17/148, The Under
tion,
what Hegel
“appearance” * because although
‘conceptual through and through. Itis nota pure theory (a statement of laws or reg
ies in the abstract) but itis completely theoretical. Th
counting as a properly completed piece of scientific research.
its experimental materials and equipment, is left behind.
Modern discussions of
nen a piece of
jon by others who
only the report to
‘Science” (as a result)
framework may reach the
rough again. But the repel
procedures (if it is really needed) will not then be a repetition of
‘ment. The repetition of procedures has become necessary because,
‘retical framework, the older description of what was done is (for some reason) no
longer adequate, In Hegel's terms, what happens is part of anew Erscheinung.
In this example of the controlled experiment as Erscheinung we can ol
another dimension of the thoughtlessness of Understanding. According
divin
‘can only observe. Its experime
0 be limited to the kind of thought experiments that Kepler
Real experiments
wolve a free self-conscious activ-
‘conceivable in the
‘Understanding is confined to the interpretation of perceptual experience through
lusion that arises from the
tion of the concept of Farce back into
ly is, is just the motion ofthe intelligible back into itself as Under-
‘What the passing show of appearance displays tothe intellect isthe eter-
yy of natural law: When the con
ir opposed rips to produce the
‘out a glorious sunrise and suns
into day and back again. Here the totality of appearance takes us i
Understanding identifies the “simple” movement
have a table of sunrise and sunset. The eycle of day and night,
1 passage of the Sun through the Zodiac, these
entrances” of Force.
indifferently both real and
ams about sunrise, moon phases, Zodiac houses.
ing appearance becomes imple distinction through its connec-
ive homogens
when Hegel says now that “the
‘ng appearance becomes simple distinction” he means that the284 “The Pilgrimage of Reason
in Sense-Certa
city of the inn
x becomes a simple continuum i
just what
in itself sim-
the Understanding. The
“universal in itself,” ie. sameness, ho
‘on the axis of a graph
world where we can speak of “pas
ut of the “present” we speak onl
and minuses in order to set up the
laws is a “still picture” of the resting equi
supersensible world.”
possible. Our system of
jum of Being in this Pythagorean
19,/180, But there is more in appearance than this realm of laws. Appearancs
comprehended
x” is a pure abstraction which
jon of natural science).
onceive the “realm of laws” at wh
.¢ have arrived as concretely
” for the Force in perception, but nota difference of “actual
in the Understanding. The Hegelian “law of nature” cannot lack a “statement of
prepare us for the
vhen the moon is not observable because it is occluded by
jal conception of the Heavens as the “utterance” of
nen the telescope revealed extinct volea-
Allofa
did not ‘The law was not
the “realm of law
‘The World of Intellectual Theory
‘noes strongly indicated that the same system of laws that operates on Earth, applies
in his universal theory of motion, the Unders
I is extremely df
concept of law—t
Newton's is deservedly one of the greatest names inthe hi
ing arrived at its objective con-
the “unconditioned univers
Hegel concentrates attention on the
[he sunspots required another law ike the cloudy night; and the dead volea-
” as observable.”
decide just what Hegel means by saying
\—"goes beyond law as such” and
of “universal attraction” becauseis Force itselfas an energetic continuum. It pertain just as much to
space as to bodies, because space is as much the utterance of Force as body is.
Hegel does not think of gravity asa force that is propagated in Newtonian abs
space, but as the force tha is expressed as both bodies and space. “Universal
tion” isthe pure continuity of energy that “posits itself in these opposite modes.
‘There cannot be any /ams—not even the law of gravity—until these opposite
modes exist
‘That is how the “pure concept of aw” is beyond law itself. The way in which iis
“turned against law” logical structure ofthe law of,
fed as masses). The law of gravity expresses their r
‘are external and indifferent to one another. In any stable gravita-
their distinctive character as repulsive is hidden.”
th of perfect reciprocity is not explicit im purely gravitational phenom-
cena, But the gravitational mass holds together because every part of i
cother part exactly as much a
balanced quantum of attraction and repulsion that attracts everything el
“distinction” in the continuum is a perfeet unity of the opposite di
the pure concept. But
ions” of
is displayed in the law (agains
action) and particu-
In the context of the universal force (in which the conceptual moments are dissoci-
“The World of Intellectual Theory 287
ated,
differences as the many ones)
‘the conceptual moments are expl
But as soon as the necessity for a multip
cept of law is “turned against” law in a new way. Ev
the concept, and its necessity is ust a contingent fact of experience. I
polar force then it must be both positive and negative. This makes it a model case
‘of the concept of Force. Any statically electrified thing will both attract and repel
rified poles. But that electricity should be polar is not a conceptual
‘not necessary that there should be
injects the statement of the law of falling bodies into his dis
force in which the inward iden-
the actual concept of
of those that do not fal
the concept and its embodied shapes, (The next paragraph examines the external-
ity of the moments in the gravitational theory of motion.)
2/183. Even
‘must be taken a primitive (or ray
‘contain distinctions.
of being. That inwardness was revealed to our intellectual gaze as the concept of
Necessity, We are beginning now to see that because ofits one-sidedly objective con-
sciousness, the Understanding is unable to establish the existence of any necessity
‘The collocation of electricity and finite gravity (simple falling) in paragraph 152
vas not accidental; for the basic weakness of the Understanding is now shown to
m of them as “forms of intuition” for the employ-
the understanding, leave space and time logically unrelated. The order of
Wf ago as a great continuum of motion, Thi
terms of a polarized concept like magnet
ied force like magnetism has to be though2B/ASA,
288 The Pilgrimage of Reason
like that. Statie charges are bu
fested separately and conti
«essence of force is manifested, is a contingent phenomen«
In ll cases, and especially in the fundamental (universal) case of motion, the
separate phenomena must be understood as one whole, if they are to be grasped as
manifestations of Force. But the putting of the phenomena together into these
finite wholes—even the interpretation of the motion of Newton's famous apple and
‘of the Moon as part of one theory—is an apparently arbitrary act of the observer,
‘That is what makes finite “explanation” into a “tautology” (as we shall now see)
‘The law is simply the shorthand record of a regularity that we have observed and
that we can treat as a “necessary connection.” But we have no
{nto why these equations hold,
ion only, so that the
If we start with the Hegelian concept of Force, the existence of the “aether”
becomes a synthetic w prior truth.
‘The actual law of gravity is still an empirical discovery. But the project of a
“unified field theory” of all forces becomes the methodological goal of Under-
standing; and we can see how the project ofa higher science of experience follows
logically asthe reintegration of the concreteness that the Understanding is obliged
to sacrifice chieve its own unity. Moreover, because of the properly
conceptual character ofthe foundation of our a priori synthesis, this higher project
is legitimated instead of appearing to be necessarily out of our reach.
order
‘The Understanding does not recognize th the “inwardness of things
Hence its explanations have only a definitional necessity. They are summary des
tions in which the explanation isa tautology.
‘This paragraph begins by summarizing the argument about the ways in which
observed laws are external to their concept. I have explained this as well as I can
already, So I have omitted it in my analysis ofthe paragraph, and I shall not com-
‘ment upon it any further,
‘The “experience that Understanding makes” of its sylogistic connection with
the inward nature of things, isan experience of the formal necessity
science is ultimately all a matter of what
what Hegel
no reason why the law of
about grav
already feigning a hypothesis unless we take the theory (1
286
y of “appearance” from
which predictions can be made deductively (and retrodictions too, of course). The
theot
In the simple judgment of Recognition
victor. (Hence the proper Gestalt of the “contradiction” is a combs
‘combatants perish.) In the divided judgment the one who heeds
advice of the victorious ghost voluntarily accepts the vanquished status; he aban.
id not flinch, and becomes a
the one who dies w
the real13/190,
358 “The Pilgrimage of Reason
“bondsman"—a living t "s disposal. Self-Consciousness
survives because the simple judgment isnot pressed toa decision; andthe simple
judgment is avoided by the doubling of slf-constiousness in opposite (and com-
plementary) roles. The two parties appear to one another to be self-standing and
‘dependent respectively; but since they form only one self-consciousnes between
them, we know already—from our study of the logic of the thing and its quali
ties—dhat they are eeally interdependent.
mastered through
‘works on them for him. The see only negates
‘them matenally independent. The master consumes what the serf works up, He never
th the independent aspect of things
‘The simple self of Desire was only the Begriff of Self-Consciousness—a project
that could not be realized, because of the imperious demands of the living body. It
was preoccupied ist and sex. The Faustian Self has now broken free
from that bondage: 3 “for itself” as the Lord; and om the other side
there is the self who has accepted dependence upon the living bod
vitude without fighting. This knowledge is implicit in his treatment
the recognition of “natural” dependence in the System of Ethical Life
He also knew, however, that the Spartans had reduced the Messenians to servi-
tude by military conquest; and that, even in the
they relented; but a few years
er they did execute the men of Melos (a Spartan
He concentrates att
(0 their vanquished foes was emblems
sedom of the Hellenic consciousness generally.
deals with a historical process that cannot
re” js ruptured. The recogni the free self
s the principle of absolute reality and value
ness in its finite singula
The Judgment of SeConsciousness 359
does not belong to the Greek world, but to the worl
the Universal Church. Thus, Lordship and Se
experience” is the hinge where the logic of the
the Universal Empire and
n of Lordship and Servitude the simple concept of Desire
tus because the lord isa self-conscious living being, whose wants,
are reliably satisfied without any effort on his part. He is immediately related to the
abjective world only in a desirable way; the world has only a pleasing or enjoyable
isharmonious with his self-wi
tothe serf, who recognizes him as “Lor
In the myth of the Ci immediate elation is speed
‘The human Lord is Adam
‘not expelled from Eden afterall, cause he eats
his bread in the sweat of another's brow?
is continued enjoyment of Eden is mediated by the self-knowledge
and the other
the Lord exhibited in the strug
he sul191
360 The
image of Reason
dependent upon, and recognizes to be essential to him) the lord is mediately
related to the serf’s consciousness.
Because the serf"s body is doth a thing, and (in its labor) a negative ageney
against things; and because under these two aspects it is the term of both
syllogisms, Hegel has to consider the serfs relation to things in this paragraph too.
iat belongs to him (in the dialectic of desire) is the one in which the
acknowledged. At the same
‘wn, because he only works on things to ful
negate things in so far as they are not according to the lord’s
acknowledge
edges the independent bein
shor, and because of his acknowledgement of dependence upon his
body, the lord (who makes no such acknowledgement of dependence in principle,
and is prepared to prove that when necessary) is able to control the sert’s labor, and
0 to set aside the natural control that his avin bodily needs would otherwise exer-
cise over him. As a result of the “first experience” Adam, the first man, becomes
‘men. One escapes the curse of abor by becoming a war
them both,
‘We have considered first the immedi
\dependent being.” The serf labors on
pleasing to his lord; and he eats things himse
position of Self-Consciousness: “Consciousness i co ise the
ness tothe
par. 166),
Both ways the lord achieves recognition a
‘what is done to him; and what he does
dependent, and the set does to himself
always done on the Lord's aut
motions: the serf labors, and he does so for the lord, he accepts authority. Both
“The Judgment of Sel
36
ways he recognizes the lord as lord. He cannot consume things or make them to
suit himself; for because he is bound to his determinate Dasein he is bound to his,
ther of the material that he works on, or of the body.
gives up his freedom, he accepts to be the living
the body can be in the eyes of the self consciousness
We should notice
depends on the recognition
not yet found anything worth dyi ying that the serf has made
the wrong choice, for we have not yet scen how choices can be right or wrong, But
the serf has made one choice, just as the lord has made the opposite one. Both of
them are “free.” This is their shared self-consciousness; and both of their choices
are equally necessary tothe existence of their shared self-consciousness.
Just as the serf knows mediately that he is acting voluntarily, because the lord
‘exemplifies the opposite choice as a real possibilty, so the lord knows immedi
is the sef in subjection and that the serf degrades himself toa
instrument. But
‘The right answer is to be
terms of recogni
these are
y the acceptance of the
finite body and its needs. The master has to accept himself as a “living being”
therefore, serf has to accept him as
wat Hegel himself says here:
sciousness (the fact
the subservi yembers one of another” and they
‘must recognize that fact. When they do, it will be possible to see and to say that
‘what is shared between them is the necessary relationship of body and spiri362 The
image of Reason
and self-conscious freedom, in each single rational individual. At present both the
‘Lord and the serf recognize Lordship as the essence. They both need to recognize
Serfalom as equally essential.*
(d) The Self-inversion of the Relationship
15,/192, ‘The lord thus depends on a consciousness without essence forthe truth of his cer
‘aint. is truth is not the truth of independence but of dependence and obedience,
ie. What faces him as the obj
ousness exists to serve des
desire is logical, since
of “universal service.”
In battle the free self-consciousness can find the momentary c
again. But thatis the 1
ads then a mistake was made somewhere atthe beginning.
was a mistake; but what matters is to comprehend it, and not to think that we have
been tripped up by art (as the victims of Socrates sometimes suspected). So
the truth presented to consciousness isa subservient world; bu the
isa world in which the free self has no function and no
‘means that all of his lordly activity
uch as the obedience of his serv
‘the truth is that they are essential to what the servants do, not to what the lord aims
to be. On both sides of the divided self-consciousness we have passed from the frst
‘moment (of simple sel assertion) to the moment of finite desire, ‘The lord can go
back to war, or he can go forward (as he will) to the Crusade for an empty tombs; but
the cannot stay peacefully at home without losing the selfhood that is his essence
16,/193. ‘Thesert's condition on the other hand will reverse itself inwardly into true indepen-
dence,
363
the direct opposite, or the exclusive alterna~
Af (selfhood being precisely the shared self
” Frusiration—not being able to express one’s “self” in the real
vworld—is what makes self-possession truly possible.
If we look back to the phases of simple Desire, loses any aspect of par-
seem to have, If what the free self needs is “another self” (as an
can aspire) then in the simple polarization of self-con-
sly the serf who is lucky in what his world
ire lordship.
sue, For it shows why the worl
nowhere to go, and
nothing satisfactory to da s of keeping al
4 proper goal. But no one who is driven by the urge to be free,
other freedom than this, until this objective is quite plainly out of reach. Only then.
‘an the consciousness that has been forced bac self begin its internal self
inversion into true independence. The crux was already stated in paragraph 191:
both the lord and the serf must recognize that serfdom is essent
both recognize the freedom of lordship, but not its serfdom. When they are both
‘oven bondage, no freedom with-
the simple estence of self consciousness as Freedom. Finally he actively achieves this
independence one step atime a he works of his dependence on nature as given
Since we have discovered that serfdom is the first step in the evolution of free-
‘dom, and that itis the real “truth” of lordship, it cannot surprise us to find that
being a serf isin and for itself the mode of self consciousness that forms the last
‘moment of the judgment of unequal recognition. We must expect now to see aIs /i95
364 The
second inver rough which the infinite selfs reincorpor
consciousness that has accepted finitude, But we shall find 1
tion isa long and slow process which takes several
reaches mat
mnsciousness as we Sa).
produces.
ed
that
-mediate forms before it
ity: Self-Consciousness is the homeland of the truth. The second
was washed out. The pure fluidity of
ure fluidity raised into a mode of self-con-
freedom is, The self as a negating power is necessarily rigid (50
does:
he side of the experience that all
who surrenders. Those who neither go berserk, nor run away,
encounter must be presumed to have both sides of the experience consi
could hardly have hung.
ss he dismissed the organic
“Taking orders and acce}
single step, he masters the world, and becomes the arc
somethi
becomes an officer (he gives th
4 common soldier; and in the Revolution th
‘mon soldiers will be wiped out
ers)
‘The experience of what,
vay to that Laboring
at arms.” But, of course, the achievement through discipli
‘vn force; and at the same
‘imselfThe lord does nothing to himself. But when he applies himself
tappens to him, too. From bei
i will be the serf who becomes,
because one of the basic meanings of Knecht in German is “man
of the a
image of Reason
ie and death
sly (san
1 wartior he
isthe sngulaity or the pare being
to face
“The Judgment of Self Consciousness 365
death is only a symbol of the second inversion, The sense in which the fear of the
Lord turns round step by step into self-mastery is a new experience altogether. 1
am deliberately using the word “mastery” for it in reference to the “master crafts
man,” because Hegel treats the compulsory labor of the serf as the origin of the
hesis about the concept of Bildung in the
the Roman Universal Church; in the ear-
evolved and became commur
he is not: he is
through to be a man, The sat
desire, the aspect of our depe
actually belongs to the b
has no objective focus that is stably permanent. Craftsmanship reshapes the form
ofan abiding physical thing; so the worker gets his enjoyment a the evel of percep-
tion, What he does remains in the world to be seen.** We should notice that forthe
singular consciousness in agricultural work true in a cyelic sense, The
improvement of the land process perceptible only to
the eye that is keen, and that cares deeply, But cultivated land goes backwards very
fast when it is neglected, so the agricultural serf has a solid awareness that his labor
isimportant,
ive activity of laboring under orders forms human singular
1 urge toward self assertion signifies or expresses
ings that we had no spontaneous
provides the mediating tran-
fe generally as divsne service,
‘consciousness comes, mn of the independent being a
distinguish “independent being” from “being for seli” The objects on which the
sert labors have sestandiges Sein. Their way of bei is variable, and
his labor changes that. But he is not:
‘The things
awareness thatthe land is not the Lord's but his. This was what did happen in 1789.
But at this primitive level of self-conscious evolution the leap to that so
imerpretation of the first self-intuition of consciousness is premature, It causes us366
to overlook the most important point that Hegel's Science has uncovered here”
‘The selbstindiges Sein serf intuits as his self is not yet his property. He
‘does not properly own even the laboring body through which lordship over him is
‘exercised. Serfdlom reduces the free human agent to a thing. The serf hi
broperty forthe free self-consciousness of his lord. That is the simple and direct
ind independent self-cons
takes the truth from
truth of things,
because the fear of the lord preserves its int
enjoyment of things as mere appearances that exist for use and consumy
self-certainty of simple desire tells us (and the other animals) that consumption
and enjoyment isthe * F the Sacken o
and the result is that a comprehensive
Perception becomes possible
Because this inversion is comprehensive the most important aspect
difference th: the perceiver. The lord turns the serf into a thing; but
then in his
anges; no new thing is created, The only
“experience” he gets to bea better farmer,
fselF-consciousness itself that is the deepest sig-
‘of Perception; and this is the most funda-
is foolish to think that labor can (oF
should) be abolished. But we must always consider what sort of sel/thing a given
shape of laboring produces.
from the thing’s owners
that of the lord, becaus
has “independent being”
‘manding voice. What the Fizsichsen of the sert is going to be we must now consider
367
be experienced in a universal way. Otherwi
done isan obstinacy that ish,
‘Through the laboring activity pure being-for-self comes to be a
(cum Scienden wird), But also the negative experience of fea
ow a force to be feared. In
as the activity of another directed
imself what being-for-self and fi
is own being-for-self conscio
serving consciousness is aware that tis in and for itself
After the lord has given his orders he disappears from the scene, and the serf is
like Adam in he surveys. But this garden that
‘Adam digs for himself is his the one God planted for him is not. The
form that the sect creates is the visible embodiment of his creative actvit
‘does not appear to him to be foreign or alien just because it i out therein the world
45 the form of an independent being. He labors under orders. Those orders are an
sense.” But the realization of the orders inthe world is still a matter of giving
‘his own sense” to things. In carrying out the orders he must
himself; and itis that interpretation that
precisely in the labor in wl
Before we examine Hegel’ argument to show
4 lord holding life and death authority is essential tothe proper experience of giv-
ing things a meaning that is truly one’s own by laboring on them, we must pause to
consider the apparently radical ambiguity of the expression Firsichsern. As an alien
ther,” being-for-self isthe fear-producing violence of the lod.
{ng consciousness itself, being-for-self is the experienced fear of death; and finally
its formative activity the serving consciousness possesses being-for-self as its
own. Finally (and the most bewildering thing of all), Hegel makes the
this formative act
‘own being for self,
for-self has two sides
that is moul
Pormiren
account of das
ty isa realiza-
is is exactly what Hegel claims the serf is
the lord’s command, to change the visible form,
directly aware of when he works,
ofthe lord’s possessions,368, The Pi
1age of Reason
is because what the serf works on belongs tothe lord that Hegel claims that he
is “destroying the alien essence before which he has trembled.” At the end of along
process of social Bildung the subservient consciousness will finally urn and destroy
the ancien Régime, the whole system of lordship before which
would require equal recog
is necessary because the lord’s
wherever he posits it. His rl
does logically require him to define himself in real terms, to become a personal
with some definite boundaries. That is what he does by giving orders. But he can
redefine himself in this way at every turn. The serf’s one certainty is that he is one
of the lord’s things, and that regard him
ful essence is not destroyed, The serf st
‘anything wrong—and with good reason,
points out that without the discipline of service and obedience the original f
not spread out over the conscious actuality of what is there.
himself or trying to wick us, The sert’s labor has to be don«
that any failure or mistake may reactivate the mortal ps
there isa sense in which the suecessfil activity of reforming the lord’s things actu-
ally does somehow destray the fear of the lord just for the period when the success-
ful reforming is in progress. For itis clear enough that when the lord comes to
inspect, the fear is present again,
w the difficult assertion to this narrow range, the answer
‘emerges, For Hegel claims that in the laboring the serf discovers “his own sense” in
appears to be done according
ust be what he means by the “dest
“essential” commands y
serf who understands the world of natur
orders, because he knows what is needful. The
being forgotten as the serf goes about the work that he understands, and the lord
be forgotten because i
‘The Judgment of Self-Consciousness 365
‘objects of labor the farm animals kept their Saxon names (bullock, sheep, pig, cal
jects of desire and consumption they took on the Norman Frenc
names of the lords (beef, mutton, pork, veal). Outside of his great hall, the lor.
th his supposedly essential orders) does not mi
1d Adam, since he is accustomed to labor anyway, does not need
bor must meet the need of others as well as his own
resents only natural necessity.
‘The alien might before which the serf trembled was rally Death. But his deat
while as
him, which he experienced when his guts turned to water in
isa death dealer whenever he destroys anything,
{is now about to argue, must be experienced
Fear and service, F
the process of forming t
‘order to achieve the new one upon which his “own sense” is fixed. So the ser
complete figure ofthe practical understanding as Death (ef. pat. 32)."The warrior-k
does not know that he is killing himself, in his readi
to the right compre
grasp" though we ma
the se
would
hence requiring to be
much of the world that the
allow any “formative activity” on his part. The wild game, and especis
were preserved by very rigorous laws for the lord’s exclusive pleasure in hunt
‘The swincherd, shepherd or cowherd did his own work in his own way in the cor
text of other things that he could not touch on pain of corporal punishment (an
even death)
‘The logical result of
substantial
separation of the two “
‘guishes in his argument with Thrasymachus. The shepherd
because he understands the prospering of the sheep, not because he can make
profit from
calls “a va370
ue sense of the Sache seit That is why the
less rational than the serf's own sense of what to do (which is not *vain’
serf would never have come to a sort of self-possession #
than lordship without this alienation,
Whether fear and trembling really isthe best emotional preparation for the wi
to do one’s best for the objective improvement of things,
is Hegel’s view that no lesser peril can certainly establish that one is
is the true road to practical objectivity —
1 fear ofthe Lord” (both the earthly and the heavenly
Judge) has in 3 of our presently more fraternal
how feebly eff ue-consciousness. Hegel’s doctrine is tha absolute fear and
absolute love are opposite faces ofthe same identical experience of freedom, Hegel
quite prepared to defend the maxim that “perfect love casteth out fear.” But fear
must arse; for (ashe reminded usin the first sentence of pa
lord isthe beginning of wisdom.™*
bourgeois
is only a vain
certainly included the Romans). Socrates found that the erafismen did not have
“universal culture, absolute Begriff; butaskilfulness that has mig
things, not over the universal might and the whole object
But the
‘higher in principle
Phenomenology bas been
also J, E. Ruson (1991).
1986] she concerns herself wi
isstnfied both about
to equal recognition; and about
clear account of “equal recon
iven by D. A. Duquette, 1994)
187) have provided a good analytical com-
‘on chapter TV A, and the opening paragraph of 1V B.
through ler
tecognition from Fichte. For ewo accounts of
now a good account in English by R.
chapter 1) gives a good account
‘of freedom in the Logie and the Philosophy of Right. There is another
needs poets to create the immortal
to measure the iepuaity of the
here. paragraph
ress back to it again likewise fort was to itself in
159-164. ‘The passage reappears unchanged in
aout which I agt
hy of Ragh, se.
1 spirit of slavery which brings
rere is mo “spirit ofThe Pilgrimage of Reason
iple of motion lis in the “dependent” consciousness—serfdom ends because the
serfs rebel
8. This is perhaps the most appropriate place to comment upon one of Findlas’s more
‘outrageous jes despt. Speaking ofthe reciprocity ofthe fully developed concept of Rec-
‘ognition he says: “One is reminded ofthe Her
example here, because his antipathy fo
to ofthe Concept at
We study singula
‘The Judgment of SelfConsciousness 373
"Thisisthe best defence that canbe offered for P, Preuss (1982) who presents the strug
igys and as an onal-imaginative
take it in either
5). For the capitalist employer
on (returning to the
the world ). This provides the logical
gale” concept of their lationship. But the long “history” that Hegel
ives of how the society of Enlightened “equality” and the Moral World-View has
bffers us an extremely complex eitique of the implicit view that the world of
tirccly replaced by 2 “classless society" governed by the Moral World-View. As far
‘comprehension of the systematic “Scene of experience”
tion is more misleading than helpful. It must be admitted certxinly, that inthe Fist
‘hy of Spin the life and death struggle is seen a arising from the
te is vested in the Family-group (compare Night Thoughts, 329-831
igm occasion for that, astrugae ine the fm
forthe oval succession inthe pre-political society:
logical construct designed to show us both why the
the “Judgment of Desire”), and how
‘developed concept of Recognition (whichis what we find in Fel
Ine Hobbesian
'R. Sonnenschmide (1991) has shown that the common theme of all of He
sions of Lordship and Bondage—h sions altogether —is the374
(in their differen senses) call the will to power “irrational.” The situation where such 2
inevitable is a quarrel over sovereign ight in the unselfeonscious com-
us Eteoces and Polyneices logical paradigm pro-
igion.” The “desire for
{ng to do withthe “absurdity” or meaninglessness of moder
manifest itself with mechanical necessity; but the movement of the Concept
ly actual.” So neither the Struggle nor Lord
and the negative pole ofits motion, respectively,
Bondage isthe subject of the Concept that will be
Desire; and Lordship is
community of Life by the Art Rel
are “living instruments”-—not members ofthe comnunity—in Aristotle
tion is completely sublated in modern society; hence we must look tothe intervening com-
‘munity of universal legal recognition for our experiential paradigm: the medieval baron and
his serfs. (H. M. Chalybais was on the right tack as far back as 1837 (1854, 359],)
For the Fichzan background of Hegel's discussion G.A. Kelly's “Notes” canbe recom-
‘mended (1966, in A. Maclntyre, ed, 1972, 189-217). For the Hobbesan background, the
‘est discussion is that of L. Siep (1974, 192-202)
‘There has been a lot of useless polemic about the various Marxist interpretations In
‘essence, a Marsist approach canbe defended, because the reference to the feudal system is
justified. For the appropriate qualifications, which are quite radi Gadamer (1976, 73).
But of couse the Marit view of wha “Science” i (and what ly different
fiom the Hegelian view
is depth-psychological applications of the whole movement that must be viewed
some reserve by students who want to master Hegel’s own meaning. Se,
ply that psycho-
* comets, Bu they are
‘The whole tendency to regard this as “the most existential ofall Hegelian texts” (Pack
ceahcim, 1967, 3m.) is deplorable, Butt isle to waste ink on that, because those who care
bout Hegelian “Science” will not need tli; and those who do not cae will not be moved
by polemical rhetoric.
12, Whenever we are considering the relation between Hobbes and Hegel
remember that both of them had pondered long and hard upon Thucydides.
less of me not to point out (in Night Though
Consciousness 375
Self-Consciousness”; itis rather the “returned” shape oft
‘of the Unhppy Consciousness as Faith or Bildung. Compar
thin the overarching context
rclopeia, section $32 Z,
13. He seems willing to ascribe it to whole groups in his treatment ofthe Mongol fighting
horde (in the $)stem of Folica! Life, Lasson, 1923, 450-451; Harris and Knox, 133-13),
Bur since their “havoc” perhaps it isthe opposing Hi that should be
identified as « mode of “selFconsciousness.” (In the conceptual context of the Phenomenal-
‘1 do not myself think that a dstinetion between the opposites can be drawn here)
1H, Hegel says “For just as life isthe natural setting of consciousness... so death i the
natural negation of consciousness.” In the light ofthis categorical affirmation it is not easy 10
maintain that “fe” designates a general spiritual category in this chapter. I suppose one
right say that the present context i not decisive for the whole discussion. In any case
‘imposible to maintain that “deat
1984, 88 and 307
th whom he disagrees, are of course
15. The likeness between
and both ofthe brothers)
(and
thre goto their death unflinching. But
y and one (Macbeth) knows that he as no social jus
cation, Thus, between them, chey get us right back ro the Faustian ego. For the pure
that they have in common, The brothers can say what they like;
bur the whole story oftheir quarel shows that itis only the selfish ambition of Macbeth that
motivates them. No “desire to be another sel." no higher ideal of “life in the Volk,” can be
invoked here (Polyneicesis not dying for “another self” One has to believe in another ie”
‘before one can do that.)
lation of “die welche diesen Kampf bestanden” as “chose who survived
‘opposite of what Hegel means. To stand the ts is odie nthe battle
17 See Lasson (1923, 135-136); Knox-Pelezynshi, 241 (and Toward the Sunlight, 475—
477, Ie is shasresule that Hegel sees asthe principal way in which the struggle produces a
passage from the state of nature to political society. The “pact of submission” —
Goldschmi
results in a di
(Struggle and Lordship/ Servtude) ae historically independent. A historical transition fom
fone tothe other ean (of course) occur. But itis not “natura,” (Ie must headed that in Ber
lin, Hegel sid and wrote things that support Goldschmi nclope-
sa, sections 432 Zand 433,
iat was probably the conclusion ofa “Natural Law” manuscript, Hegel rated the
ion from so philosophy as the retired warsior’s way of sublating
this “shame” (se Rosenkranz, 132-133; Hares and Knox, 179)
‘iad VI, 208 (the ideal is stated by the Trojan Glaucus, without reference to
yportince ofthe /iad was noticed by H.HL. Oteman (1981, 377) CE also W.T.
MacCary (1982, 22). Hegel discusses the fate of Achilles only in the conte of the theory of
prophecy and miracle (see Rosenkranz, 467 and Dob, 277) But he discusses the defeat of
superior strength by cunning (with probable reference to the revenge of Orestes and Electra
nnestra and Aegsthus) in the System of Ethical Life(Lasson, 1923, 458); Haris
0)
lien the Voll” begins already
another kinds the expert at survival376 The Pilgrimage of Reason
21, For “ie inthe
f 460-461); Harris and Knox, 147 (ef 142-143),
22, Of al the Getalten in the Phenomenology this one has been the most widely influential
in general culture. See for example the essays of H. Mayer (1974) and W.
Among the early reviewers F. Koppen was (anonymously) probably the 7
gent attention on this section (ef W. Bonsiepen, 1979, 26), i has been more dis-
‘cused than any other. The most influential reading as been that of A. Kojéve (1987). For
an excellent study of his reading se JP. Butler (1987, 63-78)—se also M. Roth (1988) and
‘T Rockmore (1993). A good survey of the influence of Hegel in France between the two
‘World Wars hasbeen provided by B. Baugh (1993).
Apart From the studies that I refer to explicitly,
Life Lasson (1923, 465-466, 471-472
have noted the following
(Genghis Khan) this simple
hapter 34). Ths story probably influenced
tan immature “free self” which
“horde”
(compare Sytem der
1¢ Mongolian
andthe dialectic of
agree that by taking the
‘denis that “natural slavery” has
that
24, There isa “dependent consciousness”—the women and children ofthe vanquished
community, who are tor for this purpose. But Hegel wants the
‘became clea fist i the Frankfurt historical fragment Gest der 428;
1). Where the relation i eigiouly founded tere is no thought of pos-
the life and death struggle
this precedent
y Lord and Bondsman are two se
, #42); Harsis and Knox, 125-126, The meaning of “inequ
uous, and several origins of se
rugele, and servitude by contrac
Fetscher) have su
this example in
and Bondage
Religion are not distinguished (History
30, H. Adelman (1980) has developed an interesting parallel between the movement
Hegel's dialectic from Life to Lordship and Bondage, nd the early chapters of Genes378 1age of Reason
losophical models. But my own reference to Adam here is
the opt
ep
ity when he sad “Where am or sre are gathered together ete”
Nor can the distnce beings of Lord and Serf be reduced
the “independent” and “depends
reduction wil happen eventually. But here
merged” (par
cases aguins Flay are the natural dependence and independ
‘the one hand (mother and children depending on father, or
sone); and the inter
‘on the other Both of these must be
and Bondage,” or the projec of a “phenomenology” will mal
3
to make the blessing of it ex
ing to saisy the desire of another is only destined tobe sublated ay
Th way toa relation of free
3 should be defined isan empirial question;
here is Mester, not Herr Perhaps this is not just for variety sake, but
between the fie formative activity oft
subservient obedience ofthe ser othe lord's commands, But
ing able to g0 tothe “absolute negation” of Se
htt take Mester asa simple synonym for Herr.
ion of gressive extrusion of Lond-
erfdom will lom ever larger as the actuality of Life. Compare the
34, Hence che further
ship into the “beyond,
‘The Judgment of Self-Consciousness 379
offers a logical an
further refined in a note by N.M,
the
L.
Lordship and
ment of Pereption. I
J-B Sartre (1965, 235-237) un ugg and the aceeptance:
‘rll. But he could not admit the transition from Self-Conseiousness to Reason bees
his view) the structure of subject-object opposition was fundamental to scientific
+68) takes Hegel’ argument inthe proper cognitive-ei
tential way.
important analysis ofthe servile consciousness (see sec. 5 ofthe *
erke I, 429-435; Heath-Lachs, 12-16); and Hegel acknowledged
94. So Siep (1979) is right to
becomes largely implicit moment of True
lucational labor onthe self we shall follow its evolution in
ean be observed in chapter V -
of the degradation of human
Joha Ruskin and William Mortis) were ui
‘enced by Feudal craftsmen. This was a
come hi
chapter VI Ar present hei concerned with advances
by every singul 1
free peasantry is not of gret phenomenological si
frame of the peasan163-104). Only his eapacity for
asa moving agent of cul
hher way momentarily when she says that “the slave... demands
recognize him 26a human being.” On the one hand, the serf knows that hei recognized as
Finally becomes “another
the otherness
inciple than the inevitable
the world encounters another
‘iberhaupt
the moments. Thus Hegel continues
fear cannot produce the reflection; and“
ither. His opening sentence isnot clearly articulate,
45. J.P Butler (1987, 8) ends her discussion of this section with the curious conclusion:
have the sense thatthe ie of selt-consciousnesss slowly drawing vo an end.” As Iseeit
the life of self-consciousness (ina recognizably ordiaary sense ofthe term) is only now
beginning. Stoicism is where the concept ofthe fee self a ational is born. (This note isnot
perience.” The sef is not “frightened of his own freedom.”
Chapter 9
The Syllogism of
Self-Consciousness
IV B: Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism,
and the Unhappy Consciousness
The concept of self-consciousess, having developed ino its primitive mode of judgment,
character ofthe transition only me who grasp the logi-
«al significance of what has happened tothe Lord and the Serf; and it is only we who can
hich the per-
ceptual consciousness decetved
(a) Freedom of Thought (the Stoic)
1 serf by fear. Our task now isto put the two inwardnesses together,
‘Serfdom is the mncersion of Lordship. We must invert the whole antithesis compre~
‘ensively, so that our new concept envelops them both, The self that refuses to
concerns about which it gives orders, must be united in a
he one that knows itis giving its own meaning to those finite
higher concept wi
381382 ‘The Pilgrimage of Reason
concerns, but will never dare to say so, And when we unite the infinite freedom that
the serf sees inthe lord, with the finitely creative freedom of his own secret con-
sciousness, we find we have the concept of a self-conscious “freedom in thought”
that can escape from the universal service of life's needs. The retreat into a purely
theoretical realm is the inversion involved in this comprehension. In making
‘ing the method laid down for pl
and in Vorstelungn. The
the comprehe
standing’s concept of Force was the first
‘The sect is di
world, when he labors. But he is also aware of himself as finite, not free. He recog-
nizes freedom as an alien objective being inthe lord who gives the orders. Putting
the two elements of this unequal gether, we obtain
concepts are necessary and complet (satisfying in the way thatthe serfs world is
ing as it takes on his meaning) without hi
like orders). This is the birth of lgical bing, the recognition of the truth that is
self-certtied by my thinking
experience asthe developed anithes
ingular selfhood, an
le negation” in which
, comprehensive,
cree experience
lordship of ni
dom, a freedom that escapes from the dominance of death,
reforms the world and creates the craft-sklls that are handed on. But the serf does
not know that he is free; he does what he does under authority, and he experiences
his freedom only when the authority is absent
“Absence of authority” is the key o the transition. For, if we set aside the fear of
serfdom forces us to recognize as our universal lord and master in
n we can recognize thatthe authority is never present in our inner con-
finite Lordship. What happens is that
we become the free self who thinks what must be thought. “To think” is not to be
383
gular) Ego—a singular will that is almays looking for death, and can
is dead—but “an Ego the signif-
is no longer to desire,
as at the same
Stoic does, and although he has not yet,
to recognize where we have arrived.
emergence of logical thought is immediately universal. Where the
unconditioned Universal of Understanding was Force, that.
‘Thought. And whereas the immediate Self asserted,
thought is free is the equal assertion ofall selves.
thinker, am conscious that logical
Igive
I from itself” into the
ided aspects of singular
the opposed unequal
We get a concept in respect of
the lord nor his serf thinks
When we show them that Freedom in’Thoug
of the concrete variety and complexity of th
Chis thinking self that recognizes all other selves as thinkers can only do
Ic knows nothing of father and son, hunting, fighting, minding sheep or forg-
show why any of those i “necessary.”
In dealing with all the Vorstellungen of my life I have to remember
“thoughts” (as I normally call them) are indeed mine, and only mine. If forget
ngs themselves ae liable to break in upon my representations, and
indeed “someth
of “what
from my consciousness)
tion” from me is
sel That I think something truly, means that everyone else must think the same;
there would be no sense to the expression “thinking the truth” ifthe thinking self
were not sel repulsive, ie, if it were not, logically and necessarily, a member in a
‘community of thinkers.384 ‘The Pilgrimage of Reason
‘This sel-repulsion
as being. for-mysef from being-in-
thinking subject, from the realm of thought
th is the logical. ‘The whole world of fini
«formal, I repel myself
distinguish mysel
2/198,
here (par. 199) and later (par. 479) we can see that itis the Roman Stoicism of
Cicero's time and the following two centuries that is significant in the bi
‘evolution of the Héligest. But paragraph 479 contains a fairly explicit acknowl-
edgement thought anticipated the real condition of things achieved
under the Empire. And this is a necessary admission on Hegel’s part, since
the important interaction of Stoicism and Scepticism took pla
world before the Romans conquered
‘The “lord of the world” was there already in the shape of Alexander; so from a
phenomenological point of v
‘ment in its aspect of temporal sequence. We ar
observations
happened;
view was logically significant, and therefore came to consciousness as a universal
aspect ofthe generally shared culture.
Stoicism and Scepticism become aspects of the Weligeist when the freedom of
Lordship is denied its natural expression. This natural expression is “True Spi
the community of free citizens who keep those who are not free as the
instruments, In the world in which cities and their magistrates must take orders
from the agents of a military conqueror, the distinction between free citizens and
bondservants does plausibility as the conceptual key t0
‘what it means to be human. It is now patent 1e—no face to face commu-
‘The concept and judgment of Recognit
harmonious world of desire; indeed they were essential to
lation since they provide the means for reconciling the infinity of the self
finitude of life's desires. But the syllogism of Recognition is differ
dead. The Stoic sage has no finite desires. He desires only to be free; and he c
desire” that, in the sense that he disciplines and schools the not-
Asa thinker he simply knows that he is free, and that happiness
self to desire
‘consists in not willing anything other than this freedom. “Something is only true
and good for consciousness, so far as consciousness behaves [or relates to itself] as
thinking essence in it.” For the Sage organic life is a servitude, towards which she
sould be indifferent. If that indifference is threatened, ifthe freedom of thought is,
physically denied to her, she can herself deny nature and die freely. she is the lord’s
tonsciousness in the serfs situation. But she “serves” only the universal commu-
nity of humanity. This is what appears in Zeno and Chrysippuss it becomes orld
historical at home.
dage in culture that has achieved philosophical
indifferent to how things go on in the real world, Father
brother, But the free self has found its
thar matters
‘ence t0 one’s true humanity. The goal is to be
worldly fortunes. The concerns
and one’s own sense of things-—both are m«
some singular transient way that
‘manding just as much as the suffering and obedience).
Hegel's characterization of the negation of the whole Lordship/Bondage rela-
mnship involves an acceptance of life as
Jing freedom” that is,
‘without being literally dead like the hero
10 preferred freedom t0 ly the Stoic has to go right
through the experience of bondage in order to discover this new kind of freedom.
ine serf discovered when he realized that the mas-
had to use his own knowledge, and do his own
is in his charge. In the technical
at is best for the Thing
the new truth-criterion of
standard comes to him naturally, bs
himself as charged (like any serf) with a responsit
desire. His Lord is the Universal Reason.
for things that he does not4/200,
386 The Pi
wage of Reason
‘The terminology that Hegel uses in his backward references is illuminating. It
helps us first to see the connection between Lordship/Bondage and Perception;
and secondly to see some new ambiguities in Eigensnn. The
ce. rue validity) are first the one that “posit
sciousness of a
‘This takes us back to the emergence of the Ego. For what
‘avec fr the same whether posited by one’s own or by an
level of Desire which has passed into Judg~
the struggle whois the
the whole sphere of the struggle, and of fear-dominated choice, is the sphere of
self-consciousness as Self-Perception. The natural Ego posits itself asa ching; it can
then discover that itis nor an independent thing, bu 1g in which thing-
hood dissolves into fluidity, so that it becomes a “property” of the real “thing.”
‘And now this experience of choice has lot its significance for the Stoic. A soldier-
‘emperor like Marcus, can recognize the servitude ofall fe, just as Epictetus recog-
nizes the freedom of all thought.
After the centeal char mn of the new attitude in which my univers
ng is the Force that makes al logically valid distinctions bue remains ident
If in them, precisely because they are logic:
paragraph 196, itis said to be *
craftsman isa special ease of legal
self-conscious existence has moved for-
ic freedom to be the stance of the Weligest, the world had to be mature
to the point of philosophical self-consciousness, and it had to be reduced to servi-
tude in that self-conscious condition. This first happened in the Hellenistic world
bat we shall see the Stoic attitude reappear in Hegel's own world as the “honest”
consciousness of Diderot the philosopher who argues with the sceptical nephew of
Rameau (pars. 523-524), Stoicism actually enjoyed a considerable vogue in Hegel's
own time, mainly in association wi sophy and, more covertly,
with Spinozism
For Stoic sel
yusness the essentially real snot the abstract Ego but the Logos
This isan abstract essence. Free thought has let nature go free and has only pure
logic as its truth. I ‘pt of freedom, not organically embodied. But all
thought-content er cannot find in his pure thinking
any criterion of w rue in this given content, Stoicism could
offer only formal tautologies which soon become boring
i is no more signifies
of truth
language of Force and Utterance. The Ego
s whole experience of desiring and labor
‘Stoic thinking has “let Nature go fre
of the being of Self-Consciousness
1 ofthe other again” (pas.
Nature” in a famous passage of Hegel’
Ps Science of Log
self-consciousness on one side, and the living universe of nature on the other, each
“reflected into ise” Ths isthe basic structure that we sav in the Understanding
but now itis explicitly the thinking self that takes itself tobe essential. We are no
now concerned to interpret appearance as the manifestation ofthe object, but todo
logic; andthe loge of Understanding, unfortunately, cannot provide us with any
concrete knowledge.*
Something degins with Stoicism that comes to its climax inthe Phenomenol
‘The Stoic fags, the spark o son recognizable in each of us, is an in
its action (Handeln) and grasp
sto be possible there hast
‘of “the Good!” and the theo
ker does not have; and the
Sceptie will demonstrate to him that he lacks any ional criterion of what
{is comprehensive (cataleptic) in theory or of what is “according to Nature” in prac
tice. Only the advent of the Gospel will provide the requisite content in though
itself for the “expansion” (Aushreitung) of individuality a alive in ation, and com.
of alien being
fothing”—it has its own finite con-
ing to Reason,” “Happiness is living in accordance wi
‘wisdom never makes us any wiser, but we do get bored? I
can form the “determinate concept” of my nature (including my world), and can388
image of Reason
“love Fate,” counting nothing human alien, etc, But the Fate that I love remains
alien and inserutable
5/201. Stoicism is therefore an incomplete negation of otherness. The determinate content
of consciousness is blandly accepted
Hegel's procedure is essentially negative. Hence when he goes over something
quickly (as he does in his discussion of Stoicism) we have to struggle to hold onto
the positive moment. It was a tremendous discovery that the freedom which we
instinctively yearn for, and uly die to asset, is found in
our thinking eapacit
idrew into her own thought, and
lords and serfs, But poor Posidonius (whom Kant permits us to smile at" for
declaring vehement
that pain was an xcept for this reasonable~
ness that he clung ot say “T surrender.” The gout mean-
le was demonstrating the alien determinateness of what there was for him to
think about. He did not choose to think about it, but obviously he had to; and he
ing (if my memory serves me) to admit that some things were preferable to
6./202,
thought becomes for Scepticism all the being that they have
‘The Syllogism of SelF-Consciousness 389
[Ancient Scepticism probably had tv origins (though the question of its origin
isa murky one). On the one hand, a group of hard-headed Stoic students seem to
hhave become convinced that a comprehensive or positive wisdom is impossible, and
that chis negative admission is the proper stance for the Sage. On the other bi
the same conclusion was arrived at, because of our empirically bounded situat
in the Platonic Academy
‘The oF is
al character of speculative thought was discovered by Plato as he:
sd on the poem of Parmenides and the arguments of Zeno, Is the isolation of
as the negative moment of the motion of thought from underst
to speculation that he ascribes to the great Academic Scepties, and espe
Cameades (213-129 8.c).
‘of Freedom of Thought, and Scepticism is its “expe-
1e concept produces a result that is the opposite of what is
projected in the conceptual blueprint, All the content of our experience comes to
us through the bodily senses. The original faith of Zeno was that itis possible to
have a “comprehensive presentation” (katalepuiké phantasia) that could be known to
for logically necessary arguments.
Since Plato was among the first to draw this distinction clearly and to build
itis not surprising to find this argument coming from the Acad-
‘my, when the agenda of philosophical discussion began to be set by the younger
school whose novelty, charismatic enthusiasm, and essential optimism made them
popular. The sceptical Platonists were only saying what Plato had learned from
Heracleitus (whom the Stoies revered): that no sensory experience could ever be
true knowledge. The Sceptics realized the conceptual freedom of rational con-
sciousness recognized by the Stoics. They insisted that “pure thought” must be
‘completely independent of sense-experience. It must not try to use “the indepen-
‘dent Dasein jing determinacy
lies outsidely determinate” world of sense-experience, and
“the real negative.”
‘There is a “correspondence” between real freedom and freedom of thought.
Stoicism conceives the “independence” of thought as a universal human activity
Everyone of us is a rational being, a
inker capable of freely recognizing necess
wg can take this freedom from us, We must
‘Scepticism realizes this universal concept in
ceeding moment the lord satin his hall eating, drinking and m
labored. At the present moment, the Sceptic upbraids the Stoic for takin
slavish experience so seriously, and seeking to make a lordly whole of it. The Sceptic
realizes the significance of “letting Nature go.” The absolute self must release its
‘own absolute other, and stop asserting that itis a realm of “bondage.” “Cast off the
slave's tunic properly and really,” says the Sceptic. “Be the free thinking being that
you are, now and here. L
in (and towards)
fe.” As we can see by comparing the Understanding,
1 self-closure that lacks any bridge to the world of sense-experience. So sce}
thought corresponds to the realization of the singular self
‘Stoicism did to its concept. The Concept of independ
the Lord/Sert which the Lord becomes indep
independence (and of
1s the advantage of what Stoicism achieved conceptus
‘thought that has become conscious of its independence; and now it sets the whole
The Syllogism of Self-Consciousness
world of nature fre infact. It looks at the whole expanse of our conscious and self
conscious relations with “the real world” and flatly declares that it is all of it only
appearance, that we have no cognition except relative cognition, and that the
yond that. The thoughts that the Stoic took to be tautolo-
ns” From the real being of nature (which must therefore have cor
responding “distinction 11) are just our thoughts; the distinctions are our
ai ‘independences” of the sensible world are recognized to be sub-
jective appearances only wy are known to be “vanis
This recognition extends
at we are sparks of the divine Fire is an
uur subjective imagination,
208, is a tuning point. Ie is the se
kept us moving through “Consciousness”
‘that what counts 2s determinate in Lordship/Bondage and in Si
‘essence. Lordship/Bondage includes the positive reduction even of ethi
positive commands. Stoic determinations ae formal laws of thought. Tecan
‘determinate concepts (which are pure abstraction) onto the independen
Our own procedure in “Consciousness” was in part that of philosophical seepti-
‘ism. We showed that there was no absolute knowledge in Cot
reached the “inverted” understanding of the “living In
(pethaps because what Hegel says gives us some new insights
‘What counts as “determined” in Lordship and Bond
aslong as it says they are valid, and no longer:392 The Pilgrimage of Reason
Stoicism is vulnerable to sceptical attack because of the positive legal character
natural law theory—the fact that a determinate law is now promulgated as the
fa sovereign. Hegel sees the Reason as an ideal analogue of
‘kon “natural
” are. From Euripides
‘onwards (or from Protagoras tradition used the
‘custom against all theories of natural law and universal sover=
dethroned in Aristophanes by “the Whithwin«
ethics”
comprehend his “in
‘a human sovereign must not con
of the Understanding
formal) standpoint of S
“observation of it. Hence the observer can only hang ‘“determ
sided, unmov ns derived from the analysis of perception) o
8./204, The negative moment
of real experience itself. It first appears as the
Nothing abides, not even the hills 0
‘The Syllogism of Sel:Consciousness 393
ing while retaining the primitive conviction that 1c is positive
he positive aspect of sensation is essen negates itself
our eyes every moment. Thus the thinking that sets itself to constr
of perceptible universals is simply misunderstanding the difference
between the eternal simy ‘what is necessary, and that boundless whirl of
‘mere Schein. In Hegel’s own language, the Seeptic grasps the absolute difference
taught by the Scepti
could comprehend
Tanguage (par.
Scepticism itself of language raised to self-consciousness
as the nature of human experience, but not yet in full possession of itself as a con-
directly inverts the Meinung of everything t id; but it does not real-
here is any way forward, when the attempt to mean something
sguistc is given up as a result ofthis criticism. It knows that “language is
1¢ name of an ext
perpetual and necessary alternat
forces to which Hegel now proceeds
9/205, Thus ie realizes freedom as
admits that all
ting theory and practice contradict one another perpet
creating contradiction inthe Stoic Understanding.
ial processes is tobe observed calmly. The philosophi
‘on the sidelines, and do not get involved, is the establishment of per-
fect antinomies, equally weighty and seemingly compelling arguments on opposi394 The Pilgrimage of Reason
sides, This was perfected by Carneades, and since Hegel seems to be referring to it
at the end of the paragraph, I think he sees Academie Scepticism as the philosophy
that grasps consciousness as the “absolute dialectical unrest.” Scepticism is the
philosophy of the “inverted world” in its absurd aspect. Everything in the supposed
illness of the teal word of pure hough experienced aan immed
“The difficulty is that in this
being moveds and Carneades hi
to keep the confusion whirling pro}
mn being unmoved is no more rational than
1 chameleon supplying whatever is needed
hhe pursues the “absolute”
thought unmoved by his
consciousness is the calmly undisturbed observer of an sni-
“forlorn” self-consciousness about with it. In this comment,
appearance. In the main the mood of
the paragraph is comie or ironic (like that of Young Rameau later). But if the
self-observation were forced to unite
the subjective freedom were forced to accept
identity
the world, and allows him
\we ought not co trust, He proves one day t
thac there isnot. But he acts according to the
and the Stoa."* Moreover, both he and his
steadiness in the pursuit of philosophy is mor le. But he cannot j
this, and his very steadiness consists in not allowing his opponent to do so.
[Anyway the suspense of judgment is. It is in essence a stable being, a state of
2 of freedom from disturbance: aaravia. The technique of mis
ide, and to ignore the fact that both sides belong to
Carneades borrowed the
ly balanced displays from the voluminous works ofthe great-
should not
arsipps oid
ott what neted conta troubled” beeue
iis both laughing and laughs
‘The Syllogism of Self-Consciousness 395
(c) Thought in Suspense: The Unhappy Consciousness
‘onsciousness a8 contradiction. But it does not
‘The Sceptic is a laughing sage because he to laugh at, We laugh at
th of them (i we are willing to follow Hegel’s ead), because these dignified mas-
‘both take their profession so seriously are Tike Charlie Brown and Lucy
the playground, while their world is falling to pieces around thei ears
sr Chrysippus, filing seven hundred and five book-scrolls with the
native Soli (from which we get the word “solecism”), generously
‘ons from better writers is really more comic than Carneades
from those books and others for the rhetorical
while conscientiously refus-
them agree that human con
to overcome the
iablets be copied for publication. Bot
(Chrysippus labor
Carneades laughs at him
not secing that the
division isa logical one, and th: Hercules
than the serf can become a lord by ploughing more land. He himself, who makes no
pretence to be Hercules, can turn all that labor upside down with much less effort,
and make another heap beside the first one with a big “No”
1m is tantamount to a serfs fantasy that
‘only way to be a Lord isto watch, and to earn to laugh atthe specta-
1c serfs fantasy isnot so itrelevant t0 reality as it seems; nor isthe Stoic
“original do-gooder of our tradition.
Tina world where only professors can be Lords—whether they think they ean
thlp the serfs or not—someone who knows what serfdom fees like s going to say
that real life is no laughing matter, and that something more is needed
jon than a professorship. In effect it was Augus is; and his
philosophical backgrou Hegel does not refer
often. But it seems q\ thesis of the
‘Unchangeable Consciousness comes from him.
“The Seeptic knows that he isa divided self. But he distracts his mind from the
uncomfortable consequences of being laughing at those
k that a logical necessity can be changed by
‘himself with the identical aspect of the contradiction, oF396 ‘The Pilgrimage of Reason
of contradiction;
i that is
beyond or behind the world of appearance. It belongs to what thought has “let go.”
‘The actual self is the consciousness of the division between an actuality that is
finite and in servitude to an incomprehensible necessity, and a possi
infinite, and perfectly free.
In this comprehension of the sceptical doctrine two selves are recognized. The
things, it has no content in its self but rather a given one
freedom by “letting the other go free.” The real “other” is not known as a “mani-
fold of things”; instead the self finds itself afflicted with the contradictory content
‘of appearances. Only the absolute freedom of the self appears in this world of sen-
sible presentations. When the “other” goes free, the rational self who releases it
‘must take complete responsibility for “appearance.
accept itself as the contradictory unity of the rational philosophical understanding
whirl of sensible consciousness
is that the rational ground
whirl. The Unhappy Conscio
‘whose content can only become kno
recognized as an
ess find
looking into a thought-wo
ssupersensible Other freely elects to give kno
cal free consciousness has been shown to be
‘ment of its own freedom, playing upon an Other th
and unrevealed by that playing.
‘The Unhappy Consciousness has a concept of truly cognitive Self-Conscious-
nes. But, in accordance with that concept, it can only Took for that free Self-Con-
sciousness to reveal itself frely. The revelation must be giver; it must come from
the absolute Self as an act of grace. For the experienced freedom of finite selfhood
is simply the power to contradict whatever content it succeeds in
‘The “unhappiness’ self-consciousness consists
conscious that real freedom belongs to an inner self whic!
outer wor been “set free.” We are stil in the sp
ness; and we lement of Self-Consciousness as
the uni
o selves facing one another within one self-consciousness we have
isness that is the concept of Spirit. “Pure self-cognition in
the ground and soil of S
1e have reached we
ng” as the “absolute othern«
tsfy the first definition of Sj
xy; but when we recognize the “otherness” of the “aether” in
sr pure self is apparent to us, something paradoxical happens. Self-con-
jousmess itself becomes a mode of consciousness, a way of being aware of an
objective reality, something other.
‘The “self” with which the Sceptical professor identifies in his ataraxia, is an
empty form. But when we invert that stance, and identify prope the tran-
sient finite content of that form, the form itself becomes for us an infinite intellect
beyond the whole finite world. This is because the inversion has to be a properly
comprehensive” one, We project the Absolute Self into an intellectual Beyond,
‘which comprehends all of us with our contradictory world of appearance. We know
thar that Being is there beyond the flux because we are conscious of ourselves in
and through Him; i is through His presence tous that we know ourselves to be lost
souls, We live and move and have our being in Him; but He is absolucely other than
Religious faith isa
conscious access to the intellectual world as “absolute otherness."
‘There is no possibility of araraxia when the two sides of the contradiction are
present in one consciousness. Self- finally changes
is the consciousness of being “saved”; and sometimes the con-
‘But it can never have Carneades’ consciousness that he
has saved himself (and can pethaps save oth not even the consciousness of
Posidonius that he could damn himself (if he admitted thatthe torment of his gout
gazes into the I-consciousness, and meets sometimes the
‘whose sight shall no man living be justified,” and at other times
her who
tof sef-consciousness as the conscious
in a higher world of pure thought,
ness of dependence upon‘he Ontological Argument is the moment of philosophic
‘Hegel knows about, and which he defends vigorously against misunderstanding.
Bur Anselm's prayer—an argument in the mode of “faith” —comes a long time
after the historical situation in which the leap of faith became universally necessary.
‘We shall see when we come to study the phenomenology of the Absolute Spirit (in
chapter VII on Religion) that the moment when “the belief of the world” appeared
is best identified as the Conversion of Constantine in 312 A.D. It is Augustine who
sequence that suggests,
“Hegel warns usin paragraph 211, however, that the singular shape of conscious
int, does not have the same experience as the
urn of the Unhappy Consci
ingular” experience of the Unhapps
crucial weakness of the Unhappy Consciousness.
12,/208, Since the two sides of sceptical consciousness ae opposites the Unhappy Conscious-
ry into an Other that sits but noe
tnd sets up the standard of Reason
Jbserves their opposition, Through the main-
istic observation the difficulty of a recognized con-
tradiction is avoided. The two self-consciousnesses are opposites. The essential
‘one, the true essence is the Unchangeable—the Other One, The self that is aware of
the contradiction between Changeable and Unchangeable, takes itself to be the
‘unessential one—the Changeable.”
‘bare, Wande
les ofthe Scept
1205). But I do not think they are derived from the technical vocabulary of Sept
‘The Syllogism of Self-Consciousness 399
legel seems to have adopted them in order to
‘and in order to make the parallel with the
by revealing itself as the Lawgiver.
the God of the Bible; and since
- and “Man” if he wanted to, we
‘must ask why he did not. The answer clearly is that he is only prepared to use these
conerete names when the consciousness that we are observing has achieved ade-
quate concepts of what they stand for. As long as we are dealing with abstract
precisely our function as
‘important to remember
Hegel uses designate
ther that the real division between them is a deliberate act, the leap of faith, which
goes beyond the pure activity of thinking and comprehensively inverts what both
Stoic and Sceptic “thought.” “Thinking,” like “Self Consciousness,” is now sud-
lated, or in suspense. The Scepi
and now what began in Stoicism as the imum
in that sublated shape.
ig of the Unchangeable Self in me, That
not my own achievement—in
the way in which the Stoics, and even the Sceptis, thought it was, when they were
struggling over the true concept of “human nature.”
‘There is no way out of the impasse created by the deadlock of Stoicism and
Scepticism, except for the Absolute to “give” itself ina new mode of thought that is
lf as a direct access to the “supersensible” through the grace ofthe lat
a problem for Hegel, He can show why there has to be a “revela-
the content of the revelation must come from the historical
ot to the singular
experience of “unhappiness.” So
1, But only the middle phase of iis
1ce of the singular consciousness—which returns to
ut of Reason. The first phase will become vital later on,
‘observed here as an exp
sel-possession as the Ge400 ‘The Pilgrimage of Reason
in the evolution of communal consciousness, where
himself eal
‘communal experience has taken over from t
Thus the “concept of the history of salv
impasse cannot appear t
of the singular Gestalt.
which ps
10 be necessary of rational
je preachers. From the side of the
comic. It shows its
led upon to be mart
Many, Hegel himself isa professor, and hi
prefers professorial views, So he now presents us with the mo
.ppy Consciousness as the “form” within which the log
Absolute Self Consciousness can be observed as a sort of Real
“obliged to recognize its own oneness, its self-idem
as a blind sel- assertion of the radically singular wi
now become intellect fas the One
but can be shown to make an effective reference to"
kes a different shape than
1s for the singular “believer”; and the third phase is what Hegel
” This third phase can only be expounded properly when the
ides our immediate
aspect only in the
Papinian (executed by Caracalla). The preachers, of
'; but for the professors they were
1¢ logical advance made by the
observing one aspect of itself as the Beyond. This unhappy self is necessarily
as an Other Having begun
free self consciousness has
chat is done in Heaven,
sth likewise. But alas it is nor done, because that blind sin-
;perience” (so that it really
is contradiction, is precisely to say that the struggle is endless:
the opposites isa rebirth of conflict. The basic problem of
Scepticism has not gone away just because ofits inversion. The truth of Revelation,
‘of Stoicism and Scepticism,
Union with the Unchangeabl
aim, But this
1s the consciousness of one's
fe isa perpetual repentance for living. To be united with the
gular self-assertion. So even the Unchangeable is affected
asa source of i
‘own sinfulness
1 is rather the loss of
assumption
previous paragraph; and since these opy
sciousness” we can get at the meaning bet
the word “consciousness
‘Changeable consciousness
of the Unchangeable Con-
‘only bring this opposite
singularity to light. This “self-repulsion of the self-same” prepares us forthe expe-
rience in which the Unchangeable has fist the shape of Lawgiver, and then that of
another finite self
struggle ofthe changeable self to become unchangeable is a hopeless one. The liv~
ing experience of the contradi "of physical suffer-
ing. But since produced (unlike the
Schmere,
pain is psychologically and
Unchangeable righteousness and experience my rej
scious that even in my pious sel-abasem
Self. By approaching Him I make H402 1 image of Reason
forat best Iam only a repentant sinner; but when I come into God’s presence Fleis
changed. And however hard I may try to deny it I shall eventually have to admit
iti he is “the Other” then he is a single “one” like me,
14/210, “The movement ofthis sreowing isthe movement of “Incarnation” The di
of the moments remains dominant, a che Unchangeable becomes singul