Jean Stein

Ben Sonnenberg

Berlin's Skeleton in Utah's Closet

Author(s): Mike Davis
Source: Grand Street, No. 69, Berlin (Summer, 1999), pp. 92-100
Published by: Ben Sonnenberg
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25008538
Accessed: 25/12/2009 16:43

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S iKELETON IN

UTAH'S CLOSET

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I..: . ii...

if .
--:---- ' -.-- ^^-.. i
BERLIN'S MOST FAR-FLUNG, secretand orphan
suburbsits in the saltbushdesert aboutninetymiles
southwest of Salt Lake City. "German Village, " as it
isofficially labeledon declassifiedmaps of theU.S.
Army'sDugwayProvingGround, is the remnantof
amuch larger,German-Japanesecomposite "doom
town"constructedbyStandardOil in I943.Dugway
played a crucial role in the New Deal's last great
publicworks project:the incinerationof cities in
easternGermanyand Japan.
Two years ago, the Army allowed me to tour
GermanVillage brieflywith a dozen of my students
from theSouthernCaliforniaInstituteof
Architecture.Dugway is slighdybigger thanRhode
Islandandmore toxicallycontaminatedthan the
NuclearTest Site innearbyNevada.As thedevil's
own laboratoryfor threegenerationsof U.S.
chemical, incendiary,and biologicalweapons, ithas
alwaysbeen shrouded inofficial secrecyandCold
Warmyth. A recent threatof base restructuring,
however, has prompted the Army tomount a small
public relationscampaignonDugway's behalf
Since napalm, botulism and binary nerve gas are not
conventionaltouristattractions,theProving
Ground insteadadvertisesitspreservationof an
original sectionof theLincolnHighway.Most
visitors arepioneeringmotorists who come to
admire thedecrepit,one-lane bridge thatcrosses
a swampy patch in Baker Area, not far from
thecontroversialbio-warfarelabwhere theArmy
tinkerswith andromedastrains,guardedby a
doubleperimeterof razorwire.GermanVillage is
a dozen or so miles further west, in a sprawling
maze ofmysterious test sites and targetareas that
Dugway's commander is reluctantto includeon
thevisitor itinerary.
He relentedonlywhen we
convincedhis press office that theVillage had an
importantaestheticaura thatmight enhance
"baseheritage":itwas designed byone of
Modernism's gods, theGerman-Jewisharchitect
EricMendelsohn.
BurningBerlin'sRedDistricts
In I943, theChemicalWarfareCorps secretly
recruitedMendelsohn toworkwith StandardOil
engineers tocreateaminiatureHohenzollem slum
in theUtah desert.Nothing in theappearanceof
the survivingstructure-a double tenementblock
known asBuilding 8ioo-identifies itas the
productof the samehand thatdesigned such
landmarksofWeimarBerlin as theofficesof the
BerlinerTageblatt,theColumbushaus, theSternefeld
villa inCharlottenburg,or theWoga Complex on
theKurfiirstendamm.Absolute "typicality"in all
93
MIKE DAVIS
aspectsoflayout and constructionwas what the
ChemicalWarfareCorpswanted. Theywere ina
hurry.Despite thehorrifyingsuccessof their
thousand-bomberfireraidsagainstCologne and
Hamburg inmid-I943, theAllieswere increasingly
frustratedby theirinabilityto ignitea firestormin
theReich capital.Their top science advisersurged a
crashprogramof incendiaryexperimentationon
exact replicasofworking-class housing. (The
design and constructionprocesseswere planned to
dovetailwith secret researchon the flammabilityof
Japanesehomes.) Only theUnited States-or,
rather,thecombined forcesof Hollywood and the
oil industry-had the resourcestocomplete the
assignment ina fewmonths.
Mendelsohn's achievementwas theanonymityof
his result:six iterationsof the steeplygabled brick
tenements-Mietskasernen, or rentbarracks-that
made theRed districtsof Berlin thedensest slums
inEurope.Threeof theapartmentblocks had tileon
batten roofs, characteristicsof Berlin construction,
while theother threehad slateover sheathing
roofs,more commonly found in the factorycities
of the Ruhr. Although not as tall as their seven-story
counterpartsinWedding orKreuzberg, the test
structureswere otherwiseastonishingly
precise simulacra.
Before drawinganyblueprints,Mendelsohn
exhaustively researched the roof area-a critical
incendiaryparameter-of targetneighborhoods in
Berlin and other industrialcities.His datawas
"iextended and confirmed,"reportedtheStandard
Oil Development Company, "by amember of the
HarvardArchitectureSchool, an expertonGerman
wooden framebuilding construction."(Couldit
havebeenWalterGropius?)The builders,working
with fireprotectionengineers, gave extraordinary
94
attention toensuring that the frames (madewith
authenticwoods, importedfromas farawayas
Murmansk) duplicated theaging and specific
densityof olderGerman construction.When the
fireexpertsobjected thatDugway's climatewas too
arid, theirStandardOil counterpartscontrivedto
keep the levelofwood moisture accuratebyhaving
GIs regularly"water"the target,to simulate
Prussian rain.
The interiorfurnishing,meanwhile,was
subcontractedtoRKORadioPictures'Authenticity
Division, thewizards behindCitizenKane.Using
German-trainedcraftsmen, theyduplicatedthe
cheapbut heavyfurniturethatwas thedowryof
Berlin's proletarianhouseholds.German linenwas
carefullystudied toensure the typicalityof bed
coveringsand drapes.While theauthenticators
debateddetailswithMendelsohn and the fire
engineers, theconstructionprocesswas secretly
acceleratedby thewholesale conscriptionof
inmatesfrom theUtah StatePrison. It took them
only forty-fourdays tocompleteGermanVillage
and its Japanesecounterpart(twelvedouble
apartmentsfullyfurnishedwith hinoki and tatami).
The entirecomplexwas then firebombedand
completelyreconstructedat least threetimes
between May and September of I943.
Mendelsohn's secretsignatureonGerman
Village is rich in irony.Likeallof his progressive
Weimar contemporaries,he had a deep interestin
housing reformand thecreationof a neue Wohnkultur
(newcultureof living).Yet, as his biographershave
noted, he was never involved in the big social
housing competitionsorganizedby theSocial
Democrats in the late I920s, which were such
crucial showcases for the urbanist ideas of the
emergentmodernmovement. His absencewas
 BERLIN'S SKELETON IN UTAH'S CLOSET

most dramatic(andmysterious) in thecaseof the TheZoroastrianSociety

I927WeissenhofSiedlung-the model housing project During the early days of the Second World War, tens
coordinatedbyMies vanderRohe and sponsoredby of millions ofAmerican voters of German and
Stuttgart'sleft-winggovernment-which Philip Italian ancestry were reassured that the U.S. Air
Johnsonhas called "themost importantgroup of Force would never deliberately make a target out of
buildings in thehistoryofmodern architecture."In "the ordinary man in the street." In every region but
Mendelsohn's biography,BrunoZevi suggests that the East-where, as Curtis LeMay would later tell
Mendelsohn was "excludedfrom the largeworks of his Tokyo-boundpilots, "thereareno civilians"
theSiedlungen"becauseof anti-Semitism. Americans (in I943, as in I999) were officially
If so,Dugwaywas his revenge.Herewas committed to theclean,high-tech destruction
workers' housing perverselydesigned toaccelerate of strictlymilitaryormilitary-industrialtargets.
thecampaign "todehouse theGerman industrial The Eighth Air Force sent its crews in daylight
worker,"as theBritish blundyput it.The "precision"raidsagainstvisuallyidentifiedtargets,
Weissenhof masterpieces of Gropius and theTaut incontrast to itsBlitz-embitteredBritish allies,who
brotherswere among the45 percentof the I939 saturation-bombed German cities at night, hoping
German housing stock thatBomberCommand and to terrorizetheirpopulations into flightor
theEighthAir Forcemanaged todestroyor damage rebellion.The extraordinarytechnologiesof the
by the springof I945. (Indeed,Allied bombers B-I7 and the Norden bombsight allowed the United
pounded into rubblemore I920Ssocialistand States to bomb "with democratic values." (Then as
modernist utopias than theydidNazi villas.) now, "collateral damage" was smugly swept under
DidMendelsohn and theother anti-Nazi thenationalconscience.)
refugeeswho worked onGermanVillage have But, as the construction of German Village
qualms about incendiaryexperimentationthat dramatizes, the story is considerably more sinister.
involvedonlyplebeianhousing?Did theyapprehend While military doctrine,aircrafttechnology,and
the terror and agony that the Chemical Warfare sensitivitytodomestic public opinion ensureda
Corpswas meticulously planning to inflictupon the huge investmentinprecisionbombing, counter
No memoir or correspondence
Berlinproletariat? civilian or "morale" bombing had never been
Mendelsohn was notoriously tight-lipped-offers excluded from U.S. war planning against Germany.
any information. Historians of the U.S. Air Force, Indeed, as Ronald Schaffer and other historians
on the other hand, have excavated a complex, have shown, AWPD i-the secret strategy for an air
sometimes tortureddebate (asneveroccurred in the war against Germany thatwas adopted months
racial inferno of the Pacific theater) over the ethics before Pearl Harbor-specifically envisioned that it
of firebombingBerlin. might be "highly profitable to deliver a large-scale,
all-out attack on the civil population of Berlin" after
precisionbombing had disruptedRuhr industries.
The British, moreover, fiercely pressured the U.S.
Eighth Air Force to join their "area bombing"

95
MIKE DAVIS
crusade.Churchill,encouragedbyhis chief science
adviserandDr. Strangelove,LordCherwell,had
turnedto terrorbombing inMarch of I942 lessout
of revengefor theBlitz (althoughthisensured
strongpublic support) thanfrom the idee fixe that
civilianmoralewas Germany'sAchilles heel.
Although a casemight havebeenmade for singling
out thehomes of theNazi politicaland industrial
elites foraerialpunishment, this riskedretaliation
againstBurke'sPeerageand had thusbeen excluded
byCherwell from theonset. ("Thebombingmust be
directedessentiallyagainstworking-class houses.
Middle-class houses have toomuch spacearound
them, and so are bound towaste bombs.") Thus the
squalidMietskasernenwere ground zero.And by
November 1942,when thousand-bombernight
raidshad become common overwestern Germany,
Churchillwas able to sharewith his allies the
optimisticquotas that theRoyalAir Forcehad
pledged toproduce:nine hundred thousand
civiliansdead, onemillion seriouslyinjured,and
twenty-fivemillion homeless.
If some of theU.S. precisionbombers, such as
GeneralGeorgeMcDonald, thedirectorofAir Force
intelligence,were appalledby thisdescent to
"indiscriminatehomicide and destruction,"thereis
evidence thatthecommander in chief, influencedby
his own Strangelovianadvisers,had amore open
mind aboutmassacring enemy civilians.When the
RAF'sOperationGomorrah succeeded inkindling
tornadicfirestormsin theheartofHamburg in July
andAugust of I943 (seven thousandchildrenwere
among thecarbonizedvictims),Rooseveltwas
reportedlygreatly impressed.
Gomorrah also strengthened the hand of the fire
war advocates within the Army Air Force and the
NationalDefense ResearchCommittee. InEngland,
96
theRAFhad organizedan informaldiscussion
group, the so-calledZoroastrianSociety, to share
expertiseon incendiarieswith EighthAir Force
planners. It soon became an intellectualhome for
aggressiveyoung commanders likeCurtisLeMay,
who were infectedwith theBritish enthusiasm for
weapons andwanted to see their
incendiary
deploymentgreatlyexpanded. (Incendiaries,all
sides agreed,weremost effectiveagainst civilian
housing, not industryor infrastructure.)
On thehome front, the firebombingofAxis
capitalsenjoyedpowerful supportfrom influential
Harvardscientists (ledby the "fatherof napalm,"
chemistLouisFeiser), theoil companies, and the
fireprotection industry.The fire insuranceexperts,
one historianpoints out, "didnot simplyadvise the
Army Air Force. They pushed it as hard as they could
tomake itwage incendiary
warfareagainst factories
and homes." They loved to point out to airmen the
overlookedfirepotentialsof structureslike
churches,which were "quitevulnerableto small
incendiaries."
GermanVillagewas constructedinMay I943, on
theeveof Churchill'sburntofferingatHamburg, to
addressopportunitiesandproblems thatwere
beyond themoral boundaryof precisionbombing.
Itwas a trade show for the burgebning firewar
lobby.Those planning thecoming airwar against
Japan were eager to see how new incendiaries,
includingnapalmand an incredible"batbomb"
thatreleasedhundredsoflive bats booby-trapped
with tinyincendiarydevices,performedagainst
Dugway's Japanesehouses.Meanwhile, the
Zoroastrian Society was looking for clues on how to
burn up Berlin's massive masonry shell.

Churchill's"MoraleBombing"
Inhis authoritativereporton "TheFireAttacks on
GermanCities,"HoratioBond, theNational
Defense ResearchCommittee's chiefincendiary
expert,underscoredtheAllies' frustration."Berlin
was harder toburn thanmost ofthe otherGerman
cities.Therewas betterconstructionand better
'compartmentation.'Inotherwords, residential
buildingsdid not present themselvesas largefire
divisionsor fireareas.Approximatelytwiceasmany
incendiarieshad tobe dropped toassurea fire in
each firedivision."As theGermanVillage tests
clarified,"little [could]be expected in theway of the
freespreadof firefrombuilding tobuilding."
Buildingswere lost "becausetheywere hit by
bombs ratherthanbecause firespreadfromother
buildings."
YetuntilZhukovwas literallyspitting in the
Spree, theBritish clung to thebelief (ordementia,
as many Americans saw it) that Berlin could be
bombed out of thewar.Although theMietskasernen
were not easilycombustible,RAFplannersargued
thatthiscould be compensatedforwith more
bombersand greater incendiarydensity.British
strategywas builtupon theassumption that
intolerableciviliansufferingwould inevitably
producea proletarianrevoltin theheartof theThird
Reich. (In this sense, Churchill had more faith in
Marxist doctrine thanStalin,who alone seemed to
understandtheenormityofHitierism'smoral hold
on thecapital.)When theRAF'scostly reverseblitz
failed to inciteBerlinersagainst theFuihrer,
ChurchillcajoledRoosevelt intounleashing an
American "super-raid" -a deus ex machina that
also failed.
BERLIN'S SKELETON IN UTAH'S CLOSET
Armageddonwas thusproduced in twoacts: the
RAF'sBatde of Berlin inNovember of I943, and the
EighthAir Force's "Operation Thunderclap"in
Februaryof I945.Promising theBritishpeople that
"Berlinwill be bombed until theheartof Nazi
Germany ceases tobeat,"SirArthur "Bomber"
Harris unleashed theRAF'sheavybomberson
November i8. In a new strategy that the Germans
dubbedBombenteppich, or carpetbombing, the
Lancasters,flying indangerouslytightformations,
concentratedtheirbomb loadson small,densely
populatedareas. Incendiaryattackswere followed
by explosives,droppedwith thedeliberateaimof
killing firefightersand rescueworkers. In
accordancewith theRAF'sdoctrineof targeting
Weimar's redbelts tomaximize discontent, the
famousCommunist strongholdofWeddingwas
thoroughlypulverizedand firebombed.
The zoo was also amajor target, which
inadvertentlyincreasedthemeat rationof thecity's
poorer residents."Berlinersdiscoveredto their
surprisethatsome unusualdisheswere extremely
tasty.Crocodile tail, for instance,cooked slowly in
largecontainers,was not unlike fattychicken,while
bear ham and sausages proved a particular
delicacy." Although Harris was unable to fuel a
Hamburg-stylefirestormin theTiergarten,the
Lancasters did flatten almost a quarter of the
metropolitan core. The BBC boasted that as many as
onemillion Berlinershad been killed or injured.
YetasHarrishimselfhad to acknowledge to
Churchill, the RAF's all-out effort "did not appear to
be an overwhelmingsuccess."Forone thing,
Goebbels, thecity's realruler,mounted a brilliant
defensewith his flak towers,squadronsof deadly
night fighters,and firebrigadesconscriptedfrom
all over Germany. Five percent of the British
97
MIKE DAVIS
aircrewswere shot out of the skyeverynight, an
unsustainablesacrificeforBomberCommand.
Moreover, despite terribledamage to the slums, the
realmachineryof power and production inBerlin
remainedremarkably undamaged.Strategic
bombing analystsmarveled at theabilityof thecity's
industries"toproducewarmaterial in scarcely
diminishedquantitiesalmost up to theend."
Goebbels cunninglyshifted theparametersof
theAllies' calculusof German suffering.More than
onemillion nonessential civilians,especially
children,were sent into thecountryside,while
hundredsof thousandsof Russian andPolish
prisonersofwarwere moved directlyunderAllied
bombsights.While Hitlerwas throwingtantrumsin
his bunker,Goebbelswas holding stirringrallies in
the ruins,harvestingpopulist angerproducedby the
carpetbombing ofworking-class neighborhoods.
At the same time,hemassively reinforcedhis
sprawlingnetworkof surveillanceand terror
ensuring thatany seedof discontentwould be
promptlydestroyedbefore itcould germinate into
a largerconspiracy.TheBritish,meanwhile,
were seeminglyoblivious to thepossibility that
"moralebombing"was actuallystrengthening
the Nazi state.
Indeed, theRAFclungwith strikingfanaticism
to its flawedparadigm.Harris convincedChurchill
that "we can [still] wreck Berlin from end to end if
the U.S. Air Force will come in on it." In thewinter
and spring of I944, as the sensational new long
rangefightersbegan togiveAmericanB-I7s
unprecedentedprotectionovereasternGermany,
theEighthAir Force,while still theoretically
selectingonlyprecision targets,joinedBritish area
bombers in a series of thousand-plane raids on
Berlin,predictablyculminatingwith a second carpet
98
bombing ofWedding and its redsister,Pankow.
One and a halfmillion Berlinersweremade
homeless, but industrialoutput, again, quickly
rebounded.
OperationThunderclap
Roosevelt had thus far in the war reconciled the
divergentphilosophies of strategicbombing by
accepting,at the I943CasablancaConference, the
British conceptof aCombinedBomberOffensive
"toundermine themorale of theGerman people,"
while at the same timepreservingtheArmyAir
Force's tacticaloption fordaylight,precision
targets.AfterHidlerretaliatedforD-Daywith his V-i
and thenV-2 attackson London, thiscompromise
becameuntenable. Indeed,Churchill's initial
reactiontoGermany's secretweapons was to
demandpoison gas attacksorworse on Berlin: "It is
absurd toconsidermorality on this topic,"he
hectoredRAFplanners in earlyJuly."Iwant the
matter studied incold blood by sensiblepeople, and
not bypsalm-singing, uniformeddefeatists."
As BartonBernsteinhas shown,Churchillasked
Roosevelt to speed up the delivery of five hundred
thousandtop-secret"N-bombs"containingdeadly
anthrax,which had been developedatDugway's
GranitePeakcomplex.The RAF,writes Bernstein,
"was putting together a plan for the use of anthrax
against sixGerman cities:Berlin,Hamburg,
Stuttgart,Frankfurt,Aachen, andWilhelmshafen.
The expectation was that forty thousand of the 500
pound projectiles,containingabout4.25million
four-poundbombs,would kill at leasthalf the
population by inhalation, and many more would die
laterthroughskin absorption.
Poison gas and anthrax were too much for the
White House, butRoosevelt passionatelywanted to

offer something to theBritish. InAugust I944, he
complainedangrily tohis Secretaryof Treasury,
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.: "We have got to be tough
with Germany, and Imean the German people, not
just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the
German people or treat them in such amanner
they can't just go on reproducing people who want
to continue the way they have in the past." The same
month, ChurchillofferedRoosevelt anRAFplan,
OperationThunderclap,thatwould guarantee to
"castrate"275,000 Berliners (deadand injured)with
a single two thousand-bombersuper-raidagainst
thecitycenter.Roosevelt, followingChief of
StaffGeorgeMarshall's advice,accepted theplan
in principle.
Some key Air Force leaders were disturbed by the
unsavoryimplicationsofThunderclap.Major
General Laurence Kuter protested to colleagues
"it is contrary to our national ideals towage war
against civilians." Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz,
the commander of the U.S. bombers in Europe, had
"no doubt ... that the RAF wants very much
the U.S. Air Forces tarred with themorale bombing
aftermath, which we feel will be terrific. "War hero
JimmyDoolittle, theEighthAir Forcecommander,
also remonstrated bitterly after being ordered by
Eisenhower, in September of I944, to be ready to
drop bombs "indiscriminately"
on Berlin.
Nor did Air Force commanders in Europe
necessarilybuy theargumentofWashington
planners, who thought Stalin had grown too
omnipotent on the battlefield and needed a
compellingdemonstrationof thedestructivepower
of Allied bombers. The RAF Air Staff had added this
frosting toThunderclap's cake in an August
briefing: "A spectacular and final object lesson to
the German people on the consequences of
BERLIN'S SKELETON IN UTAH'S CLOSET
universalaggressionwould be of continuingvalue
in the postwar period. Again, the total devastation
of the center of a vast city such as Berlin would offer
incontrovertible
proof to all peoples of thepower
of amodern air force.... Itwould convince our
that Russian allies and theNeutrals of theeffectiveness
ofAnglo-Americanairpower."
In the end,Thunderclap(whichnow included
Dresden and Leipzig on its agenda) was unleashed
forcompetingand contradictoryreasons,havingas
much to do with starting the Cold War as with
ending theSecondWorldWar.Meanwhile, the
potentialofwhat Americanplannerscalled
"promiscuousbombardment"had been
dramatically increased by the influx of hundreds of
thousandsofpanicked refugeesfleeing the
advancing Red Army in early 1945. When the leaden
that winter skies finally cleared over Berlin on February
3,Doolittle stubbornlywithheld hismore
vulnerable B-24s, but sent in nine hundred B-I7s
and hundreds of fighter escorts. Itwas not the
to have knockout blow that the British had envisioned, but
twenty-fivethousandBerlinersnonetheless
perished,while deep under theburningReich
Chancellery, Hitler listened toWagner.
Dresden, amonth later, was closer to the
original, apocalypticconceptionof Thunderclap.
Crowded with refugees, slave laborers and Allied
prisoners, the cultural center was only useful to the
war effort as a temporary transport junction on the
imploding Eastern Front. American bombers
concentrated on the railroad yards, and the British
went after everything else. Itwas the biggest
firestorm since Hamburg. The death toll will never
I944 be known, although estimates range from thirty
thousand to three hundred thousand. After
reducing it to cinder, Harris savagely bombed the
99
MIKE DAVIS
cityagainwith explosives,aiming tokill off
remainingsurvivorsin thecellars.
R,oosevelt'sendorsementofThunderclap,which
paved theway forU.S. complicity inDresden,was a
moralwatershed in theAmerican conductof the
war. By committing theAir Force toBritish doctrine
inGermany,Thunderclapalso opened thedoor to
theZoroastrianSocietyalumni,who wanted an
unrestrictedincendiarycampaignagainst Japan's
"papercities."The hundred thousandor soGerman
civilianswhom theEighthAir Forceburned todeath
in thecitiesof easternGermanyduring thewinter of
I945were but a prelude to theonemillion Japanese
consumed in theB-29 autos-da-fe laterthatspring.
100
These ghosts of theGoodWar's darkestside still
haunt the toxicwaste surroundingGermanVillage.
Now thatPotsdamerPlatzand theotheropen
wounds of Berlin's historyhavebeen transformed
into showpiecesof reunifiedprosperity,
Mendelsohn's forlornMietskasernen suddenly
seem significant,as a reproofto the self
righteousnessof punishing "badplaces"by
bombing them.GermanVillage isBerlin's secret
heartache,whispering in thecontaminatedsilence
of theUtah desert.