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Hearing Transcript - 11 August 2003 Afternoon

Hearing Transcript - 11 August 2003 Afternoon

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Published by Bren-R

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Published by: Bren-R on Sep 15, 2010
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981 A. Correct.2 Q. In tidying up the drafts.3 A. It came through, as I recall, very quickly and had to be4 turned round very quickly. Mark saw it, I saw it, but5 it was a very rapid revision/review of the work that we6 had, in effect, completed a month and a half earlier,7 around about 20th June.8 Q. Perhaps after lunch I can come back to what you drafted9 and what Dr Kelly drafted in May and June, and then the10 detail of what you had in September.11 A. Certainly.12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.13 (1.00 pm)14 (The short adjournment)15 (2.00 pm)16 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Lamb, I was asking you some questions17 about the dossier. Can you look at CAB/3/82 which is18 going to come up on your screen. This is the earliest19 version of the dossier we have been given. It is dated20 20th June 2002. If you look at the top, it says:21 "1 document version, 20th June 2002."22 A. Correct.23 Q. That talks about the history of UN weapons inspections24 in Iraq. Is that the document to which you referred25 earlier this morning?991 A. Correct.2 Q. And that is the document that you had had input into and3 you had reviewed with Dr Kelly?4 A. Correct, yes.5 Q. And if one goes, then, to the contents of the dossier as6 published, which is DOS/1/56, it rather looks as if that7 has become chapter 2, is that right?8 A. Or part 2, yes.9 Q. Sorry, part 2. You then did not draft anything further10 of the dossier?11 A. After the 20th June version you just put on the screen?12 Q. Yes.13 A. No, that was the end of my personal involvement, direct14 personal involvement with the dossier, correct.15 Q. We have been given another dossier dated16 5th September 2002; and that is CAB/3/7. Did you see17 this document at all? If it scrolls right down so you18 can see the top of the page, you can see someone has19 written in handwriting, I do not know who,20 "5th September 2002"; have you seen that document21 before?22 A. I honestly cannot recall whether I saw that specific23 document.24 Q. Right. So did you review any dossiers in September?
25 A. I personally simply oversaw or was made aware, excuse1001 me, of our revision, that is to say the revision made by2 my department to the historical element that referred to3 the UNSCOM inspections. That was the part that came4 back to the Counter Proliferation Department for5 revision as necessary on 9th September and which was6 dealt with by my colleague, Mr Peters.7 Q. When you were giving evidence earlier this morning you8 also said you had had some earlier involvement in9 chapter 3 of the dossier. Can we bring up DOS/1/5610 which was the current position, I think you said?11 A. Correct, yes.12 Q. That is chapter 3 of part 1. The current position, 199813 to 2002. You had some involvement in drafting that?14 A. Not in drafting it, but in some of the meetings in the15 Cabinet Office at which that particular element of the16 briefing papers were being discussed.17 Q. Right. Do you know when those meetings were? Were18 those before June 2002 or in September 2002?19 A. No, those were much earlier. So they took place in,20 I believe, February/March 2002.21 Q. Right. Did Dr Kelly attend any of those meetings?22 A. Dr Kelly attended no meetings in the Cabinet Office23 relevant to this dossier.24 Q. Right. Did you discuss what became chapter 3 with25 Dr Kelly?1011 A. Most certainly. Our relationship with Dr Kelly was2 a very easy one, a very relaxed one; and when he came3 into the department we would, as a matter of course,4 show him and tell him where we were up to. We would5 show him drafts if drafts were available and we would6 discuss them with him. This was, as I say, on an7 informal basis. He was keen to find out from us where8 we were, and we were keen obviously to put things back9 to him to use him as a sounding board and a source if10 need be of information and confirmation of any facts.11 Q. Looking at the contents page, those bits of the chapter12 that you, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would13 have discussed, if I can use that term, I hope fairly,14 with Dr Kelly would be part 2, History of UN Weapons15 Inspection and chapter 3, The Current Position; is that16 right?17 A. That would be correct. I would add, however, there is18 also part 3, Iraq Under Saddam Hussein, which became19 known, informally at least, to those of us involved in20 the Cabinet Office meetings, as the human rights element21 of the dossier. There we would have discussed that also22 with Dr Kelly. He had an extremely close knowledge of
23 Iraq and a very close knowledge of the nature of the24 regime. I am sure that we discussed that with him25 informally. I believe also that he would have discussed1021 that with the relevant department in the Foreign Office2 which took responsibility for drafting that particular3 section, which was --4 Q. Who is that department --5 A. Excuse me, which was our Middle Eastern department.6 Q. So he would have had direct discussions with them as7 well?8 A. He would have had discussions with them. We were a very9 close-knit group of people who had all worked on this10 issue for some time. He knew us all well. Indeed, the11 colleague in the Middle Eastern Department who was12 responsible and oversaw the human rights element, had13 previously been in the Counter Proliferation Department14 and therefore was very well known too.15 Q. Are you able to share his name with us?16 A. That is Dr Amanda Tanfield(?).17 Q. Right. So we have looked at Iraq Under Saddam Hussein,18 if one is looking at the contents page, part 3; History19 of UN Weapons Inspections, part 2; part 1, chapter 3,20 Current Position. Did you have anything to do with21 either chapter 1, the Role of Intelligence, or chapter22 2, Iraq's Programmes?23 A. Not as I recall, no.24 Q. Can I take you to some documents where he describes his25 role in the programme? The first document is MoD/1/19.1031 That is a letter of 30th June 2003. He describes, in2 the third paragraph:3 "As you know I have been involved in writing three4 'dossiers' concerning Iraq -- the 1999 UNSCOM/Butler5 Status of Verification Report... "6 Do you know anything about that?7 A. I know it historically as a document, sir, and that8 obviously marks a stage in the UNSCOM assessment of the9 situation in Iraq; but I would be unable to go into any10 detail as to its contents.11 Q. You did not know about his own involvement in that?12 A. Not personally, no.13 Q. Then he talks about the September 2002 International14 Institute of Strategic Studies report which was the IISS15 one. You no doubt have seen that document?16 A. I have seen that document, yes.17 Q. Then he talks about the UK Government's Iraq's weapons18 of mass destruction report.19 A. Correct.20 Q. He says:

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