent sover-
Israel to reach Palestine. In a similar vein, access for Palestinians to the Old eignty of the Haram
al-Sharif to Israel – an
City and the holy places in Jerusalem would be dependent on Israel, as it had action which would
been since the war of 1967.12 be opposed by the
The proposed status of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount is also mis- Muslim world.
represented in the dominant US media narrative. Barak’s offer to give the
new state of Palestine ‘control’ over the Muslim holy sites in the Old City,
duly reported by the editorial desks of the New York Times and Washington
Post,13 was again misleading. Satisfaction for either side on the issue of the
Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount will never be easy to find, given that it is a
site of great importance to both Judaism and Islam.14 However, the con-
tention that ‘custodianship’ for the Palestinians but sovereignty to Israel
was a ‘generous concession’ clearly understates the fundamental disparity
between sovereignty and ‘custodianship’. Every formula conceived at
Camp David was stymied by the underlying dogma that Israel would have
ultimate sovereignty over the land.
In the final analysis, the specifics of the Camp David proposal, combined
with Israel’s historical approach to the ‘peace process’, give reasonable
cause to doubt the intention of generosity with which the American media
credits the Israeli government. However, it is not possible to explain these
events in isolation from the broader structures and relations of politics and
political economy. Analysis of the Oslo ‘peace process’ and the historical
dynamics of the Israeli–Palestinian relationship will offer crucial insights
into the events at Camp David. A broader contextual frame will show the
conflict as a product, ‘whose roots are in patterns of capitalist development
and patterns of state formation and state-society relations’, rather than the
product of cultural norms, values and ideas (Selby 2003a: 8).
15. This argument is There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the Oslo ‘peace process’ was
made in Selby
(2003b: 130).
designed to achieve exactly that. Selby refers to this policy as ‘Dressing up
domination as cooperation’ (Selby 2003b). In his meticulously researched
thesis on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Selby convincingly contends that
water sharing and cooperation in the Holy Land offers a revealing insight
into the ‘peace process’. This insight highlights continuity in Israel’s
approach to managing the occupied territories before and after 1993. Thus,
Selby shows that the ‘peace process’ simply repackaged the occupation
giving it formal legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
The evidence presented by Selby stressing the continuities rather than
changes in Israeli water policies between the ‘pre-Oslo’ and ‘Oslo’ periods
is indeed illuminating. For an understanding of the position of the Oslo
peace process it is important to have an appreciation of the situation from
1967. After the occupation of 1967, Israel gained overall control of West
Bank water resources while the Palestinians simply became implementers
of Israeli policy. Israeli domination of these water resources had the direct
result of unequal distribution between Palestinian and Israeli population
centres. For example, by 1995 one Israeli estimate held that ‘the average
West Bank settler was in receipt of twelve times as much water as the aver-
age Palestinian’, while ‘peripheral and high-lying houses would go with-
out piped supplies for a period of three or more months each summer’
(Selby 2003b: 131). Similarly, the cost of piped supplies throughout the
region was based on equally discriminatory policies, where ‘Palestinians
would be charged much more for a cubic metre of water than Israelis’
(Selby 2003b: 128).
The alleged change in Israeli–Palestinian water relations began during
the Oslo peace process in the form of the Oslo II Agreement in September
1995. The proposed joint management system, stipulated in the rhetoric
of the agreement, was initially considered a ‘major breakthrough’. However,
Selby highlights little change for the Palestinians and marked continuity
in Israeli policy.
What then, did the proposed joint management system do to improve
this ‘apartheid-style’ distribution of the regions water resources? The
short answer for Selby is ‘very little’. First, ‘given that most local water
supply and infrastructural management within the West Bank was
already being undertaken by Palestinians […] the seeming novelty of
Oslo II’s co-ordinated management system was largely illusory’ (Selby
2003a: 107). Moreover, rather than granting the Palestinians control
over the West Bank’s water supplies, Oslo II only granted them responsi-
bilities in the management of local water supplies, leaving overall con-
trol in the hands of Israel. Thus, as Selby concludes, the agreement
‘merely formalized a supply management system which had been in
operation for years’ (Selby 2003a: 107). In terms of water supply itself
the Oslo II agreement stipulated that the Palestinians would solely be in
charge of systems that did not supply Israelis, while Israel would be in
charge of all other systems. With the infrastructural integration of the
years of occupation already in place, however, and as most supply net-
works were linked to at least one Israeli settlement, Israel remained in
sole control of almost all of the supply lines and all of the deep wells that
had been drilled since the 1980s.15
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On water prices, Oslo II promised that ‘in the case of purchase of one 16. Quoted in Selby
(2003a: 108).
side from the other, the purchaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by
the supplier, including the cost of production at the source and the con- 17. Edward Said offers
extensive
veyance all the way to the point of delivery’.16 While this sounds fair on commentary on
first impression, it quickly becomes apparent, Selby argues, that with the the fall in living
Israelis in control of the entire water network in the West Bank they would standards and the
gradual destruction
always be the suppliers and the Palestinians always the purchasers. Thus, of the Palestinian
as the agreement only applied to transactions between supplier and economy during
purchaser, Israeli settlers were free to continue to buy water at highly sub- the Oslo years.
See, for example,
sidized rates while Palestinians were forced to buy water at the ‘full real Said (2002).
cost’, ‘legitimising a discriminatory pricing policy that had existed well
before 1995’ (Selby 2003a: 108).
Perhaps the most revealing note to make about the Oslo II agreement is
illustrated by Norman Finkelstein. For Finkelstein,
the textual claim that Oslo II preserves the territorial ‘integrity’ of the West
Bank and Gaza as a ‘single territorial unit’, is mockingly belied by the map’s
[green] and [pink] blotches denoting relative degrees of Palestinian control
awash in a sea of white denoting total Israeli sovereignty.
(Finkelstein 2003: 173)
The contrast between the generous rhetoric of the text and the ungener-
ous nature of the reality is a particularly stark indication of the inherently
flawed logic of a ‘peace process’ that consolidates domination.
Similar examples of the legitimization of Israeli occupation under Oslo
can be found in several quarters. For example, despite the millions of dol-
lars promised by the international community under Oslo for economic
regeneration in the occupied territories, Palestinian standards of living fell
dramatically during the 1990s.17 Economic agreements such as the Paris
Protocol were heavily biased in favour of Israel. As a result, crucial issues
were ignored such as the return of ‘Palestinian resources such as water
[…] or land illegally expropriated by Israel, between 60 and 70 percent of
the West Bank and at least 60 percent of the Gaza Strip’ (Murphy 1995:
36). Clear evidence of unequal dynamics of the process is readily found in
Article XII of the 1994 Cairo Agreement. In this article, the Palestinian
National Authority:
accepted that it will bear financial responsibility for claims made against
Israel, and will actually defend past Israeli actions in the event of a claim
reaching the courts. Nowhere is Israel committed to paying any compensa-
tion, to individuals or the population as a whole, for taxes illegally levied and
used to destroy property or expropriate resources.
(Murphy 1995: 38)
18. For a representative One of the major advantages of the Oslo peace process for Israel was that
example of these
arguments see Morris
it largely relieved her of the rapidly escalating cost of occupation, whilst main-
(2001: chapter 12). taining all the strategic advantages that the occupied territories offered. In the
19. Under the terms of
context of the first intifada the cost of the occupation had become a heavy
the deal, all outstand- burden for the Israeli government. In the international press, sympathy for
ing debts were taken the Palestinians was contrasted with condemnation for heavy-handed Israeli
on by the Palestinian
Authority, security
suppression. Non-payment of water rates and taxation in the territories was
and policing of the creating financial arrears, which Israel was responsible for. Violence and
Palestinian unrest in the territories was also putting pressure on the settlement drive,
population was
ensured by Arafat’s
which had lost a lot of its previous appeal.18 The Oslo peace process at once
internationally enabled the Israeli government to pass the more burdensome tasks of occupa-
subsidized security tion onto the new Palestinian Authority,19 whilst Israel retained powers of
forces on behalf of
Israel, and costly
strategic value such as water resources, borders and air space.
economic powers Though not a comprehensive analysis of the Oslo period (which would be
such as health, too extensive for this short work), the preceding section highlights a number
education, investment
and so forth came
of important trends in the Israeli–Palestinian dynamic. Most importantly,
under the jurisdiction the ‘peace process’ was characterized by patterns of cosmetic agreements
of the Palestinian between unequal parties, which served to legitimize the continued domina-
Authority.
tion of one people over another. In this context it is easy to see how the
‘generous offer’ at Camp David simply attempted to further this policy of
domination, portraying unviable territorial cantonization in occupied land
as ‘concessions’. In addition it cloaked the permanent annexation of illegally
captured water resources in the West Bank in the guise of ‘equal territorial
swaps’, under which the Palestinians would receive vastly inferior desert
land. The chasm that exists between myth and reality in the Palestinian
conflict, neatly encapsulated in the Camp David summit and its coverage in
the mainstream US press, is thus, to my mind, a huge obstacle to any viable
possibilities for coexistence in the region.
A more accurate understanding of the true nature of the conflict is a
necessary first step in order to deconstruct the accepted ‘truths’ and begin
to build a new vision of the region. Support for a different use of American
pressure and influence in the Holy Land is an essential prerequisite for a
solution based on the needs of the region’s people, rather than state-centric,
zero-sum policies, which continue to create winners and losers and
ultimately undermine real security. A different ‘frame’ for the conflict is
urgently needed, especially within the United States, if Israeli policy in the
Middle East is to meet with the necessary incentive to find a better solution
for its Palestinian neighbours.
Conclusion
… we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world – a world in which per-
sons, objects, and actions have no inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is
not inherent, then it must be created – imposed on action, events, or things
through human action. But action is necessarily situated in a specific place and
time. The meaning imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which
meaning is generated. Moreover, because action in situations is inevitably struc-
tured by groups that dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent
advantage in determining the meaning derived from action in situations.
(Wolfsfeld 1997: 32) Davis, D.K.
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The ‘meanings’ and ‘truths’ that have been attached to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict in the media are often contradictory and often invite
outrage from the opposing ‘camp’. By providing a critical lens for some of
the dominant ‘truths’ about the conflict, representatively encapsulated in
the debate over the Camp David summit, I have shown that significant
aspects of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are being misrepresented in the
influential arena of the American press. This misrepresentation has had,
and continues to have, a detrimental effect on the prospects for a just reso-
lution that offers both security and peace for the region. As well as provoking
a lack of accountability in political circles, inaccurate press coverage and an
unequal power balance encourages a lack of incentive on both sides to find a
viable solution. The unequal character of the ‘peace process’ has been candidly
highlighted by Shimon Peres, who noted that Israel was ‘in some ways […]
negotiating with [itself]’ (Murphy 1995: 35).
In this article I have highlighted how the dominant press narrative in
the United States has provided an Israeli policy of ‘dressing up domination
as cooperation’ with a powerful and legitimizing voice in a country that
has a potentially transformative role to play in the conflict. Promoting a
lasting peace based on justice and reconciliation requires the long-term
support of an impartial United States in order to survive. Misleading nar-
ratives that dominate the mainstream US press about the conflict certainly
constitute a significant obstacle to impartiality or accountability in
US political involvement.
Widespread insecurity in the Middle East demands an end to inaccu-
rate and one-sided interpretation. If a solution is ever to be found in this
war-torn area, one of the first steps must be a willingness from all sides to
critically question their own ‘truths’ and to acknowledge that peace and
security can never be meaningfully achieved at the expense of others.
The future of this region is paramount to security in the whole of the
Middle East and indeed the wider world. Exposure to more critical and
honest accounts regarding the potential impact of allowing this struggle to
continue will create a growing incentive for a just solution. Greater
attempts to raise the profile of the tragic effects of the conflict on individ-
ual Palestinians might enable people to see that peace should not only be
sought as a means of security but as a moral goal that is beneficial for all
of humanity. Misrepresentation and deceitful interpretation of the conflict,
especially in the United States, might then make way for accounts that
promote justice and reconciliation in the region.
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jammr.1.1.63/1
Contributor details
Andrew J. Piner currently works as a teacher in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He has
worked extensively on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and was formerly a senior
researcher at the London-based Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies. He has also been
involved in social development work in the Arab world. He has a Master’s degree
in Critical Security Studies from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth and a BA
Honours degree in History from the University of Durham, England. The views
and opinions represented in this article are solely those of the author and do not
represent any current or former employer. Contact: The Grove Cottage, Albert Rd
South, Malvern, Worcestershire, UK.
E-mail: andypiner@gmail.com
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JAMMR_1.1_06_art_Lacatus.qxd 12/17/07 7:54 PM Page 79
Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.79/1
Abstract Keywords
Contemporary Sweden is experiencing an interesting sociocultural phenomenon migration
of redefinition of national identity as a result of the rise of awareness of the everyday diaspora
reality of discrimination and segregation of first- and second-generation immigrants ethnic identity
from the Middle East, North Africa and Africa. blatte
My article examines the formation and manifestations of a new kind of collective mass media
consciousness of immigrants living in Sweden called blatte identity, defined by ethnic cultural expression
markers constructed by opposition to the nationalistic ideals of an ethnically pure Arab world
Swedish identity. More specifically, my article examines the construction and affir- Islam
mation of a special kind of blatte identity, called a thought sultan (tankesultan). literature
Briefly, a tankesuktan is a Swede of Arabic descent, proud of his Muslim back- Sweden
ground, and actively engaging in resisting the assimilative forces within Swedish
society. The concept was coined by the author Jonas Hassen Khemiri in his debut
novel entitled An Eye Red (Ett Öga Rött) published in 2003. My argument
discusses the trajectory of the concept from the artistic and literary realm into public
discourse through the help of mass media, as well as the relation to other terms in
the official and public discourse, such as immigrant, black skull (svartskalle), or
ethnic Swede (svenne). From being an individual marker of ethnic belonging to the
community of Arabic-speaking, Muslim immigrants to Sweden, a thought sultan
(tankesultan) is used as a common denominator for some of the members of the
immigrant community living in Sweden who like to consider their marginal social
status and their everyday life marked by ethnic and religious discrimination. An
instance of such use can be found in the magazine Gringo that is distributed for free
in Sweden’s large urban areas, which made use of this concept as a categorizational
tool of ethnic otherness for blattar, or immigrants, alongside other stereotyping
concepts and images circulating in the public discourse of contemporary Sweden.
Bakgrunden till skällsordet blatte är mycket osäker. Kanske hänger det ihop
med ett verb blattra ‘pladdra, prata strunt’. Det verkar däremot osannolikt
att det skulle hänga ihop med italienska blatta ‘kackerlacka’.
Det kan beläggas åtminstone 1967, fast det kan gott vara äldre. Det finns
med i Gibsons Svensk slangordbok från 1969, både i betydelsen ‘pajas’ och i
betydelsen ‘neger’.
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82 Corina Lacatus
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The first blatte type is the gangsta, the person who does not fear to manifest
publicly his status as ethnic other through violent, illegal behaviour. Most
likely inspired by the American gangsta’ hip-hop, or at least by its repre-
sentations in the mass media and films, Halim’s gangsta is the teenager
who steals Snickers bars cool-headedly while paying the price of a chewing
gum, is able to spot a policeman in a large crowd and can handle guns
skilfully. The second kind of blatte is the socially proper Persian good kid,
the lost blatte, who never misses school because he wants to become a dentist
or an engineer, never writes graffiti, nor is able to realize that the teachers
despise him in spite of his hard work. And there is also a third kind of
blatte, the thought sultan or the revolutionary blatte, who represents the
epitome of blatte wisdom by being able to discern truth from lies in a world
dominated by Swedes (svennar) and to identify the multiple everyday man-
ifestations of the universal anti-blatte conspiracy. And Halim envisions
himself as belonging to the third category. Halim is trapped in a dichoto-
mous view of the world as divided into us and them, svenne Swedes and
blattar, characterized by stereotypes and clichés, and cannot seem to
escape it. By organizing the world around him according to this duality,
Halim reinforces ethnic differences between the two groups, ultimately
reaffirming discrimination and racism.
A blatte is a dark-haired masculine man, who takes pride in his foreign
heritage, enjoys a hip-hop lifestyle, and can code switch between standard
Swedish and Swedish with a thick foreign accent whenever appropriate.
On the other hand, a Swede is a person from a wealthy family, who dresses
well even when trying to pass for a hip-hop fan, speaks standard Swedish
and is opinionated about literature and music:
Man kan säga det finns tre sorters svennar. Först det är lyxsvennarna som
spelar maffia fast på svennevis. Dom har märken som är dyra fast ändå dom
har små loggor och syns mindre än dyra blattemärken. (Svartskallar spelar
rika mera ärliga.) [...]
Ändå lyxsvennarna är ganska få för nästan alla i skolan hör till lodis-
gänget som går klädda i tattartrasor med söndriga skinnjackor och jeansen
maxat håliga. Ofta dom har total oreda i håren och ibland tjejerna har långa
sammetskjolar och rutade strumpor. Om man vill bli en av dom man måste
säga ryssar gör bästa poesin och lyssna på Bob Hund istället for Snoop Doggy
Dogg. [...]
Tredje svennesorten är dansklassarna fast egentligen man ser dom inte
ofta på skolan för jämt dom hänger uppe i balettsalen och tränar träjning.
Danstjejerna är pyttesmala och har knutfrisyr och killarna är kanske fyra-
fem stycken per klass och ger alltid leenden på skolfotot som riktiga bögar.
Alla dansklassare går med tårna utåt och ryggen rak som värsta bräda.
(Khemiri 2003: 37)
[We can say that there are three different kinds of Swedes. First come the luxury
Swedes who act like mafiosi, only in a Swedish way. They have expensive
brand clothes, but their logos are small compared to the blatte brands and you
can barely see them. (Black skulls act like rich people in a more real way.) [...]
But there aren’t that many luxury Swedes cuz most people at school are
in the bums’ gang that walk around wearing Tatar-style rags with torn
leather jackets and jeans with huge holes. Oftentimes their hair is all messy
and sometimes girls have lace skirts and checkered socks. If you want to be
one of them you have to say that Russians write the best poetry and listen to
Bob Hund instead of Snoop Doggy Dogg. [...]
The third kind of Swede is in the dance classes though you don’t really
see them at school so much cuz they hang out in the ballet studio and practise
their practice. The dance girls are super tiny and wear their hair in a bun
and the guys are like four or five in each class and always smile in the school
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photo like real gays. All in the dance class walk with their toes outward and
their backs straight like timber.]
Aldrig jag kommer äta sur strömming med sillnubbe på Skansen eller dansa
smågrodor i träskor runt töntigaste midsommarstång. Aldrig jag kommer
låta politikerna förbjuda buffalos eller spänniströjor eller höja hårvaxpriser.
När Dalanda berättade jag trodde henne, men ändå jag visste inte tecknen
var så här tydliga.
(Khemiri 2003: 56)
[I will never eat fermented Baltic herring with aquavit at Skansen or dance
the little frogs’ dance while wearing wooden clogs around the the dummest
midsummer may pole. I will never let politicians ban buffalo shoes and
stretchy sweaters or raise the price of hairwax. When Dalanda told me about
this, I believed her, but I still didn’t know the signs were so evident.]
Halim strives to become a free thinker and to make a leap of faith from
being a gangsta blatte to becoming a thought sultan, but is not aware of his
unchanging and bounded ontological status. A thought sultan is merely
another type of blatte, an intellectual and free thinker, whose main acquired
skill is the ability to discern anti-blatte conspiracies organized by Swedes. As
a non-heritage Swede, or a blatte, he is a cultural and linguistic hybrid.
The meaning of the concept of a thought sultan is determined by one’s
Arabic ethnicity and Muslim religious beliefs; the second word of the com-
pound, ‘sultan’, implies the existence of a certain authority or power
exerted over a group of people of the same Muslim confession. The word
tanke, or thought, gives the prototypical thought sultan a reflective quality,
similar to the one of a philosopher of religion. In Halim’s words, however,
the concept acquires a new meaning contextualized in contemporary
Sweden, designating an immigrant with intellectual preoccupations and
an uncanny ability to identify manifestations of assimilationist subversiveness
in the political, public and personal spheres dominated by Swedes. The
kind of power Halim attributes to a thought sultan is exercised subver-
sively in the name of the anti-Swedish revolution rather than the religion
of the Koran, and confers this special kind of blatte a higher status among
its non-heritage Swedish peers due to his critical cunning. Yet this seman-
tic distance from the word’s connotative and denotative meanings becomes
a very efficient stylistic device, meant to induce the reader’s mistrust of the
main character as a reliable narrator.
In other words, thought sultan is a higher position in the blatte ontology,
and Halim strives to occupy it. Its etymological make-up is inspired by
Arabic culture, while its referential scope is imaginary, modified by Halim’s
own fictitious understanding of it. The concept’s newly acquired meaning is
Jag lovade från nu fittorna kommer ångra dom försöker göra om Halim till
en puckellös kamel och nu det är totalkrig för släktingar till Hannibal och
Saladin ger sig ALDRIG. Innan jag gick tillbaka till klassen jag attackerade
två toaletter nära slöjdsalen, kryssade alla keffa tags och fyllde varje kakel
med svarta stjärnor och månar.
(Khemiri 2003: 22)
[I promised that starting now those cunts will regret trying to turn Halim
into a humpless camel and now we’re at war cuz Hannibal’s and Saladin’s
relatives NEVER give up. Before I went back to the classroom I attacked two
bathrooms by the crafts’ room, drew all over the bad tags and filled every
single tile with black stars and moons.]
Jag satt där på geografin och kände mig som gammal arabisk vetenskaps-
man med fez och snabelskor som bodde i torn (kanske gamla Bagdad). Jag
hade kikare som räckte hela vägen till Europa och rykte som gjorde att
andra lärda tittade på mitt torn med blandad hat och nyfikenhet. Dessutom
jag var värsta kosmonovan och hade massa gussar som ville komma till mitt
torn för att röka shisha och sen baza bara för jag var så grymmish klokish.
(Såklart dom skulle få fetdiss för Marit är min enda.)
(Khemiri 2003: 109)
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[I was sitting in geography class feeling like an old Arabic scientist with fez 3. ‘Gringo väljer att kalla
and snail-like shoes who lives in a tower (maybe in old Baghdad). I had det miljonsvenska
eftersom det är en
binoculars that saw all the way to Europe and smoked so much that all the svenska som pratas i
other wise men looked at my tower with a mix of hatred and curiosity. miljonprogramsområ-
Moreover, I was the best Cosmonova and lots of girls wanted to come to my den i Sverige.’
tower to smoke shisha and later just fuck cuz I was so phat smart. (Of course,
I would diss them big time, cuz Marit is the only one for me.)]
Vart ordet blatte kommer ifrån ursprungligen vet vi inte. Den hetaste teorin
är att det kommer från franskan och betyder kackerlacka. En annan är att
blatte kommer från blading som är ett bladätande kryp. Oavsett ordets
ursprung föddes det inte av kärlek från början. När allt fler avvek från den
blonda mallen behövdes ett nedvärderande begrepp för att markera att vitt
är bäst. Gringos mål är att ifrågasätta den hierarkin. Vi menar att vitt är lika
bra som svart och alla andra färger med för den delen. Vårt sätt har varit att
avdramatisera och lyfta upp blatte för att jämna ut nivåskillnaden. Genom
att inte använda ordet går vi annars med på att det är sämre och reproducerar
på så sätt maktobalansen. Det senaste året har vi sett en högkonjunktur för
användningen av ordet blatte. En liten T-shirt trend för märket ‘Blattelicious’.
[We do not know the origin of the word blatte. The hottest theory is that the
word comes from French and means ‘cockroach’. Another theory is that
blatte comes from blading, which is a kind of leaf beet. Regardless of the origin,
the word was definitely not born out of love. More and more people started
breaking the patter of blond hair, and the need for a new word surfaced,
indicating the fact that being white is the best. Gringo’s goal is to question
this hierarchy. We believe that white is just as good as black, or any other
skin colour for that matter. Our strategy has been to normalize and elevate
blatte in order to level out the hierarchical difference. If we don’t use the
word, we acknowledge that that it is worse, thus reinforcing the power
imbalance. This past year, the use of the word blatte has been particularly
profitable. A fashion trend with t-shirts featuring logos for a company named
‘Blattelicious’. A recruitment company called ‘The Blatte Agency’. Or the
‘Blatte de Luxe’ award. And last but not least, ‘blatte Swedish’. The term has
moved toward desensitization and political correctness. More and more blattar
embrace the epithet proudly. There are still quite a few people who feel
offended when somebody calls them blattar. And that should be taken in
consideration. Are you unsure whether you should dare to use the word or
not, please write to us. We are hoping that the word blatte is going to disappear
in time. But that will only happen when we stop dividing ourselves and
everybody starts considering himself/herself a Swede.]
Gringo turns Halim’s blatte ontology from fictional ideology into a journal-
istic representation of everyday stereotypes circulating in contemporary
Sweden’s public sphere. In the first issue of the magazine Gringo Grande of
July 2005, Mayrem Can writes a psychometric test meant to determine
which stereotype category one belongs to. According to him, stereotypes
are the best way to measure the evolution of prejudice in a society:
Stereotyperna i samhället behövs fett mycket, utan dem skulle det bli himla
svårt att hålla reda på alla fördomar, till exempel. Vilken stereotyp är du?
J-Lo, Bling-bling eller kanske en Tankesultan?
(Can 2005)
[Stereotypes are a social necessity. If they didn’t exist, it would be awfully dif-
ficult to keep track of many things around us, including prejudice. What’s
your stereotype? J-Lo? Bling bling, or perhaps the Thought Sultan?]
If one selects more ‘A’ answers, thus fitting the description of a self-
absorbed rocker with an intellectual side, who likes to use his/her free time
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for thinking and philosophizing and has Noam Chomsky as a role model,
one is a thought sultan. Can recontextualizes Khemiri’s term, focusing
more on the thought sultan’s intellectual preoccupations rather than
Halim’s religious or cultural references to the Arab world and Muslims:
A. Tankesultanen (tjej/kille)
Du tänker och tänker, så att du tänker på vad du tänkte att du skulle tänka.
Du tänker på precis allt och ser ner på alla som inte tänker, som dig, dåra. Du
har rufsig frisyr, basker, liten skäggodling, glasögon med feta bågar, slitna
manchesterbyxor, grön militärinspirerad jacka och anser dig vara en intellek-
tuell snubbinna/snubbe. Du vägrar erkänna att din bara existens är syn-
onym med ‘pretto’.
References
Adami, Zaniar (2006), ‘Miljonsvenska är framtiden’, Gringo, 7 November.
Appadurai, Arjun (1996), Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization,
Minneapolis and London: University of Minneapolis Press.
Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel (1988), Race, nation, classe: Les identité
ambiguës, Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
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Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Bendix, Regina (2000), ‘Heredity, Hybridity and Heritage from One Fin de Siècle to
the Next’, in Pertti J. Anttonen, Anna-Leena Siikala, Stein R. Mathisen and Leif
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Johansson, Alf W. (ed.) (2001), Vad är Sverige? Röster om svensk nationell identitet,
Stockholm: Prisma.
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högstadieskola, Stockholm: Ordfront.
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Research.
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New York: Routledge.
Khemiri, Jonas Hassen (2003), Ett öga rött, Stockholm: Norstedts.
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Press.
Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt (2001), Kotsinas, Ulla-Britt, “Från Ekenssnack till
Rinkebysvenska”
Pedagogiska magasinet. Lärarförbundets tidskrift för utbildning, forskning och debatt,
April 2nd. pages 8–14.
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Kitwana, Bakari (2002), The Hip-Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in
African American Culture, New York: Basic Civitas Books.
Lacan, Jacques The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 1 (Jacques-Alain Miller, ed.) 1975
New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company
Leyens, Jacques-Philippe, Yzerbyt, Vincent and Schadron, Georges (1994),
Stereotypes and Social Cognition, London; Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi:
Sage Publications.
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Phillips-Martinsson, Jean (1991), Swedes as Others See Them, Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Rojas, Mauricio (2005), Sweden after the Swedish model: From Tutorial State to
Enabling State, Stockholm: Timbro.
Romero, Madeleine (2005), ‘Blatte – en etnicitet? om ungdomars med utländsk
bakgrund syn på sin etnicitet,’ Masters Thesis, Lunds Universitet.
Pile, Steve and Keith, Michael (eds) (1997), Geographies of Resistance, London and
New York: Routledge.
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nya Sverige, Stockholm: Ordfront.
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Journal Arena.
Suggested citation
Lacatus, C. (2007), ‘What is a blatte? Migration and ethnic identity in contempo-
rary Sweden’, Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 1: 1, pp. 79–92,
doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.79/1
Contributor detail
Corina Lacatus teaches at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and is a
research affiliate with The Center for Research on International Migration and
Ethnic Relations at Stockholm University. She graduated from Bucharest University
(Romania) with a BA in Arabic and Scandinavian and from University of California,
Los Angeles with a doctoral thesis discussing ethnicity and cultural expression in
contemporary Sweden. She is interested in the issues of migration to Western
Europe and its representations, the Middle East, and the interplay between cultural
history, literature, the arts and the law. Contact: Department of Germanic
Languages and Literatures, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2090
Foreign Languages Building, 707 S. Mathews Avenue, Urbana, Illinois 61801 USA,
Research Affiliate, The Centre for Research on International Migration and Ethnic
Relations, Stockholm University
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Book Reviews
Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research Volume 1 Number 1 © 2007 Intellect Ltd
Book Reviews. English language. doi: 10.1386/jammr.1.1.93/5
New Media and the New Middle East, Philip Seib (ed.), (2007)
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 284 pp., Hardcover, ISBNs:
1403979731, 978-1403979735, Price: £42.50.
Reviewed by Olivia Allison
Roots of credibility
One word of significant concern to this volume’s authors is ‘credibility’,
which appears first in the Preface and continues as a theme throughout
many of the subsequent chapters. In much of the book, the concept is not
defined, despite its potentially contentious meaning, but the best definition
of the topic comes from Mohammed El-Nawawy, who quotes Dominic
Infante’s definition of source credibility: ‘a set of attitudes toward a source
that influence how receivers behave toward the source’, based on expertness
and trustworthiness (p. 126).
Most other references to press freedom in the Middle East hinge on
Arabness: Philip Seib and Sahar Khamis, respectively, assert that media
credibility in the Middle East, particularly for Al-Jazeera, is based on its
quality as ‘by Arabs for Arabs’ (pp. xiii, 41). Shahira Fahmy and Thomas
J. Johnson assert that there are links between individuals’ most-used
news medium and its credibility, as well as the possibility of a link
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Thus, the overall tone of the book is one asserting a possibility that media
might stimulate change, but there are no strong arguments in this volume
of instances in which media have significantly contributed to a political
change. Media’s role in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, for instance,
is not examined (but should be). Similarly, how do pan-Arab or Egyptian
media cover the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and what effect does this cov-
erage have? It is not necessary to examine these specific situations, but pro-
viding a concrete example of when media have stimulated change, or have
been unable to stimulate change for other reasons, would be necessary to
prove that new media can indeed create or stimulate change.
Similarly, in order to understand whether and how new media can
stimulate change, future books would be well advised to consider contem-
porary demographic and economic issues. A few of the questions that
could be examined include: how does the difference between younger and
older viewers’ perceptions of credibility and possible political action affect
new media’s ability to stimulate change? How long will the ‘boom’ of new
media last if media outlets are unable to attract enough advertising rev-
enue to be sustainable? Is the lack of revenue due to economic difficulty
or political pressures, and how might that change in the event of democ-
ratization? What political impact do the debates on economic reform
(such as those mentioned in Lynch’s chapter) have on policy formulation,
if any? How does the existence of new media change traditional media
functioning? Is there an increase of communications students in the
Middle East in the post-Al-Jazeera era, and what implications might that
have on press freedom?
This volume’s main contribution is a useful examination of the current
types of dialogue, discussion, identity formation and technical capabilities
occurring in Middle Eastern media. Thus, this volume makes an important
step in establishing the current state of Middle Eastern new media and
advances some arguments concerning this media’s credibility and use in
resistance and conflict situations, thereby paving the way for future books
to examine more in-depth these issues of change. In order to understand
whether media are helping in the birth of a ‘new Middle East’ (to use
Rice’s terminology but not her ideology, as this volume does), it is necessary
to first examine its role in the current one.
Contributor details
Olivia Allison is the co-author of Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks
(Praeger 2007) after researching political and media responses to suicide bombings
in Europe, the U.S., the Middle East and Africa. Since writing that book, she has
received an M.A. from King’s College London in International Peace and Security,
focusing on international law and politics in 2007. Some of her ongoing freelance
and think-tank research projects include counterterrorism, media/communication
and terrorism, and the private military/security industry.
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‘The media in Europe has perhaps yet to become accustomed to the large
and growing Muslim presence on the continent and finds it even more
difficult to be understanding of Muslim beliefs in the current confusion
about Islam and terrorism. The right to blasphemy is not one of the rights
of the press, however free it may consider itself to be, and the extensive
reproduction of blasphemous material cannot be seen as anything but a
deliberate affront’ (Dawn (a Pakistani newspaper), 4 February 2006.
‘The West thinks that the anger is superficial and intentional and the
Muslims think of the controversy as a conspiracy theory’ (Al-Lewaa
al-Islami (an Egyptian newspaper published by Al-Azar), 2 February 2006.
‘If they (Muslims living in France) are that horrified by western values
of freedom and laicity, why doesn’t it occur to them that they could move
to Saudi Arabia’ (Le Figaro (a French newspaper), 7 February 2006.
‘To a newspaper the natural way to show solidarity with Jyllands-Posten’s
refusal to follow such a restriction on freedom of speech would be as many
newspapers luckily have done; print the cartoons’ (Jyllands-Posten (a Danish
newspaper), Ralf Pittelkow, 10 February 2006).
The Cartoons controversy initiated in Denmark became an interna-
tional debate about some of the core values that the western democracies
claimed to live by and values they believed the Muslim world lacked: free-
dom of speech.
It was a sensational key defining issue that suddenly erupted and
polarized the world into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation, and also gave rise to
the phantom threat of ‘the clash of civilizations’ prophecy as described
fifteen years ago by Samuel Huntington. Violent demonstrations in Muslim
countries led to the setting on fire of foreign embassies and the boycotting
of Danish goods, clashes on the streets led to deaths and jail sentences.
The latest publication on this subject Reading the Mohammed Cartoons
Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and
Political Spin attempts not to make sense, but to explain and record the
reactions of fourteen countries, their governments and the media’s reac-
tion to the publishing of the cartoons, fused with the underlying belief that
their ‘freedom of speech was under attack’ and the impending ‘clash of
civilizations’ was taking place.
This book represents the results of a worldwide cooperation of scholars
and research groups analysing an incident and a debate in international
media that led to extremely controversial opinions, statements and funda-
mental views. The fourteen countries studied were: Denmark, Norway,
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Egypt, Pakistan, Israel,
China, Russia, the United States, Sweden and Finland.
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with enough facts and findings so we can make up our own minds about
subjects like press freedom.
This is never more evident than the chapter on Germany by Oliver
Hahn, Desiree Gloede and Roland Schroeder who describe the background
against which the editorials were written and which paper said what.
However, it is only in the references page that we find the interest groups
behind two of the biggest newspapers in Germany, throwing the whole
issue of freedom of the press out of the window.
For example the editorials in two of the biggest German newspapers,
Die Welt and Bild belong to the publishing house, Axel Springer AG, which
is the only independent media company to have five preambles that serve
as the fundamentals for publishing activities that every journalist working
for this company has to sign and accept. Among these preambles is ‘to
promote reconciliation of Jews and Germans and support the vital rights of
the State of Israel’. Therefore the view that the cartoons controversy
should be seen in the context of ‘the clash of civilizations’ was first trig-
gered off by the Bild newspaper in Germany. While one opinionated article
published in Die Welt written by German feminist Alice Schwarzer in 2006
considers the cartoons controversy to be a red herring to take off the
media agenda the debate about Iran’s alleged nuclear armament.
Britain was a typical example of how the political climate of a country
can cloud a thorough analysis of the ‘real story’, how politics can influ-
ence and shape social ideas and, in the process, journalists. The United
Kingdom under Blair was a country that was dealing with the ‘biggest
threat to peace from “Islamo-fascists” and “Islamic Extremists”’. After
9/11 the government had introduced a series of measures aimed mainly
at Muslims, detainment of suspects was up to 30 days without charge,
police stop-and-search statistics against Muslims had increased drasti-
cally, and every day there was one story or another demonizing Muslims.
However, this reality described is not quite highlighted in the chapter
‘The UK: A Very British Response’ by Angela Phillips and David Lee, but
they do highlight an important point on how news coverage of the car-
toons controversy lacked a thorough analysis and instead it had focused
on sensationalist footage of violent demonstrations and ‘jihadists’ rather
than examining the motives of the editors at Jyllands-Posten, or the fact
that the paper had a close affiliation to the Danish government, the fact
that Muslims in Denmark had been under pressure for some time and the
fact that the current Danish government was not friendly to ‘foreigners’.
Even though the British papers did not print the cartoons, according to
the study, the media moved fast, aligned closely to the existing government
policies. The focus from freedom of the press moved very quickly to tighter
government controls, for example the Daily Telegraph was quick to point to
the failure of the government to condemn the demonstrators and to the
failure of the police to take action against the demonstrators.
The Guardian, known for its independent reporting, added fuel to the
fire by shifting its focus to the Islamic fringe groups, giving coverage to
radical leaders like Anjam Choudary, seen as a key ally of the exiled leader
of the radical Islamic group ‘Al Muhajiroun’ and spokesperson for ‘Al
Guraba’ (a fringe radical group which was one of the first groups to hold
demonstrations in London). Studies showed that Choudary was mentioned
Reports from Egypt are not surprising as the Egyptian media is tightly
controlled essentially by the government. However, in the chapter by Ibrahim
Saleh on ‘Egypt: Coverage of Professional Disparities and Religious
Disruptions’ we see a society used to conflict but eager to avoid it: ‘Mob reac-
tion doesn’t deal with the Muslim rights to respond to the western blasphemy
but rather maximizes its negative effect’ (Al Fagr (a private newspaper),
2 February 2006); ‘We should avoid repeating this controversy with real dia-
logue and mutual understanding’ (Akhbar Al-Alyoum (a government-owned
newspaper), 11 March 2006).
The Working Papers in International Journalism are a series of publi-
cations and reports from research groups and projects relevant for the
international research community. This publication on Reading the
Mohammed Cartoons Controversy is highlights how to some extent the
media dealt with the cartoons controversy and how that dealing was
based on definitions and negotiations related to the political and cultural
arenas in which journalists operate.
As mentioned earlier the study was true to its objective, not to give opin-
ions but to report findings after researching focused materials, mainly news-
papers and magazines. Even though one can argue that newspapers and
magazines are more conservative in approach and that other media were
needed to get an overall picture, the authors did go one step further and gave
a short political and social background to every country mentioned. Thus
we get a general not a thorough picture against which the cartoons contro-
versy unfolded. However, what also gently unfolds as the book unveils the
situation in each country is how political and social ideas shape journalism
and, in the case of the cartoons, how social ideas about Islam and Muslims
were reported in the wider media at a time when Muslims were and are per-
ceived as some form of threat. The authors of the book state: ‘The cartoon dis-
cussion provided a particularly interesting case for looking at how the
“journalistic field is related to the political field” in different countries.’ As most
of the print media attempts to be objective and conservative in especially its
editorials, we can still see glimpses of the strategy and allegiances of the editors
or journalists.
The book is an important study that allows readers to study facts and
figures on how the Mohammed cartoons controversy was handled in each
country and leaves them to make up their own conclusions as well as
encouraging researchers to take up further themes of essential enquiry on
a key defining issue which unwittingly united the world even for a short
space of time in a global debate.
Contributor details
Shabana Syed is the editor of Islam Magazine, a political and current affairs maga-
zine, that looks at global issues from a Muslim’s perspective. She has worked in the
Middle East for a few years with various television channels as a journalist and
producer. Shabana is undertaking a PhD programme on ‘Muslim groups in the
West and the use of the Media’. Her research interests include political communi-
cation, Islamic orientated communication and disporic media in Europe.