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"TOTALALTRUISM"IN LEVINAS'S
"ETHICS OF THE WELCOME"
M. Jamie Ferreira
ABSTRACT
Levinas's ethics of other-centeredservice has been criticized at the theo-
retical level for failing to offer a conception of moral agency adequate to
ground its imperative and at the practical level for encouraging self-
hatred. Levinas's explicit resistance to the incorporationof the phrase "as
yourself" in the Judaeo-Christian love command might seem to validate
the critics' complaints. The author argues, on the contrary,that Levinas
does offer a strong and compellingconceptionof moral agency and that his
ethics, properly understood, does not entail self-abnegation. Levinas's
attempt to counter excessive and manipulative self-concern and self-
inflation by insisting on the dependent and situational position of the self
has been wrongly overinterpreted as an abandonment of the self and its
just claims. The author seeks to establish a more balanced understanding
by focusing attention on the "ethics of welcome,"on Levinas's distinctive
conception of passivity, and on the role of "the third" in all human
relations.
KEYWORDS: agency,altruism, equality,justice, Levinas, Ricoeur
2 The Hebrew linguistic structure that I consider later does not account for Levinas's
resistance.
3 Throughoutthe remainder of the article, citations of the works of Levinas will give
only the year of publication and the page number;citations of all other works will give
446 Journal of Religious Ethics
for him "theresponsibility of the ego for an other, the impossibility of let-
ting the other alone faced with the mystery of death" (1984b, 167). In
"Ethics as First Philosophy,"Levinas details how "the Other becomes
my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for
me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me
into question"(1984a, 83). Levinas occasionallyhesitates about whether
the term "neighbor"is the best to use- sometimes because it seems to
obscure the fact of difference (1962, 27) and sometimes because it may
have lost its legitimate shock value in coming to be taken for granted
("Perhapsbecause of current moral maxims in which the word neighbor
occurs, we have ceased to be surprised by all that is involved in proxim-
ity and approach"[1974, 5]). Nevertheless, he persists in using it from
his earliest to his latest writings: "Itis as a neighborthat a human being
is accessible- as a face";"in this call to responsibility of the ego by the
face which summons it, which demands it and claims it, the other
(autrui) is the neighbor"(1951, 8; 1984b, 167).
Levinas, especially in his later years, speaks of "love of one's neigh-
bor,"which he defines as "lovewithout Eros, charity, love in which the
ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without concupis-
cence"(1982b, 103). However,most of the time Levinas uses the idiom of
"responsibilityfor"the neighbor, rather than that of love. He learned
early on, he says, to "distrustthe compromisedword 'love,'"choosing in-
stead to speak of "the responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other"
(1982a, 52). Repeatedly he distances himself from the term "love,"which
he considers "worn-out and debased," preferring instead "the harsh
name for what we call love of one's neighbor"- namely, "responsibility
for my neighbor"(1982b, 103). In sum, Levinas has what he calls "a
grave view of Agape in terms of responsibility for the other" (1982b,
113).
Levinas's preference for the term "responsibility"is an understand-
able one. The word "love"fails to announce strongly enough that "I am
ordered toward the face of the other,"who "commands"me (1974, 11,
emphasis added), that my response is his "right,"and that "the right of
the human"has the very strong connotation of "commandment"(1984b,
167, emphasis added). Still, despite his "grave"or "harsh"view of love as
responsibility for the other, Levinas does, time and again, use the word
"love,"even within those essays where he uses also the stronger lan-
guage of obligation (1984b, 169; 1975a, 140). However,he does this only
with the understanding that "thereis something severe in this love; this
love is commanded"(1982b, 108). In one of his later interviews, he is
author, date, and page, with the exception of sec. 3.1 in which the author assumed in the
citations should in all cases be Ricoeur.Italics in quotations may be assumed to have ap-
peared in the original unless otherwise noted.
TotalAltruism 447
particularly eloquent about love: he claims that the "idea of the face is
the idea of gratuitous love" and suggests that faith is "believing that
love without reward is valuable"; he goes so far as to say that "that
which I call responsibility is a love, because love is the only attitude
where there is encounter with the unique"(1986b, 176, 177, 174). In this
same interview, Levinas explicitly refers to "the commandmentof a gra-
tuitous act" like love; he observes that "commanding love signifies
recognizing the value of love in itself" and that "Godis a commandment
to love . . . the one who says that one must love the other" (1986b,
176-77).
There is some value in refusing to reduce the language of relation to
the language of responsibility- after all, responsibility can be fulfilled
grudgingly,hatefully. Perhaps this sad truth accounts for the extremely
negative reaction readers often have to Levinas's notion of the self as
"hostage"in responsibility (1974, 11, 59); this phrase seems to describe
a very unloving situation, putting us at odds with the neighbor- a
relation that we would normally condemn. But Levinas makes it clear
early on that "the other is not a being we encounter that menaces us or
wants to lay hold of us" (1948, 87),4just as he acknowledges later that
the responsibility of which he speaks "is not a cold juridical require-
ment" (1986c, 186). Responsibility is, rather, "all the gravity of the love
of one's fellowman- of love without concupiscence"- and it is accom-
plished "through all the modalities of giving" (1986c, 186). Levinas's
reversion to the term "love"may be due, then, to his sense that "giving"
calls to mind love rather than mere (juridical)responsibility
5 Kant suggests that "tosecure one'sown happiness is at least indirectlya duty,for dis-
content with one's conditionunder pressure from many cares and amid unsatisfied wants
could easily become a great temptation to transgress duties"(Kant 1785/1959, 15).
TotalAltruism 449
different vein, one could argue that if love's proper object is "the good"
(as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas think), then one must love the good in
oneself as much as the good in others.6Another version of this theme is
that reverence for God'screation or God'sgifts entails reverence for one's
self.
What is at stake for Levinas, we saw, was avoiding the danger of the
addition "asyourself"- the danger that it emphasizes equality in such a
way as to foster a comparative "bookkeeping"attitude, an emphasis on
what the other also owes. Levinas's fear of affirming self-love seems to
blind him to these other meanings of the "as yourself." Deliberately
deemphasizing the "as yourself" is Levinas's way of trying to turn us
away from ourselves toward the other, but ironically, the effort to focus
only on the self's responsibility can, despite its good intentions, return
the spotlight to the self. That is, the effort to prevent our obsession with
assessing the other's obligation carries with it the threat of taking our
attention away from the other altogether, by enshrining another kind of
self-centeredness in making the self supreme in its agency of loving.
6 For example, Aristotle brings out the ambiguity in the phrase "loverof self" and ex-
"
plains the "natureof true self-love,"affirmingthat "thegoodman should be a lover of self
(Aristotle 1954, ix.8). Accountsthat emphasize self-respectand self-esteem would fall into
this category.
450 Journal of Religious Ethics
ourselves have been loved, supported, and encouraged- with the para-
doxical result that this "selfless" interpretation ends up placing an
importanceon the sovereign self that would not otherwise be attributed
to it. The "as yourself,"as Kierkegaardconstrues it, reminds me both of
my createdness and of the gift of love to me, and thus it takes me out of
myself, renderingmy response to the other less subjective.
In Kierkegaard'sview, the "as yourself" functions as a reminder of
God'senabling gift of love, and this paradoxicallyreminds me about my-
self precisely in order to focus my attention on the other. While Levinas
is right to fear the translation "as yourself" because the language of
equality (whether in the form of "theneighbor is worthy as I am worthy"
or "the neighboris commandedas I am commanded")is open to the dan-
ger of calculation and comparisonand can be interpreted in such a way
as to set limits on our responsibility, insofar as he abandons the "as
yourself," he loses an important dimension of the love command- the
insistence that our ability to fulfill the commandrests on God'sgracious
gift of love and not our own independent powers. Thus, it seems that
Levinas's strategy for taking the emphasis away from the self actually,
and ironically, lifts up the self by denying its dependency on God and
leaving me, in the end, "on my own." My very love becomes a self-
centered achievement.
It is worth noting at this point that despite Levinas's reference to the
difficulty of the translation of the love commandment,his reluctance to
affirm the "asyourself"is not a function of the original Hebrew formula-
tion: V'ahavta re'echa c'mocha. The Hebrew linguistic structure of the
love commandment reads "Youwill love- your neighbor- as you [im-
plied verb clause]."That is, it does not place "neighbor"as direct object.7
It seems plausible to see this structure as allowing an emphasis on
equality: you will love, and your neighbor like you (will love); you will
both love; you (both equally) will love; you, as equals, will love. The He-
brew,then, can support the suggestion that the "asyourself"is meant to
remind us that we are both commandedto love and that we are both cre-
ated by or in love, and thus enabled to love.
8 Given Levinas's understanding of activity and passivity, this nevertheless does not
make substitution an "act"(1974, 117).
454 Journal of Religious Ethics
In the first one hundred and fifty pages of Totalityand Infinity alone,
"welcome"or "welcoming"are used over twenty times, and they continue
to be used up to and in the chapter entitled "Conclusions"(1961, 299).
Levinas also describes the self's response to the other in terms of
"generosity"(1961, 50, 75), and he repeatedly speaks of "hospitality,"
reminding us of the graciousness with which responsibility should be
fulfilled. The emphasis on welcoming the other is not left behind; it
informs all his later writings and explicitly appears in the way he con-
tinues to speak of "greeting"the other (1982a, 88), in "the ethics of the
welcome"(1986a, 151), as well as in the way he ties "hospitality"to the
extreme sacrifice of "giving to the other the bread from one's mouth"
(1974, 79).10In other words, the word "welcome"is used long after the
term "hostage"has been introduced (1974).
I suggest that Levinas's notion of "hostage"(otage)is not properlyun-
derstood if it is considered in isolation from his earlier use of the notion
of "host"(hdte).The positive connotation of the word "hostage"is appar-
ent in the claim that "it is through the condition of being hostage that
there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity"
(1974, 117). "Host"and "hostage"are mutually correcting tropes for re-
sponsibility- a point that is made better in the English term "(host)age"
than the French. When Levinas is appealing to the notions of host and
welcome in Totalityand Infinity (1961), he is elsewhere describing what
he calls "total altruism"(1962, 18). To put it in another perspective, his
call for "total altruism" is made at the same time that he claims that
"the welcoming of the face is peaceable from the first, for it answers to
the unquenching Desire for Infinity"(1961, 150). Moreover,at this same
time he also speaks of the command of the other in terms of gentleness:
"TheOther reveals himself in his alterity, not in a shock negating the I,
but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness" (1961, 151). The call
for "totalaltruism"is compatiblewith responsibility construed as hospi-
tality and graciousness. Furthermore,Levinas at one point decides that
the grammar of the self goes "beyondaltruism and egoism"(1974, 117).
3.5 Rethinkingpassivity
Theresponseof a "host"is not a simplereaction.A reactionis distinct
from a knowingresponsibleresponse.We can talk of the tropic "re-
sponse"of a plantto light,but suchmovementis not a genuineresponse
- it is merelyan automaticreaction,muchlike the constrictionof the
cell membranewhentouchedby the scientist'sprobe.Theseareparadig-
maticpassivereactions,but the host is not passivein this way.Levinas
acknowledgesthis when he explains that "the term welcomeof the
Otherexpressesa simultaneityof activity and passivitywhich places
the relationwith the otheroutsideof the dichotomiesvalid for things:
the a prioriandthe a posteriori,activityandpassivity"(1961,89). Even
whenconsideringthe way in which"thereis a commandment in the ap-
pearanceof the face, as if a master spoketo me,"Levinasemphasizes
responsibleagency,for "as a 'first person,'I am he who finds the re-
sourcesto respondto the call"(1982a,88-89). Therecouldbe no clearer
statementof the responsibleethical agencyrecommendedin Levinas's
ethics,andthis is just whatonewouldexpect,giventhe concern,whichI
have documented,that ipseity,the oneself,is bothmaintainedand con-
firmedin the relationship.
Just as Levinas'suse of "freedom" and "choice" variesfromstandard
use becausehe discardsthe standardassumptionthat links freedom
with unconstrainedchoice,initiative,and control,so his use of "passiv-
ity"must be understoodto be beyondor independentof ourtraditional
contrasts.His earlyappreciationof the way in whichwelcomingis out-
side the traditionaldichotomybetween active and passive is carried
throughin his frequentuse of "passivity" in Otherwisethan Being.His
use of the termthereis distinctivein two ways:
First, the state to whichhe appliesthe term "passivity" is actuallya
state that is priorto the behaviorsthat, in standardusage,we differen-
tiate as activeand passive.Thus,when he writes that "thesubjectivity
of a subjectis vulnerability,exposureto affection,sensibility,a passivity
morepassivestill than any passivity"(1974,50),the phrase"apassivity
morepassive still than any passivity"is used to great rhetoricaleffect,
but he goes on to admitthat he is not using the term "passivity" in its
ordinarymeaning.He explainsthis by sayingthat "subjectivity no lon-
ger belongsto the orderwherethe alternativeof activityand passivity
retainsits meaning"(1974, 118).The discussionsof "recurrence," "self,"
and"substitution," in chapter4 clarifythe attributionof passivity.Sub-
stitution,he says, "isnot an act"becauseit is on the "hitherside of the
act-passivityalternative"(1974, 117).Again,our standardcontrastbe-
tween active and passiveis not relevantin this case, for in the case of
responsibility"activityand passivity coincide"(1974, 115); thus, he
writes that "theself as an expiationis priorto activityand passivity"
(1974, 116).
TotalAltruism 459
3.6 Summary
All of these reminders suggest that Levinas can accommodate the
role of responsible active self, the maintenance of self in ethical rela-
tion. They support the conclusion that in the end Levinas can answer
yes to Ricoeur's question: "Mustone not, in order to make oneself open,
available, belong to oneself in a certain sense?"(Ricoeur 1992, 138). For
Levinas, one must belong to oneself sufficiently to be a host, to welcome
the other, to substitute oneself. In other words, what some see as a re-
ductio ad absurdum of his position- namely, that there can be no
absolute self-emptying because the self is the one emptying itself- is
not in fact emblematic of weakness or self-contradiction in his argu-
ment; it is, from his point of view, the very point of his argument. It is
the insight into the liberating and authenticating power of sacrifice and
self-forgetfulness that funds all his statements, which I have docu-
mented, affirming selfhood and agency.
Levinas's designation of his ethics as "the ethics of the welcome"thus
leaves room for the "yourself" of the "as yourself." Still, it might be
objectedthat Levinas cannot in principle accommodatean acknowledg-
ment of the "asyourself"because of his position on the asymmetry of the
relation, and the inequality implied in asymmetry. In some ethics, the
responsibility for the other is clearly based on the theological claim that
we are all equal before God:our ethical equality is a function of our onto-
logical equality as creatures. Since Levinas is known for challenging our
classical emphasis on equality, we need to ask whether the belonging to
460 Journal of Religious Ethics
oneself in that certain sense that Levinas's notion of ipseity affirms al-
lows the kind of equality that is implied in the "as yourself."
Levinas affirms that the other is both higher and lower at the same
time- higher in the sense that the other "commands"me, and lower in
the sense that the other is "destitute,"dependent on me for I have "the
resources to respond"to his call (1982a, 89). He writes: "the other is the
richest and the poorest of beings: the richest, at an ethical level, in that
it always comes before me, its right-to-bepreceding mine; the poorest, at
an ontological or political level, in that without me it can do nothing"
(1981, 63). "The Other,"he insists, "is always, qua Other, the poor and
destitute one while at the same time being my lord . . . the relation is
thus essentially dissymmetrical"(1975b, 38). Although this dual status
of height and humility (1961, 200) might seem just to reverse the asym-
metry, or to provide a double form of asymmetry, the fact that Levinas
holds both dimensions in place at the same time suggests that his view
of "height"does not carry in its train what is normally meant by ontolog-
ical inequality. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that Levinas would
want to engage the agenda of ontology in order to assert an ontological
inequality.13
that the other awakens in me sympathy, and this seems in perfect agree-
ment with Ricoeur'sown representation of the mutuality of equals:
In true sympathy, the self, whose power of acting is at the start greater
than that of its other,finds itself affectedby all the suffering other offersto
it in return. For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no
longer drawn from the power of acting and existing but precisely from
weakness itself. This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when un-
equal power finds compensation in an authentic reciprocityin exchange,
which, in the hour of agony,finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or
the feeble embrace of clasped hands [Ricoeur1992, 191].
If this is what Ricoeur requires for "authentic reciprocityin exchange,"
then surely Levinas's double asymmetry can accommodatethat. Levinas
would not deny the "feelings that are revealed in the self by the other's
suffering, as well as by the moral injunction coming from the other,
feelings spontaneously directed toward others" (Ricoeur 1992, 191-
92). Levinas would, no doubt, question the precise import of the word
"spontaneous,"but he would nonetheless concur in the idea of a "phe-
nomenology of the self affected by the other than self" (Ricoeur 1992,
331). This receiving role of the self is implied in Levinas's much-ne-
glected claim that "my ethical relation of love for the other stems from
the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning
within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of sameness"
(Levinas 1981, 60). Levinas here reveals a dimension of "need"of the
other that exposes an important sense in which the other is not simply
an intruder or commanderand the self is not simply the one who gives
without receiving.14This passage in Levinas is not an aberrant slip of the
pen- it is implied in his repeated claim that the self loses its life in order
to gain it.
The problem with dissymmetry, according to Ricoeur,is that "taken
literally, a dissymmetry left uncompensated would break off the ex-
change of giving and receiving and would exclude any instruction by the
face within the field of solicitude"(Ricoeur1992, 189). I have been trying
to show that Levinas, too, appreciates this problem, and that Ricoeur's
formulation of the answer is one that Levinas can accept- namely, that
"a capacity for giving in return [is] freed by the other's very initiative"
(Ricoeur 1992, 189). Moreover,Levinas's affirmation of a transformed
ipseity, an ethical self - his claim that "in this sense the self is goodness
to the point of substitution" (1974, 118)- is informed by the same in-
sight that leads Ricoeur to observe that a self can respond to another
only if the self acknowledges itself, because its "resourcesof goodness"
14In other words, Levinas agrees with Ricoeurthat "we need friends"(Ricoeur 1992,
192).
TotalAltruism 463
are available only for "a being who does not detest itself to the point of
being unable to hear the injunction coming from the other" (Ricoeur
1992, 189). Levinas knows that self-hatred would incapacitate a host,
precluding generous hospitality. We must somehow be there enough to
"hearthe injunction coming from the other,"but not there in the sense of
a self fully constituted ("alreadyposited and fully identified")and con-
tingently waiting for the demand of the other (1974, 115). Levinas's
image of the self as the sound whose echo precedes it (1974, 103, 111) is
meant to affirm both the self and the need of the self for the other.
The equality or implicit self-esteem that Levinas affirms is found in
Totality and Infinity, where he appeals to "equality"frequently and
without apology:he sees in religion "the surplus possible in a society of
equals, that of glorious humility, responsibility, and sacrifice, which are
the conditionfor equality itself" (1961, 64). He writes that "thepoorone,
the stranger, presents himself as an equal,"adding that "inthe welcom-
ing of the face (which is already my responsibility in his regard, and
where accordingly he approaches me from a dimension of height and
dominates me), equality is founded"(1961, 213, 214). In sum, "I am I
and chosen one, but where can I be chosen, if not from among other cho-
sen ones, among equals?" (1961, 279). Otherwise than Being makes
explicit the sense in which I am equal: "Thanks to God'I am another for
the others," referring to the "reciprocal[reciproque]relationship [that]
binds me to the other man in the trace of transcendence"(1974, 158).
Thus, both early and late major works reveal that Levinas does not ex-
clude appeals to equality and reciprocity.
It is worth looking more closely at the context of Levinas's claim that
"the poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal."The passage
in full is as follows:
The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality
within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus
present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the Other
already serves. He comes tojoin me. But he joins me to himself for service;
he commands me as a Master. This command can concern me only inas-
much as I am master myself;consequentlythis command commands me to
command [1961, 213, emphasis added].
Not only does the stranger present himself as an equal to me, but I am,
in a sense, equal to him. The final sentence shows the way in which, for
Levinas, the self is confirmed as master in relation to the command of
the other. I cannot give to the other what the other needs unless I belong
to myself in a certain sense; I remain, in a certain sense, the one com-
manding. The self retains responsibility precisely because the
commandment "orders me in my own voice. The command is stated
through the mouth of him it commands"(1982a, 110). The exteriority of
464 Journal of Religious Ethics
words, does "total altruism" mean that I cannot put limits on self-
sacrifice- the kind of limits that the "as myself" or the "as yourself"
legitimates?
5.1 Tworealms?
In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas decisively contrasts the situation with
respect to himself ("me!")and with respect to his "closerelations"or his
"people":they are "alreadythe others, and for them, I demand justice"
(1982a, 99). The implication is that he cannot demand justice for him-
self. This also seems to be the implication of his claim that "ifthere was
only the other facing me, I would say to the very end: I owe him every-
thing" (1975c, 83). But if this means that I cannot claim justice for
myself, then the selfhood of the subject is once more put in jeopardy be-
cause there would be no legitimate limits on my self-sacrifice.
However, Levinas does sometimes seem to allow the demand for jus-
tice for oneself. "Tobe sure," he says, "myresponsibility for all can and
has to manifest itself also in limiting itself. The ego can, in the name of
this unlimited responsibility,be called upon to concernitself also with it-
self" (1974, 128). The "concernfor justice, for oneself" is circumscribed
within the concern for justice for all (1974, 128). Even though in the do-
main of justice there is "weighing, thought, objedification," and thus a
"betrayal"of the "absoluteasymmetry"of substitution, "a new relation-
ship" arises: "it is only thanks to God that, as a subject incomparable
with the other, I am approached as an other by the others, that is, Tor
myself.'Thanks to God'I am another for the others"(1974, 158). That is,
justice is "a terrain common to me and the others where I am counted
among them"(1974, 160). This means that Levinas does not want to de-
value concern for the self, but how can he justify this if he posits a
separate realm of justice?
The threat to concern for self is raised insofar as Levinas posits a
realm in which what Ricoeur calls the "mutuality of self-esteems" is in-
appropriate.He seems to posit two separate realms when he writes that
"the word 'justice'is in effect much more in its place, there, where equity
is necessary and not my 'subordination'to the other. If equity is neces-
sary, we must have comparison and equality: equality between those
that cannot be compared"(1975c, 82, emphasis added). That is, he
seems to differentiate between a realm where I am subordinated to the
other, in altruism (love your neighbor), and a realm in which equity is
necessary, in justice (as yourself). This implies that although the I can
be taken care of in the realm of justice, it is excluded from attention in
the domain of relation with the other in which I have a responsibility for
the other "such that I keep nothing for myself" (1975a, 145). That is,
Levinas seems to break up the unity of the love commandmentin a way
466 Journal of Religious Ethics
concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire"(1981, 56).
Although Levinas might seem to deny the relevance of justice in the
one-on-one relationship, his admission that there never is a case in
which the third is not involved reestablishes a single realm, which could
be called either the realm of love or justice. In other words, Levinas has
effectively maintained the unity of the love commandment,and the con-
stant relevance of the "as yourself."
Do the implications of this acknowledgmentof justice and equality do
away with the subordinationthat is so central to Levinas's account?Has
the attempt to keep an ethical self in relation excluded the importanceof
the way in which the self is the summoned self? How can we keep the
counterweight of infinite responsibility in the face of justice's limits
on self-sacrifice?The only way to respond to this potential objection is
to say that Levinas maintains his view ofjustice in tension with his view
of infinite responsibility; his appreciation of justice does not come as a
shift away from an earlier position. The affirmation of "infinite"respon-
sibility continues to be made even while Levinas puts limits on the
self-sacrifice expected of us: he ends the interview in Ethics and Infinity
by claiming: "Inno way do I want to teach that suicide follows from the
love of the neighbor and the truly human life. I mean to say that a truly
human life cannot remain life satis-fied in its equality to being, a life of
quietude, that it is awakened by the other" (1982a, 121-22). In other
words, "infinite"responsibility does not mean that absolutely no limit is
put on what is demanded of us- it does not require suicide. In fact,
Levinas repeatedly points to instances in which genuine sacrifice is
being made or could be made- even the little "Afteryou, sir" can be an
example of genuine sacrifice (1974, 117; 1982a, 99; 1981, 68) and an
illustration of the "everydayness"of his ethics (1974, 141). Infinite re-
sponsibility does mean, however, that we can never say we are finished
with our responsibility.Our sacrifice for the other may be genuine, with-
out being suicide, but there is never an end to the demand for sacrifice.
There will always be another who needs me or another need to which I
can minister, so I can never say "Quits."
6. Conclusion
All of this suggests that there are resources in Levinas's ethics for af-
firming a self sufficient to ground responsible ethical agency and to
maintain ongoing relationship. The self is never simply emptied or anni-
hilated; the self is, in some sense, equal to the other and can, when there
is a third (and in reality, there always is), claim justice for itself. Levinas
allows for limiting the sacrifice of ourselves insofar as we need to be
there to help the others (since undue sacrifice of self would militate
against fulfilling our responsibility for the others), but he also wants to
allow justice for ourselves to limit the sacrifice of ourselves.
468 Journal of Religious Ethics
15See Schrag 1997, 14n., 100, 144, for expressions of sympathy or agreement with
Levinas.
16When self-possessionis occasionallyconstruedas thematization (1974, 100), it is be-
cause the initial self-centeredipseity must be transformed.
TotalAltruism 469
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470 Journal of Religious Ethics