Understanding the issues surrounding groundwater governance is a precondition for developing policy recommendations for both national and transboundary groundwater governance. This review discusses groundwater attributes relevant to the design of governance systems and provides a systematic review of current national groundwater governance differentiated by various policy instruments. The synthesis of both resource system characteristics and experience with policy instruments allows us to conceptualize institutional aspects of groundwater governance. This leads to six institutional aspects: (1) voluntary compliance; (2) tradition and mental models; (3) administrative responsibility and bureaucratic inertia; (4) conﬂict resolution mechanisms; (5) political economy; and (6) information deﬁcits. Each of these issues embodies institutional challenges for national and international policy implementation.
We can observe extensive water level decline, pollu- tion, and the capture of naturally poor quality groundwater in many regions of the world (Usunoff 2005). Particularly, the problem of groundwater level declines has led to a depletion in storage in both unconﬁned and conﬁned aquifer systems (Shah 2008). Although groundwater plays an important role for domestic use, its major share is devoted to agricultural activities. India, China, Pakistan, and the United States together account for more than 75% of the total reported groundwater extraction for agriculture (Moench 2004). In contrast for Africa, there is little infor- mation on the present and potential role of groundwater in agriculture (Braune and Xu 2009).
Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Theodor-Lieser-Straße 2, 06120 Halle (Saale), Germany; +49 (0) 345 2928138; fax: +49 (0) 345 2928199; email@example.com
the reasons for inefﬁcient use and depletion of ground- water (Chermak et al. 2005; Usunoff 2005; Puri and Aureli 2005; Solanes and Jouravlev 2006; Fischhendler 2008). As Ostrom (1962) stated nearly 50 years ago, “Few areas.
offer a richer variety of organizational patterns and institutional arrangements than the water resource arena.” Still, at present, little is known about the insti- tutions and policies that govern groundwater use in many different societies (Moench 2004; Mukherji and Shah 2005; Usunoff 2005, 81). This is even more important and challenging when we switch from an aquifer within a single political boundary to transboundary aquifers (Utton 1982; Ganoulis 2006, 362). This paper provides a broader review of institutional constraints than mainstream eco- nomic approaches, which typically focus on different access and forms of knowledge of the actors, different discount rates for actors, or different market rules as the institutional factors that make water use model predic- tions more difﬁcult (Chermak et al. 2005). The goal of this review is to explore the institutional aspects of policy implementation toward sustainable qualitative and quan- titative groundwater use by ﬁrst taking into account the attributes of aquifers and second undertaking a system- atic review of well-documented cases of national ground- water policies. As such, this review is inspired by the idea of the nested multitier framework by Ostrom (2007),
which considers the attributes of a resource system, the resource units generated by that system, the users, and the governance systems that affect the outcomes. In this context, the resource system might be an irrigation sys- tem with a certain amount of water to be extracted, the latter deﬁned as the resource unit. Fischhendler (2008) discusses for instance, for the Israeli case how the frag- mentation of the physical and institutional structure results in inadequate governance. This paper explores a way to come to more adequate governance and new institutional insights in policy implementation by a joint consideration of ecological and socio political characteristics. A com- prehensive application of such a joint view is done by Shah (2008) for South Asia. That the resource attributes of groundwater are particularly different than those of surface water already hints at speciﬁc requirements in governance system design.
The paper begins by deﬁning groundwater as a common-pool resource and presents its characteristics in contrast to surface water. Second, the paper reviews national policies classiﬁed by regulatory, economic, or voluntary types, and provides empirical implementation cases. A synthesis of the resource characteristics and experience with the policies leads to speciﬁc institutional challenges for groundwater governance: (1) voluntary compliance; (2) tradition and mental models; (3) adminis- trative responsibility and bureaucratic inertia; (4) conﬂict resolution mechanisms; (5) political economy; and (6) information deﬁcits. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding institutional aspects of adequate and effective groundwater governance.
Groundwater can be classiﬁed as a common-pool resource with both subtractability and low excludabil- ity. According to Ostrom (1990, 31, 32), subtractability involves the possibility of approaching the upper limit of resource units which can be produced. In the context of groundwater, this means that the water level drops with every unit extracted. Theis (1940) comes to the conclusion that in fact all water discharged by wells is balanced by a loss of water somewhere and that in this respect some groundwater is always mined. Or, regard- ing it more locally, water pumped and spread on one farmer’s ﬁeld cannot be spread on another farmer’s ﬁeld. In addition, use may involve the degradation of the qual- ity of the water returned to the aquifer (Brentwood and Robar 2004, xii). Low excludability means that it is dif- ﬁcult to exclude water users, in particular, landowners, from pumping water from aquifers. Aquifers are a source of relatively inexpensive, reliable irrigation that can be developed by individuals once either technology or energy is accessible (Schlager 2007). Both characteristics lead to the so-called tragedy of the commons, that is, the environ- mental degradation that occurs whenever a large number of individuals share a subtractable resource. However, it can be shown that it is actually the “tragedy of open access” that matters (Feeny et al. 1990; Grafton 2000).
In regions where depletion of groundwater is in progress, either minimally enforced rules related to withdrawing resource units lead to de facto open access regimes, or unrestricted open access has been the general rule (Gior- dano and Villholth 2007, 2). Shah (2008) demonstrates this for South Asia.
The frequent failure to distinguish between ineffec- tive common property regimes and no property regime at all is often responsible for pessimism regarding col- lective action. This conclusion has often led to proposals for institutional change in the management of common- pool resources in the direction of either full private prop- erty rights or state control. However, there are many empirically documented cases in which communities have contributed to sustainable resource management by estab- lishing appropriation rules, monitoring the situation of the commons, controlling rule violation, and assigning penal- ties. For example, Kadekodi (2004) provides an overview of common-pool resource management in India, includ- ing examples of successful community action in water resource management. Failure and success in solving commons problems have been widely studied for local surface irrigation systems, among others, in Asia (Ostrom 1992; Wade 1994; Lam 1998). However, the focus of these studies has not been on aquifer management. Indeed, studies of self-governance for whole aquifers are not com- mon, but this is changing rapidly (Schlager 2007; Lopez- Gunn 2009). Yet cases from California show that sustain- able groundwater management can also be achieved based on collective action (Blomquist 1992).
Besides subtractability and low excludability, other attributes of groundwater resource systems call for spe- ciﬁc governance options. In comparison to interna- tional rivers—on which an immense body of literature exists—the characteristics of aquifer systems are rarely discussed. Yet, Schlager (2007, 135), Puri and El Naser (2003, 417), Jarvis (2006, 409), and Moench (2004), to a degree, contrast both system attributes; these are displayed in the following:
aquifers suffering irreversible damage in storage capac- ities and hydraulically connected surface–groundwater systems. Likewise, once an aquifer is seriously contam- inated, it may be difﬁcult, costly, or even technically impossible to reverse this contamination.
immediately emerge downstream. In contrast, in aquifers, the effect of pollution or water extraction may become evident, if at all, only after a con- siderable time lag due to the larger spatial distance between point of intervention and noticeable effect. Impacts from neighboring countries in a transbound- ary aquifer can take decades before being recognized by the Aquifer States (Puri and Aureli 2005). The aquifer replenishment period is long, if at all, in non- renewable groundwater situations, and the provenance of groundwater generation is often unclear; difﬁculties with attributing external effects to particular pumpers
or polluters are thus typical. Management and moni- toring regimes for aquifers must account for this slow hydraulic response.
and no parts can be fenced off and protected from contamination since groundwater dissipates beneath the surface irrespective of boundaries.
boundaries of groundwater resources is extremely chal- lenging. There are uncertainties with recharge areas, ﬂow and discharge characteristics, and the interrela- tionships with surface water bodies (Moench 2004). Also, it is complicated to specify the stakeholders involved in the system and to set the social bound- aries of the aquifer system, as discussed by Blomquist and Schlager (2005) for watersheds. The acceptance of boundaries may also fade, for instance, due to upcom- ing desires of the society to protect water quality, or natural areas that are related to groundwater (Jarvis 2006).
uations and uncertainty in the hydrogeology of aquifers make management and rigid legislative classiﬁca- tions very difﬁcult (Puri 2003; Moench 2004; Puri and Aureli 2005). Knowledge of the interrelationships between human actions and the extent and timescale of groundwater degradation is lacking. The trans- mission paths by which contaminants enter aquifers are also unknown and the potential health effects, such as arsenic poisoning, are uncertain (Moench 2004, 87).
imperative for making knowledge-based and appro- priate decisions (Van der Gun 2007). In most coun- tries, the data available on both groundwater quan- tity and quality are poor and not homogeneous com- pared to the data available for surface water (Biswas 1999, 8).
extraction per groundwater device and the number of devices provides important details as regards an appropriate governance system. In contrast to Mex- ico and the United States, where groundwater extrac- tion occurs through wells with high extraction capac- ity owned and controlled by a small fraction of the population, in India, Pakistan, China, and Iran there are numerous small-scale groundwater extrac- tions (Moench 2004, 88; Shah 2008). The large number of small-scale users is a major factor of agrarian growth in South-East Asia (Moench 2004). The structure of abstraction has signiﬁcant implica- tions for decisions about management, for example, in terms of monitoring and controlling (Moench 2004, 88).
and asymmetrically held by the parties of an exchange, here the users and providers of the resource system (North 1991). In particular, between the national or regional level authority, which in most cases is the
monitoring agency, and that of polluters or abstrac- tors, information asymmetry about the characteristics of groundwater is common. This must be considered in policy design since the transaction costs for moni- toring pollution and abstractions may be prohibitively high. Moreover, knowledge is often used and mis- used by different stakeholder groups as a tactical resource in the bargaining process over issues, such as the beneﬁts of privatizing water services (Conca 2006, 378).
Similar to distinctions made by environmental econ- omists (Stavins 2004), I classify three types of policy instruments: regulatory, economic, and voluntary/advisory.
(dis-)incentives such as groundwater pricing, trading water rights or pollution permits, and subsidies and taxes.
These instruments are ideal types and no policy option ever relies purely on one type of instrument (Stone 2002). The aim of these policies is to have an impact on governance structures. Governance structures are the orga- nizational solutions for making rules effective; that is, they are necessary for guaranteeing rights and duties and their implementation when coordinating transactions. Almost every governance structure in the real world is a hybrid form somewhere between the polar cases of hierarchy and market. Various forms and combinations of governance structures are used to coordinate agri-environmental prob- lems (M´
enard and Klein 2004), and hybrids have been suggested as a possible way of managing common-pool resources, including complex and dynamic ecosystems such as transboundary water resources (Karkkainen 2005). Collective action, for instance, is a speciﬁc hybrid form of governance structure and of particular interest in man- aging common-pool resources like groundwater (Ostrom 1990). Cooperation in the water sector can even lead to spill over effects and better cooperation on conﬂictive political issues (Lopez-Gunn 2009).
Empirical evidence shows that it is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd and facilitate, with the help of policies, suitable combinations of governance structures for ensuring sus- tainable resource management. Every policy to be imple- mented encounters certain existing institutions. The diver- sity of groundwater management forms around the world are illustrated by, for example, Brentwood and Robar (2004), Giordano and Villholth (2007), Shah (2008), and Lopez-Gunn (2009).
Now bringing you back...
Does that email address look wrong? Try again with a different email.