Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
26Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Ateneo Civil Digests

Ateneo Civil Digests

Ratings: (0)|Views: 459 |Likes:
Published by AnaAtenista

More info:

Published by: AnaAtenista on Jul 24, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

01/24/2012

pdf

text

original

 
Table of contents:pageAgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 - 04Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 - 04Land Titles . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 - 26Torts & Damages . . . . . . . . .26 - 39Oblicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 - 72Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 - 96Sectrans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 - 110Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 -132Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 -139Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 -156* digests are arranged from the most recent to later casesAGENCY2000Agency; Distinguished from Sale
VICTORIAS MILLING CO. v. CA
G.R. No. 117356. , June 19, 2000.It is clear from Article 1868 that the basis of agency is representation. On the part of the principal,there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment andact on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; oneperson — the agent — agrees to act under the control or direction of another — the principal.Indeed, the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal. The control factor,more than any other, has caused the courts to put contracts between principal and agent in aseparate category.This Court has ruled that where the relation of agency is dependent upon the acts of the parties,the law makes no presumption of agency, and it is always a fact to be proved, with the burden of proof resting upon the persons alleging the agency, to show not only the fact of its existence, butalso its nature and extent.The question of whether a contract is one of sale or agency depends on the intention of theparties as gathered from the whole scope and effect of the language employed. Ultimately, whatis decisive is the intention of the parties. That no agency was meant to be established by the CSCand STM is clearly shown by CSC's communication to petitioner that SLDR No. 1214M had been"sold and endorsed" to it. The use of the words "sold and endorsed" means that STM and CSCintended a contract of sale, and not an agency.…proceeding from the theory that the transactions entered into between petitioner and STM arebut serial parts of one account, petitioner insists that its debt has been offset by its claim for STM's unpaid purchases, pursuant to Article 1279 of the Civil Code. However, the trial courtfound, and the Court of Appeals concurred, that the purchase of sugar covered by SLDR No.1214M was a separate and independent transaction; it was not a serial part of a singletransaction or of one account contrary to petitioner's insistence. Evidence on record shows,without being rebutted, that petitioner had been paid for the sugar purchased under SLDR No.1214M. Petitioner clearly had the obligation to deliver said commodity to STM or its assignee.Since said sugar had been fully paid for, petitioner and CSC, as assignee of STM, were notmutually creditors and debtors of each other. No reversible error could thereby be imputed torespondent appellate court when it refused to apply Article 1279 of the Civil Code to the presentcase.Petitioner contends that the sale of sugar under SLDR No. 1214M is a conditional sale or acontract to sell, with title to the sugar still remaining with the vendor…terms and conditions clearlyshow that petitioner transferred title to the sugar to the buyer or his assignee upon payment of the
 
purchase price. Said terms clearly establish a contract of sale, not a contract to sell. Petitioner isnow estopped from alleging the contrary.1996Contract of Agency; Validity & Enforceability
LIM v. CA
FEBRUARY 1996The contention is far from meritorious. The receipt which petitioner signed establishes a contractof agency to sell on commission basis.There are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities for particular contracts:1)When the form is required for the validity of the contract2)When it is required to make the contract effective as against third parties (Arts. 1357 &1358, Civil Code)3)When form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the contract (Statute oFrauds).A contract to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these three categories, hence, itis valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.Civil Law/Agency & Land Titles/GPA to sell land & innocent purchaser for value
FRANCISCO A. VELOSO v. COURT, AGLALOMA ESCARIO & REG. OF DEEDS, MLA.
G.R. No. 102737, Aug. 21, 1996Petitioner contends that the power of attorney (GPA) was a forgery and presented checks, hismarriage certificate, etc. to compare his genuine signature with that in the GPA. He also allegedthat the same was not duly notarized for as testified by Atty. Tubig himself, he did not signthereon nor was it ever recorded in his notarial register.The GPA was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and such such, carries theevidentiary weight with respect to due execution. While it is true that it was denominated as aGPA, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated an authority to sell. Thus, there was no need for aseparate SPA as the document expressly authorized the agent to sell the subject property. TheSPA can be included in the GPA when it is specified therein the act or transaction for which thespecial power is required.We found, however, that the basis presented by petitioner was inadequate to sustain hiscontention. Mere variance of the signatures is not conclusive proof of forgery. Forgery cannot bepresumed. (Tenio-Obsequio v. CA, G.R. No. 107967, 1 Mar. 1994) Petitioner failed to prove hisallegation and simply relied on the apprent difference of the signatures. His denial had notestablished that the signature of the GPA was not his.We agree with the lower court that private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.Respondent relied on the GPA presented by petitioner’s wife. Being the wife of the owner andhaving with her the title to the property, there was no reason for private respondent not to believein her authority. Moreover, the GPA was notarized and carried with it the presumption of its dueexecution. Thus, having had no inkling on any irregularity and having no participation thereof,private respondent was a buyer in good faith. (Bautista v. CA, G.R. No. 106042, 28 Feb. 1994)Documents acknowledged before a notary have the evidentiary weight with respect to their dueexecution. The questioned GPA and deed of sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to bevalid and duly executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized the said documents and allegedthat his signature had also been falsified. He presented samples of his signature to prove hiscontention. Forgery should be proved by clear nad convincing evidence and whoever alleges ithas the burden of proving the saem. Just like petitioner, witness Atty. Tubig merely pointed outthat his signature was different from that in the GPA and deed of sale. There had never been anaccurate examination of the signature, even that of petitioner. To determine forgery, it was heldin Cesar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 54719-50, 17 Jan. 1985): The process of identificationmust include the determination of the extent, kind and significance of this resemblance as well asof variation. It becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of adifferent personality, or is only the exepected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writingof the same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more
 
or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appeatsin a genuine writing. When these 2 questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.Even granting that petitioner’s signature was falsified, and the GPA and deed of sale void, suchwould not revoke title subsequently issued in favor of private respondent, an innocent purchaser for value.Finally, the trial court did not err in applying equitable estoppel, i.e., where one or two innocentsmust suffer a loss, he who by his conduct made the loss possible must bear it. From theevidence, petitioner must bear the loss as while he declared that he had sole access to the TCT,his wife was able to get it, hence petitioner did not observe due diligence.Civil Law/Agency
COSMIC LUMBER v. CA & ISIDRO PEREZ
G.R.No. 114311, NOVEMBER 1996Petitioner argues that the trial court’s decision is void because the compromise agreement uponwhich it was based is void. Attorney-in-fact Paz G. Villamil-Estrada did not possess the authorityto sell nor was she armed with a Board Resolution authorizing the sale of its property. She wasmerely empowered to enter into a compromise agreement in the recovery suit she wasauthorized to file against the squatters on the lot, such authority being expresly confined to the“ejectment of third persons or squatters xxx”We agree with petitioner. The authority granted to Estrada under the SPA was explicit andexclusionary: for her to sue to eject all persons found on the lots so that petitioner could takematerial possession thereof, and for this purpose, to appear at pre-trial and enter into acompromise agreement, but only insofar as this was protective of petitioner’s rights. Nowherewas Estrada granted, expressly or impliedly, the power to sell the lot or portion thereof. Neither can conferment of the power to sell be validly inferred from the specific authority “to enter into acompromise agreement” becuase of the explicit limitation fixed by the grantor that thecompromise entered into shall only be to protect petitioner’s rights. In the context of the grant of powers to Estrada, alienation by sale cannot be deemed protective of petitioner’s rights, more sowhen the land was being sold for P80/sq. m., very much less than its assessed value of P250.00/sq. m.When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of thelatter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. For the principal to confer the rightupon an agent to sell real estate, a POA must so express the powers of the agent in clear andunmistakable language. Where there is any reasonable doubt, no such construction shall begiven the document. (citations omitted)By selling to respondent Perez a portion of petitioner’s land through a compromise agreement,Estrada acted without authority. The sale ipso jure is void. So is the compromise agreement.This being the case, the judgment based thereon is void as well.It may be argued that petitioner knew of the compromise agreement since the principal ischargeable with and bound by the knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the agentwas acting as such. But the general rule is intended to protect those who exercise good faith andnot as a shield for unfair dealing. Hence, there is a well-established exception to the general ruleas where the conduct and dealings of the agent are such as to raise a clear presumption that hewill not communicate to the principal the facts in controversy. (Mutual Life v. Hilton Green, 241US 613) The logical reason for this exception is that where the agent is committing fraud, itwould be contrary to common sense to expect that he would communicate this to the principal.Verily, when an agent is engaged in the perpetration of fraud upon his principal, he is not reallyacting for the principal but is acting for himself, entirely outside the scope of his agency. (AetnaCasualty v. Local Bldg., 19P2d 612, 616) Indeed, the basic tenets of agency rest on the highestconsiderations of justice, equity and fair play, and an agent will not be permitted to pervert hisauthority to his own advantage, and his act in secret hostility to the interests of his principaltranscends the power afforded him. (citation omitted)1995

Activity (26)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 thousand reads
1 hundred reads
emiat liked this
Bob88 liked this
Apple Marie liked this
Emmanuel liked this
eine10 liked this

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->