B.

Locus Standi
Dumlao vs. Comelec
Facts:
A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio
Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to
the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan
to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite
for a review on certiorari?
Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional?

Held:
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to
prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been
adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional
body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the
competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a
candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and
unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.
De Guia vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the
position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and all the other
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He Claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of
RA 7166, which requires the apportionment into district of said municipalities does not specify
when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would
consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view
that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that “for purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall
be elected by district.” Petitioner therefore insists that elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Paranaque fell under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large
until the 1995 regular elections.

Issue:
WON petitioner has legal standing

Held:
The Court observes that petitioner does not allege he is running for reelection, much less, that he
is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paranaque. As such, he does not appear to have a
locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any
legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to
have any cause of action.
Oposa vs. Factoran Jr.
Facts:
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents and Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. ordering defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
On 22 June 1990, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. July 12, 1990, opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss due to the following: 1. That the complaint states no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question. 2. Respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has a locus standi.

Held:
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right which is the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology could be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. The Court affirmed the standing minors, represented by
their parents, to challenge the validity of logging concessions on the basis of the concept of inter
generational responsibility for and the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as guaranteed by
Article II, Section 16.
Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He
predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of
Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after
his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a
taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening
controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal
structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges
that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed." 2
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the
instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that
there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that
the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to
question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is
no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that
Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a
successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b)
the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question
must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent.
There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the
capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his
duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by
other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot
be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants."
Tatad vs. Garcia
Facts:
Petitioners filed to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised
and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and
supplemental agreement of the former. Petitioners are suing in their capacities as senators and
taxpayers.
The argument of the petitioners were: the winning bidder for the construction and operation of
the LRT is a foreign corporation violating the constitution; build-lease-transfer is not defined nor
recognized by the law nor its implementing rules and regulations; award of the contract on
negotiated basis violates RA 6957; award of contract violates requirements provided in the
implementing rules and regulations of the BOT law; agreement violate EO 380 for failure of
bearing presidential approval; and agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Respondents contend the petitioners have no legal standing; writ of prohibition as not a proper
remedy and requires ascertainment of facts; scheme adopted is actually a Build-Transfer scheme
allowed by BOT law; nationality requirement for public utilities does not apply; the
presidentially approved agreements are not disadvantageous to the government; the negotiation
granting the award of the contract and not through public bidding is allowed by BOT law; and
direct negotiation as mode of award for infrastructure projects is supported by RA 7718.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing on the petition.

Held:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to questions contracts entered
into by the national government or GOCC’s allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow
the same when only municipal contracts are involved. The Supreme Court upheld the legal
standing of the petitioners as taxpayers.
Agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental
function. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with
said function. Petitioner’s claim that Build-Lease-Transfer scheme and direct negotiation of
contracts are not contemplated by the BOT law has now been rendered moot and academic. RA
7718 Sec. 3 authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, GOCC’s and local government
units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing, construction,
operation and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure or development facilty.
Ultimately, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. Comelec
Facts:
The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) together with
GMA Network filed a petition challenging the validity Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Comelec Time),
on the grounds that the said provision (1) takes properties without due process of law and
without just compensations; (2) it denies the radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period
of election.
According to GMA Network, Comelec Time violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time without payment or just compensation.
That from the previous election GMA Network lost P22,498,560.00 in 1992 elections and stands
to lose P58,980,850.00 due to the implementation of B.P. Blg. 881.

Issue:
Whether or not, the petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar.

Held:
The petition of TELEBAP was held of no merit. That TELEBAP failed to show that they have
personally suffered harm as a result of the operation of Comelec Time.
The petition of GMA Network on the other hand appeared to have the required standing
to bring the constitutional challenge. The legal standing of GMA Network was that they are
greatly affected financially by the implementation of Comlec Time, for during elections they are
forced to give away precious time slots for the fulfillment of the said provision.
Despite of the legal standing of GMA Network it failed to contest the validity and
Constitutionality of Comelec Time on the aforementioned grounds, the Supreme Court ruled
that:
(1) The broadcast companies does not own the airwaves they are merely leased from the
government, thus no properties are taken by the requirement of giving COMELEC free air time
during elections.
(2) The difference between print media and broadcast media is that the latter uses a limited
resource namely the broadcast bandwidth of which there is a need to allocated and distribute the
same. Which the government spends money to allocate and distribute the resource, whereas in
print media there is no need for such service from the government. Thus it is but fair for the
broadcast media to provide free air time for COMELEC during elections.
(3) The provision of Section 4 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which give
COMELEC the all the necessary powers to ensure equal opportunity, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona
Facts:
Petitioner KILOSBAYAN Incorporated, and its Board of Trustees filed a petition as taxpayers
and concerned citizens. Sen. Webb and Tañada and Rep. Arroyo are suing their capacities as
member of the congress and as a taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
Pursuant to Sec 1 of the charter of the PCSO (RA 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which
grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities,” The PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing
its revenue base and diversifying its resources of funds. March 1993, after learning that the
PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad in
Malaysia became interested to offer its resources and services to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad
organized a group of Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine Corporation known as the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium,
through which the technical management services required for the project would be offered and
delivered to PCSO. Before August 1993, the PCSO family issued a request proposal for the
Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. Considering the citizenship
requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group reduce its original 75% foreign stock
holdings by selling to its local investors the 35%, making the 40% as the share of Berjada Group.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition filed by the KILOSBAYAN has a locus standi.

Held:
Wherefore the court resolved the issue on locus standi in favor of the petitioner. A party’s
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside the technicalities of the procedure in view of the importance of the issue
raised. The right of the petitioners to challenge the validity of the lotto contract of the PCSO and
for seeking a judicial review was granted by the Court on the argument that the case was
transcendental importance
Kilosbayan vs. Morato
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the
same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.
Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter
and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding
of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA
Circular No. 85-55-A.
Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law
because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation
of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have
for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would
entitle them to bring this suit.
IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The President
directed the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through
a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved
A special civil action filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the
metropolis.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to sue.

Held:
The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of
the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. The
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan vs. Zamora
Facts:
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement in 1991. The
Philippines and US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On July
18 1987 Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of VF. Negotiations by
both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text. Thereafter, President Ramos approved
the VFA.
On October 5 1998 President Estrada through respondent Secretary of Affairs Zamora, ratified
the VFA. Officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
the letter to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative oversight its implementation. Debates
then ensued.
Respondents challenge petitioner’s standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown
any interest in the case. Petitioners on the other hand, counter that VFA is a matter of
transcendental importance.

Issue:
WON petitioners have legal standing?

Held:
The court said that petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result fo the enforcement of VFA. They also don’t have standing to sue as tax payers
since VFA does not involve the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending power. In a taxpayer’s
suit. The act complained of should directly involve the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. The other petitioners who filed as petitioners-legislators do not have the
requisite of locus standi to maintain this suit. According to the court, while it may be true that
petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which may allegedly impair their legislative powers,
they failed to show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. IBP, another petitioner also lacks
standing since there is no board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing the National
President to commence the present action. The court, nevertheless decided to take cognizance of
the issues raised. The court upheld its ruing in previous cases such as that of Gonzales vs
Comelec and Kilosbabayan vs Guingona. Technicalities of procedure may be brushed aside in
view of the transcendental importance to the public where cases are demanded to be settled
promptly and definitely. The court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to
prosper even when there is no direct injury to the party suing if the case is of transcendental
importance.
Lim vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.2 They were joined
subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist
organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS
and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization are residents
of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in
Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi citing the
unprecedented importance of the issue involved.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
2. Whether or not issue is of Transcendental importance

HELD:
In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter
alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the
impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the
Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers
inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1 " involves the exercise of Congress'
taxing or spending powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient
personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora.5 Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct
personal injury. We agree.
It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this
point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic
for a special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that questions of fact
are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in
law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility."
WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional
Trial Court.
Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority
Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA which is tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands and transferring to PEA the
lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area 1,915,894 square
meters. Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. The Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation and found out (1) that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale
by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss
of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi to a bring suit.

Held:
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA
to comply with its constitutional duties. The petition raises matters of transcendental importance
to the public. The Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and
the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which
clothe the petitioner with locus standi.
AIWA vs. Romulo
Facts:
The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed a petition for
Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185
unconstitutional. According to the petitioners, the said E.O. allegedly violated their rights and
interests as labor unions and as taxpayers. By the said E.O., the administrative supervision over
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel
including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC
Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The respondents, Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas
(Secretary of Labor and Employment), opposed the petition saying that it does not pose an actual
case or controversy since the petitioners have not specifically cited how E.O. No. 185 has
prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers.
Furthermore, they argued that the petitioners have no locus standi (legal standing) to challenge
the validity of said E.O., not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are
exempt from paying taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to assail the validity of Executive Order No. 185.

Held:
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged." Since petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury due to E.O. No. 185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned
E.O. will prejudice their rights and interests. Only NLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary
of Labor’s disciplinary authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue.
As taxpayers, petitioners also don’t have legal standing on this issue since they have not
established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Jumamil vs. Café
Facts:
In 1989, petitioner Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo,
Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ
of restraining order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. Petitioner alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and
49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and
benefit of private respondents who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with
whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the constructed stalls to all private
respondents who are close friends and/or relatives of some of the public respondents which
makes the questioned acts discriminatory.  The questioned resolutions and ordinances did not
provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits
conferred on the private respondents maybe availed of by anybody who can deposit the amount
of P40, 000.00. Neither was there any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered
into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private
respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40, 000.00 

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;

Held:
Petitioner had no standing to challenge the two resolutions/ordinances because he suffered no
wrong under their terms. Consequently, it ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease
contracts, had no standing to file the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation
of the agreements. Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in
a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
being challenged. Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer and not in his
personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the
ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not
be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Petitioner also failed to prove
the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.
Furthermore, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it
was finally enacted and approved.
Therefore, petition was dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal standing.
Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Facts:
On Feb. 24, 2006, Pres. Arroyo declared a state of national emergency and orders the armed
forces to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, and suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. A lot of permits to form rallies were
revoked and those who have already formed to gather were dispersed, and warrantless arrests
were rampant. Among those arrested was the petitioner. Seven consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners.
Randolph David petitioner assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (a) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (b) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for
the imposition of martial law; and (c) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly.
Petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of
raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also
claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
Petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a
declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP
1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code."

Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has Legal standing to sue.

Held:
The petition filed by the petitioners David and Llamas G.R. No. 171396 and Cacho-Olivares and
Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. G.R.No. 171409 does have a standing to sue. The petitioner has a
personal and substantial interest in filing the petition. They have clearly sustained direct injury as
a result of enforcing the PP 1017. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R.No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. they alleged "direct injury" resulting
from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
The petitions, other than G.R. No. 171396 and 171409, which does not have a legal standing
were still granted by the court to have a judicial review for the issue involved was of a
transcendental importance
Demetria vs. Alba
Facts:
Demetrio G. Demetria and its parties filed an instant petition as concerned citizens of this
country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of
constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the relief’s, prayed for a writ
of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
On September 19, 1985, the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who
were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination. On February 27, 1986, the Court required the
petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment, thus they did.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners has the legal standing in assailing Section 44 of Presidential
Degree No. 1177 otherwise known as the Budget Reform Degree of 1977.

Held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. Thus regarding the standing of the petitioner in this case, Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177 not only affects their personal interest but also to the inhabitants of
this county and thus it will sustain direct injury to both parties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa
FACTS:
Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the
creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions
of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. He
also seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner requests to furnish petitioner
with information on certain matters. On January 28, 2009, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa,
impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest
of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their
Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000.

ISSUE:
Does the case at bar qualify for the requisites for Taxpayers suit and concerned citizen suit
regarding Legal Standing?

HELD:
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It
does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls
short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.Coming now to the instant case,
petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can
claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon
the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by
forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to
any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to
establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. Therefore the
legal standing on the requisites for the concerned citizens suit
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established
that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.,
Thus payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending power. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended
by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for
its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.”
It must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a
taxpayer’s suit. there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner
cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather,
he must establish that he has a “personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” In other words, petitioner
must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.