STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

Case 3:09-cr-00243-JBA Document 196 Filed 08/10/10 Page 1 of 31
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Case No. 3:09CR243(JBA)

:
v. :
:
EUGENE STINSON : August 10, 2010
GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING
The government respectfully submits this memorandum in anticipation of the August 16,
2010 sentencing of the defendant, Eugene Stinson. In October 2009, a federal grand jury
returned an indictment charging Mr. Stinson with Conspiracy to Steal Firearms from a Federally
Licensed Firearm Dealer and Theft of Firearms from a Federally Licensed Firearm Dealer.
Those charges stemmed from an ATF “sting”operation, using information from a cooperating
defendant, in which Eugene Stinson set up a scheme to steal numerous assault rifles from
American Precision Manufacturing (“APM”), a federally licensed firearms dealer. Eugene
Stinson organized the plan, and then instructed his father, Michael Stinson, and another
individual, on when, where, and how to steal the guns.
Mr. Stinson elected to proceed to trial, alongside his two co-defendants. The jury rejected
Mr. Stinson’s claim of entrapment and found him guilty on both counts of the indictment.
The government disagrees with the PSR’s calculation regarding Mr. Stinson’s prior
felony convictions as a basis for enhancement. The government submits that Mr. Stinson has
only one prior conviction that qualifies to enhance his base level offense. The government agrees
with the PSR’s remaining calculation. Thus, with six levels added because the offense involved
between 25-99 guns under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) and a two-level adjustment because the
defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor or manager in the criminal activity, Mr. Stinson’s
base level offense is 30. With a criminal history category III, the resulting Guideline range is
121-151 months. Because the statutory maximum sentence is 120 months’ imprisonment, the
applicable advisory Guideline sentence is 120 months’ imprisonment.
For the reasons stated below, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months’
imprisonment– the applicable Guideline range – is reasonable.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following is based on law enforcement officers’ reports, recorded conversations,
videotaped events and the evidence presented at trial. On late August, less than two months
before the theft of the firearms in the instant case, numerous assault rifles had been stolen from
American Precision Manufacturing, the federally licensed firearms dealer (“APM”). Thereafter,
in late August and September 2009, at least eight of those firearms had been recovered in
Bridgeport by state and federal law enforcement officers during seizures and controlled
purchases. Detective Sanford Dowling, an ATF Task Force Officer (“ATF TFO”) testified at
trial that because these weapons were semi-automatic assault rifles and were recovered from the
streets of Bridgeport, specifically in the Marina Village and PT Barnum Housing projects
(“P.T.”). He also testified that because of the new condition of the guns, indicating that the guns
were most likely coming from a dealer and many more could be forthcoming, law enforcement
officers believed it was a matter of urgency to discover the source of these guns to prevent more
guns from flooding the streets and getting into the wrong hands.
In late September 2009, as detailed at trial, Ameed Stevenson, an employee of APM,
confessed to ATF law enforcement officers. Among other things, Ameed Stevenson provided
information about his role in the provision of information to Eugene Stinson in August 2009
2
regarding the layout and operational methods of APM. Specifically, Ameed Stevenson told ATF
agents and TFOs that he knew an individual known to him as “Nast” (later identified as Eugene
Stinson), who lived with Ameed Stevenson’s sister in the P.T. Barnum Housing Project. Based
on conversations with Eugene Stinson, Ameed Stevenson believed that Eugene Stinson had a
criminal enterprise of about eight people that performed robberies and shootings for him.
According to Ameed Stevenson, in about August of 2009, Eugene Stinson asked him to get
weapons from APM, which Ameed Stevenson initially declined to do. After much pressure from
Eugene Stinson, of whom Ameed Stevenson said he was afraid, Ameed Stevenson gave two
weapons he had previously taken from APM to Eugene Stinson.
Eugene Stinson continued to pressure Ameed Stevenson to assist him in stealing more
firearms. Eventually, in late August 2009, Ameed Stevenson told Eugene Stinson about a door at
APM that could be accessed from the outside, which was left unlocked, that led to the room where
the firearms were kept. Ameed Stevenson also told Eugene Stinson where the guns were located
once inside the building and that third shift was the best time to steal the guns.
Ameed Stevenson provided information to law enforcement officers that, shortly after he
had provided such information to Eugene Stinson, guns were stolen from APM. A day or two
after the guns were stolen, Eugene Stinson called Ameed Stevenson and questioned Ameed
Stevenson about APM’s reaction to the missing firearms. Ameed Stevenson testified at trial that a
few days after the initial theft of firearms in August 2009, Eugene Stinson had called and asked
him to repair two of the stolen APM Century Arms guns. When Ameed Stevenson went to
Eugene Stinson’s apartment at the P.T. Barnum Housing project at Eugene Stinson’s request to
get the guns, Eugene Stinson handed a bag with greyhound tickets on it containing the two rifles
3
to Ameed Stevenson. At that time, Ameed Stevenson saw five more Century Arms rifles from
APM in the trunk of a car, which Eugene Stinson opened. When Ameed Stevenson attempted to
return the guns to Eugene Stinson later that same day (although he did not repair them), Eugene
Stinson instead told Ameed Stevenson to bring them to his father, Michael Stinson. Ameed
Stevenson then met with Michael Stinson, while on the phone with, and at the instruction of,
Eugene Stinson. Ameed Stevenson handed his phone to Michael Stinson with Eugene Stinson
remaining on the phone on the phone. After speaking with Eugene Stinson, Michael Stinson took
the bag with greyhound tickets on it, which contained the two guns. Two guns in that same bag
with the greyhound tickets were later recovered during a controlled purchase on September 21,
2009 in the PT Barnum Housing project. Based on the above information, Ameed Stevenson
believed that Eugene Stinson was involved in the in the initial theft of approximately thirty assault
rifles from APM.
On October 19, 2009, Ameed Stevenson pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the stealing,
and unlawfully taking or carrying away, from the premises of a person who is licensed to engage
in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, one or more firearms in the
licensee’s business inventory that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(u) and 924 (i)(1), and also entered into a
cooperation agreement with the government. On that same day, Ameed Stevenson was released on
bond to actively cooperate with ATF. Up through Ameed Stevenson’s guilty plea, Eugene
Stinson had continued to call Ameed Stevenson in an attempt to gain information about shipments
of firearms at APM.
Later that day, on October 19, 2009, Ameed Stevenson, under the direction and
4
supervision of ATF, engaged in a recorded conversation with Eugene Stinson at the P.T. Barnum
Housing Complex. During that conversation, Ameed Stevenson told Eugene Stinson that there
would be guns available to be stolen from APM that week on Thursday. Eugene Stinson told
Ameed Stevenson to “show him” the layout of APM the following day.
On October 20, 2009 in the morning, Ameed Stevenson placed a recorded call to Eugene
Stinson’s cell phone and asked Eugene Stinson if he was interested in meeting at APM. Ameed
Stevenson then asked Eugene Stinson if he wanted to come up now. A red Dodge Charger
bearing CT registration 604 XLC, known to be operated by Eugene Stinson, was seen by TFO
Sanford Dowling and ATF Special Agent Dennis Turman traveling in the area on Jewitt Street in
Ansonia, CT, which is directly behind APM. Ameed Stevenson alerted the ATF Task Force
Officers that the vehicle was one that he knows Eugene Stinson uses. Ameed Stevenson then
asked Eugene Stinson if he was up in the area now and Eugene Stinson responded, “Yeah, where
you at?” Eugene Stinson inquired about the exact location of APM and Ameed Stevenson
provided more detailed directions. Eugene Stinson then told Ameed Stevenson that he would call
him when he arrived.
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 10:17 a.m., Ameed Stevenson met with Eugene
Stinson at APM in front of the facility on the sidewalk. Ameed Stevenson was provided a
recording device to be worn on his person during the meeting. After meeting Eugene Stinson,
Ameed Stevenson walked to the back of the facility with Eugene Stinson. While in the back of
the facility, Eugene Stinson and Ameed Stevenson talked about different ways to enter the
building. Eugene Stinson stated to Ameed Stevenson, “I would have to send somebody I feel
comfortable with going in there. Not only that. That’s serious. Let’s say if a mother fucker gets
5
caught, that’s serious. You talk about being caught with ‘toast.’1 Now that’s federal. A mother
fucker is gonna give you up. Know what I mean? Like it sounds simple. Don’t get me wrong. I
would rather a mother fucker go in there rather than me but at the same time (Eugene Stinson
sighs).” Ameed Stevenson suggested to Eugene Stinson that he use a “dope fiend.” Eugene
Stinson then stated to Ameed Stevenson, “You say there are two doors and then to the right.”
Ameed Stevenson articulated directions to the work area (through the bay doors) that led to where
firearms were being stored inside the facility. Eugene Stinson then departed the area.
Due to the fact that Eugene Stinson was already at APM, and law enforcement’s belief that
Eugene Stinson was planning to enter the facility prior to Thursday, law enforcement officers
instructed Ameed Stevenson to call Eugene Stinson and change the date from Thursday to
Wednesday night. Ameed Stevenson, under the direction and supervision of ATF, then placed a
recorded call to Eugene Stinson at approximately 12:25 p.m. Ameed Stevenson said that he
would be coming back to work tonight and told Eugene Stinson he would be there until 4:00 a.m.
Eugene Stinson responded, “Oh, you’re gonna be there.” Ameed Stevenson said he would be
working on a machine. Eugene Stinson responded, “Yeah, It’s set up for . . . I’m setting it up
now.” Eugene Stinson then asked, “Well, who else gonna be there with you?” Ameed Stevenson
responded that he would be alone, and Eugene Stinson said, “Oh, O.K., alright.” Ameed
Stevenson said that the firearms would be prepared for shipment on Wednesday, October 21, 2009
between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m. Eugene Stinson then said, “Ah, shit, I thought you said Thursday
they were coming.” Ameed Stevenson said that the shipment had been “changed up.”
Later, around midnight, due to safety issues, law enforcement officers instructed Ameed
1
“Toast” is street parlance for firearms.
6
Stevenson to call Eugene Stinson and change the door through which one would need to enter
APM to access the firearms. Ameed Stevenson called Eugene Stinson. The following is an
excerpt from the transcribed conversation.
Ameed Stevenson: “Remember the door I showed you in the back right?”
Eugene Stinson: “Yeah.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Well don’t go through that door. There is going to be a smaller
door on the right hand side where those yellow canisters is at.”
Eugene Stinson: “Right.”
Ameed Stevenson: “That door will bring you right into the room so you don’t have to
worry about turns and all that (unintelligible) but, um listen. It, it, it, it gotta be done by
like, has to be done before four o’clock though.”
Eugene Stinson: “Right...yeah…yeah…don’t worry…it is.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah.”
Eugene Stinson: “But listen. So you said the middle one right? Boom!”
Ameed Stevenson: “Naw.”
Eugene Stinson: “The middle one.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Naw. Don’t go through that one. Go to the one the right hand side
that big door don’t even…don’t worry about that one.”
Eugene Stinson: “OK.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Go through the small door and go up the steps. You are going to
see a yellow bin.”
7
Ameed Stevenson: “There are a lot of gas cans in it. There is one door. Turn that knob
and you will be able to come right in.”
Ameed Stevenson: “I’m gonna leave it open.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright. Alright.”
Ameed Stevenson: “OK.”
Eugene Stinson: “Yup.”
On October 21, 2009, at 1:38 a.m., ATF surveilled the red Dodge Charger and a second
car, a Silver Ultima, staking out APM. At 1:56 a.m., the Silver Ultima returned. Two
individuals, David Harvin and Michael Stinson, exited the Silver Ultima and attempted to open
the wrong door to APM. The Silver Ultima left the premises of APM. Minutes later, Ameed
Stevenson received a call from Eugene Stinson, during which he told Ameed Stevenson that the
door was locked. The following is an excerpt from the transcribed conversation.
Eugene Stinson: “The door ain’t open.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah it is you went to the wrong one then. Because…”
Eugene Stinson: “The one on the right. You said the little one on the right.”
Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah the little one on the right. Right next to, to the yellow cages.
There is a yellow cage with gas cans in there.”
Eugene Stinson: “I’m talking about on the side. You know the middle shutter and
the one to the right.”
Ameed Stevenson: “No.”
Eugene Stinson: “The first door?”
8
Ameed Stevenson: “Not that one. Nah, nah, you have to back up. Back up, on the
same walkway.”
Eugene Stinson: “Uh huh.”
Eugene Stinson: “And where is that?”
Ameed Stevenson: “It’s in the back where the yellow cabinets is at. I’m going to open
it right now.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright, but…”
Ameed Stevenson: “It’s already, It’s already open…huh?”
Eugene Stinson: “But the one you told me. Where the shutter thing you told me and
that little one to the right. Not that one?”
Ameed Stevenson: “No not that one. When you on that walkway you come down and
you’re going to see a yellow fence, a yellow cage. And you’re going to see a, a, a, a, a
little gas containers in there. And there is a door right to the right.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright. And it’s, and it’s um, and that’s open.”
Eugene Stinson: “And then you go through there and what you gotta do go up
steps?”
Ameed Stevenson: “Right. You want me to open the big door?”
Eugene Stinson: “How many steps do you gotta…how many steps you gotta go up?”
Ameed Stevenson: “It’s like, It’s like three or four.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright then to the right is another door.”
9
Ameed Stevenson: “Right. That’s the one.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright. And right through that door is where it is at.”
Eugene Stinson: “Alright just, just be watching your phone cause I may have to call
you back.”
Minutes later, the Silver Ultima returned to APM. The two individuals exited the car.
Ameed Stevenson opened the door for them. The two entered the building wearing gloves and one
wearing a black mask, and loaded 29 firearms from APM into four duffle bags. This was
surveilled by ATF and captured on videotape by the security camera installed by APM.
The two then exited the APM business building with two duffle bags and placed one
duffle bag containing the guns into the trunk of the car. While Michael Stinson (the father of
Eugene Stinson) was holding the second bag, ATF deployed flash bangs and took the two
individuals into custody. ATF seized the guns that were in the trunk of the car, the guns in the
duffle bag that was on the ground outside the car, and the remaining guns that had been packed
into two additional duffle bags that were left inside APM.
Law enforcement officers were immediately deployed to find the Red Charger and to
arrest Eugene Stinson, but to no avail. Eugene Stinson was arrested the following morning at P.T.
Barnum.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2009, Eugene Stinson was arrested pursuant to a federal complaint. On
October 28, 2009, a federal grand jury in Bridgeport returned a four-count indictment against the
defendants in this case, Eugene Stinson, Michael Stinson and David Harvin, charging them each with
10
Conspiracy to Steal Firearms from a Federally Licensed Firearm Dealer, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code §§ 922(u), 924 (i)(1) and 371, and Theft of Firearms from a Federally Licensed
Firearm Dealer in violation of 18, United States Code §§ 922(u), 924 (i)(1) and 2; and charging David
Harvin and Michael Stinson each with being a Felon in Possession of Firearm, in violation of Title
18, United States Code §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
The government began its presentation of evidence before a jury on March 4, 2010. On
March 9, 2010, the jury rendered a verdict, finding Eugene Stinson guilty on both counts in the
indictment.
The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) found that the base offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a) was 26 because the firearms involved in the offense were semi-automatic and capable
of accepting extended magazines and because Mr. Stinson had at least two felony convictions for
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. PSR ¶ 20. The PSR applied a six-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(C) because the offense involved between 25-99 guns,
but added only three levels due to the limitations prescribed under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b). PSR ¶ 21.
The PSR added a two-level adjustment because the defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor
or manager in the criminal activity under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1©. PSR ¶ 22. The PSR provided no
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. PSR ¶ 26. Finally, the PSR concluded that Mr.
Stinson had accumulated six criminal history points, and fell within Criminal History Category III
PSR ¶ 32. As a result, according to the PSR, Mr. Stinson faced a guideline range of 135-168
months’ incarceration, with a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months under 18 U.S.C.
924(i). See PSR ¶¶ 60, 61. Moreover, the PSR set forth “Mr. Stinson’s criminal record contains
prior drug and violent felony convictions,” . . . that he “has spent significant time incarcerated by
11
the State of Connecticut,”that although he has earned his G.E.D. and received college credits
while imprisoned, he “continues to engage in illegal activities,” PSR ¶ 75, and that “the Court
may wish to consider the defendant’s prior periods of state incarceration, when fashioning a
sentence that will serve the statutory purposes.” PSR ¶ 71.
The government submits that Mr. Stinson has only one prior conviction that qualifies to
enhance his base level offense. First, Mr. Stinson’s 1995 conviction for Second Degree Assault
qualifies under the modified categorical approach as a crime of violence. There is no dispute that
this conviction qualifies. Indeed, the official court records make clear that Mr. Stinson “with the
intent to cause physical injury . . . did cause physical injury . . . by means of a deadly weapon, to
wit: a pistol, in violation of Section 53a-60(a)(2).”2 Amended Information dated May 1995.
Second, Mr. Stinson’s prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute narcotics
does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). The official court
documents in the government’s possession at this time regarding Mr. Stinson’s 2002 conviction
for possession with intent to distribute narcotics do not specify the type of narcotic involved.
53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony : (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second
degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to
such person or to a third person; or (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he
causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious
physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a
purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor,
unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such
person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) he is
a parole from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or
member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
12
Thus, based on the modified categorical approach, this conviction does not qualify. See e.g.,
United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 949 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Cohens, 2008 WL
3824758, 6 (D. Conn. August 13, 2008); United States v. Lopez, 536 F. Supp.2d 218, 223 (D.
Conn. February 18, 2008).
Thus, the government submits that Mr. Stinson’s base level offense is 22 under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(3). The government agrees with the PSR’s remaining calculation. Thus, with six
levels added because the offense involved between 25-99 guns under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) and a
two-level adjustment because the defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor or manager in the
criminal activity, Mr. Stinson’s base level offense is 30. With a criminal history category III, the
resulting Guideline range is 121-151 months. Because the statutory maximum sentence is 120
months’ imprisonment, the applicable advisory Guideline sentence is 120 months’ imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).
For the reasons stated below, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months’
imprisonment– the applicable Guideline range – is reasonable.
II. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
After the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which
rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, a sentence satisfies the Sixth
Amendment if the sentencing judge “(1) calculates the relevant Guidelines range, including any
applicable departure under the Guidelines system; (2) considers the calculated Guidelines range, along
with other § 3553 factors; and (3) imposes a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Fernandez, 443
F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. (2006); see also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,
113 (2d Cir. 2005). The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
13
and history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) the need for the sentence to serve various goals
of the criminal justice system, including (a) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment,” (b) to accomplish specific and general
deterrence, (c) to protect the public from the defendant, and (d) “to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;” (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing range set forth in the guidelines; (5)
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
“[T]he excision of the mandatory aspect of the Guidelines does not mean that the Guidelines
have been discarded.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111. “[I]t would be a mistake to think that, after
Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and
exercise unfettered discretion to select any sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and
minimum.” Id. at 113; see also United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“Even after Gall and Kimbrough, sentencing judges, certainly, are not free to ignore the Guidelines,
or to treat them merely as a ‘body of casual advice.’”) (quoting United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,
113 (2d Cir. 2005)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that “in the overwhelming majority of
cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be
reasonable in the particular circumstances.” Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 27; see also United States v.
Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In calibrating our review for reasonableness, we will
continue to seek guidance from the considered judgment of the Sentencing Commission as expressed
in the Sentencing Guidelines and authorized by Congress.”).
14
The sentencing court is required to calculate the pertinent Guidelines range, and – although
the Guidelines are advisory, and variance is allowed, even when solely based on policy considerations
– the court is required to state the reasons for any variance and provide sufficient justifications for the
extent of any departure. United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 163 (2d Cir. 2008).
Appellate courts review a district court’s sentence for reasonableness. See Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); Cavera, 550
F.3d at 187; Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 26-27. The reasonableness standard is deferential and focuses
“primarily on the sentencing court’s compliance with its statutory obligation to consider the factors
detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States. v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 350 (2d Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed that appellate courts must review sentencing challenges under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. In Gall, the Supreme
Court held that a reviewing court must first satisfy itself that the sentencing court “committed no
significant procedural error.” Id. If there is no procedural error, the appellate court may then
“consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Id.; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (appellate scrutiny encompasses both procedural and
substantive review); Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at127 (same).
III. ARGUMENT
In this case, the government seeks a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment– the applicable
Guideline range.
First and foremost, Mr. Stinson engaged in very serious criminal conduct by organizing
and supervising the theft of numerous assault rifles from a federally licensed firearms dealer. Mr.
15
Stinson set up a plan, in which his father, Michael Stinson, and another individual, entered a
firearm assembly business with the intent to steal numerous assault rifles. Indeed, Michael
Stinson testified that he had every intention of reselling those assault rifles on the streets of
Bridgeport. Any crime that involves the theft of a firearm, much less the illegal theft, possession
and intended distribution of twenty-nine semiautomatic assault weapons into a city that is rife
with violence stemming from the presence of illegal drugs, guns and gangs, has a serious
detrimental impact on the safety of others in the community and warrants a punishment that
dissuades Mr. Stinson and other individuals from committing similar crimes.
Second, Mr. Stinson’s criminal history supports a sentence of 120 months. Mr. Stinson
has engaged in violent and dangerous criminal activity and has repeatedly violated his conditions
of probation.
Specifically, at the age of 16, Mr. Stinson was arrested for having a weapon in a motor
vehicle. After receiving a suspended sentence, he violated his probation, for which he served six
months in jail. In 1994, at the age of 18, Mr. Stinson was arrested for attempted murder. He was
convicted by guilty plea in 1995 of First and Second Degree Assault for a particularly heinous
crime regarding a family dispute, during which he shot a pregnant woman in the stomach and then
chased and shot at her relatives. For that, he was sentenced to 90 months in jail, with five years’
probation. Accordingly, Mr. Stinson served time beginning on September 8, 1995 and was
released to supervised parole on October 1, 1999. PSR ¶ 30. During this incarceration, he
received disciplinary tickets. PSR ¶ 30. He absconded from parol on March 20, 2000. Id. Mr.
Stinson then violated his conditions of probation by committing another crime. On April 17,
2001, he was charged with Possession with Intent to Sell Narcotics, and was sentenced to fifteen
16
months in jail, and was released on September 24, 2003. PSR ¶ 31. Further, Ameed Stevenson
provided information that Mr. Stinson sold crack and heroin in P.T. Barnum, from the time of Mr.
Stinson’s release in 2003 up until the time of Mr. Stinson’s arrest in the instant matter. In fact,
Ameed Stevenson was arrested in 2004 for selling cocaine, which he reported he was selling for
Mr. Stinson. In total, to date, Mr. Stinson has served approximately 76 months, over six years –
behind bars. PSR ¶ 32.
His criminal history demonstrates that Mr. Stinson cannot conform his conduct to the law,
nor can he can comply with orders of the court. Clearly, Mr. Stinson’s prior convictions and
encounters with the criminal justice system have not served as wake up calls for him nor deterred
him from further engaging in criminal activity. Nor has more than six years in prison had any
effect on his propensity to engage in criminal conduct
Based on his conduct in this case, the government agrees with the PSR that Mr. Stinson
should receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. In addition, his lack of acceptance
demonstrates a lack of accountability for his actions, which makes it unlikely that Mr. Stinson will
be able to conform his conduct to the law and will likely continue to commit crimes in the future.
Moreover, Ameed Stevenson told law enforcement officers from the outset that he felt physically
threatened by retaliation from Mr. Stinson should Mr. Stinson discover that Ameed Stevenson had
cooperated. This apprehension was based on Ameed Stevenson’s belief that, in the past, Mr.
Stinson was responsible for Ameed Stevenson and a friend of his being robbed and tied up in
Ameed Stevenson’s home, that Mr. Stinson was previously involved in a home invasion and that
Eugene Stinson also had had a serious violent altercation with Ameed Stevenson’s cousin.
Moreover, Ameed Stevenson had seen Mr. Stinson with guns on a daily basis when Ameed
17
Stevenson lived with him at the apartment in the late 1990's and early 2000s, and during that
time, he had several times seen Mr. Stinson arrive at home covered in blood that was not his own.
And, at a break in the trial testimony of Ameed Stevenson, Mr. Stinson made a comment to
Ameed Stevenson, which Ameed Stevenson perceived as a threat.
Nothing in his past record indicates that Mr. Stinson will change his ways. He has been
arrested repeatedly for violent crimes and ones that involve illegal possession of guns. In 1992,
Mr. Stinson at the age of 17, was convicted of having a Weapon in a Motor Vehicle. In 1995, he
was convicted of First Degree and Second Degree Assault, in which he used a pistol to injure two
of the individuals. In the instant case, Mr. Stinson set in motion a scheme to steal numerous
assault rifles to resell on the streets of Bridgeport. Cf. United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555,
559 (7th Cir. 1990) (‘[r]ationally, if a defendant has been convicted for the same offense more than
once, he has demonstrated the need for greater sanctions to deter him from committing that same
crime again–greater sanctions than might be required for a defendant who has never been
convicted for a similar offense.”); United States v. Chavez-Botello, 905 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir.
1990) “[t]he recidivist’s lapse into the same criminal behavior demonstrates his lack of
recognition of the gravity of his original wrong, entails greater culpability for the offense with
which he is currently charged, and suggests an increased likelihood that the offense will be
repeated.”); see also United States v. Thomas, 1998 WL 514001, at *3 (2d Cir. 1998)
(unpublished opinion).
18
A. Eugene Stinson Should Receive a Two-Level Enhancement for Role Because

He Planned, Organized, and Directed the Theft and Instructed Others During
the Commission of the Theft.
The defendant asserts that he was not an organizer or leader in the offense of conviction.
Def. Memo at 7. Mr. Stinson sets forth there is no evidence that the defendant managed or
supervised David Harvin or his father, Michael Stinson. Def. Memo at 7. The defendant asserts
that “an argument could be made that Michael Stinson supervised the actual theft and was
responsible for its commission. Id.
Pursuant to the Guidelines, a two-level increase in the offense level is appropriate “[i]f the
defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in . . . criminal activity. . . .” U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c). According to the Application Notes to § 3B1.1(c), “[t]o qualify for an adjustment
under this Section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
one or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Application Note 2. “Facts relied on at
sentencing, including findings as to the defendant’s role, need be established only by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 411, 418 (2d. Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182-3 (2d. Cir.) cert denied, 498 U.S. 844
(1990). The sentencing court’s finding concerning a defendant’s leadership role in committing an
offense will not be disturbed unless found to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Valdez, 16
F.3d 1324, 1335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810 (1994); see also United States v. Ivezaj, 568
F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2009).
“A defendant is properly considered a manager or supervisor ‘if he exercised some degree
of control over others involved in the commission of the offense or played a significant role in the
decision to recruit or to supervise lower-level participants.’” United States v. Horton, WL
19
2382261, *1 -2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 448 (2d Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “Moreover, a defendant need only manage
or supervise one other participant to warrant a role enhancement.” Id. (citing United States v.
Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 223 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that recruiting single drug courier into
conspiracy could “by itself” support enhancement). “‘Whether a defendant is considered a leader
depends upon the degree of discretion exercised by him, the nature and degree of his participation
in planning or organizing the offense, and the degree of control and authority exercised over the
other members of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Caver, 2002 WL 109315, 2 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Beaulieau, 959 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir.1992)).
The evidence established that Mr. Stinson planned, organized and directed the theft of
firearms from APM and supervised others during the planning and commission of the theft.
Specifically, Mr. Stinson approached Ameed Stevenson initially to discuss illegally obtaining
firearms from APM. Eugene Stinson obtained the information about the layout of APM just prior
to the August theft of firearms from APM. Shortly thereafter, it was Eugene Stinson who
requested that Ameed Stevenson repair the two Century Arms rifles. Eugene Stinson then
instructed Ameed Stevenson to bring the two guns back to his father Michael Stinson. When
Ameed Stevenson went to Michael Stinson, it was only after Eugene Stinson spoke to Michael
Stinson on the phone that Michael Stinson took the two guns from Ameed Stevenson.
After that, Eugene Stinson repeatedly and continuously contacted and attempted to contact
Ameed Stevenson to inquire about and pursue the theft of additional firearms from APM. When
Ameed Stevenson finally responded to Eugene Stinson’s calls, under the instruction and
20
supervision of law enforcement officers, Eugene Stinson invited Ameed Stevenson over to his
apartment at P.T. to discuss the layout of APM and a plan. During that conversation, Eugene
Stinson requested that Ameed show him the layout the next day. The following morning Eugene
Stinson arrived at APM to stake it out. Eugene Stinson asked questions regarding the details
about how to get in, including which door to enter, and when was the best time to accomplish the
theft. Eugene Stinson discussed whether he should send someone in or do it himself.
“I would have to send somebody I feel comfortable with going in there. Not only that. That’s
serious. Let’s say if a mother fucker gets caught, that’s serious. You talk about being caught with
‘toast.’3 Now that’s federal. A mother fucker is gonna give you up. Know what I mean? Like it
sounds simple. Don’t get me wrong. I would rather a mother fucker go in there rather than me
but at the same time.”
It was Eugene Stinson that Ameed Stevenson called to change the date when the firearms
would be shipped (thus moving up the date of the planned theft) from Thursday to Wednesday.
After speaking about the shift in dates, Eugene Stinson responded, “Yeah, It’s set up for . . . I’m
setting it up now.” It was also Eugene Stinson whom Ameed Stevenson called to change the door
through which one needed to enter APM that night.
When David Harvin and Michael Stinson arrived that night at the time and place that
Ameed Stevenson had discussed with Eugene Stinson, it was clear that Eugene Stinson had set it
up with the two based on the information he had received from his conversations with Ameed
Stevenson. Significantly, when Michael Stinson and David Harvin were outside APM but at the
wrong door, it was Eugene Stinson (who was not even at APM) who called Ameed Stevenson to
3
“Toast” is street parlance for firearms.
21
rectify the problem. Michael Stinson testified at trial that he and Ameed were like family.
Michael Stinson could have called Ameed Stevenson directly. But instead, all the conversations
regarding the planning and commission of the theft were with Eugene Stinson. After getting
specific details about which door to enter, Eugene Stinson told Ameed Stevenson, “Alright just,
just be watching your phone cause I may have to call you back.” Clearly, Eugene Stinson received
the information and instructed Michael Stinson on where to enter APM.
Thus, the evidence proves beyond a preponderance that Eugene Stinson planned,
organized and directed the theft, and was instructing at least Michael Stinson on how to commit
the crime at the time. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, WL 2382261, *1 -2 (2d Cir. 2010) (role
enhancement applicable where defendant “helped negotiate prices, helped recruit certain co-
conspirators, [and] helped direct the activity of the co-conspirators to some degree,” where
defendant “(1) served as a key point of contact between the conspiracy and the New York buyer
(actually an undercover agent), (2) negotiated prices and arranged payment and delivery details,
and (3) decided to recruit others to buy guns in South Carolina and to deliver them for sale in New
York.”); United States v. Franco, 2007 WL 625080, 1 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The district court applied a
role enhancement based on its findings that [defendant] recruited co-defendant []and others as
participants in this endeavor and that [defendant] was the decisionmaker in the planning and
execution of the crime.”).
Moreover, regardless of whether anyone other than Eugene Stinson was leading the
conspiracy, “[i]t is well-established that ‘one conspirator’s leadership role is not dispositive on the
question of whether another was also a leader.’” United States v. Reyes, 2010 WL 2802607, 4
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 106 n. 6 (2d Cir.1994); citing
22
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (“There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a
leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.”)).
Accordingly, Eugene Stinson should receive a two-level enhancement for role.
B. The Defendant’s Claim of Imperfect Entrapment is Meritless.
Mr. Stinson argues that it is “abundantly clear that he had been aggressively targeted by
law enforcement and the cooperating witness.” Def. Memo at 4. He also asserts that Detective
Dowling testified that “the Defendant was set up to commit the crime of conviction, and Ameed
Stevenson was tasked to target the Defendant to commit the offense of conviction.” Id. The
defendant seeks a departure based on the doctrine of imperfect entrapment because “the
Government engaged in aggressive encouragement of wrongdoing,” and that “there can be no
argument that there would have been no crime committed without the active participation of the
Government and its aggressive pursuit and targeting of the Defendant.” Id. at 4-5.
“A departure for imperfect entrapment is based on ‘conduct by the government that does
not give rise to an entrapment defense but that is nonetheless aggressive encouragement of
wrongdoing.’” United States v. Reyes, 2007 WL 1857571, *3 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This
departure has no express basis in the Guidelines, but ‘the policy statement in Section 5K2.12 can
reasonably be read to authorize such a departure in appropriate cases.’” Id. (rejecting a claim of
imperfect entrapment “under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 (the textual source for the imperfect entrapment
departure),” where “[o]rdinarily coercion will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only
when it involves a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury.”).
See also United States v. Oliveras, 2010 WL 46872, 3 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a “departure
23
based on sentencing manipulation . . . would likely require a showing of outrageous government
conduct,” and that “consideration of such wrongful government conduct” should be considered,
“perhaps more aptly, under the rubric of imperfect entrapment,” citing to United States v. Bala,
236 F.3d 87, 91-93 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, there was no government aggressive encouragement of wrongdoing, or wrongful or
outrageous government conduct. To the contrary, the government, to its credit and for the safety
of the residents of Bridgeport, aggressively investigated the theft of numerous assault rifles, which
led to the discovery of Eugene Stinson as the one responsible for the theft. ATF law enforcement
officers deemed their investigation urgent due to the fact that many assault rifles were being found
on the streets of Bridgeport in the hands of criminals and it was necessary to stem the flow. Law
enforcement officers’ tenacious investigation resulted in the development of a cooperating witness
in less than one month, who gave information about Eugene Stinson’s involvement in the August
theft of firearms from APM. Moreover, Ameed Stevenson testified, and the phone records
demonstrated, that Eugene Stinson continued to call Ameed Stevenson up through the time of the
instant offense to inquire about getting more guns from APM.
The government presented evidence at trial that Eugene Stinson was not induced, and that,
even so, Eugene Stinson was predisposed to commit the crime based on his prior criminal
involvement with guns and his ready willingness to seize the opportunity to commit the instant
offense. A jury found there was no entrapment.
It strains credulity to suggest that there “can be no argument that there would have been no
crime committed without the active participation of the Government and its aggressive pursuit and
targeting of the Defendant.” Contrary to Mr. Stinson’s argument, without the government’s
24
intervention in this case by their aggressive investigation because of the imminent danger
associated with numerous assault rifles being stolen and sold on the streets of Bridgeport, many
more guns may have been stolen at the instruction of Eugene Stinson.
C. The Defendant Has Not Met His Burden to Show That His Family
Circumstances Are Extraordinary.
The defendant also seeks a departure or non-guidelines sentence for extraordinary family
circumstances. Mr. Stinson asserts that he is the father of three young children who rely on him
for both financial and emotional security, that his separation from them has resulted in them
obtaining lower grades and poor emotional health, that one minor child has a significant health
issue, and that his own emotional health has been adversely affected by this separation. Def.
Memo at 6. The government respectfully submits that a departure or non-guidelines sentence on
this basis is neither warranted nor supported by the case law.
“Family ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. Where a
defendant requests a departure based on a personal characteristic or circumstance that is not
“ordinarily relevant” to a departure analysis, the Court may nevertheless consider such
characteristic or circumstance “only if [it] is present to an exceptional degree.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0(a)(4). See also United States v. Leung, 360 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0) (“a circumstance that is not normally relevant in determining whether a sentence should
be outside the applicable guideline range may be relevant . . . if [it] is present to an unusual degree
and distinguishes the case from the ‘heartland’ of cases covered by the guidelines.”) (internal
quotations omitted). The Commentary to § 5H1.6 provides additional guidance on the narrow
25
parameters of this type of departure, advising that such a departure requires, inter alia, that “the
loss of caretaking or support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs
reasonably are available, making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to
the defendant’s family.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, Commentary 1(B)(iii).
The Second Circuit’s recent jurisprudence on this issue demonstrates that the defendant’s
family circumstances, while unfortunate, are within the heartland of cases, and do not, under the
circumstances of this case, support a departure from the guideline range. The adverse effect on a
defendant’s family from a defendant’s imprisonment does not ordinarily warrant a downward
departure, because “[d]isruption of the defendant’s life, and the concomitant difficulties for those
who depend on the defendant, are inherent in the punishment of incarceration.” United States v.
Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d
124, 128 (2d Cir. 1992)). “The presence of hardship resulting from imprisonment is therefore
ordinarily not enough to warrant a departure. It is only extraordinary circumstances . . . not
capable of adequate consideration . . . [that] may constitute proper grounds for departure. Only if
the district court finds the hardship to be exceptional may it downwardly depart on that basis.”
United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). See also
United States v. Smith, 331 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that “the Guidelines disfavor
departure based on family responsibilities [and] such a departure is not permitted except in
extraordinary circumstances”); United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating
that a downward departure for family circumstances “must be reserved for situations that are truly
extraordinary”); United States v. Trupin, 475 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that “the record
does not demonstrate that [defendant’s] presence was essential to his wife’s well-being; and that
26
“the separation of [defendant] from his wife caused by incarceration is not sufficiently unique to
[defendant], but rather is true of every married defendant who runs afoul of the law and is then
separated from his family. While tragic, it is a tragedy of defendant’s making.”).
The Second Circuit has found that the “absence or presence of adults who can step in
during the defendant’s incarceration to assist with caring and providing for the defendant's
dependents . . . is a central part of the extraordinary family circumstances inquiry.” United States
v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2004). A departure for family circumstances is not available
“where other relatives could meet the family’s needs . . . or the defendant’s absence did not cause
a particularly severe hardship.” United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-30 (2d Cir. 1992)
(granting departure where defendant was the sole caretaker of four young children, including an
infant).
Departures have also been granted where the defendant is the sole financial supporter of
the family. For example, in Galante, the defendant was granted a departure because he held the
primary role in the upbringing of his two young children, given his wife’s limited language skills
and her lack of ability to earn sufficient money to support the family. 111 F.3d at 1035. The
defendant had commitments to both the mother, who had little income, and his father, who was
critically ill and might have required his assistance in the future.4 Id. See also United States v.
4
According to Judge Kearse in dissent, the facts of Galante barely sufficed under an
abuse-of-discretion review. See Galante, 111 F. 3d at 1037-39 (Kearse, J., dissenting). In
denying the government’s petition for en banc review, the full Court made clear that the panel’s
majority decision was “limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart
downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances.” United States v. Galante,
128 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1997)(en banc)(per curiam). See also United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761,
762 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing en banc court’s limitation of Galante to its unique facts).
27
Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (granting a departure where the defendant worked two
jobs to support wife and two children, grandmother, and disabled grandfather who depended on
defendant’s physical strength “to help him get in and out of his wheelchair”).
This case does not fall within that narrow spectrum of cases in which defendants have
qualified for a departure based on extraordinary family circumstances. Mr. Stinson has made no
showing that his presence is essential to his family. He unfortunately suffers the same fate as
other defendants who are incarcerated after committing crimes – separation from his loved ones
and the typical collateral consequences and effects that separation has on a family. Moreover, the
children have been residing, and will continue to reside, with their mother, Nicole Barnes, who
appears to have been, and continues to be, gainfully employed. There is also no record of Mr.
Stinson being gainfully employed other than the sporadic and short-lived employment noted in the
PSR.
While the lowered grades and emotional stress on the children in response to the
defendant’s incarceration are sad, they are, unfortunately, typical among young children who have
been separated from one of their primary caregivers as a result of incarceration. This is a tragedy
for both the defendant and his children, but it is a tragedy that often results from a parent’s
conscious choice to engage in criminal conduct. Indeed, this negative disruption in the
relationship between convicted parent and child is “inherent in the punishment of incarceration.”
Johnson, 964 F.2d at 128. Here, it is fortunate that the children’s mother is able and willing to
provide a necessary continuum of emotional and familial support for the defendant’s three
children. See United States v. Madrigal, 331 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 2003) (even though
defendant’s three youngest children faced “very serious problems,” including a learning disability
28
and major depressive disorder, departure was not warranted because the defendant-mother was not
the only individual available to tend to these unique problems);5 Smith, 331 F.3d at 293 (even
though defendant had a “close relationship” with 2-year old son, a departure was improper where
defendant was not “sole caregiver” and extended family was available to assist remaining parent).6
Finally, in accordance with the Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, the Court must
consider, inter alia, “the seriousness of the offense” and the danger to the member of the
defendant’s family due to the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, Commentary 1(A)(I) and (ii).
In this case, the defendant’s instant criminal conduct occurred during the time period he was
caring for the children. Eugene Stinson met with Ameed Stevenson outside his apartment where
he lived with and cared for his children. At that time, he had in his possession seven of the assault
5
In Madrigal,, the Court reversed a family circumstances departure that was premised on
a female defendant’s relationship with her six children. Focusing again on the availability of
alternative caregivers, the Court observed the absence of evidence that the defendant was “the
only person capable of providing adequate care for the youngest children” and that “[t]here was
also evidence that the family as a whole remained cohesive, that [the defendant’s] three older
children were doing well and were available to care for their younger siblings, and that [the
defendant’s] extended family was also available for caregiving.” Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that “[u]nfortunate as the circumstances described by
the court are, they are not ‘extraordinary,’” and that "[t]hey are the common collateral damage of
imprisonment and are far enough removed from those circumstances that existing case law has
found exceptional that we must conclude that the district court acted outside of permissible limits
in granting the downward departure for family circumstances.” Id.
6
In Smith, the Court reversed a family circumstances departure for a defendant who “had
a close relationship with his two-year-old son and played a major role in caring for him,
including dropping him off at day care, feeding him dinner, bathing him, and putting him to bed,”
and where the defendant’s incarceration would result in his wife having to discontinue her
college studies. Id. at 293. The Court observed that the defendant was “not the sole caregiver or
financial supporter of his [2-year-old] son” and that the concerns for the son “may be alleviated
by the availability of Smith's mother and half-sister for child care.” Id. at 294. To the extent that
the defendant’s college studies would be disrupted, the Court noted that “[i]t is not unusual,
however, for a convicted defendant's incarceration to cause some hardship in the family.” Id.
29
rifles from APM and handed over two of them to Ameed Stevenson right outside his apartment.
Later, while caring for the children at his apartment at PT, he engaged in the conversation with
Ameed Stevenson regarding the layout of APM and how many firearms would be available to
steal. Also during the time that he cared for his children in his apartment at PT, he engaged in the
sale of heroin and crack at PT. In addition, Mr. Stinson has served a significant amount of time in
jail for drug and firearms violations. He willingly engaged in the instant criminal conduct with full
awareness of the risk that detection by law enforcement would result in his incarceration. As he
stated to Ameed Stevenson when discussing the possibility of being caught stealing guns from
APM: “That’s serious. Let’s say if a mother fucker gets caught, that’s serious. You talk about
being caught with ‘toast.’ Now that’s federal.”
Mr. Stinson’s criminal conduct, which exposed his three children to danger, coupled with
the seriousness of his offense weigh against a departure based on family circumstances created by
his own conduct.
Thus, Mr. Stinson’s criminal record and conduct in this case demonstrate that he is a
dangerous and violent criminal, with the savvy to organize others to do his bidding. Because of
his violent criminal conduct and his choice to continue to engage in violent criminal activity with
no sign that he takes accountability for his actions, despite many wake up calls and lengthy
periods of incarceration, and to provide just punishment, to promote respect for the law, to protect
society from Mr. Stinson in the future and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between
similarly-situated defendants, the government submits that a Guideline sentence of 120 months is
warranted.
30
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months is
reasonable, takes into account the particular circumstances of Mr. Stinson’s case, in light of all the
section 3553(a) factors, and is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the goals of
sentencing. The government respectfully requests that the Court exercise its discretion to
sentence Mr. Stinson to a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID B. FEIN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/
FELICE M. DUFFY
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
FEDERAL BAR NO. CT21379
157 CHURCH STREET; 23RD FLOOR
NEW HAVEN, CT 06510
203-821-3833
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that on August 10, 2010, a copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum
was filed electronically, and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice
of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court’s electronic filing
system, or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of
Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the court’s CM/ECF system.
________/s/___________________________
FELICE M. DUFFY
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
31

STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 3:09-cr-00243-JBA Document 196 Filed 08/10/10 Page 1 of 31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Case No. 3:09CR243(JBA)

GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING

American Precision Manufacturing (“APM”), a federally licensed firearms dealer. Eugene

individual, on when, where, and how to steal the guns.

applicable advisory Guideline sentence is 120 months’ imprisonment.

imprisonment– the applicable Guideline range – is reasonable.

The following is based on law enforcement officers’ reports, recorded conversations,

In late September 2009, as detailed at trial, Ameed Stevenson, an employee of APM,

weapons he had previously taken from APM to Eugene Stinson.

rifles from APM.

him when he arrived.

excerpt from the transcribed conversation.

Eugene Stinson: “Yeah.”

Eugene Stinson: “Right.”

like, has to be done before four o’clock though.”

Eugene Stinson: “Right...yeah…yeah…don’t worry…it is.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Naw.”

Eugene Stinson: “The middle one.”

that big door don’t even…don’t worry about that one.”

Eugene Stinson: “OK.”

see a yellow bin.”

Eugene Stinson: “OK.”

and you will be able to come right in.”

Eugene Stinson: “OK.”

Ameed Stevenson: “I’m gonna leave it open.”

Eugene Stinson: “Alright. Alright.”

Ameed Stevenson: “OK.”

Eugene Stinson: “Yup.”

Eugene Stinson: “The door ain’t open.”

There is a yellow cage with gas cans in there.”

the one to the right.”

Ameed Stevenson: “No.”

Eugene Stinson: “The first door?”

Eugene Stinson: “Uh huh.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah.”

Eugene Stinson: “And where is that?”

Eugene Stinson: “Alright, but…”

Ameed Stevenson: “It’s already, It’s already open…huh?”

that little one to the right. Not that one?”

Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Right. You want me to open the big door?”

Ameed Stevenson: “It’s like, It’s like three or four.”

Eugene Stinson: “Alright then to the right is another door.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Right. That’s the one.”

Ameed Stevenson: “Yeah.”

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

18, United States Code §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

sentence that will serve the statutory purposes.” PSR ¶ 71.

Conn. February 18, 2008).

imprisonment– the applicable Guideline range – is reasonable.

II. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

in the Sentencing Guidelines and authorized by Congress.”).

“consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion

substantive review); Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at127 (same).

behind bars. PSR ¶ 32.

effect on his propensity to engage in criminal conduct

Ameed Stevenson, which Ameed Stevenson perceived as a threat.

A. Eugene Stinson Should Receive a Two-Level Enhancement for Role Because

responsible for its commission. Id.

defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in . . . criminal activity. . . .” U.S.S.G.