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 1 Wednesday, 21 July 20102 (10.00 am)3 STEPHEN WHITE4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning and welcome.5 STEPHEN WHITE: Good morning.6 THE CHAIRMAN: I'll open the first session of the morning.7 Our witness is Stephen White and you were the Director8 of Law and Order and the Senior Police Adviser to the9 Coalition Provisional Authority in Basra10 between July 2003 and January 2004, I think.11 STEPHEN WHITE: That's correct, sir.12 THE CHAIRMAN: We are also aware of your long subsequent13 service in Baghdad as the head of the European Union14 Rule of Law Mission.15 Now, this session will look at the approach taken to16 police reform in Iraq, including the development of17 strategy and the resources available.18 I say on each occasion, I recognise that witnesses19 give evidence based on their recollection of events.20 We, of course, check what we hear against the papers to21 which we have access and which we are still receiving.22 I remind each witness on every occasion that they23 will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence24 to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair25 and accurate.1
 
 1 With those preliminaries, I'll ask Baroness Prashar2 to open the questions.3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much indeed. Thank4 you for your statement, which we have read very5 carefully, but there are a couple of points I want to6 clarify in this particular area of questioning.7 Prior to the invasion, were you aware of any8 planning for policing or wider law and order issues in9 post-invasion Iraq?10 STEPHEN WHITE: No, I was not aware either professionally or11 personally, in the sense that, of course, I was watching12 the news and realising that there was going to be13 an aftermath, but in terms of my role, it was very14 focused on Northern Ireland, so I had no involvement at15 all beforehand.16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did that surprise you, that there17 was no kind of planning?18 STEPHEN WHITE: It does. Indeed, it is one of my main19 recommendations about – if I jump to lessons learned, that20 there must be pre-planning, and it must be comprehensive21 pre-planning with contingency plans.22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can you just tell me, who were the23 bodies involved in your deployment, because there were a24 number or agencies, and how did they work with each25 other, how did they interact?2
 
 1 STEPHEN WHITE: Yes. Initially, it was very much driven by2 ACPO, in the sense that an advertisement went out to3 Chief Constables and senior officers. So I made my4 application to Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, who, as5 you know holds the international portfolio.6 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, could you slow down, please?7 STEPHEN WHITE: Sorry, I'll start again, if I may.8 ACPO, the Association of Chief Police Officers,9 produced an advertisement asking for senior officers who10 were prepared to go to Iraq, so I made my application to11 Chief Constable Kernaghan. ACPO, the organisation,12 I think, shortlisted four of us, and I was called to an13 interview at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.14 During the interview, I was involved with two junior FCO15 officials and one police officer who was on secondment16 to the FCO in the International Policing Unit.17 I was then involved in a number of meetings18 involving the MDP - the Ministry of Defence Police - ACPO,19 the Home Office, the FCO and a representative from the20 IPU, the Iraq Policy Unit.21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was the purpose of these22 meetings? Were you having them individually with these23 organisations or were they meeting you together? What24 was the purpose of these meetings?25 STEPHEN WHITE: I think the purpose of the meetings was3
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