4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to theUnited States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he hadrenounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs,which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in analleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and inwhich he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaimingand renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or(his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes onincome which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", hiswife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day,upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, shewas appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estateof Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as SpecialAdministratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the lattercase, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still keptin his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless SpecialAdministratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, acertain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-SpecialAdministrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estateof Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of saidestate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno andDavies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have beenproceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with theother, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at thebeginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions itwanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approvalas their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however,differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them beganacting later on separately and independently of each other, withapparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyerswhom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all theproperties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belongedsolely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers andsisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact anyof said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugalpartnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand,Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on thepremise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth withsome of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the