Assessing the Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh

Moderate Muslims represent the majority in Bangladesh and Bangladeshis have shown little
inclination to replace personal piety with theocratic government or religious violence. Instead, citizens
have shown a fierce dedication to their democratic government despite several attempts to install an
autocratic one.

Yet, ongoing news reports of the capture of active militants—with arms caches hidden in schools and
connections to regional and international criminal and terrorist organizations—suggest that the threat
is clear, present and cannot be neglected.

The emergence of groups like Harakatul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh, Jamatul Mujahedeen
Bangladesh, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh and Ahl-e-Hadith Andolon Bangladesh—which
occurred after the return of Bangladeshi mujahedeen from the Afghan wars—infused political violence
in Bangladesh with the language of jihad and tactics borrowed from terrorist groups abroad.

Acts like the August 2005 serial bombings, consisting of nearly 400 simultaneous bombs in all but one
district in Bangladesh, and attacks on prominent persons in 2004-2005 brought terrorism in
Bangladesh onto international radar screens. Though attacks to date have focused on transforming
domestic politics, reports abound of connections between Bangladeshi militants and foreign terrorist
groups and criminal syndicates, such as Harakatul Jihad al-Islami in Pakistan, or gang lord Dawood
Ibrahim’s infamous “D-Company,” believed responsible for the 1993 bombings in Mumbai.

Bangladesh is no stranger to political and ideological violence—which argues against an exclusive

emphasis on Islamist groups, though these groups have gained more attention in the post-9/11 era. The
country has long faced an insurgency by the Rohingya Solidarity Organization seeking to control the
Rakhine state in Myanmar as well as a tribal autonomy movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute reported in 2008 that leftist violence in the country was on par with,
and even at time exceeded, violence by jihadist groups. As one senior South Asian diplomat observed,
more people have been killed due to political violence in Bangladesh than terrorist attacks. This
situates the threat in the midst of complex political and social challenges, the relationship among
which should be reflected in strategies to counter such violence by the government of Bangladesh and
its international partners.

The highly partisan and confrontational nature of politics in Bangladesh has created an enabling
environment for the emergence of militant groups by normalizing the use of violence to express
political disagreement and promoting a culture of impunity. The two dominant political parties—the
left-of-center Awami League and the right-of-center Bangladesh Nationalist Party—have highly
influential leaders who govern them with little tolerance for dissent. Opponents have regularly resorted
to walkouts or general strikes (hartals) which often generate violence and economic damage that
Bangladeshis can ill afford. Moreover, the civic administration is highly politicized, and public service
has become a means of acquiring access to the national purse strings, often to compensate for
expensive campaigns that involve the use of armed gangs, or mastaans, to intimidate rivals.

A related concern is violent religious radicalization, and the replacement of the traditionally tolerant,
liberal and private practice of Islam in Bangladesh into one shaped by stricter Wahhabi influences
imported from the Middle East. Changes in language and dress, such as replacing the Persian “Khuda
Hafiz” prevalent in Bangladesh to the Arabized “Allah Hafiz” for "goodbye"; the donning of the white
robe or thoub for men and the burqa or hijab for women, in place of traditionally colorful lungis or
saris; and an intolerance for traditional Bengali arts and culture are publicly visible changes
underscoring these fears. Additionally, periodic violence against the Ahmadiyya and Hindu
communities stokes fears that Bangladesh may become less hospitable to minorities.
This increasingly religious tenor of public and political discourse has been widely ascribed to the rise
of Jamaat, the most influential Islamist party in Bangladesh. However, they have been unable in more
than three decades of activity to develop a substantial mainstream constituency, in large part due to
allegations of war crimes during the independence struggle in 1971.

Nonetheless, in developing a reputation for integrity in office and a network of social services for the
rural poor, Jamaat, or more militant groups outside the political system, can pose a significant
challenge to secular governments branded as corrupt, self-serving and unable to provide for citizens’
basic needs in Bangladesh.

The story in Bangladesh is also shaped by a number of positive trends which contribute to the
resilience of both state and society in the face of threats like terrorism and violent religious
radicalization. A strong sense of nationalism, based on a carefully balanced mix of Bengali culture and
Islam, prevents the populace at large from favoring policies that unduly tip the scales towards one or
the other. Undoubtedly, Islam plays a major role in the private lives of many Bangladeshis; however,
as a recent Gallup poll demonstrated, a large majority of Bangladeshis say that a democratically
elected government is very important to them (61 percent) or "essential and something they cannot
live without" (32 percent).

A vibrant civil-society sector, including innovative non-governmental organizations, has led to

initiatives promoting micro-credit, women’s empowerment through education, healthcare and
entrepreneurial opportunities, helping the government expand the delivery of essential social services.
Human rights advocates and the media also serve as watchdogs against government excess. Innovative
political mechanisms, such as the interim caretaker system, have to date allowed for smoother
transfers of power.

Each of these provides Bangladesh with some tools to boost its resilience in the face of militants’
rhetoric about the failures of the state and its illegitimacy compared to a theocratic state or caliphate,
and to address grievances arising from poor service delivery, which might make militant groups more
attractive recruiters.

Though Bangladesh is increasingly less dependent on foreign aid, international actors have long been
key stakeholders in the country. Additionally, the regional nature of the threat—and it would be naïve
to think that Islamists in Bangladesh aren’t watching events in Pakistan and India, and vice versa—
underscores the importance of international and multilateral cooperation in South Asia. The scope and
impact of international engagement is also constrained by difficult political relationships in the region,
as well as a lack of sustained attention in international fora and existing political will among national
elites.

The counterterrorism discourse and policies developed by international partners often focus on “hard
security” aspects. However, as the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, passed by the General
Assembly in 2006, points out, a number of development-related issues contribute to “conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism.” Support for improved governance and the rule of law or justice-
sector reform, such as looking at prison conditions and interrogation techniques, is usually classed as
development assistance, even though these are vital foundations for building state capacity to address
security threats like terrorism.

Initiatives by international stakeholders to address the challenges of terrorism and violent

radicalization will be most effective when they are aligned with national objectives. This may
sometimes require withdrawing support for programs which may be admirable in theory but
ineffective in principle. For example, decades-long efforts to promote internal party democracy in
Bangladesh have proved largely fruitless. Instead, funds should be directed where they have the most
chance of making effective change: in line with the priorities expressed by Bangladeshis and their
government.
That seems to be the biggest roadblock facing India-Bangladesh ties today.

"We both have issues with each other, as all neighbours must," says a senior Indian diplomat who has
dealt with Bangladesh closely. "But instead of addressing those issues like civilised nations, Dhaka
insists on denying all Indian concerns, even when it is backed by irrefutable and solid evidence."

"This," says the diplomat, "makes it almost impossible to engage in normal, civil diplomatic relations
with our eastern neighbour."

Apart from the longstanding worry of over massive illegal migration from Bangladesh, the main
Indian concerns include:

 Rebels from northeast Indian states who operate with impunity from Bangladeshi territory
 The growing influence and activities of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Al Qaeda in
Dhaka.
 Rapidly rising fundamentalism and anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh
 Increasing cross-border traffic in drugs, arms, women, children, and cattle
 The mushrooming madrassas springing up along the border, many funded by Pakistani and
Saudi Arabian 'charities'
 Repeated skirmishes between India's Border Security Force and the Bangladesh Rifles over
disputed territory and the latter's attempts to stop the fencing work being undertaken by India
 Dhaka's perpetual refusal to grant transit rights and permission to Indian companies like Tata
to set up shop there.

Let’s consider micro-actors in anti-terrorism exercise

M. Aynul Islam

Parliamentary Election Bangladeshi voters completely rejected negativity and cynicism in political
campaign in which some parties repeatedly invoked Islam, and they voted decisively against such
political use of Islam. The overall result demonstrates the peoples' ultimate verdict against all forms of
religious militancy. Bangladesh's 153 million people showed very little appetite for political Islam.
Thus the new government is in the heart of the people, hoping to save the country from the rise of
Islamist extremism. Obviously it is not the time to debate whether to give combating terrorism the top
priority for the new regime, rather it needs to be put on the 'emergency' list for inclusive development.
No doubt terrorism has been a worrying factor for Bangladesh - a lethal offshoot of political use of
religion, defective education system and the socio-economic backwardness of the country. It generates
national security threats, creating tailback for inclusive development of the country.

It is important to take into consideration the terrorist groups and individuals who always take
advantage of the weaknesses of a state or a government. The government is responsible to take the
most appropriate steps to protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism. Again, the government is
well placed to assess the threat for the country. The government is in a position to develop a
comprehensive counter terrorism strategy with the help of other state and non-state actors.

To face it, it is essential for the government to map out the terrorism threat level in a country.
Bangladesh has been implementing several plans and strategies to counter idiosyncratic nature of
terrorist threat. Mostly the government initiatives can be categorized into two types:

(i) Operational drives by the law and security forces, and

(ii) Legal initiatives.

The law and security forces achieved some operational success in disrupting command and control
structure of several extremist groups. A large number of extremist leaders and activists have been
captured, put on trial and executed. A great deal of arms, explosives and grenades have been
recovered. But the success in other operational spheres like disrupting financial and support bases,
profiling terrorist individuals, groups, and organizations, and mapping out vulnerabilities and
opportunities of threat, etc. is limited. In most of the cases, the Four-Party Alliance Government has
taken coercive, quiet, amnesty and negotiating approaches to minimise the terrorist threat. The
immediate past non-party Interim Government enacted the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance 2008 and the
Anti-Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance 2008. Despite the shortcomings and confusion over
these two Ordinances, Bangladesh has got a legal leverage to prevent terror activities in the country.

There are several deficiencies at different levels of anti-terrorism exercises in Bangladesh that the new
government should take into notice. First, the profiling of threat groups and the early detection
indicators are not sufficient to face new actors and techniques of terrorism. There is a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the ideologies, organizations and operations of the threat groups.
Second, the law enforcement agencies do not have close link with the other service sectors to identify
suspicious activities to prevent terrorist activities. Third, the government is not strategically,
operationally, and tactically fully capable of handling the terrorist elements. The Bangladesh
government is not sufficiently addressing strategic issues like dismantling motivation, ideologies and
support base of the threat groups.

Operationally, law enforcement agencies are not adequately developed in dealing with the technology
of terrorism. At a tactical level, there is very limited scope for the members of law enforcement,
security and intelligence services to be trained or retrained to understand and respond to the threat of
terrorism. A number of inadequacies have been identified in the armed forces, such as short supply of
trained manpower in counter terrorism, lack of intelligence gadgets and equipment, inexperience in
anti-money laundering, information insecurity, etc. Fourth, there is a lack of general consensus for all-
out drive against terrorism and extremism in Bangladesh.

Fifth, there is a very limited initiative to educate formally and informally professional groups like
academics, media community, service sector officials, and political leaders to be aware of and
sensitised about the terrorist activities. Sixth, the overall strategic responses are still inadequate. The
counter ideology or motivations and de-radicalisation measures are almost absent in the architecture of
most of the institutions. In fact, there is hardly any institution in Bangladesh to address different kinds
of motivation factors like ideological and experimental motivation, destructive and profit driven
motivation, motivation to gain acknowledgement, etc. Furthermore, there are poor commitments in
political society, lack of coordination among the anti-terrorist alliances, insufficient role of academics
and media to address the challenges of extremism and terrorism. Seventh, there is a tendency to
overemphasise military and coercive approaches in dealing with terrorism issues.

There is no dedicated research institution in the government to provide forum for understanding and
research on critical issues of terrorism in Bangladesh. Although the counter terrorism bureau of DGFI
is responsible for policy related activities, it is barely possible to workout a viable strategy by a body
of armed forces alone. Finally, it may be mentioned that, in Bangladesh, strategies and policies are
preoccupied with processes highly centralized, overly bureaucratic, too ambiguous, unaccountable and
unresponsive. Most of the initiatives are overly focusing on macro issues, not on micro issues and
actors like ideology, motivation, and propaganda activities, empowerment of the individual, etc. to
promote counter terrorism discourse.
The anti-terrorist security spending has been rising every year. Today, analysing the costs and
benefits, it has been claimed that the benefits are still lower than the costs. If someone dismantles
operational tactics, the other moves with even deadlier tactics - the ideological grouping. As evident in
Bangladesh, a few terrorist groups have been attempting to regroup, and networking in different
names and structure. Some of the new Islamist groups have emerged in Bangladesh preaching
ideologies by training, distributing books and pamphlets among the common people and educational
institutions in rural areas. Some groups often attempt to disseminate ideologies and operational
techniques and the most frightening part is choosing female trainees to motivate the local people,
especially the local women. Thus, the indicators suggest that terrorist threats to Bangladesh remain
foremost among its national security challenges. As such, the new government would need to maintain
maximum monitoring, and operational and strategic efforts to counter the constant evolution and
adaptive capability of terrorist groups in Bangladesh. To support these efforts, one has to understand
the threat level, group's intention and capabilities, and risk factors.

In most cases the current anti-terrorism discourse demonstrate the use of 'hard power' without
sufficiently addressing the root causes and new trends of terrorism. The 'soft power' mechanisms are
not being sufficiently addressed in Bangladesh. Thus the new counter terrorism discourse should look
for new techniques and understanding in order to reduce the impact of terrorism on society. Three
important new trends should be taken care of in future anti-terrorism policy formulation in
Bangladesh. First, the emergence of micro-actors in capability of terrorist groups, i.e. reduction in the
operational capability of the terrorist groups, but increase in their ideological, motivational and
propaganda ability. The second is the promotion of operational sophistication of terrorist activities
with the option of using modern technology and information flow, finance and ideas in planning,
communications, and targeting. And the last is the increasing trend of overlapping terrorist activities
with crime, using the same supply, transport, and money moving networks.

During the last two years in the absence of political activities in the country it may happen that the
threat groups have become more capable in launching any future deadly attack. Also, the new
government must look into whether the corrupt money is spent for financing terrorist activities against
the state and its citizens.

The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Jagannath University. He would
appreciate feedback at aynulbd03@yahoo.com