Neoliberalism 1NC

Family-based visas are a tool through which the state can efficiently regulate the flow of human
capital while whitewashing its human rights abuses, silencing resistance to neoliberal doctrine.
Reddy ‘5 (Chandan Reddy, Duke University Press, “Asian Diasporas, Neoliberalism, and Family: Reviewing the Case
for Homosexual Asylum in the Context of Family Rights,” Fall-Winter 2005, Social Texts 84-85, Vol. 23, No. 3-4

Since 1986 a large quotient of low-wage immigrant workers came to New York City through the Family Reunification program. For example, though many scholars
have suggested that the major pull factor for immigration in the 1990s was a shortage within the United States of workers, especially for those located within the
domestic, low-end services, and “unskilled” labor markets, the Immigration Act of 1990 capped the number of immigrant visas for so-called unskilled workers at a
paltry ten thousand while it increased family-based immigrant visas to 480,000 annually beginning in 1995. While family immigration obviously includes minors and
seniors who are either legally or functionally unable to enter the labor market, family-based immigration offers by far the largest pool of
immigrant visas for so-called unskilled workers. 19 In other words, while immigrants are recruited by the persistence of
entry-level jobs in the services, industrial, and informal sectors of New York, the federal government continues to recruit
such workers through the language and networks of family reunification. The effect of creating economic pull factors that
recruit immigrants to the United States while using bureaucratic categories like “family reunification” to code that
migration as essentially produced by the petitioning activity of resident immigrants living in the United States is to enable
the appeasement of capital’s need for immigrant workers while projecting the state as either a benevolent actor
reuniting broken families or an overburdened and effete agent unable to prevent immigrants’ manipulations of its (mandatory) democratic and fair laws. In
either case, the recruitment of low-wage workers—who compose the majorities of the immigrant of color populations in New York City—is displaced from the state’s
responsibility and relocated back onto immigrants themselves. In this manner, the state is absolved politically from having created and expanded the conditions of
noncitizen life within the territorial parameters of the United States and, at the same time, distinguishes itself as the apotheosis of Western Democracy by achieving the
status of depoliticized neutrality. Indeed, since its original passage of the Family Reunification Act in 1986, the state has increasingly elected to attach the wardship of
the welfare of all incoming immigrants to the petitioning families themselves.20 In a rather stunning move that has effectively destroyed the state’s redistributive
function within a managed economy, the state’s mandate that petitioning families must now absorb the state’s welfare functions for immigrants, in the context of the
state’s continuing bid to dismantle the welfare economy, has meant that it is now the role of the poor to absorb the social costs of poverty and a “healthy”
unemployment rate! The state has effectively managed to both increase the numbers of immigrants arriving into the
United States, as the economy continues to demand low-wage noncitizen labor, and at the same time to use
immigration as the vehicle to dismantle its welfare responsibilities.21

Neoliberalism makes extinction inevitable

Santos ‘3 (Boaventura de Souza Santos, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, Collective Suicide?,
http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php 2003

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the

West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by
destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all
the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is
how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the
period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is
how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism,
with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask
whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all
appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion:
destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is
manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise
from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market
failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it;
it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the
supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo.
Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions
of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of
insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social
actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political
democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found
to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic
heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other.
Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version,
neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the
idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and
consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent
civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT,
in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war
will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in
mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the
labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in
the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though
hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive
accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for
what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal
economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of
horror and destruction.

The alternative is to vote negative as a rejection of the 1AC and its foundations in neoliberalism –
critical examination and rejection is critical to open up new spaces for a more democratic
politics.
Giroux ‘6 (Henry A. Giroux, 11-2-06, Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of
Neoliberalism, http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/node/25904

As collective agents recede under neoliberalism, market forces incessantly attempt to privatize or commercialize public
space. One consequence is that those noncommodified spaces and vernacular capable of providing individuals with the
discourses, values, and subject positions crucial to identifying and struggling over institutions vital to the life of
democracy begin to disappear from the political scene. Under such circumstances, matters of agency become even more
crucial to viable democratic politics as those spaces capable of producing critical modes of pedagogy increasingly slip into
the black hole of commercialized space. As public spaces disappear, it becomes more difficult to develop a
democratic discourse for educating collective social agents capable of raising critical questions about the limits of a market-driven society as well as
what it might mean to theorize about the future of public institutions central to the development of truly substantive democratic society. In the absence of
public spaces that promote shared democratic values, a new authoritarian politics and culture emerge in which the state makes a grim alignment with corporate capital,
neoconservative visions of empire, and Christian fundamentalism. Political power is now accumulated behind an alliance of economic, political, and religious
fundamentalists who recognize that "military-like discipline abroad requires military-like discipline at home" (Harvey 2003:193). Repressive legislation is used to
sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security; the government promotes a culture of fear to implement neoliberal policies at home and neoconservative visions
of empire abroad; dissent is labeled as unpatriotic, and the media and political parties increasingly become adjuncts of official power (Giroux 2003; Barber 2003; Robin
2004). As neoliberal economics is accorded more respect than democratic politics, the citizen has been abandoned and the consumer becomes the only viable model of
agency. As public spending decreases, education is divorced from democratic politics and the political state increasingly becomes the corporate state (Hertz 2003). All
the more reason to take seriously Hannah Arendt's (1965) claim that "without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its
appearance" (p.149 ). And it is precisely within such a realm that subjects are socialized into forms of individual and social agency in which they learn how to govern
rather than be governed, to assume the responsibilities of engaged citizens rather than be reduced to consumers or investors. Arendt (1965) understood quite clearly that
democracy can only emerge, if not flourish, within political organizations in which education was viewed both as a site of
politics and as the foundation that provided the pedagogical conditions in which individuals could learn the knowledge,
skills, and values necessary for those forms of citizenship, leadership, and social engagement that deepened and extended
the realities of an inclusive democracy. Politics often begins when it becomes possible to make power visible, to
challenge the ideological circuitry of hegemonic knowledge, and to recognize that "political subversion
presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world"(Bourdieu 2001:128). But another element of
politics focuses on where politics happens, how proliferating sites of pedagogy bring into being new forms of resistance,
raise new questions, and necessitate alternative visions regarding autonomy and the possibility of democracy itself. Neoliberal
ideology and pedagogy have been reproduced and reinforced within the advanced countries of the West through the development of new sites of pedagogy and new
technologies that penetrate spaces that historically have been beyond the reach of the logic of commercialism and commodification. Hence, it is all the more necessary
for educators and other cultural workers to take seriously both the proliferating sites of these new forms of ideological address and the work they do within the social
order to create agents and subject positions that become complicitous with the brutalizing logic of the market. At this point in American history, neoliberal capitalism is
not simply too overpowering; on the contrary, "democracy is too weak" (Barber 2002:A23). Profound transformations have taken place in the public space, producing
new sites of pedagogy marked by a distinctive confluence of new digital and media technologies, growing concentrations of corporate power, and unparalleled meaning
producing capacities. Unlike traditional forms of pedagogy, knowledge and desire are inextricably connected to modes of pedagogical address mediated through
unprecedented electronic technologies that include high speed computers, new types of digitized film, and CD-ROMs. Such sites operate within a wide variety of social
institutions and formats including sports and entertainment media, cable television networks, churches, and channels of elite and popular culture, such as advertising.
The result is a public pedagogy that plays a decisive role in producing a diverse cultural sphere that gives new meaning to education as a political force. While John
Dewey, Paulo Freire, and various other leading educational theorists in the last century understood the important connection between education and democracy, they
had no way in their time of recognizing that the larger culture would extend beyond, if not supercede, institutionalized education, particularly schools, as the most
important educational force over developed societies. In fact, education and pedagogy have long been synonymous with schooling in the public mind. Challenging such
a recognition does not invalidate the importance of formal education to democracy, but it does require a critical understanding of how the work of education takes place
in such institutions as well as in a range of other knowledge and meaning producing spheres such as advertising, television, film, the Internet, video game culture, and
the popular press. Rather than invalidate the importance of schooling, it extends the sites of pedagogy and in doing so broadens and deepens the meaning and
importance of public pedagogy. What is being suggested here is that educators, cultural studies theorists, and others take seriously the role that culture plays, as
Raymond Williams (1967:15) puts it, as a form of "permanent education." The concept of public pedagogy as a form of permanent education underscores the central
importance of formal spheres of learning that unlike their popular counterparts—driven largely by commercial interests that more often miseducate the public—must
provide citizens with those critical capacities, modes of literacies, knowledge, and skills that enable them to both read the world critically and participate in shaping and
governing it. Put differently, formal spheres of learning provide one of the few sites where students can be educated to understand, critically engage, and transform
those institutions that are largely shaping their beliefs and sense of agency. I am not claiming that public or higher education are free from corporate influence and
dominant ideologies, but that such sites of education, at best, have historically provided the spaces and conditions for prioritizing civic values over commercial interests,
for recognizing that consumerism is not the only kind of citizenship, and for vouchsafing the purpose and meaning of critical education in a democratic society that
bears its responsibility to present and future generations of young people. In spite of its present embattled status and contradictory roles, higher education, in
particular, remains uniquely placed—though also under attack by the forces of corporatization—to prepare
students to both understand and influence the larger educational forces that shape their lives. Needless to say, those of us
who work in such institutions by virtue of our privileged positions within a rather obvious division of labor have an obligation to draw upon those traditions and
resources capable of providing a critical education to all students in order to prepare them for a world in which information and power have taken on new and
significant dimensions. In fact, the critique of information cannot be separated from the critique of power itself, providing a substantial new challenge for how we are to
theorize politics for the twenty-first century. One way to take up this challenge is to address the theoretical contributions that a
number of radical educators and cultural studies theorists have made in engaging not only the primacy of culture as a
political force, but also how the relationship between culture and power constitutes a new site of politics, pedagogy, and
resistance.
 CIR 1NC
Comprehensive immigration reform will pass now
Lawrence ’10 (The Prospects for Comprehensive Immigration Reform 1/22/2010 - Political Social - Article Ref:
CP1001-4055 By: Stewart J. Lawrence Counter Punch* - Jan 21, 2010 Stewart J Lawrence is a Washington, DC-based
public policy analyst and writes frequently on immigration and Latino affairs. He is also founder and managing director of
Puentes & Associates, Inc., a bilingual survey research and communications firm. Stewart J. Lawrence has worked as an
immigration policy analyst with the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Inter-American Institute on Migration and Labor and
the American Immigration Law Foundation.

After months of procedural delay and understandable preoccupation with the economy and health care, the White House has quietly announced plans to introduce a
comprehensive immigration reform bill in the Senate next month. The move surprised many political observers who have watched the Obama administration constantly
postpone action on immigration reform in order to address a host of other policy issues. Several White House officials, most notably Rahm Emmanuel, are known to be
deeply skeptical about the wisdom of Obama tackling immigration reform during his first term in office, let alone prior to the 2010 mid-term elections. Indeed, when
Obama named Sonia Sotomayor to replace David Souter on the US Supreme Court last August, some took it as a sign that Obama was seeking to placate his Latino
base with an "historic" appointment, in part to justify postponing first-term action on immigration reform. And now, in the wake of Tuesday's shocking Democratic
Party loss in the US Senate race in Massachusetts, some political observers fear that immigration reform, at least for now, is dead. But
the political calculus in the White House and among pro-immigration Democrats in the Senate appears to be quite
different. If anything the prospective defeat of health care reform has highlighted Obama's need for a fresh legislative victory. But three key questions remain. First,
without their filibuster-proof majority, do Democrats still have the votes needed to pass immigration reform, or is a prolonged and messy congressional debate like the
one that engulfed health care reform inevitable? Second is the question of time. With such a late start, and assuming that a measure of contentious debate is
unavoidable, could the White House end up pulling the bill or at least suspending a final vote to make room for the mid-term election campaign? And finally, if the bill
is delayed and Republicans score big in the mid-term elections, as they well might, could immigration reform, like cap-and-trade, another of Obama's promised first-
year agenda items, simply wither on the vine? Despite the loss of his "filibuster-proof" majority, Obama still has a very good chance of
passing immigration reform in the Senate, and if the Senate vote is large enough, he could probably convince skeptical House Democrats to go along.
That's because immigration reform is not health care reform in at least two key respects. First, the terms of the debate are
already well known to the contending parties, who fought each other to a legislative stalemate in 2006 and 2007. What's changed, in addition
to Obama's election, is the composition of the Congress, which is even more Democratic than it was in 2006, when the GOP
lost control of the House. That's no guarantee of victory, because immigration, unlike health care form, has never been an issue that divides neatly, with Democrats on
one side and Republicans on the other. But it certainly helps. A number of US Senators, including the ailing Harry Byrd (D-WV), who was wheeled into Congress to
cast his critical "yea" vote on health care reform, oppose granting legal status to undocumented workers. So do "Blue Dog" Democrats in the House, who have spent
much of the past two years pushing for expanded immigration enforcement. By contrast, about a dozen GOP Senators have traditionally "crossed
over" to support the Democrats on immigration. Thus, the good news is that pro-immigration Democrats won't have to go hat in hand to Olympia
Snowe (R-ME) or Susan Collins (R-ME) to defeat a GOP filibuster. The bad news is they'll still have to convince a slew of their fellow Democrats to join the
immigration reform bandwagon. For the White House to win, two steps are essential, sources say. First, the White House shouldn't defer to Congress but should drive
the legislative process "from above." This means Obama should take personal responsibility for the bill and should be willing to defend it to the public from the onset.
He must also work closely with the two Senate immigration reform captains, Democrat Charles Schumer (NY) and Republican Lindsay Graham (R-SC), to line up his
congressional ducks and forge the bipartisan deals needed to to ensure speedy passage. If instead, Obama takes the cautious, hands-off approach he did during the health
care debate, and simply lets Congress lead, the likelihood grows that obstructionists, especially House Republicans, will try to take their case to the public to exploit the
same "nativist" fears that twice sunk immigration reform in 2007. Obama met with Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle last
summer to float the White House's legislative strategy. And Homeland Security director Janet Napolitano has been meeting
quietly with key immigration constituencies for much of the past month to identify and address the key fault lines in the
debate. All of these hopeful signs point to an aggressive and pro-active White House approach that should improve the
prospects for a bill's passage, assuming that no unexpected hitches develop.

Piecemeal reform destroys comprehensive reform

Young ’10 (Comprehensive Immigration Reform—Dead, Dismembered, or Alive? Posted February 17, 2010 by Patrick
Young, Esq.

There are also calls for abandoning the comprehensive immigration reform effort and instead trying to pass sections of the
bill piecemeal. Frankly, in 1999, when comprehensive reform was first proposed as the entire agenda for the immigrant
rights movement, I believed that piecemeal was the way to go. I did not believe that passage of a comprehensive package
was possible. In addition, my experience as an advocate told me that a piecemeal approach could accomplish much without the serious negative trade-offs that
comprehensive reform would demand. But my position was not the majority position, and the broad movement adopted
comprehensive immigration reform and emblazoned it on its banner. Over the next decade, the treasure and efforts of the
immigrant rights community around the United States were devoted to crafting and passing far-reaching legislation that
would address the United States’ immigration needs for decades. While that effort has not yet succeeded, it is too soon to
declare it failed. It may also already be too late to break up the comprehensive immigration reform bill and pass smaller
pieces of legislation like the DREAM Act and AgJobs separately. Many supporters of reform will melt away if the
comprehensive bill is abandoned—they signed on for the whole package. And piecemeal legislation will be met with the
same arguments against legalizing a portion of the undocumented that have been voiced against legislation that would
enable larger earned legalization. In addition, to secure passage of the DREAM Act and AgJobs, so many concessions will
have to be made that little may be left to trade if we try to revive legalization. Analysts in Washington say that there is still
a slim chance for reform this year. With other prospects looking even dimmer than pressing on with our current strategy, it would seem that the immigrant
rights movement’s last best hope is to press the Democrats hard with the threat that a failure to push reform will lead to Latino electoral defections and simultaneously
embarrass the president into assuming the role of Reformer-in-Chief that we once thought fit him naturally. We also need to be realistic about what a reform bill will
look like if one is introduced by Senator Schumer in the next 50 days. It will not be perfect, and attacks on it for its flaws will likely condemn immigration reform to the
legislative graveyard. Any reform bill will need to satisfy the two to six Republicans we need for passage. Pulling out the
elements of any compromise Schumer arranges will doom the bill. For those of us outside the Beltway, we need to keep
the pressure on. This year there have already been more than 160 pro-reform events. More than 300,000 people have communicated with Congress and the
President in support of reform. Churches, city councils, unions, and community groups have passed hundreds of resolutions in support of reform. Here on Long Island,
the Workplace Project has collected more than 5,000 pro-immigrant postcards, Long Island Immigrant Alliance’s call-in day to Schumer’s office got wide support, and
Long Island Wins’ e-mail campaigns have generated more than 2,500 communications with our elected officials. These efforts have won over more than
half of the Senate to reform already. Since the time horizon for winning reform is limited to the next several months, we must continue to push hard in the
knowledge that while victory may be difficult even with the greatest effort, defeat will be certain if we give up.

Comprehensive reform is key to prevent food insecurity

Gaskill ’10 (Ron Gaskill is director of congressional relations for the American Farm Bureau Federation. Worker
shortage urges immigration reform efforts April 9, 2010 Season Right for Meaningful Immigration Reform By Ron
Gaskill

Even in these times of higher-than-usual unemployment, most farmers and ranchers still struggle to find all the workers they need for a
successful season. Serious concerns that not enough domestic workers will choose to work in agriculture has become a
harsh reality across the countryside. About 15 million people in the United States choose non-farm jobs at wages that are actually lower than what they could earn
by working alongside farmers and ranchers. The on-farm jobs and opportunities are there, but many workers choose not to take advantage of them. The issue is
rapidly moving from one centered on a lack of resources, to one with food insecurity at its heart. Farmers and ranchers are the ones
being squeezed; caught between a domestic labor force that doesn’t want agricultural work, government policy that fails to recognize the seriousness of the problem and
an administration that consistently makes it harder to hire workers. U.S. consumers will continue to eat fresh fruits and vegetables regardless of how the labor scenario
ultimately plays out. But, whether or not those fruits and vegetables are grown in the U.S. or imported from other countries where labor is more plentiful greatly
concerns Farm Bureau. It’s past time for our nation’s policymakers to translate grassroots concern into meaningful action. As much as we believe in a farmer’s right to
farm, Farm Bureau fully respects the right of U.S. workers to choose other lines of work. But, on the flip side, as employers, we must be able to legally employ those
who do want to work, even if they’re from other countries. Comprehensive immigration reform is needed, so that America’s farmers and
ranchers can continue to produce an abundant supply of safe, healthy food, as well as renewable fuels and fiber for our
nation.

Food insecurity kills billions

Brown ‘5 (Lester Brown, President of the Earth Policy Institute, February 7, 2005, People and the Planet, “Falling water
tables 'could hit food supply',” http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=2424

Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security, but for much of humanity, the effect of water shortages and rising temperatures on food security are
far more important issues. For the 3 billion people who live on 2 dollars a day or less and who spend up to 70 per cent of their income on food,
even a modest rise in food prices can quickly become life-threatening. For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding
concern."
 Waivers 1NC
Text: The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services should grant advance parole with
all necessary extensions to all permanent partners of United States citizens or lawful permanent
residents.

Solves 100% of case

Endelman and Mehta ‘10 (Gary Endelman, practices immigration law at BP America Inc, serves on the Editorial Advisory
Board of Immigration Daily, and Cyrus D. Mehta, nationally recognized in the field of immigration law. He represents corporations
and individuals from around the world in business and employment immigration, family immigration, consular matters, naturalization,
federal court litigation and asylum. He also advises lawyers on ethical issues. Based on 18 years of experience in immigration law, He
is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School where he teaches a course, Immigration and Work, Chair of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association’s (AILA) National Pro Bono Committee and Co-Chair of the AILA-NY Chapter Pro
Bono Committe COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM THROUGH EXECUTIVE FIAT, April 25, 2010,
http://cyrusmehta.blogspot.com/2010/04/comprehensive-immigration-reform.html)

For instance, there is nothing that would bar the USCIS from allowing the beneficiary of an approved employment based I-
140 or family based I-130 petition, and derivative family members, to obtain an employment authorization document (EAD)
and parole. The Executive, under INA § 212(d)(5), has the authority to grant parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefits. The crisis in the priority dates where beneficiaries of petitions may need to wait for green cards in excess
of 30 years may qualify for invoking § 212(d)(5) under “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefits.” Similarly, the
authors credit David Isaacson who pointed out that the Executive has the authority to grant EAD under INA §274A(h)(3), which
defines the term “unauthorized alien” as one who is not “(A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to
be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General” (emphasis added). Under sub paragraph (B), the USCIS may grant an EAD to
people who are adversely impacted by the tyranny of priority dates. Likewise, the beneficiary of an I-130 or I-140 petition who is
outside the U.S. can also be paroled into the U.S. before the priority date becomes current. The principal and the
applicable derivatives would enjoy permission to work and travel regardless of whether they remained in nonimmigrant
visa status. Even those who are undocumented or out of status, but are beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, can
be granted employment authorization and parole. The retroactive grant of parole may also alleviate those who are subject to the
three or ten year bars since INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii) defines “unlawful presence” as someone who is here “without being admitted or
paroled.” Parole, therefore, eliminates the accrual of unlawful presence. While parole does not constitute an admission, one
conceptual difficulty is whether parole can be granted to an individual who is already admitted on a nonimmigrant visa but has
overstayed. Since parole is not considered admission, it can be granted more readily to one who entered without inspection.
On the other hand, it is possible for the Executive to rescind the grant of admission under INA §212(d)(5), and instead, replace
it with the grant parole. As an example, an individual who was admitted in B-2 status and is the beneficiary of an I-130
petition but whose B-2 status has expired can be required to report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). who can
retroactively rescind the grant of admission in B-2 status and instead be granted parole retroactively.

CP avoids politics and is key to presidential powers

Lawrence ‘10 (Stewart J, is a Washington, DC-based public policy analyst and writes frequently on immigration and Latino
affairs, He is also founder and managing director of Puentes & Associates, Inc., a bilingual survey research and communications firm,
September 2, Immigration: the case for executive orders, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/02/us-
immigration-obama-executive)

Executive action is risky. But it's far less risky, politically, than convening a "lame-duck" session of congress, as some
Democrats like senate majority leader Harry Reid (Democrat, Nevada) now propose, to try to ram through the Dream Act or other
broader immigration measures, much as they did with healthcare reform. Most outgoing Democrats aren't going to play ball,
especially if they have to vote to expand enforcement. And even those who survive the mid-terms still have to face the voters in
2012. Supporting legalisation in a GOP-controlled congress could well cost them their seats. As president, Obama is uniquely
placed to step in and exercise Solomon-like leadership on behalf of Democrats and Republicans alike. Recent polls show
that a majority of voters – including a majority of GOP voters – support expanded enforcement coupled with some kind of
legalisation. At a time when the public discourse on immigration is degenerating into near-hysteria, and congress remains
paralysed, even-handed executive action can point the country forward. It sends a powerful signal to voters that the
president still has the courage to stick his neck out, even when a nervous and recalcitrant congress, including
members of his own party, won't. The entire country – Democrats, Republicans and independents alike – would stand
up and cheer.
Strong presidential powers are critical to the global economy and preventing global wars

South China Morning Post ‘2K

(12-11, Lexis)

A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States
influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of
political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on
markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The
Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between
China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would
welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East.
Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less
assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh
any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky
mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain
about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens
conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world
needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.
 Human Rights

Governments must weigh consequences

Harries ’94 (Owen Harries, editor and founder of The National Interest, Senior Fellow at The Centre for Independent
Studies, Spring 1993/1994, The National Interest, “Power and Civilization,” p. Lexis

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately
answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be
interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the
ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the
cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of
politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the
promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put
them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be
considered.

Moral absolutism suffers from tunnel vision that generates evil and political irrelevance
Isaac ‘2 (Jeffrey C. Isaac, professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, director of the Center for the Study of
Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale, Spring 2002, Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,”
p. Proquest
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness
undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from
three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.
Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence,
then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a
world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why,
from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in
principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended
consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just
as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson
of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask
about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism
inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political
effectiveness.

The aff is moral evasion: consequentialism is imperative

Nielsen ’93 (Kai Nielsen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 1993, Absolutism and Its Consequentialist
Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, p. 170-2

Forget the levity of the example and considerthe case of the innocent fat man. If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man and
if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in the cave will drown, then, innocent or not, he should be blasted out. This indeed
overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life,
for the people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such extreme action is not taken, many lives will be
lost and far greater misery will obtain. Moreover, the people who do such a horrible thing or acquiesce in the doing of it
are not likely to be rendered more callous about human life and human suffering as a result. Its occurrence will haunt them for the rest of
their lives and is as likely as not to make them more rather than less morally sensitive. It is not even correct to say that such a
desperate act shows a lack of respect for persons. We are not treating the fat man merely as a means. The fat man’s person-his interests
and rights are not ignored. Killing him is something which is undertaken with the greatest reluctance. It is only when it is
quite certain that there is no other way to save the lives of the others that such a violent course of action is justifiably
undertaken. Alan Donagan, arguing rather as Anscombe argues, maintains that “to use any innocent man ill for the sake of some public good is directly to degrade
him to being a mere means” and to do this is of course to violate a principle essential to morality, that is, that human beings should never merely be treated as means but
should be treated as ends in themselves (as persons worthy of respect).” But, as my above remarks show, it need not be the case, and in the above situation it is not the
case, that in killing such an innocent man we are treating him merely as a means. The action is universalizable, all alternative actions which
would save his life are duly considered, the blasting out is done only as a last and desperate resort with the minimum of
harshness and indifference to his suffering and the like. It indeed sounds ironical to talk this way, given what is done to him. But if such a terrible situation were to
arise, there would always be more or less humane ways of going about one’s grim task. And in acting in the more humane ways toward the fat man, as we do what we
must do and would have done to ourselves were the roles reversed, we show a respect for his person. In so treating the fat man-not just to further the public good but to
prevent the certain death of a whole group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)-the claims of justice are not overriden
either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should realize that if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out.
Thus, there is no question of being unfair. Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally
appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no
avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt
for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat
man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group
drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain
unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even
usefully and relevantly adapt herethough for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan’s. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so
persuasive “a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt.” Given the
comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square
with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed.
Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the
compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow
even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and
misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a
moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this
circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he [it] allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to
keep his ‘moral purity’ and [to] avoid ‘dirty hands’ at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called ‘double-mindedness.’ It is
understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.
 Customary International Law
CIL is not binding
Bradley and Goldsmith ’97 (Curtis law prof at U of Colorado and Jack law prof at UVA, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, lexis)
We have argued that, in the absence of federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law. Certain
doctrinal consequences follow from this argument. First, as a general matter, a case arising under CIL would not by that
fact alone establish federal question jurisdiction. Second, federal court interpretations of CIL would not be binding on the
federal political branches or the states. If a state chooses to incorporate CIL into state law, then the federal courts would
be bound to apply the state interpretation of CIL on issues not otherwise governed by federal law. If a state did not, in
fact, incorporate CIL into state law, the federal court would not be authorized to apply CIL as federal or state law. 345

No 1ac evidence why US adherence is key to international law

CIL does not affect state practice
Goldsmith and Posner ‘98 (Jack and Eric, law profs at U of Chicago, “A Theory of Customary International Law” John
M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 63, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_51-
75/63.Goldsmith-Posner.pdf)
No one, moreover, agrees about how widespread and uniform state practice must be. In theory the practice is supposed to
be “general” in the sense that all or almost all of the nations of the world engage in it.16 But it is practically impossible to
determine whether 190 or so nations of the world engage in a particular practice. CIL is thus usually based on a highly
selective survey of state practice that includes major powers and interested nations.17 Increasingly, courts and scholars
sometimes ignore the state practice requirement altogether.18 For example, they refer to a CIL prohibition on torture
at the same time that they acknowledge that many nations of the world torture their citizens.19 It is thus unclear when, and
to what degree, the state practice requirement must be satisfied.

CIL norms are an illusion – states are realist and cooperation is only a result of convergence of self-interest and
coercion
Goldsmith and Posner ‘98 (Jack and Eric, law profs at U of Chicago, “A Theory of Customary International Law” John
M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 63, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/ WkngPprs_51-
75/63.Goldsmith-Posner.pdf)
One of the central claims of the standard account of CIL is that CIL norms govern all or almost all states, or at least all
“civilized” states. This universality claim is rarely explained further. The idea is probably that certain public goods can be
created only if all or most states participate by engaging in certain actions that they would not engage in if they acted
independently. World peace, the preservation of the ozone layer, the maintenance of international fisheries, and
coordination on standards for international communication and transportation are examples of such public goods.
International scholars appear to believe that CIL norms evolve in order to enable states to create these n-state public
goods. Our theory rejects this view. It holds that most instances of spontaneous international cooperation arise as the
result of pairwise interactions. Apparently cooperative universal behavioral regularities are illusory, the result of
identical pairwise interactions, coincidence of interest, or coercion. When n-state public goods are created, it is
because states enter treaties and other agreements that solve n-state coordination games, not because of the evolution of
universal and exogenous CIL norms. To understand the illusory quality of universal CIL norms, imagine that we observe
that no state seizes civilian fishing vessels from enemies in times of war. The theory contemplates many possible
explanations for this observation. First, states do not seize fishing boats because of coincidence of interest. The nations do
not seize boats because their navies are more effectively used by attacking enemy warships or large merchant vessels.
Second, many nations receive no benefit from seizing fishing boats, and those that otherwise would receive a benefit are
deterred from doing so by powerful nations that have an interest in preventing seizures of their own boats. Third, two
nations decline to seize fishing boats in a bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemma, and all the other nations decline to do so
because of coincidence of interest (or coercion), or -- it is possible -- all or most nations face each other in exclusive
bilateral repeat prisoner’s dilemmas and refrain from seizing fishing vessels because of fear of retaliation from their
(single) opponent. For example, all bodies of water containing fish under the conditions described above are bordered by
exactly two states. Fourth, some or all nations face each other in bilateral coordination games which they solve, while any
other nations engage in the same action because of coincidence of interest, coercion, or their participation in a bilateral
prisoner’s dilemma. There are numerous other possible combinations of coincidence of interest, coercion, bilateral
prisoner’s dilemmas, and bilateral coordination. In all these cases, some or many states refrain from seizing fishing
vessels because they have better uses for their navy, or because they fear retaliation from the state whose fishing vessels
they covet. In none of these cases is an n-state public good created through multilateral cooperation. Our essential claim is
that all examples of robust CIL norms are explained in these ways. Although states often engage in virtually identical
behavior -- protecting foreign ambassadors, for example57 -- they do so because they have no interest in deviating or
because they fear retaliation from the state they victimize. The norm is universal in a trivial sense only, like the norm that
states do not drill holes in the bottoms of their own ships; it does not reflect true multilateral cooperation.

CIL norms fail – 4 reasons

1. no consensus on what CIL is
2. Courts are structurally incapable of discovering what CIL is
3. nations have conflicting legal values
4. customary norms may be repugnant
Wilkins ’05 (Brinton, attorney at Holm Wright Hyde & Hays and editor of BYU Law Review, 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1415,
lexis)
The second and third concerns that applying CIL norms without congressional direction create are related: (1) haphazard
use, and (2) selective use. Although Justice Breyer may be correct in arguing that international law "casts an empirical
light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem," 221 the difficulty [*1458] comes in finding
the right kind of light - a cave viewed with a single flashlight is a different experience from a cave viewed with full
National Park Service illumination. According to Alford, "in the international legal arena, where the Court has little or no
expertise, the Court is unduly susceptible to selective and incomplete presentations of the true state of international and
foreign affairs." 222 Attempts to systematize the use of international norms have been made, but they ultimately fail for at
least four reasons: (1) it is difficult, if not impossible to determine true international consensus on any point; (2) courts are
structurally ill-equipped to research and make such determinations; (3) nations have noncommensurate legal values; and
(4) putative international norms may be fundamentally repugnant to individual nations. 223

International law crushes hegemony

Rivkin and Casey 2000 – *partner in the law firm Baker & Hostetler, LLP, and former Deputy Director,
Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice and **served in the Office of Legal Counsel in the
U.S. Department of Justice (David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “The Rocky Shoals of International Law,”
The National Interest, Winter 2000, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Winter/ai_68547471/)

Second, as a practical matter, the

new international law has the potential to undermine American leadership in the
post-Cold War global system. Even more fundamentally, international law may well make the world safe for
aggression, by imposing undue constraints on those countries that are willing to use force to deter and
punish it. Although, as noted above, the new international law has a number of manifestations, those
elements dealing with the use of military force, and the potential consequences for individual American
officials who order or implement its use, are the most advanced and pernicious. As the world's pre-eminent military
power, with global interests and responsibilities, the United States should be very concerned about any effort to create international judicial
institutions capable of prosecuting individual soldiers, officers and elected officials in the chain of command. The international criminal "norms"
applied in these courts, both in the ad hoc criminal courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and in the International Criminal Court, are
ambiguous in their meaning and remarkably fluid in their application. For example, one of the "war crimes prosecutable in the ICC
is defined as [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. Whether any particular attack causes "excessive" civilian injuries or environmental damage is very much a matter of
opinion. This is, in fact, a crime that can be tailored to fit almost any circumstances, as was all but openly acknowledged by the prosecutor's office of
the Yugoslav tribunal during its investigation of alleged NATO war crimes. This investigation was undertaken after a number of NGOs complained
that NATO's 1999 air campaign against Serbia resulted in too many civilian deaths. As candidly noted in the report to the prosecutor, [t]he answers
to these questions [regarding allegedly excessive civilian casualties] are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and
the answers may differ depending on the background and values of the decision-maker. It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced
combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that military
commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would always agree in
close cases. [4] The key underlying problem here is that injuries to noncombatants and their property--so-called "collateral damage"--are an endemic
consequence of combat. As a result, the traditional law of war, jus in hello, although proscribing certain hostile actions toward civilians, eschewed
overly rigid rules on collateral damage. Unfortunately, instead of continuing to rely on the broad, traditional jus in hello principles of proportionality
and discrimination, the new norms have come to resemble American domestic regulatory law. These rules are overly prescriptive and
proscriptive, to such an extent that ensuring full compliance has become almost impossible. This is
particularly the case because the new international law seems to suggest that zero civilian casualties and no
collateral damage are not only attainable outcomes in modern combat, but that these should be the norm.
The combination of the unrealistic norms and unaccountable judicial bodies that would apply them is
particularly problematic. The American military is particularly vulnerable here. This is because U.S. military
doctrine has always been attrition-oriented, emphasizing the intensive application of firepower and the use
of "decisive force." It is inevitable that damage to civilian sites, and civilian casualties, will result. This is all the
more likely given the growing American aversion to combat casualties, which forces our military commanders to rely more and more on air strikes
and missile attacks. This raises the real possibility that American soldiers and officials will be considered subject to
prosecution, even in situations where the intervention has been "humanitarian" in character, as with the air
campaign against Serbia. Significantly, while no prosecutions against NATO officials are currently planned, even the relatively tame
Yugoslav tribunal did not give the alliance a clean bill of health. Indeed, the prosecutor's office declined to bring indictments, not because it
concluded that no crimes were committed by NATO, but because "[i]n all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to
result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous
offenses." Future outcomes in the permanent ICC, a court that will be less dependent upon U.S. and NATO largesse than is the Yugoslav tribunal,
may be very different. And the fact that the United States has not signed, and would not ratify, the ICC treaty will not prevent the ICC from pursuing
Americans. The court claims to exercise a form of "universal jurisdiction" that will allow it to prosecute American citizens when their actions, or the
effects of their actions, take place on the territory of a state that has signed the ICC treaty. Moreover, the danger here is not limited to the potential
actions of the ICC. Based on the "universal jurisdiction" theory--which suggests that any state can prosecute
international humanitarian violations wherever they occur, whether or not that state's own citizens are
involved--any state, or even a low-level foreign magistrate, can begin a prosecution against American
military or civilian officials. This was, of course, the case with the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, who traveled to England for
medical treatment in 1998, and was very nearly extradited to Spain to stand trial for his actions during his rule in Chile. Overall, there is no
doubt that, insofar as they can successfully claim the right to prosecute military and civilian leaders for
violations of the laws of war and international humanitarian norms, international judicial bodies and
interested states will be able effectively to shape American policy. An American president would be far less
likely to use force if there were a genuine possibility that U.S. soldiers or officials, including himself, would
face future prosecution in a foreign court. Both our allies and our adversaries fully understand the
importance of molding the new international law to fit their needs, and its power as an effective weapon
against the United States. Examples of this phenomenon are not difficult to find. Human rights activists, of course, have frequently made
exaggerated claims that pre-existing international humanitarian norms require fundamental changes in U.S. foreign and domestic policy. States
are also increasingly using the language of law as a means of shaping U.S. policy. In one of the most boldly cynical
examples of this phenomenon, the People's Republic of China--desperate to prevent American deployment of even a limited anti-ballistic missile
defense--has asserted that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union remains in force (even though the
Soviet Union disappeared a decade ago), and that it cannot be terminated by the United States because that treaty has assumed the status of
"customary" international law.

American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to
collapse
Thayer, 6 - professor of security studies at Missouri State (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”,
November/December, p. 32-37)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader.
Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should
withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue
of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a
diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic
might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of
relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it
would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the
United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state?
Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power
answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some
disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the
debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to
realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND
strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring
that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured
and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the
Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role
America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats.
Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home",
thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to
retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather
than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States,
then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy
based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's
shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground
presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global
common"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to
its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and
strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world
where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any
sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater
influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include
almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8
to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--
and the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international
institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan,
invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can
be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any
military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan
proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United
States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices
made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda
and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United
States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States,
including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident
those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall
see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba-it is an
anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could
very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or
the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we
think of when we consider the current international order-free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for
human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the
current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and
need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders
collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S.
power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner
sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things
are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international
system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During
the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France
and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between
Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to
say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great
power wars.

International human rights law insults and alienates China- it’s perceived as Western domination
Moore 2000 (Gregory, Graduate Student in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver,
“Human Rights and United States Policy
towards China in the New Millennium” September 28,
http://religionhumanrights.com/Religion/Christian/Protestant/moore.china.99.htm)

Why is the human rights issue so salient in Sino-American relations? Deng was right in the statement above, that the “battle” over
alternate visions of human rights has immense ramifications for China. However, with the end of the Cold War and the liberalization of
China’s economy, this “struggle” is not between two world systems, as was the case during the Cold War, but rather between the “Western” and alternative paradigms
of society, government and economy. In the Western position in regard to human rights, the “struggle” centers on an argument that human
rights as defined in the UN documents are universal. An alternative view, posited by leaders in China, Malaysia, and Singapore
among others, is that human rights are not universal, but rather can be defined only as being relative to local cultural, historical, and/or
developmental realities. If the Chinese government prevails in its bid to make human rights seen as developmentally relative, they will be able
to hold their heads high as they continue on their current course of development, wherein individual rights are sometimes
subsumed for the “collective good” of economic development and the maintenance of order, the status quo, and the Chinese Communist Party.
If China bows to the universal interpretation of human rights found in the UN’s Universal Declaration, it must make
monumental changes in its social order, its legal system, and its system of governance, acknowledging that the state must be fully
accountable to the people it governs in every respect. It could reasonably be argued that full compliance with international human rights norms today in China could
bring about a end to the single-party communist system of governance that has existed since 1949, for without control of the press, the freedom to quash dissent and to
appoint leaders that will support the present system, the Party would not be able to guarantee its hold on power. If the Party could no longer engage in these activities,
the only way it could remain in power would be to seek the legitimacy that victory in democratic elections amidst open party competition could give it. Even if the
Communist Party were to prevail and remain in power, which would be within in the realm of possibilities, this new situation would be a monumental change.3 The
human rights debate is no peripheral issue to the Chinese leadership, but is central to their ability to maintain their course along the Maoist/Dengist road, and they are
well aware of that. So from the Chinese perspective, fully conceding today to universalist notions of human rights could bring
great social, economic and political unrest to their country, and could even mean the collapse of Chinese communism as
we know it. The Chinese, therefore, see the present human rights debate as the continued attempt by Westerners to dominate
them and reshape them into an image of the West, philosophically, economically and politically. Yet the Chinese have always seen and continue
to see themselves today as fundamentally different from the West and the rest of the world, and quite capable of choosing their own path to development. Consequently,
they find it insulting that the U.S., a nation with so much injustice and so many double standards in its own history (slavery,
genocide of native populations, racism, CIA plots to overthrow governments, etc.), should deem itself worthy of judging
the Chinese, particularly as it concerns a matter that according to the UN Charter falls within the purview of their own sovereign authority.

This destabilizes the CCP

Moore 2000 (Gregory, Graduate Student in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver,
“Human Rights and United States Policy
towards China in the New Millennium” September 28,
http://religionhumanrights.com/Religion/Christian/Protestant/moore.china.99.htm)
It could reasonably be argued that full
compliance with international human rights norms today in China could bring
about a end to the single-party communist system of governance that has existed since 1949, for without control of the
press, the freedom to quash dissent and to appoint leaders that will support the present system, the Party
would not be able to guarantee its hold on power. If the Party could no longer engage in these activities, the only way it could remain in
power would be to seek the legitimacy that victory in democratic elections amidst open party competition could give it. Even if the Communist Party were
to prevail and remain in power, which would be within in the realm of possibilities, this new situation would be a monumental
change.3 The human rights debate is no peripheral issue to the Chinese leadership, but is central to their ability
to maintain their course along the Maoist/Dengist road, and they are well aware of that.
CCP instability escalates- causes extinction.
Yee and Storey 02 (Herbert and Ian, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist
University, and Lecturer in Defense Studies at Deakin, respectively. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and
Reality,” pg. 5)
http://books.google.com/booksid=2OMF7rsP7PkC&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=The+fourth+factor+contributing+
to+the+...to+its+neighbours+and+the+world.&source=bl&ots=Ne6OItMjva&sig=m1ukmxcMYmIRRM5vv45X
PMRIyac&hl=en&ei=xkBHTMqgDM-
jnQfAp_GQBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=The
%20fourth%20factor%20contributing%20to%20the%20...to%20its%20neighbours%20and%20the
%20world.&f=
false
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the
PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war, and waves of refugees pouring into neighboring countries.
Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the
Chinese leadership faces a raft of international problems, including the increasing political demands of its
citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment
caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to
govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking
asylum in neighboring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe
strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare
scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or
warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the
world.
 Soft Power

1. Plan can't solve soft power --- many issues swamp the plan --- only a broad
overhaul of policy can make a dent in the U.S. global image

Talbott ‘06
(Strobe, President – Brookings Institution, Keynote Address to Stanley Foundation Conference, "Bush Foreign
Policy: The Next Phase", 12-7, http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/talbott/20061207.htm)
To its credit, starting in 2004, even before President Bush's re-election, he took some positive steps that were reassuring both at home and
abroad. Early after his second Inaugural, he sent Secretary Rice to Europe and then made a trip of his own to Brussels and Berlin. Instead of following up, as many
feared he would do, on the implications of his "Axis of Evil" rhetoric—that is, having the military juggernaut roll right on from Baghdad to Tehran and Pyongyang and
change the regimes there—he outsourced diplomacy on Iran to the European Union and on North Korea to China. The reason President Bush
changed approach was, quite simply, that Iraq was going badly, Afghanistan seemed stuck, and support for his foreign policy was eroding at home.
The administration also belatedly recognized how much help it need from rest of world. That was the
backdrop for a trend toward restoration of more moderate, multilateralist foreign policy in the second
term. But there has been a sense of tentativeness, of tactical fine-tuning rather than strategic
readjustment, a sense of course-correction rather than course-reversal. We saw evidence
of that in recent days in the reluctance with which President Bush gave up on his determination to keep, as his ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who has
been the personification of in-your-face unilateralism. Let me give you my own view on what it would take— not to
"solve," perhaps, but to manage—the foreign policy problem from hell. Let me also be clear: this is not a prediction of
what the administration will do; rather, it's a prescription for what I believe it should do. What's needed now is nothing less than a
broad-gauge overhaul of American foreign policy commensurate with, necessary to, supportive of a change in policy on Iraq
itself. It should start with recognition—and this is not a matter of semantics; it's a matter of political realism— that we're enmeshed in a civil war in Iraq and civil wars,
by definition, require political solutions. The greater reliance on diplomacy that everyone seems to agree is necessary must include negotiation with regimes we don't
like for good reasons, especially Syria and Iran , because we need them to rein in the militias. It must also include repairing relations with allies and friends. We
must strengthen international institutions we have weakened, starting with the UN . Now that Mr. Bolton is out, the President should appoint someone
who would personify respect for what is good and admirable and supportive of U.S. interests in the UN's legacy, its potential, and its utility—I'd even say its
indispensability to us in the years ahead. It should also not be someone closely identified with Iraq policy to date. The administration should conduct the earliest
possible meetings at the highest possible level with new Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and help him establish the best possible relationship with the Congress. These
are steps of immediate relevance to the challenge we face in Iraq and the Middle East. No less important is a range of other steps we
should take to restore American leadership of the international system. We should do so in arms control and
nonproliferation by strengthening treaty regimes which, like UN, we have weakened .
I would stress the importance of the Strategic Arms
Reduction process, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That would be: reducing our strategic arsenal as soon as possible to
the limits set by the so called Moscow Treaty and returning to negotiations with Russia on significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons and the elimination of tactical
nuclear weapons. As for the NPT, we should work to get India, Pakistan, and the five Treaty-approved nuclear-weapon states to join in a moratorium on the production
of fissile material pending verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Let me give extra attention to the CTBT. The refusal of the Republican-controlled Senate to ratify
the CTBT in October 1999 was a dark day in the history of this country. That was seven years ago. Much has been written lamenting the irony and the folly of what
happened then. But nothing is more eloquent or astute than what Johnny Apple—whose memorial service took place two days ago—wrote for the front page of the New
York Times at the time: "The Senate's decisive rejection tonight of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the most explicit American repudiation of a major
international agreement in 80 years, and it further weakened the already shaky standing of the United States as a global moral leader. Not since the Versailles Treaty
was voted down in November 1919, an action that was repeated in March 1920, has so far-reaching an accord been turned down." The Bush administration made clear,
soon after coming into office, that it would let the CTBT languish. I realize the administration is, to put it mildly, unlikely now to embrace the treaty. But at least it
should back off hints of that the U.S. may break out of the CTBT—that is, begin testing again—in order to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons. And the new
Congress, along with the NGO sector, should do everything possible to lay ground work for ratification of the CTBT early in next administration. That is a goal that I
believe would have bipartisan support, since there are plenty of Republicans who recognize the importance of the treaty and the self-destructiveness of what the Senate
did seven years ago. There should also be an unambiguous American endorsement of international law— not later,
but now. With regard to the International Criminal Court, the best thing would be to return to the U.S. position of September 2000. That
would mean re-
signing the Rome treaty that Clinton signed and Bush "unsigned"—a gratuitous insult to many of our friends around the world whose help we are
going to need. Again, that's unlikely to happen. But there should be no doubt about the damage we do ourselves by remaining outside the ICC. At a minimum, we
should abandon efforts to negotiate immunity for U.S. forces, especially since we have, in those negotiations, little "leverage"—to return to that word in the conference
topic—for getting our way in that regard, as in so many others. Another salutary step would be to engage actively and constructively
with the new Human Rights Council at the UN . We're in the position now of not even having a delegate on the council. The country of
Eleanor Roosevelt is on the sidelines of the effort to breathe new life into the Human Rights Commission that she was so instrumental in establishing. This is not just a
shame—it's an absurdity. Speaking of international law and human rights—and coming back to Iraq—there's the question of treatment of
prisoners. We should make a commitment to adhere to the Geneva Conventions and move affirmatively to restore habeas corpus rights to terrorist detainees.
And since we're so focused on exit strategy for Iraq, let's have one for Guantanamo as well: either make it Geneva-compliant or close it down in way that ensures its
inmates aren't sent to places, like Syria, where the conditions will be even worse. I'm now going to put one more issue on the table: climate
change. That may seem extraneous to dealing with terrorism and Iraq and the meltdown of U.S. policy in the Greater Middle East. I include it on the list for two
reasons: first, because a new policy on global warming is important in its own right; second, it's important as evidence of a new foreign policy in general. The
Bush administration's obstructionism and obscurantism on global warming has become symbolic of what
much of rest of world resents and resists about the substance and style of leadership. We can't launch an
effective "diplomatic offensive" in the Middle East if a key aspect of our global
diplomacy is offensive to much of the world—and, by the way, to many of our own citizens.

Alt causes ---

A) Prisoner abuse

Wang ‘05
(Jisi, Dean – School of International Studies, Peking U., Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, Lexis)
Since then, the extent of armed resistance to the U.S. occupation of Iraq has exceeded the Bush administration's expectations. Meanwhile, revelations
of
prisoner abuse by U.S. personnel in Iraq and elsewhere have undermined the credibility of U.S. rhetoric on human rights
and further damaged the United States' image in the world. U.S. "soft power"--the country's ability to influence indirectly the actions of other
states--has been weakened.

The United States also faces serious competition and disagreement from Europe, Japan, and Russia on many economic and
development-related issues, and there have been disputes on arms control, regional policies, and the role of the United
Nations and other international organizations.

B) State visits

Delhunt ‘07
(Bill, US Representative, D-MA, FNS, 5-2, Lexis)
But let me suggest that it is not simply our counterterrorism policies that have undermined our claim to
world leadership in terms of human rights. In the same inaugural address that I quoted earlier, President Bush spoke of how the "untamed
fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world." But as the reports clearly lay out, some of the darkest corners of the world
are governed by some of our allies in the so-called war on terror, or those with whom we have important economic relationships.
Now, the administration is right to criticize governments of countries like Iran or Cuba or North Korea for violations of human rights and a lack of democracy. But I
would suggest that that criticism rings hollow when the president welcomes Hu Jintao of China or Islam Karimov
of Uzbekistan or Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to the White House; or when Vice President Cheney visits Kazakhstan's dictator,
Nazarbayev, and expresses, in his words, admiration for all that has been accomplished here in Kazakhstan; or Secretary Rice herself refers to Teodoro Obiang of
Equatorial Guinea as a "good friend." And outside of the reports that we're reviewing here today, there is silence as to these leaders'
abysmal human rights records. I'm not naive. I understand that absolute consistency in foreign relations is impossible, and that sometimes the
choice is not between good and evil, but between more evil and less evil. But I also know that America's
power ultimately comes not from our
military and economic strength, but it emanates from our core values: our commitment to human rights and democracy, and from
how we fulfill that
commitment in our action, not just with our rhetoric. The unfortunate fact is that many of our policies have not
lived up to those inspiring words of President Bush. This inconsistency between words and deeds makes
us vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy, and hypocrisy erodes our claim to moral leadership and
to the sincerity of our commitment to human rights and dignity, which has always, always been so appealing to the rest of the
world about the United States. And as the Government Accountability Office has concluded, that growing negative opinion of the United States can have real and
dangerous consequences for the safety and the interests of the American people.

C) United Nations support

Shattuck ‘07
(John, CEO – John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, CQ Testimony, 3-29, Lexis)
4. The U.S. decision to disengage from U.N. human rights institutions undermines its position as a
human rights leader. For more than sixty years the U.S. has been a world leader in building international institutions to promote human rights. Today,
unfortunately, we seem to have renounced that leadership by withdrawing from the new U.N. Human Rights
Council and by refusing to participate in efforts to shape the new International Criminal Court. In both cases the U.S. now has no
influence over the future of these two flawed institutions. In the case of the Human Rights Council, the U.S. abandoned its support when it was unable to limit the
Council's membership to countries with good human rights records, despite the fact that the Council membership requirements adopted in the recent U.N. reforms are
an improvement over those of the dysfunctional Human Rights Commission which it replaced. In the case of the International Criminal Court, many structural changes
need to be made in order for the U.S. to become a full participant. Nevertheless, in recent years the U.S. has lost all leverage over the Court's development by
withdrawing its signature from the treaty establishing it. In addition, an active U.S. campaign to put pressure on governments
not to join the Court has engendered international ill will and further undermined the capacity of
the U.S. to exercise human rights leadership.

No impact to soft power- cooperation occurs out of self-interest

U.S. human rights promotion is counter-productive

Neier ‘06
(Aryeh, President – Open Society Institute, “How Not To Promote Democracy and Human Rights”, 9-25,
http://www.humanrights.uconn.edu/rese_papers/DemocracyHumanRightsANeier.pdf)
From the standpoint of the Arab intellectuals, they feel they have to separate themselves from United States policy
in order to have credibility in their region. So, when the United States speaks in the name of democracy and human
rights in justifying its policy in the Middle East, Arab intellectuals who are themselves committed to democracy and human
rights run away as fast as they can. It tarnishes their effort. That is, I believe, one of the consequences of American military policy that is
proving very destructive. The very terms democracy and human rights are increasingly associated in many parts of the world with
American willingness to impose our government’s will by its superior force, and to act in a way that seems to disregard all
international agreements and international conventions in the process of imposing its will. A second way that the Bush Administration’s policies have helped to give
human rights a bad name has to do with our own practices since September 11, 2001. The United States always had something of a checkered
record in promoting human rights internationally. There were parts of the world where we were very vigorous in promoting human
rights, and there were parts of the world where we were allies of those who were abusing human rights. On balance, however, the United States was a force worldwide
for the human rights cause, and part of that had to do with our own reputation as a government that was respectful of human rights. The United States’ own practices
were widely admired worldwide, and those who criticized United States policy complained that we were willing to ally ourselves with governments that were not
similarly respectful of human rights. The chapters in this volume by Carol Greenhouse and Neil Hicks expand on this point. What has happened since September 11,
2001, is that the image of the United States worldwide is now the image of a human rights violator, rather than the image of a
respecter of human rights. Everywhere in the world people know about Guantanamo Bay, and Guatanamo has become a symbol
of American policy. The idea that the United States would arbitrarily hold a large number of people in a legal black hole for a period of years with no
access to attorneys, no access to families, and no charges, was beyond anything that anyone could have expected. Several other democratic countries have had terrorist
problems. Britain has had the IRA, Spain has had the ETA, India has had terrorism related to Kashmir, Israel has had suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism.
None of the democratic countries elsewhere in the world that have experienced terrorism did anything that is comparable to Guantanamo in the manner that they dealt
with terrorism. There were delays in bringing detainees before judges in various places, and periods of time when they did not have access to lawyers and families,
but Guantanamo exceeded what any other democratic government has done in dealing with those persons it accused of terrorism. Though the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2004 decisions in Padilla and Hamdi have now limited, to some degree, the extent of the arbitrariness with which the United States may hold prisoners at Guantanamo,
most of the detainees there have not yet seen a lawyer, nor have they yet had contact with members of their families. The prolongation of detention without charges is
likely to be a factor for a good while to come. In addition, of course, the Abu Ghraib scandal and the images that went around the world of American soldiers engaged
in the intentional humiliation and torture of detainees is another part of America’s new image. The consequence is that when the United
States now attempts to lecture other governments about human rights, the images that come to
mind worldwide are the images from Abu Ghraib and the images from Guantanamo. The United States is seen as
hypocritical in its advocacy of human rights. That perception of hypocrisy is another factor that
tends to give the human rights cause, as espoused by the United States, a bad name.

Shuttle diplomacy --- the plan fails because it’s perceived as weakness

Northam ‘07
(Jackie – National Security Correspondent at NPR, NPR Morning Edition, “Bush Team Explores Use of 'Soft
Power'” 3-23, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9096714)
Morning Edition, March 23, 2007 · Much of the Bush administration's foreign policy has been characterized by hardline demands when engaging other countries in
diplomacy, and standoffs with adversaries. Recently, however, there have been diplomatic openings — with North Korea on nuclear weapons, and
with Iran and Syria regarding stability in Iraq. The shift in policy has raised speculation that the United States recognizes that a
softer approach to foreign policy is in order. The changes come at a low point in the Bush administration's tenure. Many analysts say the quagmire in
Iraq, and controversial policies stemming from the so-called "war on terrorism" have reduced the prestige of the U.S. and limited its leverage abroad. But James
Carafano, a senior research fellow with the Heritage Foundation, says shuttle diplomacy, like that now being pursued by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, is unlikely to reverse America's diplomatic problems. "I think what the administration is doing now in
terms of the diplomatic outreach is really out of weakness, not out of strength," Carafano said. "And therefore, I don't think
it's going to be terribly effective."

Timeframe --- it will take decades to repair soft power

Freeman ‘06
(Chas W., Ambassador (USFS, Ret.), “Why Not Let Them Hate Us, as Long as They Fear Us?”, 11-4,
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/71.htm)
To rediscover public diplomacy and to practice it successfully, in other words, we must repudiate Caligula’s maxim and replace it with our traditional
respect for the opinion of mankind. I do not think it is beyond us to do so. We are a far better and more courageous people than we currently appear. But
when we do restore ourselves to mental balance, we will, I fear, find that decades are required – it will take decades – to rebuild the
appeal and influence our post-9/11 psychoses took a mere five years to destroy. In the process of reaffirming our traditions, as I am
confident we shall, Americans may well find a renewed role for an independent agency that can facilitate the projection of our democracy and its values abroad.