KSC2

LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE
NFL Topic, January-February 2010
Dr. John F. Schunk, Editor
“Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.”
AFFIRMATIVE
A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS
A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL
A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD
A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS
A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY
A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS
A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY
A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR
A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE
A11. IRAN
A12. NORTH KOREA
A13. CUBA
A14. MYANMAR (BURMA)
A15. IRAQ
A16. RUSSIA
A17. SOUTH AFRICA
A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN
NEGATIVE
N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE
N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE
N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE
N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE
N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE
N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY
N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES
N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS
N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY
N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR
N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE
N12. IRAN
N13. NORTH KOREA
N14. CUBA
N15. MYANMAR (BURMA)
N16. LIBYA
N17. SOUTH AFRICA
N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN
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SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS
1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL
SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.],
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60.
Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target
countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott,
1990; Pape, 1997).
SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia],

POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic
sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the
effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are
ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967;
Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998).
SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The
consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.”
SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic
sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is
demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown
by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the
burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but
also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries.
2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME
SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful,
silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from
other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First,
sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997).
SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876.

Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success
in changing national policies.
3. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL
SK/A01.07) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Second, sanctions as a means of punishment and
isolation rarely succeed. Indeed, sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to
alter the behavior of stubborn targets. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of
international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a
sanctions strategy. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons
proliferation.
4. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions
dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions. When states design sanctions,
the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite. Sanctions that are merely
symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that
lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail.
5. U.S. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE
SK/A01.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH, November 2008, pNA, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the
downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States.
Filled with countless studies, freshly updated for the new edition, it looks at some sanctions
failing to have the desired effect for the country, and how the end of the Cold War means the
United States actually has less power than it used to.
6. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL
SK/A01.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Autumn 2006, p. 70, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective, but
even multinational actions work no more than half the time, according to research cited by
Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE]. Every relevant
nation must be on board. Even then, sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the
sanctioned nation, as well as nearby trading partners. When the United Nations imposed
sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s, neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion
in damages.
SK/A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL
1. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK
SK/A02.01) Thomas J. Donohue [CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce], BUSINESS

WEEK, March 3, 2008, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Are
economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion, unilateral sanctions never work.

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. First, in this age of globalization, unilateral sanctions
seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions.
SK/A02.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho, FORBES, October 29, 2007, p. 54, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A study by the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, a Washington, D.C. think tank, says unilateral efforts to choke off
investment, trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases. Most attempts fail and end up
hurting innocent people, rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti, Serbia, Syria and Iran) and
resulting in unintended consequences, like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. It's hard to
recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. The chronic
reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help.
2. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED
SK/A02.04) Mark Landler, NEW YORK TIMES, September 28, 2009, p. A1, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. "For sanctions to work, they not only have to be
multilateral, but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time," said
Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a
senior adviser to the Obama administration.
SK/A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD
1. U.S. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP
SK/A03.01) Bryan R. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard
U.], CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 25, 2009, p. 9, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In the research I have conducted on the international
response to US economic sanctions, I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the
sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. In studying more than 100 cases of
US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000, I found that the United States' allies have consistently
exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. US allies
have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries. Part of this is
because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies. It is also because these states use
their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation.
In effect, this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own
businesses.
SK/A03.02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U.] et al., WORLD ECONOMY, August
2009, p. 1223, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. We investigate the
impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a two-
level framework. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a
negative impact on EU trade (total, imports and exports). We argue that unilateral sanctions, if
extensive in nature, would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade, especially in the
stage after sanctions have been imposed. Over time, both multilateral and unilateral sanctions
lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU, lending support to the third-country
effect of sanctions.
2. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s
SK/A03.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Autumn 2006, p. 70, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in
the 1990s, Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says, and
the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions. When Congress prohibited
U.S. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993, French, Russian, Malaysian, and Chinese
companies seized the opportunity.
3. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA)
SK/A03.04) Fareed Zakaria, NEWSWEEK, October 15, 2007, p. 34, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The other effect of sanctions has been that American
firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. (This is precisely what's happened on a
larger scale in Sudan, where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields, then had
to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation, and now find that the fields
have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame
Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime, the Indians, the Thais, the Malaysians and others
have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma.
SK/A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS
1. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION
SK/A04.01) Editorial, THE TIMES (London, England), February 25, 2009, p. 2, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. But the practice of imposing economic sanctions
on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. It is to some extent
inevitable that the worst of regimes, by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms,
will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval.
2. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case.
The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. Autocracies where
oppression is almost total - such as North Korea or Burma - can allow domestic conditions to
worsen almost indefinitely, because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable.
3. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS

Academic ASAP. The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the
amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. However, this relationship remains
tenuous, since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest
also involved subsequent military intervention, as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia.
SK/A04.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Political Science, U. of Mississippi],

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2008, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p.
918. In practice, high levels of economic impact, and thus, civilian punishment have not always
resulted in compliance by the target state, as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq
demonstrate. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that
causes social suffering to be translated into political change, even in democratic states, much less
autocratic states (Jentleson 2000; Lopez 1999; Baldwin 1985). The economic hardship created by
the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to
greater focus on survival, which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995).
SK/A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY
1. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL
SK/A05.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics, U. of Wollongong, Australia]

et al., AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES, December 2008, p. 1707, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In addition to that, economic sanctions
tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government. In other words,
people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies.
Therefore, sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. 64).
2. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS

Academic ASAP. In addition, punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the
target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. The effect would tend to
entrench the target's objectionable policy, rather than moving the target further toward
compromise.
3. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. By design, sanctions shrink a country's economy. But
the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. The
result, says Robert Pape, a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging
study on the topic, is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. And it shifts resources
in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it." In
other words, the government gets stronger. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. "Even in
Iraq," says Pape, "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous
decades."
4. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT
SK/A05.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics, U. of Wollongong, Australia]

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For example, Niblock argued that
economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for
democratization (p. 64). He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap
between rich and the poor.
SK/A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS
1. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 62. First,
economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to
escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and
its constituency. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources
(typically made more scarce by the sanctions), political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to
average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss,
1999; Rowe, 2000; Cortright, Millar & Lopez, 2001).
2. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 489. Drawing on both the public choice and
institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively
impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase
repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to
augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters,
minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical
results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose
political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations.
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 59.
Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the period 1981–2000, the findings suggest that
economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom
from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment. The results also
show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective
sanctions. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are
specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Finally, multilateral sanctions
have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions.
3. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. The
extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the
negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. The research suggests that, owing to the
disproportionate economic impact on citizens, economic coercion inadvertently worsens public
health, economic conditions, the development of civil society, and education in target countries
(e.g. Galtung, 1967; Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Cortright, Millar & Lopez, 2001; Lopez &
Cortright, 1997; Cortright & Lopez, 1995).
Academic ASAP. Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human
suffering in the target country, which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to
claim the moral high ground. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against
Iraq, which, many observers argued, created great suffering among the Iraqi populace,
particularly through shortages of food and medicines.
SK/A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY
1. U.S. SANCTIONS HURT U.S. BUSINESSES
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point
well. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business
elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was
scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based
subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007. Halliburton moved
because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the
United States. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business
profitably, how can we expect them not to leave?

Academic ASAP. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please
interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. The sender adopts
the position that, rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target, it
would prefer to take a moral stand, ideally at very low domestic cost. An example is Canada's
banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South
African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place. While
such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target, occasionally
sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. This was the case
for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union, which imposed huge
costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself. The Soviet Union, however, was
easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain.
2. U.S. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U.S. JOBS
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Remarkably, some of the same congressmen who supported
the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act
in 1996, which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba. If Congress can vote to
"Buy American," why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs.
3. WAGE LOSSES OF U.S. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE
SK/A07.04) David J. Lektzian [U. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. Sprecher [Texas
A&M U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, April 2007, WILEY
INTERSCIENCE, p. 416. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition
of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state, but also to the sender nation
(Askari et al. 2003; Barber 1979;Hart 2000;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990;Wagner 1988).2
Hufbauer et al., for example, estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United
States and concluded “as a consequence of U.S. sanctions, workers probably lost somewhere
between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”. Since these costs
are lost when sanctions are imposed, and are unrecoverable, they represent sunk costs associated
with the imposition of sanctions.
SK/A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
1. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES

Academic ASAP. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international
relations, but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most
situations. Instead, alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be
considered.
2. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE

Academic ASAP. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it
may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic
damage to the sanctioning countries. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural,
athletic, scientific, or academic exchanges between states. Such sanctions usually have only very
minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals
concerned the sanctions can be significant. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott, the

Academic ASAP. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is
that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the
implementation will lead to success. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives
to comprehensive sanctions. We believe that among those alternatives, narrowly targeted
sanctions, and sometimes even non-economic sanctions, are often more likely to be effective in
achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment
flows to a target country.
SK/A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR
1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. Second, they [economic sanctions] have
failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant
collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e.g., Bhoutros-Ghafi
1995). These costs include increased unemployment, declining GNP, capital flight, lost foreign
investment, reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott
1990a; Hufbauer et al. 1997), increased corruption, drug and arms smuggling, and illegal trade
syndicates (Andreas 2005; Heine-Ellison 2001;joyner 2003), deteriorating public health
standards (Ali and Shah 2000; Garfield 2002; Garfield, Devin, and Fausey 1995; World Health
Organization 1996), and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000, 2002; Crawford
1997; Faris 1997; Hoskins 1997; Weiss 1999).
2. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets.
It was military action, not the sanctions applied to them, that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban,
and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo.
3. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR
SK/A09.03) FOREIGN POLICY, July-August 2007, p. 19. But a recent study by David
Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals
that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield.
Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that, when
sanctions are added to the mix, conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between
countries than if sanctions had not been imposed.
SK/A09.04) FOREIGN POLICY, July-August 2007, p. 19. Because countries prefer to

enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves, target countries often interpret the
action as a lack of resolve. That leads "the country being sanctioned ... [to] become almost
provocative in its actions," explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U.]. "If you try to get away with
foreign policy on the cheap, then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really
wanted because of miscommunication," adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U.],
SK/A09.05) David J. Lektzian [U. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. Sprecher [Texas
A&M U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, April 2007, WILEY
INTERSCIENCE, p. 415. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they
can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making
military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military
force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test
hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that
after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force.
Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the
same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly
likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.
SK/A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE
1. U.S. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 491. By contrast, Li and Drury (2004) and Drury
and Li (2006) show that U.S. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square
massacre failed to improve human rights practices. According to their results, U.S. sanctions
threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006, 321). They further
speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at
improving Chinese human rights practices.
2. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, pp. 60-61.
For instance, Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights. Contrary to
expectations, they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer
Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens.
SK/A11. IRAN
1. U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED
SK/A11.01) Editorial, THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston, SC), September 28,
2009, p. A10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Unfortunately, as French
President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on
nuclear proliferation, years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's
to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium, more centrifuges" for
enriching it, and a vow to "wipe a U.N. member [Israel] off the map."
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions, having
weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment
purposes, as much as I think they deserve it, probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving
the issue," said Thomas R. Pickering, a former under secretary of state who has held informal
negotiations with the Iranians.
2. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL
SK/A11.04) Rachel L. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs, U.S. Treasury
Dept.], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March-April 2009, p. 101, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and
targeted way to hurt Iran financially, Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn
how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. And in some cases, large global banks have
been willing to help. On January 9, Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney,
announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic
process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients." Although Lloyds
voluntarily curtailed this practice, the Iranian banks Sepah, Melli, and Saderat had managed to
push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over. Ultimately, the
question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but
how much they will, how quickly, and at what cost?
SK/A11.05) Peter Crall, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2008, p. 47, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Moreover, even when such sanctions have
increased the cost of doing business with Iran, that cost may not have risen to a level that will
significantly deter trade. In the first half of the year, the volume of German trade with Iran has
increased by about 14 percent, after a 16 percent decline in 2007. Germany maintains that one of
the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran. This suggests,
however, that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian
markets.
3. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Administration officials acknowledge it will be
difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh, long-term sanctions against Iran, whatever the
assurances that the Russian president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, gave last week to Mr. Obama. China,
these officials say, is even less dependable, given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade
ties with Iran.
4. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For example, the United States imposed unilateral,
comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis, and it has maintained a
consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since. In 1996, Congress passed the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act, which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and
imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran. These have
continued in various forms, even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly
weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts. In fact, these sanctions have
been counterproductive, strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran.

Academic ASAP. In other instances, however, sanctions backfired by enhancing the political
legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many
sanctions scholars. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been
counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics.
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. And the political upheaval creates a new
complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of
ordinary people, because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement.
Citing those fears, the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said last Monday that he was
opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products.
SK/A12. NORTH KOREA
1. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED
SK/A12.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science],
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Winter 2008, p. 648, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA:
An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950, edited by Suk Hi Kim and
Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of
American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. Not surprisingly, Michael
Whitty, Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible, failing to achieve
the goals upon which they were justified. The authors argue that the political nature of economic
sanctions is the main reason for their failure.
SK/A12.02) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 875. In

fact, economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health.
Furthermore, they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea
have failed to do so.
SK/A12.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 14, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and
military sanctions from the U.N. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and
attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. The resolution passed
unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds, credit lines, grants and loans contributing to
the nuclear, ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the
reclusive communist regime.
2. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on
political change, prevention of nuclear proliferation, or improvement of human rights. In fact,
economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North
Korea to militarise even further.
ASAP. However, the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH
KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950, edited by Suk Hi
Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against
North Korea. Rather, the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather
than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. As
the authors pinpoint, sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a
final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea.
ASAP. In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH
KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950, edited by Suk Hi
Kim and Semoon Chang], Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed
the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests, as well as those imposed by the UN. Kim
concludes that the sanctions will not work, and suggests that negotiations are the only means to
solve the current nuclear crisis. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate.
3. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS
SK/A12.07) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, pp. 875-
876. Similarly, North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic
sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. Its economic and public health systems further
buckled with successive years of floods and droughts, leading to widespread malnutrition and up
to one million excess deaths in the 1990s.
SK/A13. CUBA
1. U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED
SK/A13.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM, February 24, 2009, pNA,, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard
Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U.S.
policy toward Cuba, including a lifting of economic sanctions. Lugar, who has long said the U.S.
policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals, recently sent Carl Meacham, a senior
GOP staffer for the panel, to Cuba to evaluate the situation. In his report, Meacham wrote that
President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to
that nation should be fulfilled, that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel
outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to
Cuban participation in international institutions.
SK/A13.02) Julia E. Sweig, THE NATION, May 14, 2007, p. 11, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and
setting right a mismanaged U.S. foreign policy could begin normalization in U.S.-Cuba relations.
2. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. As for US sanctions against Cuba, in the past five decades
Canada, Japan, Spain, Britain, France, and Italy have all played an active role in sanctions-
busting on Cuba's behalf. One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially
competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses.
3. U.S. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U.S. ECONOMY
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete
in Cuban markets, the results are impressive. After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the
export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000, US trade in those products rose from $6 million in
2000 to $350 million by 2006. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could
once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years, US sanctions have failed to bring about
regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities.
4. U.S. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
SK/A13.05) Tim Padgett, TIME, November 6, 2007, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45-
year-old U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, and Fidel Castro was predictable as well, writing
beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U.S.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. Who benefits
most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro, who is likely to succeed him.
With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the embargo is not so painful
as it once was, and heated U.S. rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's anti-
Yanqui defenders. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped
up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more
effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition.

WEEK, March 3, 2008, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
U.S. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years, and it doesn't seem to work.
We have basically kept Castro in power. I've been to Cuba. It is clear to me that he used
sanctions as a means to stay in power.

WEEK, March 3, 2008, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
When I was in Cuba, I talked at length with dissidents, and their belief is if you take the
sanctions away, you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves.
SK/A14. MYANMAR (BURMA)
1. U.S. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED
SK/A14.01) Seth Mydans, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, March 16, 2009, p.

1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The sanctions began with an arms
embargo after a massacre of as many as 3,000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988. Broader
sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included
restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures.The
European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes, and analysts say
those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change.But Myanmar's military has not
budged. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds, free speech and assembly are still
smothered, the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty, and any protests are
crushed by force.Rather than forcing change, many analysts say, the confrontational approach
has made the generals more stubborn, more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West.
The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it
with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior.
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Would tougher economic sanctions
against Burma work? Probably not, if history is a guide.
2. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS
SK/A14.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, October 2008, pNA,

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. This is the second time in less than
two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly
supported by the United States has been vetoed. In January 2007, China and Russia vetoed a
resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma.
SK/A14.04) Jim Webb, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 26, 2009, p. A23, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Sanctions by Western governments have not
been matched by other countries, particularly Russia and China. Indeed, they have allowed China
to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar, furthering a dangerous
strategic imbalance in the region. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International, at
least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower, oil,
gas and mining projects in Myanmar. This is only the tip of the iceberg. In March, China and
Myanmar signed a $2.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport
Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. When completed, Chinese oil
tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca, a time-consuming,
strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes. If Chinese
commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow, a military presence could easily follow.
3. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Turning up the heat on Burma (a.k.a.
Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime,
which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves. But it would take little for either
China or India to pick up the slack from, say, Chevron . Chevron is a 28% partner with France's
Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand.
Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be
"the last resort"?
4. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better
system for a country, devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. The Burmese
government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect. The
United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country. Its economy will
suffer, its isolation will deepen. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny
of foreign policy. Despite a dismal record, they just keep on ticking. With countries like Burma,
sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy.
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Burma, one effect of Western sanctions was to shut
down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s, forcing hundreds of thousands of people
out of jobs. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade, enough
evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it
but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma. In addition, as legitimate
businesses dry up, black markets spring up, and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new
rules flourish. Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner. Then there are drugs,
whose production and supply multiply. In all of this, the military, which controls border
crossings, ports and checkpoints, always prospers.
5. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
SK/A14.08) Jim Webb, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 26, 2009, p. A23, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. For more than 10 years, the United States and
the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against
Myanmar, in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990
election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. While the political motivations behind this approach
are laudable, the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. The ruling regime has
become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. The Burmese people have lost
access to the outside world.
SK/A15. IRAQ
1. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged
sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country, those
who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better
system for that country, devastating its society is a strange path to the new order.
2. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN

Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation, including dramatic
declines in resources that we essential for health, such as drugs, vaccines, food, water, and
energy." For example, during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s,
mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000
live births).
SK/A15.03) Shereen T. Ismael [School of Social Work, Carleton U., Canada], JOURNAL
OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES, Spring 2007, p. 337, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in US-
led campaign, its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity, knew the
necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions, and fully understood the implications for Iraqis.
The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as
vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. "Iraq will
suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals", the DIA
wrote in January 1991. "Incidences of disease, including possible epidemics, will become
probable unless the population were careful to boil water." Predictably, the most vulnerable in
America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. Further US
intelligence documents, observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing
continued, noted the particular impact on children. Within months of the war, the UN secretary
general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis, predicting an
"imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemics and famine, if massive life-supporting
needs are not rapidly met"; US intelligence agreed.
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In October 1991, The International Study Team sent a
task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines,
including medicine, health care and child psychology, to conduct an in-depth comprehensive
study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians, particularly children. The study
covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi
government. The study was based on 9,000 household interviews in more than 300 locations.
The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water
supplies; malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import
sufficient food; a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war;
and, severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children.
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The study reported an immediate and startling increase
in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the
collapsing the health care system, which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out.
The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the
onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less, the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent. The
study estimated that there were approximately 46,900 excess deaths during the first eight months
of 1991.
3. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. By January 2002, the Iraqi government informed the
United Nations that 1,614,303 Iraqis--including 667,773 children under five--had died from
diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions. Even taking into account the
possibility of Iraqi exaggeration, nearly three years earlier, two prominent US strategic analysts
concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more
people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout
history."
SK/A16. RUSSIA
1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK
SK/A16.01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum],

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, September 9, 2008, p. 12, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting
came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time
being. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future, just one in a wide array of measures the
West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior. However, it is highly
unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation, like excluding
Russia from the Group of Eight, suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World
Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or
making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad.

LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Russia should, on the contrary, be further brought in to
global markets and international institutions, not isolated. Indeed, exposure to a combination of
market forces and good governance already has done, and will do, more to show Russia the
consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve.
2. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the
opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin"
attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. It
would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda. In
the new more cautious global economy of today, through a combination of market forces and
disciplined and consistent international regulation, Russian companies should be encouraged to
compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices.
SK/A17. SOUTH AFRICA
1. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS

Academic ASAP. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used
against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt. The
problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very
financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. Consequently, it was
willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the
international banking community. It should be noted, however, that these financial restrictions
were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa, not a
governmental sanctions initiative per se.
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked
Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and--
despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training
South Africans of any color.
2. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES

Academic ASAP. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa, which
decreased the employment and wages of black labor, had the unanticipated effect of undermining
the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime.
SK/A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN
1. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE
SK/A18.01) Malcolm R. West, JET, June 18, 2007, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't
pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support, says
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick.
2. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE
SK/A18.02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, October 2008, pNA,

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In July 2008, following widely
criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party
and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate, the United States led an unsuccessful effort to
have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on
Zimbabwe. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage
but was vetoed by China and Russia, which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's
powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs.
3. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED

Academic ASAP. Finally, sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. Examples
are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
SK/N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE
1. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
SK/N01.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept. of Economics, Boston U.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. of
Economics, U. of Virginia], AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 1999, p. 409. Sanctions
have long been important in international relations. Athens imposed a trade embargo against
Megara, ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). Sanctions are central to
such international agreements as the United Nations Charter, the World Trade Organization, and
the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. U.S. law prescribes the use of sanctions in
circumstances related, for example, to national security, human rights, intellectual property, and
international trade.
SK/N01.02) James A. Nathan, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, September 1997, p. 37,

Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Since Thomas Jefferson,
Americans have been certain that, in a "contest of self-denial," the U.S. would prevail. Sanctions,
the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists), were a form of
"peaceable coercion." Governments, especially the British, would be compelled to yield to
American pressures, for, in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson, the British need for
American goods and services was essential to England's well-being. In contrast, Americans
would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words.
2. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING
SK/N01.03) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

Academic ASAP. Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day
and age. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month,
as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. Such sanctioners are no
longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations;
today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that
economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on
international issues. And likewise, the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of
yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions.
SK/N01.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.],
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p.
59.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics.
Hence, the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).
The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target
countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands.1
Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals, ranging
from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists,
restoring democratic regimes, or ending the use of repression by the government.
3. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE
SK/N01.05) Richard M. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing, Columbia

U.], THE SCIENCES, January 1999, p. 19, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Sanctions are a reality of international relations; trying to do away with them
would be as ineffective as outlawing war.
SK/N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE
1. SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME
SK/N02.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics],

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, December 2008, p. 1001. This finding contrasts
sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, third edition, 2007]: we
claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the
past century.
SK/N02.02) Richard N. Cooper, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November-December 2008, p.

159, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. This [ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann
Elliott, and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of
economic sanctions, covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000, of which a third have occurred
since the second edition was published, in 1990. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each
episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions, the nature and magnitude of the sanctions,
the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country, and the efficacy
of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. (All the episodes, plus 13 more that have
occurred since 2000, are reported in a separate CD-ROM.) perhaps surprisingly, the authors find
that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the
cases examined, which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period
from 1914 to 2000.
SK/N02.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Proponents of the use of sanctions
argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of
military intervention (Baldwin 1985). The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether
economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. The
most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure
works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer, Shott, and Elliott 1990).
2. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE
SK/N02.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions,
which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. Others worry that Congressional trade
and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US
foreign and economic policy. And yet, sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective.
3. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS
SK/N02.05) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva
[Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, pp. 848-849. Critics of sanctions effectiveness
often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure, such as the League of Nations sanctions
against Ethiopia in 1935, which failed to make Italy reverse course. Nevertheless, even the
staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. For instance,
American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as
successfully coercing those states into changing policies.
SK/N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE
1. U.S. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS”

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Second, the development of sharpened sanctions
techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. These
provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic
measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring.

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As a means for responding to a wide array of national
security concerns and violations of international norms, economic sanctions have occupied an
increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. Ever since the United States
championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990, it
has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments, protect human rights,
extradite international fugitives, and end inter-state and civil wars. Especially after the Al Qaeda
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has employed more specialized smart
sanctions, both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council, to combat what
many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
2. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY

Academic ASAP. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically
important individuals, measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. The role of such
"smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to
them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. The most frequently used forms of smart
sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the
offending regime.
December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 867. In all cases, the key to sanctions success
is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. Against democracies, one
can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. Against nondemocracies, broad
sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more
rents, thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield. As a
result, the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional. Success
against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on
the leadership.
SK/N03.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Political Science, U. of Mississippi],
939. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders, it is imperative
for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse
to comply with sanctions pressure. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions,
these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. Freezing the personal assets
of leaders, curtailing travel, and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the
hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves.

Academic ASAP. In many instances, the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by
racial, ethnic, class, or religious distinctions, as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. In these
countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups, and
consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling
regime. In South Africa, the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for
whites than for blacks. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco
products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to
blacks, especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking.
3. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Since the mid-1990s, all UN and multilateral sanctions
in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions. Some of the most notable
successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks
in seven African internal wars. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets
and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al
Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. With these four
considerations integrated into their framework, smart sanctions can continue to be used as
effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries.
4. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion
now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial.
In particular, a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups, rogue state leaders,
and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past
decade.
5. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. During the past two decades, imposing smart sanctions
in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive
results. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, South
Africa's disavowal of the bomb, and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil,
substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more
important than punishing sanctions.
SK/N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE
1. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE
SK/N04.01) Rachel L. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs, U.S. Treasury
Expanded Academic ASAP. Traditionally, Washington has worked with compliance departments
in global banks to combat terrorism, weapons proliferation, the narcotics trade, and corruption.
Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions, thereby
cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system. The benefit of
compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether
to handle certain clients on their own. Surprisingly, these restrictions have reached beyond the
boundaries of legal jurisdiction. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U.S. watch lists
even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so.
Expanded Academic ASAP. In the global financial marketplace, a brand name is a valued asset,
one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. The risk of an alarmist
headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation
abroad, even unwittingly, is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. Accordingly,
the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to
encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global
security.
2. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE
Expanded Academic ASAP. Through targeted financial measures, Washington has signaled to
banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial
system. Banks, for the most part, have acted on these signals, and the two most recent chapters in
this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the
behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful.
Expanded Academic ASAP. Four months later, the United States targeted another of Iran's most
important financial institutions, Bank Sepah, for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons
development. This time, the U.S. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank
Sepah ongoing access to the U.S. financial system. Two months after that, the United Nations
registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution
1747, which toughened sanctions against Iran.
Expanded Academic ASAP. After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U.S.
government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian
banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that
counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities.
This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008, when British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions
against Bank Melli. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global
capital markets. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global
image and operating ability.
SK/N04.06) Peter Crall, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2008, p. 47, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. On Oct. 22, the Department of the
Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its
affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected
of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs, effectively cutting them off from the
U.S. financial system. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to
respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and, more broadly, to place pressure on
countries of proliferation concern such as Iran.
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Although the use of sanctions against
entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new, the strategy of implementing
targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial
system has only been developed in recent years. Stuart Levey, undersecretary of the treasury for
terrorism and financial intelligence, told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key
difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction
of the private sector." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business
with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to
protect their reputation, adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily
amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures."
SK/N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE
1. U.N. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of
financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in
response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Since December 2006, the
council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals
and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs, including Bank Sepah, Iran's
fifth-largest bank.
2. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM
SK/N05.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics, U. of Wollongong, Australia]

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. On the other hand, Collins argued that the
application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to
discontinue its support for terrorism program.
SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY
1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE
SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia],

POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented
from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply
a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and
Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success
or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not
have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the
target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains.
December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one
should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions
may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986,
153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should
be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty
gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more
important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000,
160).
2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION
SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58.
Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which
should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to
the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international
community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political
community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment
or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose
importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).
3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for
Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full
compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and
generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the
target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the
target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from
gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the
delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political
bargain.

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions
eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central
factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected
terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In
Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined
with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia,
sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.
SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES
1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS
SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do
economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure,
sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on
whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect:
it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why
destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure
destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding
indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think.
SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that
sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that
sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and
the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure
leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by
destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is
installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining
range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567).

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective
sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the
domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer,
Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize
governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage
defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition
to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen
2007).
2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between
the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to
challenge the status quo (Allen 2007; Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999, 48-51; Rowe 2001). In
this case, citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition
groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. Often sanctions are intended to
spur exactly this response.
STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 509. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically
and economically isolate the target regime, causing negative aggregate economic growth and
potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime
activity.

Academic ASAP. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group
condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world. This awareness then gives rise to
optimism that, given tangible evidence of external support, the opposition may someday succeed
in its efforts. Consequently, individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective
action with the opposition group. In other words, the indirect impact of sanctions might work by
sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. An example
of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from
1960 to 1962, which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition.
SK/N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS
1. SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION

STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, pp. 490-491. Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens
(2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i.e.,
military and police equipment), or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition,
they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence.
2. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that,
at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for
governmental policies, it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions. The fact that it shares
moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it
changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government).
Accordingly, the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each
and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable, but rather that the unjust
policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other
democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. And if they want to eliminate these
costs, and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world, it is
their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies.
SK/N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY
1. LOSSES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT
SK/N09.01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 59. I
should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the
sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender
less than 0.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of
GNP (Cox and Drury, 2006).
SK/N09.02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, THE QUILL, January-February 1999, pp.
21-24, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. When military
intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective, governments often resort to sanctions as a
means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small
fraction of U.S. GDP, and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U.S. firms and
communities. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U.S. sectors that trade or invest in the
target country.
2. LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW
December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 855. Because sanctions harm the sender’s
economy as well as the target’s, greater economic interdependence discourages the actual
implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and
noncredible. Thus, one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to
occur. On the other hand, when economic interdependence is low, sanctions are likely to be both
credible and insufficiently severe, making them more likely to be initiated.
SK/N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR
1. SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR
21-24, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Advocates regard
sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road
instrument between diplomacy and military action.
SK/N10.02) Richard M. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing, Columbia

U.], THE SCIENCES, January 1999, p. 19, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. As tools of international pressure, sanctions rank somewhere between
diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding
the costs and destruction of war.
2. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. According to Niblock economic sanctions
are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war, which damages the country's
infrastructure and development.
SK/N10.04) Kenneth R. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology, Washington Theological

Union], COMMONWEAL, February 28, 1997, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Still, despite their harmful consequences, sanctions are almost
always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare. Sanctions
do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation. They are ordinarily
incremental and capable of being altered. In addition, use of armed force only as a last resort is a
longstanding element of the just-war tradition.
SK/N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE
1. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE
December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, pp. 854-855. Sanctions, like any coercive threat,
only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi
1998; Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005). If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe, then the
target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat.

POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 143. Second, if the issue under dispute
is a highly salient issue for senders, they should be more committed to conveying their
willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat
stage. If a target faces a resolute and credible sender, then compliance should be more likely
since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states.
2. IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES

POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Furthermore, more recent studies
in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the
threat of sanctions, which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996; Drezner 1999, 2003;
Miers and Morgan 2002; Nooruddin 2002; Lacy and Niou 2004; Y. Li and Drury 2004; Drury
and Li 2006). These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested
once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis.
The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the
imposition of sanctions, they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the
economic cost of implemented sanctions.
SK/N12. IRAN
1. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U.S. SANCTIONS ON IRAN
SK/N12.01) James Blitz, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, November 27, 2009, p. 9, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks
likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the
country's nuclear programme, in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition
of economic sanctions on Tehran.
SK/N12.02) Mark Landler, NEW YORK TIMES, September 28, 2009, p. A1, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. U.S. efforts to marshal worldwide pressure
against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a
clandestine nuclear site.
SK/N12.03) Mark Landler, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, September 28, 2009, p. 1,

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Senior Obama administration officials,
meanwhile, said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. The
sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and
restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted, senior administration
officials said Sunday.
2. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY
SK/N12.04) Brian Radzinsky, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, September 2008, p. 42,

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Sanctions appear to be taking their
toll on Iran's economy, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug.
14. It finds that UN, U.S., and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the
profitability of Iranian banks.
3. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In an Oct. 23 e-mail to Arms Control
Today, David Asher, who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting
North Korea's illegal financial dealings, said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having
a dramatic effect, noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran. In the last
several years, major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran. Asher asserted that because
proliferators still rely on the global trading system, the sanctions "make life much harder for the
proliferator or procurement agent," regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on
the regime itself.
SK/N12.06) Michael Jacobson, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer 2008, p.

2, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A debate within Iran about the
wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting. Success is far from guaranteed, but if the
international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking, it should
use greater economic pressure.
4. IRAN, LIKE SOUTH AFRICA, IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION
SK/N12.07) Editorial, THE TIMES (London, England), February 25, 2009, p. 2, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. South Africa systematically disenfranchised its
black majority, yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent
press. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological
confidence. Similarly, sanctions against Iran - an extremist regime but not a totalitarian state -
have had some successes when consistently applied. Iran has a nuclear programme that is
patently not designed purely for generating electricity. Though the regime is hardly undermined
by sanctions, it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has
responded to pressure.
5. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE
Expanded Academic ASAP. For years, the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions
program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. In September 2006,
Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for
supporting terrorism. To do so, U.S. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the
already broad sanctions program. Instead, they eliminated a small but significant exception to the
program, the so-called U-turn authorization, for Bank Saderat. Few foreign-policy watchers
noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs, but bankers engaged in the day-to-
day work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could
no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. For a bank in a country that still
had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade, also
denominated in dollars, is its primary livelihood, being rejected by Wall Street was serious
business.
Expanded Academic ASAP. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a friction-
free financial relationship with the outside world, the costs of financial pressure have been high
and unwelcome. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and
30 percent. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no
one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore, which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran
in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks. In June, The Washington Post
reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said
that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly
impossible to pay for goods.
Expanded Academic ASAP. Whereas Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States were
Iran's top export markets 14 years ago, China and Turkey had taken second and third place by
2006. Even Germany, which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006, has seen its
exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years. This shift reflects not just the
inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the
pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider
pursuing contracts with Iran.
6. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED
SK/N12.11) James Kitfield, NATIONAL JOURNAL, March 3, 2007, p. 79, GALE

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by
the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective
weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. The refusal of private banks, global
financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the
government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran, paving the way for a gradual
economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U.S.
SK/N12.12) CQ RESEARCHER, November 16, 2007, p. 976. But a former National

Security Council (NSC) official, Lee Wolosky, sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down
Iran's use of the international financial system. European governments may ignore the sanctions,
he acknowledges, but European banks could cooperate, if only to avoid complicating their own
dealings with the United States. "Already, a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to
European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran," he says. "This has had a certain measure of
success," he continues. "You're going to see non-U.S. banks cease to do business with [Iranian
entities].”
Expanded Academic ASAP. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to
develop a nuclear weapons program. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and
incentive packages multiple times. But in this context, financial gamesmanship is but one of the
many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment
of the new financial statecraft, but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer
seem to exist.
SK/N13. NORTH KOREA
1. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. U.S. officials have argued that the success
of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen, but rather
the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. In the case of Banco Delta Asia,
for example, the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million.
Nonetheless, it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean
business. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007, Treasury officials
continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the
international financial system. Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China, Japan, Vietnam,
Mongolia, Singapore, and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far
outweighed any benefit."

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Similarly, in the two instances of North Korea halting
the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush
Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007, the methods and substance of compromise were
nearly the same as in the Libyan case. The United States and its multilateral partners promised
that if Korea complied with their demands, they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial
food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. North Korea gained access to these economic
benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in
accordance with international standards.
2. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS
Expanded Academic ASAP. In short, the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure
that would apply only to U.S. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing
with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea. By March 2007, when Washington actually
made it illegal for U.S. banks to maintain relationships with BDA, many in the global financial
community had already cut ties with BDA on their own.
Expanded Academic ASAP. In the spring of 2007, North Korea demanded that roughly $25
million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities, not the United States--be transferred from
BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing. The funds were available for
immediate physical withdrawal, but the issue was not the availability of the money. Pyongyang
seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and
unfettered access to the international financial system. Ultimately, thanks to the unwillingness of
global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime, the $25 million in frozen assets had
to travel from Macao, through the U.S. Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia, and
finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. As a result of the U.S. regulatory action, North Korea
could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two
central banks working through days of negotiations. Washington's action had significantly
increased the costs of being a rogue state.
SK/N13.05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 14, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The sanctions were in response to the country's second
nuclear test, launched May 25. North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing
missiles. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community
the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions. This was a tremendous
statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and
the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the
neighbors, as well as the greater international community, Mrs. Clinton said during a visit to
Niagara Falls, Ontario. I think these sanctions ... give the world community the tools we need to
take appropriate action, she said.
SK/N14. CUBA
1. U.S. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE
SK/N14.01) Juan J. Lopez [Asst. Professor of Political Science, U. of Illinois at

Chicago], ORBIS, Summer 2000, p. 345, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. Currently, the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U.S. sanctions
against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and
other reprehensible behavior, to change Cuban policies, to destabilize the Castro regime and
hasten a transition to democracy, and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana. The
mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. But what of the rest? Is
there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes,
although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely, if ever, addressed the
relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings
germane to whether the U.S. embargo should be maintained.

ASAP. The argument here is that any critique of the U.S. embargo in terms of the usual
ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the
simple reason that the U.S. embargo does not have this aim. Rather, its aim now is to bring about
a regime change, i.e., to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. And consistent with previous
findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments, the U.S.
embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise.

ASAP. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship, neither engagement nor the embargo by itself
will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. But unilateral economic
sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and
justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. The U.S.
sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship, and the deterioration of the
Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of
independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the
part of the general population. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic
problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres, including
military officers.
2. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT

SK/N14.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U.S. Representative], CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST,
March 1999, p. 83. However, if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat, it is because U.S.
sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal. Without U.S.
sanctions, Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military
capabilities.
SK/N15. MYANMAR (BURMA)
1. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS
SK/N15.01) Seth Mydans, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, October 16, 2007,

p. 7, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Although sanctions have failed so
far, Turnell [Macquarie U., Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if
combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. But
the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the
cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners, none of whom have shown any interest in joining an
economic embargo.
2. TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS
SK/N15.02) Seth Mydans, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, March 16, 2009, p.

1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In any case, a weakening of sanctions
would face tough opposition in Washington, where the policy carries emotional resonance and
has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups."I think we have to stay the
course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue," said Debbie
Stothard, coordinator of Altsean-Burma, a regional human rights group. "If you want to throw
away the best cards that you have, you are setting yourselves up for failure."Sanctions may not
be an all-or-nothing issue, though, said Sean Turnell, an expert on the Burmese economy at
Macquarie University in Sydney.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the
financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the
people the message needs to be sent to."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this
description, blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits.
SK/N16. LIBYA
1. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Libya is a small oil-producing developing
economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue. Libya plays an
important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. Conditions in the
Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed
by United Nations in the earlier 1990s.

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The sanctions possible to accomplish
success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that
exceed more than 2% of their GDP; or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender
countries. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya.
2. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Furthermore, Stephen argued that
multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism
sponsors. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan
government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. He concluded that economic
sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision.

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this
balancing act rather well. After six years under various UN sanctions, Libya agreed in 1998 to
comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103
airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. When this extradition was completed,
the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya.

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As referenced earlier, many observers were surprised
by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons programs, while also allowing international inspectors to
verify compliance. This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term
negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a
lifting of the sanctions, but also open access to European investors and markets.
SK/N17. SOUTH AFRICA
1. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS
SK/N17.01) Editorial, THE TIMES (London, England), February 25, 2009, p. 2, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently
cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. Sanctions in that case were
undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system.
SK/N17.02) Franklin L. Lavin [Executive Director, Asia Pacific Policy Center],

FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1996, pp. 138-153, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which
sanctions were used successfully. After years of economic stagnation, the South African business
establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for
preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. They shifted to
favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be
ended.
21-24, Online, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Economic
sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system, not least because the initiative
enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained
sensitive to external opinion. Even under apartheid, South Africa was a semi-democratic country,
somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. Semi-democratic regimes are more
vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah
that accompanies multilateral sanctions.
2. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE
SK/N17.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Political Science, U. of Mississippi],

940. Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against
autocratic regimes. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population, targeted
sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. The sanctions levied
against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of
diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in
international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic
punishment).
SK/N17.05) James Tellenbach, WORLD AND I, May 1999, p. 16, Online, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Sanctions against South Africa worked in
that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change.
Sanctions bit, but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity.
The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then
lobbied the government to change its policies.
SK/N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN
1. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS
SK/N18.01) Malcolm R. West, JET, June 18, 2007, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks
on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more
than 200,000, and displacement of some 2.5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese
government forces and rebels. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's
ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by
unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder, rape,
mutilation and plunder.
SK/N18.02) Malcolm R. West, JET, June 18, 2007, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE

LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right
direction, but more must be done," she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman
Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET, following the president's recent announcement. "The
Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and
encourage the international community, including the United Nations, the European Union,
China, and the Arab League, to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately," she said.
2. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Academic ASAP. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its
objectionable policy. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to
pursue their policy objectives, such as in the case of police repression. Restricting the ability of a
country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may
serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan
may have, in fact, delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades.

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LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE

NFL Topic, January-February 2010

Dr. John F. Schunk, Editor

1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL

SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia],

SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME

SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876.

SK/A01.07) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

4. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL

SK/A01.08) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

5. U.S. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE

SK/A01.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH, November 2008, pNA, GALE CENGAGE

6. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL

SK/A01.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Autumn 2006, p. 70, GALE CENGAGE

1. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK

SK/A02.01) Thomas J. Donohue [CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce], BUSINESS

SK/A02.02) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

2. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED

1. U.S. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP

2. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s

SK/A03.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Autumn 2006, p. 70, GALE CENGAGE

3. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA)

1. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION

2. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER

3. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS

SK/A04.03) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

SK/A04.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Political Science, U. of Mississippi],

1. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL

SK/A05.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics, U. of Wollongong, Australia]

2. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS

SK/A05.02) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

3. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES

4. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT

SK/A05.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics, U. of Wollongong, Australia]

1. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE

2. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED

SK/A06.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

3. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE

1. U.S. SANCTIONS HURT U.S. BUSINESSES

SK/A07.02) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

2. U.S. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U.S. JOBS

1. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES

SK/A08.01) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

2. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE

SK/A08.02) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

SK/A08.03) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR

SK/A09.01) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

2. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION

3. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

SK/A09.04) FOREIGN POLICY, July-August 2007, p. 19. Because countries prefer to

1. U.S. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED

SK/A10.01) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL

2. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS

1. U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED

2. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL

4. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

SK/A11.07) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre

SK/A11.08) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] &

1. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED

SK/A12.02) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 875. In