Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Qualitative Explanations
MES379HB
May 2010
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Faegheh Shirazi
Department of Middle Eastern Studies
Supervising Professor
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Sonia Seeman
Department of Middle Eastern Studies
Second Reader
i
Abstract
The modern Salafi ideology used by Al-Qaeda to justify suicide attacks is based
on the reactionary writings of Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th century scholar. The fall of Baghdad
in 1250 was echoed in the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, as well as
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia
during the Gulf Wars. During each of these times, similar political climates led to the
revival of Ibn Taymiyya‘s extremely narrow interpretation of Islam. I will explain the
rise in female perpetrated suicide attacks in Iraq examined in the context of the origins of
Al-Qaeda‘s ideology as well as their strategic organizational motivations.
As these groups adapted, they failed to consider the consequences of their actions.
Their increased attacks on soft targets, namely Sunni members of the ―Awakening‖
turned their natural constituency against them. Coupled with the contradictory nature of
how Salafis value martyrdom and their low view of women, al-Qaida in Mesopotamia
has alienated it‘s supporters; both the Sunnis who participated to fight Shi‘ia militias and
their true believers. This will have organizational consequences for the group which may
contribute to the eventual end of their operations.
i
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the army of helpers that has gotten me to where I stand,
namely my mom Maria Lourdes De Hoyos Guevara, my sister Venus Piñeyro De Hoyos,
and dear friends such as Mustafa Mezaal. They have not only helped me focus and
dedicate myself, but have intellectually and personally challenged me into becoming the
person I am today.
Thank you to all of the participants of Thesis Sweatshop 2010: Jessica Walker,
Ethan Walker, Spencer Franklin, Andres Gutierrez, and the three aforementioned, in
which you sacrificed your evenings and even Mother‘s Day to finish this thesis. I could
This thesis itself would not be possible without the dedication and selfless
kindness of Dr. Faegheh Shirazi my primary advisor and the continued support of Dr.
Sonia Tamar Seeman who has supported my musical endeavors for the past three years.
Were it not for their willingness to help me (and in the case of Dr. Shirazi, to help
a stranger) in my time of need, I would not have had the support to write this thesis. This
experience has truly served to channel my academic achievement thus far into a shining
apex, and what I have learned from the process and from the research has already proven
invaluable.
ii
Table of Contents
iii
Figure 4: Location of Female Suicide Attacks ...................................................................... 44
Table 2: Location of Female ................................................................................................. 45
Perpetrated Suicide Attacks .................................................................................................. 45
Unwilling Martyrs ....................................................................................................... 45
Strategic, Not Symbolic Actions ................................................................................. 46
Female Multipliers ...................................................................................................... 49
Table 3: Total Suicide and Car Bombs and Female Perpetrated Suicide Attacks ................. 50
God Knows No Wrath like a Woman Scorned ......................................................... 51
CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................ 53
Consequences ............................................................................................................... 57
Appendix A: Raw Data ................................................................................................................ 59
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 62
VITAE .................................................................................................................................. 66
iv
List of Tables
TABLE 3: TOTAL SUICIDE AND CAR BOMBS AND FEMALE PERPETRATED SUICIDE ATTACKS ....................... 50
v
List of Figures
vi
CHAPTER ONE: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF JIHAD
"Usually, terrible things that are done with the excuse that progress requires them are
Russell Baker
it is crucial to understand the historical factors that led to the current circumstances. The
use of suicide terrorism in the name of Jihad in Islam is a departure from mainstream
Since the 8th century, the Muslim Empire had relied on Mamluks1 to serve as their
military forces. Over time, many capable Mamluk leaders used their political prowess to
gain control of outlying kingdoms. This weakened the Arab empire due to the fact that
their motivations and background were clearly different from the previous Arab army.
They were more interested in preserving their domains and power than in the greater
good of the kingdom. This led them to create alliances with invaders, which left areas
vulnerable to attack.
1
ٍَيىكor plural ( اىََاىيلal-mamalik) were the military ‗contractors‘ or converted slave armies of Muslim
Empires in use as early as the 9th century.
1
In the thirteenth century, the Islamic Empire was at its nadir. Converts joined
from different ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, splitting the Muslim umma2
into `Arab `araba3 and `Arab must`araba4. Because of their non-Arab heritage, the
newcomers did not care about Arabs as leaders of the Muslim world which led to the fall
of Baghdad at the hands of Mongol leader Hulagu Khan 5 in 1250. After the Mongols
invaded and overwhelmingly conquered the Muslim Empire, they stayed there and
adopted the religion and customs of the land they came to inhabit. Around this time,
many European crusaders did the same. This lead to a sudden dilution of the customs and
language which had united the Muslim Empire since the time of the first Caliph Abu
The current ideological justifications for Jihad used by groups such as al-Qaida
are built on revivals of the scholarly work and revolutionary interpretation of Ibn
Taymiyya. He was the first Muslim scholar to expropriate the authority to declare jihad—
a power previously reserved for a rightful imam6. Three major attacks on the Muslim
Empire during Ibn Taymiyya‘s life radicalized his studies and writings: the Tatar Mongol
invasion from the East, the influx of Crusaders from West, and the military betrayal by
Mamluk Caucasians from within. Ibn Taymiyya took the right and responsibility of
declaring Jihad out of the hands of the Imam and gave it to the masses, changing forever
2
The world-wide community of Muslims
3
عرب
َب عربThe original and ethnically Arab Muslims
4
عربٍسخععرLiterally meaning ―Arabized Arabs‖ including all converts to the religion after the original
Muslim expansion
5
Hulagu Khan
6
اإلٍاًباىعادهThe Fair Imam is the supreme religious and political empire of the Muslim umma
2
It was this political climate that spurred Ibn Taymiyya to be the first cleric to re-
define Jihad as the religious justification to war that many terrorist organizations use
today. Though long dead, his ideas were revived during periods with political parallels to
the times in which he first popularized his beliefs. As the Ottoman Empire weakened and
fell, Mohammed Ibn `Abd al-Wahab drew on Ibn Taymiyya‘s work to call for a return to
Islam as it was originally practiced. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the
presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Wars revived for the second time
on Mamluk slaves as their military apparatus. While it was common for the military
leaders to fight each other to be near the caliph, they would put their divisions aside in the
These were not the Mamluk‘s birthright lands and they resented the system which
treated them as second class citizens. Thus, valued their small kingdoms over the larger
Arab empire and made deals with threatening conquerors relinquishing the rule of small
pieces of land in exchange for the right to stay in power. They preferred to be number one
in their smaller kingdoms rather than being part of a greater empire that relegated them to
a second class, leaving them few resources to present a united Arab military front
(Michot 1995).
In comparison to the military of the Mamluks, the patriotic Arabs before them
were willing to fight for the survival of the empire, refusing propositions made by
3
conquering forces. The Mamluks held second-class status in the empire overall, but their
successful administration of petty kingdoms gave them local power which they sought to
maintain. After the fall of Baghdad Mamluks became kings, and fled Baghdad and stayed
This retreat of the Mamluks from Baghdad meant that the caliph failed to gather
the requisite forces to stop Mongolian invasion. The Mongols were brilliant military
leaders as shown by their vicious conquest of all lands from Central Asia to the shores of
the Mediterranean. However, their slash and burn tactics destroyed civilizations. They
moved from land to land because they were incapable politicians who couldn‘t rule and
knew only war. When they came to the Middle East it was the first time in history, a
conquering force adopted the culture and religion of the land they conquered
During the Mongol invasion, the intruders realized the power of the Imam and the
importance of destroying him. From their stronghold in Tabriz (present-day Iran), they
sent the Caliph a message calling for his surrender which he refused, saying that the
Imam of Muslims does not surrender to anyone but God. The Caliph Mu`atasim fatally
assumed those three months would be enough to send runners to all Islamic territories
and re-form his army but by then the empire was at it‘s weakest point. Al-Mut`asim, the
last caliph was a spoiled and foolish young man had not maintain the pivotal runner
Not only did he overestimate his ability to regroup his army, but he also failed to
realize that Mongols actually prefer winter for their attacks. As soon as summer and
4
autumn ended, with the granted time coming to an end, the Caliph began to form an
army. This was too little too late and by this time, Mongol forces pressed at the gates of
Baghdad. When they invaded, one castle stood alone, defenseless and unprepared for the
Mongol siege.
They ruthlessly destroyed everything. Hulago‘s 7 first order of invasion was to kill
every male above the age of 13, a massacre which lasted for two weeks. They killed the
caliph and his 13 sons and his daughters and his wives, destroying every single living
symbol of Arabic Muslim Empire. They showed no mercy or respect to anybody with
ruthlessness unmatched in any war between two empires before (Klein-Franke 2007).
The Mongols had destroyed the core and source of Arab Muslim strength and the
ultimate symbol of its power, forever eliminating the caliphate by killing al-Mua`tasim
Cultural Consequences
The Arab Muslims who lived during the time of the fall of the empire saw a
dramatic change in their culture, their religion, and most importantly their mother tongue.
Historically, their language was their biggest source of pride and unity. Arabic as a
language was extremely important to them as shown by the fact that their prophet‘s only
The reason for this rapid change was that newcomers to Islam brought with them
their languages, traditions and beliefs, mixing these with the existing culture. New faith
7
Hulagu Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan was the Mongol conqueror who led the sack of Baghdad
(Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2009) Accessed 4/29/2010
http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=
39012518&site=ehost-live
5
groups in Islam such as the Sufis8 created during this time exemplify how the new mix of
Patriotic Arab clerics such as Ibn Taymiyya believed that the purity of Islam was
the source of its strength and the force behind all of the past success and the victories of
the Islamic empire. According to these Arab patriots, the only pure Islam was that which
was carried by the original Arab Muslims and their descendents thereafter. They kept
themselves away from the Sufis, whose beliefs were adopted by the Mamluk sultanates.
Scholars like Ibn Taymiyya thought that the new orders had nothing to do with the
original religion which organized every single detail of the political, social, and economic
life of believers, even discussing beliefs surrounding military and war tactics—something
Ibn Taymiyya was born in what is now Saudi Arabia during the Tatar invasions of
the Muslim empires. He fled with his family and moved to Damascus where he published
his first religious interpretations by the age of 20. His area of study focused particularly
on Jihad and hurub ar-rasool9, the wars of the prophet. His formative years were thus
spent in a political climate of great upheaval and change, reacting to the diversification of
Islam that would bring about the subsequent collapse of the Muslim Empire.
The fall of Baghdad affected Taymiyya deeply. He personally bore witness to the
end of Islam‘s golden age and the empire‘s transition from a super power to small and
8
صىفيan adjective describing the practitioners of the mystical sunni sects of Islam
9
دعورباىعّ سىهThe wars fought by the Prophet Mohammed against infidels in his lifetime (Imam Shirazi
World Foundation 2006) accessed 5/1/2010
6
scattered kingdoms ruled by non Arab rulers, who, as recent converts to the religion, did
not prize Islamic heritage as deeply as Arab Muslims. This fall from power inspired his
interest and subsequent research and writings concerning Jihad. When the Mongolian
Tatars killed the Caliph10, there remained no murja`ia 11. The Mongolians had effectively
ended righteous Jihad for good, having killed the caliph and all of his sons, wives, and
blood relatives, making it so no one remained with the religious authority to declare Jihad
Ibn Taymiyya was the leading Sunni cleric of the time. His entire philosophy was
based on this idea of pure Islam and its perpetuity through the original believers and their
descendents (as-salaf as-salih12). One may easily see his radical reaction toward any new
or modern thought in the religion as reactionary to this influx of new practices in Islam,
and this became his weak point. He decided that it was up to him not only to fight new
things being added to Islam during that period, but he also started to fight things which
were established before his time under a ‗fair imam‘ which he had no authority to doubt.
However, the center of his philosophy was that the weakening and collapse of the Islamic
Empire was a result of the influx of other beliefs and practices on Islam which—
He believed it was his duty as a Muslim to fight current events, as well as to fight
the weight of history. Having witnessed the fall of the empire, he saw what the Imam
10
Another word for the Imam
11
ٍعجعliterally meaning reference, here a person holding religious authority to declare jihad as prescribed
by Muslim belief
12
اىسيفباىصاىخThe Righteous Descendents, those alive during the time of the life of the Prophet Mohammed
and of the four Rashidun Caliphs
7
could not have seen, and was thus felt endowed with the right to revise the word of the
fair imam.
With this philosophy as his starting point, he began to write his books about how
everything in Islam as a practice (mu`amilat13 and `ibadat14): (Arabi and Ibn Taymiyya
1998) has to be exactly the same as what the good descendents in the first generation of
Muslims who actually lived during Mohammad‘s life and during the time of the
Rashidun caliphs did. The Qur‘an says about them ―No falsehood comes from their hands
and no falsehood can approach them from before or from behind.‖15 Basing his ideology
on this term is what made him the first Salafi cleric. Most of the Salafi practices and
There are several schools of thought: hanbali, shaf`ai, maliki, and hanafi plus the
ideology of Shi‘is, ja`fari. The Ja`fari school of thought followed by Shi‘is is greatly
disliked by Ibn Taymiyya and Salafis today who consider them infidels for their
reverence of the family of the prophet. According to Shi‘is the twelfth imam will come
back with Christ at the end of the time to fill the earth with justice and fairness after the
period of evil and injustice. This effectively closed the door in the face of any cleric at
any time wishing to use this dangerous weapon. The other four divisions closed the door
13
ٍعاٍالثThe practical components of Islam which dictate human affairs not intended to bring one closer to
god.
14
ببإ باداثThe spiritual components of Islam including but not limited to: belief in the one god, praying,
fasting, alms giving, and pilgrimage
8
of fatwa16. Though this was less definitive of an obstacle to jihad, no cleric can make
fatwas without having strong evidence from their book as a reference for his fatwa.
Ibn Taymiyya opposed the centralization of the fatwa process and attributed to it
the weakening of Islam, as well as the outright denial of jihad in Ja‘fari thought. To
circumvent this, he started looking before the time of the division between the five
schools of Islamic ideology. Thus, the perfect time for him was that of the good
descendents. As they are even mentioned in the Qur‘an so no Muslim can argue with
whatever evidence he finds during their time to back up his new school of thought
There are four circumstances in which Muslims are allowed to kill anyone
without direct and explicit permission from a fair imam. These four just reasons for
murder are: in defense of one‘s money, in defense of honor, or `ard17 and their female
relatives, in defense of blood spilled, and in defense of religion (Swazo 2008). There is
only to be one fair imam in the world and this position was permanently eliminated by
the Mongol slaughter of the Caliph and his family. In consequence, any halal18 taking of
Ibn Taymiyya had observed this destruction of the Muslim Empire by the
Mongols and watched as Arabs under the command of Salah ad-Din19 began to stop the
crusaders.. Salah ad-Din, in his defense of Muslim territory against the Crusades,
abstained from declaring Jihad even though there was a fair Imam to validate it, unlike
16
فخىةA religious decree
17
عضArabic word meaning honor
18
دالهSomething which is permissible, also the opposite of sin, or haram ًدعا
19
ِ صالحباىديThe leader of Muslim forces in defense against the Third Crusade, known as Saladin in Europe
9
the Salafi organizations of today. While modern groups say they are fighting crusaders
and, therefore, have the right to declare Jihad, Salah ad-Din instead fought a permissible
war which was never declared as a jihad, even in the presence of a fair imam.
It was around this time as well that the Tatars and Mongolians became Muslim
and, after the peace treaty, some crusaders likewise converted and stayed in the territory,
Many of these new converts lived in Arab lands without speaking proper Arabic,
a fact that grated with conservative elements of Muslim society. These conservatives
believed corruption had infiltrated so deep in their society as to have infiltrated even the
Arabic language, the pride of the Arabs for centuries. Encouraged by the success of the
Arab campaigns against crusaders, they felt well positioned to form a new Arab patriotic
military campaign against all non-Muslims Their aim was to re-form a pure society out
These factors—the numerous violent conquests on the Muslim Empire, the killing
of the Caliph, and the perceived corruption of Arab society—together drove Ibn
Taymiyya to write what were essentially the new rules for Jihad drawing from Kitab20,
Qur‘an and Sunnah21. After centuries of the rule of the Arab iron fist around the world,
their enemies had come to realize that the source of their strength was the fair imam. The
holy man who served as the spiritual leader and political of the empire, and supreme
20
مخارLiterally meaning book, here referring to the holy books revered in Islam including the Torah and
the Bible
21
سّْتباىعّ سىهThe traditions, sayings, and habits of the Prophet Mohammed as reported by various sources
10
military leader—the only person who could declare jihad and inspire their countless
purify Islam by removing the impurities and live just like the old descendents and do
exactly what they did and follow their beliefs and practices and commands blindly. What
ever happened after their time became matters of arguing between the five schools. He
they sultanate there was Sufi, and thus not receptive to being declared infidels. In Egypt,
the Sufi sultan of Alexandria imprisoned him, incidentally making him famous. Under
public pressure, Ibn Taymiyya was released and moved to Cairo where he was to say
But Ibn Taymiyya didn‘t stop there. He gathered followers around him again so
the authorities imprisoned him again, and he leveraged the authorities‘ unfairness to tell
the people how zaahid22 or ascetic he was. After that the authorities decided to banish
him from Egypt and send him back to Damascus where he started his journey. During
that time, he was afforded much time to write and produced more than 24 books about
the good descendents. The most important of them all was ‖Minhaj as-Sunnah”23 in
which he destroyed all of the fundamentals of the other schools of thought based their
preaching upon, going so far as to call most of them infidels. He wrote a book about ―the
22
زاهدAscetic, devoted to spiritual pursuits above all earthly ones
23
ٍْهجباىسّْتBook by Ibn Taymiyya (Ibn Taymiyya 1322)
11
Misguided Ones‖ al-thaleen24. Using Christians as an example, he said they should be
eliminated because they will never make real peace with Muslims. He said the same thing
about the Shi‘i and the Nussariyah25—the other 80% of schools of thought in Islam.
Ibn Taymiyya‘s fatwas were in thirty seven books by the time he died at the age
of 67 in the prison the Damascus castle (qala’t salah ad-din). His death in the prison
drew much attention. Public opinion was against the authorities back then for being soft
and making treaties with the crusaders. Shortly after his death, his books and his school
of thought had been almost forgotten, partly due to his belief in violent elimination of
Allah‖26 in which he declared that groups don‘t need a fatwa from a fair imam to fight an
enemy in your land, or anywhere else you can harm him. Changing this ideological
convention was a critical turning point. As part of traditional Islamic belief, declaring a
jihad fatwa to fight the enemies of Islam still requires a fair imam. Here, Ibn Taymiyya
dismissed this obligation—in effect handing out the rights for DIY fatwas. He went so far
as to disregard the fatwa which all the Muslims agreed upon which classified the states
between dar al-harb27 and dar al-salm28: house of war, house of peace, or less literally,
state of war and state of peace. Even if a fair Imam has declared jihad has you cannot
24
ِ اىظاىيThe misguided ones as referred to in the Qur‘an
25
ّسعيتA group believing that the caliphate should remain in the family of the Prophet and that this cannot
wait until judgment day, but that they must participate in revolution now to make this a reality
26
جيهادبفيبسبيوبهللاJihad in the name of/for the sake of God
27
دارباىذعرThe permissible state of war
28
ٌ دارباىسّيThe permissible state of peace, during which no war can be fought
12
fight your enemy during dar as-silm but according to Ibn Taymiyya the whole world is
dar al-harb until the entire world believes in what he believes: the practice of and rule by
a Salafi Islam
Wahabi Revival
Viewing the world as in a perpetual state of dar al-harb was adopted by Wahabis
in the 19th century when they established the first Saudi-Wahabi state in Saudi Arabia.
Ibn Taymiyya‘s long dormant ideas were revived by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutub 29‘s
books in the early 20th century. Wahabis at the time were fighting the hanafi30 Ottoman
Empire. Weakening the Ottoman Empire was a shared interest of the British and the
Wahabis, and with British help they conquered most of the land between Najd and
The British also supported the Wahabi movement with weapons and military
advisors and maps, sometimes offering air support as they did in the battle of ad-Diraiyah
in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia where all the oil wealth is now found. Sayyid
Qutub was not viewed favorably by the Wahabis because his intention was to use the
ideology of Ibn Taymiyya to declare jihad against the British occupation of Egypt,
29
سيدبقطبThe intellectual force behind the Muslim Brotherhood who wrote many famous books advocating
a return to pure Islam, the most famous of which is called ―Signposts on the Path‖ or ‖ بٍعيٌبفيباىطعيق‖ب
30
بدْفيبOld school of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence
31
اىْجدبواىذجازبLarge territory in what is now Saudi Arabia from the coastal strip along the Red Sea to the
central flats of Saudi Arabia
13
He failed and died, but one of his students, Hassan al-Banna32, who established
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt adopted the same thoughts and beliefs, adding from
Ibn Taymiyya‘s books to his own ideology—using the same reasons to declare jihad
against the kings of Egypt and Sudan because they were backed by the west because they
were not Arabs and following the good descendants‘ established path.
Parallel Realities
By comparing the times and political situation that Ibn Taymiyya experienced
after the fall of the Islamic empire and its‘ subsequent occupation, with the time and
political circumstances of the formation of the Wahabi movement and the writing of
Sayyid Qutub, we find striking similarity in the socio- and geo-political conditions of the
fall of the Muslim Caliphate, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Nafi 2009).
of Egypt sensed the potential danger of the movement and decided to stop it by
imprisoning some of the followers. This was the height of tension between the
movement and the authorities in Egypt, and after the assassination of the prime minister
who had just disbanded the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna was assassinated in
retaliation. Everybody thought that was the end of al-Banna‘s movement in Egypt, but
two years later the military revolution occurred in Egypt. The inexperienced government
tried to wear the Islamic robe to lead the Egyptians and to control the southern territory of
Sudan. Public opinion favored the Islamic regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood
32
دسِباىبْابPolitical leader and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood
33
باىَاىلبفؤادبThe last king of Egypt to wield any power
14
Abdel Nasser34 decided to free the Muslim brothers from prison and to investigate
Hassan al-Banna‘s assassination. He ordered the capture of two of the top officials of the
royal palace and imprisoned them, accusing them of his assassination. Abdel Nasser gave
the brothers maneuvering space and time to reform their line and re-elect leadership.
Learning from history‘s mistakes at this time, it became an organization with multi-
headed leadership. This gave the Muslim Brotherhood a sort of hydra effect; so, it
became impossible for anyone to take the whole organization by taking the head off.
This spirit of Ibn Taymiyya‘s decentralized the religion and allowed anybody to be the
leader and the soldier and the cleric at the same time.
However, the honeymoon between Abdel Nasser and his revolutionary supreme
council and the Muslim Brotherhood did not survive an attempt to assassinate Abdel
Nasser when he was giving a public speech from a balcony in Alexandria on the 26 th of
October in 1954. The authorities blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for this attempt even
though many believe that Abdel Nasser himself faked the attempt in order to re-imprison
the Muslim Brotherhood members who, at the time were the fastest growing threat to
Nasser‘s revolution. Nasser saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the Arab
and supporting clerics after he executed various leaders and launched a campaign to clear
34
جمال عبد الناصر
15
al-Azhar35 from all the clerics who supported the Muslim Brotherhood or believed in Ibn
Taymiyya‘s fatwas.
During the 1960‘s Abdel Nasser almost succeeded in eliminating the movement,
but the 1967 war came and destroyed Abdel Nasser‘s biggest source of power—the
Egyptian armed forces. Egypt suffered crippling damages during that war almost left the
military government crippled and gathered all of its forces east of the Suez canal to
defend Cairo from the Israeli army. During the six-day war in 1960, the Arab nationalist
movement‘s pride suffered irreparable injuries which led Abdel Nasser to go alone to al-
Azhar to pray and ask for the people‘s support to free the lost territories. This gesture
Between 1967 and 1970, Abdel Nasser‘s regime stopped harassing the Muslim
Brotherhood acknowledging he needed the mosque‘s authority and influence over the
people. Religious authority will go beyond any government authority in Egypt as there is
a mosque in every village and neighborhood in Egypt. It is clearly far beyond the
government‘s capabilities to match that influence to recruit people to rebuild the country
and rebuild the armed forces to re-take the Sinai and heal the fatal blows suffered byArab
pride. However, in most of the nations who lost the war, the public opinion shifted
toward god and religion to protect them and help them win the next war.
Abdel Nasser died suddenly in 1970, and General Anwar Sadat, the most
pragmatic Arab leader, succeeded him in office. He shut down all the secret prisons and
35
جاٍعتباالزهارباىشعيفThe Noble Azhar University which has been the leading Sunni institution of literature
and Islamic Jurisprudence since the late 10th century.
16
the internment work camps for political prisoners in which were the majority of the
prisoners were Muslim Brotherhood members and communists. He even revealed the
secret phone-tapping documents of the political leaders of the country and held a meeting
harm in Egypt from now one. This spiked his approval ratings, allowing him to control
the government and the country with more ease. The boost was desperately needed, for in
the beginning the supreme revolutionary council voted for him to be the president
perceiving him as the weakest and least well known of all of them. Without public
support, he would have been the council‘s puppet. As-Sadat now had the street power
behind him to eliminate the power centers and lobbyists in the regime loyal to Abdul
revenue of the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia; and this oil revenue was beyond any previous
charitable contribution. Saudi Arabia lacked the internal infrastructure on which to spend
their revenue and needed an outside market for their new capital. This brought millions of
dollars to Egypt, to the Brotherhood, and to the government. This is a stark contrast to
Abdel Nasser‘s time when he fought against the Wahabis in Yemen and the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt.
After the 1973 war, Sadat and the Egyptian Army won the war against Israel and
crossed the Suez Canal. This created a new situation in the Middle East that dragged the
superpowers and the international community in to solve the crisis between Israel and
17
Egypt before it would become an international crisis, which led to the Camp David
accords between Egypt and Israel. That was a turning point in public opinion and was a
huge disappointment for the Muslim Brotherhood who thought that even Abdel Nasser,
their number one enemy who had imprisoned them and executed their leaders was better
than Anwar Sadat because he didn‘t shake hands with the Zionists. Organized protests
filled the streets in most of the areas that the Muslim Brotherhood controlled. They took
to the streets of Cairo, protesting against the treaty and calling Anwar Sadat a traitor
Anwar Sadat decided to strike back, this time in a different way than what the
Muslim Brotherhood was used to. He struck them through the National Assembly by
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic Church in Alexandria. The Muslim
Brotherhood claimed that the Coptic Church hosted a play that offended the Prophet
Mohammed and threatened to burn down all of the Coptic churches in Egypt down unless
the Coptic Church apologized. As-Sadat used this incident as an excuse to re-imprison
most of their leaders and attack them publicly on national TV where he used strong
words against their leaders calling them names like ―filthy dogs‖ ―primitive‖
―uneducated‖ ―clerics‖ ―from the 13th century‖. These words were an internal message
18
This incident directly lead to his assassination by Khalid al-Islambooli36, during a
military parade on the revolution day. Al-Islambooli was part of a secret armed cell
which followed the command of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was executed and general
Husni Mubarak37 became president and declared a state of emergency and banned the
brotherhood from any political or social activity, re-imprisoning many of their followers
and leaders.
mountains of the southeast border area. During that time, the Wahabi clerics in Saudi
Arabia declared Jihad on the Soviet troops in Afghanistan based to Ibn Taymiyya‘s
fatwas which gave them the authority to do so, even in the absence of a fair imam. They
started sending money and recruits to Afghanistan through Islamic charities and
organizations in Pakistan run and funded by Saudi Arabia. The United States backed this
movement and sent military equipment and advisors to train the fighters in camps
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The regime in Egypt found this a golden opportunity
to get rid of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were thorns in their side,
specifically the most violent cells, by making a deal with them to send them to the greater
Jihad against the Soviet invaders of Islamic Afghanistan. Of course, the Muslim
Brotherhood swallowed the bait and started sending a flow of people to Afghanistan.
Most of the governments in the Middle East started making it easy for unwanted jihadists
to go to Pakistan where their final destination would be the border American training
36
خاىدباإلسالٍبىىيبEgyptian officer largely responsible for assassination of Anwar Sadat
37
ٍذَدبدسْيبٍباركبAnwar Sadat‘s vice president who assumed the presidency upon death of Sadat and has
been there ever since.
19
camps to fight the Soviet enemy. Organizing these camps was done with the blessing of
the CIA (the Central Intelligence Organization) and the greater U.S. Government.
The Arab fighters in Afghanistan grew in numbers and became what they call the
―Arab Afghans38‖. They were hard-core fighters who had nothing to lose but their lives,
which they believed is the ultimate sacrifice and would redeem them from whatever sins
they‘ve committed on Earth, making a clear, wide open path to paradise. Those Arab
Afghan fighters were different than the true Afghan fighters, because they were pure
fighters with no political agendas or local affiliations like Afghan groups fighting the
Soviets. Their attitude gave them the upper hand in battles with the Soviets and in the
entire war over all; not to mention the help of millions of Saudi dollars and the training
by the most lethal trainers in the world, the CIA and the green berets.
The Arab Afghans are the first manifestation of what we know today as al-Qaida.
After the complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Arab Afghans
appeared on the surface and to the public as holy heroes who brought the lost pride of the
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union later on as well as the fall of Warsaw
and the Iron Curtain, busied the west with re-organizing Eastern Europe and preserving
the Soviet heritage during the 1990‘s. This gave time to the Arab Afghans and their new
leader Osama Bin Laden—a prince from the royal family of Saudi Arabia and a member
38
Arab Afghans were the ethnically non-Afghan men organized around Islam to expel the Soviets from
Afghanistan
20
international organization, which is what they call ―qa`dat al-islam39‖ meaning the base
of Islam.
invasion of Kuwait. By night time, Saddam controlled 20% of the world‘s oil production.
Fearing that the Republican Guard would march forward to Saudi Arabia‘s eastern oil-
rich fields and gain control of 50% of the world‘s oil, the Kingdom‘s government invited
The United States of America launched Operation Desert Shield which flooded
the holy lands of Saudi Arabia with western forces for the first time in Islamic history.
The Saudi government knew that they were playing with fire, but they had no other
choice. Saddam controlling the eastern oil fields jeopardized the entire region and the
world. Nascent Al-Qaida vehemently opposed this and called for the formation of an
Islamic army from Muslim countries to protect the holy land and liberate Kuwait, and
asked the Saudi government to retract their invitation to the foreign forces.
Al-Qaida‘s demand was not realistic because the oil fields were only a few
hundred miles south of the border with Kuwait, lightly defended by the comparatively
inadequate Saudi army. In the face of the world‘s fifth largest army at the time, the Iraqi
army, the Saudis had no choice but to call upon the West and specifically the United
39
اىقا دةName of premier world-wide terrorist organization, literally meaning in Arabic ―The Base‖
21
The Saudi government disregarded Bin Laden‘s demands and the campaign
escalated until the allied forces launched Operation Desert Storm, using Islam‘s holiest
lands to launch their attack and repel Saddam‘s forces. The operation was a huge success
for the allied forces, who liberated Kuwait within two months. The Iraqi forces suffered
catastrophic damages but Saddam managed to maintain enough military power to control
Even though the military campaign destroyed most of the offensive capabilities of
the Iraqi army, Saddam managed to hide a few hundred long-range ballistic missiles and
four thousand tanks and two thousand pieces of artillery with an immense stock-pile of
chemical warheads. Thus he remained a threat if he were to decide to launch any suicide
operations. This is why Kuwait and Saudi Arabia wanted a permanent US presence on
That decision continues to affect the region and the entire world; this foreign
presence is what al-Qaida used as an excuse to declare jihad against the Saudi
government and the royal family for the first time. The Saudi government found itself
between two difficult choices: fighting yesterday‘s ally, al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden—
whose beliefs enjoy deep popular support; and living at mercy of Saddam‘s whim and
arsenal.
fast. In 1992, al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the first terrorist attack against two
hotels hosting westerners, mostly Americans in Yemen. The attack was intended to
22
eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia in support of operation Restore
Hope. The Saudi government banished bin Laden and he moved to Sudan where he
stayed with Hassan at-Turabi, an Islamist theoretician. From Sudan he started re-
grouping the Arab Afghan fighters. In 1993 when Saudi Arabia gave support for the Oslo
Accords which set the path for peace between Israel and Palestine, bin Laden and
Zawahiri opposed this decision as al-Qaida‘s supreme leaders. Zawahiri was already
wanted by the Egyptian authorities for his affiliation with the assassination attempt on the
life of Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sudqi. The police arrested 280 of al-Jihad‘40s
In 1994, King Fahad41 sent a delegate to Sudan to bring bin Laden back but Sudan
refused because of bin Laden‘s support of the Islamic groups in the south who were
fighting the Christian separatists and paying millions of dollars to support them. After
the American withdrawal from Somalia, it was declared as a failed state, meaning that
there was no form of government controlling the territory. Al-Qaida found this to be a
golden opportunity to plant its roots in the African horn42, spreading its cells through the
region in the name of fighting the increased Israeli influence in the region. However, this
led to the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar as-Salam. Here, al-Qaida
40
اىجهادباإلسالٍيباىَصعيبThe Egyptian Islamic Jihad, referred to as “al-Jihad” seeking to institute Islamic
law in Egypt
41
اىَيلبفهدببِب بدباىسعىدKing of Saudi Arabia until 2005
42
The Horn of Africa: The part of Eastern Africa literally shaped like a horn
23
Sudan found itself surrounded by the international community and facing the
threat of a U.S. military operation on its soil against al-Qaida, like that which happened in
1969 against what the U.S. thought to be al-Qaida training camps and chemical weapons
factories, despite the Sudanese government‘s insistence that they were just
manufacturing drugs. Seeking to avoid a repeat of this episode, the Sudanese government
Back in Afghanistan, the Taliban who were gaining power and territory welcomed
their old allies back. Al-Qaida returned back to where it had begun—Afghanistan, and
In 1998, bin Laden and Zawahiri signed and issued a declaration under the name
of the Organization ―World Islamic Front‖ called‖ Combat Against the Jews and
Crusaders43‖. From that date until September 11th, 2001, al-Qaida was a big part of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and played a key role in Taliban military success in the
Afghan civil war. In 2001, al-Qaida hit the heart of the American empire and the world‘s
financial capital fast and hard to send a clear message that they did not fear anyone or any
power ruling the world now. However, the attack brought al-Qaida back to the surface
from Kandahar‘s caves and it became the world‘s most dangerous and powerful terrorist
organization. Even the United States—the biggest military power in the world—needed
the support of other countries to fight it. Al-Qaida‘s strategy behind the attack was to
drag the U.S. into a long conflict on a battlefield they knew well and had already fought
the only military power comparable to the U.S. on it for ten years and won. Al-Qaida
43
"ِ( "بّصببياُباىجبهتباإلسالٍيتباىعاىَيتبىجهدباىيهىدبواىصييبييWorld Islamic Front 1998)
24
knew that after the attack the Americans would strike back, and hard, but from a military
perspective that‘s what they wanted: to choose the battlefield where theywould have the
upper hand. In the mountains of Afghanistan, the technological disparity between their
fighters and the U.S. military became less important a tactic they continue to use
successfully today.
The Taliban‘s regime collapsed after the allied invasion of Kabul and al-Qaida
fled the country, with most of al-Qaida‘s leaders moving to the tribal area of Waziristan.
Here, they reorganized their lines to start a long guerilla war against the U.S. and their
allies in Afghanistan. After the 2001 war in Afghanistan, al-Qaida changed their tactics.
Instead of the traditional, pyramid organization it was, it shifted shape into a line
organization. The line had already been told by Ibn Taymiyya that the whole world was
dar al-harb, giving the impetus to hit the enemy where ever they can, whenever they can,
and as hard as they can. Technically, they no longer needed regular operational
statements to the media, especially on the al-Jazeera network, and over the Internet to
connect with the groups world-wide. Al-Qaida didn‘t gain much fame from this phase of
the war against the U.S. in Afghanistan because unlike when they were fighting the
Soviets, they didn‘t receive any support from any other country, not financial or military
support.
Support came from some radical Wahabi charity organizations in Saudi Arabia
through Afghanistan, and it is suspected that they have some connections in the Pakistani
government that allow them to have access to some sensitive information, useful for their
25
attacks. The war in Afghanistan was not very popular in the Islamic world because it
happened a thousand miles away from their immediate interests. But, after the U.S.‘s
invasion of Iraq, al-Qaida had the golden opportunity to fight its nemesis: the United
States of America, in the Arabian Peninsula—the center and the heart of the Islamic
Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia
Al-Qaida started its operations in Iraq a few months after the fall of Saddam‘s
regime. The first attack that al-Qaida claimed was the bombing of the Jordanian embassy
in Baghdad in 2003. However, al-Qaida‘s presence in Iraq began long before that,
starting in the Kurdish region in the north which was under the UN protection after desert
storm to protect the Kurds from revenge from Saddam. The new form of regional
government in the Kurdish region wasn‘t powerful enough to control its own territory,
In 1993 the first Islamic group linked directly to al-Qaida called Ansar al-Islam44
started operating in the mountainous area between Iraq and Iran. This area was among the
first targets during Operation Iraqi Freedom to be hit by cruise missiles, remaining a
target of air strikes until the end of the war. Most al-Qaida experts in Iraq think that the
leaders and most of the followers of Ansar al-Islam fled the area and went to Baghdad to
meld in with the chaos the fall of Saddam‘s regime brought with it. They started
contacting other regional extremists like Zarqawi. A Jordanian national who fought in
Afghanistan, and he worked as an advisor for the group during the1990‘s in the north. He
44
اّصارباإلسالًبA Kurdish Salafi group
26
came to Iraq to lead al-Qaida in Iraq and to establish what they call ―al-Qaida in
Mesopotamia.‖
Soon after their attack on the Jordanian embassy, they claimed responsibility for
the devastating suicide attack against the UN headquarters in Baghdad, which killed over
400 Iraqi civilians and UN employees including the chief of the mission, Sergio De Milo
leading the UN to withdraw all of its employees from Iraq and close their offices there,
running their operations from their regional office in Amman. Al-Qaida became an
embarrassment to the coalition forces and the newly formed Iraqi transitional government
under the supervision of the coalition provisional authority. It became one of the most
difficult challenges that both of the US government and the Iraqi government would deal
After several big attacks, al-Qaida made an alliance with the remaining members
of Saddam‘s regime and the B`athists who fled to Syria, fearing the revenge of the Iraqi
people after the collapse of the regime. The B`ath party45 thought they would use al-
Qaida as their armed wing to achieve political success by embarrassing the US in Iraq
and make the current government weak and non-functional. Al-Qaida realized early that
the B`athists just wanted to use them to reach a deal with the Americans to have the
chance to rejoin political life in Iraq. Al-Qaida distanced itself from the B`ath party,
45
دزرباىبعثباىععبيباالشخعاميKnown as the Arab Socialist Ba`th Party is a secular pan-Arab socialist party
which has ruled both Syria and Iraq at different times
27
However, from 2003 to 2007, al-Qaida succeeded in launching catastrophic
attacks all over Iraq against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government and the Iraqi
civilians who were affiliated with the new government and the coalition forces, especially
the Shi‘ia who supported and participated in the new government and the liberation of
Iraq.
The most complicated and dangerous attack took place in Samarra, 170 miles
north of Baghdad when al-Qaida managed to bomb and destroy one of the most sacred
This single attack put Iraq on the edge of a civil war. In the hours that proceeded
the attack, over 170 attacks were recorded against Sunni mosques in the capital alone.
The day after protesters walked the streets in most of the Shi‘i neighborhoods and cities
asking for revenge; threatening that if the government couldn‘t or wouldn‘t do that give
them revenge, and if the Americans couldn‘t protect them, they would wipe out the entire
Sunni population of Iraq—around 25% of the Iraqi population. Sectarian violence led to
the area where al-Qaida mostly operated from around Baghdad, known as the Sunni
The new government of Iraq found itself in a difficult position of being incapable
of placating angry masses and of taking the revenge that the angry crowds in the streets
demanded because of their limited military resources. Thus, they needed American
support. Somehow, the Iraqi government, with the help of the Shi‘ia cleric in Iraq (Ali as-
46
ٍعقدباىعسنعيis a twelve Shi‘i shrine in Samarra, Iraq that because of its great cultural importance, has
often been targeted by sunny extremists
28
Sistani47) managed to calm the angry streets. The top US commander, General David
Petraeus, flew to Washington to ask the administration for 30,000 more troops in Iraq in
order to impose order in the streets of Iraq. The administration greed and congress gave
the green light for the increased troop levels and increased war funds.
Petraeus‘ Plan
General Petraeus started the surge in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle to crack
bought the loyalty of the Sunni tribal leaders in the Sunni areas and supported them
against al-Qaida attacks directed at the tribe leaders for not paying a protection tax. This
became one of the American top strategies to fight al-Qaida in Iraq and this Sons of Iraq
initiative spread through the Sunni areas forming what was called the ―Awakening‖
The Sunni Awakening turned the war against al-Qaida in Iraq and was a huge turn
in the overall war where al-Qaida lost their operative areas, recruits, supply routes, and its
social support among the local Sunni populations—the only area in Iraq where they had
support to begin with. Al-Qaida suffered catastrophic damages to its structure by losing
almost 90% of their leaders by aerial attacks launched by the US, and the rest was lost as
the local fighters who used to work for al-Qaida switched sides to the Awakening after
47
اىسيدب ييباىذسيْيباىسيسخاّيIs the highest Shi‘a authority in the world right now
29
By the end of 2007, the roads to Baghdad were opened and the death triangle,
became a relatively safe place again, colloquially returning to the Sunni triangle. Iraq
held another election and a national constitutional government was put in place for the
first time in the country‘s history, and its armed forces started increasing in numbers and
equipment. A huge military campaign was launched against the Shi‘ia militia who were
attacking the Sunni neighborhoods in the name of fighting al-Qaida. That gave the Shi‘ia
impact in the battle. Al-Qaida was pushed out of the Sunni Triangle and out of Baghdad
to a mountain area north of Baghdad in the provinces of Ninava, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and
Diyala. This area had no cities or villages or even accessible roads—important for the
most rudimentary operational base. The area was surrounded by hundreds of military
Al-Qaida lost its last support in Iraq and the Islamic world saw all of the
devastating attacks against Iraqi civilians and the death toll among Muslim Iraqis—
hundreds of times higher than the coalition-caused deaths in Iraq. Even the most
extremist groups started questioning the point of this massacre against Muslims in the
name of jihad. Al-Qaida lost the initiative, lost the domestic support, and lost the
international extremist sympathy which decreased the supply of foreign recruits on whom
they depended to carry out their suicide attacks in Iraq. At the end of 2008 a joint
intelligence operation led by the American Special Forces with the Iraqi Special Forces
on a Syrian border town led to the capture of one of al-Qaida‘s leaders alive. From his
confiscated laptop security forces found all of the information about the international
30
recruits and their routes from Europe and North Africa and the Middle East. After the
This huge loss impacted the operations of al-Qaida‘s suicide missions in Iraq.
With al-Qaida left crippled and handcuffed, choking with no international aid, starving
for domestic support, they started thinking about another strategy. For the first time al-
Qaida used female suicide bombers in Iraq. From a western perspective it may seem
inconsequential, but anybody who knows the structure of the society and the traditions
According to all Muslim schools of thought, including Ibn Taymiyya and the
Salafis, there is no jihad for the women—jihad is requisite for all Muslim men and
women are exempt from this responsibility. They can participate if they want but most
likely as a matter of culture, they didn‘t in Iraq, even in al-Qaida attacks up until then.
The huge security increase in Iraq, and the huge decrease of the amounts of attacks which
went from 200 attacks per day to 17 attacks per day, gave the government the time and
the maneuvering space to distribute its forces and regain the initiative to launch counter
attacks against the insurgency. But, the security forces in Iraq are almost entirely male
and in Iraq, just like any other Muslim country, especially in the Middle East, a male
security officer is not allowed to touch or search any female, and sometimes, not even
31
Al-Qaida used this hole in security and started recruiting women to launch suicide
attacks because they knew how dangerous this weapon would be and the amount of effort
the government would need to train another army, of female security personnel and
distribute them to all of the important checkpoints and security units, or to order male
security officers to search females which would cause the government indescribably
outcry from the public. Either way, the government would need time to adjust to the
tactic and find the solution to it which would not be easy. That was al-Qaida‘s reasoning,
to take back the initiative back from out of the hands of the Iraqi government and put the
part of everyday life. That being said, is it impossible to understand why one human
being would end their life to end the lives of others. Through this comprehensive history,
we examined how Mamluk ambivalence contributed to the fall of the Muslim Empire at
the hands of the Mongols in the 13th century. The subsequent integration of the Mongols
and that of crusaders who stayed after the battles led to a dilution of Arab Muslim
culture. These incidents deeply impacted Ibn Taymiyya, the jurist who re-defined Jihad
as a right explicitly reserved for a fair Imam to something any Islamic jurist can declare.
At the time of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Wahabis based their ideology
on Ibn Taymiyya‘s Salafi interpretations, based on a similar sequence of events. After the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the presence of American troops on holy Muslim land
32
during the two Gulf Wars of the 1990‘s, bin Laden and al-Qaida saw the same threat to
Islam that Ibn Taymiyya saw, leading them to revive his ideology once again.
33
METHODOLOGY
I began my search on Lexis-Nexis Academic Resource (Lexis Nexis 2010)and
identified all mentions of ―Iraq‖ and ―female‖ and ―suicide terroris*‖. I compiled all of
the news with those I collected from the internet cross-listed with incident database
iraqbodycount.org (Iraq Body Count 2010) as well as that of antiwar.com (Anti War.com
2010) and with the Brooking‘s Institution ―Iraq Index” (O' Hanlon and Livingston 2010).
increased troop levels and more generally the Iraq war in general has negative effects on
the casualties and other sites to over-represent the effectiveness of the surge. Thus,
military counts of this data would be more accurate though possibly still biased to reflect
the success of their operations in reducing violence or civilian deaths, or to reflect what
The U.S. government has not declassified any documents relating to terrorism
since 1987, and none about Iraq since 2003. However, one can apply for an account to
research is limited by the widely varying reports of death and injury counts, as well as
inconsistencies in the permanence of digital news sources beyond one or two years.
34
CHAPTER TWO: FEMALE
PERPETRATED ATTACKS IN IRAQ
2005-2010
The use of female suicide attackers is in Iraq is a strategic organizational decision.
It was a response to the increase of America and Multi-National Force Coalition troops in
2007 that acted as a barrier to the use of male suicide bombers. The fact that an
decision to use women. This is especially true when combined with the confessions of a
captured organizer which shows us that 34% of the total of female suicide attackers in
Iraq were directly and strategically organized by this one woman. What makes women
more successful perpetrators of suicide attacks is the fact that they are culturally exempt
The absence of self-organization also makes the use of women a clearly strategic
decision. Many of these women were coerced to participate as shown by the same
apprehended organizer, and some women were very young or mentally handicapped.
Iraqi female suicide bombers were selected and recruited by an operator, meaning
someone else made the decision to perpetrate this act rather than each individual woman.
messages celebrating martyrs, nothing of this sort is made to boast the acts of these
women. Palestinian suicide organizations not only use women, but also include them in
35
postmortem. Attacks of this nature are strategic because of the perceived effectiveness of
The Surge
On January 10th of 2007, President Bush announced his ―New Way Forward‖, an
action plan to deploy an additional five U.S. Army Brigades, approximately 20,000
American soldiers to Iraq (Laurent 2009). Also known as the ―surge‖, this increase in
troop levels was intended to reinforce and secure Baghdad and the Sunni Anbar province.
This action proved effective at reducing casualty rates in affected areas over the long
term. Table 1 shows the astonishing 62% reduction in Iraqi civilian casualties from 2007
when the surge was announced, to a year later. In the year of 2007 alone, there was a
68% reduction in Iraqi civilian deaths from 2,807 in January of 2007 to 905 Iraqi civilian
36
Table 1: Iraqi Civilian Deaths iraqbodycount.org48 Acessed 04/22//2010
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/announcements/3/
The rise in the number of deaths points to the need to address the comprehensive
differences between the ideological justification used by Shi‘i groups-who see their
actions as defensive-and the offensive nature of Salafi-based jihad groups (such as al-
Digging Deep
There is relatively little literature that analyzes the number of female suicide
attackers in Iraq from 2005 through 2010. Yet the reason why I found it so critical to
research this subject, the contemporary nature of the conflict, was also the cause of much
of the difficulty in researching it. While much investigation has been done with regard to
Algeria‘s FLN (National Liberation Front) and in the infamous LTTE (Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Elam), the reportage of attacks and the associated body counts is a grim and
48
According to the Iraq Body Count website the data is based on 22,451 database entries from the
beginning of the war to 26 April 2010. The most recent weeks are always in the process of compilation and
will rise further. The current range contains 4,243–4,398 deaths (4.4%–4.2%, a portion which may rise or
fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps
in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths
from violence.
37
sometimes sporadic business. Subsequently, it has been difficult to find consistent
reliable figures of women‘s participation in suicide campaigns in Iraq. From the data I
compiled, I synthesized Figure1 below, showing the number dead and wounded by
female suicide attackers. This shows the marked increase from 2007 to 2008 in the
attacks are implemented by organizations that follow a strategic logic. He claims that
suicide attacks have increased since the 1980‘s because of the tactic‘s success in gaining
38
Pape‘s critical finding is that terrorism is strategic, not random or isolated;
announce specific goals and stop attacks when those have been achieved. According to
Pape, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern
the face of foreign occupation. Pape concludes that groups continue to use suicide attacks
Thus, the most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists‘
confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target society. Pape argues that,
―States that face persistent suicide terrorism should recognize that higher offensive
military action nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should invest
significant resources in border defense and other means of homeland security.‖ (Pape,
While Pape‘s premise that the strategic logic of suicide attacks targets liberal
that it is not so in Iraq. Of the 72 attacks perpetrated in Iraq by female suicide bombers,
not one targeted the Multi-National Force Coalition or even any non-Iraqi interests.
Every single female perpetrated attack targeted Shi‘i neighborhoods and pilgrims,
Awakening coalition members, Iraqi police, and other local interests such as weddings.
According to Pape, psychological profiles are not one size fits all, and therefore
such evaluations are not very useful. Even if suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical,
39
the leadership that directs and recruits them is not. He cites Thomas Schelling‘s, ―the
rationality of irrationality,‖ in which, ―an act that is irrational for individual attackers is
meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater
attacks are sure to come. As such, modern suicide terrorism is analogous to instances of
Of the 72 women who perpetrated suicide attacks in Iraq from 2005 to 2010, 76%
of these attacks were carried out after the beginning of the surge. Figure 1 shows the
dramatic decrease of male-perpetrated attacks after the beginning of the surge in 2007. At
group limits the ability of any other group to attack it. Barriers essentially require some
amount of time and effort to be defeated or circumvented, thus increasing the resources
needed to complete an operation against the group that erected the barrier (Jervis,
By increasing the planning required on the offending side, barriers slow down
offending groups and give the erectors more time to prepare for their attack. An-Nakhla
says ―a barrier supported with checkpoint systems and surveillance increases the
possibility of stopping and punishing infiltrators before they reach their targets.‖
(Nakhala 2009).
40
500
450 Total and Female Suicide Attacks per Year
400
350
300
250
Attacks
200
150
100
50
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
Erecting barriers is not a tactic that prevents attacks outright, but rather one that
contend that the increased use of female suicide bombers by al-Qaida in Mesopotamia49
and other related Sunni terrorist groups was a strategic reaction to the increased
In her doctoral prospectus, Dua‘a an-Nakhla claims that, ―barriers are institutions
of intensified border-policing enabling the state to practice coercion and extraction. These
practices include preventing exit and entry, suppressing contraband, and extracting
revenues from goods and people in the form of customs taxes.‖ (Nakhala 2009). I would
further posit that the surge of troops, the capture of high-level al-Qaida in Mesopotamia
49
The part of al-Qaida which operates in Iraq goes by the name ―al-Qaida in Mesopotamia‖
41
operatives, and loss of public support ostensibly served as immaterial barriers. These
three factors meet the criteria of a barrier and have the intention defined above, without
8% Courthouse
Hospital
Market
7%
Police
Shi'a Mosques & Neighborhoods
5% 2%
Shi'a Pilgrims
13% Wedding Procession
17%
This is supported by the anecdote of the capture of the Iraqi woman by the
orchestrating the rape of dozens of women in order to later convince them that the only
way to recover their honor was to perpetrate suicide attacks (Haynes 2009). The 51 year-
old woman claims that she was personally responsible for the recruitment of over 80
42
young women this way, and that 24 of them went on to perpetrate suicide attacks in
data, it is clear that attacks from Baghdad and Diyala‘s city of Baquba account for the
Al-Mu‘mineen (whose real name was Samira Ahmed Jassim) worked for a
network of Sunni extremists that directed her to orchestrate these attacks. They supplied
her with a monthly stipend and living quarters above a store where she sold abayas, the
long flowing black robes in which she concealed her recruits‘ bombs. Though the rapes
have not been independently confirmed, she allegedly manipulated the rape victims to
in the province of Diyala. This means that 48% of the women who committed suicide
attacks did so in, and were likely from, Diyala. Thus we can conclude that a strong
correlation exists between the political and social climate of that area and female suicide
attacks. Diyala is a province in the Sunni triangle where al-Qaida held their
organizational stronghold before the surge and awakening programs really took hold.
Figure 3 shows that 49% of attacks were perpetrated in this province (with 48% in
43
Baquba alone, a city in Diyala). This geographic centralization shows the organizational
confirms that, ―Female suicide bombers became a weapon of choice for al-Qaeda and
other extremist groups in Iraq over the past year because they can penetrate more easily
the defenses of the increasingly competent Iraqi security forces.‖ (Abdul-Zahra and
Murphy 2009)
44
―Um al-Mu‘mineen‖ was responsible for recruiting 24 female suicide attackers as
she claims to have done, this shows that she was directly responsible for 37% of all
Female Attacks From From this example we can surmise that Um al-
September 2009 to April
2010 by Location Mu‘mineen was not the only such recruiter for Ansar al-
Baghdad 18
Baiji 1 Islam, a group widely associated with al-Qaida. Rather,
Baquba 30
she exemplified the strategic trend by terrorist
Diyala 1
Dura 1 organizations to manipulate social conventions of the
Falluja 1
Kirkuk 5 need to cleanse personal and family honor after a rape
Tal Afar 3
Tarmia 1 through an honor killing. IN this case, she convinced the
Tikrit 2
women to perpetrate honor suicide attacks.
Unwilling Martyrs
Recruiters like Um al-Mu‘mineen target women in weak positions, as shown not
only by the coercion of rape victims, but also by the October 8 th, 2009 incident.
The coercive nature of the recruitment of women and girls in weak positions in
society is further shown by the example of Rania al-Ibrahim—a young girl who was
stopped before she detonated the bomb strapped under her robes in a crowded Baquba
45
market. She remembered her husband taking her to a woman‘s house where she was
served cookies and juice. This juice was drugged, and after they strapped her with a
remote-controlled bomb she was sent out to walk to the market. As the narcotic haze
began to lift, she realized that ―she didn‘t want to die‖ and walked toward a police
officer. The bomb was disarmed and she was subsequently taken into custody unharmed
(Chulov 2009).
The infamous February 1st double pet market attacks in Baghdad was another
women‘s chests were detonated by remote control, killing 99 and injuring over 154
Iraqis. While the original claim that these women were mentally retarded was
exaggerated, they were indeed recruited from a mental institution—a clear example of the
Terrorism‖, Mohammed Hafez argues that individuals are driven to suicide terrorism by
motives different than those held by their organizers. Organizations have strategic goals
and employ religion, ritual, and ceremony to legitimate and honor martyrdom. They
frame their tactics as a continuation of accepted and revered historical traditions in order
to imbue their worldly goals with the transcendent morality associated with national
salvation or religious redemption. Having that in mind, Hafez looks at (in the case of
46
Palestinian terrorism) the symbolic meaning ascribed to suicide attacks both by the
None of these things, however, apply to the case of Iraqi female suicide attackers.
The organizations which dispatch these women do not organize ceremonies to celebrate
recording any ideological justification for their suicide. The recruiting organizations do
not employ the rhetoric of national or ethnic redemption. Rather, recruits are more likely
to be reminded of the practical reasons why their sacrifice is the best way to de-shame
Hafez details the way in which a favorable cultural climate resonates with the
population is created, in effect tailoring history to meet their needs, effectively inspiring
the martyrs. The essence of this act is the process ―whereby old ideas are represented in
new ways that appear to be simultaneously authentic and relevant for contemporary
times.‖ (p 15).
historical events such as the revelation of Islam to the prophet and his defeat of the
infidels were parallels to Ibn Taymiyya, and to point out that their stories are now the
legitimizing rhetorical force behind Salafi jihad groups. Though Muslim groups around
the world who want to join this subscribe to Ibn Taymiyya‘s rhetoric, the direct
martyrdom in the way that was seen in Hafez‘s Palestinian case studies. Hence this
47
absent cultural climate has been critical to the diminishing public support for Ansar al-
Islam and other groups responsible for dispatching female suicide attackers.
I argue that if Iraqi female attackers were coming out of a symbolic cultural
practice, these attackers would be backed by organizations who spin the attack into
something that is redemptive in the field of ―religious revivalism, nationalist conflict, and
community ties.‖ (Hafez n.d.) The fact that the connection between history and the
present is so easily made is clear after a brief recollection of events such as the successful
Iranian revolution and the successful liberation of Afghanistan. After decades of failed
democracies in the Middle East, Islamic organizations have come out of the experience
In the mid-20th century, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the iconic champion of Arab
democracy at the time when the Arab street was widely secular in nature. When he fell,
the symbol that he had become died as well, which created room for Islamist
organizations to fill the void in public life. The beloved symbol of Nasser has been
conflated with the role of the corrupt and unbelieving Meccans at the time of the spread
of the prophet‘s message. Now, the fight by the believers against the unjust has turned
The coercive nature of recruitment of Iraqi female suicide bombers, the absence
of commemorative shaheed 50videos and pictures and parties shows that the bases of
Hafez‘s symbolic dimensions are simply absent from the Iraqi female example.
50
martyr
48
Furthermore, the wide circulation of al-Qaida shaheed videos elsewhere indicates that
recruiting, inspiring this culture would be simple if al-Qaida‘s goal was to do so. Yet, this
is just not the case in Iraq. Thus it seems that the symbolic dimension present in Hafez‘s
studies is absent here, and that it is replaced by the cold calculations of wider
organizational strategy.
Female Multipliers
Having seen the clearly strategic motivations for the use of female attackers as
opposed to a symbolic cultural or individual desire, we can now examine the benefits of
using female attackers. Women magnify the desired effect of suicide attacks by garnering
more media attention than the now more commonplace act of a man detonating a suicide
Despite the hundreds of suicide attacks perpetrated worldwide every month, only
a select few reach our ears. We have become accustomed to men blowing themselves up
in the name of a god or nationalist cause, yet something deep inside a human being is
Some claim (Patkin vol. 7, number 2) that attacks carried out by women are more
deadly because of this element of surprise. The notion that people are less suspicious of
women to begin with would allow them to do more damage, at least in theory.
49
In Table 3 below shows that while the total number of suicide operations
decreased dramatically from 442 in 2007 to 83 in 2008, female perpetrated attacks rose
from 4 in 2007 to 42 in 2008. In 2008, female attacks made up 50% of total suicide
attacks including car bombs in Iraq. This dramatic shift means that organizational
resources previously devoted to using male attackers were repurposed to deploy female
attackers.
Total
Number of
Total Female Female Female
Deaths by
Year Suicide Suicide Female Attackers Attacks Attacks
Suicide
Attacks Attacks Deaths Injured
Attacks and
Car Bombs
*Total number up to April of 2010 compiled from Iraq Body Count database & Lexis Nexis.
**Total Deaths added from the count per day.
*** Female counts compiled from Lexis Nexis.
Table 3: Total Suicide and Car Bombs and Female Perpetrated Suicide Attacks
Perverting the image of a woman, who traditionally nurtures and gives life, into
an agent of death and destruction symbolically impacts society and garners a great deal
media coverage (O'Rourke 2009) . For some deeply rooted biological reason, we as
humans are much more inclined to react with sympathy at the image of a female attacker,
50
feeling that something must be wrong for a woman to blow herself up (Thayer and
Hudson 2010). This is contrary to the anger and desire for revenge typically inspired by a
similar attack perpetrated by a man instead. Thus it has been documented that female
attackers, through their increased media attention have a greater psychological impact
than male attackers. This image is relevant in that it also contributes to the loss of public
Trend‖, ―Attacks by women receive eight times the media coverage as attacks by men,
again largely because of the expectation that women are not violent.‖ (Bloom, Female
organizations such as Chechen black widows, Palestinian female attackers, and female
members of the Algerian FLN during their nationalist campaigns of the last century, Iraqi
female women were not likely motivated by desire for revenge—even though they were
Muslim and their cause is nationalist. Palestinian women declare feminist intention, Iraqi
women don‘t leave videos or statements at all indicating that they are just foot soldiers,
Mumineen made the strategic decision to use female suicide bombers in reaction to the
effectiveness of the troop surge in 2007. This surge made it more difficult for male
51
suicide attackers to infiltrate, but because of cultural conventions, male soldiers are
forbidden from searching them. The fact that these women were recruited, and did not
decision.
of Diyala, a former terrorist stronghold. These attacks targeted the former supporters of
Sunni terrorist groups, the members of the awakening. In contrast to the availability of
martyr propaganda circulated worldwide and on the internet, no such statements were
made by these women, showing that they did not share in the common-found pride of a
martyr. Through this, according to Patkin, ―the female suicide bomber turns into a victim
in the midst of what she may consider the most empowered act of her life.‖ (Patkin vol. 7,
number 2)
52
CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSIONS
“Terrorism, like war, never ends; however, individual terrorist campaigns and the
the hatred of freedom, nor is it a fascist club, nor even a great clash of civilizations.
Terrorism is the cyclical, violent expression of the farthest extreme of any ideology.
Terrorism‘s allure can be harnessed by any group, in any country, at any time to express
preached by the Prophet Mohammed strictly forbids declaring Jihad against any enemy,
even crusaders, without the presence of a fair Imam. The Mongolian invasions that razed
Having witnessed the collapse of Muslim power, the 13th century jurist Ibn
Taymiyya advocated practicing Islam as was done by the as-salaf as-salih , the Muslims
who lived during the time of the prophet and of the four rightly-guided caliphs. The
Salafi ideology that he developed is the most radically conservative form of Islam. In his
book “Hijab al-Mar’a‖, he advocates covering women‘s hands and eyes and relegating
53
them to reproductive roles in society, even forbidding them from praying in mosques. Ibn
Taymiyya and the Salafi ideology that he founded are the most radically sexist in Islam.
The cognitive dissonance of the use of female perpetrators in the ultimate sacred
Chapter 1shows how, with striking arrogance Ibn Taymiyya revised all of Islamic
practice a right reserved to the supreme leader of the Muslim Umma by all other Muslim
ideologies.
Understanding the anti-female nature of the only ideology within Islam that
acknowledges the right of contemporary Muslims to wage Jihad shows us that the use of
their terrorist modus operandi. Even in death, there is no equality for these women, who,
instead of being glorified in Salafi propaganda as their male counterparts, have died to
deaf ears.
requires public support. The use of women to perpetrate attacks is contrary to the status
quo roles ascribed to women in the Middle East, especially in rural areas of Baquba
where many of these perpetrators came from. Public support has already reached rock
bottom. In 2004, Salafi Jihadi organizations were in full control of entire provinces of
Iraq; marketing themselves as the Sunni vanguard in the face of sectarian violence, and
54
subsequently in the face of the Shi‘i dominated government. The public support they
enjoyed then enabled them to hit hard targets such as the military and general
infrastructure.
Ansar al-Islam would still perpetrate attacks on hard targets such as military installations
if they could. Just nine years ago in 2001, al-Qaida attacked the Pentagon. Today in Iraq,
they have bee weakened too the point where they can barely attack a checkpoint. This is
because of the effectiveness of the surge and the awakening movement, and the loss of
public support due to the use of female suicide bombers to target fellow Sunnis.
has proven to be a double edged sword. Soft targets are also attacked for the sake of
revenge against the ‗traitor‘ Sunnis who ‗betrayed‘ Salafi organizations by participating
in the general Iraqi security and political apparatus. The key difference between true Iraqi
Salafis and other Sunni Iraqis is that Sunni Iraqis attacked American interests in Iraq
because their country had been invaded; al-Qaida attacks American interests at every
opportunity. Swaths of Sunnis switched sides when given the chance to participate in the
new political order. The so-called ―Sons of Iraq‖ wanted what anyone wants, a decent
After this betrayal, al-Qaida treated the members of the Awakening as the enemy,
and the feeling was mutual. Al-Qaida has assassinated enough Sunni members of the
Awakening to garner the contempt and bloodlust of prominent Sunni tribes. Based on the
55
workings of tribal culture, this turns all members of the tribe against the killer of any
other member. Proportionally, a higher percentage of the Sunni population has been
killed than that of the larger Shi‘i one, creating a large base of anti-al-Qaida sentiment—
mean that these women are slaughtering themselves in the name of their own oppression.
Granted, as we saw in the cases of young drugged brides, remote controlled bombs, and
mentally impaired women, not all of the female attackers were consciously choosing to
For those Iraqi women who perpetrated attacks fi sabil allah51, it was not culture-
symbolically motivated, nor by a desire for fame, nor to make a feminist statement. These
Tunisia‘s struggle for decolonization, and by the recent attacks on Moscow‘s subway by
two young Dagestani women. The two Dagestani women were self-motivated to
indoctrination. Through the capture and confession of the recruiter female Iraqi Um al-
Mu‘mineen it is clear that many of the individual motivations of these women were
51
فيبسبيوبهللاfor the cause of God
56
In the face of a successful quell of violence by the surge of Multi-National
Coalition Forces in Iraq; a wildly successful Awakening movement that incorporated al-
Qaida‘s natural supporters, and; an even further alienation of this group by making them
the targets of the attacks they once orchestrated, al-Qaida resorted to using female
At its core, Salafi ideology places women at the lowest place in society. By giving
them the greatest honor a Salafi Muslim can earn, they have jeopardized their future
organizational survival in three ways. The disparity between what they practice and what
they preach tarnishes their reputation while alienating their true believers who deem
women unworthy of martyrdom. Third of all, targeting other Sunni Muslims further
Consequences
Security forces all over the world are responding to female attackers by hiring
more women to participate in security apparatuses. This is not limited to the military or to
recruited) to fill positions traditionally filled by men, such as special Marine task
inconsequentially causing it.Some reports hint the potential use of female attackers in the
West, due to their ability to blend in as done by female members of the Algerian FLN
57
Furthermore, the potential consequences for the future of al-Qaida are
however, there may be potential for it to have this impact on a new generation of
educated and conservative youth all over the Arab Middle East.
of two things may happen. Al-Qaeda will have to reevaluate the ideology it chooses to
follow and claim to represent regarding the position of women, or a new Ibn-Taymiyya
will have to rise to the challenge of establishing a new school of ideology that can
support both jihad in the absence of a fair imam and the participation of women in it;
Otherwise, as al-Qaeda ceases practicing what it preaches, this will tear the
58
Appendix A: Raw Data
59
5/1/2008 35 65 wedding procession Baquba
60
awakening member and
12/15/2008 1 1 son Baghdad
61
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VITAE
Angela Piñeyro De Hoyos Candidate for Special Honors in Middle Eastern Studies
Angie Piñeyro De Hoyos is a senior at the University of Texas at Austin graduating in May of
2010 from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies with honors.
She has lived in Austin since her mother returned to to finish her PhD 15 years ago.
Angie hopes to enter the JDS, dual M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas in
the fall of 2011 will spend this summer as a fellow at Public Strategies Incorporated in Austin, Tx.
She is fluent in Spanish, French, and Arabic, and loves to sing, dance, eat, cook, and trail run.
66