48 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy

relationships resulting from the introduction of performance

records had given rise to an organizational need, and a further
IV I COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY
, change in social relationships met this need. In the process,
,,: several operating practices had been changed. None of these
"The statistics, which show how many interviews and how
developments constituted a return to an earlier state of equi­
many placements each person in the section did, are passed around
librium. and neither did the transformations within groups that
to all interviewers. Of course, you look at them and see how you
are the topic of the next chapter.
compare with others. This creates a competitive spirit," explained
an interviewer in Department X. The form that this competition
took was determined by the specific work situation. It differed in
the federal and in the state agency, and variations existed even be­
tween the sections of Department X.
In the federal agency, as we shall learn in Part II, each offi­
cial was assigned specific cases; his work on them was independent
of anything his co-workers did. Extensive performance records
provided the major basis for ratings, and superiors made invidious
comparisons freely, criticizing the record of one agent by contrast­
ing it with those of others. As a result. federal agents competed
with one another, in the manner in which trackmen compete, each
trying to outdistance the others. This type of competition differs
basically from that between salesmen trying to sell the same product
in the same territory. The success of anyone salesman may inter­
fere with the chances for success of the others, since all depend
for their sales on the same market. Competing in this situation in­
volves reaching a potential customer and selling him the product
before anybody else does. The competition between interviewers in
the state agency assumed this form. since the ability of each to
find jobs for his clients depended on the common, sectional pool of
available job openings. Inherent in this competition was a tendency
to monopolize job openings. just as competition for sales leads to
attempts to monopolize customers. Such a tendency could not have
arisen in the competition between federal officials. since their
performance was not dependent on common and limited resources.
In contrast to those in the federal agency. superiors in the state
agency emphasized that statistical records were not used to "com­
pare interviewers with each other, but only with standards." How­
ever, fluctuations in the conditions of the labor market made it
impossible to establish absolute standards of performance. As one

49
50 / The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
superior explained, "In each month, we look at the production, and
the average becomes the standard." Consequently, interviewers
were indirectly compared, and direct comparisons were, in fact,
also made. The fiction that records were not used for comparative
purposes was designed to discourage competitive efforts to monopo­
lize job openings by hiding them from others, since this type of
competition, as distinguished from that which prevailed in the feder­
al agency, interfered with operations. An examination of the extent
of such competition and its effects is the subject of this chapter.
Competitive Monopolization of Job Openings
There were seven interviewers in Section A and five in Section
B. 1 Within each section, every interviewer had the same duties.
The operating procedures of the two sections were similar, but
not identical. Requests for workers were received over the tele­
phone throughout the day. Employers previously served by a cer­
tain interviewer sometimes asked for him by name. In all other
cases telephone operators distributed requests for workers in a
given occupation among all interviewers in the appropriate section.
The order forms on which job openings were described were
arbitrarily (alphabetically) classified and deposited in five boxes
in Section A and in two boxes in Section B. The file boxes of Sec­
tion A were located on the desks of five interviewers, who were
responsible for keeping them in order. An interviewer in this
section found some orders more conveniently accessible than others,
but he had the right to use, and did use, the orders in any of the
boxes in his section. The two boxes in Section B were moved from
desk to desk as needed.
The cards of clients waiting to be interviewed in each section
were arranged in order of their arrival. Whenever a member of a
section completed an interview, he called the next client in line
to his desk. After ascertaining the applicant's qualifications, he
searched the files for a suitable job. The scarcity bf job openings
was the major obstacle to making many placements.
Evaluation on the basis of statistical criteria of performance
induced interviewers to compete with one another for outstanding
placement records. This competition took the form of trying to uti-
Competition and Productivity / 51
lize job openings before anybody else could. An interviewer could
maximize his placements by sending a marginally qualified client
to a job, lest the opening beused by another interviewer before he
could find a fully qualified client, or by keeping job orders on his
desk, thus preventing others from discovering them in the file. These
and less legitimate devices were used, because performance rec­
ords made interviewers so anxious to make many placements that
they were willing to employ illicit means to do so. One interviewer
gave the following account of illegitimate competitive practices: 2
When you take an order, instead of putting it in the box,
you leave it on your desk. There was so much hiding of orders
under the blotter that we used to ask, "Do you have anything
under your rug?" when we looked for an order. You might
leave an order you took on the desk, or you might leave it
on the desk after you made no referral. . . . Or you might
take an order only partially; you write the firm's name, and
a few things; the others you remember. And you leave it on
the pad lof order blanksl. You keep on doing this, and all
these orders are not in ffle box. You can do some wrong filling­
out. For instance, for a rather low-salary job, you fill out
"experience required." Nobody can make a placement on that
except you, because you know that experience isn't required.
Or, if there are several o~enings [on one orderl, you put
the order into "referrals ([file category for filted job openings]
after you made one placement. You're supposed to put it into
"referrals," but stand it up, so that the others can see it. If
you don't, you have a better chance of making the next place­
ment than somebody else. And time and again you see four,
five openings on one order filled by the same person. [Exami­
nation of files revealed one case where eight out of nine open­
ings on one order had been filled by the same interviewer.]
The tendency to monopolize job openings forced interviewers
to watch one another's movements, not only if they wanted to hide
orders, but also in order to prevent others from doing so. Incidents
like the follOwing were frequent: Mrs. Adams had an order in her
hand, while another one was lying on her desk. Miss Akers, who
had gone through the file box, looked at the order on the desk over
Mrs. Adams' shoulder. When Mrs. Adams started to explain defen­
sively, "I'm just trying-," Miss Akers interrupted her, "I'm just
looking at it."
A former member of Section A described the atmosphere there
in these words:
They are so competitive, an order never stays in the box.
Most of the time, they leave the order on their desk. and fill it
52 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy

right away. Or what happens is that you write an order, and Competition and Productivity / 53

before youlve finished writing it. somebody else will tear

it out of your hand. That's terrible. I don't like to work that
TABLE 2

way. I want to have confidence in the others, and don't want

to feel they watch me all the time. If I feel that I have to
watch every move of the others, 'I feel I'm licked from the COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY
start. IN SECTIONS A AND B

This type of tension and strain in interpersonal relations re­

Ratio of

sulted specifically from competing for job openings as a means

Openings
a ~eferrals/ReferralSlcompeti b Froduc ~o. of
of improving one l s record. It did not occur in other departments. Received ade by _to Open- tiveness tivityC lace­
(1) ecipient ings ments
where interviewers also competed for making the best record, but
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
not for job openings, since each handled a different occupational
Adams 34

category, and there were no common pools of job orders. Ahman 19

0.56
62
27
3.9 0.70 100

Of course, not all interviewers were equally competitive. To Ajax .44

3.1
40
28 .49
70

Akers 71
.70
4.9 .97

determine the differences between them, an index was devised. 32 .45

139

Ambros 69
3.2 .71 101

18 .26

The major opportunity for competitive monopolization of job orders Atzenbergi 106
1.8 .45
65

43 .41

presented itself when they were received over the telephone. The
Auble 10
2.9 .61
87

3 .30 2.1 .39 56 d

extent to which an interviewer used the orders he had received from Babcock
16
7
.44

Beers 58
2.2 .53
46

employers for his own clients in excess of chance expectations. 19 .33

Bing 51
1.6 .71
62

15 .29

which shows that he did not make them available to his colleagues, Borden 17
7 1.5 .75
65

Bush .41
2.1
provides an index of competitiveness. Obviously. this index does 43
19
.42

.55 48 d
2.1 .97
84

not reflect all forms of competition in Department X. but it does Section A 392
170
.43

Section B 185
3.0 .59 590

measure the most prevalent one and has the further crucial ad­ 67 0.36 1.8 0.67 289

vantage that it is not affected by the concealment of illicit prac­ .J I

tices, since it is based on the records of official transactions.

a. The great differences between interviewers in this column

This index of competitiveness was based on the analysis of all show that some were much more successful than others in inducing

job openings filled during the first half of April. The first two employers, or telephone operators, to channel requests for workers

to them personally. This was a form of competing for an outstand­

columns in Table 2 show the number of these job openings each ing record
note 6.) which did not involve competitive interaCtion. (See foot­
interviewer had received over the telephone, and the number of
referrals he had made to the openings he himself had received (not b. Competitiveness index (col. 4): The proportion of job openings

all the referrals he had made). The proportion of openings used by received to which the recipient made a referral (col. 3), times the

number of members of the section. (This represents the observed di­

the recipient for referring his own clients is indicated in column vided by the expected frequency of referrals made by the recipient of

a job opening.) Base period: First half of April, 1949.

3. One-seventh of the job openings in Section A with seven members
and one-fifth of those in Section B with five would have been filled c. Productivity index (col. 5): The number of placements made
by the recipient if no tendency to usurp orders had existed. The inci­ (col. 6), divided by the number of job openings available, that is,

the number
April, 1949. of openings in the section per interviewer. Base period:

dence of much larger proportions reveals monopolistic practices. To

standardize the index, these values were multiplied by the number of
members in each section, that is by 7 and 5, respectively (col. 4).
d. The number of placements made was adjusted for the two
interviewers who had been absent for more than five days during
April. Since the sectional numbers of placements were not revised,
the values in col. 6 add up to more than the two totals shown.

54 / The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
Competitiveness is indicated by the extent to which this index ex­
ceeds 1.0.
The members of Section A were more competitive than those
of Section B. Column 4 also reveals that the variation between
individuals in the first group was greater. Since placement pro­
cedures in the two sections differed only in respect to the arrange­
ment of file boxes, this factor may have been responsible for these
differences.
The permanent location of the boxes with job orders on the
desks of most interviewers in Section A indeed provided occasions
for hoarding orders which did not exist in Section B, where boxes
were constantly moved around. On the average, an interviewer in
Section A used nearly twice as many job openings from his "own"
box than each of his co-workers did. However, the orders in his
box were not necessarily the ones he had received over the tele­
phone. The monopolization of job orders in the interviewer I s box,
most of which had been received by other interviewers. is not
reflected in the competitiveness index, which takes into account
only monopolization by the recipient. The different arrangement
of boxes did not affect the measure of competitiveness used. and
therefore cannot explain the observed difference between the two
3 logical rather than psychological terms, as Durkheim has long
sections.
As a matter of fact. an interviewer in Section B who had former­
ly worked in Section A thought that the stationary boxes in his old
section made monopolization of job 9rders by the recipient techni­
cally more difficult:
1 think that it would be even easier to hide an order here.
The boxes move around so much. you can have an order on
your desk because you didn't get around to putting it in the
l
box. But there, when an order belongs to another box. it s
much more difficult to explain why you didnlt carry it l there
immediately. Why does it happen more there. since it s easier
here? I'd say that different personalities are the main factor.
Most officials attributed the great competitiveness of Section
A to the personality characteristics of some of its members. their
ambition, eagerness to please superiors. or competitive spirit.
"There is usually one individual who starts it. who becomes a pace
setter. Once it has started. it is too late." The others. so interview­
ers claimed. have to follow suit. However. the account the most
Competition and Productivity I 55
competitive member of Section A gave of her first reactions to
statistical records indicates that these explanations are inadequate:
When they introduced statistics. I realized how fast I
worked. I even wanted to drop lower. I didn't mind working
fast as long as it didn't show. but when it showed up like
that on the record, I wanted to work less. But you know what
happened? Some of the others started to compete with each
other. and produced more than I did. Then I thought to m1self.
"Since I can do it. itls silly to let them get ahead of me.' 11m
only human. So. I worked as fast as before.
When statistical records made the superior performance of
this interviewer public knowledge, she decided to work less. quite
possibly in response to pressures the others had brought to bear
upon her. At the same time, the other members of Section A. while
complaining about the unfair production standards she set. improved
their own performance. Consequently, this interviewer. just like the
others. felt constrained by colleagues to work fast and compete for
an outstanding performance record. One or two individuals in Sec­
tion B. on the other hand. were also accused of having competitive
tendencies, but their colleagues successfully discouraged the ex­
pression of such tendencies in monopolistic practices. It is in
this sense that the competition of one group and the co-operation
of the other were social factors. calling for expianation in socio­
.
smce emp h aSlze
. d •4
Structural Differences between Sections
Competitive monopolization of jobs had the purpose -of maxi­
mizing placements. How well did it accomplish this purpose? The
last column in Table 2 shows how many placements each interview­
er had made during April; this is divided by a constant for each
section. controlling for the different number of job openings avail­
able. to provide a comparable index of productivity. Comparison
between columns 4 and 5 shows that competitiveness was related
to productivity in Section A, but not in Section B. The Pearsonian
correlation coefficient between these two factors is +.92 for
Section A, but -.20 for Section B. 5 The more competitive inter­
viewer in Section A made more placements; the more competitive
interviewer in Section B did not.
56 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
This startling difference helps to explain why the members of
Section A were more competitive. Since monopolizing jobs was an
effective way to improve one's placement record only in this group.
its members had more incentive than those of Section B to engage
in such competitive practices. 6 Of course. this does not yet answer
the question why the two factors were related in one section and
not in the other.
Co-operative norms had developed in Section B which discouraged
competitive practices by making them ineffective. as many comments
illustrate:
The advantage of [Section B over Section A] is that we
never cover up orders. We always work together. That proves
one point-the only people who can make the job hard for you
are those who work with you. I can tell right away when somebody
tries to cover up. . . . If the supervisor doesn't catch it. I do.
And I won't go to the supervisor to tell on the guy. but talk to him
directly.
They might use co-operation. telling each other about all
the jobs they have and so forth. to counteract the use of statisticS.
I mean. through co-operation you might equalize the placements
various interviewers make. and counteract the statistics. which
tend to make people egocentric. making everyone work for him­
self. trying to make as many placements as he can by himself.
We did many things~ We co-operated in making notations
of applicants who were deadheads. who would not take jobs when
sent out. Second. we checked each other's placements. so that
statistics were nearly evenly divided. Also. if one got a job.
everyone else knew about it. If I saw an applicant at another desk,
and had an order for which he might qualify, I would bring the
order over the;re. Every applicant became your applicant.
Although these co-operative practices did not equalize productivity,
they did make competitive monopolization of jobs ineffective as an
instrument for improving it. When a new interviewer manifested com­
petitive tendencies, he was penalized by being excluded from the net­
work of reciprocal information. For example. he was not told about the
job orders received by others. Any advantage of hoarding jobs was at
least neutralized by the lack of co-operation it provoked. Competitive
practices in this situation made an interviewer unpopular and failed to
improve his productivity and therefore were infrequent.
Different historical experiences that had influenced the development
of these two group structures were responsible for the emergence of
co-operative norms in one. but not in the other. Three contrasting con­
ditions could be discovered. First, the rating practices of the two super-
Competition and Productivity / 57
visors had differed. second, only one group had had an opportunity
to develop a professional code of employment interviewing. Third,
great differences in job security had existed between the two sec­
tions when statistical records had been introduced.
Supervisor Astor relied heavily on performance records in
evaluating the interviewers in Section A: "And here. in the pro­
duction figures. is the answer to the question: How good are you?
Here you see exactly how good the work you did was." Interviewers
often mentioned the pressure this created: "[Especially] around
rating time. you get this competition. You don't care whether the
best per.son gets the job. but you try to make the placement your­
self. Of course. there are some who are strong. who don't do it. I
admire them. But it's difficult to be that strong."
Supervisor Bohman. who had been transferred to this depart­
ment less than a year before these observations were made, sur­
prised his subordinates when he rated them for the first time:
When the rating period came around, and we saw that
[Supervisor BOhman] doesn't use statistics too much, and
lD spite of statistics gave pretty good ratings-judging the
entire person and giving good ratings-we became less anxious
about the statistics. Another experience like that, and we
might forget all about placement credit.
(Did the other section have a different experience?) Yes;
there they were told that placement is important. Before,
the two units were pretty much alike. Maybe, this one was
a little less competitive, but not much.
Since their ratings were not primarily based on performance
records, members of Section B were less anxious about productivity,
and this encouraged the development and persistence of co-operative
norms.
Utlimately. therefore. the extent to which production records
served as the basis for ratings were a crucial factor in determining
whether the members of a section worked competitively or co-oper­
atively. but it was not the only factor. The methods of supervision and
evaluation employed 7 were not independent of the social situation
in which .the supervisor operated. To be sure. Mr. Bohman's person­
alityand past experience were partly responsible for his more lenient
and less productivity-oriented rating practice. But it was also influ­
enced by his position as a new supervisor of this groupS and by the
professional code that prevailed among its members.

58 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
The least competitive interviewers in any of the sections in
Department X were persons identified with reference groups that
supplied them with professional standards of correct interviewing.
such as a former social worker and a prospective clinical psychol­
ogist. Their orientation induced these officials to strive in their
operations for other goals besides maximum productivity. Since
competitive practices did not aid in the attainment of these goals,
interviewers with such professional standards had little incentive
for engaging in them.
A similar orientation had emerged in the formative period of
Section B. Three of its present members had joined the section
upon being discharged from the Army after the last war, when
large numbers of returning veterans needed occupational advice.
Counseling and intensive interviewing had therefore been stressed
at the time when they, together, received their training under a
supervisor who was especially interested in these phases of oper­
ations. One of them described this period in the following words:
When I first came here, in May, 1946, we had a very nice
bunch. It was like an all-day consultation; we discussed place­
ments with each other all day long. At that time, the veterans
came back, and there was a lot of emphasis on counseling.
Nobody asked "you how many placements you made, then. The
emphasis was on quality, and we consulted with each other
all day.
In this situation, the group devel.oped a professional code of
own. It was considered most important to help each client find
job that interested him and to give him all the occupational advice
he needed; quick interviews were unacceptable, since they could not
meet these objectives. This code condemned the goal"of maximizing
! productivity as interfering with proper service to clients. In effect,
\ this transformed competitive practices from the state of being
~ illegitimate means for desirable ends into illegitimate means for
! worthless ends. If such practices did occur, they were more vigorously
opposed, because the code provided moral justification for co-opera­
tive norms. Competitive practices were disapproved not merely be­
cause they made the work of other interviewers more difficult but
because they led to defective service to clients. Nevertheless, co­
operation was contingent on the absence of acute anxiety over ratings
and thus on the evaluation practice of the supervisor, as will be
Competition and Productivity / 59
shown. However, the existence of this group code would have made
it difficult for the supervisor to judge perfomance mainly on the
basis of production figures. To have done so would have stamped
him as ignorant of the most important requirments of correct em­
ployment service.
No opportunity for the development of a common professional
code had existed in Section A. Its members had not received their
induction training together, nor had they been trained at the time
when intensive interviewing of returning veterans had been empha­
sized. Since competition prevailed in this group, the individual
whose professional standards made him reluctant to compete either
became a deviant whose productivity suffered or mOdified his stand­
ards and started to compete in order to produce more.
Finally, most members of Section A had been appointed to tempo­
rary civil service positions during the last war. They were on
probation pending permanent appointments when production records
were originally introduced and even afterward remained subject
to layoffs due to reductions in staff. Their insecurity led them to
strive to impress superiors with outstanding performance. In con­
trast, all but one of the members of Section B were veterans, whose
employment could not be terminated except for cause. They could
more easily afford to co-operate with one another in disregard of
official production records, since, as one envious colleague put it,
"they felt that nothing could happen to them, because they were
veterans and had superseniority."
Differences in these three conditions-employment security,
opportunity for the development of a common professional orienta­
tion, and evaluation practice of the supervisor-gave rise to two
dissimilar social structures. Opposite criteria determined the net­
work of relationships in the two groups. While productivity was nega­
tively valued in Section B, it became a central value for the mem­
bers of Section A, as this statement by one of them illustrates:
Right now, since we have statistics, the emphasis is on
production and results. Before, people took pride in the
placements they made. They went to the supervisor and told her
what an employer had said, how satisfied he was with the
placement, and so forth. Now, they don't feel so strongly about
that any more. I know it myself. I don't feel elated any more
when employers tell me they like a worker especially, but I
feel elated when I make a placement.

60 I The Dyna mic s of Bureaucracy
In accordance with these values. outstanding productivity be­
came a sign of high status in Section A, but one of low status in
Section B. When a member of Section B explained why she con­
sidered a certain colleague the best interviewer in her section, she
actually inverted official performance standards: "Herbert has
more patience; also, he made fewer placements G.i£] , which I
thought was to his credit. The person who does the better job very
often has fewer placements. It usually works out that way." The
most productive interviewer in this section was least respected
and least popular. In Section A, on the other hand. competitive ex­
celling did not make an interviewer unpopular, as one of its mem­
bers explained: "Eve told me that in [another department] the
person who is highest on production records is very unpopular;
1I
they don't like it. That's not true here. On the contrary. the
most competitive and most productive member of Section A was
considered the best interviewer by her colleagues and was most
9 index measures, weakened social cohesion. and this in turn reduced
popular with them.
The interviewers in both sections disliked to work in a com­
petitive atmosphere. However, the different values and especially
the related differences in relative positions made it possible in
one group. but impossible in the other. effectively to curb com­
petitive practices. Occasionally. a member of Section A tried to
discourage them. One said: "If I see that an interviewer keeps
orders on her desk, I take them and put them in the box. . . . Of
course. you don't make friends that way. II Since most members of
this section, including the most popular ones, were competitive.
antagonizing them would have threatened an interviewer's own
standing in the group. This deterred interviewers from discourag­
ing competitive practices. even though they disliked them, with the
result that such practices prevailed.
Antagonizing a deviant, on the other hand, does not endanger
the status of an individual. Since a competitive striver was an un­
popular deviant in Section B, its members could use sanctions
freely to combat competitive practices. This enforced the co-opera­
tive norms of the group and made monopolization of jobs an ineffec­
tive method of operation. In this section. therefore, competitiveness
was not related to productivity, and it was considerably less preva­
lent than in Section A.
Competition and Productivity / 61
Social Cohesion and Productivity
The group much concerned with productivity was less produc­
tive than the group unconcerned with it. 10 Table 2 shows that 59
per cent of the job openings received in Section A were filled. in
contrast to 67 per cent of those in Section B. 11 Another paradox
implicit in these data is that the more competitive interviewers in
Section A made more placements, but the group whose members
were more competitive made fewer placements. Why were com­
petitiveness and productivity related directly for individuals, but
inversely for groups ?12
Anxious concern with productivity induced interviewers in
Section A to concentrate blindly upon this goal at the expense of
other considerations. In their eagerness to make many placements,
they often disregarded official rules and ignored whether their
actions injured their interpersonal relationships with colleagues.
The prevalence of such competitive behavior, which only the group
operating efficiency. 13
The extent to which the members of a work group spend their
lunch and rest periods with one another can be considered an index
of social cohesion. Officials who enjoy their contacts in the office
tend to avail themselves of these opportunities for informal get­
togethers and thereby strengthen their social ties. Conversely, if
strained relations between colleagues develop at work. officials will
not seek one another's company in their free time, and thus they
fail to cement their interpersonal relationships.
None of the interviewers in Department X joined another mem­
ber of the department for lunch. 'This is in sharp contrast to the
custom of lunching together that prevailed in the federal agency to
be discussed in Part II. Although a lunch schedule limited the choice
of partners in the state agency (and not in the federal agency). there
can be little doubt that the strained relations between competing inter­
viewers were primarily responsible for their lack of contact at noon.
Most interviewers explained that they preferred to eat alone, since
they had to talk all day in the office. A few in Section A added that
they often joined a friend from the outside for lunch, which shows
that they did not really wish to be alone, but only wanted to escape

62 / The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
from co-workers. Moreover, some interviewers reported that they
used to lunch with colleagues in the past, that is, before the intro­
duction of statistical records had engendered competitive relation­
ships.
Rest-period engagements, however, indicate that one group was
more cohesive than the other. All but one of the five members of
Section B usually spent their rest periods together,14 whereas none
of the seven interviewers of Section A did so regularly, and only
two occasionally. Moreover. the interviewers of Section B spent
more of their free time in the company of members of other de­
partments than did those of Section A. The less competitive group
was more cohesive, and its members were better integrated members
of the division.
Social cohesion enhanced operating efficiency, first, by facili­
tating co-operation and. second, by reducing status anxiety. Although
the interviewers in each section often co-operated with one another
in many ways, those in the less cohesive group did so less readily.
Greater efforts were required in Section A to elicit the co-opera­
tion of colleagues. as a comparison of the interaction patterns of
the two groups shows.
All social contacts which any member of Department X had in the
office were observed for 24 hours (the busiest hours in one week).
resulting in 2.625 recorded interactions. They were classified either
as official contacts, those directly concerned with a specific job or
client, or private ones, which included all other interactions. The
frequency of an interviewer's official contacts was related to his
producti vity in Section A (rank correlation +.98) but not in Section
B (+.08). This suggests that only the interviewers who kept, as one
of them put it, "hopping around all the time" to retrieve job open­
ings that others kept on their desks were able to make many place­
ments in the competitive section. In the cohesive group, on the other
hand, the co-operation needed in the placement process occurred
as a matter of course and not only in response to special requests.
This social effort was not required there for high productivity.
The productive interviewer in Section A hoarded jobs and also
prevented others from doing so by asking them for the job orders
they had received over the telephone. Both these practices antago­
nized his co-workers, whose co-operation he needed if he was to
Competition and Productivity / 63
perform well. The members of this section. therefore, had to en­
deavor to conciliate colleagues whom their competitive practices
had alienated. Often, an interviewer paid another a compliment
about her work or her apparel shortly after having interfered with
her operations. Joking and relaxing for a minute together also re­
stored more cordial relationships. The most competitive inter­
viewer was in the habit of taking time out "to fool around" with her
co-workers and was proud of making more placements than any­
body else "nevertheless." Actually, this compensating friendliness,
which made her popular despite her competitiveness, helped her
to be so productive.
Only those members of Section A who made special efforts to
mend their interpersonal relationships were able to make many place­
ments, but this was not necessary in the cohesive Section B. At
least, this seems to be suggested by the finding that the frequency
of private contacts was also related to productivity in Section A
(rank correlation +.84). but not in Section B (+.13). In the cohesive
section, where operating practices did not disadvantage colleagues,
interviewers did not have to devote time and energy to solicit and
encourage co-operation. since it was not extended reluctantly. Their
spontaneous co-operation improved operating efficiency in Section B.
Social cohesion also lessened the status anxiety generated by
evaluation on the basis of production records. Such anxiety is most
acute for the individual who does not feel integrated in his work group
and therefore seeks to derive social recognition through excelling
in his tasks and from approval of superiors. Friendly relations
with co-workers made the standing of the individual in the cohesive
group independent of his productivity, especially since fast work
was disapproved as a sign of superficial service. The consequent
reduction of anxiety in the cohesive group which was antiproductivity­
oriented actually raised its productivity.
Fluctuations in productivity illustrate the dysfunctions of status
anxiety. Section B had not always operated more effiCiently than
Section A. Its productivity had been lower during the two months
preceding the last rating. but had abruptly increased then, while
that of Section A had declined, as Table 3 shows.
The two groups found themselves in different situations before
and after they were rated. The members of Section A were familiar
 Competition and Productivity I 65
64 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
significance as a status symbol in the work group. Their lesser

TABLE 3
anxiety. as well as their greater co-operativeness. enabled the
members of the cohesive group to perform their tasks more effi­
PRODUCTIVITY BEFORE AND AFTER

ciently than did the members of the other group.

THE TIME OF RATING

In the absence of social cohesion, competitive striving for an

Section B outstanding record and for approval from superiors became a sub­
Section A
stitute means for relieving status anxiety in Section A. This psycho­
(619)a 0.56 (317) logical funotion of competitive behavior is illustrated by an inci­
December. 1948. . . . • . • 0.64 (472)
.70 (941) .56
January. 1949 • . • . • . • • .60 (477) dent of psychosomatic illness. A temporary supervisor once repri­
February, 1949 (rating) •• .56 (1,342)
( 1.335) .71 (448) manded Mrs. Adams for having engaged in illicit competitive
March. 1949 ••.•••..• .59 (433)
0.59 ( 1,001) 0.67
April, 1949 .••••••••• practices and ordered her to stop them. This interference with her
way of handling her anxiety disturbed Mrs. Adams to the extent
a. Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of job openings
available on which the productivity index-the proportion of these of making her phsycially ill. The supervisor told the observer:
openings that were filled-is based. "[Mrs. Adams] is going home now. Every time something comes
up that displeases her, she gets sick. She isn't pretending or trying
with Supervisor Astor's rating standards and her emphasis on pro­ to get off. She really gets sick. Now she has a very bad cold. This
ductivity. since she had rated them in previous years. Their anxious happens every time something unpleasant comes up."
concern with a good rating induced them to work especially hard Anxiety over productivitydisturbed the equanimity an official
on making many placements just prior to the time of being rated. needed for the successful performance of his duties. Even in the
The members of Section B. however. had never before been rated cohesive group, productivity was low when the unknown rating
by Supervisor Bohman. They were also concerned about their rat­ standards of a new supervisor created acute and diffuse anXiety.
ing but could not calm their anxiety by concentrating upon certain Otherwise. however. this group was more productive, because
tasks, because they did not know which factors the supervisor social cohesion reduced anxiety by making the individual's standing
15
would stress in judging their performance. This diffuse anxiety in the group independent of his productivity. Competitive striving for
was especially detrimental to efficient performance. Since Mr. outstanding productivity was an alternative way of relieving this
Bohman did not base his ratings primarily on statistical records. anxiety. but one that simultaneously undermined the group's co­
anxiety over productivity largely subsided in Section B after Feb­ hesiveness. The hypothesis that the cohesion of the group and the
ruary, and productivity increased. The ratings of the members of competitive behavior of the individual in the noncohesive group had
Section A. on the other hand, were again strongly influenced by the same effect of lessening status anxiety explains the paradox
their production records. This intensified status anxiety. which that the less competitive group and the more competitive individual
was no longer channeled into exceptionally hard work by an impend­ in the competitive group were p~rticularly productive.
ing rating. with the result that the productivity of this section de­
clined below that of Section B. Conclusions
Social cohesion is no guaranty against anxiety in a bureaucratic
The statistical method of evaluating performance had serious
situation. Their civil service status is too important for officials
dysfunctions in Department X. It engendered competitive behavior
to retnain immune and maintain their cohesi ve bonds when it seems
which interfered with operating efficiency and thereby produced an
threatened. But when such immediate threats did not exist. social
organizational need for social mechanisms to combat competition.
cohesion reduced anxiety over productivity by divesting it of its
66 I The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
Competition and Productivity / 67
If this need had been met in all groups under observation. as it
outweighed dysfunctions cannot easily be decided. but such a
actually had been in Section B. its existence could not have been
decision would have little practical significance in any case. The
empirically demonstrated. Only the comparison of the productivity
dysfunctions resulting from this evaluation system did not re­
of a competitive and a relatively noncompetitive group indicated
main fixed social costs. They constituted organizational needs
that competitive interaction needed to be changed in the interest
that often. although not always. gave rise to new social patterns
of productivity. 16
which met them. This process as well as the functions of per­
The fact that competitive tendencies prevailed in one group.
formance records as control mechanism has been discussed in
but were successfully suppressed in the other. calls attention to
the last two chapters. The next chapter will deal with one of their
the historical conditions that must have differentiated the two social
unexpected contribUtions to bureaucratic operations. namely. the
structures. Three differences in past social experience had contrib­
elimination of bias from the treatment of clients.
uted to their divergent development. with the result that high
productivity was valued and became associated with an individual's
standing in Section A. whereas concern with productivity as such
was disrepected in Section B. This made it easy to discourage
competitive attempts to maximize productivity in Section B. but
most difficult to do so in Section A. Consequently. co-operative
norms developed in Section B. which effectively curbed competitive
practices and strengthened social cohesion. In contrast, competi­
tive behavior persisted in Section A. and this weakened social co­
hesion.
In respect to competition, Section B was further advanced in
its development than Section A. In the latter group the need to
control competition was manifest. In the former group this need
had been met by social innovations in the form of new patterns of
co-operation and of penalizing competitive acts. However. social
conditions in Section A did not remain completely unchanged either.
Whereas the prevalence of competitive striving intensified status
anxiety in this group. the individual could escape from such anxiety
by being successful in the competitive struggle. The competitive
situation was self-reinforcing. since it furnished strong incentives
for becoming increasingly more competitive. This poses an interest­
ing question. which cannot be answered here: what conditions de­
termine whether this process ultimately levels off or reaches a
climax in a revolutionary transformation of the competitive struc­
ture into a co-operative one?
The introduction of statistical records had many and diverse
consequences for operations in Department X. Whether functions