Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Content
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Right to Transparent Governance
Mario Gomez 1
Introduction
Much of Sri Lanka’s decision making processes are shrouded in secrecy. Crucial
decisions that impact on public life are made behind closed doors and public
officers are reluctant to share information on these decisions or the basis for these
decisions. Information that should be in the public domain is seldom released and
the public sector is covered in an ethos of secrecy.
This culture of secrecy is compounded by the state of the media in the country.
The media has a major role to play in creating a culture of transparency and in
exposing corruption. Yet the media as it stands today is unable to perform this
role effectively. Major media institutions are state owned and their coverage of
events is partial to the ruling regime. Some parts of the independent media
engage in investigative reporting and provide alternative views. Yet this is not as
effective as it should be. In recent years independent media institutions that have
dared to confront the government have been subjected to threats, intimidation
and in a few cases their staff has even been assassinated.
Transparent governance deals with government decisions about which the public
has a right to know. Public decisions and decision making processes should be in
the public domain and be easily accessible to the public. The public have a right to
know about national, regional and local budgets; development strategies and
national action plans; agreements with multilateral institutions; plans for
infrastructure development; the expenditure of government Ministers,
departments and other institutions; and about other decisions that impact on the
public.
The public also have a right to know about private sector decisions that impact on
the general public. The private sector should be encouraged to communicate
openly and transparently with all its stakeholders, including the wider
1
LL.B. LL.M. Ph.D. Human Rights Lawyer and Member of the Law Commission of Sri Lanka.
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community on key decisions that impact on public interest. Similarly professional
associations and regulatory bodies should also make their decisions transparent
since many of those decisions have an impact on the public.
Access to information with regard to the decisions, actions and policy of public
authorities is vital in ensuring the transparency and accountability of these
authorities. It enables the public and civil society to challenge the relevance of
proposed projects and plans. Transparency and openness in public decision
making also minimizes the opportunities for bribery and corruption.
Around 2001 the Law Commission of Sri Lanka presented a rudimentary draft
law on the freedom of information to the government. Civil society and the media
then took up the issue and presented a more detailed draft law. After a concerted
campaign by civil society and the media the draft law was approved by the
Cabinet in 2003. As a result of tensions between the then President and Prime
Minister, Parliament was dissolved in 2004 before the law could be passed.
The Law Commission subsequently took up the issue and presented a revised
draft (based largely on the civil society draft law) to the state around April 2006.
However, no action has been taken since then to present and debate the draft law
in Parliament.
4
According to the Law Commission draft every citizen and incorporated and
unincorporated bodies will have a right to access official information in the
possession, custody or control of a public authority. Information in the possession
of private bodies was not covered by the draft law.
Where information is over 10 years old the exemptions will not apply except in
specific circumstances. The Freedom of Information Commission to be set up
under the law has the power to order disclosure of information where in its
opinion public interest in disclosure outweighs any of the interests protected by
the above exemptions.
5
The draft law envisages a Freedom of Information Commission consisting of three
members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the
Constitutional Council. Every public authority is required to appoint at least one
Information Officer who will deal with requests for information.
Under the draft law public authorities are required to maintain records in a
manner consistent with their operational requirements, duly catalogued and
indexed. Records are required to be maintained for ten years.
The draft law also envisaged a concept of ‘proactive disclosure’. The second
section of the draft law casts responsibilities on Ministers and public authorities to
make official information freely and readily available to the public. Every two
years, every Minister must publish a report containing information giving details
of the functions, activities and duties of the Ministry and of all public authorities
under the Ministry, and the norms and procedures followed in the decision
making process of the Ministry. Additionally the Minster has a duty to inform the
public about any projects that are to be undertaken by the Ministry.
The draft law provides that, notwithstanding any legal or other obligation to
which a person may be subjected to by virtue of being employed in a public
authority, the disclosure of information permitted to be released under the law
should not make such person liable to any punishment. This is particularly
important given that some provisions of the Establishments Code, which
regulates the terms of employment of public officers, explicitly discourage public
officers from sharing information with the public.
The enactment of a Freedom of Information law can potentially enhance the levels
of accountability and transparency within the public sector. However, such
formal access by itself will not ensure accountability or transparency, unless
citizens, civil society groups and the media are vigilant and make constant and
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effective use of the right to access official information, the law will have little
impact.
This is an application filed in the public interest. … the Petitioner, being a well
recognized entity working for the preservation of the environment is entitled to act in
the public interest …. In several cases the Petitioner has assisted this Court in
important matters with regard to the preservation of the environment. In this
instance too the Petitioner has acted in the public interest and exposed acts on the
part of the UDA that are clearly ultra vires.
Although there is no explicit right to information in the Sri Lankan Constitution, the
Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of speech, expression and publication
contained in Article 14 of the Constitution included by implication a right to
information. The Urban Development Authority (UDA), in refusing to provide
information about the purported lease of ‘Galle Face’ to the petitioner, had violated
the petitioner’s right to information.
The UDA’s action was also in violation of the constitutional right to equal protection
of the law since its ‘bare denial of access to official information’ in the absence of
specific reasons was an arbitrary exercise of power. The Court noted:
… I am of the view that the ‘freedom of speech and expression including publication’
guaranteed by Article 14(1)(a), to be meaningful and effective should carry within its
scope an implicit right of a person to secure relevant information from a public
authority in respect of a matter that should be in the public domain. It should
necessarily be so where the public interest in the matter outweigh the confidentiality
that attach to affairs of State and official communications. (Emphasis added)
In at least two previous cases too, the Supreme Court has echoed this reasoning
and upheld the right of access to official information.3
2
Environmental Foundation v UDA, (The ‘Galle Face’ Case), Supreme Court Minutes of 28
November 2005.
3
See Fernando v. Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 2 Sri L.R. 311 and Heather Mundy
v. Central Environmental Authority and Others SC Appeal 58/03, SCM 20th January 2004.
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The 2000 Draft Constitution included the right to information as an aspect of the
freedom of speech and expression.
Some countries have a separate right to information as a part of the Bill of Rights.
For example Section 32 of the South African Constitution states:
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and
may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative
and financial burden on the state.
Recent reports from the two Parliamentary oversight committees - the Committee
on Public Enterprises (COPE) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) –
established in a striking way the extent of corruption and wastage in the public
sector. The COPE report of January 2007 observed that the 26 government
institutions examined at that time had caused a loss of approximately Rs 150
billion to the public exchequer. A report of the PAC in 2008 revealed a Rs 3.7
billion fraud with regard to the Value Added Tax in the Department of Inland
Revenue. The PAC report estimated that corruption in the public sector is costing
the country around Rs 100 billion every year. Despite prima facie cases being
established by these two parliamentary committees, no action has been taken to
ensure the accountability of those responsible.
4
Article 16(1) of the Draft Constitution of 2000
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Public sector corruption strikes at the very roots of democratic government. It
siphons public resources from the public good and retards the processes of social
and economic growth.
At the moment there is little political will to implement the existing legal
framework. While there are many gaps in the current framework even those
standards that exist are not enforced or applied in an uneven and politicized
manner. If the levels of bribery, corruption and nepotism are to drop, the state
needs to develop a capacity and willingness to investigate and prosecute bribery
and corruption in a sustained, principled and effective way.
The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC)
was set up in 1994 amidst much public debate. It was the first piece of legislation
passed consequent to a change of government in August that year. Bribery and
corruption had been a major issue in the run up to the Parliamentary elections of
that year and public expectations were high at the time the law was passed.
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that the new Commission would be able to address the issue of bribery and
corruption in a serious way. Yet in almost 15 years of operation the Commission
has failed to make a significant impact. In theory, the law sets up an independent
institution with financial and operational independence. In practice, this
independence has not materialized and the Commission has functioned under
many constraints: political, human and financial.
A total of 120 prosecutions were initiated in a three year period between 2001 and
2003. Ninety trials were concluded during this period and 25 cases resulted in a
conviction. 5 Almost all those convicted were low ranking public officers. The ‘Big
Fish’ got away.
The law and institutional framework are just two elements in a larger matrix of
relevant factors. The best laws with poor implementation will have little impact.
At the same time weak laws with imaginative implementation could have a better
impact.
Laws however, do posses the capacity to trigger political will on the part of
decision makers. They need to be supported by effective pressure from civil
society groups, social movements, the media and the public in general. Given the
right degree of public pressure and the right personalities, laws and institutions
can be made to work and influence political decision making with regard to
bribery and corruption.
The Hong Kong experience has provided a model for other countries that
subsequently then set up a dedicated anti-corruption agency. In 1974 the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was set up in Hong Kong.
5
Lawyers for Human Rights and Development, ‘Bribery and Corruption in Sri Lanka: A study on Law and
Enforcement’ (November 2005) p 37.
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At that time corruption was a way of life in Hong Kong and as one seasoned anti-
corruption campaigner notes ‘existed from womb to tomb’.6 There were close
connections between law enforcement agencies and crime syndicates, and several
forms of organized crime were protected. In its first three years the ICAC
prosecuted 247 government officers including 143 police officers. In 30 years the
ICAC achieved important successes in bringing down the levels of corruption in
Hong Kong, including corruption that occurred within the private sector. The
Hong Kong experience with anti-corruption shows us that the necessary political
will accompanied with effective institutions and committed personalities can
make a huge difference.
Two key ideas shaped this jurisprudence: the idea of a public trust and the notion
of fairness. According to the Supreme Court public power is vested in public
officials to be used in trust only for the purposes for which it is conferred. It
cannot be used for any extraneous or ulterior purpose and if it is so used, would
then amount to an abuse or misuse of public power. Concurrently public power
must be exercised fairly which in the view of the Court means a range of different
things.
It is possible to distil from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence over this period a
set of principles that should guide and structure the exercise of public power in
this country. It may even be possible to transform this code into an enforceable
6
Tony Kwok, (Former Deputy Commissioner and Head of Operations, ICAC, Hong Kong)’ How
to Formulate an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy in an Organisation: Hong Kong Experience’ .
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standard for which sanctions would attach if those standards were breached. If
an Ethics and Integrity Commission is established as discussed below, then it
would be possible for such a Commission to draw inspiration from the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
In more recent times, in many parts of the world, civil society groups have begun
to play an important role in advancing the Rule of Law. Consumer groups,
environmental groups, human rights groups and women’s groups have begun to
bring cases on behalf of victims before the courts in several countries. Public
interest litigation has emerged as an important branch of litigation not just in
South Asia, but in other parts of the world too. In Sri Lanka several public interest
petitioners have brought cases before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.
One of the advantages of public interest litigation is that the petitioner is able to
provide legal arguments and material that victims may not be able to present to
court. They thus enhance the range of materials available to the court and
consequently enhance the court’s capacity to address and resolve complex aspects
of economic and social policy.
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The Politicization of the State
Public life in Sri Lanka has been characterized by a high level of politicization.
Political office is now more a means of pursuing individual ambitions rather than
serving the public interest. The abuse and misuse of public office for personal gain
is a constant feature of Sri Lankan public life.
The public service, which at one time was independent, has now been infused
with a large number of political appointees and has lost independence and
credibility.
Independent institutions such as the police and the judiciary must exhibit both an
institutional independence and an individual independence. Institutional
independence requires that public institutions be independent from executive or
legislative interference. Individual independence requires that the members who
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staff these institutions be free from influence, whether it is from their peers or
from external sources.
The number of PIL cases has ballooned in recent years as the courts in Sri Lanka
have relaxed ‘standing’ requirements. It has begun to attract a lot of public
attention mainly because of three high profile decisions given by the Supreme
Court in the past few years.
3. The use of novel methods to gather facts. Often the court appointed a socio
legal commission of inquiry to investigate the disputed facts and submit a
report to the court.
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4. A creative interpretation of some of the fundamental rights provisions of
the Indian constitution. For example, the right to life clause in the
constitution was broadly interpreted to include a right to livelihood, a right
to speedy access to justice and the right to a clean and healthy environment.
This litigation has been referred to as public interest litigation or social action
litigation. In developing this litigation the Supreme Court of India has argued that
court procedures must be deformalised to enable all segments of society to have
access to the courts. Most disadvantaged and economically underprivileged groups
lacked the capacity to the approach the courts on their own. Thus the court should
permit non governmental organizations (NGOs) and other public interest groups to
litigate on their behalf.
One of the goals of public law litigation is to control public power and to
ensure governmental accountability.
It does not matter who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. Some victims
may not have the capacity to approach the courts and thus a third party
should be allowed to petition on their behalf.
The victim is not the best placed to argue the matter in every case. A public
interest petitioner can bring new material and enhance the quality of the
judgment. Third parties may have better expertise and resources to present
to the court all the relevant material and facilitate a ‘better’ judgement.
If the victim is not always the most competent person to argue the case,
then there is a strong case to allow a third party to intervene or for the
court to appoint an amicus curiae to assist the court, in appropriate cases.
7
See Article 27(15) of Sri Lankan Constitution according to which the state shall endeavour to foster
respect for international law and treaty obligations in dealings among nations.
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PIL is a great legal innovation. It is a powerful tool for the public spirited citizen
to control the exercise of public power and to ensure that public officials always
act in the best interests of the public. It is a powerful tool for ensuring greater
transparency in government and for creating a culture of openness.
There is however, still some space for reviving the vibrancy of the Parliamentary
oversight system even in the context of strong Executive Presidency. A strong
Parliamentary oversight system could potentially play an important role in
enhancing transparency, ensuring that public power is not abused and in
delivering accountability.
The Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) and the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) set up under Standing Orders 125 and 126, are important ways in which
Parliament plays its role as the controller of public finance. Parliament has control
over public finance and in theory the executive is prohibited from using public
funds unless such expenditure has been approved by Parliament. According to
the Constitution it is Parliament’s role to approve the allocation of funds for
projects and services and to supervise and scrutinize the expenditure of such
public funds.
COPE and PAC are both members of multi party committees who between
themselves share the burden of scrutinizing public finance. Both are key
mechanisms for ensuring that public funds are used for a public purpose and are
not mismanaged or embezzled. They have wide powers that enable them to
summon any person to appear before them and to request to see any documents
or records.
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scrutinizes the work of government departments and local authorities. COPE and
the PAC in combination enable the legislature to keep track of public expenditure
and ensure that public funds are used for a public purpose.
In 2007 COPE released two reports one in January and the other in August, both
of which attracted significant public attention. Both reports were released after a
process of inquiry that lasted several months and highlighted the rampant
corruption, waste, and inefficiencies in the public sector.
Parliament was then prorogued on 6th May 2008 by the President without
assigning any reason and the commencement of the new session was fixed for the
5 th of June 2008. The prorogation provided an opportunity for the two key
Parliamentary committees to be reconstituted. The former Chairman of COPE,
who was responsible for producing an independent and credible report on waste
and corruption in the public sector, and had developed a strong public reputation
for his willingness to tackle corruption, was not re-appointed. He was instead
replaced by a government Minister and a member of the Executive. Similarly the
chairman of the Public Accounts Committee was also replaced by a government
Minister. In terms of previous Parliamentary practice, oversight committees were
generally headed by a member of the opposition, even though the previous chair
had been a member of the governing party.
The purpose of COPE and the PAC is to enable Parliamentary oversight over
government institutions that expend public money. Having two members of the
Executive head two important oversight committees that oversee public
enterprises and public expenditure is a clear conflict of interest since the Ministers
sit in committees that scrutinize their own conduct.
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Parliamentary Questions
The other important way in which the legislature exercises control over the
exercise of executive powers is by way of questions, directed at government
Ministers.
Recommendations
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d. The process for accessing information which should be simple, cheap
and widely accessible in all parts of the country and to all social groups.
e. The process for filing an appeal where the initial request for
information is refused.
f. Processes for ensuring that public institutions proactively disclose
information at least once in every two years.
The Establishments Code should be amended and provisions that may prevent
public sector employees from disclosing information should be deleted.
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Issue guidance, warnings and comments with respect to behaviour that it
considers may violate a code of practice or the principles of probity in
public life.8
Such Commissions will frame and supervise standards to ensure that public office
is not used for personal gain or to pursue partisan political interests. This includes
ensuring that public property is not used for personal use and ensuring that
public funds are used in an efficient and effective way. They would also seek to
preclude holders of public office from engaging in specific post-retirement
activities to prevent the perception that the officer holder’s conduct was
influenced by the prospect of a post-retirement benefit.
Public life in Sri Lanka, especially with regard to those who hold public office, has
been characterized by a high level of politicization. The abuse and misuse of
public office for personal gain has also been a feature of Sri Lankan public life.
Needed is an institution that can ensure that public power is exercised in an open,
fair and efficient manner and that public office is not used for personal gain. An
independent institution with a broader mandate than the current CIABOC and
staffed by dynamic and honest personalities will provide better way of addressing
this problem.
Strengthen CIABOC; or
Create a New Institution?
There are two options with regard to institutional reform:
Whether either option is pursued the following points should be kept in mind:
8
Article 178 2(b) and (d) of the Draft Constitution of Kenya (2002)
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Operational Autonomy and Independence
Independence and autonomy both as a principle and in operational terms is
fundamental if bribery and corruption are to be reduced.
The principle of independence needs to apply to all aspects of its operations. The
Commission must be able to assess a complaint, investigate a complaint and
prosecute a complaint without any interference direct or indirect. Pressure cannot
be brought to bear on the commission however indirectly, whether by way of
suggestion or inducement of any form. A common form of inducement is the
promise of some reward or high appointment to the commission members. This
needs to be avoided and should be specifically provided against.
Beyond this it must have autonomy with regard to deciding on the ambit of its
operations. It must have the freedom to recruit its own staff; decide on terms and
conditions of work; design and execute training programmes for its staff; exercise
disciplinary control over its staff; and make other decisions pertaining to staff
management.
Composition
The current requirement that at least two members of the Commission should be
retired judges of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal has proved to be an
obstacle in practice. While it may desirable in some cases to have retired Supreme
Court or Court of Appeal judges, this need not be a requirement. This condition
should be removed and the Constitutional Council should be permitted to
recommend other persons for appointment. The focus should be on honest and
dynamic persons. It would be useful to have at least five Commissioners from
different disciplines and backgrounds and at least three should work full time. A
gender balance must also be maintained.
The Commission should be able to function even in the event of one or more
vacancies.
Functions
The Commission should engage in four broad functions:
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2. Monitoring systems and procedures in the public sector and suggesting
changes to minimize opportunities for bribery and corruption.
3. Educating the public including school children and youth, and
mobilizing the public in the fight against corruption.
4. Enhancing the capacities of civil society organizations and social
movements so as to improve their ability to monitor, report and combat
corruption.
Other Skills
If the Commission is going to perform the other functions mentioned above, it
would also need other skills. Apart from a well equipped investigative team the
Commission would require staff with strong and innovative managerial skills, IT
and financial skills, public education skills and public relations skills. While
some skills may be recruited immediately, others will take some years to build
and so the Commission will do well to plan for a substantial and sustained
training programme for its staff.
The ICAC in Hong Kong ran three departments: the Operations Department to
investigate corruption; the Corruption Prevention Department to look at systems
and procedures in the public sector, to identify the opportunities that exist for
corruption and fill in the gaps; and the Community Relations Department which
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focused on public education. Yet 70% of the resources were ploughed into the
Operations Department with a view to prosecute corruption seriously.9
Public Complaints
The Commission would need to develop an effective system for receiving and
responding to public complaints. The ICAC in Hong Kong had a 24 hour hotline,
which was highly publicized and CIABOC may want to consider a similar model.
The capacity to respond speedily in those cases where a ‘quick reaction’ is
required is also important. This would also operate as a serious deterrent to
corrupt activity.
The Hong Kong ICAC has adopted an effective review system to ensure that all
complaints are promptly investigated. Successful prosecutions are given
prominent publicity in the media and media exposure is used as another way of
deterring corruption. Where a complaint is rejected reasons should be provided
by the Commission to the complainant.
Financial Autonomy
Independence means little without financial autonomy. Although Parliament
approves the annual budget of the Commission, in practice the funds are
controlled by the Treasury. This needs to be changed. Parliament should decide
on the annual budget of the Commission based on an estimate provided by the
Commission. This could be done through one of the standing committees of
Parliament. Once that sum has been approved the Commission should then be in
a position to manage these funds according to internationally approved auditing
standards.
Public Education
While prosecuting and publicizing the prosecutions should remain one
substantial focus of the Commission’s work, this should not be its sole focus. The
Commission should also engage in public education work in a bid to create an
environment that is free of bribery and corruption.
Public education in three languages will require a set of entirely different skills.
Public education as an area has grown and developed so much in recent years
9
Tony Kwok,’ How to Formulate an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy in an Organisation: Hong
Kong Experience’,
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and the Commission must be able to access the state of the art knowledge in this
respect. This will mean that the Commission should be able to recruit and train a
team of educators who will design and then execute the public education
programme.
Public education has the potential to swamp the Commission. The Commission
will thus be forced to prioritize the sectors with which it will work. It could have
programmes that will broadly target the public but beyond that may want to
focus on particular sectors such as youth, the judiciary and the public sector.
There have been a few instances in the recent history of the Commission where
the state has criticized the Commission and attempted to tarnish its reputation.
The Commission should ideally have the capacity to respond to this criticism and
maintain its reputation.
While the Constitution envisages that the Auditor General will assist Parliament
in the scrutiny of public enterprises and public finance it currently functions as an
arm of the executive with the executive having control over many aspects of its
operations including the disbursement of funds to the institution.
10
Articles 153 – 154 0f the Constitution.
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Ideally the institution should be able to examine the performance of all public
institutions, including looking at issues pertaining to economy, efficiency and
effectiveness, and be able to release its reports to the executive, the legislature and
the media.
One of biggest constraints of the Office is a lack of trained staff with the broad
range of skills required of an institution of this nature. There is an urgent need to
upgrade the competencies of its staff through training in modern and
sophisticated audit techniques including the use of computer assisted audit
techniques.
While many other audit institutions in other parts of the world have embraced a
wider array of auditing methodologies including environmental, performance,
investigative and ‘value for money’ audits, the Sri Lankan Auditor General tends
to focus largely on financial auditing. The generation of high quality audit
reports is key aspect of an institution of this nature. Generating such reports will
mean that the capacities of the Department need to be significantly strengthened.
A. Effectively audit all public sector institutions not just for financial
accountability but for efficiency and effectiveness as well. It should be
capable of conducting a wide variety of audits such as environmental,
performance, investigative and ‘value for money’ audits.
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One of the main objectives of the Draft Audit Act is to provide greater operational
and functional independence for the Auditor General’s office. In addition the
draft Act aims at strengthening the capacities of the Auditor General to conduct a
wide variety of audits that go beyond the conventional financial audit. For
instance, in carrying out an audit, the Auditor General has the power to examine
whether satisfactory procedures are in place to assess the environmental impact of
a project.
The draft spells out in detail the different powers and duties that each of these
bodies would have. The objective of establishing these institutions is to ensure
that the Auditor General will have the required independence and ability to audit
accounts of public bodies and to ensure that there is transparency and
accountability in the audit procedures. For instance the Auditor General’s
accounts too are subject to an audit by an independent auditor.
The draft Act seeks to impose criminal sanctions on any ‘audited entity’ which
fails to assist the Auditor General in the discharge of the Auditor General’s
functions. This includes the failure to furnish necessary information and the
refusal to appear before the Auditor General when called to do so. Such actions
can be punished through an indictment in the High Court and will attract either
one year’s imprisonment, a fine of one hundred thousand rupees or both. This
section underlines on one hand the need to introduce penal sanctions in order to
bring about a culture of co-operation with regard to auditing and on the other the
high degree of importance given to the duties that are to be fulfilled by the
Auditor General.
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way how acts of corruption may be exposed without subjecting themselves to any
reprisals or sanctions.
Whistleblower protection laws are likely to have a stronger impact if the agency
to whom the act is reported takes action based on the information provided. Even
if the whistleblower does not suffer any reprisals, lack of follow up action by the
agency concerned will discourage others from taking the risk.
If the Presidency is amended the President should not be permitted to hold any
ministerial portfolio. The Cabinet of Ministers should consist of Members of
Parliament, only.
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b. Ensuring that public funds are used efficiently and in ways that
maximizes output.
This means that Parliament must allocate funds for projects and services through
the annual budget and supervise public expenditure in accordance with such
projections. The procedure for the preparation of the annual budget must be
streamlined and there must be greater consultation between executive and the
legislature in the preparation of estimates and budgets.
Both committees should have the power to summon and examine Ministers,
heads of institution and other staff. They should have the power to examine and
scrutinize any organisation in which the government has a substantial number of
shares. Government loans which create a liability on the Treasury should receive
the prior approval of Parliament.
In the event that the Executive Presidency is not abolished, the unbridled
immunity provided to the acts of the President in Article 35 of the Constitution
should be removed.
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Services Commission must be approved by the Council prior to their appointment
as required by the Constitution.
The procedures for the removal of judges should be strengthened. The current
procedure for an inquiry before a Select Committee of Parliament should be
changed. Judges of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court should be removed
only after an inquiry before a panel of three peer judges from one or more
Commonwealth countries, or after inquiry before an independent panel of the
Judicial Services Commission set up specifically for that purpose.
Retired judges should be provided a pension that is linked to the rate of inflation
in the country. This will strengthen their financial independence after retirement
and make them less susceptible to pressures and inducements from the state.
Retired judges should not be appointed to any public office, except as members of
the independent commissions. Where retired judges are appointed as members of
independent commissions their appointments should receive the prior approval
of the Constitutional Council.
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened …. The persons who may
approach a court are –
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anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
anyone acting in the public interest; and
an association acting in the interest of its members.
All Bills must be published in the gazette and made widely available
before being debated in Parliament.
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INTRODUCTION
There have been 3 phases in the global movement against corruption.
1 st Phase: In the 1980s there was growing intolerance to corruption in a number of
countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, China, Brazil, Venezuela among
others.
2 nd Phase: Convention making and standard setting
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996)
OECD Convention Against the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International
Business Transactions (1997
Council of Europe’s Criminal and
Civil Conventions (1999)
UN Convention Against
Corruption in Mexico in December 2003
3rd Phase: The current phase is implementation and enforcement. This has proved
the most challenging phase, with countries facing unique challenges. While the
laws and institutions may be in place, the challenge is in ensuring they are
respected and adhered to.
I. ETHICS ADVANCES, CORE PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES, AND
STANDARDS
IN PUBLIC SERVICE
In 1994 the United Kingdom developed the 7 Principles of Public Life
Selflessness – Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms
of the
public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other
material
benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.
Integrity – Holders of public office should not place themselves under any
financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organizations that
might influence them in the performance of their official duties.
Objectivity – In carrying out public business, including making public
appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for
rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on
merits.
Accountability – Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions
and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny
is appropriate to their office.
Openness – Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all
the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their
decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest
clearly demands.
31
Honesty – Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private
interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any
conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interests.
Leadership – Holders of public office should promote and support these
principles by leadership and example.
Codes of Conduct for Ministers and Public Officials: Codes of conduct for
ministers, legislators, civil and foreign services officers, the judiciary, and local
government can assist countries in putting principles to work. Guatemala is
among the countries that have instituted codes of conduct for ministers and
permanent secretaries. In the United Kingdom, the Standards Board for England
is active in setting and enforcing standards of conduct, transparency, and
accountability across local government structures. The Board is responsible for
promoting high ethical standards and investigating allegations that members’
behavior may have fallen short of the required standards.
32
direct or indirect personal financial interest that might be expected to impair his
objectivity or independence of judgment.”
The Public Integrity Index is the centerpiece of the Global Integrity Report,
produced by the Center for Public Integrity. This provides a quantitative
scorecard of governance practices in a range of countries. It brings together data
on 292 corruption related governance variables for 25 countries and assesses the
institutions and practices that citizens can use to hold their governments
accountable to the public interest. The Public Integrity Index does not measure
corruption itself, but rather the opposite of corruption: the extent of citizens'
ability to ensure their government is open and accountable.
Declarations of Asset: Although forms providing for the disclosure of assets and
income are unlikely to be accurately completed by those who are taking bribes,
the requirement that they formally record their financial positions can lay an
important building block for any subsequent prosecution.
33
Political Party Financing: Political parties need adequate funding for offices, staff,
and communication with the electorate, but individuals or companies often agree
to fund a political party with the expectation that they will benefit in some way, if
the party is elected to office. There are two models for political financing – the
public model (for example, Japan, France, and Spain) and the private model (for
example, the United States and the United Kingdom). However, few systems are
exclusively one or the other. Donations by foreign donors to political parties can
often raise greater concerns among democratically-minded citizens. Such
donations can easily be represented as an attempt by foreign powers, companies
or individuals to place in power a party most likely to do their bidding. Political
parties in the US, Britain, Germany, and Australia have all been asked to explain
why foreign individuals and corporations have given them massive donations.
Some countries, such as Poland, avoid the problem completely by simply
prohibiting all foreign contributions to political parties. If the funding process is
not transparent and political parties are not required to disclose the sources of
sizeable donations, then the public is left to draw its own conclusions when it sees
those suspected of secretly funding political parties as openly benefiting from
handsome contracts and other government business. The election process can
quickly degenerate into an auction of political power.
Access to Information: One can begin with the assumption that all information
belongs to the public. For unless there are compelling reasons why it should be
withheld, information is held in trust by a government to be used in the public
interest.38 This is the approach adopted in such countries as Brazil and New
Zealand, where there is a legal requirement that all official information be made
available to anyone who seeks it, unless there is adequate cause to withhold it. In
Latvia, the rights of the citizen are specifically provided for in the constitution.
The 1998 Law on Freedom of Information guarantees public access to all
information in “any technically feasible form” not specifically restricted by law.
34
Bodies must respond to requests for information within 15 days. Moldova and
Bosnia-Herzegovina also require that government institutions respond within 15
working days.
Home to some 16 million people in China, Shanghai adopted the country’s first
provincial level open information legislation in January, 2004. It has worked hard
to transform itself into an international financial, trade, and shipping center, with
a goal to become a "global metropolis." Shanghai was an early proponent of e-
Government and the nationwide movement for more "open government affairs,"
recognizing that making more information available to its citizens would
stimulate economic activity, help curb corruption, and ensure more efficient and
effective governance. In May of2004, Shanghai launched its Transparent
Government Programme, and the new legislation came into force. There is a
presumption of disclosure, making secrecy the exception rather than the rule. The
law provides citizens, legal persons, and other organizations with the right to
request government information from government agencies, including
information about individuals themselves. It also imposes a legal obligation on
government agencies to all information not covered by a specified exemption.
The Media: A free, independent and pluralistic media is essential to a free and
open society and to accountable systems of government. While many journalists
have been killed while reporting on violent conflict, many more have been killed
in the course of reporting on issues of corruption. Governments should embrace a
basic set of principles to inform their policies towards the media. In general, these
argue against legislation and restriction. A good example is the Charter for a Free
Press, approved by journalists from 34 countries at the Voices of Freedom World
Conference on Censorship Problems.
35
The agency has enjoyed independence from political interference, political will
has been in abundance, adequate resources have been provided, and the agency
has been able to rely on the support of independent courts committed to the Rule
of Law. Those who have tried to copy the model have largely failed when they
have lacked one or more of these elements.
A highly successful initiative in South Africa has been a strategy of civil asset
forfeiture. Their Asset Forfeiture Unit is placed within the Office of the National
Director of Public Prosecutions. When property is tainted by criminal activity, the
Unit can commence court proceedings for its forfeiture to the state. Under the
Prevention of Organized Crime Act 1998, such property is liable to be forfeited to
the state by way of a civil action. Civil asset forfeiture enables the state to
confiscate suspected criminals’ assets purely through a civil action against the
property, without the need to obtain a criminal conviction against the owner of
the property.
• To ensure that the elected representatives of the people can speak in the
legislature without fear of criminal or civil sanctions and a host of claims for
defamation;
• To protect elected representatives from being arbitrarily detained and so
prevented from attending the legislature; and
• To act as a shield against malicious and politically-motivated prosecutions
being brought against them.
36
her office (as confirmed in a recent decision in France). Constitutions usually
provide for the impeachment of a president, and serious criminal acts would
provide those grounds. Therefore, there is usually a remedy, but it lies with the
legislature, rather than with the judiciary.
Judges: Members of the judiciary present special difficulty. They are generally
immune from being sued personally for errors they may have made in their
judgments (for example, for exceeding their jurisdiction). To protect them from
political pressures, they are generally also immune from criminal prosecution,
unless the immunity is lifted. In the case of Estonia, the GRECO review
recommended that any decision to lift the inviolability of judges should be free
from political influence. It should be a decision based on a request from the
prosecutor, supported by the Supreme Court.
Steps are also being taken in the fight against corruption to improve information
sharing and best practices across the United Nations and other agencies, starting
with an inter-agency anticorruption coordination meeting held in Vienna in
February 2002.
37
principles assert that judges should be accountable for their conduct to
appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are
themselves independent and impartial.
In the European context, there are a number of major instruments in this field.
Among them are The Judges’ Charter in Europe, a Recommendation on the
Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges made by the Council of Europe, and
the European Charter on the Statute for Judges adopted by participants at a
multilateral meeting in 1998.
In cases where a large number of the judiciary has become corrupt, as has been
seen in countries such as Kenya and Ecuador, a mechanism to address this needs
to be developed.
38
ensuring accountability. In the United Kingdom, this position is held by a public
servant appointed through a competitive process.
Licensing: In Bolivia, reforms there have included the publication of details on all
government procedures and fees. All government offices now have to display
posters explaining the required paperwork and the exact costs of each transaction.
This is designed to prevent government employees from demanding bribes, and
to dispense with the need for “middle men” to help citizens through their
transactions. Alongside this, “positive silence” has been introduced. This means
that citizens applying for occupational licenses, car registrations or other
government certificates will be considered to have had their applications
approved automatically if the applications have not been rejected within 15 days.
39
over. Not only does it make use of a panel of anticorruption experts, but it also
has developed a set of standards for fighting corruption in police forces
worldwide. Its Global Standards to Combat Corruption in Police
Forces/Services76 seek to ensure that police forces of member states have high
levels of probity. Each member state commits to making corruption by a police
officer a serious criminal offence. Other standards include establishing and
maintaining high standards of conduct for the honest, ethical and effective
performance; and setting up and maintaining effective mechanisms to oversee
and enforce high levels of conduct in the performance of policing functions.
INTERPOL is now developing ways in which to provide practical assistance and
training to the forces of member states that require it.
Integrity Testing: Systems are being developed to ensure that police integrity
receives continuous attention instead of being isolated to investigating selected
‘rotten apples’. In this, “integrity testing” has emerged as a particularly useful tool
in metropolitan areas such as New York and London.
The NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau in New York now creates fictitious scenarios
based on known acts of police corruption, such as the theft of drugs and/or cash
from a street level drug dealer, to test the integrity of their officers. Those who fail
the tests are either disciplined or dismissed from the force.
The concept need not be confined to police activities. In some countries, hidden
television cameras have been used in the ordinary process of criminal
investigations to monitor illicit activities conducted in the private offices of
judges. These cameras have captured corrupt transactions between judges and
members of the legal profession. It would also seem to have potential use in other
areas where the public sector is engaged in direct transactions with members of
the public, particularly in customs.
Revenue Collection: In some countries (e.g. Peru and Uganda), corruption related
to state revenues had become so endemic that governments decided to close
down existing tax administrations and to replace them with new ones. Corrupt
customs officials also mean porous borders. Through these can flow not only
untaxed goods, but also arms and illicit drugs, illegal immigrants etc. The
organizational structure of Latvia’s State Revenue Service was improved to
integrate tax, customs, and social security collections, and to create strong internal
control and anticorruption functions. A Vigilance Unit, operating independently
from the tax police, was also established. Implicit in this was the need to ensure
that tax assessments were simple to calculate, and that levied rates were realistic.
A code of conduct, based on the WCO model, was developed that includes
instructions on the proper response for staff when offered a bribe. In the
Philippines, automation has been used to reduce transactions, from 10 documents
40
in triplicate and about 91 steps, to one single administrative document for the
whole process. This has simplified work and minimized red tape, corruption, and
tax evasion and at the same time has reduced cargo release times from 6-8 days to
as little as four hours.
41
• Forfeiture of their performance bond; and
• Liability for damages, both to the government principal and to competing
bidders
(for the losses they have incurred through an unsuccessful bid).
Visa Refusals: A recent innovation has been the adoption by the United States of
a policy limiting entry to the United States for politicians accused of corruption in
their own countries.
Privatization and Competition Policy: Few would disagree with the proposition
that ambitious privatization programmes were urgently needed in transition
countries to end the grossly inefficient, state-owned monopolies which dominated
the economy. Riddled with cronyism, bled to provide illicit funding for the party
in power, plundered by corrupt managers and pilfered by staff at all levels, many
of these companies were as bankrupt as they were unproductive. Privatization
can result in a reduction of corrupt practices by shifting the emphasis of an
operation to the transparent discipline of the private sector’s pursuit of profit.
Privatization can reduce forms of corruption: managers of companies make
decisions that ultimately have to satisfy owners instead of public officials;
government assets for which no one is held accountable cease to exist; and once a
particular privatization has been completed, the company can conduct its affairs
without government interference. To be effective, however, policies must go
beyond the mere process of privatization and address the integrity of the markets
in which the privatized concerns are to function. Experience in Eastern and
Central Europe and elsewhere has shown how privatization can create
opportunities for politicians to distribute favors to their friends.
Corruption does not take place only within the public sector. Nor is it restricted to
public procurement transactions involving both the public and private sectors. It
can also take place within and between private sector organizations, when
corporations abuse market power in areas of the economy that should be
governed by a country’s competition policy. The development of a sound
competition policy is an essential tool for protecting and promoting economic
activity, and for underwriting the integrity of private sector activities. It
determines appropriate ways in which the private sector should function, thus
42
ensuring that its performance serves the best interests of all. A prime purpose in
developing a sound competition policy is to minimize the scope for rigging
markets.
As well as governments, others have come together. These include the Group of
Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC), the chief justices of the Judicial
Integrity Group ; academics and training institutions under the rubric of the
Public Integrity Education Network (PIEN); members of the International
Chamber of Commerce with its Commission on Anti-Corruption107; and global
banks under the caption of the Wolfsburg Principles. In almost every country,
there are civil society groups active on the ground – lobbying for institutional
change, public awareness raising and working to empower citizens in their day-
to-day lives.
43
At the national level a very steep learning curve continues. New tools and
approaches are being generated, and many lessons are being learned along the
way, among them being that:
It is generally accepted that crude, single figure country “corruption scores” have
their uses for awareness-raising purposes, but are not designed to measure
progress on the ground, or to provide data indicating precisely where attention is
needed. Fortunately, three new approaches to meet these needs have evolved. The
first, a Public Integrity Index, provides a quantitative scorecard of governance
practices in a range of countries to assess the extent of citizens' ability to ensure
their government is open and accountable. The second is the Country Assessment
in Accountability and Transparency (or CONTACT) model, developed by the
44
UNDP with the main objective being to “assist governments in conducting a self-
assessment of their financial management and anticorruption systems.” Under a
third and complementary approach, the functioning of National Integrity Systems
are starting to be “mapped”, and in ways that can provide much greater insight
than hitherto, as to where things are going wrong, and why, and where progress
is being made. The tracking of the success or otherwise of reforms provides
information that is presently not available.
The most effective way forward would seem to involve two complementary
approaches. One, at the macro level, focusing on strengthening national integrity
systems in a holistic and informed manner. The second, working with citizens on
the ground, actively involving them in the formulation and implementation of
policies that affect their daily lives.
45
(Conclusions of a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and
World Bank Institute Study Group on Access to Information Held in
partnership with the Parliament of Ghana Accra, Ghana, 5-9 July
2004)
Freedom of information is a fundamental human right, crucial in its own right and
also as a cornerstone of democracy, participation and good governance.
Recognition of this key right is essential to empowering all members of society,
including Parliamentarians, to strengthening parliamentary democracy, to
reversing practices of government by the few and to improving the relationship
between Parliament and the media. It is essential that legislation be adopted to
give proper effect to this right and countries around the world, and within the
Commonwealth in particular, have either adopted, or are in the process of
adopting, such legislation.
46
(3.1) Public bodies should be required by law to publish and disseminate widely a
range of key information in a manner that is easily accessible to the public. Over
time, the amount of information subject to such disclosure should be increased.
(3.3) Public bodies should make use of new information technologies so that, over
time, all information that might be the subject of a request, and that is not covered
by an exception, is available electronically. This will not only significantly promote
public access to this information but also result in considerable savings for public
bodies due to the drop in the number of requests that this will occasion.
(4.2) Public bodies should be required to respond to requests within set time
periods. A failure to respond to a request within that time period should be
deemed a refusal of the request.
(4.3) Any refusal to provide information should be accompanied by the reasons for
that refusal, including which provision in the legislation is being relied upon, as
well as information detailing any right of appeal the requester may have.
(4.4) Requesters should have the right to appeal any refusal to provide
information to an independent administrative body. A final appeal should also lie
to the courts.
(5) Costs
(5.1) Costs for access to information should not be so high as to deter requesters.
When putting in place statutory fee systems, consideration should be given to the
following:
(5.1.a) requesters only have to pay for the cost of reproducing the information;
(5.1.d) if the information is not provided within a set time period after the fee has
been paid, the money will be returned and the request will be free of charge;
47
(5.1.e) costs are charged only where requests go beyond a certain size or
complexity; and
(6) Exceptions
(6.1) The right of access should be subject to a narrow, carefully tailored regime of
exceptions to protect certain overriding public and private interests. Exceptions
should not be phrased in vague or subjective language but should, as far as
possible, be set out in clear and objective terms.
(6.2) Exceptions should apply only where there is a risk of substantial harm to the
protected interest, and where that harm is greater than the overall public interest
in having access to the information. The practice in Scotland in this regard is
commended.
(6.3) No public body should be completely excluded from the ambit of the
legislation; rather, exceptions should be applied on a case-by-case basis in light of
specific information requests.
(7.2) Urgent steps should be taken to review and, as necessary, repeal or amend,
legislation restricting access to information.
48
technologies can significantly facilitate record management, promoting better
record maintenance practices.
(10.2) Parliamentarians should play a leadership role in this area, sending a clear
signal to public officials that they fully support openness and setting a positive
example through their own openness. Parliamentarians should also seek to
employ innovative strategies to address the culture of secrecy and to involve
public officials in promoting openness. The Group commends in this regard the
good practice in Trinidad and Tobago.
(12.2) The independent administrative body should have the power to hear
appeals from any refusal by a public body to provide information, along with all
necessary powers to effectively exercise this role. This should include the power
49
to mediate disputes, to compel evidence and to review, in camera if necessary,
the information which is the subject of the request, to order the disclosure of
information. and, where appropriate, to impose penalties.
(12.3) The independent administrative body should also play a role in ensuring
that public bodies properly implement access to information legislation. This
should include an obligation to keep the performance of public bodies under
effective review, as well as the power to review the performance of any particular
public body. The independent administrative body should be required to report
annually, as well as on an ad hoc basis as necessary, to Parliament.
(12.4) The independent administrative body should also play a role in ensuring
that other legislation is consistent with the access to information law. This should
involve reviewing existing legislation and making recommendations for reform of
any inconsistent laws, as well as being consulted on whether or not proposed
legislation would impede the effective operation of the access to information
regime.
(13.3) All public bodies should be required to provide a full annual report, either to
the responsible minister or to the independent oversight body, on the information
requests they have received and how they have been dealt with. This information
should then be laid before Parliament in a public document.
(13.5) Parliament should play a key oversight role regarding the independent
administrative body responsible for implementation of the access to information
legislation. Parliament should, in particular, play a leading role with respect to
appointments to and funding of the body. Consideration should be given to an
appointments process that requires either unanimous approval or a super majority
vote. The appointments process should be conducted in a transparent manner.
The body should, in addition, formally report to and be accountable to Parliament.
(13.6) Consideration should be given to regular parliamentary review, for example
on a biannual basis, of implementation of the access to information regime.
50
(14.1) Parliament should play a leadership role in promoting open government by
opening up its own practices and procedures to the widest possible extent.
Parliamentary debates should be televised and records of these debates should
be made publicly available as soon as possible, including through the Internet.
(14.3) There should be a presumption that committee meetings are open to the
public, so that closed meetings are the exception rather than the rule. Where it is
necessary to hold a meeting, or part of a meeting, in private, a decision to that
effect should be taken in public and reasons for that decision should be given. The
Group notes, in this regard, Recommendation 8.9 of the CPA Study Group on
Parliament and the Media’s meetings.
(15.3) The Group notes the following specific areas of interest and we encourage
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the World Bank Institute, the
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, the Commonwealth Secretariat, NGOs
and the international community to provide assistance for the following:
(15.3.b) The Group recognized the need for better information on access and, as
a result, recommended that Commonwealth-wide comparative studies be
conducted in key thematic areas; and
Conclusion
The Group recognizes the enormous variety that exists within the Commonwealth
and that the implementation of these Recommendations for access to information
will vary from country to country. At the same time, we believe that these
Recommendations represent a foundational set of standards to which all
51
Commonwealth jurisdictions should aspire. We call on all Commonwealth
Parliaments and their Members to take effective measures, as soon as possible,
to implement these Recommendations in practice.
52
The Government established a Permanent Commission to Investigate Allegations
of Bribery and Corruption by Act No 19 of 1994. The Commission comprises of
three members, two of whom are to be retired judges of the Supreme Court.
Definition of Bribery Under the bribery Act No. 11 of 1954, Bribery can be defined
as ‘The offer, solicitation or acceptance of any gratification.
Corruption is defined as an act by a public servant that will cause wrongful or
unlawful loss to the Government or confer a wrongful or unlawful benefit on
himself or another person wherein the public servant:
Does or forbears to do any act which he is empowered to do by virtue of his office
as a public servant
Induces any public servant to perform, or refrain from performing such acts
Uses any information coming to his knowledge by virtue of his office as a public
servant
Participates in the making of any decision by virtue of his office
Induces any person by virtue of his office to perform or refrain from performing
any act.
Those who commit the offence of corruption shall be liable to a jail term of not
more than 10 years or a fine of up to Rs 100,000.
Purpose Under the Bribery Act No. 11 of 1954 as amended, the Bribery
Commission is empowered to direct and investigate all allegations of bribery
made to or that come to the knowledge of the Bribery Commissioner.
Powers of the Commission
The Commission has the power to:
procure oral and written evidence
examine witnesses under oath
request the production of documents or other material from banks, the Inland
Revenue Department or any other person or institution
prohibit a person from leaving the country
enter any place and seize any documents or materials
Weaknesses
The Commission must depend on the IGP to provide officers to conduct
investigations and on the Ministry of Public Administration for administrative
work
The Director General of the Commission is appointed by the President and
accountable to the President, not the Commission. The term of the Director
General is not secured and he could be removed by the President.
The Commission requires a written complaint of Bribery or Corruption to take
action
Comments
53
Members of the Commission should be appointed for 3 and not 5 years
The appointment of retired Supreme Court Judges to the Commission could
compromise the independence on the judiciary
There is no witness protection scheme in Sri Lanka. The Act further appears to
penalize informants and if the complaint is deemed false the informant can be
penalized
In some countries minor complaints are dealt with by a panel and offenders can
avoid charges by resigning from their posts and paying a fine
The Commission should be empowered to act on oral complaints, anonymous
petitions and even newspaper articles. In Hong Kong, the Commission has a 24
hour hotline for complaints
There should be units in the Provinces to investigate
Public awareness needs to be created on the ill-effects of corruption
The Commission could be called the Ethics and Integrity Commission. It should
have financial autonomy. The Commission should monitor state institutions to
ensure funds are not misused
The Declaration of Assets and Liabilities law (Act no. 1 of 1975, 29 of 1985 and
Amending Act No 74 of 1988
Purpose The purpose of the law was to monitor the acquisition of wealth by
Politician, Public Servants and others with a view to contain Bribery and
Corruption. The law requires MPs, members of local authorities, Chairmen and
Directors of State Corporations, Office Bearers of Political Parties, Trade Unions
and also other categories referred to in Section 2 to make a declaration of their
assets and liabilities as at 31 March each year.
Offences
Failure to submit a return within 3 months
Making a false statement
Willfully omitting any asset or liability
Punishment A fine not exceeding Rs1000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year
or both.
Weaknesses
There is no central authority vested with the power to receive and monitor the
filing of Declarations. Nobody knows or monitors who has filed a report and
there is no process for verification.
Section 9 (a) requires a complainant to deposit security for cost and damages. No
one will initiate action given this requirement.
Comments
Without a Central Authority to monitor declarations, no one appears to know
whether all the relevant officers have sent their declarations and if any assets have
54
been omitted. It is reported that up to 31 December, 2005 only 7 MPs had made
Declarations.
The Election Law should be amended to prohibit the acceptance of the
nomination of a candidate who has not filed a true declaration of his assets and
liabilities.
The Ombudsman
The office of the Ombudsman was established by the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration Act No. 17 of 1981 and amended by Act No 26
of 1994.
Purpose The purpose of the office was to provide the public with a cheap and
expeditious means to resolve injustices and disputes. The Ombudsman is
appointed by the President.
Functions Any person can complain to the Ombudsman directly. He can
investigate into any matter in respect of an infringement of a fundamental right or
other injustice by a public officer or corporation officer providing that it does not
contravene any other laws.
Determination of the Ombudsman Act No 26 or 1994 amended Section 17 spelled
out what kind of determination the Ombudsman could make. The Ombudsman
will determine whether there has been or is likely to be an infringement of a
fundamental right, contrary to the law, oppressive or discriminatory or unjust.
The Ombudsman is required to forward his determination to the Minister, Head
of Department and Public Petitions Committee. If no action is taken on the report
or recommendation the Ombudsman shall forward a report to the President and
to Parliament.
Comments
Sometimes the directions given by him are ignored and the law is rendered
virtually impotent. In some countries the Ombudsman has wide powers and can
give orders and directions and ensure that they are implemented.
The Ombudsman should be able to open offices in the Provinces to enable greater
access
The term and background of the Ombudsman should be reconsidered. At present
the term is not fixed and mostly the appointees are retired Judges. This should be
open to a wider range of persons of integrity.
55
To investigate the infringement of imminent infringement of fundamental rights
and to provide for settlement by conciliation and mediation
To advise and assist the Government in formulating legislation to further
Fundamental Rights
To make recommendations to the Government to ensure that national laws and
administrative practices are in accordance with international Human Rights
norms and standards
To recommend to the Government to ensure that national laws and
administrative practices are in accordance with international Human Rights
norms and standards
To recommend to the Government on the need to subscribe or accede to treaties
and other international instruments in the field of human rights
To promote awareness of and provide education in relation to Human Rights
Powers of the Commission
To investigate violations or imminent violations of Fundamental Rights
To appoint sub-committees at Provincial level to carry out the duties of the
Commission
To intervene in any proceeding relating to the infringement of Fundamental
Rights pending before any Court.
To monitor the welfare of persons detained by the state and to make
recommendations to improve the conditions of detainees.
To take steps as directed by the Supreme Court.
To undertake research and promote awareness of Human Rights by conducting
seminars etc
To award expenses reasonably incurred by a complainant
To summon any person and receive evidence and examine witnesses
Weaknesses
The definition of “human rights’ in the Law is incomplete- it does not include
many of the Rights referred o in various UN Conventions which have been
adopted by Sri Lanka.
The Commission can only attempt to settle disputes by conciliation. There is no
provision to compel the state or institutions to carry out directions of the
Commission.
When the Commission fails to give relief to any person who has filed a complaint,
they can appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 126 of the Constitution.
However such applications are expensive and the cost could be considered
prohibitive.
Comments
56
Under Section 28, police officers must inform the Commission of details of
persons arrested and detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
Every offence of contempt committed against, or disrespect of the authority of the
Commission shall be punishable by the Supreme Court
Such an institution should be proactive and dynamic it is to be effective
Comments
The Purpose of the 17th Amendment is to
De-politicize certain vital departments and institutions which are under the
control of the government in power.
Ensure the appointment of competent professionals and others with integrity to
various Commissions on the principle of merit.
Ensure to all citizens the Right to equality and non-discrimination in
appointments and to public officers the same right in transfers, promotions,
transfers and disciplinary control. (d) To ensure that the Commissions established
57
by the Law would function independently without fear or favor and without
political interference.
58
The Commission may delegate to Secretary JSC the power to make transfers of
scheduled public officers.
Comments
The independence of the Judiciary should comply with International Standards
spelt out in the UN Instruments. There should be a Code of Ethics based on the
Bangalore Principle as a guide for Judges.
The Commission should consist of at least five members. At present there are
three, all of whom are Supreme Court Judges. In South Africa there are 18
members, including the leader of the opposition, lawyers, academics and other
persons of integrity.
There should be a code of Ethics based on the Bangalore Principles as a guide for
Judges
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At present the NPC is not functioning.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act No 5of 2006
Purpose Money laundering is the practice of engaging in specific financial
transactions in order to hide the identity, source, and/or destination of money
generated from unlawful activity as defined in Section 28 of the Act. The Act
prohibits money laundering in Sri Lanka, provides the necessary measures to
combat and prevent money laundering and provides for matters connected with
or incidental to it.
Punishment The punishment on conviction after trial before the High Court is a
minimum fie, not less than the value of the property and the maximum fine not
more than three times the value. The punishment for attempting or conspiring to
commit the crime or aiding and abetting the crime is the same as for the
commission of the crime.
Duty to Disclose Any person who has knowledge or information pertaining to
the commission of an offense or a planned offense is required to report it to the
Financial Intelligence Unit.
Freezing of Property and Forfeiture of Assets in Relation to Money Laundering A
Freezing order for 7 days can be issued by a high ranking police officer to prohibit
any transaction relating to any account, property or investment which may be
used or is intended to be used in connection with money laundering. The freezing
order must be confirmed by the High Court within 7 days. The court can extend
the validity of the order for up to one year.
Upon conviction the Court can order that any movable or immovable property of
the person so convicted will be forfeited to the State.
Financial Intelligence Unit The Financial Intelligence Unit was established under
the Financial Transactions Reporting Act No. 6 of 2006. The Unit refers reports
that it deems to warrant investigation or prosecution under the Act to the
appropriate law enforcement agency.
Amendment of the Extradition Law No 8 of 1977 When a foreign national is
arrested for an offence of money laundering, the government should inform that
State about the measures being taken against him to prosecute or extradite him.
Should a foreign national be arrested, he will be entitled to communicate without
delay with a Representative of his State.
Assistance from other States The provisions of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act No 25 of 2002 can be invoked to obtain assistance for investigation
and prosecution of an offense from any other Commonwealth State or any other
State if it has entered into an agreement under this Act.
Financial Transactions Reporting Act of No.6 of 2006
Purpose This law applies primarily to financial institutions. It is based on the
premise that financial institutions can detect and help to eliminate money
laundering by ‘knowing their customers’. This means that by having a good
knowledge of their customers they will be in a position to help to detect
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suspicious behaviors such as unusual transactions and other behaviors that may
indicate laundering is occurring.
Obligation to Check Identity of Customer Under the Act institutions must verify
the identities of customers who are opening accounts.
Records Every institution under the Act is required to maintain records of
transactions and correspondence relating to them and any records of reports
made to the Financial Intelligence Unit for a period of six years.
Due Diligence The institution should conduct due to diligence on any business
relationship. The institution must report to the Financial Intelligence Unit:
Any transaction in cash or its equivalent in foreign currency which is above the
prescribed limit
Any electronic funds transfer requested by the customer which is above the
prescribed limit
Every Institution is required to inform the Financial Intelligence Unit of such
suspicious transactions as it forms a suspicion or receives such information and
thinks it is relevant for the investigation or prevention of money laundering or
terrorist financing act.
Every institution is required to appoint a compliance officer who will be
responsible for ensuring the institution complies with the requirements of the Act.
He or she is required to screen all persons before hiring them and train officers,
employees and agents to recognize suspicious transactions.
Restrictions The Act will not apply to Wills, Bills of Exchange, a Power of
Attorney, a Trust, contract for sale or conveyance of immovable property or any
other transaction specified by the Minister.
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Purpose The Law Commission prepared a draft Freedom of Information Bill in
2003 and submitted it to the Ministry of Justice. It confers a right to access official
information in the custody of public authorities.
Comments
Under 5(1) (k) access is denied where the ‘disclosure of such information would
be in contempt of court of or infringe the privileges of Parliament. The law of
contempt of court depends on the Judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court. In the past the decisions have not been consistent and depended on the
interpretations of the Judges. Because interpretation is not rigid, Information
Officers are open to take restrictive attitudes and refuse to give information that
has been requested
It is suggested that a Clause be included relating to the Privileges of Parliament
that information may be withheld that establishes particular criteria for
withholding information. This would prevent varying interpretations and
allowing access on tangible and non-negotiable criteria
Clause 5(4) introduces a new offence for the disclosure of prohibited information.
This many intimidate Information Officers, who may refuse to disclose
information rather than committing a possible offence
Information Officers should be responsible for ensuring records are properly
maintained to enable easy access
At present, the Information Officer should provide information ‘as soon as
practicable’. A time limit must be set on this. It is suggested that in general this
should be twenty working days, however if the request is in order to safeguard
the life and liberty of a person it should be within 48 hours
It is necessary to ensure the independence of the Freedom of Information
Commission. A new sub-section should be added under Section 14 to state that
the Commission shall enjoy operational and administrative autonomy, except as
specifically provided for by the law.
The Decisions and Orders of the Commission should be binding
No one should be subject to any legal, administrative of employment related
sanctions for releasing information on wrong doing, provided that they acted in
good faith
Whistle-blowing to be made a legal duty on the part of all public officers and
members of Parliament
Purpose There is no law or constitutional requirement that casts any duty on
citizens to blow the whistle where they become aware of corrupt conduct. It is
therefore only a moral obligation. It is necessary to impose a legal duty by passing
a law conferring such a right and a duty to blow the whistle where any citizen
becomes aware of corrupt conduct.
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The Bribery Commission has drafted amendments to the present law to give
protection for whistle-blowers to disclose information to it. This includes
immunity from disciplinary proceeding of persons making public interest
disclosures, protection of Identity and protection from all forms of reprisal.
A Law to Promote Public Interest Litigation
Purpose A specific law pertaining to group rights should be introduced. In India
Courts act on a letter or petition by a member of the Public and order the
complaint to be investigated. In South Africa PIL and the Right to Information
Law is spelled out as a Fundamental Right.
Advantages
It provides access to justice to a group or class of persons
PIL restrains the state and state agencies from acting in an unconstitutional or
illegal manner
There is a need to have a specific law to provide public interest litigation in Sri
Lanka.
Contempt of Court
Contempt of Court gives the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal the power
to punish for contempt any person who defies a court order, criticizes the Judge
or interferes with judicial proceedings. Criminal contempt would occur where
someone yells at the judge in court or by publishing matter which may prejudice a
fair trial which undermines the public’s confidence in the judge or judicial
proceedings. Civil contempt occurs when a person disobeys a court order.
Contempt can be punished with a fine or imprisonment or both.
These powers can become a serious threat to freedom of expression and inhibit
the exposure of corruption in the Judiciary. In a democracy the public must have
the right to scrutinize governance including governance in the Judiciary.
It is necessary for an enactment to be passed by Parliament to regulate the offence
of contempt of court. It may be an ordinary Act of Parliament or a Constitutional
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Amendment. Both India and the UK have passed such laws. Such an enactment in
Sri Lanka should:
Define what Constitutes Contempt of Court
Define what could be legitimately prohibited
Clarify the ruling regarding disclosure of sources
Enact protection for journalists regarding non-disclosure of their sources of
information as in international standards
Stipulate a fair procedure to be followed in a trial for contempt ensuring the rights
of the accused are not violated in any way
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Bribery and Corruption in Sri Lanka:
Strengthening the Institutional Framework
Background
Corruption can be defined as ‘Abuse of power for private gain’. The
Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts recently estimated corruption in
the public sector in Sri Lanka is costing approximately Rs100 billion a year.
Despite being widely acknowledged, little has been done to reduce its practice.
This is demonstrated by the fact that over the years only a few low level officials
have ever been prosecuted.
Sri Lanka is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption,
which seeks to define the obligations of States to prevent corruption and promote
a culture of transparency and accountability with regard to the management of
public affairs and property. There are a number of laws and institutions in the
country which should prevent corruption, yet clearly they are not serving their
purpose effectively.
The Current Institutional Framework
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption
CIABOC was set up in 1994. The objective was to create a powerful, independent
institution capable of investigating and prosecuting all forms of bribery and
corruption. Despite high expectations, the Commission has failed to make a
significant impact. The main reasons for its failures have been in its lack of
financial and operational independence. Political, human and financial constraints
have made the Commission ineffectual.
Structure: The Commission is led by three Commissioners who are appointed by
the President based on recommendations of the Constitutional Council. Two of
the three members should be retired Supreme Court Judges. Commissioners’
tenure is for 5 years and they can only be removed on the grounds of incapacity
or misconduct through an order of Parliament, supported by a majority of
members. The Commission can not currently function in the absence of one or
more of the Commissioners. This has severely hampered the functioning of the
Commission in the past, in some cases suspending work for over a year.
The Director General reports directly to the Commissioners. CIABOC’s
investigative staff consists of around 100 members, drawn mostly from the police
force. These officers receive an additional 33% of their police salaries as a ‘risk
allowance’. The composition of the investigators has hampered the work of the
Commission, because they lack adequate training and capacity to understand and
investigate complex forms of corruption.
The Commission is hampered by financial constraints. Currently financial
resources are decided on by the treasury, and funds have been inadequate to meet
the need.
Functions: The main function of CIABOC is to investigate allegations of bribery
and corruption received from the public and then to initiate prosecution.
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Allegations must be deemed genuine and disclose material which can be
investigated. This is done by the Commissioners. Once this has been decided,
cases are handed over to the Director General for Investigation.
If an investigation shows that an offence was committed under the Bribery Act,
the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law (No 1 of 1975) or under any other
law, the Commission may proceed to prosecute the offender. A suit may be
launched either in the Magistrate’s Court or the High Court. Suits are initiated in
the Magistrate’s Court where the amount involved is less than Rs 2,000. Suits are
conducted by the Commission’s legal staff.
Independence: The extent to which the Commission can operate with autonomy is
reflected by the effectiveness of its work. Unless it is fully independent, the
Commission cannot effectively investigate all forms of bribery and corruption at
all levels of government. There is little evidence that the Commission has had any
significant impact. This is primarily due to three significant constraints that have
limited its independence and capacity to carry out its functions. These constraints
are:
Political
Human
Financial
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institutions would be established to ensure the Auditor General would have the
required independence and ability to audit accounts of public bodies.
Parliamentary Oversight Bodies: The Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE)
and the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) are the two principal methods of
parliamentary oversight. COPE draws its members from different political parties
in government. The Committee scrutinizes the accounts of public corporations
and other public undertakings and comments on how public institutions are
being run.
The Bribery Act
Background
The Bribery Act was passed in 1954. In the 1994 amendment, the offence of
‘corruption’ was introduced for the first time.
Categories of Offenders: According to the Bribery Act a public servant is deemed
guilty of bribery where such person solicits or accepts any gratification:
As an inducement or reward for interfering with the administration of
justice
To protect from detection or punishment the perpetrator of an offence
For abusing official powers to the inquiry or detriment of a person
For giving assistance or using influence to obtain a contract with the
government
For performance of any official work or for expediting such
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A person charged with corruption can be convicted by a magistrate to
imprisonment for a term of not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding
Rs100,000 or both.
Proposed modifications
Definition: It has been proposed that the definition of bribery by expanded. Any
person who accepts, solicits or agrees to accept ant gratification either for himself
or another should be considered guilty of bribery.
Trial: At present a conviction for corruption is by a magistrate through summary
trial. It has been recommended that corruption be made an offence to be tried by
the High Court by way of an indictment. This would highlight the gravity of the
offence and reduce the possibility of corruption in yjr prosecution process.
Time limit: At present the Act deals only with bribes given/taken while a person
is dealing with the public official or bribes given/taken within one year or having
dealings with that particular official. It has been proposed that this one year time
limit be removed.
Scope: At present a public servant who solicits or accepts a bribe outside Sri
Lanka can be tried in Sri Lanka. It has been proposed that this should apply to
other officers including judicial officers.
National Procurement Guidelines on Goods and Works 2006
Background
The National Procurement guidelines where approved by the Cabinet in 2006.
Along with the guidelines, a National Procurement Agency was established to
overlook the procurement process. The guidelines detail the procedures to be
followed by any procuring entity in carrying out any procurement financed in
whole or part by the Government of Sri Lanka or a Foreign Funding Agency. The
guidelines aim to:
Maximize economy, timeliness and quality in procurement resulting in
lowest cost/highest quality
Adhere to prescribed standards, specifications, regulations and good
governance
Provide fair, equal and maximum opportunity for eligible interest parties
to participate in procurement
Expeditiously execute works and delivery of goods and services
Comply with local laws and regulations and international obligations
Ensure transparency and consistency in the evaluation and selection
procedure
Retain confidentiality or information by bidders
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The guidelines apply to:
Ministries
Government departments
State corporations and statutory bodies
Fully government-owned companies
Local authorities
The guidelines also identify ethical standards for procurement. These include
confidentiality, prohibition on corruption, the duty to avoid a conflict of interests
and prohibition of the acceptance of any gift or inducement.
The Procurement Process: For each process of procurement a Procurement
Committee (PC) and Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) should be
appointed. The PC is responsible for the steering of the procurement process. The
TEC is responsible for the technical evaluation of the relevant project.
Appointment to the PCs are made by either the Secretary of the Ministry or the
Head of the Department. There may also be a Standing Cabinet- appointed
Procurement Committee that will be responsible for procurement in special
circumstances.
The NPA The NPA plays a supervisory role. According to the guidelines, the
NPA’ shall monitor the performance of the PCs and TECs, conduct random
procurement reviews and examine ongoing procurement processes. The NPA also
provides guidelines for the bidding process.
Enforceable Standards: Though the Procurement Guidelines provide detailed
measures that public institutions and officials should observe with regard to
procurement of goods, services or works and the NPA was created, the guidelines
are not clearly enforceable. It is not clear whether violation of the guidelines
attracts ant sanction or penalty. It is also possible for the Cabinet to override the
guidelines in exceptional circumstances, such as when an expeditious
procurement is necessary or where security considerations warrant.
Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law
The Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act was passed in 1975.
Persons Covered Under Assets and Liabilities Law and Entities that Ought to
Receive such Declarations:
Persons as set out in Section 2 of the The person to whom the Declaration
law ought to be made under Section 4 of
the Law
Speaker of the Parliament President of Sri Lanka
Cabinet of Minister and other Ministers Same
Judges and Public officers appointed by Same
the President
All other members of Parliament Speaker of the Parliament
All other judicial officers Judicial services Commission
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Presidential, Parliamentary Election Commissioner of Election
Candidates
Candidates of accepted political parties Same
Those appointed by the Cabinet of Secretaries of such Ministries
Ministers
Heads of departments Same
Chairmen of the Directors of Public Same
Corporations
Staff officers of the Ministries Same
Staff officers of corporations Chairmen of such corporations
Mayors and Heads of local government Secretary of Ministry in charge of the
authorities subject
Who has the Power to Request that Such Declarations be Made? Section 5 (1)
states that:”Any person , body or authority responsible for the appointment,
promotion, transfer or secondment of a state officer or employee of a public
corporation or local authority shall, for such purpose, have the right to call for and
refer to any declaration of assets and liabilities of such state officer or employee.
The Attorney General, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and
Corruption and the Commissioner General of Inland Revenue and the Head of
Department of Exchange and Control also have the right to call for any
declarations of assets and liabilities.
The President: Section 4, as amended in 1998, makes it mandatory for presidential
candidates to declare assets and liabilities to the Commissioner of Elections prior
to the Election. However, where a presidential candidate is elected and later
found not to have made a declaration, there are no steps to bring the candidate
before a court of law. At the time the President assumes office, he should make a
declaration to the Chief Justice or the Commissioner of Elections.
CIABOC and the Law Relating to Assets and Liabilities
Under Section 5 CIABOC has the power to call and refer to any declaration.
Under Section 6, it can also call for additional information from any person who
has made a declaration.
CIABOC is a ‘competent authority’ for prosecuting false public statements.
However, the power of the institution is limited because no prosecution for any
offence under the law can be instituted without the prior sanction of the Attorney
General.
Procedure for Written Communications: Any person can draw the attention of the
authority to any recent acquisition of wealth or property which seems to be of
dubious origin through a communication in writing addressed to the appropriate
authority.
Offences and Sentences
Failure to disclose such as assets and liabilities
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False declarations
Intentionally excluding an asset or liability
Failure to disclose any additional information requested by CIABOC
While enabling access to information is an important step, the public also needs to
be aware of how to access information, why they should take an interest in it and
how they can play a part in ensuring transparency and accountability.
Protecting the Whistleblower
At present there is no legislation to protect the whistleblower. Lack of protection
from reprisal can be a significant deterrent. An ideal law would provide physical
security, identity protection and employment security.
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on the Use of Public Power
The Supreme Court has developed jurisprudence that set standards of conduct
with regard to the exercise of public power by public officials. According to the
Supreme Court, public power is vested in public officials to be used in trust only
for the purposes for which it is conferred. Any other use would be construed as
an abuse or misuse of public power.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Developing an Effective Institutional Framework
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The biggest challenge Sri Lanka faces in fighting corruption is the lack of political
will to implement the existing legal structure. An ideal institutional and legal
framework should encompass the following:
An Independent anti-corruption body: This could be an entirely new institution
such as an Ethics and Integrity Commission or a revamped Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption. The Commission should be able
to:
Investigate and prosecute all forms of bribery and corruption
Monitor systems and procedures in the public sector and suggest changes
to minimize opportunities for bribery and corruption
Engage in public education
Develop capacities within civil society
Strengthening CIABOC
Two options for CIABOC are to either reform an entirely new entity such as an
Ethics and Integrity Commission that will have stronger impact or to strengthen
the existing Commission through legislative and other changes.
In either case the following are essential:
Operational Autonomy and Independence
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Change the Composition and restrictions
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work through information dissemination, and also work to address criticism that
may come from political actors and the state.
An Ethics and Integrity Commission: An Independent Ethics and Integrity
Commission would not only look at issues of bribery and corruption but also
work towards ensuring public and political office is exercised fairly and
reasonably and power not abused. A Commission would frame and supervise
standards to ensure that public office is not used for personal gain or to pursue
partisan political interests. This includes ensuring that public property is not used
for personal use and ensuring public funds are used efficiently and effectively.
While an Anti-Corruption Commission focuses only on corruption, an Ethics and
Integrity Commission would address the broader notion of abuse of power that
accompanies the exercise of public office.
Freedom of Information Law: Parliament should set up a freedom of information
law on the lines proposed by the Law Commission of Sri Lanka. Such a law could
establish citizens’ right to access information that is in the public domain. An
independent Freedom of Information Commission to supervise the
implementation of the law should be set up.
Protection of ‘Whistleblowers’: Those who expose corruption should be
protected. This should be via a separate legislation that should provide physical
security, identity protection and employment security.
Audit Act: The Audit Act should be enacted by Parliament. This Act will provide
greater operational and functional independence of the Auditor General’s Office
and enable the Auditor General to conduct a variety of audits beyond basic
financial auditing.
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The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
Executive Summary
2007 UNCAC had been ratified by 92 nations, of which the majority are developing
countries. The Convention is now the global instrument for combating corruption. It
complements the anti-corruption conventions of the Organization of American States
(OAS) states, the African Union and the Council of Europe, the SADC Protocol against
Corruption and the OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions. The Convention is divided into eight chapters. The
most important provisions relate to preventive measures, criminalization and law
enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery and technical assistance.
Core issues
Prevention
The preventive measures of UNCAC (Chapter II) cover both the public and private
sectors. They include measures such as the setting up of anti-corruption bodies,
provisions governing finance, procurement and appointments in public administration,
public reporting and participation of civil society and business. Emphasis is laid on the
strengthening of transparency in financial matters and public procurement and in the
funding of election campaigns and political parties. States undertake to introduce
effective appointment and promotion systems that are based on transparency, efficiency
and performance. Public officials should be bound by codes of con-duct; effective
sanctions should be imposed if particular provisions are infringed. Since the combating of
corruption depends on cooperation between state and society, UNCAC places particular
emphasis on the involvement of civil society and on the general reporting process
through which the public administration reports to the people. The requirements made of
the public sector also apply to the private sector – it too is expected to adopt transparent
procedures and codes of conduct.
Criminalization
Chapter III of UNCAC regulates the punishing of corrupt behaviour, such as active and
passive bribery in the public and private sectors. All the states parties are obliged to
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extend the concept of the public official to members of parliament. According to UNCAC,
offences of corruption also apply to international public officials. Particularly important is
the introduction of the liability of legal persons. Provisions are also proposed that would
simplify the provision of evidence of corrupt behaviour; this is especially important as
corrupt behaviour is very difficult to prove before a court. In the area of law enforcement
the Convention calls for better cooperation between national and international bodies and
with civil society. There is provision for the protection of wit-nesses, victims, expert
witnesses and whistleblowers, in order to ensure that law enforcement is truly effective.
International cooperation
Chapter IV places particular emphasis on mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Countries should enter into bilateral agreements or be able to refer directly to UNCAC in
making requests for legal assistance or ex-tradition. International cooperation between
the states parties is simplified by a looser form of “double incrimination”. In order for a
request for legal assistance or extradition to be implemented, it is not necessary for the
alleged behaviour to be described in both countries as exactly the same offence.
In this context UNCAC makes detailed provision for handling the formalities of requests
for legal assistance or extradition, which are often very difficult to comply with.
UNCAC recommends that the states parties assist each other in capacity building in
order to ensure that international cooperation is underpinned by training and
development measures.
Asset recovery
Asset recovery is one of the core issues dealt with in the convention (Chapter V). It is a
vitally important matter for countries in which state funds or the proceeds of natural
resource extraction have been misappropriated by cleptocrats and corrupt elites and
transferred into foreign accounts. To assist the process of recovery, provisions regulate
the national financial sector as well as international claims that the states parties may
have to goods embezzled within their country. All the states parties are encouraged to set
up mechanisms for the direct recovery of assets. Here, too, countries that have no legal
assistance agreements with third countries can make direct recourse to the relevant
provisions of UNCAC.
Technical assistance
Technical assistance is fundamental to the support offered to developing and transition
countries in implementing the convention. The relevant provisions are detailed in
Chapter VI; they cover the development of national capacity to implement legal
compliances and preventive measures, and legal assistance in connection with
investigations or asset recovery. The setting up of a trust fund that could be used to fund
technical assistance initiatives is suggested.
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United Nations Convention against Corruption
(Summarized Version)
Concerned with the impact of all forms of corruption on democratic values and
institutions, the UN Convention against corruption outlines measures and
recommendations for states to combat corruption in the state and private sectors.
These measures include domestic legislative measures as well as regional and
international cooperation.
The Convention specifically aims to address Misuse of Assets and State resources
which may result in political instability and negatively impact on sustainable
development and equality. It further commits States to adopt measures to
mitigate the impact of illicit acquisition of personal wealth on democratic
institutions, national economies and rule of law.
Chapter I: General Provisions
The Convention takes an approach to corruption as a transnational phenomenon
and aims to take a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach to eradicating it
through strengthening State’s capacity to address it at all levels. Article 1 states
the Purpose of the Convention:
(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption
more efficiently and effectively;
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of civil servants, based on principles of efficiency, transparency, merit, equity and
aptitude. Within the public service, training and awareness raising about anti-
corruption laws and prevention should also be provided.
Article 7 (2): recommends States prescribe selection criteria concerning candidates
for election to public office. Further, it recommends legislative and other
measures to enhance transparency in the funding of candidates for public office
and the funding of political parties.
Codes of Conduct for Public Officials (Article 8): State Parties commit to the
establishment of systems and measures within their legal and institutional
frameworks to ensure standards of conduct for the correct, honorable and proper
performance of public functions. Paragraph 4 calls for the establishment of
systems through which abuses of prescribed codes of conduct and acts of
corruption can be reported. States should impose systems by which public
officials must declare all relevant outside employment, investments and assets, in
the interest of transparency. Each State Party shall consider taking, in accordance
with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, disciplinary or other
measures against public officials who violate the codes or standards established in
accordance with this article.
Public Procurement and Management of Public Finances (Article 9): States agree
to establish transparent, competitive and objective criteria and processes for the
procurement and management of public finances. These principles should include
transparency in disclosure to the public of information regarding the procurement
processes, use and distribution of public finances. Effective measures for internal
controls will be established and systems put in place for transparent accounting
and auditing. Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding
personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in
particular public procurements, screening procedures and training requirements.
Public Reporting (Article 10): States will adopt measures to increase transparency
within the public administration. Such measures include making available to the
public information on the organization, functioning and decision making
processes of its public administration, as well as information on decisions and
legal acts that concern members of the public. States should also take steps to
simplify procedures to enable easy access by the public to competent authorities.
Periodic reports on risks of corruption in public administration should also be
published.
Judiciary and Prosecution Services (Article 11): States will adopt measures to
ensure the integrity of the judiciary and prevent opportunities for corruption. This
may include rules for conduct of members of the judiciary.
Private Sector (Article 12): States agree to introduce legislative and other
measures for the prevention of corruption in the private sector. Such measures
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include the provision effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative
or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures.
State parties should make known to the public the relevant bodies and institutions
that function to combat corruption, as well as how to contact them with
anonymity and freedom from fear of retribution.
Bribery of National Public Officials (Article 15): State Parties shall adopt
legislative and other measures to establish the following as criminal offences:
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public or private funds or property of any kind that has been entrusted to the
official by virtue of his or her position.
Trading in Influence (Article 18): States will adopt legislative or other measures
to establish as a criminal offence the promise of undue advantage for any official
to use the influence of their position to create undue advantage for the instigator.
States shall criminalize the solicitation or acceptance of the same by public
officials.
Illicit Enrichment (Article 20): State Parties shall consider adopting such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal
offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant
increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain
in relation to his or her lawful income.
Bribery in the Private Sector (Article 21): States shall consider introducing
legislation and other measures to criminalize bribery of private sector employees
in order to obtain undue advantage and further for the criminalization of the
solicitation or acceptance of the same.
Embezzlement in the Private Sector (Article 22): States will take measures for the
criminalization of embezzlement by a person who directs or works, in any
capacity, in a private sector entity of any property, private funds or securities or
any other thing of value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or her position.
States agree to consider introducing legislative and other measures for its
prevention.
(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is
the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit
origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the
commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his
or her action;
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(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:
Under Paragraph 2, each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect
to this Article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
Obstruction of Justice (Article 25): States will criminalize the use of physical
force, threats and intimidation or the promise/giving of undue advantage in order
to induce false testimony or the production of evidence in regards to an offence
under the Convention. States will also criminalize the use of physical force,
threats, intimidation etc used to prevent the exercise of official duties of a justice
or law enforcement official.
Liability (Article 26): States agree to adopt measures to establish liability for legal
persons who engage in any of the activities outlined in the Convention. Such
liability includes the imposition of proportionate legal or non-legal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions.
Participation and Attempt (Article 27): States will criminalize participation of any
kind in any of the offences outlined in the Convention. Paragraphs 2-3 criminalize
participation in attempts and or plans to carry out such offences.
81
the Convention. This should be extended or suspended in cases where the
accused has evaded justice
Prosecution, Adjudication and Sanctions (Article 30): States will ensure that the
commission of offences will be liable to sanctions in proportion to the gravity of
the offences. Discretionary legal powers within domestic law of State Parties
relating to prosecution of offences under the Convention should be exercised to
the maximum extent as a deterrent. States may consider measures by which an
official being accused of an offence under the Convention may be suspended or
removed from their position, bearing in mind the presumption of innocence.
Freezing, Seizure and Confiscation (Article 31): States shall take all possible
measures to confiscate proceeds of crime derived from offences committed under
the Convention, including property to the value of the proceeds where necessary.
States also commit to measures to enable the legal confiscation of property or
equipment that has been or may be used in to commit an offence under the
Convention. Appropriate regulatory measures for the administration of
confiscated seized or frozen assets will be introduced.
Protection of Witnesses, Experts and Victims (Article 32): States must take all
possible measures to protect witnesses and victims from potential retaliation or
intimidation for providing testimony in the investigation or prosecution of an
offence under the Convention. Such measures may include relocation and non-
disclosure of identity and whereabouts of witnesses under protection as well as
measures to provide enable witnesses to provide evidence in a safe manner – eg
via video.
Protection of Reporting Persons (Article 33): Each State Party shall consider
incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide
protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good
faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning
offences established in accordance with this Convention.
Compensation for Damages (Article 35): States will take measures to ensure that
entities or persons are able to initiate legal proceedings to obtain compensation as
a result of loss or damages due to an act of corruption.
Specialized Authorities (Article 36): Each State shall ensure the existence of a
body specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. This body
will be empowered to function independently and without undue influence.
82
Cooperation with law Enforcement Authorities (Article 37): States agree to take
appropriate measures to encourage persons who have participated in committing
an offence to supply information to investigators. Such measures may include
measures such as immunity from prosecution.
Cooperation between National Authorities (Article 38): States will take measures
to engender cooperation between public authorities and officials and authorities
responsible for prosecuting crimes committed under the Convention.
Cooperation between National Authorities and the Private Sector (Article 39):
States should engender cooperation between national investigating/prosecuting
authorities and the private sector and in particular financial institutions.
Bank Secrecy (Article 40): States shall establish appropriate mechanisms within
their respective legal systems to overcome obstacles arising from bank secrecy
laws.
Criminal Record (Article 41): States will adopt legislative and other measures to
enable consideration of previous conviction for an offence under the Convention
in another State.
Jurisdiction (Article 42): States may establish jurisdiction for offences committed
within the State, on a ship or vessel flying the flag of the State Party. States may
consider jurisdiction of an offence is committed against a national or a stateless
person who is residing in the country. States may also establish jurisdiction for
offences committed outside the country if the offence is committed against the
State.
83
Transfer of Sentenced Persons (Article 45): States will consider entering into
multi or bi-lateral agreements for the transfer of persons sentenced for offences
under the Convention
Mutual Legal Assistance (Article 46): States agree to afford the widest measure of
legal assistance to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings included
under the Convention carried out by other State Parties.
Joint Investigations (Article 49): States may consider entering into multi or bi-
lateral agreements to establish joint investigative bodies. In the absence of such
agreements joint investigations may be considered on a case-by-case basis.
General Provision (Article 51): The return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a
fundamental principle and States Parties shall afford one another the widest
measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.
84
linked to individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public
functions. Enhanced scrutiny measures should be designed in a way that will
detect suspicious transactions. States will implement these measures by issuing
directives to bank and non bank financial institutions that include the types of
accounts, persons and transactions that require scrutiny. Where appropriate,
names of individuals whose accounts should be scrutinized should also be
advised. Measures should be taken to ensure banks maintain adequate records
which will be kept for a reasonable period of time. States should consider laying
out effective financial disclosure systems for appropriate public officials along
with appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. This may also include requiring
appropriate public officials to disclose details of foreign accounts to which they
are a signatory.
Measures for Direct Recovery of Property (Article 53): Each State will take
measures to permit other States to initiate civil action to establish ownership of
property acquired through the commission of an offence under the Convention.
Under these measures, courts will be permitted to order compensation or
damages.
Special Cooperation (Article 56): States may forward any information derived
through their own investigations to other State Parties unrequested if this
information will aid in detecting or preventing crimes under the Convention.
Return and Disposal of Assets (Article 57): Measures should be taken to return
any confiscated assets to the legitimate owner. All appropriate measures should
be adopted by States to enable competent authorities to return confiscated
property upon request of another State.
Financial Intelligence Unit (Article 58): States will cooperate for the purpose of
preventing and combating transfer of proceeds of offences and recovery of
proceeds. Cooperation will include sending and receiving information of
suspicious transactions.
85
Training and Technical Assistance (Article 60): States will develop training
programs for relevant personnel to prevent and combat corruption. These training
programs will facilitate improved measures to prevent, detect, investigate, punish
and control corruption and strengthen capacities to develop anti-corruption
policy. States will take measures to evaluate and strengthen capacities to prevent
corruption within the public and private sectors. States will consider cooperation
for the purposes of technical assistance and knowledge sharing and research.
The first Convention will be convened by the Secretary General of the United
Nations and thereafter meet regularly in accordance with the regulations adopted
at the Conference. States will provide information regarding plans, progress
reports as well as legislative and administrative measures as set out. (Article 63)
Secretariat (Article 64): The Secretary General of the United Nations will provide
secretariat services to enable Conference of State Parties in carrying out its
functions, assist State Parties in providing information required under Article 63
where requested and ensure coordination between the Secretariats of relevant
organizations and institutions.
State Parties agree to carry out all measures defined under the Convention. Where
applicable, States may adopt stricter measures or laws to combat corruption than
prescribed under the Convention.
86
The Convention will be open for signature to all States from 9-11 December 2003
in Merida, Mexico and thereafter until 9/12/2005 at the United Nations
Headquarters. The Convention is open to regional economic integration
organizations provided that at least one member State is a signatory to the
Convention.
87
THE RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AN INSTRUMENTAL RIGHT FOR EMPOWERMENT
Introduction:
Since April 2005 the Association for Civil Rights (Buenos Aires- Argentina),
jointly with ARTICLE 19, has been developing a two-year project that aims to
promote the right of access to information. One of the goals of the project, called
“Information for Transparency”, is to provide a set of tools to assist in the
practical realization of this right. Towards this end, this article ‘Access to
Information: An Instrumental Right” presents both concepts about the
relationship between access to information and social rights, as well as strategies
that can be used to realize social rights through the assertion of the right of access
to information.
The right to information does not exist in isolation. On the one hand, the right to
information can be understood as a member of a larger group of civil and political
Prepared from the publication published by the “ARTICLE 19, a UK based organization campaigning for
the Right to free expression
11
UN General Assembly, (1946) Resolution 59 (1), 65th Plenary Meeting, December 14.
12
On a regional level, there exist several documents or declarations that establish standards to delineate the
concrete application of this right. For example, The Lima Principles or the Chaputelpec Declaration.
13
Victor Abramovich y Christian Courtis, “El Acceso a la Información como Derecho”, en Anuario de Derecho a la
Comunicación; Año 1 Vol.1 (2000); Editorial Siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, p. 227.
14
Corte IDH La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 Serie A, No 5 , del 13 de
noviembre de 1985 para. 70.
88
rights – a component part of the fundamental right to freedom of expression,
which requires governments to refrain from interfering with the free flow of
information and ideas.15 On the other hand, the right to information is also
intricately related to and necessary for the protection of all other human rights. In
recent years the right to information has received growing attention and
treatment in international and regional declarations that have elaborated both its
specific content and the positive – instead of merely the negative – obligations it
imposes on States. The understanding of the right has developed to encompass a
concrete and immediate obligation on the part of governments to provide access
to information, as well as to refrain from interfering with communication of
information necessary to a citizen’s ability to make autonomous choices.
15
This view is reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that the
right to receive information “basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving
information that others may wish or may be willing to impart to him.” Leander v. Sweden, Judgment of 26
March 1987, Series A. no. 116, para. 74.
16
Roberts, Alasdair. “Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information” in The Riht to Know, The Right to Live: Access
to Information and Socio-Economic Justice, Calland, Richard and Allison Tilley, ed. Open
Democracy Advice Centre, 2002, pp. 36-37.
17
Banisar David, (2002). Freedom of Information and Access to Government Records Around the World 2
Privacy International: London/www.freedominfo.org.
18
Blanton Tom (2002) “The world’s right to know” Foreign Policy July/August 50.
19
Calland, Richard. “The Right to Know is the Right to Live” in The Right to Know, The Right to Live: Access to
Information and Socio-Economic Justice, Calland, Richard and Allison Tilley, ed. Open Democracy Advice Centre,
2002, p.xvi.
20
ARTICLE 19, The Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation, June 1999, available
at: www.article19.org/work/regions/latin-america/FOI/english/elements/index.html. These principles were endorsed,
inter alia, by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, in his report to the 2000 session of
89
Principle 1 – Maximum disclosure: Freedom of information legislation should
be guided by the principle of maximum disclosure.
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and referred to by the Commission in its 2000 Resolution
on Freedom of Expression.
21
Open Society Justice Initiative, Principles on the Right of Access to Information in Chile, December 2004,
available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102436, accessed July 21, 2005.
90
2. All Public Bodies should be subject to the Access to Information Law. The
right of public access to information should extend to all institutions receiving
funding coming from the public funds (taxes) or performing public functions.
3. Access to Information is a Right for Everyone. To exercise the right of access
to information, it is neither necessary to justify any legal interest, nor to
explain the reasons for requesting the information from government. All
requests should be treated without discrimination as to the nature or
profession of the requestor.
4. Free Access to Information. Costs for exercise of the right to information
should be kept to an absolute minimum for the requestor, who may be
charged only for the reproduction of documents that contain the requested
information.
5. Simple and Speedy Processes. The process for requesting information should
be the least complicated and most efficient possible, and the provision of
information should be quick and complete. Delivery of requested information
should be either immediately or within the timeframes established by law,
which, in any case, should not exceed ten (10) working days.
6. Exemptions Provisions Should Be Clearly Defined. The grounds for
withholding information should be clearly and specifically established by law
with the goal of protecting legitimate interests. The law should establish a
harm test and a public interest test which should be applied to all information
before its disclosure is denied. The principle of partial access should be
applied to all documents containing information that can legitimately be
exempted from release.
7. Independent Regulatory Body. Decisions to withhold information should be
subject to review by an independent body empowered to order compliance
with the law and release of information.
8. Duty to Assist. Public officials charged with information provision should
assist requestors in the formulation of their questions in order to guarantee the
exercise and enjoyment of the right of access to information. When the
information being sought is held by a different body, these officials should
refer requestors to the correct institution.
9. Proactive Publication of Information. Every public body should make readily
available all information related to its functions and responsibilities without
the need for a formal information request. This information should be in clear,
plain language, and should be up to date.
10. Harmonization of Right of Access to Information with other Law. All laws that limit
the right of access to information should be amended or revoked in order to
guarantee the principle of maximum openness.
91
Amartya Sen has said that there has never been a famine in a country with a free
press and open government.22 The relationship between information and power is
profound. Without information, the people have no power to make choices about
their government – no ability to meaningfully participate in the decision-making
process, to hold their governments accountable, to thwart corruption, to reduce
poverty, or, ultimately, to live in a genuine democracy.
Accountability:
Without access to information, citizens are unable to hold their government
accountable. Access to information such as annual reports or policy and
legislative reviews allows for the monitoring of government performance. As the
government demonstrates its accountability, trust in the government grows,
creating a healthy relationship between the government and its citizens.
Development:
The right to access information is a powerful tool that allows the most
disadvantages groups of society to become involved in the development of
initiatives that affect them. Lack of information prevents the participation of these
groups in their own development by limiting their rights and freedoms and
placing them in a position of vulnerability, thereby preventing them from
exercising any control over those public policies. Without access to information, a
22
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom, New York Knoft 1999, p. 178.
23
Calland, Richard and Allison Tilley, ed., The right to Know, The Right to Live: Access to Information and Socio-
Economic Justice. Open Democracy Advice Centre, 2002.p.xi
24
Ibidem.
25
Camerer, Lala. “Information and the Quest for Global Accountability” in The Right to Know, The Right to Live:
Access to Information and Socio-Economic Justice, Calland, Richard and Allison Tilley, ed. Open
Democracy Advice Centre, 2002. pp. 139-140.
26
Ibidem, p.31.
92
country cannot sufficiently develop. For example, the health of a society depends
on information related to clean water and sanitation, vaccines, statistics etc.
International law prescribes that these exceptions should not be balanced against
the right, but should be applied as narrow exceptions to the general rule in favor
of the right.29
27
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 10) Available in:
www.hri.org.
28
United States Freedom of Information Act.
29
As stated by the European Court, the decision-maker “is faced not with a choice between two conflicting
principles but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be
narrowly interpreted.” The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 Apr. 1979, Series A no. 30,
para. 64.
30
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. La información como herramienta para la protección de los derechos humanos,
2004. p. 43.
31
Ibidem.
93
because it is always possible that a government will process gross data in ways
that manipulate its results to reflect its policies or actions more favorably.32 For
example, gross data is useful in domestic violence cases, because it provides
information such as the date and place of occurrence, surrounding circumstances,
names and ranks of agents, and judicial intervention. Access to this gross data
allows analysis of patterns in occurrence and response by the State.33
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form or
art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be
subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to
ensure:
(a) respect for the rights and reputations of others; or
(b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
32
Ibidem.
33
Ibidem.
34
Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
35
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UNGA Res. 2.200 A (XXI), 1966.
36
Article 4 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
94
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideals of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any another media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health
or morals.
In addition to the above, international law provides for the right to access public
information as it relates to the realization of social, economic and cultural rights.
The American Convention (Article 42)38, the San Salvador Protocol (Article 19)39
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) (Article 16)40 provide for the right to access periodic governmental
information on progress related to economic, social and cultural rights in order to
facilitate public examination of policies and stimulate participation among diverse
sectors of society. The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has
confirmed that “The dissemination of information about government activities
37
Coliver, Sandra. The Right to Know: Human rights and access to reproductive health information. Edited for
ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1995, p. 4
38
Article 42 of the American Convention of Human Rights.
39
San Salvador Protocol. O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), entered into force November 16, 1999.
40
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 3 Jan. 1976,
G.A. Res.2.200 A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967).
95
should be as transparent as possible and available to all sections of society.”41 In
addition, Limburg Principal 76 mentions that the mandatory reporting for the
ICESCR should be publicized for public debate and participation every five
years.42
It has been also said that ESCR involve policy choices and should not, therefore,
be taken care of by judges, who lack expertise and political accountability to deal
with them. The idea is that the judiciary should not make decisions that involve
positive State obligations, which, at the end, will have important resource
implications. However, counter- arguments to this idea point to the fact that
judges are actually expected to take into account public policies when deciding a
case and that involvement in matters which have important resource implications
is already part of their work. Further, when courts adjudicate on CPR they
become involved in political issues as well, and if this step beyond purely legal
41
CIDH, Informe No. 20/99, Cas 11.317, Rodolfo Robles Espinoza e Hijos (Perú), en CIDH INFORME ANNUAL
1998.
42
The Limburg Principles on the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Forty-third Session., Agenda Item 8 UN Doc.
E/CN. 4/1987/17, Annex (1987).
96
matters is not considered problematic, why should their role in upholding ESCR
be questioned?
In this context the enforceability of ESCR has been questioned, suggesting that
judges are not well situated to deal with both the determination of social policies
and the allocation of resources.43 For a long time this argument has undermined
the validity of ESCR, although in more recent times, sound arguments have
demonstrated that ESCR are enforceable and therefore, justiciable.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has affirmed that
many elements of ESCR are susceptible to judicial enforcement. Governments’
obligations related to ESCR are generally evaluated in light of Article 2.1 of the
ICESCR. The article requires that every state party “undertakes to take steps . . . to
the maximum of [its] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively
the full realization of the right recognized in the … Covenant.”44 Therefore, unlike
civil and political rights, which the government generally has an immediate
obligation to ensure, ESCR can be achieved more progressively. Increasingly, this
obligation is being interpreted to require governments to take some immediate,
concrete steps toward implementation, leading over time to a certain degree of
progress.45
Article 19 of the ICCPR requires governments to “respect and ensure respect” for
the right to access information. As a negative obligation, the government must
respect the right by not violating it directly through legislation, policies, judicial
decisions or actions of its officials or its agents.46 As a positive obligation, the
government must take direct, affirmative action, possibly to protect the right by
preventing others from violating it or to fulfill the right via legislation, policies or
judicial decisions.47 Therefore, the government must take steps to prevent private
43
C. Fabre, Social Rights Under The Constitution: Government and Decent Life (Oxford-New York-Oxford
University Press, 2000) p. 150.
44
Supra N° 29 at article .2.1.
45
P Alston and G Quinn, “The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations in the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights”, 9 Human Rights Quarterly (1987), 164-87; R. Robertson, “Measuring State
Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the ‘Maximum Available Resources’ to Realizing Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights”, 16 Human Rights Quarterly (1994), 693-714.
46
A Eide, “Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach”, Human Rights Law
Journal (1989), pp. 35.
47
Supra 35 at 37.
97
groups or individuals from interfering with lawful communication of
information. Increasingly, governments must also fulfill the right by providing
information in circumstances of particular public interest. For example, in relation
to information concerning public health:
(1) The government has information that is relevant to the health or private life of
a particular individual. This obligation requires immediate implementation.
(2) A category of people has need for the information to protect their health or
their private lives and the government either has it or is in a position to collect
it. This obligation allows some discretion regarding what steps to take, but the
government must take some steps immediately, and the obligation to take
further steps increases over time.48
According to Sandra Coliver, there are several government obligations that can be
identified in relation to this right. These duties are arguably part of international
customary law but also arise from treaty law, and therefore have greater force on
States that have ratified the treaties.50
48
Coliver, Sandra. The Right to Know: Human rights and access to reproductive health information. Edited for Article
19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1995, (p. 46) (2nd: GA Res. 59(I) of 14 De. 1946, “Yearbook of the United
Nations 1946-1947 (New York: 1948), 33.
49
Jagwanth, Saras. “The Right to Information as a Leverage Right” in The Right to Know, The Right to Live:Access to
Information and Socio-Economic Justice, Calland, Richard and Allison Tilley, ed. Open Democracy Advice Centre,
2002, p.7.
50
Coliver, Sandra. The Right to Know: Human rights and access to reproductive health information. Edited for
ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1995.
98
To take concrete steps toward providing adequate and accessible information,
education and counseling necessary for protection and promotion of social
rights.51
The interaction of the right to information and social rights can be highly
instructive of a government’s attitude towards the realization of human rights in
general. States should allow individuals access to information that may have an
impact on their life, which will allow them to exercise other rights. Information is
important for learning about the existence and protection of social rights.
Individuals should know about public policies and measures that the government
has taken in relation to these rights, in order to control the development of such
policies. They should also be aware of the content of said policies, so as to analyze
how measures are considered in the budget and how budgetary commitments are
delivered. On the contrary, the failure to provide information or access to certain
information constitutes a violation of obligations that the State agreed to fulfill.
The UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), has stated
for example in its General Comment No. 14 paragraph 11 and in relation to the
right to health, that information should be accessible. This includes the right to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues.53
Moreover, States have the obligation to submit reports on measures that they
have adopted and the progress made in achieving obligations assumed in the
ICESCR. In its General Comment No. 3, the Committee pointed out that States
should take a minimum core of obligations to ensure the satisfaction of at least the
minimum essential levels of each of the ESCR. If the State fails to meet that
minimum core based on a lack of resources, it has to demonstrate that efforts have
been made to use all the resources that were at its disposal.54 General Comment
No 1 paragraph 3 establishes that States should ‘...monitor the actual situation
51
Ibitem, at 328
52
Saba Roberto, “Derechos Sociales, Políticas Públicas y Acceso a la Información” , Serie de Seminarios Salud y
Política Publica, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad ( CEDES), Seminario VII; 2004.
53
General Comment No. 14 UN E/C.12/2000/4. para. 3 and 11.
54
General Comment No. 3 UN Doc E/1991/23 para 10.
99
with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis and are thus aware of the
extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by all individuals
within its territory.... The fulfillment of this objective cannot be achieved only by
the preparation of aggregate national statistics or estimates, but also requires that
special attention be given to any worse-off regions or areas and to any specific
groups or subgroups which appear to be particularly vulnerable or
disadvantaged’.55 Paragraph 4 adds that one of the objectives of the reporting
process ‘...is to enable the Government to demonstrate that such principled policy-
making has in fact been undertaken’.56 This means that the State should have
available information in relation to ESCR even, when its realization is to be
achieved progressively.
In The Right to Know, The Right to Live, Saras Jagwanth provides a meaningful
summary of how the right to access public information is related to other rights:57
7.1. Awareness
The right to access public information about one’s economic, social and cultural
rights is not only related to these rights – it is a precondition for their realization.
Without information about the scope and content of their rights to health, housing
or work, citizens are unable to determine whether their rights are being respected.
International law recognizes this connection. For example, the World Health
Organization Constitution provides for policies of promotion, information and
education for health as part of States’ obligations.59 Another example is the
Brundtland Report60, which, in relation to the right to a healthy environment,
55
General Comment No. 1 UN E/1989/22, para. 2.
56
General Comment No. 1 UN E/1989/22, para. 4.
57
Jagwanth, Saras. “The Right to Information as a Leverage Right” in The Right to Know, The Right to Live:Access to
Information and Socio-Economic Justice,p 13.
58
Ibidem.
59
Constitution of the World Health Organization, Basic Documents, Official Document No. 240 (Washington, 1991).
The Constitution of WHO was adopted at the International Health Conference held in 1946 in New York, where it was
signed by the representatives of sixty-one states, p.283.
60
In 1983, the UN General Assembly created the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED), chaird by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. In December 1987, the WCED
published the Brundtland Report p.288.
100
recommends that governments recognize the right of individuals to know and
have access to information about their environment and natural resources.61
Here follow three examples that illustrate the link between access to information
and other rights – the right to a fair trial, to a healthy environment, and the right
to the security of the person.
7.2. Moniroting
The right to access public information is also vital to monitoring the achievement
of all ESCR. The reporting requirement every five years under the ICESCR is most
effective when States parties provide meaningful information about the
achievements and measures taken. International guidelines indicate that reporting
should include not only data but also meaningful analysis to evaluate trends and
demonstrate whether the State is fulfilling its obligation under the ICESCR.65
61
Cited in Lloyd Timberlake, “Freedom of Information on the Environment,” Index on Censorship (London: Writers and
Scholars International) 18, nos. 6 and 7 (1983): 7.
62
2000 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
63
26 Eur H.R. Rep 357
64
Jane Doe v. Board of Commissioners of Police for the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1998), 49 O.R. (3d)
487 (G.D.).).
65
General Comment 1 Reporting by States Parties UN Doc E/1989/22.
101
Information is vital at the more local level as well. For example, to evaluate the
extent to which the right to education is realized, it is necessary to have access to
literacy rates, enrollment rates, commuting times, dropout rates, and budgets, not
only in the aggregate but disaggregated by gender, social class, geographic
centers (urban, rural), religion and ethnicity.66 These factors should be measured
over time using trend analysis of key indicators and benchmarks.
7.3. Litigation
Information is often critical to the ability to effectively litigate ESCR. For example,
it is difficult to prove the existence of discrimination in equality claims when
discrimination is denied or unconscious, without concrete evidence.
The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, an NGO based in The Netherlands,
published a 2003 report entitled Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Achievements, Challenges and Strategies, featuring 21 case studies of ESC rights
litigation. Throughout the case studies, the interdependent relationship between
access to information and the realization of ESC rights is revealed.
66
Circle of Rights: Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource.
International Human Rights Internship Program and Asian Forum for Human Rights and
Development, p, 309 (2000).
67
The Centre on Housing Rights and Development. Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Achievements, Challenges and Strategies, (2003), p.25.
68
Ibidem, p. 36.
69
Supra Nº 57 at 53.
102
In Argentina, Victor Abramovich, former director of the Argentina-based
Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), noted that in its case against the
government for the right to a vaccine for haemorrhagic fever, the public
information from the Ministry of Health regarding the vaccine, its
effectiveness, and the political policies was the most relevant data to solve the
case. The information served as the State’s recognition of the fact that a vaccine
was the only way to effectively address the epidemic, and rather than have a
policy debate in court, CELS needed instead to transform an already-made
political decision into a legal obligation.70
In Canada, in advocating for substantive equality rights for the poor, Bruce
Porter, Director of the Social Rights Advocacy Centre, stressed that
concreteness is critical. Therefore, if welfare benefits are being cut, activists
should bring specific evidence demonstrating families’ financial inflow and
outflow and how many homes will be lost as a result.71
In Ecuador, one of three approaches used in cases combating water pollution
was the right to information and to participate in the oversight and decisions
related to the oil industry.72 The NGOs also utilized ILO Convention 16973,
which calls for transparency and participation before the undertaking of major
projects that will affect indigenous groups.74
In Nigeria, in a case against the exploitation of oil reserves by Shell Oil, part of
the court decision stated that the government must provide information on
environmental and health risks to the people in addition to social impact
assessments, in the future.75
In Portugal, in a case against child labour before the European Committee on
Social Rights, the principal argument was that Portugal was not doing enough
to enforce its anti-child labour legislation, including that the government’s
statistics were flawed and understated the problem.76
In eviction cases against the Dominican Republic brought before the UN
Committee on ESCR in 1990, the level of detail in the information provided to
the Committee proved extremely effective. The Committee’s Concluding
Observations (in its first ever ruling against a State), included the individual
names of people affected by the evictions based on an NGO’s fact-finding
mission in the slums which provided testimonial and photographic evidence
of the State’s violations.77
70
Supra Nº 57 at 63.
71
Supra N° 57 at 74.
72
Supra N° 57 at 83.
73
Convention No.169 of the International Labour Organisation, the Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention, 27 June
1989, in force 5 September 1991, (1989), 28 ILM 1382.
74
Supra Nº 57 at 82.
75
Supra N° 57 at 120.
76
Supra N° 57 at 140.
77
Supra N° 57 at 160.
103
8. What strategies can be employed by NGOs to realize economic,
social and cultural rights?
Some countries, such as Argentina or South Africa, have incorporated
international human rights treaties within their constitutions as well as some
judicial tools such as the writ of individual and collective Amparo, which allow not
only individuals but also groups to invoke the constitutional provision to obtain
relief when their social rights are violated. Therefore, the non-compliance of the
State with their international obligations will indicate the violation not only of the
international commitment assumed but also of the constitution.
Obligation to respect:
The obligation to respect is the so-called negative obligation since it is related
to what the State should not do. Eide has defined it as the obligation ‘...that
requires the State ... to abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity
of the individual or infringes on his or her freedom...’80 ‘Although this duty of
restraint upon States closely resembles the obligations generally associated
with civil and political rights, it is also intimately a part of [ESCR] as well’.81
‘Respect’ implies also the non-regression in the enjoyment of ESCR that
individuals have been currently enjoying. In this sense, the State should not
adopt any measure that may worsen the enjoyment of [ESCR].82 This
obligation also implies that States should refrain from interfering with social
rights by any practice, policy or legal measure that could violate ESCR.
78
G.J.H van Hoof, ‘The legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some traditional Views’, in
P. Alston and K. Tomasesvski (ed.), The right to Food (Netherlands,Martins Nijhoff Publishers , 1982), p. 97.
79
See C. Scott and P. Macklem, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South
African Constitution’ in (1992) (141-No1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 3-147.
80
A. Eide, ‘The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights’ , UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987.
81
V.Dankwa et al., ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’
in (1998) (20) Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 705-730.
82
The Committee stated in its General Comment No. 3 paragraph 9 that ‘...any deliberately retrogressive
measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by
reference to the totality of the right provided for the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum
available resources’. UN Doc E/1991/23 para.9.
104
Obligation to protect:
The obligation to protect is the positive obligation of the State to prevent
human rights’ violations by third parties. The State has a positive duty, which
is to prevent certain rights from being violated by private actors. According to
Van Hoof the obligation to protect requires the State to take measures in order
to prevent individuals or groups from violating human rights. In this context
‘...the State must respect human rights limitations and constraints within its
scope of action, but it is also obliged to be active in its role as protector and
provider’.83 The State should adopt legislative measures and other measures to
fulfill this obligation.
Obligation to fulfill:
The obligation to fulfill requires the most proactive and programmatic action
on the part of the State. According to Eide this obligation requires the State to
take the appropriate measures in order to provide ‘...for each person within its
jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of ... needs, [such as food,
health, housing, education etc], which cannot be secured by personal efforts’.84
Thus, the failure of the State to take those positive interventions could result in
ESCR violations, for example if the State omits to provide measures that tend
to reduce infant mortality, or to provide free compulsory primary education,
or to prevent children from exploitation or if it omits to take the appropriate
measures to guarantee access to medical health services.
Under the obligations imposed by article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, state parties are
required to take steps, to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
Covenant.85 ‘The progressive realization imposes the obligation on States to move
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal of realizing fully
[ESCR], and as an obligation, exists independently of any increase in available
resources’.86 However, the condition to achieve progressively the positive
obligations assumed by the State, according to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, does
not impede individuals from using judicial strategies in order to effectively
evaluate if the State has taken the appropriate measures, since the Committee of
83
Supra Nº 68 at 106.
84
A. Eide ‘Realization of Social and Economic Rights The Minimum Threshold Approach’: in (1989) (43)
International Commission of Jurist. p 42.
85
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 3 Jan. 1976,
G.A. Res.2.200 A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967).
86
S.Leckie, ‘The jusiticiability of Housing Rights’, in SIM Special 18 p. 35-76.
105
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has recognized by its General Comment
No.3 that some obligations are of immediate effect.87
On the one hand, States should guarantee that relevant rights will be exercised
without discrimination (article 2.2 ICESCR) and on the other, States should take
steps which are not inherently qualified or limited by other considerations (article
2.1 of the ICESCR). Thus, ‘...while the full realization of the relevant rights may be
achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a
reasonably short time’.88 As the General Comment states, such steps should be
deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the
obligations recognized in the Covenant.89 Additionally, ‘...state parties have an
obligation to begin immediately to take steps towards the full realization of the
rights contained in the Covenant, [in this respect they] shall use all appropriate
means, including legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, social and
educational measures...in order to fulfill their obligations under the Covenant...’.90
Whether cases are won or not, the public can benefit from the very nature of legal
proceedings in that they allow for scrutiny of public policies and practices.
87
UN Doc E/1991/23 General Comment No. 3.
88
Ibidem, para. 2.
89
Ibidem.
90
The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 para, 16 -17.
106
Social rights litigation tends to concentrate on large scale violations of rights, since
there is an inherent group component to the enjoyment of these rights. The
judiciary is used to denounce social concerns and to highlight violations created
by the political and social systems, with the idea of creating change in the political
attitude and pressing for a correction of social injustices.91 On the other hand, it
tries to generate a high degree of participation, with unprecedented exposure of
cases to public opinion.
91
D. Feldman ‘Public Interest litigation and Constitutional Theory’ in (1992) (55) Modern Law Review, p
72.
92
Supra No. 57 at 25.
93
Coliver, Sandra. The Right to Know: Human rights and access to reproductive health information. Edited for
ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1995, p. 348.
94
Ibidem, 349.
107