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Ethics and the

Limits of Language in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus
B. A. W O R T H I N G T O N

THIS ARTICLE IS A STUDY of the "mystical" passages at the end of Wittgen-

stein's Tractatus and will put forward an interpretation of Wittgenstein's
doctrines of the inexpressibility of ethics and metaphysics.' My first principal
claim is that the rejection of metaphysics is based on a belief, evident in the
mystical passages, that metaphysical reflection is inseparable from meta-
physical anxiety and is therefore to be avoided. Wittgenstein's ethic of "life
in the present" is put forward as a means by which freedom from metaphysi-
cal concerns may be achieved. Since "life in the present" is presented in the
Notebooks as a means of overcoming "the misery of the world," I suggest that
this part o f Wittgenstein's system is based upon his acceptance of Schopen-
hauer's doctrine that "the misery and suffering of life" is the source of man's
metaphysical impulse, and, moreover, that "life in the present" is itself a
derivative of Schopenhauer's prescription of "the denial of the will" and "the
liberation of knowledge from the will." Since indifference to the facts will be
incompatible with evaluation of the facts, I argue that the prescription of
"life in the present" entails and explains the doctrine of the inexpressibility
of ethics.
My second principal claim is that the association of metaphysical reflec-
tion and metaphysical anxiety is an indispensable support of the central
semantic doctrine of the Tractatua: that language cannot be used to describe
its own semantic structure. If this second claim is correct, it means that
technical semantic considerations f o u n d e d on the problems of propositional

My very real gratitude is due to Professor J. A. Faris and to Ms. A. C. Stubbs. My thanks
are also due to Mr. J. C. B. Glover for his kindness and encouragement during the early stages
of the work on this article.

[4 81 ]
482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

self-reference are integrated into a single system with quasi-existentialist

doctrines c o n c e r n i n g self-consciousness. It is this aspect o f the Tractatus
which I believe holds the greatest promise o f f u t u r e development.

1. THE INEXPRESSIBILITY OF ETHICS IN TIlE "TRACTATUS"

C o m m e n t a t o r s have o f f e r e d little explanation o f Wittgenstein's arguments
for t h e inexpressibility o f ethics. Most commentators mention 6.4n, which
asserts that value c a n n o t lie in the world on the g r o u n d s that "all that
h a p p e n s a n d is the case is accidental." Little attempt, however, has been
m a d e to explicate the a r g u m e n t ; and P. M. S. Hacker, no d o u b t as a result o f
this failure, has felt able to write: " T h e a r g u m e n t for the ineffability o f
ethics is t e n u o u s to say the least, it hangs on nothing m o r e than the non-con-
tingency o f the ethical, a point asserted rather than argued.""
Against H a c k e r I will a r g u e that both the exclusion o f value from a
c o n t i n g e n t world and the c o n s e q u e n t inexpressibility o f ethics are doctrines
with a clear and c o h e r e n t base which is f o u n d in the text o f the Tractatus. I
will a r g u e that both derive f r o m Wittgenstein's prescription o f asceticism.
This itself, which is a p p a r e n t l y derived from S c h o p e n h a u e r , receives lengthy
s u p p o r t i n g a r g u m e n t s in the Notebooks and appears again, with laconic but
clear s u p p o r t , in the Tractatus.
I will first t u r n to 6. 41:
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists--and
if it did, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole
sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it
would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world:
T h e most i m p o r t a n t word h e r e is "accidental," and the most important
assertion is evidently that value "must lie outside the whole s p h e r e o f what
h a p p e n s and is the case." T h e word "accidental" must be used in the sense o f
"not logically necessary." It is used in this sense at 2 . o t 2 - - " l n logic nothing
is a c c i d e n t a l " - - a n d at 6 . 3 - - " O u t s i d e logic everything is accidental." T h e only
o t h e r way the word is used in the Tractatus is to describe the surface features
o f propositions, which play n o ' p a r t in conveying the meaning o f the proposi-
tion. This sense o f the word obviously has no relevance to 6. 41. T o u n d e r -

9 Insight and Illusion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, L972), p. 83.

s Tractatus Log~o-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, n960.
 WITTGENSTEIN 483
stand the possible significance o f this word it is necessary to turn to the 6.3s,
w h e r e Wittgenstein discusses the contingency and independenCe o f elemen-
tary propositions. H e r e it is stated:
6. 3 The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to
/aw. And outside logic everything is accidental.

For present purposes the most i m p o r t a n t developments o f this t h e m e are:

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has
happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
6.373 The world is independent of my will.
6.374 Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a
favour granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connexion between
the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical
connexion itself is surely not something that we could will.
An almost identical f o r m o f the last two remarks appears in the Notebooks at
5.7.16. A likely explanation of their m e a n i n g is to be f o u n d in the immedi-
ately p r e c e d i n g r e m a r k (which are part o f the previous entry, m a d e nearly a
m o n t h earlier):
I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless.
I can only make myself independent of the world, and so in a certain sense
master it, by renouncing any influence on happenings. [l 1.6. a6]4
In these remarks Wittgenstein is apparently stressing o u r inability to deter-
mine the course o f events and consequently r e c o m m e n d i n g acceptance o f
the world as it is. T h e doctrine o f the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f world and will
t h e r e f o r e also appears to be an assertion o f our inability to control events.
T h e t h e m e o f " r e n o u n c i n g influence on happenings" rapidly becomes
the d o m i n a n t t h e m e o f the Notebooks. As it develops it assumes the f o r m o f a
familiar e n o u g h a r g u m e n t , which proposes acceptance o f the world as the
only way o f c o m i n g to terms with suffering that we are otherwise powerless
to escape. H e speaks o f being " h a p p y in spite of the misery of the world"
( t 3 . 8 . t 6 ) 5 and o f "life in the present" (8.7.x6): It is easy to see the connec-
tion between this last idea and " r e n o u n c i n g influence on happenings." At
14. 7.16 we read, "whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope. ''7
T h o s e who accept the world as it is will neither fear nor hope for ar~y change
in the world; they will t h e r e f o r e be living without r e g a r d to the f u t u r e and
in this sense will be living in the present.

4 Notebooks z9t4-z6 , ed. G. H, von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. An-

scombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961).
Notebooks, p. 8 l.
6 Notebooks, p. 75-
7 Notebooks, p. 76.
484 HISTORY o r P H I L O S O P H Y

It is possible that Wittgenstein's doctrine "the world is i n d e p e n d e n t of my

will" derives originally f r o m Schopenhauer, since the latter uses an almost
identical phrase a n d uses it, moreover, to express the underlying truth of
Stoicism:
If in the wridngs of the Stoics which are left to us, all of which are unsystematically
composed, we look for the ground of that unshakeable equanimity which is con-
stantly expected of us, we find none other than the knowledge that the course of the
world is entirely independent of our will and consequently that the evil that befalls us is
inevitable,a

F u r t h e r m o r e , the b u r d e n of Schopenhauer's system lies in his twin prescrip-

tions o f "the liberation o f knowledge from the will" and o f "the denial of the
will." These arise f r o m his extended discussion of "the suffering and misery
of life" and consist in abstention from the exercise of the will. It seems likely,
especially in view o f o t h e r correspondences I will show between Schopen-
h a u e r a n d Wittgenstein, that these prescriptions are a source of Wittgen-
stein's "life in the present," to which they bear an obvious resemblance.
With this excursion complete we can now return to 6.41. I have argued
that the word "accidental," which last appeared in 6. 3 , alludes to the discus-
sion in the 6.3s o f the contingency and independence o f elementary proposi-
tions; a n d I have f u r t h e r argued that what is "accidental" cannot be of value
because it will be " i n d e p e n d e n t of my will" (6.373). T h e context in which the
equivalents o f 6.373 a n d 6.374 appear in the Notebooks shows that this phrase
means "beyond m y control." T h e assertion that value "must lie outside the
whole sphere o f what happens and is the case" because "all that happens and
is the case is accidental" now has the effect that no value can lie in what
happens and is the case because all that happens and is the case is beyond
my control. Proposition 6.41 can therefore be seen as a reiteration of the
prescription o f " r e n o u n c i n g influence on happenings" in the Notebooks. T h a t
value cannot lie in the world simply means that we are not to attach value to
the facts of the world.
It remains to consider Wittgenstein's immediately subsequent statement
that "what makes it non-accidental" must lie outside the world. T h e sen-
tences "In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does
happen: in it no value exists" and " I f there is any value that does have value,.
it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case" are
a p p a r e n d y i n t e n d e d to support the assertion immediately preceding them:
" T h e sense o f the world must lie outside the world." If one does not assume
this, t h e n the last sentence appears u n s u p p o r t e d and awkwardly detached

s The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F.J. Payne, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1966),
~: 156-57 (my italics).
 WITTGENSTEIN 485

f r o m the rest. T h e phrase "what makes it non-accidental" must be in apposi-

tion to "value." T h i s is quite certain. W h e n this phrase occurs we have
already been told that value c a n n o t lie within the world, because the acciden-
tal n a t u r e o f everything in the world precludes value f r o m being in the
world. T h e sentence "What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the
world, since if it did it would itself be accidental" is obviously intended to
explain this, but it can have no relevance as an explanation unless we pre-
s u m e an i n t e n d e d apposition between "value" and "what makes it non-acci-
dental." T h e word "it" must r e f e r to "all that happens and is the case" since
in the G e r m a n text there is no o t h e r word or phrase in the whole o f 6. 41
which agrees with it in g e n d e r . "All that happens and is the case" is, o f
course, the world, since "the world is all that is the case" (though in the
G e r m a n text there is no parallel to the dual o c c u r r e n c e of "is the case"). This
account o f the word "it" appears to be accepted by Anscombe, who asks,
"Why then, having said that whatever happens and is the case is accidental,
does Wittgenstein speak o f 'what makes it non-accidental'? ''9 T h e identifica-
tion o f "value" with "what makes it non-accidental" enables us to answer her
question. Value, a "value that does have value," is presumably to be found in
"life in the present." Since life in the present will make us indifferent to "how
things are in the world" (6.44), it will make us i m m u n e to the i n d e p e n d e n t
o r "accidental" n a t u r e o f the world. T h e world is "accidental" in the sense
that it is " i n d e p e n d e n t o f my will," but life in the present will make it
"non-accidental" in the sense that its accidental nature will no longer affect
us. I f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 6. 41 is correct, then 6.4--"All propositions are o f
equal value"--is likely to m e a n "there is no m o r e value in one proposition's
being true t h a n in another's being true."
Propositions 6. 4 and 6141, with which we have so far been concerned, are
not themselves explicitly c o n c e r n e d with the inexpressibility o f ethics. This
doctrine is asserted at 6.42 as a consequence o f 6.4:
6.4 2 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing of what is higher.

T h e phrase "so too," which appears in the m o r e recent editions o f the Pears
and McGuinness translation, replacing the earlier "and so," does not clearly
suggest that this doctrine is a consequence o f the earlier remarks. T h e r e can,
however, be no d o u b t that we are i n t e n d e d to take it this way, for in the
G e r m a n text 6.4~ begins with the word Datum, a word normally translated as
" t h e r e f o r e " ( O g d e n has "hence also").

9 G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's "'Tractatus" (London: Hutchinson,

1959), pp- 17o-71.
 486 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
It is not difficult to see why Wittgenstein should deduce the inexpressibil-
ity o f ethics f r o m 6. 4 a n d 6.41. Language is concerned with stating facts.
F r o m this it follows that if no value can lie in the facts, no value can lie in
a n y t h i n g that language can describe. Any statement of the form "It is good
that X" (or "It is not good that X" or "It is good that not X") involves us in
attaching value to the facts of the world. Since no value can lie in the facts,
such a statement is necessarily false and thus meaningless. Propositions of
ethics are t h e r e f o r e impossible.

2. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

This section is c o n c e r n e d with the positive side o f Wittgenstein's remarks on
ethics. In particular it will attempt to provide an account of "the solution of
the problem of life" (6.52 ta).
T h e r e is a repeated suggestion in both the T r a c t a t ~ and the Notebooks that
compliance with Wittgenstein's ethical prescriptions will conduce to the dis-
covery o f "the sense o f the world" and of "the solution o f the problem of
life." For example, in the Notebooks we read:
The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this
problem.
But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? That one is
//v/rig in eternity and not in time?" [6.7.16] ~0
This aspect o f the Notebooks may be connected with Wittgenstein's stress on
happiness and with his doctrine that a person who follows the ethic o f "life
in the present" will be "happy." This doctrine is stated in "Only a man who
lives not in time but in the present is happy" (8.7.i6) '~ and is suggested by
" T h e good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis" (7.1o. 16)?' T h e con-
nection between life in the present, or acceptance of the world, and happi-
9hess can easily be seen, since the former is proposed precisely as a means of
being " h a p p y in spite o f the misery of the world." T h e likely connection
between happiness and "the solution of the problem of life" is that once
happiness is u n d e r s t o o d as absence of desire it suggests a tranquillity that
would exclude metaphysical perplexity. T h a t some such reasoning influ-
enced Wittgenstein is suggested by remarks on 6. 7.16. On the day following
a series o f remarks which reappear in the Tractatus a m o n g the 6.43s Witt-
genstein continues:
And in this sense Dostoievsky is right when he says that the man who is happy is
fulfilling the purpose of existence.

'~ Notebooks, p. 74.

" Ibid.
'" Notebooks, p. 83.
 WlTTGENSTEIN 487
Or again we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who no
longer needs to have any purpose except to live. That is to say, who is content.
[6. 7.16] ~s

T h e connection between "life in the present" and "the solution of the

problem of life" appears again in the Tractatus at 6.4312. Here we are told
that "temporal immortality" would not solve the "riddle of life." In the
previous r e m a r k "temporal immortality" is sharply contrasted with "timeless-
ness," which suggests that the purpose of the latter state is to produce such a
solution. We are, moreover, assured that this state will be possible for those
who adopt Wittgenstein's ethic of "life in the present," since "if we take
eternity to m e a n not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eter-
nal life belongs to those who live in the present" (6.431 l).
T h e same connection is f o u n d in 6.41, where the assertion that value
must lie outside the world is evidently used to support the assertion that the
sense o f the world must lie outside the world. As I argued in the previous
section, this is the only natural way of reading the remark. It follows that the
discovery of "the sense of the world" must be d e p e n d e n t on the discovery of
a "value that does have value."
T h e remarks on the mystical also contain this association. After the re-
mark at 6.52 that there are no questions except "scientific questions" and
that realizing this will provide the solution to "the problems of life," and
after the remark at 6.521(a) that "the solution of the problem of life is seen
in the vanishing o f the problem," Wittgenstein continues:
6.5~ There are, inded, things that cannot be put into words. They make them-
selves manifest. They are what is mystical.

T h e r e is an obvious implication here that "what is mystical" will be, or will

provide, the "solution of the problem of life." At 6.45 we are told:
6.45 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole--a limited
whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical.
From this it seems that viewing the world sub specie aeterni is "mystical" and
therefore provides the solution to the problem of life. I presume that view-
ing the world sub specie aeterni will be the attitude of those who "live in the
present."
Lastly, it should be noticed that the dependence of "/he sense of the
world" on good conduct is explicitly asserted in the Notebooks version of 6.43
(which appears at 5.7.16). H e r e the assertion that "good or bad willing" will

'~ Notebooks,p. 73-

488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

cause the world to "wax o r wane as a whole" is followed by the p h r a s e "as if

by accession o r loss o f m e a n i n g . " It has generally escaped attention that the
w o r d Sinn that A n s c o m b e h e r e translates as " m e a n i n g " is the same word that
in 6. 41 Pears a n d M c G u i n n e s s translate as "sense." T h e effect o f g o o d or
b a d willing, then, will be the accession o r loss o f "the sense o f the world"
m e n t i o n e d in 6 . 4 t . O f course, since the p h r a s e "as if by accession or loss o f
m e a n i n g " d o e s n o t a p p e a r in the Tractatus it m u s t have failed to "hit the nail
o n the h e a d . T M It nevertheless gives us a good idea o f what nail Wittgenstein
was trying to hit.
A possible historical e x p l a n a t i o n o f this position begins to e m e r g e w h e n it
is noticed that S c h o p e n h a u e r r e g a r d s the misery a n d insecurity o f the world
as the sole s o u r c e o f the " u r g e to metaphysics." This claim is m a d e repeat-
edly t h r o u g h o u t his c h a p t e r " O n Man's N e e d for Metaphysics" in The World
as Will and Representation. For e x a m p l e : "But u n d o u b t e d l y it is the knowledge
o f d e a t h , a n d t h e r e w i t h the consideration o f the s u f f e r i n g a n d misery o f life,
that give the s t r o n g e s t impulse to philosophical reflection a n d metaphysical
e x p l a n a t i o n s o f the world. '''s
T h e r e is, t h e r e f o r e , reason to think that Wittgenstein accepted this view
o f S c h o p e n h a u e r a n d r e g a r d e d "life in the present" as a solution to meta-
physical p r o b l e m s on the g r o u n d s that by enabling us to be " h a p p y in spite
o f the misery o f the world," "life in the present" will cut o f f o u r metaphysical
u r g e at the source. F u r t h e r s u p p o r t for my suggestion is that, for Schopen-
h a u e r , consciousness o f this misery is closely b o u n d u p with consciousness o f
past a n d f u t u r e . '6
A first step t o w a r d establishing such an explanation can be f o u n d if we
t u r n to 6.5~ a n d 6.52 ~ in the Tractatus.

6.52
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered,
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.
6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.
(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of
doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say
what constituted that sense?)

,4 "If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are ex-
pressed in it, and on this score the better the thoughts are expressed--the more the nail has
been hit on the head--the greater will be its value. Here I am conscious of having fallen a long
way short of what is possible" (Tractatv.r, author's preface, p. 3).
~5 2 : 1 6 1 .
,s For example, human consciousness is in this respect contrasted with that of animals,
which is described as "'mere consciousness of the present without that of the past and future;
consequently without that of death" (World as Will and Representation, 2:571 ).
 WITTGENSTEIN 489
Since Wittgenstein speaks of those to whom the sense of life has become
clear, he cannot merely be dismissing "the solution of the problem of life" as
simply a notion void of content. On the other hand, it appears that the
solution to these problems consists in the realization that there are no ques-
tions except "scientific questions." " T h e solution of the problem of life,"
then, consists simply in our ceasing to look for a solution. T h e reason why
questions about "the solution of the problem of life" (unlike scientific ques-
tions) are not real questions is presumably found in 6. 5, on which 6.52 is a
gloss: " I f a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it." It will
be impossible to answer such questions for reasons that are now familiar:
any attempted answer will p u r p o r t to attach greater significance to one fact
than to another. Life in the present, however, which consists in attributing
no greater significance to one fact than to another, will make it impossible to
raise such questions and will itself therefore bring about the solution of the
problem of life.
Initially, I set out to show that Wittgenstein holds a position according to
which metaphysical anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of metaphysical
reflection, which is therefore to be avoided. So far as "the problems of life"
are concerned, this claim has been substantiated, l have shown that no
p u r p o r t e d answer to questions expressing the problems of life can be a
satisfactory answer. Any answer can only state a fact, and no fact can provide
"the solution o f the problem of life." So long as we raise these questions we
must remain at a loss for an answer. T h e only solution is to stop asking such
questions, a n d this will be possible if we "live in the present."
Nothing, however, has so far been done to extend this interpretation to
other areas o f metaphysics. It remains to show that the association between
metaphysical reflection and metaphysical anxiety not only explains the non-
sensicality of propositions expressing the meaning of life but has also been
an important factor in the rejection of all metaphysics as nonsensical. This
task will be the concern of the next section.

B" THE GENERAL NONSENSICALITY OF METAPHYSICS

One would certainly expect there to be some such influence. It would be
surprising if Wittgenstein had declared different areas of metaphysics to be
inexpressible on quite unrelated grounds. Some similarity in Wittgenstein's
treatment of different areas of metaphysics is easily found. For example, his
treatment of solipsism runs parallel to his treatment of "the problem of life."
At 6. 51 Wittgenstein tells us that skepticism is "not irrefutable, but obviously
nonsensical" and at 5.6~ that "what the solipsist means" cannot be said. Ne-
vertheless, expressions of solipsism are not mere verbal effusion, since we
also read that "what the solipsist means is quite correct," and that, although
49 ~ HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

the underlying truth of solipsism cannot be said, it "makes itself manifest".

Finally, when philosophical clarification has been achieved the problem of
the solipsist, like the problems of life, will simply vanish: "solipsism, when its
implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism" (5.64).
The problem o f the solipsist, then, resembles the problems of life in that the
solution of the problem is seen in the vanishing of the problem.
If, moreover, we suppose that Wittgenstein's rejection of metaphysics was
influenced by the association of metaphysical reflection with metaphysical
anxiety, then this will enable us to explain an oddity in the text. The impossi-
bility of expressing "the solution of the problem of life" is the concern of the
6.4s. After this, we have:

6. 5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be
put into words.
The r/dd/e does not exist.
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

In the remarks numbered as comments on 6. 5 Wittgenstein asserts the non-

sensicality of "skepticism" (6.51), of verbal expression of the mystical (6.522),
of the solution of the problem of life (6.52), of metaphysics (6.53), and of the
Tractatus (6.54). It is surely significant that Wittgenstein presents each of
these doctrines as a gloss on the nonsensicality of "the question" and of"the
riddle." The interesting cases are 6.53 and 6.54, which deal, respectively,
with the nonsensicality of metaphysics in general and with the nonsensicality
of the Tractatus. Why should the nonsensicality of the Tractatus, which asks
no questions, be presented as a comment on the nonsensicality o f " t h e ques-
tion"? This oddity can be explained if we suppose that in each case the
recognition of the nonsensicality of metaphysics will not merely eliminate
nonsensical assertions but will provide relief from perplexing questions.
What is more, the 6.5s follow the discussion of ethics in the 6.4s and
immediately follow the description of the mystical attitude of "feeling the
world as a limited whole," which, as the 6.52s suggest, provides or at least
accompanies "the solution of the problem of life." At 6.52 Wittgenstein
discusses the nonsensicality of questions expressing the problems of life. He
does not suggest that the ground of their nonsensicality is to be distin-
guished from that of the nonsensicality of the other metaphysical questions.
There is therefore some reason to think that the rejection of metaphysics
generally is connected with the solution of the problem of life. I will argue
that this is indeed so and that the attitude of mind involved in metaphysical
reflection is incompatible with that of "feeling the world as a limited whole"
and so with the solution of the problem of life. First, it will be necessary to
discuss the mystical attitude in greater detail.
 WITTGENSTEIN 49 ~
T h e word "mystical" appears in three remarks: 6.44, 6.45 and 6.522. T h e
second and third o f thes~ are q u o t e d above; the first runs:

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

It is not a t e r m for which Wittgenstein specifies any precise meaning, but

two things a b o u t it are clear. First, the mystical is inexpressible. This is
evident f r o m 6.522: " T h e r e are, indeed, things that cannot be put into
words. T h e y make themselves manifest. T h e y are what is mystical." Secondly,
what is mystical in some way conduces to "the solution o f the problem o f
life." This is indicated by the a p p e a r a n c e o f 6.52', as a c o m m e n t on:

6.5~ We feel that even when all possible scientific question have been answered,
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

It is also indicated by the Notebooks version o f 6.52:

The urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science.
We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not
touched at all. Of course in that case there are no questions anymore; and that is the
answer. [25.5-15]'7

It is clear f r o m 6.44 and 6.45 that the mystical experience involves

some special awareness o f the existence o f the world as a whole described
in 6.45 as "feeling the world as a limited whole." (The word "limited,"
when applied to the world, at once recalls 5.6: "The limits of my language
m e a n the limits o f my world." T h e limits o f language are the limits o f
what can be said, the totality o f e l e m e n t a r y propositions. It is likely, then,
that "the world as a limited whole" means the whole o f logical space, the
totality o f facts and possible facts.) In 6.45 Wittgenstein identifies this
awareness with the attitude o f viewing the world sub specie aeterni, and one
may surmise f r o m this that it will be a natural consequence o f "life in the
present." Living in the present means, first and foremost, attaching no
m o r e i m p o r t a n c e to one possible fact than to another, that is, attaching
i m p o r t a n c e and directing o u r attention to all possible states o f affairs
equally. It is easy to see how a sense o f "the world as a whole" could arise
f r o m this attitude.
H e r e , again, Wittgenstein's doctrines correspond to those o f Schopen-
hauer. T h e phrase sub specie aeterni might suggest the p r e d o m i n a n c e o f a
Spinozistic r a t h e r than S c h o p e n h a u e r i a n influence, but it should be noticed
that an almost identical phrase f r o m Spinoza CMens aeterna est quatenus

,7 Notebooks, p. 51 .
492 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

res sub aeternitatis specie concipit") is quoted by Schopenhauer in his de-

scription of the liberation of knowledge from the will. '8
Since it has already been established that the solution of the problem of
life consists simply in "the vanishing of the problem," we can assume that
these experiences merely accompany "the solution." There is certainly no
doubt either that Wittgenstein does regard this experience as unspoken or,
more importantly, that he does not regard it as consisting in the acquisition
of knowledge. For example, awareness of the existence of the world is also
mentioned at 5.552 , which begins: "The 'experience' that we need in order
to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but
that something /s: that, however, is n o t an experience." By saying that this
"experience" is " n o t an experience" Wittgenstein apparently means that it
does not consist in the acquisition of knowledge. This point can also be seen
in his assertion that the experience in question is not an experience "that
something or other is the state of things".
"Feeling the world as a limited whole," I conclude, involves an awareness
o f the world itself (the world as a complete whole, one might say), not an
awareness of something outside the world and distinct from the world. Simi-
larly, when Wittgenstein says, in 6. 4 l, that the sense of the world and "what
makes it non-accidental" must lie outside the world, or in 6.4312 that "the
solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time,"
this is likely to be an allusion to the mystical awareness of the world as a
whole mentioned in 6.44 and 6.45.
T h e nature of this mystical experience may explain why the metaphysical
attitude should be incompatible with "the solution of the problem of life." If
we describe the world as a limited whole in language, then we are treating
the existence of the world as itself a factual matter. But it is of the essence of
the mystical attitude of "feeling the world as a limited whole" that is should
be an awareness of the totality of possibilities, not of one supposed preemi-
nent fact. Metaphysics, therefore, since it attempts to describe the world as a
whole in language, will be incompatible with "feeling the world as a limited
whole" and so with "the solution of the problem of life." Its mistake is
precisely that of trying to place "the sense of the world" among the "sphere
of what happens and is the case."
These ideas have affinities in Schopenhauer. I suggested in the first
section that the mystical attitude of "feeling the world as a limited whole" is
derived from Schopenhauer's notion of knowledge liberated from the will
and of the denial of the will. For Schopenhauer the liberation of knowledge
from the will leads to "knowledge of the Ideas." This knowledge is con-

,s World as Will and Representation, 1: 179.

 WITTGENSTEIN 493
trasted with "science," and the Ideas are contrasted with "the concept, the
object of rational t h o u g h t and of science. '''9
A f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t that the rejection of metaphysics is a consequence of
its incompatibility with "the solution of the problem of life" is that in no
other way does it seem possible to make sense of the vexed problem of the
nonsensicality of the Tractatus. It is not difficult to see why the Tractatus has
often been t h o u g h t self-defeating. At 6.54 Wittgenstein writes: "My proposi-
tions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical . . . . He must, so to speak, throw
away the ladder after he has climbed up it." Wittgenstein can hardly mean
that the Tractatus fails to convey ideas, because obviously it succeeds. Every
c o m m e n t a t o r since Russell has agreed with his observation: "After all, Mr
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said.' .... (In-
deed, Wittgenstein himself says that his remarks "elucidate" (erliiutern).
Since, however, the Tractatus does succed in conveying ideas, it seems wrong
to describe it as nonsensical. Why throw away a perfectly good ladder?
In one respect this is easily understood. T h e Tractatus proposes a model
of language to which it does not itself conform. According to the Tractatus
a proposition acquires m e a n i n g by mirroring a possible fact. T h e transcen-
dental matters discussed in the Tractatus are not, however, one set of pos-
sibiliies a m o n g others; they are the necessary preconditions of all possibili-
ties. T h e Tractatus is, therefore, by its own standards, nonsensical. On the
other hand, since the Tractatus does succeed in the significant discussion of
these matters, it might seem better to abandon the theory of language the
Tractatus proposes.
It is true that Wittgenstein distinguishes between propositions (or pseu-
dopropositons) that are sinnlos (without sense) and those that are unsinnig
(nonsensical). T h e first term is applied to, for exmple, tautologies and con-
tradictions. T h e distinction appears to be that the propositions (or pseudo-
propositions) described as sinnlos are without sense only in the technical
sense that they do not mirror facts and that they need not therefore be
dismissed as (utterly) "nonsensical." This distinction, however, does nothing
to ease the problem of the nonsensicality of the Tractatus, for the term which
Wittgenstein applies at 6.54 to "my propositions" is not sinnlos, but unsinnig
(the same term which at 6. 51 is applied to skepticism).
T h e means of solving this difficulty is hinted at in a sentence of Pears:
" T h e object of philosophical enquiry, is also the object of religious feelings? '

,9 World as Will and Representation, 1:233.

9o Tractatus, introduction, p.xxi.
"' D. F. Pears, Wittgenstein (London: Collins, 1971), p. 89.
494 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The Tractatus is concerned with setting out the relation between any possible
proposition and any possible fact, but what is true of any possible fact is true
of all possible facts, that is, of the world as a whole. At the same time, the
mystical attitude of "feeling the world as a limited whole" is what will enable
us to discover "the sense of the world" and "the solution of the problem of
life." We have already seen that it is important for Wittgenstein that this
should be an unspoken attitude. Any attempt to speak about the world as a
limited whole in language will involve treating the existence of the world as a
contingent fact. This in turn will make the mystical attitude of "feeling the
world as a limited whole" impossible, since it is an attitude not toward any
single fact but toward the totality of possible facts. Since the Tractatus de-
scribes the world as a whole in language, the attitude of mind involved in
reading the Tractatus is incompatible with that of "feeling the world as a
limited whole." This, then, does seem to be a sufficient explanation of Witt-
genstein's willingness to accept the nonsensicality of the Tractatus. The lad-
der is to be thrown away not because of any preposterous notion that it fails
to convey ideas, but because throwing it away is a prerequisite of "the solu-
tion o f the problem of life."
Finally, I will come to the question of how its incompatibility with "the
solution of the problem of life" can justify condemning metaphysics specifi-
cally as "nonsensical." It might seem that this description could only be
hyperbole, but it is in fact justified because precisely the same considerations
which make metaphysics incompatible with "the solution of the problem of
life" also make it nonsensical in a technical semantic sense. To treat the
noncontingent as a matter of contingent fact is not only inimical to the
mystical "feeling the world as a limited whole" but also systematically mis-
leading and inherently paradoxical. The word "nonsensical" is therefore
quite appropriate. In this way it may be that the technical nonsensicality of
metaphysics and its unacceptable role as a source of anxiety may not be
sharply distinguishable. It will be seen that this interpretation of the word
"nonsensical" has the effect of bringing the Tractatua closer to the later work
where conceptual confusion is conceived as akin to a neurotic disorder. The
image of the fly in the fly-bottle is no less apposite to the Tractatus than to
the Investigations.

4- SELF-REFERENCE AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

The semantic doctrines of the Tractatus and its doctrines concerning "the solu-
tion of the problem of life" reveal an important underlying resemblance: both
concern reflexivity or self-consciousness. By drawing out this resemblance I
hope to identify an unusual and ingenious thread in Wittgenstein's argument,
one which, I suggest, holds important promise of further development,
 WiTa'GrNs-rtlr~ 495
First I will deal with the wider questions of metaphysics, questions con-
cerning "the solution of the problem of life," "the sense of the world," the
nature of a "value that does have value." All of these question the general
principles or assumptions underlying specific aims or actions. They do not
add to the myriad of problems comprising ordinary life, but they raise
questions involving all possible problems of ordinary life. They are not prob-
lems about the world, but about the assumptions, values, and purposes
which underlie one's whole approach to the world. In this sense they are
questions about oneself or instances of self consciousness.
Similarly, the semantic doctrines of the T r a c t a t u s are concerned with self-
reference. The central idea of these is that language cannot be used to
describe its own semantic structure. This idea is expressed by Russell in the
formula "Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the
expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in
language. '''' Anything "involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of
language" will be a feature of all possible propositions and all possible facts,
that is, of the world as a whole. Conversely, since the function of language is
to mirror facts "in" the world, the existence of the world is itself "involved in
the very idea o f the expressiveness of language." It follows, therefore, that
the formula last quoted is equivalent to another, which Russell describes as
"Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis"; namely, that "it is impossible to say
anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be
about bounded portions of the world. '''3 The doctrine expressed by these
formulae is not explicitly summarized in the T r a c t a t u s , but instances of it
occur constantly. It is to be found, for example, in the assertion that "propo-
sitions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its
reflection in language, language cannot represent" (4.x21). It is also to be
found in Wittgenstein's assurance at 5.552 that the experience that we need
in order to understand logic, namely, "that something /s," is itself " n o t an
experience"; it reappears in the statement at 6.13 that logic is "not a body of
doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world" and is "transcendental."
It seems natural to suppose that this doctrine derives from Russell's caveat
against the self-referential proposition. Whether or not this account of the
origin of the doctrine is correct, it is quite clear that a proposition which
purports to express transcendental matters will be at least indirectly self-refer-
ential since it will purport to state matters presupposed by its own signifi-
cance. It now appears that the T r a c t a t u s recommends a nonreftective language

"" Tractatus, introduction, p. xxi.

93 Tractatus, introduction, p. xvii.
496 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

as one which will permit the solution of the problem of life by making possible
the elimination of metaphysical reflection and of self-consciousness. Thus, it
becomes true to say that the central semantic doctrine of the Tractatus, that
language cannot be used to describe its own semantic structure, is the out-
come o f quasi-existentialist considerations concerning self consciousness.
It is perhaps this aspect of the Tractatus which holds the greatest promise
for future development. By excluding metaphysical reflection Wittgenstein
limits philosophy to the two fields of conceptual clarification (the "applica-
tion o f logic" [5.557]) and of showing the metaphysician that he has failed to
give a sense to certain signs in his propositions (6.53). These doctrines con-
cerning "the right way of doing philosophy" have probably been the most
influential part of the Tractatus. Their influence can be seen most clearly in
writers such as Ryle and Austin and the school of "ordinary-language phi-
losophy." The latter was of course only one of the two main schools of
philosophy in the immediate post-war period, the other being existentialism.
Both schools have been the objects of attacks which are as much concerned
with style and technique as with specific doctrines. Ordinary-language phi-
losophy has been accused of narrow concern with linquistic minutiae, exis-
tentialist philosophy of empty bombast. My claim is that the doctrines that
Wittgenstein put forward concerning the limits of language and that gave
rise to ordinary language philosophy were themselves an attempted solution
to the problems of self-consciousness that occupied existentialist philoso-
phers. While the tradition which follows Wittgenstein has largely avoided
any further discussion of these problems, much attention has nevertheless
been paid, for example, by Tarski and Prior, 24 to the problems of self refer-
ence and of how language can be used to describe its own semantic struc-
ture. If we abandon Wittgenstein's proposed solution to "the problem of
life" but retain his association of self-consciousness with the problem of how
language can contain its own semantics, then it is possible--it is not certain,
but it is possible--that this association may enable philosophers to discuss the
existential problems of self-consciousness with the rigor and precision of
analytic philosophy.

University of Genoa

94 A. Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of" Semantics,"
Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 4 0944):341-76; A. Prior, Objectsof Thought, ed. P. T.
C,each and A.J. Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), chap. 6.