There is plenty of speculation in India and elsewhere about the future of Afghanistan

when and if the ISAF leaves. While some quarters are rooting for an Indian Armed
presence in Afghanistan, others are asking for Indian Military Training Teams to
participate in sidelining the Taliban in any future political arrangement by finding favours
with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.. Voices in Indian Media
and strategic circles are also voicing concerns regarding failure of the Obama
administration in dismantling the Pakistani Military Jihadi nexus before the pull out. This
has ominous portends for India, especially in Pakistan’s game plan in Kashmir and
elsewhere in the country. That Indian investment in Afghanistan is in shovels and not
guns is bothering the thinkers.
We sincerely hope the dynamics of the Afghanistani imbroglio were so straight forward.
There are clear and unambiguous interests of Pakistan ably supported by US and backed
by China to keep India out of the region, lest it imbalances the geostrategic situation in
South Asia.
A Carnegie report of last year had thrown light on an interesting triangle with China at
the centre of all Pakistani endeavors in Afghanistan. Despite China’s weariness with
USA on a host of economic and political issues, it is standing solidly behind Pakistan in
finding a solution to the Afghan imbroglio to serve its own interests in the region.
Beijing’s approach to the AfPak issue derives to a great extent from its strategic
interests regarding South Asia, and the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in particular. Over
many decades, China has developed a very close political, military, and economic
relationship with the Pakistani leadership (described by some Chinese and
Western analysts as an “all weather” and “adversity-tested” friendship), largely in
order to support Islamabad’s role as a strategic counterweight to New Delhi.
Specifically, a stable, independent, friendly, and regionally influential Pakistan
prevents Indian domination of South Asia, weakens Indian influence in Central
Asia, and obstructs any Indian desire to focus primarily on strategic rivalry with
China. Moreover, from the Chinese (and Pakistani) perspective, a stable and
friendly Afghanistan provides Pakistan with a degree of “strategic depth” against
India’s nuclear capabilities and conventional military superiority .
The greatest consequence for China in the event of a U.S. failure is the radicalization of
the region to the point that extremism becomes contagious among ethnic minorities in
China. Thus, some Chinese observers argue that Obama’s troop surge in Afghanistan
might actually benefit Chinese efforts to suppress terrorist and separatist activity within
Xinjiang, as well as drug smuggling into China.
It is in the light of these developments in the neighborhood that Indian response merits a
balancing act in which it achieves its policy objective of a friendly Afghan Government
at the end of ISAF pullout. The Indian commitment to the security apparatus is restricted
to ITBP protecting its missions and some of the development sites in Afghanistan.
Economically India is one of the largest doners to Afghanistan. Despite its geopolitical
interests, the Af Pak policy and the Chinese interests are not in favour of growing Indian
influence in Afghanistan for the reasons mentioned above. According to General
McChrystal a strong Indo Afghan relationship will exacerbate regional tensions,
encourage Pakistani “countermeasures” against India and not be conducive to peace in
the region. It can be surmised that McChrystal’s statement comes from a partisan
paradigm of Pakistani support to the ISAF in bringing Taliban to the negotiating table.
All this for an early face saving withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan.
A pro Taliban or Taliban Government in Afghanistan is what Pakistan and US may be
forced to accept for an early solution. Pakistan, as brought out on the earlier post “ Is
Taliban on the Run?”, is providing active support to the Afghan Taliban purely from this
standpoint that it sees Taliban as the strategic hedge against India. If results of the
London conference are anything to go by, Pakistan will use US and China both to root for
its interests in Afghanistan against India and succeed, for obvious reasons.
What then should be the Indian response when major players in the game don’t want to
play ball with it?
The Indian policy with respect to Afghanistan is largely dependent upon a favourable non
Taliban regime as the best option. India aided the overthrow of the Taliban and became
the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid. However, from
supporting the Russian backed government in the First Afghan War to anti Taliban policy
till date, India now stands cornered if both the US and Pakistan broker a pro Taliban
government when the ISAF leaves. We may see a blocking of all Indian efforts in
Afghanistan strongly enabled by collusive support between Pakistan and China.
Dynamics in Afghanistan can no longer be seen only from the Indian Prism. Entire South
Asia including Iran, the Central Asian Republics including China have their vested
interests in the outcome of the failure or otherwise of the Af Pak policy of US. If Taliban
are a part of the solution to ISAF withdrawal, we can be sure of increased Pakistan-
China involvement in the events of tomorrow. Should this calculus for which Pakistan is
hedging strongly with Chinese backing and to which US appears to be lending its
support, to ensure a face saving pullout, then India, Russia and Iran can forget about a
short term participation in the future of Afghanistan. The attendant resurgence of Islamic
militancy in the Central Asian Republics would be another fallout the world would have
to contend with.
No one, whether it is US, China or Pakistan, is going to let Indian military or greater
reconstruction presence in Afghanistan by the end of next year..when regretfully the
Good Taliban, remote controlled by ISI, are going to be part of a solution or the problem
to Afghanistan’s future.
Then even shovels won’t be allowed.
Deepening political crisis Ghulam Asghar Khan When the top political leaders are not on
the same wavelength vis-à-vis important national issues, it doesn’t reflect well on the
government, the opposition and the future of the country itself. The major stakeholders in
the struggle for domination are President Zardari and the PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharif.
Removal of the military dictator from the political arena has, as expected, unleashed a
new power struggle within country’s fractious coalition. Asif Zardari, for being the
widower of former PPP chief Benazir Bhutto and co-chairperson of the party, staked the
claim to the presidency to which he was unanimously elected by the parliament. The
Bhurban Agreement he signed with Nawaz Sharif had the major clause that the sacked
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry with all the other judges would immediately be restored
was not honoured and the matter was practically shelved by the president on flimsy
grounds to the disappointment of the people of Pakistan, who saw a hope of justice in the
person of CJ Iftikhar. Francis Bacon says, “Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad
supper.” Hope is necessary in every condition. The miseries of poverty, sickness and of
captivity would be unsupportable without this comfort.” And even that comfort was
denied to the downtrodden masses by none other than the widower of a great scion of
Bhutto family who had declared that she would herself unfurl the National Flag at CJ
Iftikhar Chaudhery's house. The Zardari-Sharif power-tussle had already broken up the
coalition cobbled together after the Feb. 18, 2008, polls and with every passing day gulf
between the two major political parties is widening. While the PML-N had withdrawn its
ministers from the federal cabinet, it is holding the fort in the Punjab with a delicate
majority that is being threatened by the Punjab Governor, who has apparently been
assigned the mission to scuttle Shahbaz Sharif’s coalition government in the Punjab. The
question arises; will there be fight to the finish between Zardari and Sharif that will
further drag Pakistan deeper into the mire? The incumbent governor Punjab is
hobnobbing with Musharraf’s scampered PML-Q to join hands with lucrative offers such
as the CM’s slot in the Punjab. Whether he succeeds or not, it has certainly paralysed the
bureaucracy in the province much to the discomfort of the common man. Thanks to
Punjab governor’s over-indulgence in the provincial politics that has brought PML-
N/PPP coalition to the breaking point. At what a cost, the two leaders are manoeuvring
themselves into the best possible position after banishing Musharraf? They have launched
a far more vicious campaign of eliminating each other. This is a power-play in which
both could lose and a new a mercenary would walk in. And, that has all along been our
political history that we win liberty after prolonged struggles against the dictators, and
once we get it, we surrender it because of the in-fights of our short-sighted leaders. It
reminds me the fable of two cats fighting over a loaf of bread, when a monkey pops in
with a balance to do justice to them. And in this balancing justice, monkey ate up all the
bread and cats were left high and dry. The present system of governance, which is self-
indulgent and egotistic does not have the stomach to clean the mess left by the former
military dictator who is ruling the roost in Washington as Pakistan’s self-styled
ambassador at large and a messiah with bagful of failures and lies. What he is lecturing
about in the US? That he was the frontline runner who dragged Bush in the Afghan
quagmire by the biggest lie of the new millennium that the US mission in Afghanistan
would be over in just about one month. And this was the lie he often repeated with the
people of Pakistan, who are still waiting as to when that ‘one month’ would end. After
despoiling all the state institutions, Musharraf keeps grasping on all he can get, taking no
responsibility for the mayhem he has left the country in. Whole the country is on fire for
which this self-styled hero is holding the new fragile government in Islamabad
responsible. Who was the one that lit the match? It was not Zardari, but Musharraf
himself who mortgaged the sovereignty of Pakistan for a fistful of dollars. Musharraf still
is under the stupor that he is the ‘Don Quixote’ or Wizard of OZ, who can work miracles.
After parroting without thought and understanding in America, he now plans to go on a
parroting spree to India to once again despoil the credibility of the present democratic
government in Islamabad. President Zardari must stop this man immediately from
gibbering over sensitive national issues in alien lands. Rescue the state and not the one
who brought the country to the brink during eight years of his despotic rule. The worst
thing he did was to create a political vacuum in which the growth of popular leadership
was stunted and replaced by a conscienceless breed of hangers-on whose very existence
was subject to Musharraf’s absolute hold on power. This absolute hold on power blinded
him absolutely and he destroyed the entire vital state institutions one after the other. Can
one imagine that his hand-picked politicians in his king’s party passed resolutions that
Musharraf must stay in military uniform and rule the country till eternity? As the fate
would have it, this frontline runner is now running in the streets of Washington to woo
the new administration, and plans to repeat the exercise on Indian roads. He should
realise, a military dictator that has been rejected by his people cannot stage a comeback.
Even, Zardari’s vote bank had a big breach after he had given Musharraf a ceremonial
send-off from the presidency. The bitter truth is, because of this uncalled for
confrontation between Sharif and Zardari, cleverly manoeuvred by buffoons around the
presidency, has loosened the state grip on law and order and Pakistan has unfortunately
been marked as an insecure zone. The security situation has so much worsened that even
President’s father is being shifted from a Karachi hospital to Islamabad. How many more
could be shifted to Islamabad that itself is not a very safe haven after the Marriott
inferno? With darned complacency you protect no citizen, but you abet those who are out
to destroy the country from within and without. McClatchy has just revealed a nearly
completed US military study that says nuclear-armed Pakistan, not Iraq, Afghanistan or
Iran, is the most urgent foreign policy challenge facing President Obama. The report
depicts Pakistan as a country convulsed by a growing al-Qaeda-backed insurgency,
hamstrung by a ruinous economy and “run by an unpopular government” that’s paralysed
by infighting and indecision, is critical of US efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, frustrates
the spread of nuclear weapons and prevents tensions with India from escalating into a
nuclear showdown. The present ruling coalition is, however, split between those who
favour a military approach and others, including some Taliban sympathisers advocate
dialogue. As a consequence, civilian rulers have allegedly given no clear direction to the
army, while the politicians complain that they are shut out of key decisions by the
military. The report quotes that some in the army privately complain that civilian leaders
have no political or even police counter-terror strategy. The report quotes a retired
general, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, saying
“The civilian government just doesn’t have capacity enough, especially on security
matters, and when there is a vacuum like that, it has to be filled. And who else is there
other than the army?” President Zardari must realise what is at stake. The McClatchy
report revolves around one major point: “failure of his government is being attributed to
the failure of coalition between the PPP and PML-N.” With the looming mid-March
storm over the judicial stalemate, it would be difficult for him to wriggle out of it single-
handedly or with the help of buffoons. Ibne Khaldun “calls such buffoons as worthless
persons who cannot improve.” Unfortunately, there is an army of such hangers-on around
Zardari. In the name of God rejuvenate the PPP/PML-N coalition to save the country.
The Solution To The Afghanistan Imbroglio
By Ramtanu Maitra
14 October, 2009
Countercurrents.org
Oct. 9—President Obama held yet another long session on Oct. 7 with administration
officials, debating the options for Afghanistan in the coming days. The stated objective is
to stabilize Afghanistan, and to enhance the security of the United States and its allies.
However, the options discussed, as reported by the news media, amount to an absurd
hoax.
As of now, the administration is allegedly divided into two groups, each backed by its
sycophants, who masquerade as “experts”; each tries to influence the President to adopt
either a strategy based on counterinsurgency, or counterterrorism. In case of
counterinsurgency, the U.S. must infuse as many as 40,000 troops, in addition to the
68,000 U.S., and 35,000 NATO troops already stationed there. In this scenario, bringing
the strength of the foreign troops up to 143,000 is necessary, not only to fight and defeat
the surging “Taliban,” but also to protect the Afghan people, in large population centers,
and to train more Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel and Afghan Police. What
comes with that formulation is the Vietnam-era’s failed strategy of “winning the hearts
and minds” of the people. This phrase was borrowed by the Americans in the 1960s, from
the British colonialists, who applied this cruel hoax in their former colony, Malaysia, in
the 1950s.
The opponents of this argument claim that the stabilization of Afghanistan will ensue
only if the “bad guys”—in this context, what is loosely identified as al-Qaeda militants—
are knocked off, using drones, missiles, and other electronically targeted weapons. The
counterterrorism advocates claim that once Afghanistan and Pakistan are free of the
militants, Afghanistan will be stable, and the U.S. and its allies will be safe. The saving
grace of those who hold this view, is that the killing of Afghan citizens under the pretext
of annihilating the “Taliban” is not on their agenda. They do admit that some “collateral
damage” (read: killing of innocent civilians) would surely occur.
What is evident is that proponents of both these strategies do not discuss withdrawal from
Afghanistan as a necessity. They do not dwell on how long the process will take to
stabilize the country, and make assertions, after eight years of squandering money and
people’s lives, that the conditions that are necessary to make their schemes work exist.
The Hoax
The debate, as posed so far, has blinded most Americans, if not the President himself, to
the reality: Putting a large number of troops in Afghanistan at this juncture will mean
more deaths and more expense, yielding nothing. Almost 60% of the territory of
Afghanistan is controlled by the insurgents, who are hell-bent to drive out the foreign
occupiers. The proponents of counterinsurgency have failed to recognize the fact that the
enemies of the foreign troops are not the “Taliban” alone, but insurgents of all ethnic
groups.
This was pointed out by Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, a conduit between Taliban supremo
Mullah Omar and the Afghan government, when he recently told an Associated Press
correspondent that the militant leadership refers to its forces not as Taliban now, but as
“mujahideen,” a throwback to the Afghan “holy warriors” who ousted the Soviet Union
at the end of the 1980s. The reason is that only one out of ten militant fighters is a true
“Taliban.” The rest are ordinary Afghans, Zaeef said.
Those who are aware of the ground situation know that Zaeef was not whistling in the
dark. In fact, at least one very well-known Tajik warlord, based in the western province
of Herat, has publicly taken up arms against the foreign troops. This commander had
been on the U.S. side in 2001, when U.S. Special Forces, aided by the Tajik-Uzbek-
dominated Northern Alliance, ousted the Taliban regime, within a span of six weeks,
incurring minimum losses. In addition, it has become public knowledge that in many
provinces of northern Afghanistan—Kunduz province, in particular—where the Pushtuns
are a minority, Uzbek militants have taken control, and are now gunning for German and
other NATO troops.
The second part of this hoax is the assertion that building up the Afghan National Army,
which now totals 80,000 or 90,000, according to “experts,” will help to stabilize the
country. In reality, the ANA is a “foreign army” to the Pushtun-led militant groups: The
vast majority of its personnel are recruited from the Tajik-Uzbek and other non-Pushtun
ethnic groups to fight the Pushtun-led Afghan militants. These army personnel do not
venture out in the Pushtun-dominated areas. When Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S.
and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, sent 4,000 Marines in July, to Helmand
province, a southern stronghold of the Pushtun militants, to clear out villages and destroy
opium/heroin stores, promising a quick success, he was able mobilize only 600 ANA
troops. The whole campaign has now been recognized as an abysmal failure; it has also
come to light that the non-Pushtun ANA personnel did their very best not to counter their
ethnic rivals in this Pushtun-dominated area.
The third part of this hoax is ignoring the cost of maintaining 240,000 ANA troops.
According to one estimate, maintaining an Afghan soldier costs the United States close to
$11,000 annually, and this does not include the cost of training them. Training requires
an additional $250,000 a year for each American trainer, in an insecure environment like
Afghanistan. In other words, the maintenance cost of the Afghan soldiers, if this hoax is
allowed to be perpetrated, will be much greater than the GDP of Afghanistan. According
to one ground-level operator, it could be as high as three times the GDP of Afghanistan.
The fourth part of the hoax is what is ignored in this argument. As pointed out in last
week’s EIR (“The British Plan: Send More Troops, To Partition Afghanistan”), if this
war is continued, with no plan to end it, it is almost a certainty that the Pakistani Pushtuns
will become a part of it. And the Pushtun community in Pakistan is much larger than that
in Afghanistan. This means that the draining of U.S. and Pakistani manpower and
resources, not to mention those of Afghanistan, under such circumstances, would be
much bigger than it ever was in Vietnam. What London understands, and fully welcomes,
and Washington does not, is that such an endless war has only one possible outcome: the
break-up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. It should also be noted that, in this part of the
world, and particularly after years of bloodshed, such a partition will not come through
peace negotiations. It will come out of the barrels of Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers,
grenade launchers, and other targeted weapons.
While the proponents of counterinsurgency are propagating a policy which will not only
bring back the morbid memories of the Vietnam War, and weaken the already
economically devastated United States, the proponents of counterterrorism are lying
through their teeth, as well. To get an idea of this hoax, one must take into account
certain truths. To begin with, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, al-
Qaeda was lodged only in Afghanistan. Today, the intelligence community points out that
after eight years, al-Qaeda has bases in almost 60 countries. Killing the “bad guys” in
Afghanistan-Pakistan may create a few heroes, but the fact remains, that al-Qaeda, which
had been a wing of the International Islamic Movement, and its co-operators have
expanded enormously.
Moreover, even if one accepts, in toto, that 9/11 was perpetrated entirely by the members
of al-Qaeda, there is no evidence whatsoever that 9/11 was planned inside Afghanistan
and Pakistan. All intelligence information suggests the plotters were located in Western
Europe. The second part of the hoax perpetrated by the counterterrorism protagonists is
the claim that the Pakistani Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will go all out
to eliminate al-Qaeda and the other militants. In fact, it is on the record that some
Pakistani commanders operating along the Afghan borders have already told at least one
tribal group in Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) not to attack the
Taliban and other militants. One commander explained that, if the militants are killed off,
“who is going to fight the U.S. troops and NATO?”
In other words, the Pakistani Army’s covert, or sometimes overt, protection of the “bad
guys” stems from the fact that foreign troops are operating on the other side of the border,
and have been threatening Pakistan’s sovereignty for some time. Thus, the proponents of
counterterrorism will soon find out that their drones and missiles, instead of getting the
“bad guys,” were causing more “collateral damage,” and stirring up more trouble for
Islamabad.
What To Do?
After eight years of pursuing insane policies in Afghanistan, under the Bush, and now,
the Obama Presidencies, Obama is left with only one option: to call a regional
conference, which will include the U.S.A., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran. No
organization, such as NATO, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, will attend; nor
will Saudi Arabia, Britain, or any other European nation. This will involve only the
United States, because of the circumstances that exist today, and the five regional powers.
Once that conference takes place, the U.S. can bring back its troops, and earn the respect
of larger regional powers.
The objective of the conference is the stability of Afghanistan, and what the regional
powers can do to ensure that, and to enable the United States and NATO to get out of this
quagmire. The regional powers must be told that much of the threat in that region ensues
from the violence and instability in Afghanistan.
Calling the conference, Washington must make clear that it would maintain a few of its
military bases, until such time that it is unanimously agreed upon, that Kabul, with the
help of the regional powers, has become stable. The regional powers also should be told
clearly that it was the Saudis and the British who created the Taliban, and how and why
they continue to fish in the troubled Afghan waters.
The Russians, the Central Asian nations, and perhaps the Iranians, understand, to a large
extent, the role of the Saudis and Britain in Afghanistan. Since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the emergence of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, and
Turkmenistan, bordering Afghanistan, as independent nations, the Saudis have pumped in
money to indoctrinate the citizens of these nascent states. They provided the money, and
Britain provided the manpower, in the form of a religious group, the Hizb ut-Tahrir
(HuT). The HuT is headquartered in England, but banned in many Central Asian states. If
one were to ask Tony Blair or Gordon Brown about the HuT, one would be told that the
group is “peace-loving.” Both prime ministers, despite the demands of many Britons,
have refused to ban the group’s activities in Britain.
On the other hand, ask the same question of any of the Central Asian heads of state, and
he would point out, that the most ferocious militant group in Central Asia is the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and that almost all the members of the IMU were
former HuT members. Both groups are dedicated to destroying Islamic sovereign nation-
states and establishing a caliphate. Understanding all this will be vital for the future
stability of Afghanistan and the region.
British Colonial Legacy Haunts the Region
In addition to these five nations’ requirements, what Washington would encounter in
setting up such a conference, where each nation will have to cooperate to stabilize
Afghanistan, is the continuing British colonial mindset that drives the people in power in
this region.
The India-Pakistan divide is rooted in the partition of the country by the British Raj. The
most glaring example of that divide is the Kashmir dispute, left behind, and exacerbated,
by London during the Cold War days. Neither India, nor Pakistan, could resolve this
problem—not because a resolution could not be worked out—but the imperial mindset of
divide-and-rule vibrates throughout the power corridors of both New Delhi and
Islamabad. In addition, the powers-that-be in both nations practice, within their respective
countries, the British-led policy of exclusion and division. In Pakistan, Balochistan and
the FATA were kept virtually separated from mainstream Pakistan, and out of all
developmental processes, because they were not part of the British Raj, but were, instead,
British protectorates.
In India, since independence in 1947, the Northeast has been split up into smaller and
smaller states and autonomous regions. The divisions were made to accommodate the
wishes of tribes and ethnic groups which want to assert their sub-national identity, and
obtain an area where the diktat of their little coterie is recognized. New Delhi has yet to
comprehend that its policy of accepting and institutionalizing the superficial identities of
these ethnic, linguistic, and tribal groups has ensured more irrational demands for even
smaller states. It has also virtually eliminated any plan to make these areas economically
powerful, and the people scientifically and technologically advanced.
Following annexation of Northeast India, the first strategy of the British East India
Company during the 1830s toward the area was to set it up as a separate entity. The
British plan to cordon off the Northeast tribal groups was part of their policy of setting up
a multicultural human zoo during 1850s, under the premiership of Henry Temple, the
third Viscount Palmerston. Lord Palmerston, as Temple was called, had three “friends”:
the British Foreign Office, the Home Office, and Whitehall. The Indian leadership never
realized that, to set up a true republic, these British policies would have to be abandoned,
and appropriate conditions adopted to integrate the various tribal groups.
Sino-Indian relations are also affected by British policy, which is to keep them at each
other’s throats. The McMahon Line in the Himalayas, that separates India and China,
along the northeastern and central part of the boundary, was drawn by the British Raj
arbitrarily, and left undemarcated, like the Durand Line that separates Pakistan from
Afghanistan, as a potential conflict point. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi have been able
avoid the trap; they fought a pointless war in 1962, which merely concretized their
differences, which have remained settled for almost five decades.
Subsequently, when China moved in to take over Tibet, London picked up the Dalai
Lama and projected him as the legitimate owner of a nation called Tibet. Although India
has overcome this part of the British perfidy, the Tibet issue still lingers as one of
unexpressed suspicion between the two nations.
In Iran, the British legacy goes back to the post-World War II days, when, in 1951, then-
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh broke off negotiations with the U.K.’s Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, in response to threats issued to Iran by imperial Britain. As
Mossadegh’s nationalist faction hardened its anti-Britain stance, and moved towards
nationalizing Iran’s oil production, America’s anglophile President Truman sent
Amb.Averell Harriman to cool down Mossadegh. In his book, Negotiating with Iran:
Wrestling the Ghosts of History, the U.S. diplomat John Limbert quotes the late Vernon
Walters, who attended the Harriman-Mossadegh meeting. According to Walters,
Mossadegh looked at Harriman and said, “You do not know how crafty they [the British]
are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they
touch.” While Harriman, another anglophile, taken aback by Mossadegh’s conviction,
said there are good and bad among the British, like most people, Mossadegh, who was
obviously not referring to individual Britons, continued, “You do not know them. You do
not know them.”
The tragedy in that part of the world, is that those who knew what Britain represented,
such as Mossadegh, were assassinated, or removed from office. That tradition continues
unabated as well, in the mindset of the leaders of the Indian subcontinent—now broken
up into three nations. To cooperate to resolve a conflict which would open up
opportunities for the people that they serve, and strengthen the nation and the region in
the process, remains an anathema to most of those who were, or are, in power in this
region.
What To Expect
Leading up to the conference, Washington will have to do its homework, which means
having direct talks with the leaders of each of these five nations, stating the U.S. interest
clearly. Also, Washington must take clear that the conference will not entertain any
attempt to resolve any bilateral conflicts that exist among the participating countries; but
the importance of Afghanistan’s stability, in the context of the region’s stability, must be
presented fully. It is evident that in getting the proverbial nod from the participating
countries, Washington will be confronted with a number of demands from the regional
countries. To name a few:
Iran: The country has been devastated by the Afghan opium explosion. Tehran is also
deeply concerned about the Saudi-British push to bring to the fore in Afghanistan, and in
the Central Asian nations, the indoctrinated Wahhabi militants. Followers of this extreme
orthodox variety of Sunni Islam, born in, nurtured by, and spread by Saudi Arabia, in
collusion with Britain, pose a serious threat to all Islamic nation-states, but particularly to
the Shi’a Republic of Iran. To a Wahhabi, a Shi’a is as much an infidel as a Hindu or
Christian. In other words, Iran will be more than willing to participate in this conference,
but will most certainly seek to open up bilateral relations with the United States, and
work in the area as an equal partner.
Russia: Russia has also been badly affected by the opium/heroin produced in vast
amounts in Afghanistan. A significant amount of opium and heroin, as well as hashish
and marijuana, produced in Afghanistan, travels routinely by road to Russia, destroying
its youth and criminalizing society. The drug-traffickers operate hand-in-glove with the
HuT, IMU, and other criminal elements that are now operating inside Russia, in
provinces such as Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Ingushetia. These groups generate cash
by running drugs, to help some of the secessionist forces within Russia. Russia is also
concerned about
NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, and Washington’s use of NATO as a battering ram to
weaken Russia’s southern flank. It is only expected that Russia will bring up these issues
with Washington in preparation for the conference.
China: China is becoming increasingly aware of the Uighur militancy being run through
Afghanistan by the British. Also, a huge amount of Afghan drugs is moving into Pakistan
through the wholly unpatrolled areas of Badakshan. It is kind of a free-for-all region.
There is no road on which motor vehicles can travel, in this narrow strip of Afghanistan
that juts inside southwestern China.
China has also deployed its defensive arsenal along the Kazakstan borders. Reports
indicate that China has missiles, nuclear and non-nuclear, along these borders. From time
to time, Beijing has expressed concerns about the U.S. air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan,
which is less than 40 minutes’ flying time away from western China’s defensive line. In
addition, China is seeking a land-based outlet to the Persian Gulf. The present plan is to
develop a north-south highway through western Pakistan, and make that outlet more
effective, by connecting it to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The instability of
Afghanistan, because of the ongoing war, and the instability in Pakistan’s southwestern
province of Balochistan, centered on anti-Iran activities run from this area by Britain and
the United States, has prevented China from developing infrastructure in this area. Such
infrastructural development would not only benefit China, but all the nations linked to
those roads and railroads.
India: India’s major concern in this context is the terrorism pushed into its territory, by
forces that operate within Pakistan. New Delhi is convinced that these anti-India forces
can be curbed by the Pakistani authorities. India’s other major demand will be to secure
help from Pakistan to develop a land corridor through Pakistan into Afghanistan, Iran,
and Central Asia. India has already requested it be permitted to open a rail corridor
Pakistan: Devastated by the insurgency that followed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,
there is no question that Pakistan will require financial help from the United States, other
foreign nations, and international financial institutions. Islamabad will also make sure
that the Indian presence in Afghanistan does not become too large. Pakistan will welcome
Chinese, as well as Iranian, presence in Afghanistan.
Written by www.quqnoos.com - Wednesday, 24 December 2008
10 million people in the country suffer from severe poverty, says the commission
Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has expressed concerns
over the increasing poverty in the country.
According to the latest report by the commission, about ten million people in Afghanistan
which make 37% of the population, suffer from severe poverty. Also a large number of
people in Afghanistan earn less than Afg50 in a day.
The commission has warned that if no attention is paid to this problem, the country will
face a humanitarian disaster this winter.
The Anti-natural Disasters Struggle Department (ADSD) has confirmed the report and
says that food has been delivered to the country’s most vulnerable provinces so far.
ADSD said the Afghan government has made serious efforts to solve this problem, and is
planning to distribute more than 30,000 tons of food to the needy people in Kabul and
other provinces.
Nazanin, one of these vulnerable people who has eight children, said her husband had left
her and she had to sell one of her daughters to pay her debts. She said she also has to sell
her other daughters to survive. She said her children even spend nights without having
dinner.
Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission says lack of job opportunities,
droughts, lack of public welfare projects and the bad security situation are among the
main reasons for the increasing poverty in the country.
Afghans reject US militia troop plan
Written by www.quqnoos.com - Wednesday, 24 December 2008
US militia Plan lead the country to such a misery that no one will be able to overcome,
says Afghan MP
Afghan government strongly denies the formation of militia troops. However, according
to New York Times, some American and Afghan authorities are trying to arm the local
people against Taliban.
Denying this strategy, the Afghan Ministry of Interior said, any military aid that aims to
support the peace in Afghanistan should go through government’s security sections.
Spokesman for ministry of interior Zemaray Bashari said: “The Afghan government,
ministry of interior in particular does not have any idea of forming militias. With no
doubt the cooperation of Afghan people with security forces is really crucial, but this
cooperation must take place under the form of ANA or ANP. Ministry of interior does
not support the idea of forming local militia. Forming militia is not the solution for
Afghan government. We must strengthen the lawful security systems in the county so we
can get good results.”
Some American commanders proposed the formation of local semi-military troops to
fight against the terrorists. Maidan Wardak province is said to be the leading province in
this process. According to New York Times, the US wants to practice in Afghanistan
their experience of arming local militias they did in Iraq.
Mir Ahmad Joyenda, Kabul representative in Afghan parliament said: “Now, the tribal
leaders do not have power in Afghanistan. The local commanders who were involved in
30 years of war in Afghanistan are the powerful ones. Arming them will, once again, lead
the country to such a misery that no one will be able to overcome. Another important
thing is that Afghanistan is not Iraq. In Iraq all the social organizations were active, but it
is visa versa in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there are no tribal leaders any more. There
are commanders. And if, once more, they find the chance to have the gun in hand, they
will do whatever they want”.
The proposal for formation of militias is planned at such a time that every effort for
stability and security in Afghanistan has failed for the past seven years.
US Looks at Iraq-Style Community Policing for Afghanistan
Voice of America,By Al Pessin Pentagon - 24 December 2008
The Pentagon is preparing what it calls a "pilot program" to organize local Afghan
citizens to help secure their towns and neighborhoods. The program is similar to one in
Iraq that was a key factor in security improvements there during the last year.
Pentagon Spokesman Bryan Whitman confirmed the plan to launch the program, which
was first reported by The New York Times.
"It is, I guess, best described as kind of a grassroots program, with prospects that could
lead to improved Afghanistan security," Whitman said. "This is more of a pilot program,
a very modest initial look at a community type policing program."
Whitman describes the plan as an Afghan government initiative that U.S. and NATO
forces are supporting. He says it will start in Wardak Province, near Kabul, where
Taliban fighters have been gaining strength in recent months.
Whitman says the idea is to deputize local citizens to improve security and extend the
reach of the Afghan government.
"This is designed to facilitate sharing of information, building trust, all with an eye
toward improving governance at the district and provincial level and connecting it better
to the central government," Whitman said.
Whitman says the initial program will involve only several dozen Afghans, but the Times
says commanders plan to expand it rapidly if it succeeds.
A similar program in Iraq organized more than 100,000 local citizens, including former
insurgents, and put them at checkpoints and local police stations. Commanders credit the
program with improving security, partly by turning government opponents into allies.
The Iraqi government is in the process of taking responsibility for those forces, absorbing
some into the security services and disbanding others.
Officials say it was not necessary to provide weapons to the Iraqi groups, which became
known as the Sons of Iraq. The New York Times says there is a plan to provide arms to
the Afghan citizens' groups, but Whitman could not confirm that. The Times also quotes
Afghans as saying the plan could lead to new local militias and potentially spark a civil
war. But Whitman says it is "premature" to be concerned about such things.
The former U.S. commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, is now in charge of U.S.
efforts in both wars. He has said he wants to transfer some of the concepts used in Iraq to
the increasingly difficult fight in Afghanistan. And while he acknowledges the two wars
are very different, and he has not said exactly which techniques will transfer and which
will not, he believes both have the same top priority - providing security so government
efforts to build long-term stability can take hold.
NATO commanders in Afghanistan wary of antidrug effort
The opium trade helps fund the insurgency but also provides farmers livelihood.
Christian Science Monitor, By Gordon Lubold - 25 December 2008, Kandahar,
Afghanistan
NATO leaders' agreement this fall to let their troops attack drug traffickers in
Afghanistan held the promise of stemming the flow of funding for the violent insurgency
here.
But military commanders now seem reluctant to go after the drug runners. NATO
commanders in Afghanistan say they are holding back because of concerns over the
legality of drug operations. But they may also be unwilling to conduct what is seen as a
politically unpopular mission that could endanger their troops.
The country's multimillion-dollar opium industry is blamed for funding much of the
bloody insurgency against US and allied troops.
Top NATO officials see differences in opinion between NATO's political leaders and the
military commanders charged to do the work. "Now that we have a gap between the
political authority granted and the legal interpretation of that order, it must be resolved,"
said Gen. Bantz Craddock, the supreme allied commander of Europe, earlier this month.
The new authority was granted at an October meeting of NATO ministers in Budapest.
The agreement does not allow NATO troops to conduct sweeping eradication efforts such
as torching fields, but lets them interdict facilities or personnel involved with drug
trafficking.
But so far, NATO troops have not used the new authorization. Military officials cite legal
concerns that, despite the Budapest agreement, it is inappropriate for the military to be
used in a counternarcotics role – which is still seen as a criminal activity.
Current estimates suggest the $4 billion opium industry, which feeds a market for heroine
and other drug products in Europe, could be sending as much as $500 million a year to
Taliban and Al Qaeda operations including those in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It is also an agricultural staple on which many Afghan farmers depend for their
livelihood.
The southern sector of Afghanistan, where the bulk of opium grows, has about 18,000
troops from six countries currently commanded by a Dutch officer. The Netherlands, like
other European allies, is averse to drug eradication programs for fear of alienating the
local population and because of the risks associated with such operations, say US
officials. Those officials note that commanders should distinguish between their NATO
role and being part of their country's military.
NATO concerns that counternarcotics policy could alienate the very population it is
trying to coopt are valid, acknowledges Seth Jones, a senior analyst at the military
research group RAND, who recently visited Afghanistan. But he says security must come
first.
"Talking about narcotics policy when you don't control territory is putting the cart before
the horse," says Mr. Jones. "What ultimately will matter is the ability to control areas."
Once security is established, the Afghan justice system will need more "teeth" to convict
traffickers, he adds.
Gen. David McKiernan, the top NATO and US commander in Afghanistan, said in an
interview in Kabul this month that he was hopeful the matter could be addressed through
more dialogue between NATO officials.
"What we know we're able to do is where we can make the connection between
counternarcotics [and] a personality or a facility, a nexus target ... we can treat that as a
military objective," General McKiernan said.
"There is agreement on the ground, but it is subject to national approvals and some of the
precise language still needs to be worked out," he said.
Opium production remains strong here, though it has dropped from last year's "historic
high water mark" of about 193,000 hectares of opium cultivated, according to the Afghan
Opium Survey by the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime.
The survey says 98 percent of Afghanistan's opium is grown in seven of 34 provinces –
all seven have a Taliban presence.
There are signs of some progress – the UN attributes the drop in poppy cultivation to
drought and good local leadership by some Afghan governors who have discouraged its
production.
4 Taliban insurgents killed in S. Afghanistan
Xinhua, www.chinaview.cn - 2008-12-24 - KABUL
The U.S.-led Coalition forces killed four rebels on Wednesday during a combined
operation with Afghan forces against the Taliban network in southern Afghan province of
Zabul, officials said.
Ghulam Jailani Khan, deputy provincial police chief told Xinhua that the operation
occurred at around 4 a.m. local time (GMT 2330)when the joint forces targeted a Taliban
hideout in Sury district of Zabul.
"The combined forces engaged militants and killed at least four including one local
commander Mullah Assadullah," Jailani Khan said.
"A search of the building revealed one PKM machine gun, multiple AK-47s, blasting
caps and wires used to make roadside bombs and bandoliers full of ammunition," a
Coalition statement confirmed later. It added that "the forces destroyed these items to
prevent future use."
Spiraling conflicts and Taliban-linked insurgency have claimed more than 5,000 people,
mostly militants, so far this year, despite over 70,000-strong international troops stationed
in strife-torn Afghanistan.
Taliban abducts Indian in Herat
Deccan Herald - 25 December 2008, New Delhi
Suspected Taliban militants have abducted an Indian national working for an Italian
company in the war-torn country, in yet another incident targeting Indians in
Afghanistan.
38-year-old Simon, who hails from Villupuram district of Tamil Nadu, was abducted
along with his Afghan interpreter and driver in Herat province on October 13, official
sources said here on Wednesday.
He was working as a cook with the Italian food store ‘Fiano’, which serves Italian
soldiers in Afghanistan. He had gone to Afghanistan a year ago, the sources said.
Simon and the two locals were kidnapped while they were delivering food at the
International Security Assistance Force camp in Bagram air base, they said.
Indian Embassy in Kabul and Consulate in Herat are in constant touch with top Afghan
authorities who are making efforts to secure his safe release, they said. The Embassy is
also in touch with Simon’s company. Citing latest information, the sources said Simon
was alive but did not give more details because of fear that it could jeopardise the safety
of the hostage.
Simon did not have any security unlike other Indian nationals who have gone there
through the government, the sources said. “Since he had gone through a private contract
with the Italian firm, his security was the responsibility of the company,” they said.
The abductors are believed to have made a ransom demand of $ 50,000. Simon’s wife
Vasanthi appealed to the abductors to release him, saying the family would not be able to
meet the abductors’ ransom demand.
She urged the government to ensure safety of her husband. The kidnappers allowed
Simon to talk to his brother Subbu who was also working in Kabul.In the last three years,
Simon is the third Indian to have been abducted in Afghanistan after BRO driver M R
Kutty and K Suryanarayanan. Both of them were killed by their abductors.
Air strikes, night raids a 'last resort' in Afghanistan

CTV.ca News,Tue. Dec. 23 2008

Brig.-Gen. Denis Thompson, the head of Canadian and NATO forces in Kandahar, is
taking issue with an independent report alleging air strikes and nighttime raids in
Afghanistan may be stoking a backlash among civilians.

The report by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission -- entitled "From
Hope to Fear" -- says violent house raids and air strikes on civilians could undo seven
years of NATO and government efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
civilians.
Thompson says he welcomes the report but also noted that coalition soldiers only conduct
such strikes as a "last resort."

"Every precaution is taken to ensure there is a high degree of certainty regarding

targets ... Task Force Kandahar troops -- both U.S. and Canadian -- take extraordinary
efforts to minimize collateral damage and to avoid harm to innocent civilians," he said.

Thompson referred specifically of two incidents this year -- one on July 27 and the other
on Sept. 18 -- in which civilians were killed.
"Both incidents were investigated, and in both cases, it was found that our soldiers
followed proper escalation of force procedures," he said.
The AIHRC, which "acts independently," is funded by NATO countries involved in the
Afghan mission.

"From Hope to Fear" claims that Afghan families know stories of friends and family
members who have been awoken in the middle of the night and "abused" by armed men.

"In general AIHRC questions PGFs'(Pro-government Forces') heavy reliance on air

strikes, which on several occasions have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties
that may have been symptomatic of excessive use of force," the commission's report says.

"Afghan families experienced their family members killed or injured, their houses or
other property destroyed, or homes invaded at night without any perceived justification or
legal authorization ... local resentment over high civilian casualties and perceived
insensitivity are exacerbated by a lack of public accountability."

There have been several high-profile attacks that have killed and injured civilians in
recent months. They include, an Aug. 22 U.S. raid on the village of Azizabad in Herat
province, which killed at least several dozen people, including women and children.
According to the United Nations:

A total of 1,798 civilians have been killed this year. A total of 455 civilian died from
coalition air strikes.

Omar Samad, the Afghan ambassador to Canada, told CTV Newsnet on Tuesday that
government and NATO forces are obviously not targeting civilians. But he added that
there has been a "pattern" over the years where civilians have been hurt and killed.
"We do not want to erode the support the Afghans have for the (international security
force)," he said.

The Canadian Press reported earlier that British Royal Navy Capt. Mark Windsor, a
spokesman for NATO forces in Afghanistan, said coalition forces are aware of the
report's criticism.

"We have to do our job, obviously, but we must demonstrate proportionality and restraint
and discrimination in the use of firepower," Windsor said.

"We are concerned about this ... and we are trying our utmost to work with the Afghan
security forces to try and reduce civilian casualties, but also any distress to our Afghan
hosts in this country." This report recommends that:
1. Pro-government forces minimize collateral damage to civilian lives and properties.
2. There be better PGF co-ordination amongst its forces in planning and conduct of
operations.
3. PGF review and clarify chains of command and any controlling guidelines on night
raids.
4. Military or security tactics be avoided wherever possible in favour of regular law
enforcement-led search and arrest procedures.
5. PGF should initiate prompt and thorough investigations into any incident of alleged
civilian casualties and publicly release details of their findings and evidence.

The Afghan government coalition troops make a more concerted effort to render justice
for victims. In the past, Karzai has called for a review of the use of U.S. and NATO air
power.

A second commission report -- also released Tuesday -- claims there have also been a
litany of Taliban abuses. They include kidnappings and executions against Afghan
civilians.

"Attacks against government civilian officials and institutions have increasingly chipped
away at the government's ability to provide services to hundreds and thousands of
people," the report on the insurgency says.
"It is often the poorest people of Afghanistan who are being threatened, kidnapped, and
executed because they work on government or international construction or development
projects."
A Foreign Face Beloved by Afghans of all Stripes
New York Times, United States - 25 December 2008, KABUL, Afghanistan
History has fostered a notion here that all foreign occupations of Afghanistan are
ultimately doomed.
There was the catastrophic retreat of a British expeditionary force in 1842. Nearly 150
years later came the Soviet troop withdrawal of 1989. Now, with the Taliban pressing in
on this city and dominating the countryside, there are fears that this occupation, too, will
eventually fail.
But whatever the outcome, Afghans of all ethnic and political stripes, even the Taliban,
seem likely to count Alberto Cairo as one foreigner who left the country better than he
found it.
Mr. Cairo, once a debonair lawyer in his native Turin, Italy, is almost certainly the most
celebrated Western relief official in Afghanistan, at least among Afghans. To the
generation who have been beneficiaries of his relief work for the International Committee
of the Red Cross, he is known simply as “Mr. Alberto,” a man apart among the 15,000
foreigners who live and work in this city.
That total includes civilians working for embassies or foreign relief agencies, like Mr.
Cairo, and troops from 41 nations fighting to hold the line against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban. In Afghanistan’s turbulent history, there have rarely been as many foreigners
living in Kabul, the Afghan capital, nor as much riding on what they achieve.
Mr. Cairo, 56, arrived long before the vast majority of them, in 1990, after the Soviet
occupation. He had transferred from a Red Cross posting in Africa to run the orthopedic
rehabilitation program of the organization — a job dedicated to helping Afghans disabled
by war injuries to live normally again, by equipping them with artificial legs and arms.
What the Red Cross centers have accomplished is visible on the streets of almost every
Afghan town and village. Since the Red Cross started the program in 1988, the centers
have provided prostheses to nearly 90,000 Afghans, between a third and a quarter of all
those thought to have suffered disabling injuries from 30 years of warfare, beginning with
the Soviet invasion. Many Red Cross patients were victims of the 10 million mines
strewn across the landscape during the Soviet period.
Mr. Cairo, slim, affable and an energetic enthusiast of tennis, rarely shows the edginess
that wears away at the most courtly of foreigners under stress in foreign lands. But a rare
impatience shows when the people who know what he has accomplished suggest that he
has become a legend here. Rather, Mr. Cairo says it is he, more than his Afghan patients,
who has been the greatest beneficiary of his years in Kabul.
His passion took root the moment he arrived. Not long before, he had abandoned law and
retrained as a physiotherapist, seeing it as a path to a more fulfilling life. The choice grew
from a teenage experience in Italy, when he joined a school trip to a rehabilitation center.
Now, he says, he cannot imagine another life.
“When I’m away from Afghanistan, I can’t think of anything but what I have here,” he
said during a pasta dinner he cooked at his Kabul home.
Continuing in English, which he speaks fluently and mixes, when among Afghans, with a
strong working command of Dari and Pashto, Afghanistan’s two principal languages, he
added: “Whenever I go to Europe, I'm scared that for some reason I won’t be able to
come back. What I’m doing here is so rewarding. For me, it’s perfect. I feel I have been
very, very lucky.”
The Kabul rehabilitation center is an airy, spacious complex built on an old hospital
graveyard in northwestern Kabul. It was assigned to the Red Cross by President
Najibullah, the Afghan leader during the last years of the Soviet occupation, who was
lynched by the Taliban when they captured the capital in 1996. The center has remained
there ever since, apart from a break during a period of ethnic warfare that enveloped the
neighborhood in the early 1990s. Unusually, for a highly visible operation involving
foreigners, it has never been attacked.
In the traditions of the Red Cross, founded in the 1860s as a neutral intermediary in time
of war, the orthopedic centers make no distinction on the basis of political affiliation.
Asked whether disabled Taliban fighters were among those now under care at the centers,
Mr. Cairo replied: “I hope so. We ask for a name when our patients register, but they can
give any name, and we don’t investigate.”
In practice, many new patients treated at the centers now, about 6,000 a year, are not war
casualties, or even victims of the mines that brought most patients in the past. Two
decades of intensive mine-clearing operations by the United Nations, and by private
charities like Britain’s Halo Trust, have cleared most of minefields in the lower-lying
areas where Afghan villagers, particularly farmers, are vulnerable.
Instead, many of the new patients are being treated as a result of circumstances not
related to war: car accidents; congenital deformities; or the effects of polio or
tuberculosis.
But the legacy of past fighting and the injuries inflicted in the current conflict — in which
both Taliban and coalition forces have caused civilian casualties — keep the centers
busy. Of the 90,000 people who have received new limbs, 70,000 revisit the centers every
year, usually for replacement or readjustment of their prostheses, which last an average of
two to three years for adults, and as little as six months for children. All the treatments,
including overnight stays at the centers that can run on for weeks, are free.
A frequent complaint among Afghans is that much of the $10 billion to $15 billion in aid
donated since the Taliban’s fall in 2001 goes to the salaries of foreign workers and other
perks, like expensive offices and four-wheel-drive vehicles.
“They see us flashing about in big cars, and they have the impression that we don’t really
belong here,” Mr. Cairo said. He is insistently frugal in his own life, giving up much of
his salary to patients and ensuring that all but a handful of the jobs at the centers go to
disabled Afghans, not foreigners.
Mr. Cairo’s passion for his patients is reciprocal, and nowhere is that more evident than
out on the Kabul center’s open-air testing ground, a concrete platform where men,
women and children, some standing for the first time in years, learn to walk again with
artificial limbs. Tears flow readily, and much of the gratitude flows to “Mr. Alberto.”
Shah Mohammed, a 25-year-old policeman who lost a leg this year to a bomb buried by
the Taliban, waited in a wheelchair. The Americans? “It is better that they should be here,
because of the Taliban,” he said. And the Taliban? “If I find them, I’ll put them in a
grinding machine.” He paused, and turned to something more immediate. “Mr. Alberto,”
he said. “We love him. Please put that down. We love him.”
Iran, great, influential country in region: Afghan VP
IRNA, Islamic Republic of Iran, 12/24/2008
"no plan in Afghanistan is accepted without the presence of Iran"
Afghan Vice-President Abdul Karim Khalili said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a
great and influential country in the region.
In a meeting with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, he added that Kabul is
interested in Iran's participation in all regional and international circles to help settle the
existing problems and regional crises.
Khalili, who is currently in Tehran at the head of a delegation, quoted President Hamid
Karzai as repeatedly announcing that "no plan in Afghanistan is accepted without the
presence of Iran".
Appreciating Iran's great assistance during his country's difficult time, he said the Islamic
Republic is a good neighbor and close friend of Afghan nation.
Mottaki said that the current visit to Tehran of the Afghan delegation is a good
opportunity for further expansion of bilateral cooperation and for reviewing the regional
developments.
Underscoring the importance of Afghan security and stability, he said the Afghan
security would lead to establishment of security in the whole region.
Criticizing new approach of certain foreign powers in Afghanistan, the Iranian foreign
minister called for withdrawal of all foreign forces from the entire region.
Voicing Iran's readiness to help settle the existing problems facing the Afghan people, he
called for solving the regional problems through regional cooperation.
Houses of 2 Taliban leaders demolished
Daily Times - Thursday, December 25, 2008, LAHORE
Security forces, the political administration of Mohmand Agency and Haleemzai tribes
have demolished the houses of two key Taliban commanders in the agency, a private TV
channel reported on Wednesday. Meanwhile, Taliban fired mortar shells at the house of
the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid’s chief of the NWFP chapter Ameer Muqam in Swat.
Although the house was damaged in the attack, there were no casualties. Muqam told the
channel that the federal and provincial governments had ‘failed’ in restoring peace.
According to the channel, suspected US drones were also seen flying low over various
parts of North and South Wazirtistan and Bannu. daily times monitor
Amid Taliban Rule, a NATO Supply Line Is Choked
New York Times, United States - 25 December 2008, PESHAWAR, Pakistan
This frontier city boasts a major air base and Pakistani Army and paramilitary garrisons.
But the 200 Taliban guerrillas were in no rush as they methodically ransacked depots
with NATO supplies here two weeks ago.
The militants began by blocking off a long stretch of the main road, giving them plenty of
time to burn everything inside, said one guard, Haroon Khan, who was standing next to a
row of charred trucks.
After assuring the overmatched guards they would not be killed — if they agreed never to
work there again — the militants shouted “God is great” through bullhorns. They then
grabbed jerrycans and made several trips to a nearby gas station for fuel, which they
dumped on the cargo trucks and Humvees before setting them ablaze.
The attack provided the latest evidence of how extensively militants now rule the critical
region east of the Khyber Pass, the narrow cut through the mountains on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border that has been a strategic trade and military gateway since the time of
Alexander the Great.
The area encompasses what is officially known as the Khyber Agency, which is adjacent
to Peshawar and is one of a handful of lawless tribal districts on the border. But security
in Khyber has deteriorated further in recent months with the emergence of a brash young
Taliban commander who calls news conferences to thumb his nose at NATO forces, as
well as with public fury over deadly missile attacks by American remotely piloted
aircraft.
Khyber’s downward spiral is jeopardizing NATO’s most important supply line, sending
American military officials scrambling to find alternative routes into Afghanistan through
Russia and Central Asia. Three-quarters of troop supplies enter from Pakistan, most of
the goods ferried from Karachi to Peshawar and then 40 miles west through the Khyber
Pass into Afghanistan.
A half-dozen raids on depots with NATO supplies here have already destroyed 300 cargo
trucks and Humvees this month. American officials insist that troop provisions have not
suffered, but with predictions that the American deployment in Afghanistan could double
next year, to 60,000 soldiers, the pressure to secure safer transportation is even more
intense.
For NATO the most serious problem is not even the depots in Peshawar but the safety of
the road that winds west to the 3,500-foot Khyber Pass. The route used to be relatively
secure: Afridi tribesman were paid by the government to safeguard it, and they were
subject to severe penalties and collective tribal punishment for crimes against travelers.
But now the road is a death trap, truckers and some security officials say, with routine
attacks like one on Sunday that burned a fuel tanker and another last Friday that killed
three drivers returning from Afghanistan.
“The road is so unsafe that even the locals are reluctant to go back to their villages from
Peshawar,” said Gul Naseem, who lives in Landi Kotal, near the border.
The largest truckers’ association here has gone on strike to protest the lack of security,
saying that the job action has sidelined 60 percent of the trucks that normally haul
military goods. An American official denied that the drop-off had been that severe.
“Not a single day passes when something doesn’t happen,” said Shakir Afridi, leader of
the truckers’ group, the Khyber Transport Association. He said at least 25 trucks and six
oil tankers were destroyed this month. “Attacks have become a daily affair,” he said.
There are new efforts to deter Taliban raids, including convoy escorts by a Pakistani
paramilitary group, the Frontier Corps. But now militants are attacking empty — and
unguarded — trucks returning to Pakistan. The road from Peshawar to the border has
become far more perilous than the route on the other side in Afghanistan, truckers say.
“Our lives are in danger and nobody cares,” said Shah Mahmood Afridi, a driver who
was in the returning convoy attacked on Friday. “They fired at the trucks and killed three
men inside. There is no security provided when we are empty.”
Escalating violence on the Khyber road has paralleled the rise of Hakimullah Mehsud, a
young Taliban commander and lieutenant of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the main
Pakistani Taliban faction.
Earlier this year, Hakimullah Mehsud’s forces took control of Orakzai Agency and
instituted the strict Islamic laws known as Shariah. At a news conference there one month
ago, Hakimullah Mehsud declared his intention to intensify attacks on NATO supply
convoys. Some security officials say they believe that he was behind the assassination in
August of a rival militant leader, Hajji Namdar, in Khyber.
At the same time, another powerful Khyber warlord, Mangal Bagh, who officials say has
not been attacking the convoys, has seen the geographic range of his influence narrow
somewhat, easing the path for Mr. Mehsud’s authority to expand inside some parts of
Khyber. “I have no love for Mangal Bagh, but the fact remains that Mangal Bagh does
not do these attacks,” said Tariq Hayat, the Khyber political agent, the top government
official in the region.
Increased missile attacks by remotely piloted American aircraft — like one that killed
seven people in the South Waziristan Agency on Monday — have enraged residents in
Khyber and other tribal areas near the border, increasing sympathy for attacks on
convoys. Mr. Afridi, of the truckers’ association, condemns the strikes and blames them
for increased assaults on his drivers. “We are a tribal people, and if the Americans hit
innocent people in Waziristan, we also feel the pain,” he said.
Raising the prospect of an even wider threat to the convoys, an influential Islamic party,
Jamaat-e-Islami, staged a rally last week in Peshawar, turning out thousands to condemn
the missile strikes. The marchers demanded that Pakistan end the NATO convoys, and
they vowed to cut the supply lines themselves.
Taliban militants have also moved into Khyber after Pakistani military campaigns in
nearby areas like Bajaur Agency. Their migration is reminiscent of a tactic that bedeviled
the American military in Iraq for years — dubbed “whack a mole” by combat officers —
in which guerrillas eluded large American combat operations and moved to take up
positions in areas with understaffed troop contingents.
All those factors have been amplified, in the view of some officials, by the torpor of the
Pakistani government. Mahmood Shah, a retired Pakistani Army brigadier who until
2006 was in charge of security in the western tribal regions, said the government had the
manpower to drive militants out of Khyber but had mounted only a weak response.
He recounted a recent conversation with a senior Pakistani government official. “You
have the chance to wake up,” he said he told the official. “But if you don’t wake up now,
there is a good chance you won’t wake up at all.”
Only Way Out of Afghanistan
Khaleej Times Online, 25 December 2008
Reports in media have quoted elusive Taleban leader Mullah Omar as saying his group is
not in talks with the Afghan government.
In fact, the Reuters report quoting a website insists no one from the Taleban had ever
been in talks under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, and other friendly Arab countries to end
the conflict.
However, there are reasons to doubt the veracity of the statement directly quoting
Taleban chief Mullah Omar. The facts are: he has been at large since the US Invasion in
October 2001, and Washington has announced a reward of $10 million for his capture.
Secondly, he is not a media- savvy person and has kept himself largely aloof, even when
his militia reigned supreme in Afghanistan. And last but not the least, reputed Taleban
leaders like Mullah Zareef and spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid have time and again said
that the student militia is not averse to talks – but only with a couple of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’.
Keeping aside what Mullah Omar said verbatim or didn’t, there are always spaces within
a movement where nuances of reconciliation exist amid assertions of challenge. The
reality is that the mess in which Afghanistan is in today cannot be cleared until and unless
Taleban are brought on board.
At a time when Pentagon and Nato are planning to double their strength, the possibilities
and opportunities of a meaningful dialogue shouldn’t be squandered. Fortunately, the
Americans too are weary of this never-ending conflict. The new thinking among the top
brass is to keep the option of a dialogue with Taleban open to help reverse the downward
spiral in Afghanistan, and neighbouring Pakistan.
In these testing times when the US and the world at large are increasingly battling the
economic chaos, it has become all the more necessary to find a negotiated way out of
Afghanistan.
With India and Pakistan raising stakes of another war following the Mumbai terror
attacks, the entire region can slide into utter chaos and anarchy. If Afghan history is
anything to go by, no foreign power has ever been able to win a war in Afghanistan. For
all their ruthless ways and often unacceptable actions, Taleban cannot be wished away.
The West has no option but see them as part of a solution, rather than a problem. The
militia representing the country’s Pakhtun majority is a force to reckon with. A three-way
dialogue involving the Afghan government, the United States and Taleban should begin
forthwith. Washington, which blundered its way into the country after the September 11
attacks ostensibly to punish the Taleban, urgently needs to prepare ground for a political
settlement. Dialogue is the only way forward.
Afghan imbroglio needs political solution
Lalit K Jha - Dec 24, 2008 - 16:26
WASHINGTON (PAN): A former US National Security Adviser said Tuesday that
cutting a deal with the Taliban and separating it with the Al Qaeda would be more helpful
in Afghanistan rather than sending more troops to the country.
Opposing surge of troops 30,000 as being reported in the US media Z Brzezinski told the
popular MSNBC news channel in an interview that such a step by the upcoming Obama
Administration might end up in a Russia-like fiasco in Afghanistan.
Expressing concern over such media reports, Brzezinski said: : "What I fear is that quite
unintentionally, we may be repeating the same mistakes the Soviets made."
The fundamental Soviet mistake was that the Soviets thought there were in Kabul in
Afghanistan, a bunch of Marxists, leftists, pro-Soviets -- with whose help they could
create, in effect, a replica of the Soviet Union on a small scale -- a Soviet republic.
And they moved in troops expecting, essentially, that it would be easy and with the help
of these guys, it would create a Soviet-type system. Then they had to escalate the troops,
escalate the troops, escalate the troops and they ended up with about 160,000 troops who
waged a brutal war, a genocidal war, literally, against Afghans -- killed about one million
Afghans, drove about five million Afghans out of the country and in the end, lost, he said.
"We're there on the assumption that we can create a modern Democratic pluralistic
Afghanistan with the help of pro-western Democratic intellectuals in Kabul. And these
are noble people. They're by and large good people, but they live in a medieval society.
And if we simply ratchet up our military presence, we'll stimulate what is fundamental to
the Afghans, xenophobia: resentment of foreigners with guns in the middle of their
country," Brzezinski said.
"So, I am of the view that while we may, here or there, have to increase our troops in
some province -- if there is some particular military threat -- what we really need to do is
to try cutting deals with the local Talibans," he argued.
The Taliban is not a unified disciplined movement and it's not the same thing as al Qaeda.
"It's fundamentalist. It's hostile to our values, but it's not out to blow us up," he observed
arguing that it is time to have talks with the Talibans.
"I think we should try to make local accommodations with local Talibans. And if they
promise to eliminate all al Qaeda presence, or to kill the local Al Qaedas, we will
disengage from that district," he said.
Promoting peace in Afghanistan – with a lighter touch
A provincial reconstruction team's visit to a remote area underscores the challenges of
winning hearts and minds.
Christian Science Monitor - World - By Danna Harman, December 26, 2008
Barge Matal, Afghanistan - A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) has landed in remote
Barge Matal, and everyone – from the elders up the mountain trails to the girls who
usually spend their days hidden from view – wants to make requests, lodge complaints,
and generally be part of the action.
Born out of the mantra that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means
alone, the mission of these small units – 26 in total – is to coordinate with local leaders
and do development work – thus winning Afghan hearts and minds.
It was not always like this. As the war here began in October 2001, there was much talk
about the need for reconstruction. But a RAND Corp. study found that, even as President
Bush was promising a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, the country received less
assistance per capita than postconflict Bosnia, Kosovo, or Haiti, and less than half of
what later would be spent in Iraq.
Last year, though, the budget for reconstruction projects here tripled, USAID
development experts were shipped out by the dozens, and the PRTs were given new
status. The US has now spent more than $32 billion on assistance to Afghanistan – 32
percent of which was allocated to development and humanitarian assistance. That
number, according to the US State Department, will continue to climb in 2009.
Today, it is easy to find Marines measuring footbridges, Air Force pilots negotiating with
road contractors, Navy reservists debating the finer points of pouring concrete for school
foundations, infantrymen immersed in solar-cooking projects, and field medics handing
out packets of lozenges to curious villagers.
Moreover, explains John Espinoza, the State Department representative in Nuristan
Province, there is simply more emphasis on such support. "While the amount of money
committed to the effort is important, the impact of small, lower-cost community projects
is also critical," he says. "Whether it's fresh water supplies, schools, clinics ... we are
bringing immediate changes to Afghan communities. The long-term effects of that cannot
be underestimated."
All this is being carried out amid ongoing fighting and a rising death toll. But while it is
difficult to do effective development work without security, stresses Nuristan PRT
commander George Perez – it's harder yet to attain security without offering
development.
"Until we really have an impact here, in terms of healthcare, education, etc., Afghans will
continue to suffer – and be amenable to ideological pressures of Al Qaeda," says Mr.
Perez, a submarine officer. We need to give them a reason to be on our side."
Perez and others reject the argument that soldiers should stick to what they know best –
fighting. "What does winning mean?" asks Col. Skip Davis, top strategic adviser to Gen.
David McKiernan, who commands the approximately 70,000 US and coalition troops in
Afghanistan. "Like in Iraq, our strategy must involve both fighting and building. We need
to stay the course and be responsible for both."
Scarcity of just about everything - Nuristan, arguably the least developed province in
Afghanistan, is home to the newest PRT, established two years ago. Electricity is scarce
here, phone lines and hospitals nonexistent, and infant mortality is the highest in the
country, with 1 in 4 children dying before age 5. Only a handful of roads are paved, and
literacy is estimated at 25 percent (9 percent for women) – below the national average.
Barge Matal, set in the stark, snowcapped mountains of the Hindu Kush, is as far
northeast as the PRT ventures. Monthly visits here need to be planned meticulously,
requiring an airlift of the PRT and tight security. Insurgents regularly attempt to attack.
The Nuristan PRT has completed 31 projects at a cost of $12 million, and has contracted
more than $60 million in roads. But little of that has reached Barge Matal.
Today, the plan is to offer a health clinic and meet with the shura, or council of elders, to
determine priorities.
The heavily armed team arrives in Barge Matal on two helicopters in the early morning
and immediately bumps into the shura – headed out of town. The elders, explains
Mohammad Rasul, Barge Matal's deputy subgovernor – wrapped in a blanket, a wool hat
pulled down snugly – are visiting a nearby village. They will be back in an hour. "No
problem," says Perez, respectfully taking off his helmet.
As the medics set up a clinic, the State Department representatives head off with
minipatrols, to find out how voter registration is proceeding. Some PRT members hand
out hats and gloves to the kids.
Perez wanders into a local shop. "What's new?" he asks, striking up a friendly chat –
through his interpreter – "anything exciting?"
The price of sugar is up, he learns. Sunflower oil is selling well. Roads are insecure. The
Taliban are close by. And the Americans need to bring more hope.
Perez buys two cartons of strawberry wafers and candy and passes the time handing them
out to a group of ragged boys, trying to get them to say thank you. "Tashukur, tashukur,"
they begin yelling. "Thank you." Clusters of men with dyed red beards and turbans
observe the scene, glancing sidelong at the PRT's security men, stationed up and down
the muddy paths and atop the wooden compounds.
Two-and-a-half hours later, the shura members return, but need to meet before talking
with the Americans. Five hours after the PRT has arrived, and 20 minutes before
helicopters are to whisk them away, they are ready to convene.
They need blankets for winter, they explain. The Army needs concrete to fortify its
positions. The police need coats. And arms. The roads are dangerous. The proposed
school location needs to be changed. Above all, they need security.
"Security is worse now," complains Mr. Rasul. "And we don't even have a new school."
Barge Matal still supports the government and coalition forces, he explains afterward,
"even though all the Americans do is visit us and do nothing."
"Let me conclude," begins Perez brightly, as the sound of the Chinooks is heard overhead
and a half-dozen Americans raise eyebrows and tap watches. The commander talks about
the problem of bringing in concrete to build a clinic because the roads are insecure; about
the need for the village itself to help enhance security.
"We are committed here," assures Perez, standing up. "We will do our part."
More conversation will have to wait until a visit the following month. Perez and this
team, having completed nine months in Nuristan, will be back in the US then, but their
replacements, he promises, will pick up where they have left off. The elders nod.
PRT members across Afghanistan are used to delayed meetings, unrealistic expectations,
duplicated demands, and corrupt contractors – just as Afghans are accustomed to mixed
messages, a lack of understanding of local ways, and changing American faces.
Are hearts and minds won? Still, hundreds of PRT projects have been completed. But
how effective this seven-year effort has been in helping win the war, or even getting
Afghans on the coalition's side, is unclear.
"There is a fundamental problem here," says Edward Luttwak, a senior associate at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. "No
Afghan can bring himself to believe foreigners are in the country for anything but a
nefarious reason." These projects, he says, might well be welcomed by some locals – but
they are "basically a waste of time.
"This is a struggle that will be won when we provide effective armed security for
Afghans. That is what is appreciated," he continues. "Sure, we can give them schools and
chocolate and they will be happy. But if the Taliban then come back to the village with
guns and we don't protect them, they stop being interested in our projects."
The PRT soldiers defend their mission. "I am better at fighting the enemy than building
footbridges, that's for sure," says Nuristan PRT's 1st Sgt. Willie Mitchell, a South
Carolinian who has seen combat in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. "But ... this building ... it's
the only way we can think of to move forward."
"We have not made it worse," he concludes quietly. "I have walked these hills, and I
know we have brought some change for the better ... at least I have to believe that."
U.S. draws India into the Afghan war
The Hindu - M.K. Bhadrakumar - 25 December 2008
The time has come to carefully assess the U.S. motivations in widening the gyre of the
Afghan war, which commenced seven years ago.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States armed forces, Admiral
Mike Mullen, has lent his voice to the incipient idea of a “regional” approach to the
Afghanistan problem. He said the over-arching strategy for success in Afghanistan must
be regional in focus and include not just Afghanistan but also Pakistan and India. The
three South Asian countries, he stressed, must figure a way to reduce tensions among
them, which involves addressing &# 8220;long-standing problems that increase
instability in the region.”
Adm. Mullen then referred to Kashmir as one such problem to underline that if India-
Pakistan tensions decreased, it “allowed the Pakistani leadership to focus on the west
[border with Afghanistan].” He regretted that the terror attack in Mumbai raised India-
Pakistan tensions, and “in the near term, that might force the Pakistani leadership to lose
interest in the west,” apart from the likelihood of a nuclear flashpoint. Interestingly, he
gave credit to the Pakistani top brass for its recent cooperation in the tribal areas which,
he said, has had a “positive impact” on the anti-Taliban operations.
The Pentagon’s number one soldier has legitimised an idea that was straining to be born
— U.S. mediatory mission in South Asia. Adm. Mullen announced that the U.S. was
doubling its force level in Afghanistan from the present strength of 32,000 troops. The
Afghan war is about to intensify. All this comes in the wake of the recent hint by Senator
John Kerry that the appointment of a U.S. special envoy for South Asia by the Obama
administration is on the cards.
The time has indeed come to carefully assess the U.S. motivations in widening the gyre
of the Afghan war, which commenced seven years ago as a vengeful hunt for Osama bin
Laden and metamorphosed into a “war on terror.” What is in it for India? It is very
obvious that the U.S. thought process on a “regional approach” to the Afghan problem
and the appointment of a South Asia envoy go hand in hand. The U.S. design confronts
India with a three-fold challenge: it insists that India is a protagonist in the U.S.-led war;
India-Pakistan relationship is a crucial factor of regional security and stability which
directly affects the U.S. interests and, therefore, necessitates an institutionalised
American mediatory role; and, it asserts a U.S. obligation to be involved in “nation-
building” in South Asia on a long-term footing.
Vulnerable to U.S. pressure - Islamabad will be chuckling with pleasure. The parameters
of its foreign policy, which Indian diplomacy rubbished for decades, are finally gaining
habitation and name. The heart of the matter is that India has made itself vulnerable to
U.S. pressure. Of all Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries that are exposed to the danger
of militancy, India is the only “non-combatant” threatened with a spill-over. The Central
Asian countries bordering Amu Darya, though much weaker than India, have
marvellously insulated themselves from the pernicious fallout from the Hindu Kush. So
has China’s Xinjiang. So indeed has Iran despite robust efforts by the U.S.-British
intelligence to inject the virus of terrorism into its eastern provinces. Certainly, Moscow
managed to insulate Chechnya too.
Alas, India stands out as the solitary exception. If diplomacy is the first line of national
defence, there have been shortfalls. The slide began, in retrospect, when the Indian
foreign policy seriously erred in 2001 while assessing the implications of the U.S.’ march
into Afghanistan. Except India, the regional powers that took part in the Bonn conference
in December 2001 seem to have had a Plan B. Our diplomats blithely travelled in the
U.S. bandwagon as one-dimensional men fixated over Pakistan, comfortable in their
assumption that the underpinning of a strong “partnership” with the U.S. elevated India
from the morass of its regional milieu, opening up in front of it a brave new world as the
pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean region. They remained sure that Pakistan would
be a passing aberration in the U.S. regional policy, whereas India would be a life-long
blissful partner. And all that was needed was for us to keep an obscure back channel to
Pakistan from time to time.
The cold blast of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai scatters these facile assumptions. After
all, the accumulated debris of India-Pakistan tensions did not go away and the past four
years have been a chronicle of wasted time, as the relationship is in ground zero. The
Mumbai attacks underscore that the Afghan war has crossed the Khyber and is stealthily
reaching the fertile Indo-Gangetic plains. Our opinion still underestimates the gravity of
the unfolding crisis by visualising it as merely an India-Pakistan dogfight, which it
certainly is but is far from everything. Adm. Mullen has done a signal service by starkly
placing the crisis in its setting.
Fortunately, we stopped in the nick of time from plunging into the Afghan cauldron via a
military intervention from which there would have been no turning back. This fortuitous
happenstance leaves us some options to incrementally step back from becoming part of
the lethal brew that the witches are concocting in the Hindu Kush.
Way ahead - What is to be done? First, we need to realise that the Afghan war is a classic
Clausewitzean affair politics by other means. The U.S. has ensured a permanent presence
in the strategic highlands of the Pamir mountains. Even the current highly simulated
disruption of transit routes for NATO supplies via the Pakistani territory is providing a
pretext for the establishment of fresh U.S. military presence in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan and in the Caucasus for the first time ever. While the U.S.’ close partnership
with the Pakistani military continues intact, the search for new supply routes becomes the
perfect backdrop for ruthlessly expanding American influence in the Russian and Chinese
(and Iranian) backyards in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
This signifies a great leap forward for NATO, which is poised to wade ashore from the
Black Sea into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Also, the U.S. is effectively undercutting
the raison d’etre of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation. In short, the “war on terror” is providing a convenient rubric
under which the U.S. is incrementally securing for itself a permanent abode in the
highlands of the Pamirs, the Central Asian steppes and the Caucasus that form the
strategic hub overlooking Russia, China, India and Iran.
We must, therefore, be vigilant about the veiled U.S. threat of reopening the “Kashmir
file,” which Admiral Mullen held out. It aims at keeping India off balance. Plainly put,
the U.S. faces a real geopolitical challenge in the region only in the eventuality of a
coalition of like-minded regional powers like Russia, China, Iran and India taking shape
and these powers seriously beginning to exchange notes on what the Afghan war has so
far been about and where it is heading and what the U.S. strategy aims at. So far, the U.S.
has succeeded in stalling such a process by “sorting out” these regional powers
individually. Indeed, Washington has been a net beneficiary of the contradictions in the
mutual relations between these regional powers.
If Barack Obama genuinely wants to end the bloodshed and the suffering in Afghanistan,
tackle terrorism effectively and enduringly, as well as stabilise Afghanistan and secure
South Asia as a stable region, all he needs to do is to turn away from the great game, and
instead seek an inclusive inter-Afghan settlement facilitated by a genuine regional peace
process. The existential choice is whether he will break with the past U.S. policies out of
principle. Surely, as Adm. Mullen’s statements underscore, Mr. Obama will run into the
vested interests of the U.S. security establishment, the military-industrial complex, Big
Oil and the influential corpus of cold warriors who are bent on pressing ahead. India
must, therefore, take note that the war in the Hindu Kush enters a decisive phase for the
New American Century project.
Independent policy - The need arises for India to revive close consultations with Russia
and Iran with which we have profound shared concerns over the Afghan problem and
regional security. We must steer an independent policy towards Iran as a factor of
regional stability. It is not in the interests of Russia, Iran and India to abandon
Afghanistan to the U.S.-U.K.-Pakistan-Saudi condominium. They must use their
influence on Afghan groups to chisel a regional peace initiative. In a helpful departure,
China also took a differentiated approach to the recent U.N. Security Council move
regarding Pakistani militant outfits, which we must take note of and build on. Finally, of
course, while there is a time for everything, India must eventually resume the arduous
search to make Pakistan a stakeholder in good neighbourly relations. The U.S. factor
complicates this search, which is best undertaken bilaterally.
The wheel has come full circle. Those who sold us the dream of a U.S.-India strategic
partnership are nowhere to be seen. (The writer is a former ambassador and Indian
Foreign Service officer.)
Why Pakistan's military is gun shy
Asia Times Online - By Syed Saleem Shahzad - December 24, 2008 - KARACHI

The attack on Mumbai on November 26 by Pakistan-linked militants opens a similar

opportunity for India to what happened to Washington after the September 11, 2001,
attacks on the United States. The US was able to further its regional designs with global
support and was able to coerce Islamabad into cracking down on its own strategic
partner, the Taliban in Afghanistan.
New Delhi also now has the international community on its side, but Pakistan is in a very
different position from where it was seven years ago, and the new political and military
leaders are not in a position to take similar steps to those of their predecessors.
In a new round of international pressure following the Mumbai attack, the chairman of
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, arrived in Pakistan this week to meet
with senior Pakistani officials. The chief of Interpol was also scheduled to visit Islamabad
on Tuesday to discuss the mechanism for the arrest and interrogation of wanted people
such as Zakiur Rahman, the chief of the Lashka-e-Toiba (LET), which was connected to
the militants who attacked Mumbai; Maulana Masood Azhar of the outlawed Jaish-e-
Mohammed and former Mumbai underworld kingpin Dawood Ibrahim.
India is reported to have mobilized forces near the Rajasthan-Sindh Pakistani border
areas and Pakistani intelligence sources have talked of possible surgical strikes on
militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and in Lahore, at the central offices of
the Jamaatut Dawa, which this month was declared by the United Nations Security
Council a front for the LET, which is banned as a terror group. The Pakistan Air Force
has been placed on red alert.
Earlier, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, both in public statements and private
meetings, urged Pakistan to understand the gravity of the current situation and to take
immediate steps to stop terrorists from using its soil for attacking others. The US warned
Pakistan that in the absence of appropriate steps, it would be hard for the US to prevent
Delhi from carrying out strikes inside Pakistan in retaliation for the Mumbai attack in
which 10 militants held the city hostage for three days and killed 175 people, including
top police officials.
In a speech at Washington's Council on Foreign Relations, Rice said what Pakistan had
done so far to catch those responsible for the attacks in Mumbai was not enough. "You
need to deal with the terrorism problem," she said when asked what her message was to
Pakistan. "And it's not enough to say these are non-state actors. If they’re operating from
Pakistani territory, then they have to be dealt with."
According to reports, Islamabad has assured Indian leaders and international leaders such
as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown that it is ready to take all steps demanded by the
world community to avoid a war.
All the same, actions speak louder than words and the prevailing opinion in Western
capitals and in New Delhi is that Pakistan will not undertake any real crackdown on
militants.
This view is reinforced by the contradictory statements of Pakistani officials. On
December 7, Pakistani authorities issued a statement that Azhar, the founder of the Jaish-
e-Mohammad, had been placed under house arrested at his Bahawalpur residence in
Punjab. But on December 17, first the Pakistan envoy to New Delhi and then Pakistani
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stunned everybody by saying that Azhar was at
large and not in Pakistan.
Azhar, a firebrand orator in favor of jihad although he has never been a combatant, was
arrested in India in 1994 over his connections with the Kashmiri separatist group
Harkatul Mujahideen. In December 1999, Azhar was freed along with separatist
guerrillas Mushtaq Zargar and Omar Shiekh (the abductor of US reporter Daniel Pearl in
Karachi in 2002) by the Indian government in exchange for passengers on the hijacked
Indian Airlines Flight 814 that was held hostage in Kandahar, Afghanistan, under Taliban
control.
In 2000, Azhar, claimed by Pakistan to have never entered Pakistan, announced the
formation of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, at a press briefing at the Karachi Press Club, along
with the now slain Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai. Jaish was banned in 2002 under US
pressure, but Azhar remained close to the Pakistani establishment, mainly because he
refused to support al-Qaeda against the Pakistan military.
Following the Mumbai attack, Delhi has demanded that Azhar, along with others such as
Dawood, be handed over. This was refused by Pakistan, which said Azhar was a
Pakistani national and had never been tried by Indian authorities. Then came the surprise
announcement that he was not even in Pakistan.
What complicates the situation is the lack of unity between the civilian government in
Islamabad and the military. The government managed to get the international community
to support it by having the Jamaatut Dawa declared a front for the LET to justify a
crackdown on the organization against the will of the army. (See Pakistan's military takes
a big hit Asia Times Online, December 13.)
But the military establishment, which has been humiliated over the past seven years, has
good reasons not to back the government.
The problems started after September 11, when the US forced the then-military
government of president General Pervez Musharraf to abandon the Taliban. Up to 2001,
Afghanistan had virtually been a fifth Pakistani province for which Pakistan arranged
day-to-day expenditures. Even the communications network was run by the Pakistan
Telecommunication Corporation Limited.
By 2003, Pakistan had been forced to send the army into the restive tribal areas bordering
Afghanistan to crack down on al-Qaeda and militants, in breach of its agreements with
the tribes.
In 2004, Pakistan was forced to shut militant camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir
and to accept India's fencing of the Line of Control that separates the two Kashmirs. As a
result, militant operations into India-administered Kashmir were badly interrupted.
When Pakistan changed its Afghan policy, Musharraf, who was also chief of army staff,
informed all jihadi organizations that the policy was necessary to preserve Pakistan's
interests in Kashmir. However, when the Kashmir policy changed and operations started
in the tribal areas, the jihadi organizations reacted.
By 2005, all the big names in the LET had left the Kashmiri camps and taken up in the
North and South Waziristan tribal areas. The same happened with Jaish and other
organizations. The most respected name of the Kashmiri struggle, Maulana Ilyas
Kashmiri, the commander of Harkatul Jihad al-Islami, also moved to Waziristan.
This was the beginning of serious problems for Pakistan and also resulted in a change in
the dynamics of the Afghan war. Trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence's India
cell, these disgruntled militants caused havoc in Afghanistan and played a significant role
in bringing the latest guerrilla tactics to Afghanistan. They also introduced major changes
in the fighting techniques of the tribal militants against the Pakistani forces.
By 2006, the Taliban had regrouped and launched the spring offensive that paved the way
for significant advances over the next two years. At the same time, militants escalated
their activities in Pakistan and forced Pakistan into virtual neutrality in the US-led "war
on terror".
An unprecedented number of attacks were carried out on Pakistani security forces in
2007 and by February 2008 suicide attacks in Pakistan outnumbered those in Iraq.
Militants carried out dozens of attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
(NATO's) supply lines from Karachi, virtually bringing them to a halt. According to
Strategic Forecasting, a Texas-based private intelligence entity: "Pakistan remains the
single-most important logistics route for the Afghan campaign. This is not by accident. It
is by far the quickest and most efficient overland route to the open ocean."
In this situation, the only peaceful place in Pakistan is Punjab, the largest province and
the seat of government. But this peace can only be ensured through central Punjabi jihadi
leaders like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of the LET and southern Punjabi jihadi leader
Azhar. Azhar has influence in the jihadi networks in Punjab and he convinced jihadis,
after a wave of suicide attacks in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad, to go to
Afghanistan and spare Punjab.
The highly demoralized Pakistan army has failed in the tribal areas and in the Swat
Valley it has had to solicit peace accords. Opening up a new front in Punjab, which could
spread to the port city of Karachi - the financial lifeline of the country - would be a
disaster.
This explains the military's resistance to the government push to go full out against
militancy, a move that would also compromise NATO's lifeline to Afghanistan.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief.
Taliban ban female education in Pakistan's Swat district

Irish Sun - Wednesday 24th December, 2008

Islamic militants have imposed a ban on female education and warned teachers of severe
consequences if any girl is seen heading for a school in the restive Swat district of
Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, local residents said Wednesday.
The announcement was made Friday by a spokesman of radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah
- who has waged armed struggle to impose Taliban rule in the district - on a pirated FM
radio frequency regularly used by the militants.
'All the private and government schools have been given a 15-day deadline to close down
the female education facilities. They have also banned women from visiting markets,'
Mohammad Osman, a school teacher and social worker, told DPA.
'We have no choice but to follow the orders. The government cannot give us protection.
Taliban have established a parallel government in 90 percent area of the district and they
execute everyone who opposes them,' he added.
Pakistan deployed more than 30,000 troops to quell Fazlullah's rebellion in October, but
the government has not been able to establish its writ in the district. Hundreds of troops,
insurgents and civilians have died in the continuing clashes.
Rebels have blown up or torched hundreds of girls' schools over the last 14 months while
female teachers regularly receive threats.
'From 9.00 in the morning till 3.00 in the afternoon, you can see military patrolling the
streets of some towns. As they leave, Taliban take over and for the rest of the day and
night they rule the area,' said Osman.
US needs to use clout with Islamabad
Times of India, India, 25 Dec 2008 - NEW DELHI
It's become more necessary than ever before for the US to step in and use its considerable
influence with Pakistan -- including its steady financing of its
army -- to rein in the jehadi elements and make every effort to isolate them politically,
say foreign policy experts.
According to the experts, war mongering by Pakistan is its latest attempt to not just
backtrack from the US-led war against terror on its western border but also scuttle
Washington's plans to intensify the war against al Qaeda and Taliban in the near future.
Already, the US has pumped in $10 billion in Pakistan since 2002, bulk of which has
gone to the Pakistan military establishment. The Americans themselves have discovered
that most of this money has not been used for fighting Islamic extremists but to buy
weapons for countering India. It has bought, for instance, radars and anti-submarine
planes to track the non-existent al Qaeda air force.
This, says defence expert K Subrahmanyam, exposes the fallacy of having Pakistan as an
ally in the war against terror. "The US decision to have Pakistan as an ally in the war
against terror was always an untenable strategy. Pakistan doesn't want to cooperate fully
with the US in the war against the Taliban. It seems that it wants to prevent incoming
President Obama from pursuing his surge strategy in Afghanistan,'' says Subrahmanyam.
He adds that by not retaliating till now, India has put paid to Pakistan army's hopes of
escalating the conflict. "Chances are that the Pakistan army will facilitate more terrorist
strikes to force India to retaliate. If India retaliates, they will then use it to excuse
themselves from the war against terror. Pakistan wants the US and NATO forces to tire
out and get out of Afghanistan,'' says Subrahmanyam, adding that it's time now for the
US to consult India while formulating its strategies for Afghanistan.
The New York Times in December last year carried a report saying that much of the $5
billion that the US had spent till then to augment Pakistan army's strength against al
Qaeda and Taliban had instead been used to purchase weapons meant to be used against
India. "Apart from this, the Americans also give $300 million every year for equipment
and training. Earlier, Pervez Musharraf used the money to establish his government. The
Americans turned a blind eye to all this and continue to be taken for a ride,'' says another
expert and retired diplomat who requested anonymity.
Having pumped billions of dollars into Pakistan since 9/11, it was only a year ago that the
Pentagon realised the futility of the entire exercise, and came with a clear plan to finance
equipment and training for forces specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).
According to Subrahmanyam, the US should make Pakistan realise that if it withdraws its
army from FATA, it will risk the integrity of Pakistan. He says that the Pathans on both
sides of the border may be able to realise their dreams of having a separate nation by the
name of Pashtinistan. "The US can call their bluff by arguing that if the Pakistan Army
withdraws its forces from FATA it may risk the integrity of Pakistan. If the Taliban ousts
Americans and the NATO from Afghanistan, the secession of Pashtinistan is a virtual
certainty,'' he adds.
Why Britain Increasingly Worries About Pakistani Terrorism
U.S. News & World Report, DC - By Thomas K. Grose - Posted December 24, 2008 -
LONDON
That Britain faces a very real risk of home-grown Islamic terrorism has long been known.
But now, Prime Minister Gordon Brown has not only publicly hinted at the extent of the
problem but bluntly charged that most U.K.-based extremists are linked to Pakistan, some
3,700 miles away.
According to Brown, fully three quarters of the serious radical Islamist plots under
investigation in the United Kingdom have connections to the South Asian Muslim
country. Published reports say they total more than 20, and the government reckons that
at least 4,000 British Muslims have received training at terrorist camps in Pakistan or
Afghanistan—among them, most infamously, Mohammed Sidique Khan, one of the July
7, 2005, suicide bombers who killed 52 people in London.
Islamabad's inability to keep a lid on its extremist elements was highlighted last month
when a gang of Pakistani terrorists attacked a number of sites in Mumbai, killing more
than 170 people.
Brown described a "chain of terror that links the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan
to the streets of Britain and other countries of the world." As if to underscore Brown's
point, Rangzieb Ahmed of Manchester was convicted last week of running a three-
person, al Qaeda terrorist cell and arranging to send British citizens to training camps in
Pakistan. Another man, Habib Ahmed, was convicted of being a member of al Qaeda.
This situation poses a delicate situation here. More than a million people of Pakistani
heritage call Britain home—only Saudi Arabia has a larger Pakistani expatriate
community—and clearly the vast majority are law-abiding citizens who eschew
terrorism.
"However, there is a significant number who are radicalized," says Farzana Shaikh, an
expert on Pakistani affairs.
One question is where they are indoctrinated by violent Islamism. Is it here in the United
Kingdom or on trips to Pakistan?
"There's a lot of evidence that a lot of it takes place in the U.K.," says Gareth Price, head
of the Asia Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. For
instance, Britain's prison system has been called a breeding ground for budding Islamic
extremists.
Then again, young British Pakistanis who fall into trouble with alcohol or drugs are
sometimes sent by their parents to stay with relatives in Pakistan to straighten them out.
"And they are vulnerable to brainwashing there," Price adds.
Shaikh says that "economic deprivation" and "social exclusion" among British Pakistanis
may play a role in radicalizing the community's young men. Many of Britain's Pakistanis
are not fully integrated into wider society. They live in low-income neighborhoods where
joblessness is high and poor education rampant.
But that's also true for some of Britain's other Asian Muslim communities, such as the
Bangladeshis. Though they tend to be marginalized, too, their communities are not
hotbeds of radicalism. "That says something about Pakistan," Price says. "That it's not a
Muslim problem in general."
One factor may be that more than half of Britain's Pakistanis have ancestral ties to
Kashmir, the disputed territory that's a source of tension between Pakistan and India. So
it's possible that resentment over that festering feud plays a role in turning some young
British Pakistanis toward Islamism. The now banned Pakistani extremist group Lashkar-
e-Taiba, blamed for the Mumbai terrorist attack, has targeted India in the past as part of
its campaign to force India to give up its claim to largely Muslim Kashmir.
But Shaikh argues that anger over Britain's role in the Iraq war has been a far more potent
marketing tool for Islamic extremists: "There's no question that the war in Iraq has
radicalized many [British] Muslims."
On a trip to Pakistan last week, Brown offered President Asif Ali Zardari a "pact against
terror." He proposed that Britain would help train Pakistani security forces in bomb-
disposal and anti-car-bomb tactics and help them work to improve airport security. The
pact would also include $9 million ineducational materials to help counter antiwestern
propaganda dispersed by Pakistan's militants.
The "hearts and minds" educational element of the pact is a good idea, Shaikh says,
because many Pakistani children are subjected to Islamist "brainwashing" at the more
radical mosque schools, or madrasahs. The problem, however, could be getting the
materials and teachers to where they're most needed. Many of the worst-offending
madrasahs are in the country's vast tribal areas that border Afghanistan, a mountainous,
inhospitable nether world where al Qaeda and the Taliban are resurgent.
Britain says it wants to help Pakistan root out and quash its terrorist camps; it also wants
permission for British police to pursue terrorist suspects in Pakistan. "That's not likely to
happen," Price says, because Pakistan's intelligence network probably won't cooperate.
Elements within Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency and its military
are suspected of abetting some terrorist factions, particularly Lashkar-e-Taiba, in the past.
Zardari has pledged that he won't allow Pakistan to become a terrorist launching pad.
"But so far he's been unwilling or unable to crack down" on the extremists, Shaikh says.
And that's a home-grown problem for both Zardari and Brown.
[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view
or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The
collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources
is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the
responsibility of the original source.]

Broad-based Afghan govt idea supported

By Abdul Sami Paracha

KOHAT, Oct 7: Mohammad Chamkani Sharano, who served as a senator for four years
during former king Zahir Shah’s rule in Afghanistan, has said that the only solution to the
Afghan imbroglio lies in the establishment of a broad-based government under Zahir
Shah, and urged the Taliban to accept the international community’s demand and save the
country and its people from further devastation.

In an exclusive interview with Dawn at his residence in KDA Township on Sunday, Mr

Sharano said that all ethnic groups should be given representation in the government, and
added that the Taliban had only been ruling and conquering the land and not the hearts of
Afghans.

The Taliban had now lost the support of UAE and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was also
annoyed by their non-cooperation in handling the present crisis.

Mr Sharano said that efforts of the international community for the formation of a broad-
based government were praiseworthy and had the support of majority of Afghans because
the people had become sick of the situation in their homeland prevailing for the last two
decades.

Afghan refugees, living in Pakistan and elsewhere, wanted peace in their homeland so
that they could return, and this was possible only if Zahir Shah came back to Kabul, he
added.

Mr Sharano said that whenever an attempt was made by any party in Afghanistan to rule
the country without the active participation of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other ethnic groups,
results had been disastrous.

Why the Gorkhas could solve the Afghan

imbroglio
May 13, 2010 20:59 IST
Tags: Pakistan, Osama bin laden, Taliban, Gorkhas, US
Share
thisHYPERLINK "http://mypage.rediff.com/qna?article_url=http%3A%2F
%2Fnews.rediff.com%2Fcolumn%2F2010%2Fmay%2F12%2Fwhy-the-gorkhas-could-
solve-the-afghan-imbroglio.htm&article_title=Why%20the%20Gorkhas%20could
%20solve%20the%20Afghan%20imbroglio"
Ask
UsersHYPERLINK \l "write"
Write a
Comment
Leaving Afghanistan to the tender mercies of the Taliban [ Images ] and the
Pakistan army [ Images ] could mean another 9/11-like attack -- only this time with
nuclear weapons, writes Colonel Dr Anil Athale (retd).

Even as Afghan President Hamid Karzai [ Images ] met US President Barack Obama [
Images ] in Washington on Thursday, the Americans continue their search for a way out
of Af-Pak quagmire. Unfortunately the whole Af-Pak debate is so stuck in economical
truth and selective memory that a clear understanding of the problem is necessary before
we think of an out of box solution. While the problem that the US faces is tough, it must
be clearly understood that it is India that will face the repercussions of an adverse
outcome in Afghanistan.
The US went into Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy Al Qaeda [ Images ] and dethrone the
Taliban who sheltered them. Taliban were jointly-fathered creatures of the US and
Pakistan during operation 'Cyclone' (1979-89).
It is also clear that Al Qaeda-Taliban, located in landlocked Afghanistan, could only
carry out their global jihad with access provided by a complicit Pakistan. It was an Af-
Pak problem in 2001 itself, complicated by the nuclear weapons with Pakistan. Again the
Pakistani nuclear weapons were a joint Cold War enterprise between the US and China to
create a balance with India that was in Soviet camp and a nuclear power since 1974.
The twin Frankensteins -- nukes and Taliban -- were created during jihad 1.0 when
madarassas were funded by American dollars, the Mujahideen were the good guys,
Pakistani dictator Zia-ul-Haq was the defender of freedom and a certain Osama bin laden
[ Images ], a valued ally.
In Jihad 2.0 on since 2001, America is again throwing dollars to check and shut down
madarssas, re-brainwash the fanatical youth and is worried about Pakistan's nukes.
The cardinal mistake the US made is to ignore the Afghan/Pak past. For most of the
people world over, war is a business to be gotten over and peace is the goal. While for the
Afghans and Pakistani tribesmen, it is a way of life, sport and normal condition.
If not fighting against foreigners then they fight amongst themselves. John Masters in his
autobiographical Bugles and the Tiger (published by Michael Joseph Ltd, London [
Images ] 1956) has drawn a vivid picture of the battles the British fought there in 1936-
37. In this case the history seems to repeat itself with vengeance.
John Masters writes of the British-Afghan battles in 1937, "The terms ruthlessness and
brutality was a relative and the definition used on the frontier was the Pathan definition.
The Pathan's mined and booby-trapped the roads with dud shells and grenades (what we
call Improvised Explosive Devices today). They never took prisoners but mutilated,
skinned alive and beheaded any prisoners they took."
"The troops found that a British officer taken prisoner was flayed while still alive and his
skin pegged on the rocks near the British camp."
Masters writes that the Gorkhas, then fighting for the British, replied in kind and would
peg a prisoner to the ground in the hot sun with every passerby kicking him till he died of
thirst and repeated blows.
But there is another and uncanny similarity between the present and events of 1937. I am
referring to the case of Pir of Ippi. The Pir revolted against the British on November 25,
1936, called it jihad and for the next 12 years Waziri and Mehsud tribesmen, less than
1,000 in number, kept a well-equipped British Army of 40,000 engaged. At the time of
independence in 1947, the Pir remained free and finally died of old age in 1960.
The British managed to control the situation in two years time mainly with the Indian
army [ Images ] troops, the Gorkhas and Sikhs. The tribals at that time were armed with
primitive guns and were perpetually short of ammunition. Once jihad was declared it
became impossible to 'buy' tribes, as loyalty to faith was above all.
Cut to the 21st century. Thanks to Jihad I, the frontier area is flush with arms and
ammunition. The tribal is as well equipped as the soldier. Add to this his native skill in
the use of terrain and local knowledge and you have a formidable foe. Mountainous
terrain neutralises technology. Like the Pir of Ippi, Osama Bin Laden remains out of
reach of the Americans even after nine years of fighting.
The Americans seem to have underestimated the influence of religion and ideological
sympathy for the jihad's objectives, though not methods, that ordinary Muslims feel. It is
also doubtful if economic aid package could deal with the issue of extremism. It is true
that economic hardships helps extremism gain recruits, but economic prosperity is no bar
to extremism. The cases ranging from 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta, to a million rupee
salary earner like Mansoor Peerbhoy of the Indian Mujahideen [ Images ] and the recent
would-be bomber of Time Square in New York Faisal Shahzad, were motivated by
factors other than poverty.
In fact, all of them belonged to well-to-do families of the so-called moderates (Faisal is
son of a retired air vice marshal of the Pakistan air force). Given the above analysis, it is
extremely doubtful if the American strategy in Af-Pak will succeed.
What is needed is a strategy of containment in the area with efficient and adequate boots
on the ground. Just like the Pathans, the Gorkhas too love fighting and soldiering. In
mountain operations, they have no peers. Not for nothing, did the British trust the
Gorkhas when Prince William [ Images ] did duty in Afghanistan.
The situation in Afghanistan needs to be controlled for at least 20 years or so in the
interest of world peace and security. It is time to think of a Peace Enforcement Force
under the UN to occupy and keep the barbaric tribesmen in check. This force cannot be
operating with its hands tied like the UN peacekeepers, who operate under strict
conditions of engagement.
Instead what is being suggested is a Korea-like UN intervention. The task will be carried
out at a fraction of the cost of NATO forces -- which are ineffective any way. The Indian
army has the facilities to train these forces at existing regimental centres and the
officering pattern of these forces could well be based on international cadres. As a bonus,
the situation in Nepal will automatically stabilise, for the 'real' problem in Nepal is not
Maoism but unemployment and poverty. Much like the Swiss in the middle ages, the
Gorkhas could well be the guardians of peace!
On an informal employment, the Gorkahs are already doing these jobs from Europe to
Hong Kong! What is suggested is institutionalising a Gorkha force at an international
level.
This is just the basic idea and much work will have to be done to give it practical shape.
Yet, leaving Afghanistan to the tender mercies of Taliban and Pakistan army will mean
return to pre 9/11 situation and risking another 9/11 like attack in the future, only this
time with nuclear weapons.
Colonel Dr Anil Athale (retd) is a former joint director, war studies, ministry of
defence, and co-ordinator of the Pune-based Initiative for Peace and Disarmament.
Colonel Dr Anil Athale (retd)
Pak seen as a key to Afghan conundrum
Asif Haroon Raja

The main objective of USA to occupy Afghanistan in November 2001 was to break the myth
that Afghanistan is unconquerable, tame the Afghans and convert it into a permanent military
base for the realization of its regional and global ambitions. After eight years of fighting the sole
aim of the US is how to pullout its forces from self created Afghan quagmire safely and
honorably. Till 9/11, India taking advantage of its relationship with USA, painted Pakistan as a
failed state, abettor of cross border terrorism in occupied Kashmir and involved in
manufacturing an Islamic bomb. The US obliged India partly by placing Pakistan in the watch
list of countries suspected of indulging in terrorism and keeping it under harsh sanctions.

9/11 helped India achieve what it could never have in normal course. New rules on global
terrorism framed by USA and doctrine of pre-emption and shock and awe conceived by George
W. Bush Administration helped India to convert Kashmir freedom struggle into terrorism, brand
Pakistan as an extremist state indulging in international terrorism and in nuclear proliferation.
Pakistan’s nuclear capability was projected as a threat to world peace. The US helped India in
regaining and expanding its influence in Afghanistan to be able to encircle Pakistan and to put
into operation the devised game plan. Themes of extremism, terrorism and nuclear proliferation
appealed to the jittery senses of western audience fearful of Islamists and also fitted into the
policy framework of new rules injected in New World Order in which Islam figured as the chief
threat to US imperialism and capitalist oriented international order. There was clear cut
mutuality of interests between the four strategic partners USA, UK, Israel and India. Pakistan did
not fit into George Bush doctrine but was accepted as a tactical coalition partner on condition of
taking upon itself the most hazardous task of frontline state. It was to be kept within the loop till
the realization of US short term gains and then dropped like a hot potato at an opportune time.
Although the ground situation made it crystal clear that Pakistan had been turned from an ally
into a target from 2005 onwards, our short-vision leaders infatuated with friendship of US and
India ignored repeated warnings of saner elements and kept pursuing US agenda under the false
hope that such a recourse would be beneficial for Pakistan. They received the whips without a
whimper and shut their eyes to Indian ingresses into Pakistan merely to remain in their good
books. As a consequence, flames of terrorism engulfed each and every part of Pakistan and
caused colossal human and material losses.

To the utter bad luck of people of Pakistan, even the new leaders whom they had elected with
fond hopes brought no change in the highly damaging policies. They too took no notice of the
deadly game of our adversaries’, hell bent to destabilize, denuclearize and balkanize Pakistan
and continued to follow the dictates of US energetically. Already reeling under the impact of
fruitless war on terror, Pakistan’s position became more fragile when its economy collapsed and
the country fell into the clasp of IMF. I have not an iota of doubt that the US gave all out support
to India and would have continued to support its filibustering, blackmailing tactics and covert
operations till the accomplishment of laid down sinister objectives against Pakistan had the
security situation in Afghanistan not spun out of control and US economy nosedived radically
making the stay of coalition forces dangerous. Afghanistan became the proverbial Achilles heel
of USA and military defeat at the hands of rag tag Taliban became a reality. Decision to
© Pakistan Observer 1998-
2009, Home | Top Stories | National
All rights reserved

Pakistani Authority Uses EIR's Solution

to the Afghan Imbroglio
Oct. 16 (EIRNS)—In an interview with the Indian news agency Rediff, the chief
secretary of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Rustam Shah Mohmand, said
that the United States and the Afghan Taliban must come to an agreement. A benchmark
is not a prerequisite to that, he said, but "these benchmarks have to be set up by a contact
group comprising countries such as Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and India."

The chief secretary's remarks are the exact replica of formulation that EIR had presented
in its Oct. 16, 2009 issue. That article, titled "The Solution to the Afghan Imbroglio," has
been widely circulated in India and Pakistan.

During his interview, Mohmand pointed out certain other facts that EIR has stressed
repeatedly, but which have been ignored by both the previous and the present U.S.
administrations. "We have to understand that the Taliban and the al-Qaeda have totally
different targets," he said, "and also that the Afghan Taliban are different from the
Pakistani Taliban--and there is evidence of this." He said the fear is that if the United
States leaves Afghanistan, the country will fall into the hands of the Taliban. But that is
not so, because "the Afghan people are not Taliban. But yes, there is a national liberation
struggle on in Afghanistan against forces of occupation. And even ordinary Afghans have
risen up against them."

He also noted that "the Afghan Taliban have been telling the Pakistani Taliban not to
attack government forces and installations. But the Pakistani Taliban have not paid heed
to this advice," the reason for this being--although Mohmand did not point it out--that the
Pakistani Taliban is under control of the Saudi-British nexus.
Comprehensive solution
needed for Afghan
imbroglio
2009-03-28 00:41:45 GMT2009-03-28 08:41:45 (Beijing
Time) xinhuanet
by Lin Jing, Abdul Haleem
KABUL, March 28 (Xinhua) -- War-battered Afghanistan has gradually become a center
of instability in the region since U.S.-led troops' invasion in 2001.
The more than 70,000-strong U.S.-led coalition force and the NATO-led ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) have been stationed in the country, but unabated
fighting in Afghanistan and the resurgence of the Taliban have already killed 1,115
foreign troops.
The civilian death exceeded 2,000 in 2008.
Observers believe that Afghanistan would witness an up tick in violence and riots in
2009, as the U.S. government has approved the sending of an additional 17,000 troops to
the country and the date for the Afghan presidential election, scheduled for August,
approaches.
The Taliban have called on Afghans to boycott the polls and vowed to intensify fighting,
fearing that the elections would generate another "puppet regime" appointed by the U.S.
and its allies.
In fact, disappointed Afghans have been suffering as the government has failed to provide
an adequate security environment for the country's economic reconstruction.
High unemployment has been a key factor driving up crime, armed robberies and suicide
attacks in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Afghans have been fed up with foreign troops' operations which often show
disregard for their religious and cultural values.
Arbitrary house searches and arrests during the international troops' military operations
against Taliban insurgents have disappointed Afghans and prompted President Hamid
Karzai to condemn the act and call on the U.S. and NATO troops to coordinate
operations with Afghan forces.
Currently, the Afghan army has around 90,000 troops and the Afghan National Police has
about 80,000 members. But neither of them are well-trained to combat rampant militants.
The failure to ensure stability in Afghanistan through military means has prompted the
Obama administration to work out wider and comprehensive approaches which
reportedly include reconciling with moderate oppositions, accelerating the reconstruction
process, alleviating poverty, enhancing the operational capacity of Afghan security
forces, enlisting support from neighboring countries, and even an "exit plan."
"A comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan -- including an exit plan -- is key to America's
"No. 1 mission" of preventing an attack on the U.S., its interests or its allies," President
Barack Obama said in an interview on Sunday.
EMAIL | PRINT | RSS

NATO SG: Military alone no solution to

Afghan problem
2009-08-06 08:03 BJT
Special Report: Afghan presidential election |