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ReadingBetweentheLines:The
SupremeCourtsTextualAnalysisofthe
ADEAinGrossv.FBLFinancialServices,
Inc.

MEGHANC.COOPER*

ABSTRACT

Since the passing of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA)in1967,ithasbeenillegalforemployerstodiscriminateagainst
theiremployeesbasedonage.However,suchdiscriminationhasremained
pervasive.Asisthecaseinmosteconomicdownturns,olderworkershave
beenfaringtheworstinthisplummetingeconomy.
At the height of this increase in workplace agediscrimination claims,
theSupremeCourtdecidedacasethatwillinevitablyaffectolderworkers
seeking relief for age discrimination. The Court held in Gross v. FBL
FinancialServices,Inc.thataplaintiffallegingaviolationoftheADEAmust
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the butfor
causeofanallegedillegalemploymentaction.ThisCommentarguesthat,
in so holding, the Court overturned decades of precedent, engaged in
judicial activism by deciding on this issue, and created an illogical and
unduly burdensome evidentiary standard for plaintiffs alleging age
discriminationintheworkplace.Accordingly,thisCommentcontendsthat
the Court should have applied its established precedent from Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and held that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the
ADEAbearsonlytheburdenofprovingthatagewasamotivatingfactorin
an employment decision to impart the burden on the defendant, as an
affirmative defense, to prove the same employment decision would have
beenmadedespiteanyconsiderationofage.

*Candidate forJurisDoctor,NewEnglandSchoolofLaw(2011).B.A.,Sociology,summa

cum laude, Loyola College in Maryland (2008). I would like to thank my wonderful family
andfriendsfortheirunconditionalpatience,love,andsupport.Iwouldalsoliketothankmy
editorsfortheirencouragementandassistancethroughoutthewritingprocess.

753
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754 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

INTRODUCTION

H
ow should an unemployed older worker reconcile the repeated
statementsfrompotentialemployers,Imnothiringyoubecause
youareoverqualified,or,Imnothiringyoubecauseyouarenot
proficient with technology?1 Reading between the lines, what is the
ordinary meaning of these statements? One possible, but hard to prove,
interpretationis:Imnothiringyoubecauseyouaretoooldand[fillinthe
blank].2Ifproven,isthisenoughtoestablishagediscrimination?
Despite the fact that it has been illegal for employers to discriminate
againsttheiremployeesbasedonagesince1967,3suchdiscriminationhas
remained pervasive.4 In the workplace, older workers constantly battle
inaccuratestereotypeslabelingthemasinferior,sedentary,technologically
obsolete, less productive, more vulnerable, and resistant to change.5
Furthermore, there is a perception that age discrimination is not only
different than other types of discrimination, but also less important and
less egregious.6 However, age discrimination is inherently unjust, just as
any other form of discrimination, because it inaccurately treats people as
inferioronthebasisoftheirmembershipinagroup.7
Asisthecaseinmosteconomicdownturns,olderworkershavebeen
faring the worst in this plummeting economy.8 Approximately 24,580

1SeePaulKeegan,LaidOffat50,MONEY,Jan.2009,at84,87.

2Seeid.

3See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602

(codifiedasamendedat29U.S.C.623(2006)).
4SeeHelenDennis&KathrynThomas,AgeismintheWorkplace,GENERATIONS, Spring2007,

at84,8485(notingthatPresidentLyndonB.Johnsonacknowledgedtheproblemofageismin
the workplace by signing the ADEA for the purpose of promoting employment based on
abilityratherthanarbitrarydeterminationsbasedonanemployeesage).
5EleanorG.Henry&JamesP.Jennings,AgeDiscriminationinLayoffs:FactorsofInjustice,54

J. BUS. ETHICS 217, 221 (2004) (reporting that, contrary to popular belief, research indicates
thereisnopatternofsuperiorjobperformancebyanyagegroup).
6SeeDennis&Thomas,supranote4,at85(contendingthatsomeviewagediscrimination

asaneconomicissueratherthanacivilrightsissuelikeraceorgenderdiscrimination).
7SeeHenry&Jennings,supranote5,at221.JudgeRichardA.Posnerhaswritten,Tosome,

agestereotypingiseverybitasviciousasracialstereotyping.Theconcernisthatifeverybody
is believed to age, this might be thought to imply that every old person is less competent
intellectuallythananotherwisesimilaryoungperson.Thatwouldindeedbefalse.RAYMOND
F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD AT A YOUNG AGE 22
(2001).
8Christine Cadena, Age Discrimination, the Elderly and the Economy: Connections that Affect

Retirement, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/

1368823/age_discrimination_the_elderly_and.html?cat=3(statingthatinpooreconomictimes,
there are higher layoffs and climbs in unemployment, all of which affect elderly adults at
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 755

complaintsofagediscriminationinemploymentwerefiledwiththeEqual
EmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)9inthefiscalyearending
September 30, 2008, representing a twentynine percent increase over all
agediscriminationclaimsin2007.10Furthermore,astaggeringtwomillion
AmericansfiftyfiveandolderwereunemployedasofJune2009.11
At the height of this increase in workplace agediscrimination claims,
the Supreme Court recently decided a case that will undoubtedly affect
discriminationreliefsoughtbyolderworkersinAmerica.12TheCourtheld
inGrossv.FBLFinancialServices,Inc.thataplaintiffallegingaviolationof
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the butfor cause of an
alleged illegal employment action.13 Thus, in the hypothetical posited
above,theSupremeCourtwouldanswerwithanemphaticnoatleastnot
without proof that but for the employers consideration of the workers
age, the worker would still not have been hired.14 This Comment argues
that,withsuchananswer,theCourthasoverturneddecadesofprecedent,
hasengagedinjudicialactivismbydecidingonthisissue,andhascreated
an illogical and unduly burdensome evidentiary standard for plaintiffs
allegingagediscriminationintheworkplace.15

higher rates than other populations); see JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION: AN
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS249(2006)(describingthedisproportionateeffect
the downturning economy in the 1980s had on older workers); Keegan, supra note 1, at 84
(reportingthatstudiesshowworkerspasttheageoffiftyaretwiceaslikelytobelaidoffas
their younger colleagues, experience a harder time gaining new employment, stay
unemployedlonger,andexperiencepaycutswheneventuallyfindingwork).
9The EEOC was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was given the

responsibilityofenforcingtheADEAin1978.SeeMACNICOL, supranote8,at23839;Pre1965:
Events Leading to the Creation of the EEOC, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/history/35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2011); Prelude to the 1980s
Reorganization and Expanded Authority, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/
35th/1970s/prelude.html(lastvisitedApr.23,2011).
10Vickie Elmer, Age Discrimination Claims Reach Record High, AARP BULL. (Mar. 25, 2009),

http://www.aarp.org/work/employeerights/info032009/age_discrimination_claims_by
_workers_reach_record_high.html(emphasizingthatthetwentyninepercentincreaseinage
discriminationclaimsissignificantlyhigherthanthefifteenpercentincreaseindiscrimination
claimsoverall).
11StevenGreenhouse,DemocratsWorkingtoOverturnJusticesonAgeBias,N.Y.TIMES,Oct.7,

2009,atA20,availableat2009WLNR19732144.
12SeeGrossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,129S.Ct.2343(2009).

13Id.at2352.

14Seeid.

15See id. at 235358 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 235859 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Smith v.

CityofJackson,544U.S.228,23134(2005)(holdingthatsincethelanguageandpurposesof
TitleVIIandADEAareidentical,theyarepresumedtohavesamemeaningandapplication);
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756 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of the ADEA, Title

VII and its 1991 Act, and the Supreme Court cases establishing the
frameworks under which such statutes are applied. Part II discusses the
CourtsopinioninGross.PartIII.AarguesthattheCourtwronglydecided
anissuenotpresentedtoitinatimelymanner.PartIII.Bcontendsthatthe
Court overturned precedent by deeming the ADEA and Title VII
materially different. Part III.C asserts that the Court erroneously
interpretedthelanguageoftheADEAtorequirebutforcausation.Part
III.DarguesthattheCourtsplacementoftheburdenofproofrequiring
the plaintiff to prove butfor causationnot only overturns precedent,
but also is unfair and illogical. Finally, Part III.E discusses the confusing
and concerning aftermath that Gross has caused and the resulting call for
congressionalamendment.

I. BackgroundLaw

Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
andtheADEAinanattempttoprohibitemploymentdiscriminationbased
onrace,color,religion,sex,nationaloriginorage.16However,thestatutes
merely make it unlawful to discriminate in employment because of
membershipwithinoneoftheseprotectedclasses.17Asaresultofthislack
of specificity from the legislature, the task of further developing the
procedural, evidentiary, and substantive law of employment
discriminationhasbeenlefttothecourts.18

A. EmploymentDiscriminationStatutes:TitleVIIandtheADEA

In passing Title VII, Congress sought to prohibit employment

discriminationonthebasisofspecificimmutablecharacteristics.19TitleVII
readsinpertinentpart:
Itshallbeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeforanemployerto
failorrefusetohireortodischargeanyindividual,orotherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
becauseofsuchindividualsrace,color,religion,sex,ornational
origin....20

seealsocasescitedinfranote45.
16SeeAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct,29U.S.C.621(b)(2006);CivilRightsActof

1964,42U.S.C.2000e2(a)(1).
17William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 8283

(2009).
18Seeid.at83.

19See42U.S.C.2000e2(a)(1).

20Id.
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 757

Following the passing of Title VII, Congress passed the ADEA in

1967.21TheADEA,beingderivedfromthelanguageofTitleVII,22similarly
reads,[i]tshallbeunlawfulforanemployertofailorrefusetohireorto
dischargeanyindividualorotherwisediscriminateagainstanyindividual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,becauseofsuchindividualsage.23Afterthepassageofthese
incrementalstatutes,courtswerelefttodecidehowapartycouldestablish
aviolationofthesestatutes.24

B. SupremeCourtCases

In construing Title VII and the ADEA, the Supreme Court has
established two general frameworks to establish unlawful discrimination:
disparate impact and disparate treatment.25 This Comment will focus on
disparatetreatmentliability,whichatitsmostbasiclevelinvolvesproving
an employer engaged in an employment practice with an intent to
discriminate.26 The Supreme Court has further developed two distinct
disparate treatment frameworks, pretextual burdenshifting and mixed
motives,eachofwhichissufficienttoproveunlawfuldiscrimination.27

1. PretextualBurdenShiftingFramework

In 1973, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

endeavoredtoclarifytheburdenandorderofproofinactionschallenging
employment discrimination under Title VII.28 In its threepart burden
shifting scheme, the Court imparted the initial burden on the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.29 In order to

21See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)

(codifiedasamendedat29U.S.C.621634).
22Lorillardv.Pons,434U.S.575,584(1978).

2329U.S.C.623(a)(1).
24SeegenerallyDesertPalace,Inc.v.Costa,539U.S.90(2003)(establishingthetypeofproof

plaintiffisrequiredtobringinamixedmotivesTitleVIIcase);PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 23746 (1989) (plurality opinion) (establishing a mixedmotives evidentiary
framework for Title VII cases); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(establishingtheburdensofproofandpersuasioninaTitleVIIcase).
25Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither

McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1892 (2004). Disparate impact attaches liability,
whether or not discriminatory intent is proven, if an employment practice has a
disproportionateimpactonaprotectedgroup.Id.
26Id.at189293.

27See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 11720

(2007).
28McDonnellDouglasCorp.,411U.S.at800.

29Id.at802.
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758 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show he or she is: (1) a
memberofaprotectedclass;(2)who,althoughqualifiedforthepositionin
question; (3) was rejected; and (4) the employer continued to seek
applicantsafterrejectingsaidqualifiedapplicant.30Theburdenthenshifts
to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employees rejection.31 Finally, if the employer meets his or her
burden of offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse
employmentaction,32theemployeemayestablishaviolationofTitleVIIby
proving that the employers proffered reason was merely a pretext for
discrimination.33 Thus, the McDonnell Douglas scheme creates a series of
rebuttablepresumptionswhichallowthefactfindertoinfertheexistenceof
the employers intent to unlawfully discriminate based on the absence of
othercrediblereasonsfortheemploymentdecision.34

2. MixedMotivesFramework

Sixteen years after the Supreme Court established the McDonnell

Douglas pretextual burdenshifting framework, in 1989, the Court
established a new evidentiary framework for proving a violation of Title
VII.35ThepluralityofPriceWaterhousev.HopkinsreadTitleVIIasrequiring
race,color,religion,sex,ornationalorigintobeirrelevanttoemployment
decisions.36 Thus, the plurality rejected the notion that a plaintiff must
show that an employers consideration of an impermissible characteristic
was the butfor cause of the adverse employment action.37 The Court,
instead, implemented a test requiring a plaintiff to show that a
discriminatory factor wasa motivatingforce in the employment decision,
to impart the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the same
employment decision would have been made in the absence of the

30Id.;EzraS.Greenberg,Note,StrayRemarksandMixedMotiveCasesAfterDesertPalacev.

Costa: A Proximity Test for Determining Minimal Causation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1795, 1801
(2008).
31McDonnellDouglasCorp.,411U.S.at802.
32Adverseemploymentactionreferstodiscriminationwithregardtohiring,termination,

compensation,promotion,assignmentorclassificationofemployee,jobtraining,oranyother
term, condition, or privilege of employment. See MARGARET C. JASPER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATIONLAWUNDERTITLEVII,at7(1999).
33SeeKatz,supranote27,at117.

34Greenberg,supranote30,at180001.

35Jamie
Darin Prenkert, The Role of SecondOrder Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law:
McDonnellDouglassLongevityandtheMixedMotivesMess,45AM.BUS.L.J.511,527(2008).
36SeePriceWaterhousev.Hopkins,490U.S.228,240(1989)(pluralityopinion).

37Id. (To construe the words because of as colloquial shorthand for butfor causation,

...istomisunderstandthem.).
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 759

unlawful motive.38 Accordingly, in this mixedmotives scheme, a plaintiff

only bears the initial burden of showing that an impermissible
characteristicplayedaroleintheemploymentaction;thentheburdenison
the defendant, as an affirmative defense, to establish that but for the
consideration of an impermissible characteristic, the same employment
decisionwouldhavebeenmade.39

C. CongressionalAmendmenttoTitleVIIin1991

In1991,CongressimmediatelyreactedtotheCourtsdecisioninPrice
Waterhouse by amending Title VII to strengthen existing protections and
remediesavailableunderfederalcivilrightslawstoprovidemoreeffective
deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.40
The amendment codifies the Courts Price Waterhouse holding that an
employers mixedmotive is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII,
statinginpertinentpart,anunlawfulemploymentpracticeisestablished
whenthecomplainingpartydemonstratesthatrace,color,religion,sex,or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.41 However, the
amendment takes Price Waterhouse further and provides that if a plaintiff
meetsthisburden,whetherornotthedefendantcanproveitwouldhave
taken the same action despite the protected factor,a violation of Title VII
hasbeenestablished.42

D. ApplicationofTitleVIIFrameworkstotheADEA

Although the Supreme Courts decisions in McDonnell Douglas and

Price Waterhouse and Congresss 1991 amendment to Title VII do not
explicitly address the ADEA, it has generally been accepted that those
evidentiary frameworks similarly apply to ADEA claims.43 The Supreme

38Id.at250.
39Seeid.
40H.R.REP.NO.10240,pt.2,at1(1991),reprintedin1991U.S.C.C.A.N.694,694(statingthe

CivilRightsActof1991hastwopurposes:(1)torespondtorecentSupremeCourtdecisions
limitingcivilrightsprotections;and(2)tostrengthenexistingprotections).
41CivilRightsActof1991,Pub.L.No.102166,107(a),105Stat.1071,1075(codifiedat42

U.S.C.2000e2(m)(2006))(emphasisadded).
42SeeKatz,supranote27,at118(explainingthatevenifdefendantmeetsthisburden,itis

onlyapartialdefense;liabilitywillstillattach,butdamagesarelimited);Prenkert,supranote
35,at53435.
43Matthew Brod, Comment, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.: Determining the

EvidentiaryRequirementsforBringingaNonTitleVIIMixedMotiveCase,4DUKE J. CONST. L. &

PUB. POLY SIDEBAR 349, 352 (2009), https://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp/index.php?
action=downloadarticle&id=109; see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005); cases
citedinfranote45.
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760 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

CourthasexplicitlynotedthatwherespecificprovisionsoftheADEAare
identical to Title VII, its interpretation of Title VII applies with equal
forcetotheADEA.44Furthermore,thecourtsofappealshaveconsistently
foundTitleVIIsframeworksanalogousandapplicabletotheADEA.45

II. TheCourtsOpinioninGrossv.FBLFinancialServices,Inc.

Petitioner, Jack Gross, began working for Respondent, FBL Financial

Services(FBL),in1971.46GrosssteadilymoveduptherankswithinFBL,
receiving a total of four promotions between 1990 and 1999.47 By 1999,
Gross was named to his highest position.48 Grosss success at FBL was
marked by high scores in evaluations from his supervisor and a clean
disciplinaryrecord.49Grosswasdemotedin2001,however,aspartofFBLs
reorganizationoftheclaimsdepartment.50
In2003,morerestructuringoccurredwithinFBLand,asaresult,Gross
was again demoted.51 Simultaneously, a position was created, mirroring
that of Grosss former position, for Grosss subordinate Lisa Kneeskern.52
Atthistime,GrosswasfiftyfouryearsoldandKneeskernwasinherearly
forties.53 Ultimately, Gross filed a claim in district court alleging that his
reassignmentin2003violatedtheADEA,asitwasimproperlybasedonhis
age.54
Although FBL presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Grosssdemotionattrial,thejuryfoundGrosssevidencemoreconvincing
andconcludedthatGrosssdemotionwasmotivated,atleastinpart,byhis

44Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that

interpretations of Title VII appl[y] with equal force in the context of age discrimination
becausethelanguageoftheADEAderivedfromTitleVII).
45SeeRachidv.JackInTheBox,Inc.,376F.3d305,31012(5thCir.2004);EEOCv.Warfield

RohrCasketCo.,364F.3d160,163(4thCir.2004);Wexlerv.WhitesFineFurniture,Inc.,317
F.3d564,57172(6thCir.2003);Febresv.ChallengerCaribbeanCorp.,214F.3d57,5960(1st
Cir. 2000); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303, 130405 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Hutson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.,54F.3d1089,109596(3dCir.1995);Ostrowskiv.Atl.Mut.Ins.Cos.,968F.2d171,178,
186(2dCir.1992);Visserv.PackerEnggAssocs.,Inc.,924F.2d655,658(7thCir.1991).
46Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,129S.Ct.2343,2346(2009).

47Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,No.4:04CV60209TJS,2006WL6151670,at*23(S.D.Iowa

June23,2006).
48Seeid.at*3.

49Id.

50Id.

51Id.at*34.

52SeeGrossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,526F.3d356,358(8thCir.2008).

53Gross,2006WL6151670,at*4.

54Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,129S.Ct.2343,2347(2009).
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 761

age and awarded him $46,945.55 FBL moved for judgment as a matter of
lawarguingtherewaslegallyinsufficientevidenceforareasonablejuryto
concludethatGrosswasdiscriminatedagainstonthebasisofhisage.56The
trial court denied this motion, finding sufficient evidence to support the
jurysverdict.57
FBL appealed the jury verdict to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
challenging the final jury instructions provided by the district court.58
Pursuant to Justice OConnors opinion in Price Waterhouse, the Eighth
Circuitreversedandremandedthecaseforanewtrialonthebasisthatthe
jury was improperly instructed.59 The court held that the instructions
should clearly have established that the burden ofpersuasion shifts to an
employerif,andonlyif,anemployeedemonstratesdirectevidencethathis
orherageplayedasubstantialroleintheadverseemploymentdecision.60
Inturn,GrossfiledapetitionforcertioraritotheSupremeCourtaskingfor
review of whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age
discrimination in order to obtain a mixedmotives jury instruction in an
ADEAcase.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued a majority opinion
writtenbyJusticeThomasvacatingthejudgmentoftheEighthCircuitand
remandingthecase,holdingthatmixedmotivesjuryinstructionsarenever
appropriate in ADEA claims.62 The Court found that although the mixed
motives burdenshifting framework is available in Title VII claims, as a
result of Price Waterhouse63 and congressional amendment,64 it is not
similarly available to ADEA claims, as the ADEA and Title VII are
materially different.65 Thus, the Court focused its inquiry on the
language employed by Congress in the ADEA to determine the
appropriateburdensofproofandpersuasion.66TheCourtultimatelyheld
that the ordinary meaning of the text of the ADEA, requiring proof of

55SeeGross,2006WL6151670,at*1,*47.

56Id.at*1.

57Id.at*8.
58Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,526F.3d356,358(8thCir.2008).

59Id.
at 360; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278 (1989) (OConnor, J.,
concurring)(stating,foramixedmotivesinstruction,aplaintiffmustshowbydirectevidence
thatanillegitimatecriterionwasasubstantialfactorintheemploymentdecision).
60Gross,526F.3dat360;seePriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at278(OConnor,J.,concurring).

61Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,129S.Ct.2343,2352(2009).

62Id.at2346.

63SeePriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at23746(pluralityopinion).

64See42U.S.C.2000e2(m)(2006).

65Gross,129S.Ct.at2348;seeinfraPartIII.B.

66SeeGross,129S.Ct.at2350.
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762 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

discriminationbecauseofanindividualsage,requirestheplaintiffsage
to have been the butfor cause of the adverse employment action.67
Accordingly, to establish a violation of the ADEA, a plaintiff must now
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for the employees
consideration of his or her age, the employer would not have made the
employmentdecision.68
JusticeStevensissuedadissentingopinion,joinedbyJusticesGinsburg
and Breyer, expounding that the majority not only engage[d] in
unnecessary lawmaking by issuing an opinion that concededly does not
answer the question presented to the Court, but also misconstrued the
language of the ADEA.69 Justice Stevens found the Courts reading of the
ADEA requiring butfor causation objectionable, as [t]he most natural
readingof[theADEA]prohibitsadverseemploymentactionsmotivatedin
whole orinpart by theage of theemployee.70 Furthermore, heasserted,
it is particularly inappropriate for the Court, on its own initiative, to
adopt an interpretation of the causation requirement in the ADEA that
differsfromtheestablishedreadingofTitleVII,giventhatboththeCourt
in Price Waterhouse and Congress, in its 1991 amendment to Title VII,
rejected such an interpretation.71 Most importantly, Justice Stevens found
the majority to have departed from established precedent in rejecting
applicationofTitleVIIsburdenshiftingframeworkstoADEAclaims.72
Justice Breyer issued his own dissent, in which Justices Souter and
Ginsburg joined, contending that the majority was wrong in reading the
ADEA to require butfor causation, as [t]he words because of do not
inherently require a showing of butfor causation.73 Accordingly, he
determined mixedmotives instructions should be allowed in ADEA
cases.74 Justice Breyer further declared that, beyond being an incorrect
reading of the statutory language, the majoritys butfor causation
requirement creates an unnecessarily illogical burden of proof on

67Id.

68Seeid.
69Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 2348 n.1 (majority opinion) (determining

whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts to a party defending a mixedmotives claim
undertheADEAalthoughthepartiesdidnotspecificallyframethequestiontoincludethis
thresholdinquiry).
70Id.at2353(Stevens,J.,dissenting).

71Id.

72Gross,129S.Ct.at235455(Stevens,J.,dissenting)(statingthattheCourtsinterpretation

of the ADEA is a departure from precedent because [t]he relevant language in the two
statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VIIs
languageapplywithequalforceinthecontextofagediscrimination)(citationsomitted).
73Id.at2358(Breyer,J.,dissenting).

74Id.
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 763

plaintiffs.75Hereasonedthatplacingtheburdenofproofonthedefendant
to show that an employees age had no role in the actual employment
decision,asanaffirmativedefense,isamorelogicalalternativeprecisely
becausethedefendantisinabetterpositionthantheplaintifftoestablish
how he would have acted if the employer had not considered the
employeesage.76

III. ReadingBetweentheLinesofGrossv.FBLFinancialServices,Inc.

A. TheCourtsOverreaching

The question presented to the Court was whether a plaintiff must

present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed
motivesjuryinstructioninasuitbroughtundertheAgeDiscriminationin
EmploymentActof1967.77ThismuchwasconcededbyGross,FBL,and
theCourt.78Despitethis,theCourtansweredthemuchbroaderquestionof
whether a mixedmotives instruction is appropriate in ADEA claims at
all.79
AcolloquybetweenJusticeGinsburgandFBLsattorney,Mr.Phillips,
isillustrativeofthetensionbetweenthequestionproperlybeforetheCourt
andthequestionansweredbytheCourt:
Mr. Phillips: I would be delighted, candidly, if the court would
go back to just butfor causation as the element of age
discrimination....

JusticeGinsburg:ButthatquestionIthinkitcantbebeforeus.
We would certainly want to know what the governments
position is on it. And Ms. Blatt was very clear that the
government is not taking a position on that issue today. Your
brief in opposition did not so much as mention McDonnell
Douglas.Sohowisanybodytothinkthatwasatstake,thatthat
regime, which you later clarify in your Respondents brief, you
thinkshouldbethesoletest?Howcouldthatcomeintothiscase
whenitsnotinthebriefinoppositionand,therefore,itsnotin
thePetitionersbriefanditsnotinthegovernmentsbrief?80

AsJusticeGinsburgsuggested,Grossnotonlyhadnotpresentedthis

75Seeid.at235859.

76Id.at2359.

77Id.at2346(majorityopinion).

78Gross,129S.Ct.at2346;PetitionforWritofCertiorariati,Gross,129S.Ct.2343(No.08

441),2008WL4462099;BrieffortheRespondentati,Gross,129S.Ct.2343(No.08441),2009
WL507026.
79Gross,129S.Ct.at2346.

80TranscriptofOralArgumentat4445,Gross,129S.Ct.2343(No.08441),2009WL832958.
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764 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

questionwhether the mixedmotives framework applies to theADEA at

allto the Court, but he also had not briefed or presented oral argument
on it.81 Furthermore, Ms. Blatt, on behalf of the United States as amicus
curiae for Gross, expressly urged the Court not to decide this broader
issue.82 Even more striking, FBL did not set forth an argument for
prohibiting the use of mixedmotives instructions in ADEA cases in its
briefinoppositiontocertiorari.83
TheCourtregularlyexercisesdiscretiontodeemwaivedobjectionstoa
question presented if not called to the Courts attention in a respondents
firstbrieftotheCourt.84Thus,inthiscase,whereFBLfailedtoargueinits
initial brief that the Court should consider overruling Price Waterhouses
application to the ADEA, the Court had discretion to deem the broader
proposed question waived.85 The Court should have exercised such
discretion.86 FBLs argument that Price Waterhouses mixedmotives
frameworkshouldbeoverruledinrelationtotheADEAisafarreaching
argument, as Price Waterhouse is longstanding precedent that has been
consistentlyappliedtotheADEAbythelowercourts.87Furthermore,such

81SeeBriefforthePetitionerat1114,Gross,129S.Ct.2343(No.08441),2009WL208116;

PetitionforWritofCertiorari,supranote78;TranscriptofOralArgument,supranote80,at3
18.
82Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80, at 1828 (stating that overruling Price

Waterhousewouldbeanupheavalinthelaw,andcertainlythiswouldntbetheappropriate
casetodoit).
83SeeBriefinOppositiontoPetitionforWritofCertiorariat624,Gross,129S.Ct.2343(No.

08441), 2008 WL 4824079 (making no argument that the question presented should be
broadened,althoughpresentingthequestionofwhetherTitleVIIsallocationsofproofshould
apply to the ADEA). But see Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 3031 (presenting the
argumentthatmixedmotivesshouldnotapplytotheADEA).
84SUP. CT. R.15.2(providingthatabriefinoppositionmuststateitsarguments,perceived

misstatementsinthepetition,andobjectionstothequestionpresented);see,e.g.,Alabamav.
Shelton,535U.S.654,660n.3(2002)(refusingtooverturntwopreviouscasesonthebasisthat
respondentmadesuchanargumenttoolateinthecase);S.Cent.BellTel.Co.v.Alabama,526
U.S. 160, 171 (1999) (refusing to consider abandoning its negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudencebecausesucharequestwasmadetoolateinthecase);seealsoSUP.CT.R.14.1(a)
(Onlythequestionssetoutinthepetition,orfairlyincludedtherein,willbeconsideredby
theCourt.).
85SeeBriefinOppositiontoPetitionforaWritofCertiorari,supranote83;SUP. CT. R.15.2;

seealsoSUP.CT.R.14.1(a).
86SeeS.Cent.BellTel.Co.,526U.S.at171(statingtheCourthasanestablishedpracticeof

normally expecting notice of an intent to make farreaching arguments in respondents

initialbriefsothatallinterestedpartieshaveadequatetimetoprepare).
87Although Price Waterhouse was a fragmented decision that created some confusion,

CongresssamendmenttoTitleVIIin1991clearlyratifiedthemixedmotivesstandard.See42
U.S.C.2000e2(m)(2006);PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins,490U.S.228,231(1989)(containing
Justice Brennans opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in which three justices
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 765

an overhaul of precedent would have broader implications, beyond

applicationtotheADEA,tootherfederalstatuteswithsimilarlanguageto
TitleVIIandtheADEAthatalsoapplyPriceWaterhousesburdenshifting
framework.88 Thus, this is the very kind of farreaching argument that
must be presented at the outset to provide sufficient notice to ensure
adequatepreparationtimeforthoselikelyaffected.89BecausetheUnited
States is an interested party that was not given sufficient notice and
opportunity to prepare for this overreaching argument,90 the Supreme
Courtshouldnothavetakenituponitselftoconsider,muchlessanswer,
it.91

B. SubstantiallySimilar,NotMateriallyDifferent

Justice Thomas, in the opinion of the Court, boldly proclaimed that

because Title VII is materially different from the ADEA, the Courts
decisionsconstruingTitleVIIdonotapplytotheADEA.92Thisdeclaration
fliesinthefaceofdecadesofprecedentandlanguagebytheCourttothe

joined, Justice OConnors opinion concurring only in judgment, Justice Whites separate
opinion concurring in judgment, and Justice Kennedys dissenting opinion in which two
justices joined). Since such ratification, there has been question as to how this framework
applies,butlittlequestionastowhetheritappliestotheADEA.CompareRachidv.JackInThe
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004) ([D]irect evidence of discrimination is not
necessary to receive a mixedmotives analysis for an ADEA claim.), and Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that direct evidence that age played a
substantialroleintheadverseemploymentdecisionisnecessaryforamixedmotivesanalysis
for an ADEA claim), with cases cited supra note 45 (holding Title VII frameworks, including
mixedmotives,applytoclaimsmadeundertheADEA).
88SeediscussioninfraPartIII.E.2.

89S.Cent.BellTel.Co.,526U.S.at171.Cf.CityofSherrillv.OneidaIndianNation,544U.S.

197, 214 n.8 (2005) (deciding the case on considerations not discretely identified in the
partiesbriefs,afterdeemingthemtobefairlyincludedandessentialtotheanalysisofthe
decision);SUP.CT.R.14.1(a)(Thestatementofanyquestionpresentedisdeemedtocomprise
everysubsidiaryquestionfairlyincludedtherein.).
90SeeBrieffortheUnitedStatesasAmicusCuriaeSupportingPetitionerat1,Grossv.FBL

Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08441), 2009 WL 253859 (representing that the United
StatesisaninterestedpartyinGrossbecausetheEEOCretainsresponsibilityforinterpreting
and enforcing the ADEA and that the Department of Justice has a significant interest in the
interpretationandenforcementofallfederalcivilrightsstatutes).
91Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (I disagree not only with the Courts

interpretationofthestatute,butalsowithitsdecisiontoengageinunnecessarylawmaking.I
wouldsimplyanswerthequestionpresentedbythecertioraripetition....).JusticeGinsburg
expressedsimilarviewsbyjoiningJusticeStevensinhisdissentandcontinuallyreiteratingat
oralargumentthattheCourtshouldonlyconsiderthequestionpresentedtoitinthepetition
forcertiorari.SeeTranscriptofOralArgument,supranote80,at4445,51.
92Gross,129S.Ct.at2348.
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766 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

contrary.93 Although the Court has never directly held that Price
Waterhouses mixedmotives framework applies to ADEA claims,94 it has
held that certain sections of Title VII appl[y] with equal force in the
contextofagediscrimination.95TheCourthasrepeatedlyemphasizedthe
similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, not the differences.96
Specifically,theCourthasfoundthattheADEA,inpartspertinenttothis
discussion,97 is derived from and identical to Title VII in its purpose,
language, and meaning.98 Furthermore, the Court has expressly held that
certain Title VII frameworks are fully and equally applicable to the
ADEA.99
Despite this, the Court in Gross found the ADEA to be materially
differentfromTitleVIIlargelybecauseofCongresss1991amendmentto
Title VII.100 The Court applied the principle of statutory construction that
[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
presumedtohaveactedintentionallytomeanthatCongresspurposefully
neglected to amend the ADEA.101 However, even if this assumption is

93Seeinfranotes95113andaccompanyingtext.

94Gross,129S.Ct.at2349.

95Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (finding that since the

ADEAwasderivedfromTitleVII,interpretationsofTitleVIIapplytoADEAclaims).
96See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (finding that except for the

substitutionofthewordageforthewordsrace,color,religion,sex,ornationalorigin,the
language of the ADEA, in pertinent part, is identical to that of Title VII); McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publg Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (finding that the ADEA and Title VII
share common substantive features and purposes); Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121
(findingtheADEAslanguageandmeaningtobesimilartoTitleVII);Lorillard,Inc.v.Pons,
434U.S.575,584(1978)([T]heprohibitionsoftheADEAwerederivedinhaecverbafromTitle
VII.).
97For a discussion on sections of the ADEA that differ from Title VII, see Prenkert, supra

note35,at54850(discussingtheADEAsdefenseofanemployerwhosedecisionwasbased
on reasonable factors other than age as a marked difference from Title VII, which does not
providesuchadefense).
98Seecasescitedsupranote96.

99See Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (holding that the ADEA authorizes recovery in disparate

impactcasescomparabletotheCourtsdeterminationinGriggsv.DukePowerCo.,401U.S.424
(1971),forTitleVIIcases);Reevesv.SandersonPlumbingProds.,Inc.,530U.S.133,142(2000)
(applyingMcDonnellDouglastoaclaimmadeundertheADEA);HazenPaperCo.v.Biggins,
507U.S.604,612(1993)(applyingMcDonnellDouglasprinciplestotheADEA).
100See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (Unlike Title VII, the

ADEAs text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that
agewassimplyamotivatingfactor.).
101Compareid.(statingthattheCourtcouldnotignoreCongressdecisiontoamendTitle

VIIsrelevantprovisionsbutnotmakesimilarchangestotheADEA),withcasescitedsupra
note96.
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 767

accurate, it was unreasonable for the Court to conclude that Title VII
frameworksareinapplicabletotheADEAdespitehavingpreviouslyfound
thestatutestosharethesamelanguageandpurpose.102
In fact, since Congresss 1991 amendment to Title VII, the Court has
heldthatTitleVIIframeworksaremeanttoapplytotheADEAbasedona
different principle of statutory construction.103 The Court applied the
followingpremise:whenCongressusesthesamelanguageintwostatutes
havingsimilarpurposes,particularlywhenoneisenactedshortlyafterthe
other,itisappropriatetopresumethatCongressintendedthetexttohave
the same meaning in both statutes, to lead to the inevitable conclusion
thatTitleVIIsframeworkfordisparateimpactclaimsappliescomparably
to ADEA claims of the same vein.104 Thus, as a result of the undeniable
similaritybetweenTitleVIIsandtheADEAslanguageandpurposes,the
CourtshouldhaveinferredthatCongressintendedTitleVIIandtheADEA
tobeappliedcomparably.105
Moreover, the Courts argument that Congresss failure to amend the
ADEAnecessitatestheconclusionthatPriceWaterhousecannotapplytothe
ADEA106isillogicalanderroneousbecausePriceWaterhouserepresentsthe
Courts interpretation of Title VII before the 1991 amendment.107 Price
Waterhouse wasaninterpretation of TitleVIIs language ata time when it
was not just similar, but identical to the language of the ADEA.108
Accordingly, the 1991 congressional amendment to Title VII should have

102SeeGross,129S.Ct.at2349.

103SeeSmith,544U.S.at233.

104Id.

105SeeGross,129S.Ct.at235455(Stevens,J.,dissenting);Smith,544U.S.at233.

106Gross,129S.Ct.at2349.

107SeeMichaelC. Harper,TheCausationStandardinFederalEmploymentLaw:Gross v.FBL

FinancialServices,Inc.,andtheUnfulfilledPromiseoftheCivilRightsActof1991,58BUFF.L.REV.
69, 10708 (2010); Bradley R. Tengler, A Splitting of (Gray) Hairs: The Implications of Desert
Palacev.CostafortheAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct,DCBABRIEF, June2008,at51,51
(statingPriceWaterhousewasthecontrollingCourtopinionforallmixedmotivescasesbefore
the1991amendmentwasenacted).
108Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 23940 (1989) (plurality opinion)

(examining language from Title VII stating it shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or
refusetohireortodischargeanyindividual,orotherwisetodiscriminatewithrespecttohis
compensation,terms,conditions,orprivilegesofemployment...becauseofsuchindividuals
... sex (citations omitted)), with 29 U.S.C. 623(a) (2006) (It should be unlawful for an
employer...tofailorrefusetohireortodischargeanyindividualorotherwisediscriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,becauseofsuchindividualsage....).SeealsoBriefforRespondent,supranote
78,at31n.22(Thereis,however,nothinginthetextoftheADEAnowandthetextofTitle
VIIatthetimeofPriceWaterhousethatwouldjustifydifferenttreatment.).
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768 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

nobearingonwhetherPriceWaterhouseappliestotheADEA.109
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that it has been standard
practiceinthecourtsofappeals,bothbeforeandafterthe1991amendment
toTitleVII,toapplyPriceWaterhousesmixedmotivesframeworktoclaims
made under the ADEA.110 FBL conceded as much in its brief before the
Court contending: Congresss deliberate decision not to extend the
amendments to Title VII to the ADEA is, in effect, a ratification of the
applicationofPriceWaterhousetotheADEA.111Thus,itisevidentfromthe
Supreme Courts precedent, the circuit courts standards, and even FBLs
originalargument,thattheCourterredinconcludingthatPriceWaterhouse
isinapplicabletoclaimsundertheADEA.112Accordingly,theCourtshould
have followed Price Waterhouses precedent and rejected the implication
thattheADEArequiredbutforcausation.113

C. FormulatingNewOrdinaryMeanings

After rejecting the possibility that the ADEA could be governed by

alreadyexistingTitleVIIframeworks,theCourtleftitsanalysistothetext
of the ADEA.114 The Court ultimately determined that the ordinary
meaningoftheADEAslanguage,requiringanemployertotakeadverse
action because of an employees age, meant age must have been the
reason that the employer decided to act.115 The Court found that this

109SeeGross,129S.Ct.at2356(Stevens,J.,dissenting)(Becausethe1991Actamendedonly

Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixedmotives claims, the Court reasonably
declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA. But it proceeds to ignore the
conclusion compelled by this interpretation of the Act: Price Waterhouses construction of
becauseofremainsthegoverninglawforADEAclaims.).
110Compare Visser v. Packer Engg Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991) ([Price

Waterhouse]wasaTitleVIIcasebutitsreasoningisequallyapplicable,anditsrulehasbeen
extended, to age discrimination cases.), and Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.6 (8th
Cir.1991)(PriceWaterhouseinvolvedaTitleVIIclaim.However,thisCourthasacceptedPrice
WaterhousesburdenshiftingstandardsinADEAcases.),withLewisv.YMCA,208F.3d1303,
130405(11thCir.2000)([T]hiscircuitandothersextendedtheholdingsofTitleVIIcasesto
discrimination cases brought under other statutes, including the ADEA.), and Ostrowski v.
Atl.Mut.Ins.Cos.,968F.2d171,180(2dCir.1992)([W]ehaveheldthatthePriceWaterhouse
frameworkappliestoactionsbroughtundertheADEA.(citationomitted)).
111BriefforRespondent,supranote78,at50n.34.

112Id.;seesourcescitedsupranotes45,96.

113See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 24142 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the notion that

because of means butfor causation because [the Court] need not leave [its] common
senseatthedoorstepwhen[it]interpret[s]astatute).
114Gross,129S.Ct.at2350(OurinquirythereforemustfocusonthetextoftheADEAto

decidewhetheritauthorizesamixedmotivesagediscriminationclaim.);Harper,supranote
107,at107.
115Gross,129S.Ct.at2350.
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 769

necessitated the conclusion that the plaintiff retains the burden of

persuasion to establish that age was the butfor cause of the employers
adverseaction.116
However, the Court failed to clarify its logic in arriving at such a
conclusion.117 The Court merely cited to the holy triumvirate of
dictionaries118 as making because of and by reason of synonymous,
thentoHazenPaperCo.v.Bigginsasrequiringanemployeesprotectedtrait
to have had a determinative influence on the outcome as all the proof
necessary to determine plaintiff bears the burden of proving butfor
causation.119However,thelogicbehindthischainofinferencessimplyfails:
evenifbecauseofmeansbyreasonof,itdoesnotfollowthatbutfor
causationisrequired.120
Ratherthanrequiringbutforcausation,asthemajoritysuggests,the
CourtinBigginsstatedthatanimpermissiblefactorwasrequiredtoplaya
roleintheadverseemploymentaction,nottherole.121TheCourtevenwent
sofarastostate,[the]lawrequirestheemployertoignoreanemployees
age.122 Accordingly, the Court failed to provide a sufficient rationale for
concludingthatbecauseofismerelyanotherwayforCongresstorequire
butfor causation.123 In contrast, the Court itself has explicitly, and
emphatically, held [t]o construe the words because of as colloquial
shorthand for butfor causation,... is to misunderstand them.124
Congressreinforcedthisinterpretationinits1991amendmentand,likethe
Court, rejected the notion that its language required butfor causation;
instead, Congress adopted express language requiring only that an
impermissible character be a motivating factor in an employment
decision.125 The Court erroneously created a new meaning for Congresss

116Id.at2351.

117Seeid.at2354n.4(Stevens,J.,dissenting).

118Andrew L. Rempfer & David B. Dornak, Setting New Standards for Employers: The

SupremeCourtsRetiringoftheMixedMotivesStandardforADEAClaims&theRetroactivityofthe
Ledbetter Act, NEV. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 18, 20 (referring to Websters, the Oxford English
Dictionary,andtheRandomHouseDictionaryastheholytriumvirateofdictionaries).
119See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610

(1993)).
120Id. at 2354 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the dictionary definition does not

conclusivelyestablishthatbecauseofnecessitatesbutforcausation).
121Biggins,507U.S.at61011.

122Id.at612.

123Seesupradiscussionaccompanyingnotes11822.

124PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins,490U.S.228,240(1989)(pluralityopinion).

125See42U.S.C.2000e2(m)(2006);H.R. REP. NO.10240,pt.2,at2,1617(1991),reprinted

in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 695, 70910 (stating the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was responding
partlytotheSupremeCourtsdecisioninPriceWaterhouse).
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770 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

express language by requiring the more stringent standard of butfor

causation despite its own and Congresss contrary interpretations.126 The
Courtshouldhavedetermined,again,thatthemostnaturalreadingofthe
textproscribesadverseemploymentactionsmotivatedinwholeorinpart
bytheageoftheemployee.127

D. UnfairandIllogicalBurdenonADEAPlaintiffs

The Court not only overturned prior precedent by interpreting

becauseofastheequivalentofbutforcausation,butalsobyallocating
theburdenofproofwhollyontheplaintifftoprovesuchcausation.128Price
Waterhousespluralityclearlyarticulatedthattheproperallocationofproof
requires plaintiff only to persuade the factfinder that an impermissible
characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision; then
defendantmayprovideanaffirmativedefensethatthesameemployment
decisionwouldhavebeenmadedespiteconsiderationoftheimpermissible
characteristic.129 Despite this, the Court again dispensed with Price
Waterhouses logical relevance to the ADEA and found instead that the
plaintiff must bear the burden of proof pursuant to a statutory rule
requiringthatwheretextissilentontheburdenofpersuasion,theplaintiff
shallbearit.130
The Court placed the burden of proving butfor causation on the
plaintiffundertheguisethattheyha[d]nowarranttodepartfromthis
ruleofstatutoryinterpretation.131However,thatisfarfromthetruth.The
law of tort liability, from which the Court derived its butfor causation
requirement,haslongrecognizedthatincertaincasesbutforcausation
would simply be unfair and a circumvention of the law.132 In such cases,

126See42U.S.C.2000e2(m);PriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at240(pluralityopinion);H.R.REP.

NO.10240,pt.2,at2,1617(1991),reprintedin1991U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,695,70910;Prenkert,
supranote35,at53435(explainingthestandardscreatedunderPriceWaterhouseandthe1991
Actarelessstringentthanthebutforstandard).
127Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see

PriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at241(pluralityopinion).
128SeePriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at246(pluralityopinion).

129Id.([T]heemployersburdenismostappropriatelydeemedanaffirmativedefense:the

plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to
prevail,mustpersuadeitonanother.).
130Gross,129S.Ct.at2351(quotingSchafferv.Weast,546U.S.49,56(2005)).

131Seeid.

132See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263 (OConnor, J., concurring) (stating the Court has

takenthebutforrequirementfromtortlawandplaceditintheemploymentlawcontext);
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (When two or more persons by their acts are
possiblythesolecauseofaharm,orwhentwoormoreactsofthesamepersonarepossibly
the sole cause, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence that the one of the two persons, or
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 771

thecommonlawoftortshasshiftedtheburdenofprooftodefendants.133
Mixedmotives cases are the very sort of casesmultiplecausation
casesfor which tort liability finds, in fairness, that the defendant must
bear the burden of proof.134 Otherwise, the plaintiff would be required to
provetheimpossible:It[would]challenge[]theimaginationofthetrierto
probeintoapurelyfancifulandunknowablestateofaffairs.He[wouldbe]
invited to make an estimate concerning facts that concededly never
existed.135 That is exactly what the Court now requires a plaintiff to do:
delveintothemindofthedefendant.136Moreover,theplaintiffisaskedto
prove what the defendant would have done, in a hypothetical situation, if
therehadbeennoconsiderationofageintheemploymentaction.137
Thisisaburdenmorepracticallyandfairlyplaceduponthedefendant
himself.138 The law [should] permit[] the employer this defense, not

the one of the same persons two acts is culpable, then the defendant has the burden of
proving that the other person, or his other act, was the sole cause of the harm.);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS433B(3)(1965)(Wheretheconductoftwoormoreactors
istortious,anditisprovedthatharmhasbeencausedtotheplaintiffbyonlyoneofthem,but
thereisuncertaintyastowhichonehascausedit,theburdenisuponeachsuchactortoprove
thathehasnotcausedtheharm.).
133See,e.g.,Summers,199P.2dat3;RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS433B(3).

134See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 26566 (OConnor, J., concurring) (finding, despite her

viewthatTitleVIIrequiredbutforcausation,thattheproperallocationofthisburdenison
thedefendantpercommontortlawprinciples).
135Id. at 264 (quoting Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on CauseinFact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67

(1956));seeGross,129S.Ct.at235859(Breyer,J.,dissenting);MichaelForeman,Grossv.FBL
Financial ServicesOh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 681, 69192 (2010) (predicting that the
butforcausationstandardwillnullifytheADEAandlimitrelieftoonlythemostextreme
casesofdiscrimination).
136SeeGross,129S.Ct.at235859(Breyer,J.,dissenting);MartinJ.Katz,GrossDisunity,114

PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 882 (2010) (explaining that a plaintiff is now required to prove a
negativethe absence of any other independently sufficient causewhere defendant could
have considered any number of reasons in forming a decision, any of which might be
sufficienttoreachthedecisionandnoneofwhichareobservableorknowntotheplaintiff).
137SeeGross,129S.Ct.at235859(Breyer,J.,dissenting).

[T]oapplybutforcausation[tomultiplemotivescases]istoengageina
hypotheticalinquiryaboutwhatwouldhavehappenediftheemployers
thoughtsandothercircumstanceshadbeendifferent.Theanswertothis
hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the
employee likely knows less than does the employer about what the
employer was thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a
strongerpositionthantheemployeetoprovidetheanswer.
Id.
138SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS433B(3)cmt.f(statingthereasonforshiftingthe

burdentodefendantsinsuchcircumstancesistheinjusticeofpermittingprovedwrongdoers
...toescapeliabilitymerelybecausethenatureoftheirconductandtheresultingharmhas
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772 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

because the forbidden motive, age, had no role in the actual decision, but
because the employer can show that he would have dismissed the
employeeanywayinthehypotheticalcircumstanceinwhichhisagerelated
motivewasabsent.139Thus,theCourthasimposedanillogicalandunfair
burden on the plaintiff by requiring that he or she delve into the
hypothetical mind of the defendant to establish a violation of the ADEA,
wheresuchaburdenismorejustlyplacedonthedefendant.140

E. GraveConsequencesforaGrossMisinterpretation

1. GrosssAftermathonADEAPlaintiffs

Strikingly, the Court failed to articulate exactly how a plaintiff must

meetthisseeminglyinsurmountableburden.141TheCourtmerelyreiterated
that a plaintiff must prove that age was a butfor cause of the
employment action at issue.142 The Court refused to answer whether
McDonnell Douglass purported butfor causation test applies to the
ADEA.143Moreimportantly,theCourtneveraddressedthequestionbefore
it:whatkindandlevelofevidenceisrequiredtoestablishaviolationofthe
ADEA.144
Inthewakeoftheseunansweredquestions,lowercourtshavebeenleft
to scramble with this newest wrinkle in employment law.145 As a result,
manycourtshavesimplyappliedMcDonnellDouglasasthetestforADEA

madeitdifficultorimpossibletoprovewhich...[isthecauseof]theharm).
139Gross,129S.Ct.at2359(Breyer,J.,dissenting).

140SeeKatz,supranote136,at882(arguingthatitisnearlyimpossibleforaplaintifftomeet

thenegativeproofstandardofbutforcausationandadvocatingthatburdenshiftingisthe
better,fairersolution).
141Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2 ([T]he Court has not definitively decided whether the

evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, utilized in Title VII cases is
appropriateintheADEAcontext.)(citationomitted).
142Id.at2352.

143TheCourthasrefusedtodecidewhetherMcDonnellDouglasappliestotheADEAonat

leasttwooccasions. Gross,129S.Ct.at2349n.2; Reevesv.SandersonPlumbing Prods.,Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (stating the Court has not squarely addressed whether McDonnell
Douglas applies to ADEA, but because the parties did not dispute the issue, the Court
assumedMcDonnellDouglas fullyapplicable).But seeKatz,supranote27,at124(contending
thattheMcDonnellDouglasframeworkisnottheequivalentofproofofbutforcausation).
144See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Although the Court declines to

addressthequestionwegrantedcertioraritodecide,Iwouldanswerthatquestion....).
145See Corbett, supra note 17, at 8283 (describing the wreck of employment law); Katz,

supranote27,at11115(contendingthatemploymentlawiscurrentlyfragmented);Prenkert,
supra note 35, at 51933 (discussing the fragmentation of employment disparate treatment
law).
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 773

claimsif neither party objects to suchanapplication.146 Other courts have

directly held that McDonnell Douglas remains governing law over ADEA
claims.147Thisresultshedsevenmorelightontheunreasonablenessofthe
Courts decision in Gross, as there is no rational basis for applying the
McDonnell Douglas standard, another Title VII framework, to the ADEA
whenTitleVIIandtheADEAareapparentlymateriallydifferent.148

2. GrosssImplicationsOutsideoftheADEA

Beyond creating an uphill battle for ADEA plaintiffs, Gross also has
had grave implications on plaintiffs making claims under other federal
employment discrimination statutes.149 The Courts emboldened words of
caution that courts must be careful not to apply rules applicable under
one statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination150 has stirred action in the circuit courts regarding other
federalstatutesthat,liketheADEA,aremodeledafterTitleVII,suchasthe
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with

146See,e.g.,Fullerv.SeagateTech.,LLC,651F.Supp.2d1233,124243&n.9(D.Colo.2009)

(In Gross, Justice Thomas pointed out that the Supreme Court has not definitely decided
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies in ADEA cases. . . . Nonetheless, this
Court finds nothing in Justice Thomas opinion that would alter the widespread use of the
McDonnellDouglasframeworktodecidewhethersummaryjudgmentisappropriateinADEA
cases.);Bellv.RaytheonCo.,No.3:08CV0702G,2009WL2365454,at*5(N.D.Tex.July31,
2009) (stating that McDonnell Douglass framework will remain applicable to ADEA cases in
thisjurisdictionbecausetheCourt,thoughnotdefinitelyholdingitapplicable,hascontinued
to apply it where neither party objects to such application); Woehl v. HyVee, Inc., 637 F.
Supp. 2d 645, 651 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (holding in an ADEA claim that McDonnell Douglass
frameworkappliesbecauseneitherpartyobjectedtosuchapplication).
147See,e.g.,Jonesv.Okla.CityPub.Schs.,617F.3d1273,127879(10thCir.2010)(holding

that,despiteGross,McDonnellDouglasappliestoADEAclaims);Smithv.CityofAllentown,
589F.3d684,69091(3dCir.2009)(Gross,whichprohibitsshiftingtheburdenofpersuasion
to an ADEA defendant, does not forbid our adherence to precedent applying McDonnell
Douglas toagediscriminationclaims.);Vlezv. ThermoKing dePuertoRico,Inc.,585F.3d
441, 447 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009) (This circuit . . . has long applied the McDonnell Douglas
frameworktoADEAcases.UntiltoldotherwisebytheSupremeCourt,weshallcontinueto
doso.(citationsomitted)).
148Compare Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 234849 (Because Title VII is materially different with

respect to the relevant burden of persuasion, however, these decisions do not control our
construction of the ADEA.), with id. at 2349 n.2 (refusing to decide whether McDonnell
DouglasmaybeappropriatelyappliedtotheADEA).
149See
Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Courts 20082009 Labor and
EmploymentCases,13EMP.RTS.&EMP.POLYJ.253,27273(2009).
150Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393

(2008))(internalquotationsomitted).
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774 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

Disabilities Act (ADA).151 Courts have also questioned Grosss effect on

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 1983,152 the Juror
Act,153andevenstatefairemploymentstatutes.154Morestrikingyet,courts
have been compelled to reinterpret application of Title VII itself.155 All
provethat[t]he[Gross]decisionwasneitherhumble,norminimalist,nor
deferential to the elected branches of government.156 Therefore, unless
CongressactstooverridetheCourtsdecisioninGross,itwillcontinueto
have devastating repercussions for plaintiffs alleging workplace
discrimination.157

3. OutcryforCongressionalCorrection

Asaresult,therehasbeenastrongcallforacongressionaloverride.158
One commentator predicts, Gross is... not long for this world.159

151See, e.g., Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)

(reevaluatingwhetherthemixedmotivesframeworkisapplicableundertheADA);Hunterv.
Valley View Local Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 69092 (6th Cir. 2009) (questioning whether mixed
motivesremainsapplicabletotheFMLA).
152See,e.g.,Brownv.J.Kaz,Inc.,581F.3d175,182n.5(3dCir.2009)(consideringwhether

thecircuitsestablishedprecedentofapplyingthemixedmotivesschemeto1981survived
Grosssdeclaration).ForfurtheranalysisontheCourtsdecisioninGrosson1981and1983,
seeRobertFuller,Casenote,Grossv.FBLFinancialServices,Inc.:ASimpleInterpretationofText
andPrecedentResultsinSimplifiedClaimsUndertheADEA,61MERCERL.REV.995,1013(2010).
153See,e.g.,Williamsv.DistrictofColumbia,646F.Supp.2d103,104(D.D.C.2009).

154See, e.g., Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 842 (Alaska 2010) (questioning

whetherGrosschangedtheburdenofproofunderAlaskasstatefairemploymentstatute).For
furtherdiscussiononGrosssrealandpotentialeffectonstatestatutes,seeBranNoonan,The
Impact of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Meaning of the ButFor Requirement, 43
SUFFOLKU.L.REV.921,93335(2010).
155See,e.g.,Smithv.XeroxCorp.,602F.3d320,32530(5thCir.2010);Nuskeyv.Hochberg,

F. Supp. 2d 1, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (reevaluating whether the mixedmotives standard remains

applicabletoTitleVIIretaliationclaims).
156CivilRightsUnderFire:RecentSupremeCourtDecisions:HearingBeforetheSubcomm.onthe

Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 90
(2009)(statementofDahliaLithwick,SeniorLegalCorrespondent,Slate).
157See supra notes 14555. But see William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment

DiscriminationLaw:DoestheMasterBuilderUnderstandtheBlueprintfortheGreatTower?,12U.
PA. J. BUS. L.683,72829(2010)(arguingthatastatutoryoverrideisinsufficient,asitamounts
tomorepiecemeallegislation).
158See,e.g.,Harper,supranote107,at69(callingforaresponsetotheCourtsunrestrained

[assertionof]judicialauthorityinGross);LeighA.VanOstrand,Note,ACloseLookatADEA
MixedMotivesClaimsandGrossv.FBLFinancialServices,Inc.,78FORDHAML.REV.399,44951
(2009)(advocatingforCongresstoamendtheADEAinaccordwithTitleVIIandits1991Act).
159Jim
Goh, Caught in the JudicialCongressional Tug of War: Making Sense of Recent and
UpcomingSupremeCourtDecisionsandCongressionalLegislation,inEMPLOYMENT LAW2010:TOP
LAWYERSON TRENDSAND KEY STRATEGIESFORTHE UPCOMING YEAR 19, 24(2010);seealsoJesse
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2011 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 775

Congresshasalreadybegunworkingtoensurethatsuchapredictionrings
true.160 A bill, Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, was
introducedtotheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesonOctober6,2009
in an attempt to amend the ADEA and completely abrogate Gross.161 The
bill proclaimed that the Gross majority severely, and wrongly, narrowed
thescopeofprotectionoriginallyintendedbyCongressintheADEA,and
thus eliminat[ed] protection for many individuals whom Congress
intended to protect.162 In response, the bill would have afforded ADEA
plaintiffs the same burden allocated to Title VII plaintiffs under the 1991
Act:theplaintiffmustonlyestablishthatagewasamotivatingfactorinan
employmentdecisiontoimpartliabilityonthedefendant.163However,this
bill would have gone further than the 1991 Actand possibly prevented
further Courtinduced devastation to plaintiffemployeesby expressly
providingthatthemotivatingfactorstandardwouldapplytootherfederal
employmentdiscriminationlaws.164Congress,therefore,isintheprocessof
mustering strength to override the Courts decision in Gross and ensure
that ADEA plaintiffs rights to be free from workplace discrimination are
protectedfullyandliberallyinaccordwithCongresssoriginalintent.165

CONCLUSION

The ADEA was enacted in an attempt to mirror Title VII, both in its
languageandpurpose.166Asaresult,subsequenttotheADEAspassingin
1967, courts have consistently found Title VIIs evidentiary frameworks

T. Mosser, Comment, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 651, 662
(2010) (predicting, in accord with the fate of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Grosss
influenceontheADEAwillbeshortlived).
160See Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009);

Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009). The
HouseBillwasreferredtocommittee,butitwasnotreportedoutorsenttothefloorforavote
prior to the end of the 111th Congress. See H.R. 3721: Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1113721
(lastvisitedApr.23,2011).Thelanguageofeachbillwassubstantiallysimilar;thisComment
willreferencetheHousebillforclarity.
161SeeH.R.3721,2(a)(4)(6),(b).

162Seeid.2(a)(4).

163Compare42U.S.C.2000e2(m)(2006),withH.R.3721,2(b),3(g)(1)(A).

164SeeH.R.3721,3(5)(B).

165See,e.g.,PressRelease,HouseComm.onEduc.&Labor,CongresstoHoldHearingon

Supreme Courts Gross Ruling Regarding Age Discrimination (June 30, 2009), available at
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/newsroom/2009/06/congresstoholdhearingon
su.shtml.
166Seecasescitedsupranote96.
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776 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|753

equallyapplicabletotheADEA.167Tothecontrary,however,theCourtin
Gross proclaimed the ADEA to be materially different from Title VII.168
This conclusion is neither supported by Supreme Court or courts of
appealsprecedentnorthetextoftheADEAitself.169Rather,theCourthas
expresslyheldexactlytheopposite:thatthesimilaritiesbetweentheADEA
and Title VII warrant comparable treatment of the two statutes.170 The
CourtshouldhaveapplieditsestablishedprecedentfromPriceWaterhouse,
rather than unnecessarily establishing a new and heightened burden of
proofforADEAplaintiffs.171Accordingly,theCourtshouldhaveheldthat
theplaintiff,undertheADEA,bearsonlytheburdenofprovingagewasa
motivatingfactorinanemploymentdecisiontoimparttheburdenonthe
defendant, as an affirmative defense, to prove the same employment
decision would still have been made despite the consideration of age.172
The Courtsfailure to do so has shifted the burden to Congress to ensure
older workers are guaranteed the robust protections Congress originally
intendedundertheADEA.173

167Seecasescitedsupranote45.

168Grossv.FBLFin.Servs.,Inc.,129S.Ct.2343,2348(2009).

169SeediscussionsupraPartIII.B.

170Smithv.CityofJackson,544U.S.228,23334(2005).

171SeePriceWaterhousev.Hopkins,490U.S.228,24445(1989)(pluralityopinion).

172See id. at 258 (holding that (1) plaintiff is required only to show an impermissible

characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and (2) defendant may
establishanaffirmativedefensebyprovingthesameemploymentdecisionwouldhavebeen
madedespitetheimpermissiblecharacteristic);seealsodiscussionsupraPartsIII.CD.
173SeediscussionsupraPartIII.E.3.