| | | | | Transcript from audio tape recording: Richard M, Nixon, Press Conference at Manchester, New Hampshire. February 2, 1968, [The substance of the first paragraph was stated twice ecause of inadequate pickup on the first take; only the second take is transcribed here. ] NIXON: Yesterday, I informed the Nixon for President campaign chairmen and committees in the States of Wisconsin, Indiana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Oregon that I would be entering those primaries and that they could go forward with their plans and with my cooperation. I also made a decision with regard to other primaries involving not entering primaries in what are called "favorite son" states. I talked by phone to Governor Shafer of Pennsylvania, to Governor Reagan of California and to a representative of Governor Rhodes in Ohio, and indicated my decision that unless the situation changed - and I do not anticipate any change in this respect - that I would not enter primaries in any favorite son states. The reason for that decision is that my major objective, and I'm sure the major objective of all the candidates and “non-candidates", is victory in November; and to enter a favorite son state might affect the nomination, but it would assure the loss of that state in November, and consequently I have made that decision and have announced it to the various favorite sons involved. One other thing I should point out from a logistical standpoint - there will be an advance text for my remarks tomorrow night, and tiat text will be available at the door as you leave, and you can rely on that text as being covered in my remarks at Concord. Some of you old-timers who have covered me before will know that this is not always available, but we will try during the course of this campaign, perhaps on a fairly regular basis - once a week, onceevery ten days - to give you a full advance text and to have some advance each day, now that we do have the beginnings of a campaign staff. With those announcements, I think it would be proper now to go on to your questions, and we'll recognize those. 125REPORTER: What are you going to offer the American people in the way of a policy toward Vietnam, that they don't have at the present time? NIXON: Well, my policy toward Vietnam has been spelled out on many octasions, including my previous visit to New Hamshire; and I will continue to discuss it in major statements during the New Hampshire campaign. At this point, I think it is very important to make quite clear that when American forces in Vietnam are under very devastating assault from a desperate - I would hope, last-ditch - effort on the part of the Vietcong, we must recognize that that effort by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese is not directed toward our forces in South Vietnam. It is directed toward public opinion in the United States. And I want to make it very clear that, as one member of the loyal opposition and as @ candidate for the Presidency, that we may be divided on many issues, but that the enemy in North Vietnam and the Vietcong in South Vietnam cannot and should not count on American division to gain politically in the United States what they cannot gain militarily in Vietnam, I begin with that proposition. I have had and I will continue to have differences with the administration on the conduct of this war. I don't believe that there's ever been a time in our history when more military and economic and diplomatic power has been used less effectively than in Vietnam, But insofar as the commitment is concerned, a commitment which is shared, I understand, by this administration, that this war must be brought to a successful conclusion - and by successful, that means a conclusion which does not reward aggression and which does not produce what would be the element which would being on another war~ that commitment is one that is above partisanship, and it is one that I support. Our disagreement on the war in Vietnam is not about the goal; our disagreement is about the means to achieve that goal. I believe that better diplomacy, more effective use of our military and economic strength, can being this war to a quicker conclusion. And I will be spelling out ways and means for that to be accomplished during the course of this campaign. REPORTER: Will you accept the challenge by Governor Romney to debate here for the New Hampshire primary? NIXON: I've considered the proposal of Governor Romney that he and I engage in a series of debates. As you gentlemen are aware, he sent me a wire indicating that - in a friendly way - that a challenge had been laid down. And I have decided that it would not be in the best interest 126 cof the objective to which both Governor Romney and I are deeply dedicated - the election of a Republican President in November - for a debate to occur between potential Republican nominees. The great debate in 1968 will be and should be between the Republican nomineé and Lyndon Johnson. The only winner of a debate between Republicans, as we learned in 1964, would be Lyndon Johnson. And so consequently, I will state my views on the issues; I know Governor Romney and other potential candidates will state their views on the issues; but I do not think that personal confrontation and debate would serve the interest of a victory in November and consequently, I will not engage in a debate. REPORTER: There are all kinds of estimates as to what the margin of your lead is here in New Hampshire at this point. Some have indicated as much as six to one, others down to two to one, and various figures in between. What would you suggest your status is right now? NIXON: Well, I've read the estimates with of course great interest. I'm supposed to be a pretty good predicter of political results, except where my own case is involved, (Laughter.) I'm referring of course to the results of 1966. In this campaign, let me say right now that I'm going to content myself by making this statement: 1 did not make the decision to enter this campaign lightly. As I told you gentlemen when I met with some of you when I was in New Hampshire a couple of months ago, I became a candidate for the Presidency only after I became convinced that I could win a decisive majority at the primaries and after winning the primaries, win the nomination and win the election and then do the job. Those are the considerations that entered into ,that decision. I believe that having made that decision, that I will simply say that any predictions would simply be self- serving. Many of them would not - and very appropriately - not be believed. I think that this primary, and all the primaries, will be hard-fought. They will be cleanly fought. And I think they will be much closer than any of the polls would indicate. REPORTER MIKE WALLACE: Who is your toughest opponent here in New Hampshire - Romney or Rockefeller, Mr. Nixon, in your estimation? NIXON: Well, Mr. Wallace, your opponent is the man who is in the arena, and not the man who's in the grand- stand rooting for the man in the arena. Now, I have great respect for Governor Rockefeller as a potential opponent and as a vote-getter; I have great respect for Governor Romney as @ vote-getter and as an opponent, But Governor Romney is 127entered in the New Hampshire primary, Governor Rockefeller has endorsed his candidacy, and that of course strengthens Governor Romney. Referring to your earlier question, I will go this far by saying that Governor Romney's strength must be increased by the unpredictable amount that the Rockefeller support will add to his strength when that support becomes widely known during the course of the campaign, as it will, So what you really have to do is to take the Rockefeller standing in New Hampshire and the Romney standing in New Hampshire and see whether the Nixon standing will overcome it. REPORTER MIKE WALLACE: Governor Rockefeller polls, though - NIXON: Yes, sir? REPORTER MIKE WALLACE: Delete. Some of the polls show Rockefeller ahead of Romney in New Hampshire at this moment. NIXON: I assume that what you're referring to is that Rockefeller on a write-in basis, then - if that is correct - because naturally, he is not on the ballot. Well, New Hampshire as its voters clearly demonstrated in 1964, are not necessarily bound by the names that appear on the primary ballot and sometimes the appeal of a man who is not on the ‘allot is greater than that of somebody who is on it. Whatever the polls may shov now, however, with regard to Governor Rockefeller and Governor Romney, I have no reason to doubt the integrity of Governor Rockefeller's pledge of ‘support to Governor Romney. Governor Romney believes it; I have no reason not to believe it; and I would think that under those circumstances, that whatever the polls may indicate now, that Governor Romney is the man to beat in New Hampshire. I'm basing all of my plans on that, and - just as Governor very graciously indicated that he considered I was the man to beat. This is a Nixon-Romney race - depending upon your point of view - Romney-Nixon. REPORTER: Do you think a loss in New Hampshire would kill off anybody's chances of - farthe future, in any other primary - do you think this is the decisive primary? NIXON: I would suggest that the primary in New Hampshire is quite important, due to the fact that it comes first and due to the fact that it will create momentum for the candidates in the next primary, Wisconsin, and Nebraska 128and Oregon, or it could depress the candidates! chances. But the New Hampshire primary will not be fatal to either of the candidates. I'll put it this way - the New Hampshire primary isn't going to nominate the candidate, and it is not going to defeat a candidate, because a man can come back froma defeat and win the next time. REPORTER: Mr. Nixon, do you have the’ support of former Governor Wesley Powell in New Hampshire? NIXON: I have not had any conversations with Governor Powell recently, and I frankly have not had any assurance of his support. I would hope to have his support, as well as that of other former Governors and New Hampshire political leaders; but at this particular time, I do not know what his position will be. REPORTER: Based on the public information now available, do you agree with the administration's handling of the Pueblo incident in North Korean waters? NIXON: The major concern of the United States Government must be to secure the release of the 83 Americans who are now being held hostage by the outlaw government of Vietnam [?]. Now the administration therefore very properly has to be cautious in what it does. And I do not Join with those who suggest that we take very drastic military action in order to recover the ship. We would recover the ship, possibly; but we would lose the lives of the 83 Americans, Diplomatically, at this point in time I think the administration probably is following the proper course, On the other hand, I think getting into this mess is a subject for proper criticism. For weeks - as a matter of fact, for months - before the Pueblo crisis occurred, the the North Koreans had been harassing South Korean fishing boats in that areas they had also made an attempt on the life Premier; they had even been making passes at this particular naval vessel of the United States.. Having in mind those warnings, and knowing the unpredictability of the North Korean regime, it was simply unthinkable that that ship could have been there without some air cover in the immediate vicinity, or some sea cover which could some to its rescue in the event that something happened, as it did happen, And I think that for the future, that what we must remember is that we do have this kind of ship around the world, just as the Soviet Union has them. We must continue to have this kind of surveillance around the world. But 129let's have some preventive action now, in the books and on the way, so that this will not happen again, and so that the United States is not again put in an indefensible position where we're unable to move strongly because they have made hostages of American men. REPORTER: ee +++, looking back on your last two losses (inaudible) ,.. and they don't think you can overcome that. K was Fonte if you would respond to that; and secondly, is there a new Nixon? NIXON: I've given consideration to - as you might imagine - this problem of "Can Nixon win?" which is really your question. And I want to be quite candid about it. Many of you gentlemen in this room have interviewed me at some length over the past few months and years, and I think that you'll agree that there is no one in this room - no one in the Republican party or in the nation - who is more interested in seeing that the Republican nominee win this year, than I am, I know what it means to win, I know what it means to lose, from a personal standpoing; but more important, I think this nation needs new leadership and more important than the ambitions of any man to become President of the United States, the Republican party must nominate the man who can win. A second consideration, of course, is that the man who can win must also be a man who can do the job, once he wins, My answer to those who say, because I have lost a couple of elections, can I win? - is this: That those who have lost elections in the past, have come back to win. I hope to come back to win. But more important than that, I recognize that I have to demonstrate - demonstrate to the American people, to the Republican party leaders, to the Republican party voters at large throughout this country, to independents and to those Democrats who will vote Republican in 1968, that Ican win and that I can win the job. I am prepared to meet that challenge. That's why I have decided that I will test ny ability to win, and my ability to cope with conditions, in the firesof the primaries, and not just in the smoke-filled rooms of Miami, And I suppose this will sound like a statement of some conceit, but as you enter a campaign you must go in with confidence, and I have great confidence - not cockiness, confidence, I believe I'm going to win the New Hampshire Primary. I believe I will come out the winner of - the decisive 130winner - of the primaries, and will go on to win the nomination, And if I do that, I will be the strongest candidate, and I believe I can beat Mr. Johnson. REPORTER: Why d you feel that you can win now, when you couldn't win in '60? NIXON: I believe that the chances to win in 1968 are infinitely better for any Republican, and they are better for me as well. First, with regard to any Republican. The Republican party in 1960 was weaker than at any time it had been in 20 years. We had only 16 Governors, we had only 155 Congressmen, we had only 34 Senators, and we were very weak at the state legislative level. Today, we have 26 Governors, we have 30 more Congressmen, we have two more Senators, and more important, we have 700 more state legislators than we had in '60, So the party is stronger, we have a stronger base to start from. That of course would apply to any nominee - Governor Rockefeller, Governor Romney, Governor Reagan, and of course to me, There's a second reason why I think that I individually will be stronger in 1968 and in 1960. In 1960, I necessarily had to be on the defensive. I was proud to defend the record of the Eisenhower administration. I thought then, and I think now in perspective, as I see what troubles we're in around the world, that it was a record that was worth defending. But on the other hand, a man on the defensive in a tight, closely-fought campaign, is always at a disadvantage. This year, we will be on the attack, and I think that I can carry the attack to this administration, to Iyndon Johnson, or to someone else if he decides not to run, More important, however, I believe that in 1968 I am frankly - and the great difficulty about answering questions about winning and qualifications, you sound so insufferably conceited, but you'll just have to take it for what it is - I think in 1968 that I am better qualified to handle the great problems of the Presidency than I was in 1960. Seven years out of office has given me a chance to travel much more broadly without protocol, to think much more deeply, to read much more, to know where the United States is, to know where it's going. In 1968, I'm looking to the future of this country, down to the end of the 20th century. In 1960, I necessarily had to think of the past - also of the future - but to think of the past and to defend it. And in 1968, as you gentlemen will hear in my speeches, starting Saturday night, I'm going to be talking about America's future, my vision of that future, and what I think I can do with the years of experience I have behind me, to make it a better future for peace and freedom abroad and a better future for peace and freedom at home. : 131REPORTER: How much time will you spend in New Hampshire, Mr. Nixon? NIXON: Time in New Hampshire? Well, I'm glad this question came up - usually we use that device when we didn't want the question, but in this case, I can assure you that I'm glad it came up, because there has been some Speculation which I understood, that I planned to spend six days in New Hampshire, Now, I've made many goofs in my political career; but om thing that I don't do, I never take anything for granted. We're going to go all-out in New Hampshire, and in Wisconsin, and in every other state, and we're going to do all that is necessary. The New Hampshire schedule will be very intensive; it will be a schedule in which we're going to try to meet as many people as we can, talk to as many people as we can, get their views, answer their questions, and present the case. And I would suggest that David Sterling, as he releases the schedule week from week, will find that our campaign will be many times more than six, in the State of Hampshire. REPORTER: Governor Romney is carrying on a so-called "Kefauver-type" campaign, handshaking, meeting as many people as possible. Do you plan to do the same thing, or will you be assuming a more statesmanlike approach to the campaign? NIXON: Well - just a moment, let the record say that you said "a more statesmanlike approach to the campaign" and not I. I - I have great respect for Governor Romney, and he's very effective in the kind of campaigning that he's doing. And I respect him for that. I like to meet people, too; and I plan to shake a lot of hands and I have a good, strong hand, and I also like to talk to people. But on the other hand, I believe that a Presidential candidate has a responsibility at this time and at this place, to add to the person-to-person dimension of politics - which is enough when you're running for Governor, or for Senator, or for local office - to add to that particularly his understanding of and his ability to cope with the great issues before this country and the world. Never has American been in more trouble abroad and at home at the same time. And so consequently, I'm going to be talking to the voters in New Hampshire, some individually, but if, in using my time I can reach more of them through radio or television - and I'll try to use television despite my past track record on that score - I can assure you that during the course of this campaign, I want the people of New Hampshire to know where I stand, my understanding of the issues, and that will take precedence over individual cam- paigning, to the extent I have to make that choice. . 132REPORTER: Governor Romney's been talking about four major issues: Vietnam; crime; inflation; and the crisis in the cities. Do you regard those as the four major issues, or do you have anything to add to that list? NIXON: I believe that Governor Romney has properly outlined what I would call the issues of attack - Vietnam; the crisis of the cities; crime; and the problem of inflation. These are the deficiencies of the Johnson administration and we need action to deal with these deficiencies. But there are positive issues. The positive issues are: What are we going to do to prevent more Vietnams? What are we doing to do to prevent a nuclear confrontation in the next two years when the Soviet Union - if you read the reports of Mr. Mac Namara's news conference yesterday in the papers this morning - will acquire nuclear parity with the United States? What are we going to do - purely apart from crime, putting the lid on it, and the problem of our cities, putting the lid on that - what are we going to do to give American youth, not just negro youth, but all youth, a new sense of purpose and vision about America? These are the more important issues. The others all of us will campaign about, and I will talk about them, and I will have programs to deal with them. But I hope that We will be able to raise this campaign above the mundane discussions of what's wrong with Lyndon Johnson, but more than that, what's wrong with what his administration has done. We must move on and say, "What's right for America" as we look down the next 30 years. REPORTER: There's been some reference to the fact that President Johnson may not run - do you entertain this thought seriously in your mind? NIXON: Well, this gets into political gamesmanship, I suppose. There have been reports, some written and some private reports, that President Johnson might not run. It is my belief that President Johnson will run, It is my belief also that Hubert Humphrey will be the Vice Presidential candidate. But President Johnson is a man who is not the most predictable of men; he plays his cards quite close to the vest, and I - he has not consulted with me, certainly, as to whether he will run or not - under the circumstances, while I believe he will run, I think we have to have contingency planning for the possibility that he might not. REPORTER: (Inaudible) ... what would you do differently in Vietnam? NIXON: I have discussed at great length my dif- ferences as far as Vietnam is concerned, And my criticisms 133of the Administration's policy in the past, very briefly, are these: First, that we have failed to use our military adequately. By using more power earlier, we could use less power now. We have failed to use our economic and diplomatic power adequately. We have failed to apply the leverage that could have been applied with the Soviet Union to enlist them on the side of peace in Vietnam, rather than playing the role they presently play, of instigating and fueling the war. We have failed in South Vietnam, in the critical area = until very, very lately - of having the South Vietnamese take a greater responsibility for their own defense and also in the pacification program, We have failed on the diplomatic front in changing the deal too often. From day to day, the enemy doesn't know whether this administration is going to be for this or that or some other proposal - the San Antonio proposal, or Mr. Clifford's, or somebody else. And if you want peace with this kind of an enemy, you must decide what you want, and then stick to it. Because when you change the deal; it encourages the enemy to hang on, in the view that he might get a better deal. And finally, this administration has failed in the most critical area of all. And that is, in informing the American people about why we are there, and thereby providing a degree of unity behind this war, unity which is important here, but unity which is vital to convince the enemy that he cannot win politically what he fails to win militarily. What can we do between now and November? All that we can do, asa member of the loyal opposition, is to give the enemy no’ hope that by hanging on, he is going to get concessions - a part of South Vietnam, for example - that he cannot get from the very generous offer that Lyndon Johnson has made to this date. ie After November - assuming that this war is still on, and I hope that it is not - but after November, I am convinced that a new administration and a new President, with the mandate of an election behind him, will have the diplomatic, the economic, and the military tools at his disposal; and I am convinced he can use them far more effectively to bring this war to a swift conclusion. REPORTER: What do you mean by the military tools, after November, at his disposal? NIXON: When we speak of military strength, we too often speak of it as what we do. We fail to recognize that our military strength is far more effective as a diplo- matic weapon, than simply as a military weapon in the field. Anyone who knows how the war in Vietnam - the war in Korea - 134ended, knows that it was the military strength in being, rather than its use, which enabled General Eisenhower to bring quite great leverage on the North Vietnamese [sic]. In my view, so thet I can be quite precise with regard to what I would not do, and would do, I do not favor the increase of America's military attack against North Vietnam in these areas. I do not, for example, believe that we should resort to the use of nuclear weapons, that we should invade North Vietnam, that we should extend the war on the ground. I do believe, however, that what the United States does or does not do with regard’ to bombing, what the United States does or does not do with regard to putting additional pressure on the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam, must be orchestrated with a diplomatic offensive at the same time, which offers the promise of peace and on the other side, points up the very great danger of the enemy continuing to fight militarily. REPORTER: In your list of favorite son states tmt you would not enter, you did not mention Massachusetts. Was that intentional, or - ? NIXON: The question was that in my list of favorite son states, I did not mention Massachusetts. It was not a deliberate oversight, because there's never been really any speculation about my entering Massachusetts, and there will be none. I have already discussed that, incidentally, with Governor Volpe, he's aware of that, and when f go to speak at the Middlesex Club for a Lincoin Day dinner, I will assert it again publicly. REPORTER: Did you discuss with Governor Volpe the possibility that he would be your running mate, if you get through this mess? cs NIXON: Get through what? REPORTER: This - NIXON: - mess? Oh. (Laughter.) Shades of 1960. I have discussed with Governor Volpe his political career . | from the time he began it, when I met him for the first time | in 1951 when I was there speaking as a Senator at a Lincoln Day dinner. I have high regard for him as well as for a number of other Republicans who are potential candidates for the Vice | Presidency, But me make one thing very clear: Until I do what I think I am going to be able to do, win the nomination nyself, I'm not going to go around the country, and nobody in my name is going to go around the country, dangling the Vice Presidency to prospective candidates. I just hope that-we have, 135by the time August comes, a good stable of potential candidates for Vice President; and if I am the nominee, I'll pick the strongest man and the man I think will make the best President [sic]. Governor Volope would be among those who potentially could meet that, as well as some others could meet it. REPORTER: Is Governor Kirk one of those? NIXON: Yes. He's one of those that has been mentioned. And I should also point out that Governor Kirk called me yesterday, said that apparently I hadn't seen this - I do read the papers, but I didn't happen to see it yesterday - he said that he had - that someone had entered his name in the New Hampshire primary. He said that it was without his consent and that he would withdraw it when he comes to New Hampshire for a speech here on the seventh. REPORTER: He said this to you yesterday, Mr. Nixon? NIXON: Yes. REPORTER: Because he had said in Tallahassee that he was going to think it over, NIXON: He called me on the phone yesterday and informed me of the decision. REPORTER: Mr. Nixon, if you should win decisively over Governor Romney in New Hampshire and Wisconsin, do you think that might have a bearing on Governor Rockefeller's present posture as a non-candidate? I refer specifically to the Oregon primary - would there a possibility he moves from a disinterested person in the political arena now to @ possible contender against you there? NIXON: I really can't qualify as an expert on wnat Governor Rockefeller might do in this - and I don't really mean that facetiously, because there's been understandably a great deal of speculation about him as a potential candidate. But let's understand one thing - I think I may have read it in Teddy White's book, but you gentlemen must have reported it, that very early in 1960 I think President Kennedy, then Senator Kennedy, in a memorable statement about the primaries, a statement directed against Iyndon Johnson, said that te thought that if anybody was going to win the Presidency or the nomina- tion, he had to get in and try in the primaries. Governor Romney and I share that view today. I believe that the decisive winner of the primaries will and should be nominated. I believe that his ideas, his ability 136 i vto cope with the issues, should be tested in the fire of the primaries, as I indicated earlier, and not simply be kept in the grandstand and then be submitted to the tender mercies of the Kingmakers at the convention, REPORTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Nixon. I think your schedule's caught up with us now, it's two-thirty - (Recording switches off, then resumes.) REPORTER: ... a potential threat to your nomination, assuming that you went the primary route and were successful, would you still consider Governor Rockefeller a potential threat or a possible nominee for tne Presidency? NIXON: Gentlemen, let's understand this, Having made the statements which I would make, and which Governor Romney should very properly make - since we're both here and we're committed now to the snows of New Hampshire and Wisconsin and the roses of Portland and what-have-you - certainly any realist knows that Governor Rockefeller could become a candidate at a later time; Governor Reagan could become the candidate; under certain circumstances, Senator Percy might; and one of them might be nominated. "I'm simply expressing the view. though, that if any of these men are to become candidates, that it's a very long chance for them unless they're willing at some point in time to enter the primaries and prove what they can do in this year 1968 to win, This is the year we have to win, not 1906. And past track records - and I hope this is the case in my view - will neither be a disqualifiying thing or a qualifying factor in determining whom we nominate in 1968. Gentlemen, thank you very much. 137