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A
NTITRUST
E
NFORCEMENT AND
I
NTELLECTUAL
P
ROPERTY
R
IGHTS
:
Promoting Innovation and Competition
I
SSUED BY THE
U.S.
D
EPARTMENT OF
J
USTICEAND THE
F
EDERAL
T
RADE
C
OMMISSION
A
PRIL
2007
This Report should be cited as:U.S.
D
EP
’
T OF
J
USTICE
&
F
ED
.
T
RADE
C
OMM
’
N
,
A
NTITRUST
E
NFORCEMENT AND
I
NTELLECTUAL
P
ROPERTY
R
IGHTS
:
P
ROMOTING
I
NNOVATION AND
C
OMPETITION
(2007).This Report can be accessed electronically at:www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdfwww.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................1
CHAPTER 1:THE STRATEGIC USE OF LICENSING: UNILATERAL REFUSALS TOLICENSE PATENTS
.................................................15I.Introduction.........................................................15II. The
Kodak
and
CSU
Decisions..........................................16A.The Basic Facts and Holdings of the Cases..................16B.Panelist Views on
Kodak
..................................17C.Panelist Views on
CSU
...................................18D.Ambiguity as to the Scope of the Patent Grant..............19III. Policy Issues Relating to Unilateral Refusals to License...................20A.Should Antitrust Law Accord Special Treatment to Patents?..21B.Should Market Power Be Presumed with Patents?...........22C.If an Antitrust Violation Were Found, Would ThereBe Workable Remedies for Unconditional, UnilateralRefusals to License Patents?..............................22D.What Would Be the Effect of Liability for Refusals toLicense Patents on Incentives to Innovate?..................23E.Competitive Effects of Refusals to License Patents...........24IV.Legal Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Patents...................25A.Does Section 271(d)(4) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code Createan Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to License Patents?......25B.When Do Refusals to License Patents Violate theAntitrust Laws?.........................................27V.Conclusion..........................................................31
CHAPTER 2:COMPETITION CONCERNS WHEN PATENTS ARE INCORPORATEDINTO COLLABORATIVELY SET STANDARDS
.......................33I.Background and Introduction..........................................33
Sections
« prev | next »- INTRODUCTION
- I. INTRODUCTION
- A.The Basic Facts and Holdings of the
- B.Panelist Views on Kodak
- V.CONCLUSION
- INTO COLLABORATIVELY SET STANDARDS
- A.Use of Disclosure Rules to Deter
- B. Use of Licensing Rules to Deter
- 1. Use of RAND Licensing
- 2. Royalty-Free Licensing Standards
- 2. Group Buying Power
- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. PORTFOLIO CROSS LICENSES
- Portfolio cross licenses are
- A. Efficiencies
- B. Competitive Concerns
- C. Analysis
- III. PATENT POOLS
- competitive concern
- 2. The Summit-VISX Pool
- 1. Substitutes Within a Patent Pool
- 3. Grantbacks
- 4. Access to Information
- 5. Royalties for the Pool’s Patents
- 6. Requests for Partial-Pool Licenses
- IV. CONCLUSION
- II.NON-ASSERTION CLAUSES
- III.GRANTBACKS
- A.Efficiencies of Grantbacks
- VII.CONCLUSION
- OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
- Intellectual Property Bundling
- IV.CONCLUSION
- IV.THE AGENCIES’ ANALYSIS
- HEARINGS PARTICIPANTS
- HEARINGS SUBMISSIONS
- Competition and Intellectual Property
- Law and Policy as It Relates to the
- PUBLIC COMMENTS
- HEARINGS TRANSCRIPTS
- UNITED STATES CODE
- CITED CASES AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN REPORT
- INDEX
- Acknowledgments:
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