: Suspension of petitioners was proper. Sec13 of RA3019 unequivocally provides that theaccused public official “shall be suspended from office” while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. Under
case, such suspension is mandatory. It is not violative of theConstitution as it is not a penalty. It is mandatory as soon as the validity of the information isdetermined. There is no merit in the contention that their admission of the acts constituting theoffense charged against them eliminates apprehension that they might tamper with the records. Itis not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution willneed to hold up its case against them. The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non intervention and non-interference for 90 days from petitioner’s camp.The fear that the government will be paralyzed by their suspension is remote. There are 8councilors left who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, theSecretary of Interior and Local Government will know how to deal with the problem of filling upthe temporarily vacant positions in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.
3. Garcia vs. COMELEC (1993)Facts
: On July1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of 12municipalities of Bataan province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory RecallAssembly (PRA) in the Bagac town plaza to initiate the recall election of Governor Garcia(elected governor of Bataan in May, 1992 elections) for “loss of confidence”. COMELECscheduled recall elections. Governor Garcia asserts the unconstitutionality of Sec70, LGC.
Sec70 of LGC is constitutional. The presumption of validity rests on the respect due to thewisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by whom the law is approved. Garcia does not point to any constitutional provisionthat will sustain their contention – for surely, there is nothing in there that will remotely suggestthat the people have the “sole
and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.”The Constitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall elections. It did not prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by Sec3of Art X of the Constitution is for Congress to “enact a LGC which shall provide for a moreresponsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum xxx”Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as itsdiscernment dictates. Power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate, and it was notstraight jacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections.The Constitution requires only that the mechanisms chosen (one or many) be effective.Congress deemed it wise to enact the alternative mode to supplement the former mode by directaction, and the Court cannot supplant this judgment by Congress in respect of the principle of separation of powers. Choice may be erroneous but the remedy against a bad law is to seek itsamendment or repeal by the legislative.Initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives this act by the people through their elected representatives is not constitutionallyimpermissible as seen in the task of drafting the Constitution which is delegated to their representatives (either by constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly).2