in order to avert sudden exchange rate movements.A longstanding demand of civil society groups has been the need for broaderroom for exchange rate management in developing countries. This is in accountof these countries' greater reliance on trade and their position as net "takers"rather than "makers" of global monetary trends.In the words of the IMF paper:"Large fluctuations in exchange rates, due to sharp shifts in capital flows (as wesaw during this crisis) or other factors, can create large disruptions in activity. Alarge appreciation may squeeze the tradable sector and make it difficult for it togrow back if and when the exchange rate decreases."Granted, along the lines of the rest of the paper, this was not such a boldassertion, and it came as sort of an oblique reference. The reference was foundin a place where the paper's main argument was that central banks argued theywere targeting inflation. The paper said that this was, indeed, the case inadvanced economies, but that in "small open economies" the evidencesuggested central banks "also" intervened to smooth the volatility of theexchange rate.So exchange rate-targeting was presented more as something possible and afact of life, and, not to be forgotten, as accompanying, not substituting, a policyof inflation-targeting, rather than as a policy prescription. Further, the usefulnessof that practice seemed, in the eyes of the IMF, and also in a one-size-fits-allfashion, confined to "small open economies."Nonetheless, the fact that the IMF also characterized the actions of thesecentral banks as "more sensible than their rhetoric" may have allowed hopefulreaders to see a change in its approach to this practice. Let us not forget thatonly three years ago, the IMF had reviewed its Decision on BilateralSurveillance policy that had been in place for thirty years to make it all moredifficult to keep "misaligned" - that is, not floating-exchange rates. (Caliari 2007)Though the Guidance Note for implementing this Decision was eased last year,the policy itself as revised in 2007 stays in place. (Caliari 2009)Hopeful readers were up for a disappointment, though.A more recent paper called "Central Banking Lessons from the Crisis" (IMF2010a) - this one made official and submitted to Board discussion, so it can besaid to represent an institutional position- has chosen to avoid makingexchange rate-targeting the subject of any significant finding orrecommendation. Its only reference to the practice is the purely factualassertion that exchange rate stability is one of the policy objectives CentralBanks take into account (Ib. at 6-7 and footnote 38).In all fairness, those really hopeful readers might still wait further for anotherpaper, as this one seems focused on the need to include financial stability - not just price stability-as a major policy objective in Central Banking. But do not holdyour breath on it. The conclusive title suggests there are no more lessons forCentral Banking the IMF intends to draw from the crisis.