bidding with other potential market participants andseeking to purchase from someone willing and ableto sell, but rather relied on its governmental powerof eminent domain.[See
Commerce § 3--State Regulation and Taxationof Interstate Commerce-- Eminent Domain.A state may exercise eminent domain power eventhough by so doing it indirectly or incidentally bur-dens interstate commerce.
Commerce § 3--State Regulation and Taxationof Interstate Commerce-- City's Acquisition of Na-tional Football Franchise by Eminent Domain.Because professional football is such a nationwidebusiness and so completely involved in interstatecommerce, the acquisition of a National FootballLeague franchise by a city through eminent domainwas invalid under the commerce clause(U.S.Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The city's proposed actionwould more than indirectly or incidentally regulateinterstate commerce, since the city claimed author-ity, pursuant to eminent domain, to bar indefinitelythe relocation of the franchise out of the city. Thatis the precise brand of parochial meddling with thenational economy that the commerce clause was de-signed to prohibit. The relocation of the franchiseimplicates the welfare not only of the individualteam franchise, but of the entire league. Thus, theburden that would be imposed on interstate com-merce outweighed the local interest in exercisingstatutory eminent domain authority over the fran-chise.COUNSELDavid A. Self, Self, Dang & Kelson, Horan, Lloyd& Karachale, Laurence P. Horan, Michael W.Stamp and Richard E. Winnie, City Attorney, forPlaintiff and Appellant.Moses Lasky, John E. Munter, Lasky, Haas, Cohler& Munter, William Mathews Brooks, Brooks &Hughes, Barrie Engel, Hardin, Cook, Loper, Engel& Bergez, Gary R. Netzer, Ira Reiner and James K.Hahn, City Attorneys, Edward C. Dygert, DeputyCity Attorney, De Witt W. Clinton, County Coun-sel, and Dennis M. Devitt, Deputy County Counsel,for Defendants and Respondents.SABRAW, J.Plaintiff City of Oakland appeals from a judgmentafter a court trial in favor of defendants OaklandRaiders et al. We have determined that plaintiff'sproposed exercise of eminent domain power would,in this case, violate the commerce clause of theUnited States Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm.I. Facts and ProcedurePlaintiff sued in 1980 to acquire by eminent domainthe property of defendants Oakland Raiders(Raiders), a National Football League (NFL orLeague) franchise. The Alameda County SuperiorCourt issued a preliminary injunction prohibitingtransfer of the franchise from Oakland, the case wastransferred to Monterey County(Code Civ. Proc., §394), and summary judgment was entered for de-fendants. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed,holding our eminent domain statute allowed con-demnation of intangible
property and thatplaintiff had a right to show whether its attemptedexercise of eminent domain over the Raiders fran-chise would be a valid public use. (
].) We subsequently granted a peremptorywrit of mandate directing the trial court to hold ahearing on plaintiff's application for reinstatementof the preliminary injunction against transfer of thefranchise from Oakland. (
].) In the meantime,however, Raiders home games were played in LosAngeles. In early 1983 the trial court reinstated andmodified the injunction against transfer, providingthat all 1983 Raiders home games for the 1983 sea-son would be played in Oakland “unless and untilPage 2174 Cal.App.3d 414, 220 Cal.Rptr. 153
(Cite as: 174 Cal.App.3d 414)
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.