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CIA Shoot Down Scheuer FOIA

CIA Shoot Down Scheuer FOIA

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Published by Rob
This is a final response letter from the CIA to a requester seeking the documents described by Michael Scheuer in his book Marching Toward Hell. Also attached is the portion of Marching Toward Hell describing the files.
This is a final response letter from the CIA to a requester seeking the documents described by Michael Scheuer in his book Marching Toward Hell. Also attached is the portion of Marching Toward Hell describing the files.

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Categories:Types, Letters
Published by: Rob on Jul 29, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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09/17/2010

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Genral
IntelligenceAgency
Washington,
D.C.
20505
22
IuLy
2010
R*eference
:
F
-201
0-01
409
Dear
Thisis
a
final
response
to
your
19
June
2010
Freedom
oflnformation
Act(Fo{A)
request,
received
in
the
offi."
of
the
Information
unJ
pri,ru.y
Coordinator
on30June
2010,
for
"a
copy
of
the
bindergivenby
Michael
scheuer
to
the9/11
Commission'sexecutive
director
philip
Zellkow.,,
with
regard
toyour
request,
responsiverecords,shourd
theyexist,
would
be
contained
in
operationar
files.
The
clAlnformation
a.t,
so
u.s.c.
$
431,
as
amended,exempts
CIA
operationai
fi1es
frorn
the
search,
review,
publication,
and
disclosurerequirements
of
theFreedom
of
InfonnationAct.
Sincerely,
&''^*h'
u
elores
M.
Nelson
Infonnation
and
Privacy
coordinator
 
l,
Author's
Note
tainly
cannot answerto the satisfaction
of all.
I
faced
it
before
while
a
serv-
ing
member
of
the
CIA
s
SeniorIntelligence Service,
however, and
it
may
help
the current reader
if
I
explain how
I
then
tried
to be
credibletomy
audience
usingmuch
of
the
same
materialthat
informs
this book.On
the
day of
the
9/11
attacks
it
was clear thatthe
CIA
andtheother
lC
components
would
be
investigated
for
their"failures."As
it
turned out,
I
and
my
CIA
colleaguesparticipated
in
three
such
investigations:
one
by
the
CIA
s
inspectorgeneral;
another
by
a
joint
congressionalpanel cochaired
by
then-senator
Bob
Graham
(D-Florida)
andthen-congressmanPorterGoss
(R-Florida);
andthe
independentinvestigatorycommission
headed
by GovernorKean
and Congressman
Hamilton.
Faced
with
these
investi-
gations,the veteran
CIA
officerswho
were most
closelyinvolved
in
track-ingbin
Laden
and
providing
the
White
House
with
opportunities
tocapture
or
kill
him,
decided
that their
testimony-whether
underoath
or
not-
would
be
useless
if
they
could
not
provide
documents
to
backup
what
was
toldto
the
commissioners
and
their
staffers.u
Cognrzant
of
our
imperfect
memories,
and
well
aware
of
the
always-overriding
desire
of
such
postdis-
aster
investigatorycornmissionsto
flay
the
lowest-ranking
civil
servants,T
those
of
us
at
thecenter
of
operations
against
bin Laden
and al-Qaeda
col-lectively
decided to
provide
official
documents
to
support
testimony when-
everpossible.We
naivelybelieved
that
if
the
commissioners
had been sent
to
protectthe
leaders
of
both
parties and
their
lieutenants
in
the
bureau-
crelcy,
they
could ignore whatwe
said-*chalkingit
up
to
hearsay-but
thatthey
would
be hardpressed,
in
the
context
of
threethousand
dead
Ameri-
cans,
to
ignorewhat
was
contained
inofficial
documents.We were
wrong.Let
mehere
partcompany
with
my
former
CIA
colleaguesand say
that
henceforth
I
am
speaking
only
for
myself.
Most
of my
colleagues
are
stillworking
at
the
CIA
and
are
therefore
forbidden
from
speaking
publicly
aboutthe
issues
raised
in
this book.
If
they did
so,
they
would
be subjectto
disciplinary
actionordismissal.
I
also
must
add
that nothing
I
have
written
in
this
book
is
based
onanyconversation
with
any
officer
still
employed
by
the
CIA
or
other
lC
component
that
occurredafter
the
effective
date
of
my
resignation,November
12,z}A{.Letme
say
it
clearly:
I
aloneamrespon-
siblefaraII of
the contents
of
this
book
and
it
containsno
information
from
any
still-serving
IJ.S.
intelligence
officer.*
As
I
was
preparingto
brief,
answer
questions,orgivetestimonyto
the
trio
of
glll
investigatorypanels,
I
wanted tobe able
to
tell
the
truth
as
I
Author's
Note
knew
it
and
as
the
documentsshowed
it.
To that
end,
I
prepared
a
compi-lationof
between 480and500
pages
of official
documents
to
takealong
with
me whenever
I
wasappearing
before
either
commissionersor
staffers.
The
documents
included
cables
to
and
from
CIA
facilities
overseas,
inter-nal
CIA
memoranda,
e-rrnil
messages
between
and
amoqg
CIA
oflicers,
after-actionreports,and
a
smattering
of
official
documents
from
othergov-ernment
agencies.e
The binder
inwhichI
placed
my
documents,
I
must
stress,
didnot con-tain
notes
I
wrotedown
from
rnemorylongafter
theevents,but
rather
con-
tempor&ty,
official,
and
electronicallyretrievable
documents
thatwould
either supportor
not
support what
I
had
to
say.
Tomake
the
process
work
as
smoothly
as
possible
for
theKean-Hamiltoncommission,
I
decided
to
pass
the entire
binder to
those
commissioners
and
their
staffers
so
it
would
be
in front
of
themwhenever
we
spoke.'0
It
took
me threeattempts
to
get
it
passed
to
the
glll
Commissionthrough
the clearinghousethat
DCI
GeorgeTenetestablished
in
the
CIA for
the transfer
of
such
material.
I
donot
know
why
the
first two
attemptswereunsuccessful,butonthe
third
try
I
num-
bered
each
page
by hand
and
consecutively
with
a
black
indelible
markel,
thentelephoned
the
commission's
executive director,
Philip
Tnlikow,
to con-
firm
that
it
was
in
his
hands.
Mr.
Zehkowconfirmed
thatthe
binder
hadarrived,but
I
was
neveragaincalledon to
testify
toor
brief
thecommission.
I
go
into
this detailto
emphasize
that
the
CIA
thoroughly
screenedthe
documents
in
my
binder, redactedthem
appropriately
to
protect
sources
and
methods,
and
forwarded
themtotheglLL
Commission.
The documents
therefore
have
nopotential
for
damagingIJ.S.nationalsecurity
or for
compromising
the
CIA
spast
or
ongoing
operations.Indeed,
they
werecleared
of
sensitive
data
by
the
CIA for
the
express
purpose
of
allowing
their
use
to help
Americans
understand
why
the
9/1
1
attacks
occured.
The
documentsdo,however,
holdsignificant potential
for
embarrassing
seniorU.S.
officials-elected,
appointed,
and
civil service-butCIA
regulations
state
that embarrassmentdoes
notconstitutegrounds
for
censoring.
These
documents,others,
and the
testimonyheld
by
the
glII
Commission iden-
tify
those
who
did
not
act
toprotectAmericans
and
their
interests;
shows
Americansthe
truth
about
foreign
enemies,
like
Saudi
Arabia,
that
U"S.leadershave
for
decades
consistently
identified
as
friends
and
allies;
andshames each
9lII
commissioner
for
failing
to
give
Americans
a
completeascounting
of
theevents
preceding
9lIL"
)
14
15

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