KANTIAN CONCEPTUALISM AND APPERCEPTIONbyRALEIGH MILLERUnder the Direction of Melissa McBay MerrittABSTRACTIn this paper I argue, with many leading commentators, that Kant is a conceptualist. Isupport this conclusion, argued for independently by Hannah Ginsborg and John McDowell, byappeal to the
analyticity of Kant‟s apperception principle in the transcendental deduction. I argue
that the apperception principle, if taken as an analytic proposition, implies that any mentalrepresentation that figures into discursive cognition is the product of
synthesis. I furtherargue that making
synthesis a condition for the possibility of any mental representation issufficient to make mental representation conceptual in the relevant sense. This, I argue, stronglysuggests that Kant is a conceptualist.