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Hearing Transcripts
841 A. No, none whatsoever. 2 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say?3 A. No.4 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Air Marshall.5 Do you want me to rise now, Mr Dingemans?6 MR DINGEMANS: Yes. I am sorry, we have finished a wee bit7 early.8 LORD HUTTON: We will sit again at 2 o'clock.9 (12.45 pm)10 (The short adjournment)11 (2.00 pm)12 SIR RICHARD BILLING DEARLOVE (called)13 Examined by MR DINGEMANS14 LORD HUTTON: Good afternoon Sir Richard. I hope you can15 hear me clearly.16 A. Yes, I can my Lord.17 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name and18 occupation.19 A. Richard Billing Dearlove. I am the Chief of the Secret20 Intelligence Service popularly known as MI6.21 Q. How long have you held that position?22 A. Since 1st August 1999.23 Q. Very briefly what was your career before that?24 A. Before that I was an officer, in the service since 1966.25 Q. Can I ask you about the intelligence leading up to the851 45 minutes claim. When did you first become aware of2 this?3 A. Can I just say, you use the word "claim"; I think4 I would prefer to refer to it as a piece of well sourced5 intelligence.6 Q. Right. When did you first become aware of this well7 sourced piece of intelligence?8 A. It first came to my attention when it was reported9 towards the end of August. I think the precise date is10 29th August.11 Q. And what was the process which this intelligence12 underwent after it was reported?13 A. Well, the normal SIS procedure would be to put this into14 what we call a CX report and send it out to customers15 who would be on the distribution, normal distribution16 for this type of intelligence.17 Q. In the Foreign Affairs Committee report at FAC/3/26 we18 can see, at paragraph 62, that the Foreign and19 Commonwealth Office had told the Committee that the20 intelligence on which the claim was based came from "an21 established, reliable and long-standing line of22 reporting". Can you comment on that?23 A. Well, I can except I would not normally comment in24 public on the status of an SIS source; but a certain25 amount of this is already in the public domain.861 Q. I am only seeking comments that are already in the2 public domain.3 A. Yes, it did come from an established and reliable source4 equating a senior Iraqi military officer who was
 
5 certainly in a position to know this information.6 Q. That is at the end of August. On 3rd September we have7 heard that the Prime Minister announced his intention to8 publish a dossier in relation to intelligence. What was9 the first you knew about the proposed publication?10 A. As far as I recall, David -- well, I had known of plans11 to publish for some considerable time. In terms of this12 project as it was announced, David Manning, the13 Prime Minister's foreign affairs adviser, called me on14 the morning of 4th September to discuss this.15 Q. Sir Richard, I am not sure if you are moving to or from16 your microphone because I cannot see you. It sounds as17 if you are. Do you think you can speak a little more18 closely to your microphone?19 A. I can. I will pull it closer towards me.20 Q. Did you have any comment about the proposed publication21 of intelligence material?22 A. Yes, I certainly did. I discussed with David Manning to23 what extent it would be possible to put intelligence24 from my service into the public domain; and I said that25 I thought it would be possible to put some of this in871 the public domain, but that I would insist on grounds of2 source protection on having the last word in withholding3 material from publication, if necessary.4 Q. And was that agreed?5 A. Yes, it certainly was.6 Q. As a result of your position, are you a member of any7 Cabinet Office Committees?8 A. Yes, I am a full member of the Joint Intelligence9 Committee, as are all the heads of the agencies. That10 is the Director General of the Security Service and the11 Director of GCHQ.12 Q. Did you attend any Joint Intelligence Committee meetings13 relating to the drafting of the dossier?14 A. Yes, I certainly did. I think that the two key meetings15 I attended were on the 11th and 18th of September; and16 there was also another important JIC meeting at which17 Iraqi issues were discussed on 4th September.18 Q. Can you help me with 4th September? Was there any19 mention of the dossier and drafting of the dossier about20 which the Prime Minister had made his announcement the21 day before?22 A. I do not recall specifically whether the dossier was23 actually discussed at that meeting. I do not think it24 was a formal item.25 Q. We know that the intelligence that you have referred to881 relating to the 45 minutes source formed part of a JIC2 assessment. If we look at CAB/17/3 we can see the draft3 of 5th September and then of 9th September. Were these4 drafts considered at the JIC meeting on 4th September5 before being finalised?6 A. What happened was on 4th September it was clear that7 there was a certain amount of new material produced by8 my service which had not arrived in time to be included9 in the original draft that was put together. I think,10 as far as I recall, I recommended that the draft be
 
11 reworked to take account of this new material.12 Q. Was that on 4th September?13 A. The discussion was on 4th September. A new draft,14 I think, was then put together and circulated to JIC15 members, because there were quite a few changes, on16 5th September and the resulting assessment was issued on17 the 9th.18 Q. We can see that at CAB/17/3.19 A. Yes. Yes. And, in fact, what we are looking at there20 is a change in the drafting, which I think was21 recommended by my staff to ensure that the inclusion of22 intelligence on 45 minutes reflected more accurately the23 wording of the original CX report -- CX is the phrase we24 use to refer to the intelligence reports produced by25 SIS.891 Q. On 10th September, at CAB/33/131, Mr Scarlett produced2 a memorandum commenting on Alastair Campbell's note of3 9th September, in which he said this in paragraph 1:4 "Alastair did not refer to an additional section,5 which I have agreed with him, would be considered for6 inclusion in the 'dossier'. This would give an account7 of the JIC assessment of developments in Iraqi WMD8 programmes since UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn in9 late 1998."10 Did that reflect any discussions you had had amongst11 members of the JIC?12 A. Well, it was certainly my strong view that if there was13 to be a section which drew heavily on intelligence, that14 this should be under the control of the JIC; and I was15 aware, from the attendance of SIS staff at meetings in16 No. 10 before that was written, of what was intended.17 Q. The dossier, or the next draft of the dossier is dated18 10th/11th September 2002. We can see that at DOS/2/2.19 A. Okay.20 Q. And I think you have the material available to you. At21 DOS/2/37, we can see what was then said about the22 45 minute source:23 "Within the last month intelligence has suggested24 that the Iraqi military would be able to use their25 chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an901 order to do so."2 Did you see the dossier drafted on 10th or3 11th September?4 A. Yes, I certainly would have done, in preparation for the5 JIC meeting that took place on 11th September. I mean,6 it is normal practice for me to be closely briefed by my7 staff before attending the full JIC meeting; and, in8 fact, the process of putting together the dossier was9 covered very closely on a day-to-day basis by the team10 that I had working on it. Although it is some time ago11 and I do not have a precise recollection of every12 exchange, I was kept closely involved.13 Q. Was there any discussion of the draft dossier on14 11th September?15 A. At the JIC meeting?16 Q. Yes, sorry, at the JIC meeting.
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