Motion To Compel Answers To Deposition Questions of Ron Wolfe FDLG

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CITIBANK, NA AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE GENERAL JURISDICTION

FOR BSARM 2007-2, DIVISION
Plaintiff, CASE NO.

50 2008 CA 030498XXXX MB
vs.
Division: AW
JOSEPH J BARBARO A/K/A JOSEPH
BARBARO; THE UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF
JOSEPH J BARBARO A/K/A JOSEPH
BARBARO; MAUREEN RUSSELL A/K/A DEFENDANTS, JOSEPH J.
MAUREEN A RUSSELL; THE UNKNOWN BARBARO AND MAUREEN
SPOUSE OF MAUREEN RUSSELL A/K/A RUSSELL’S, MOTION TO
MAUREEN A RUSSELL ANY AND ALL COMPEL ANSWERS TO
UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING BY, DEPOSITION QUESTIONS
THROUGH, UNDER, AND AGAINST THE
HEREIN NAMED INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANT(S) WHO ARE NOT KNOWN
TO BE DEAD OR ALIVE, WHETHER SAID
UNKNOWN PARTIES MAY CLAIM AN
INTEREST AS SPOUSES, HEIRS,
DEVISEES, GRANTEES, OR OTHER
CLAIMANTS; BANK OF AMERICA;
CHASE BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION; TENANT #1, TENANT #2,
TENANT #3, TENANT #4, TENANT #5,
TENANT #6, TENANT #7, and TENANT #8
the names being fictitious to account for parties
in possession,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Defendants, JOSEPH J. BARBARO and MAUREEN RUSSELL, move the Court,
pursuant to Rule 1.380(a) Fla. R. Civ. P., for an order compelling RONALD WOLFE
(“WOLFE”), a non-party witness, to answer deposition questions which he refused to answer
despite the absence of any privilege. Defendants also request an instruction that WOLFE’s
counsel refrain from making speaking objections during the deposition. Additionally,
ICE LEGAL, P.A.

1015 N. STATE RD. 7, SUITE D, ROYAL PALM BEACH, FL 33411 • TELEPHONE (561) 729-0530 • FACSIMILE (866) 507-9888
CASE NO. 50 2008 CA 030498XXXX MB
Defendants request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for having to bring this motion (and
reconvene in Tampa) and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. In support of this
motion, Defendants state as follows:
I. Introduction
This is a foreclosure action in which Plaintiff, CITIBANK, NA AS INDENTURE
TRUSTEE FOR BSARM 2007-2, (“CITIBANK”), seeks to take the real property of the
Defendants, JOSEPH J. BARBARO and MAUREEN RUSSELL, in satisfaction of a debt.
A. The assignment of mortgage was executed by Plaintiff counsel’s managing

partner, WOLFE.
This case was filed by Florida Default Law Group, P.L. (“FDLG”) on behalf of
CITIBANK alleging that CITIBANK is now the holder of a promissory note granted to WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A. (“WELLS FARGO”) “and/or is entitled to enforce the Mortgage Note and
Mortgage.” While CITIBANK originally argued that no assignment of mortgage was necessary
to foreclose, 1 it later filed an assignment of mortgage which had been executed and recorded
after the case was filed (but well before it told this Court that an assignment was not needed). 2
The Assignment purported to transfer both the mortgage and note from the original
lender WELLS FARGO to CITIBANK and was executed by its self-described attorney-in-fact,
WOLFE. WOLFE is the managing partner and attorney supervisor of the law firm representing
CITIBANK in this action, FDLG, and was at the time that he executed the assignment of
mortgage to his firm’s own client. 3
1
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Maureen Russell’s Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 6.
2
Notice of Filing Original Note and Assignment of Mortgage, January 30, 2009.
3
Deposition of Ronald Wolfe taken August 26, 2010 (“Wolfe Depo., Exhibit A”), pp. 5-6;
Deposition of RONALD RICHARD WOLFE in Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Seigman, Case No.
16-2008-CA-9724 (Duval County) taken January 27, 2010, p. 21 (excerpts at Exhibit D).
2
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
B. WOLFE also strategized with “independent” witnesses as to how to respond

to deposition requests from Defendants and other homeowners.
CITIBANK also filed an affidavit of an alleged expert on the reasonableness of the
attorneys’ fees requested, Lisa Cullaro (the “Cullaro affidavit”). The affidavit was notarized by
her sister-in-law and former FDLG employee, Erin Cullaro, who, according to newspaper
reports, is currently under investigation by her own current employer, the Florida Attorney
General, in connection with her notarization of such affidavits. 4
When defense counsel attempted to depose the Cullaros regarding their signatures on the
affidavit, FDLG withdrew the affidavit. 5 Both CITIBANK (through FDLG) and the Cullaros
(through their own attorney) filed motions for protective order to avoid the depositions on the
grounds that the affidavit had been withdrawn. 6
Before arriving at this tactic of withdrawing the affidavits in this and other cases in which
defense counsel sought the Cullaros’ depositions, the Cullaros conferred with FDLG attorneys—
including WOLFE—as to how to avoid the depositions and whether FDLG would shoulder the
burden of opposing them. In an email to FDLG (and WOLFE), Lisa Cullaro stated that she had
no intention of filing her own motion for protective order and that she understood it would be
FDLG which would “aggressively defend” against the depositions:
I have never indicated that I would, nor do I intend to, either: (1) directly handle
any discovery matters in any FDLG case with opposing counsel, or (2) file any
motion for protective order either on behalf of myself or Erin. To the contrary,
4
State AG investigates its own. Shannon Behnken and Michael Sasso, Tampa Tribune, May 1,
2010, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2010/may/01/bz-state-ag-investigates-its-own/.
5
Defendants’ Notice of Deposition of Lisa Cullaro, dated December 17, 2009; Defendants’
Notice of Deposition of Erin Cullaro, dated December 17, 2009; Notice of Withdrawal of
Affidavit as to Reasonable Attorneys Fees, January 8, 2010.
6
Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order, January 8, 2010; the Cullaro Motion for Protective,
January 19. 2010, in which the Cullaros are represented by FDLG’s current “expert” on the
reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, John Cullaro.
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ICE LEGAL, P.A.
and as Ron [WOLFE] and discussed last week, it was my understanding that
FDLG wished to aggressively defend the taking of Erin's deposition as a notary,
as well as my request to be paid as an expert witness.
…[I]t was my impression that FDLG was not going to permit this type of patently
abusive discovery. To this end, Ron informed me that any fees associated with the
defense of such discovery motions would ultimately be paid by the defendant and
as such, it was his desire to pursue an aggressive course of action on these types
of issues. 7
Lisa Cullaro went on to specifically address WOLFE in the email, asking him to “make a
final decision on this issue so we may present a cohesive front, not only in this case, but with
respect to any future matters.” 8 Notably, shortly after this email conversation between FDLG
and these witnesses, FDLG claimed that it represented the Cullaros, but quickly disavowed such
representation when it was pointed out that such representation would be a conflict of interest. 9
C. WOLFE is also an investor, owner, and manager of the title company whose
fees are at issue in this litigation.
CITIBANK seeks to recover the fees for a title search conducted by New House Title,
L.L.C., a company owned by FDLG 10 or more specifically, by the partners that own FDLG. 11
RON WOLFE has described himself as an “investor” in New House Title and as the one who
ultimately addresses management issues. 12
7
Email from Lisa Cullaro to Cindy Runyan of FDLG (cc: Erin Cullaro and RON WOLFE)
September 16, 2009 (Exhibit B).
8
Id.
9
Emails dated November 13, 2009 through November 17, 2009 in The Bank of New York Mellon
Trust Co. NA v. Sanchez, Case No. 50 2008 CA 027182XXXX MB (Palm Beach County)
(Exhibit C).
10
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel as to Attorney's Fees and Costs, February 9, 2009, ¶7.
11
Deposition of RONALD RICHARD WOLFE in Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Seigman, Case No.
16-2008-CA-9724 (Duval County) taken January 27, 2010, pp. 24-25, 111 (excerpts at Exhibit
D).
12
Id. at 24.
4
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
D. WOLFE’s job responsibility includes ensuring that FDLG policies and

procedures are followed.
As the managing partner of FDLG, WOLFE has the responsibility, among others, to
ensure “that the policies and procedures of the firm are—are reviewed, intact and followed.” 13
Once such practice is the certification by attorneys that documents are mailed by U.S. mail days
before they are actually delivered to the United States Postal Service. The following table
summarizes only some of the documents filed in this case in which the certificates are false:
Document Certified By An Actual Mail Date Time Lag

FLDG Attorney According to Date
As Having Been Stamp on
Mailed: Envelope
Affidavit of Improper Service December 24, 2008 December 29, 2008 Five days
Discovery propounded on Defendants June 5, 2009 June 9, 2009 Four days
(See, email exchange Exhibit E)
Notice of Mediation Conference. January 16, 2009 January 19, 2009 Three days
Notice of Filing Affidavit of February 11, 2009 February 13, 2009 Two days
Amounts Due and Owing
Plaintiff’s Response to Maureen January 7, 2009 January 8, 2009 One day
Russell’s Motion to Dismiss
Notice of Filing of Affidavit of February 9, 2009 February 10, 2009 One day
Reasonable Attorney Fees and
Affidavit of Plaintiff’s Counsel as to
Attorney’s Fees and Costs.
Notice That Plaintiff Has Responded March 4, 2009 March 5, 2009 One day
To Defendant, Joseph J Barbaro
A/K/A Joseph Barbaro, Discovery
Request
A letter from a FDLG attorney 14 concedes that FLDG does not deliver its motions and
pleadings to the U.S. Postal Service on the day certified by FDLG lawyers. Rather, the certified
13
Wolfe depo., p. 6.
14
Letter to defense counsel re: “Mail Issues” dated March 17, 2009 (Exhibit F).
5
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
date is the day FDLG delivers its mail to a third party “mail service provider” for pre-sorting and
bar-coding before it is delivered to the U.S. Postal Service. As the FDLG partner responsible for
the adherence to FDLG procedures, WOLFE would be able to provide information on this
subject.
Additionally, WOLFE would be able to verify facts about the fees CITIBANK seeks to
recover from Defendants in this case. An example of such fees are those of the process server,
the only evidence of which is an affidavit filed by an FDLG attorney without any supporting
invoice. 15 Cross-examination regarding fees proven only through affidavits of FDLG attorneys
(such as service of process and title search fees) has never been more important, given that the
Attorney General’s Office is currently investigating FDLG because the firm “appears to be
fabricating and/or presenting false and misleading documents in foreclosure cases.” 16
II. WOLFE’s Testimony is Highly Relevant to this Case.
As shown above, WOLFE’s testimony is directly relevant to a number of issues in the
case:
• His authority to execute an assignment of mortgage on behalf of WELLS FARGO;
• The underlying facts represented in the assignment he executed—i.e. whether a

transfer of the debt from WELLS FARGO to CITIBANK actually occurred;
• The transfer of the note, given that, at the time he executed the assignment,
CITIBANK had represented to the Court that the subject promissory note could not
be found, even “after due and diligent search.”
15
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel as to Attorney's Fees and Costs, February 9, 2009, ¶6.
16
Case L10-3-1095, Active Public Consumer-Related Investigation;
http://myfloridalegal.com/__85256309005085AB.nsf/0/A4F1B85DCC5D5ACD852577130045B
63F
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ICE LEGAL, P.A.
• Whether FDLG is providing legal services for its own fee expert, Lisa Cullaro, and
the notary on the expert affidavits, Erin Cullaro. (Such services would be undisclosed
compensation to these witnesses for their testimony.)
• The details of his conversations with these witnesses regarding their joint plans and
agreements for blocking their depositions. (Relevant to credibility of the witnesses
and the defense of unclean hands.)
• Actual fees for title searches performed by New House Title, LLC, in which WOLFE
has an interest. (No receipts or other evidence has been produced of actual fees
charged.)
• Policies and procedures of FDLG regarding the practice of certifying pleadings and
motions as having been served by U.S. Mail days before they are actually delivered to
the U.S. Postal Service.
• The identity of the process server normally used by FDLG and the actual fees paid for
service of process.
III. WOLFE Refused to Answer Relevant, Non-Privileged Questions at His Deposition.
Upon his agreement to appear for deposition without subpoena, Defendants noticed the
deposition of WOLFE. The notice specified that he was being asked to appear as “Attorney in
Fact for Wells Fargo and Individual Capacity.” 17 WOLFE brought his own attorney to the
deposition, Suzanne Barto Hill from Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.
On instructions from Ms. Hill, WOLFE refused to answer a number of questions relevant
to the issues listed above, foreclosing entire lines of questioning in these areas. Not one of these
objections was based on a privilege. The following table lists the nineteen questions that
WOLFE refused to answer based on instructions from counsel. In one instance, (marked with an
arrow below), WOLFE even refused to answer whether he had any personal knowledge of a fact
in issue:
17
Notice of Deposition dated June 9, 2010.
7
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
QUESTION OBJECTION
Q. Do -- to your knowledge, did the retainer Not within the scope of his testimony…not
agreements between Florida Default Law noticed as a representative of FDLG. (p. 77);
Group and their attorneys [differ] from one relevance and lack of foundation. (p. 78).
client to another? (p. 77) Instruction not to answer. (p. 79)
Q. Are you aware whether affidavits signed Object to the form. Beyond the scope of the
by Lisa and Erin Cullaro have been withdrawn deposition because witness was not noticed as
in any cases? (p. 83) a corporate representative. (p. 84) Instruction
not to answer. (p. 84)
Q. … Did you ever discuss having their Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 84)
depositions taken with either Lisa or Erin
Cullaro? (p. 84)
Q. … Did you ever instruct Lisa Cullaro or Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 85)
Erin Cullaro that Florida Default Law Group
would aggressively defend having their
depositions taken in this case or any other
cases? (p. 85)
Q. Do you have personal knowledge as to “That’s a question that needs to be directed to
how Lisa Cullaro would be paid as an expert an appropriate representative of Florida
for executing these affidavits? (pp. 96-97) Default Law Group pursuant to an appropriate
notice.” (p. 97)
Q. … In regards to Erin Cullaro, do you have Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 97)
any personal knowledge as to how -- or
whether she was paid to notarize the Affidavits
of Reasonable Attorney's Fees? (p. 97)
Q. Okay. And what are your firm policies That is a question that should be directed to an
regarding affidavits filed or regarding appropriately-noticed corporate representative
attachment of documents to affidavits of -- deposition. Instruct the witness not to answer.
filed in support of summary judgment? (p. 98) (p. 98)
Q. Do you have personal knowledge [Witness] A. Again, do I have knowledge on

regarding the firm's policy on those types of that? Sure. … Am I prepared to discuss that
records being attached? (p. 99) with you today, absolutely not. And based on
the advice that I've been provided by my
lawyer, which has been stated on the record
several times, I'm not going to answer. (p. 99)
8
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
QUESTION OBJECTION
[When asked to compare signatures on Lisa Same objection. Same instruction. Witness
Cullaro’s notary application with her signature not an expert on signatures. (pp. 104-05)
on the affidavit]
Q. … Would you agree that the signatures
look different from the affidavit to the notary
application? [objection]
Q. Simply to a layman – [objection]
Q. -- would you agree that they look

different? (pp. 104-05)
Q. Okay. And moving to Erin Cullaro's Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 105)
application, would you agree that those
signatures look different? (p. 105)
Q. … Are you aware of any policies or Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 105)
procedures regarding how the mail is handled
at Florida Default Law Group? (p. 105) MR. IMMEL [defense counsel]: … are you
instructing the witness not to answer based on
any sort of privilege or --
MS. HILL: It's the same objection that I have
asserted over and over again.
MR. IMMEL: Based on relevancy and scope
then essentially?
MS. HILL: And I think constitutes
harassment. (p. 106)
Q. … who in 2008 were you using as service Same objection. Same instruction. (pp. 106,
of process? (p. 106) 107)
Q. Were you using Provest as a servicing

company -- or process server in 2008? (p. 107)
Q. Are you personally aware in your

experience as either an associate, managing
attorney or partner of how Florida Default --
what type of what service company Florida
Default utilized? (p. 107)
Q. Well, so you don't have any personal Mischaracterizes the testimony. Assumes facts
knowledge as to who was being used by not in evidence. Same objection based on
Florida Default Law Group for service of prior objection. Same instruction. (p. 112)
process in 2008? (p. 112)
9
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
QUESTION OBJECTION
Q. … are you more familiar of any recent Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 114)
changes as to requirements in filing motions --
or Affidavits as to Amounts Due and Owing,
what is to be attached to them during May of
2010? (p. 114)
Q. When the affiant says that they've Same objection. Same instruction. (p. 116)
examined all books, records and documents,
does Florida Default Law Group have a policy
of requiring the affiant to attach or produce the
books, records and documents that they
examined? (pp. 115-116)
Q. Okay. Recently, the Attorney General's This is not a deposition that is being conducted
Office has opened an investigation of some of with respect to any investigation conducted by
the practices regarding the firm. Have you any agency. You are not a representative of
individually been – as one of the managing any agency conducting any sort of an
partner -- as the managing partner been one of investigation. This question goes far beyond
the people dealing with the Attorney General's the scope of this case in which this deposition
office in response or is that another attorney was noticed. Clearly gone into an area that
with the firm? (p. 116) constitutes pure harassment. Instruct witness
not to answer. (p. 116)
Q. Okay. Since the investigation, have any Same totality of objections. Same instructions.
policies, procedures been looked at or (p. 117)
changed in any manner by Florida Default Law
Group? (p. 117)
IV. Black Letter Law Forbids the Instruction Not to Answer a Deposition Question,
Except on the Basis of Privilege.
Rule 1.310(c) Fla. R. Civ. P. mandates that a witness must testify in response to questions
that do not seek information that is privileged or already prohibited by a court order:
A party may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a
privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a
motion under subdivision (d). Otherwise, evidence objected to shall be taken
subject to the objections.
Here, no privilege would apply to any of the questions and, not surprisingly, not a single
objection to the above questions was based on a claim of privilege. Neither WOLFE nor
10
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
CITIBANK sought a protective order to limit WOLFE’s testimony prior to the deposition—nor
would any such limitation have been available since the areas of inquiry were all relevant to the
subject matter of this action. Rule 1.280(b)(1) Fla. R. Civ. P.
The Fourth District has vehemently condemned the practice of instructing witnesses not
to answer deposition questions, a tactic it considers to be a breach of the standards of
professionalism:
[The witness] indeed should have answered, and the arrogance of the defense
attorney in instructing the witness not to answer is without legal justification.
Nowhere in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is there a provision that states
that an attorney may instruct a witness not to answer a question
Smith v. Gardy, 569 So.2d 504, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The court went on to denounce this
tactic as “selective adherence to the rules of civil procedure by the trial bar,” that sadly, “shows
that the level of professionalism is not where it should be.” Id. As a veteran attorney from a
well-respected firm, WOLFE’s counsel surely knew that the instructions violated the Rules of
Civil Procedure. But like the attorney in Smith v. Gardy, WOLFE’s counsel took “a calculated
risk…that the rules could be violated with impunity.” Id. See also State v. Pelliccio, 388 So.2d
19, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (“…witness on deposition may not pick and choose with immunity
what questions he wishes to answer, absent any recognized privilege.”). WOLFE’s refusal to
answer based on his attorney’s instruction is even more egregious since he is also a member of
the Florida Bar and the supervisor of an army of civil litigation attorneys; it may be presumed
that he has a passing familiarity with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
WOLFE’s primary objection throughout the deposition—that the questions were beyond
the scope of the notice for deposition—is without merit. Specifically, WOLFE claimed that the
deposition notice somehow limited the questions that could be posed to the witness. For
example, according to WOLFE, even though he may have personal knowledge related to a
11
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
undocumented fee on an affidavit of an FDLG attorney, he could refuse to testify on the subject
because he had not been noticed as a corporate representative of FDLG. Indeed, according to
WOLFE, he may refuse to reveal whether he even has personal knowledge on a subject.
WOLFE would have this Court believe that, to answer these questions, Defendants would
have to separately notice him as a corporate representative of various non-parties, such as FDLG
and New House, LLC. There is no rule or case law, however, to support the notion that a
witness noticed individually for deposition may evade questions within his personal knowledge
solely based on the deposition notice.
Even if he had been noticed as a corporate representative, Defendants would not be
limited by the topics listed in the deposition notice. See King v. Pratt & Whitney, a Div. of
United Technologies Corp., 161 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995) aff'd sub nom. King v. Pratt &
Whitney, 213 F.3d 646 (11th Cir. 2000) and aff'd sub nom. King v. Pratt & Whitney, 213 F.3d
647 (11th Cir. 2000) (“If the examining party asks questions outside the scope of the matters
described in the [30(b)(6)] notice, the general deposition rules govern … so that relevant
questions may be asked and no special protection is conferred on a deponent by virtue of the fact
that the deposition was noticed under 30(b)(6).”); New World Network Ltd. v. M/V NORWEGIAN
SEA, 05-22916 CIV, 2007 WL 1068124 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“This procedure of course does not
mean that a party can simply instruct a witness not to answer questions that the party's lawyer
unilaterally deems irrelevant. The Court's Local Rules squarely preclude this tactic that was
mastered by deposition bullies masquerading as members of the bar.”) 18
18
Florida courts look to the federal rules and decisions for guidance in interpreting Florida's civil
procedure rules. Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos, 602 So.2d 1282, 1283-84 (Fla. 1992).
12
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
Accordingly, Rule 1.310(b)(6) (designation of corporate representative) is one of
specification, not limitation. More importantly, the Defendants are deposing WOLFE as an
individual, not as a corporate representative—by definition, there is no designation of topics.
The only limitation on the scope of a deposition of an individual in this personal capacity is
relevance to the subject matter of the case. See Murray Van & Storage, Inc. v. Murray, 343
So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (“The scope of [deposition] examination covers all matters not
privileged which are relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. The examination is not
limited to what is relevant to the issues, nor is it limited to what would be admissible as evidence
at the trial.”). And even a perceived lack of relevance cannot justify an instruction not to answer.
V. Defendants request that the Court instruct WOLFE’s counsel to refrain from
“speaking” objections.
The courts have described what occurred here (an attorney instructing a witness not to
answer relevant, non-privileged deposition questions) as arrogant, unprofessional, and the tactic
of “deposition bullies.” But the deposition transcript is also replete with examples of yet another
abuse—the speaking objection. Here, WOLFE’s counsel repeatedly argues her objections on the
record for pages at a time. 19 Indeed, as a result of these lengthy monologues, she speaks fifty
percent more words than her own client at the deposition. She also repeatedly threatens to “get
the judge on the phone,” 20 even though such a procedure is not enumerated among those
provided by Rule.
Rule 1.310(c) Fla. R. Civ. P. also provides that “[a]ny objection during a deposition shall
be stated concisely and in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.” When this language
19
See e.g., Wolfe depo., pp. 22-24, 53, 62, 66, 78-79, 81, 87-89, 101-103, 109-111.
20
See e.g., Wolfe depo., pp. 23, 33, 34, 79, 108.
13
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
was adopted into the federal version of the rule, the Advisory Committee explicitly stated that
the purpose was to address what it considered to be obstructive tactics:
Depositions frequently have been unduly prolonged, if not unfairly frustrated, by

lengthy objections and colloquy, often suggesting how the deponent should
respond.
Accordingly, Defendants request that, if the deposition is reconvened upon order of this
Court, that WOLFE’s counsel be instructed to refrain from making speaking objections.
VI. Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
Rule 1.380(a)(4) Fla. R. Civ. P. provides that, when a motion to compel is granted, the
court shall require the deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion (or counsel advising the
conduct) to pay the moving party the reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred in
obtaining the order. Costs for bringing this motion would include the court reporter fees for
preparing the transcript of WOLFE’s aborted deposition.
Defendants submit that, in the spirit of this rule, they also be reimbursed for the costs and
fees for having to travel back to Tampa to obtain the answers to questions that the witness
wrongfully refused to answer.
WHEREFORE, Defendants ask the Court to grant its motion to compel WOLFE to
answer the questions posed and any questions related to those areas of inquiry and to instruct
WOLFE’s counsel from making speaking objections. Defendants also request reimbursement for
costs and fees and associated with bringing this motions and travelling to Tampa to continue the
deposition.
14
ICE LEGAL, P.A.
CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 1.380(d) FLA.R.CIV.P.
The movant, in good faith, has conferred, or attempted to confer, with the party failing to
answer or respond in an effort to obtain such answer or response without court action.
Dated: September 13, 2010.
ICE LEGAL, P.A.

Counsel for Defendants
1015 N. State Rd. 7, Suite D
Royal Palm Beach, FL 33411
Telephone: (561) 729-0530
Facsimile: (866) 507-9888
By:
THOMAS E. ICE
Florida Bar No. 0521655
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by mail
this September 13, 2010 to all parties on the attached service list.
ICE LEGAL, P.A.

Counsel for Defendants
1015 N. State Rd. 7, Suite D
Royal Palm Beach, FL 33411
Telephone: (561) 729-0530
Facsimile: (866) 507-9888
By:
THOMAS E. ICE
Florida Bar No. 0521655
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ICE LEGAL, P.A.
SERVICE LIST
Joseph Mancilla, Esq. Suzanne Barto Hill, Esq.

FLORIDA DEFAULT LAW GROUP, P.L. RUMBERGER, KIRK & CALDWELL, P.A.
9119 Corporate Lake Dr., Suite 300 100 North Tampa, Suite 2000
Tampa, FL 33634 Tampa, FL 33601
(305) 662-4110 Counsel for Wolfe
Plaintiff’s counsel
Florencia Engle
2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312
Counsel for Bank of America
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Exhibit A
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Exhibit B
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Exhibit C
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Exhibit D
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Exhibit E
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Exhibit F
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Motion To Compel Answers To Deposition Questions of Ron Wolfe FDLG

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Motion To Compel Answers To Deposition Questions of Ron Wolfe FDLG

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CITIBANK, NA AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE GENERAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiff, CASE NO.

Defendants, JOSEPH J. BARBARO and MAUREEN RUSSELL, move the Court,

(“WOLFE”), a non-party witness, to answer deposition questions which he refused to answer

ICE LEGAL, P.A.

motion, Defendants state as follows:

This is a foreclosure action in which Plaintiff, CITIBANK, NA AS INDENTURE

Defendants, JOSEPH J. BARBARO and MAUREEN RUSSELL, in satisfaction of a debt.

A. The assignment of mortgage was executed by Plaintiff counsel’s managing

mortgage to his firm’s own client. 3

B. WOLFE also strategized with “independent” witnesses as to how to respond

CITIBANK also filed an affidavit of an alleged expert on the reasonableness of the

General, in connection with her notarization of such affidavits. 4

grounds that the affidavit had been withdrawn. 6

FDLG which would “aggressively defend” against the depositions:

ultimately addresses management issues. 12

D. WOLFE’s job responsibility includes ensuring that FDLG policies and

Document Certified By An Actual Mail Date Time Lag

fabricating and/or presenting false and misleading documents in foreclosure cases.” 16

II. WOLFE’s Testimony is Highly Relevant to this Case.

As shown above, WOLFE’s testimony is directly relevant to a number of issues in the

• His authority to execute an assignment of mortgage on behalf of WELLS FARGO;

• The underlying facts represented in the assignment he executed—i.e. whether a

III. WOLFE Refused to Answer Relevant, Non-Privileged Questions at His Deposition.

Q. Do you have personal knowledge [Witness] A. Again, do I have knowledge on

Q. Simply to a layman – [objection]

Q. -- would you agree that they look

Q. Were you using Provest as a servicing

Q. Are you personally aware in your

subject matter of this action. Rule 1.280(b)(1) Fla. R. Civ. P.

to answer deposition questions, a tactic it considers to be a breach of the standards of

that he has a passing familiarity with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

solely based on the deposition notice.

Even if he had been noticed as a corporate representative, Defendants would not be

mastered by deposition bullies masquerading as members of the bar.”) 18

Accordingly, Rule 1.310(b)(6) (designation of corporate representative) is one of

individual, not as a corporate representative—by definition, there is no designation of topics.

the purpose was to address what it considered to be obstructive tactics:

Depositions frequently have been unduly prolonged, if not unfairly frustrated, by

VI. Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

preparing the transcript of WOLFE’s aborted deposition.

wrongfully refused to answer.

CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 1.380(d) FLA.R.CIV.P.

Dated: September 13, 2010.

ICE LEGAL, P.A.

ICE LEGAL, P.A.

Joseph Mancilla, Esq. Suzanne Barto Hill, Esq.

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