Welcome to Scribd. Sign in or start your free trial to enjoy unlimited e-books, audiobooks & documents.Find out more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
9Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Battle Experiences 6

Battle Experiences 6

Ratings: (0)|Views: 81|Likes:
Published by bawb-2

More info:

Published by: bawb-2 on Jul 15, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

01/03/2013

pdf

text

original

 
.
wr.
j,FTH
ARMY
CROUP
BA7T
bE
EXPERIENCES
No.
61
9
OCT
1944
'Battle merienoee*
are
published regularly by this headquarters to anable
unlts
in training to pmfit
from
the latest combst emeriencea
of
our tmope
nor
fighting the
Gem
n Burope.Although the experiences of certain units at
a
particular looation
are
not necessarily applicable to all units in all situatiolu.the
item8
published
will
be those
based
on practical experienoe
and
are
reoormmtndedfor careful consideration by units which may enmuter similar problems.Reportsof corroborative or contrary elperiencas are partioularly desired in oraer that thevalidity of the indicated battle lesson
may
be determined.By cnmannd of Lieutanant General
ERADLtSY:
c.$,U
C*
M.
LAAIDON
Colonel,
A6D
Adjutant Generalbbte:
'I'he
following material, extracted
from
a mfmorandum
of
the
2d
Inf
Div concern-
iq
the experiencee of that unit in large aoale street fighting
in
Brest,
is
wrthy
of
mte
as indicative of conditions likely to
be
encountered
by
units fighting
in
German
cities.
A
discussion of
this
subject by the
div
condr
ras
published
in
Battle&&pexriencere
No.
50.
1.
Bnanw
deie~be
mthods.
a.
-Streeta were covered normally
by
sazing
fire ofautomatic
rpns
loaated in pillboxes
and
in basgneats. Pillboxes
were
located
fie-
quently at
street
interaectionn.b. mRiPlemenwere placed both in upper stories
and
in basements
ta
corer theautcnaatic rpns positions.Hiflemen were located alao
in
my
utted building^^
anal1
holes haring been made
in
the
remaining
wllls
to enable fire to be placed
in
the cen-ten of blooks.c.
'Buildings
within the interior of
a
block
nornvsily
were
mt
occupied
as
they
did
not afford fields of fire and were easily sumunded.d. "uirect fire
upad
were kept at some distance
and
were used
mainly
to
fire atupper stories,in many cases
denying
the use of upper stories
to
arty
obsrs.
e.
*A
Large number of tunnels and undergmmd insfdlationa
mere
asea
8s
pro-
tective shelters, atoreroome,
or
repair
shopa. Entrances to
these
shelters
often
were
defended.
f.
*Buildings were set
afire
frequently in
order
to bhck
the
advance
of
attackingienits. After the buildings had burned
out
the additismi
?pen
space
gave
the defenders
fmpmved
fields
of
fire.
2.
Zones of action--F'onaations.
a,,
aWidths of
wrnse
c;f
action
were
reduced
be
to
the height
and
depth
of
the
area
to
'be
~eutr&laed
.?zi-i
&;l.tkrad,
!
zones
varied
between. one
and
two
block
fronts
with
each
plat
-signed
.%
rox
or
bbck
of
buiidiwa,
4
defrdte street
or
building
was
mrsl@&
i;s
casc~
A%S:W.;G
dad
md
plat*
 
b,
.It
was
found desirable to attack two cos abreast, with the reserve co heldmuch closer to the assault units than in open terrain.The reserve co could deal withlocal counterattacks rapidly and could prevent successful infiltration in rear of theassault units,
c.
*To insure maintaining a continuous front, each sqd and plat coordinated riththe next higher unit after securing
an
objective.
3.
Bgethod of advance.
a.
.Because the streets were so heavily defended, thebuildings provided the routes of advance.
mtry
was gained
by
blasting holes throughcovered sides of walls. In
some
casee, demolition
team
with prepared charges wereattached to each assault plat; in other cases,
engre
prepared and furnished the chargesand the inf executed the demolitions.b. *After
a
hole had been blasted, a rlfle sqd, or half-sqd made
an
aseault throughthe hole before the en- aould recover from the shock.Once
a
building
was
entered,each floor had to
be
cleared in turn.c.*Experience proved
it
was
often best to enter a building from the roof or topfloor and work down. Scaling ladders were invaluable in providing entrances throughwindows and ceilings.d.
BWke
grenades were used to cover the unite crossing streets and gap8 betweenisolated bujldings.
Enemy
A1
sametimes could
be
located when they fired at the arnoke.
4.
Time
of operations, a. fiExperience showed that advances could
be
initiated
any
time after daylight, the hours of darkness 'being utilized to blast holes in ini-tial objectives for the
following
day.b..Three or four hours sometimes were necessary for consolidation of positionsfor the night. This
was
found desirable to enable units to prepare positiom to coverevery enemy approach. Without this coordinated defenee for the night, the enemy in-filtrated riflemen behind advance elements and seriously hampered operations on thefollowing morning.
5.
supporting artillery. a. *Close arty support from organic hows was of littlevalue due to the varying heights of buildings and to the very close contact with theemuxryb.
uuty
rendered invaluable support in engaging targets some distance ahead offront line
units
and in placing
an
intense
24
hour program of harassing
and
inter-diction fires on selected areas and targeta in the enemy's rear.c.aTD wpns and
155~~1
elf-propelled
guns
proved extremly helpful in neutralizingor destroying heavy emplacements, pillboxes, heavily defended buildings and strongpoints,. These qns a180 were instrumental in providing avenues of advance for units
by
blasting walle of buildings. The following points are worthy of interest in theemployment of these
rrpnsr
(1)
A
In
0
or
NCO
should remain with the rifleco ccsndr at all
times
to speeddelivery of fire.
(2)
Guidesshould be furniehed to lead the wpne into positions and to point outtargets,(3)The upna met be given protection against enemy
ff
upns.
(4)
Wpns should follow front line unite by bounds when not employed.(5Morte or arty fire should be used to conceal the noise of lrljns moving topositions,
(6)
Normally one eection of TDa was attached to each aeaault co.Subordinateand adjacent unita should be infomd when these wpns
are
to fire.
 
6s
Chet14oal
mrtars.
"The
4.2
cml
mrt
rss
one of the mat eff ectiva .mpporting
*ma
It
waa able
to
shoot over
hip
builainga
to
render support withiu 100
yds
of
front line elenenta.
Large
amunts of
1P
ware ased ta drivethe
enary
out
of
cel-lars
and
buildiw into the range ofrifle8
and
atoartic
wpm,
7.
mantry
weapow.
a,
*Tb. =st
affsative ti~tamtio
rm
aployed rere
BdRs.
'1-son
SIP)e,
and
carbine8 nmdiiied for autamatic flm.be
'H)10.
ftmnishod
little aupport due to limited fields
of
firs.
They
rrarw
m-
Plally ueed to corer streets leading into the flanks,
acd
m~reoa8ibl0,
co
fife
down
streets
to
the fmnt
to
prevent the fmm cros~ily treets
and
shiftlug positions.
c,
.Rocket
launchers me mfitably snployod
w
*PL
it
raa
possible to tdvcace with.in range.Thsy
rere
effective in clearing out
YI
positions in houses
and
pi.,lboxe&
dm
.371m
Ax
guns
rare
held near street comers
it
ready porritions, fr&
which
they could
go
into firing position rapidly, fire and vithdraw.e.
860a
mr&s
=re
used on close-in
targets,
and
ram
sifeotire in
baaping
an-
rlflemen from
mofs
or top floors of buildirga.
They
were of
mro
valuein ssskdentialdistricts
than
in solid bloch of high
buildings,
but
Ln
both caaes
rsw
helpful
in
fixing the
enemy
and in preventing
his
movaasnt to new firing
positions.
fa
'8-
mrta pmvided excellent support at ranges not to exueed 1500
yda.
Ma-placement
mas
normally
by
section as euitable
are-
for plat posltiona rare
rare,
WP
om
was used extensively for screening
and
for aaoualty effect,
and
HK
(both light and
heavy)
for destruction of buildings.
g
.Band
grenades (fragmentation
andWP)
were
essential for clearrng out taae-mente
,
ouses
,
nd pi lboms.h..Flame throwers were used in several instances den direct fire
upna
couldnot be employed and proved
a
great incentive to the enemy
to
surrender.
8.
hmudtion
sw~1~.
Co
sup dumps
were
maintained one block in
rear
of
as-
sault
units,
because front line units could not nonnally carry
a
full day'n ap.
9*
Ocnmntnications,
a.
*sCR
536
radios pmved
to
be of little value, becausetransmesion
and
reception
in
buildings
were
not
good.
b.
*wn
with plats
was
maintained by sound-gowered telephones.
10.
Mine
clearinq,
*Ue
etectiry personnel
from
enn
and pion plats and
from
combat engm followed the
assrnalt
closely in order to clear mutes of advance for
'I'D
and
AT
rpm.
11.
annineeps.
'nngr
troops wed of invaluable assistance in the followingroles:
a.
Capping
walls,
floors or ceilings to permit
inf
units to advance.b.Clearing routes
ma
preparing
positions for sels-propelled
rpm.
This oftenwas accompllahed
during
hours of darbess with hand tools to avoid disclosing ~aai-
t
iona,c.~illingraters, which were numerous,
with
rubble
from
destroyed bizildjngsnd.rilling
nueteroua
AT
ditchea by placing explosives inside
walls
of adjacentbuildings in such a manner that the debris was
blown
into the ditches.This
was
found to be
much
faster than blowing in the shoulders of.ditches, due to
i%zx
and
hard surfaced roads.e.Checking atreeta for mines.
Some
mines
werefoundunder regularly spacedremovable concrete squares.These concrete blc~~kaere not camouflaged
=d
mama:Py
would be presune~d to
cover
slots for holding steel roadblocks.f. Cutting steel roadblocks
with
TMI'.
This was
found
to be the
~uj
kest
.?.z:i!
safest
method.
-3-

Activity (9)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 hundred reads
cjnjr1 liked this
ab212amisar liked this
harrisburrrg liked this
txwarbirds liked this
Ray Merriam liked this
Mmeako liked this

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->