Analysis
Will Turkey Opt Out?
Summary: Many of the develop-
ments that shake the world happen
around Turkey, most notably Iraq,
Iran, and Georgia. Both the Turkish
state and nation feel the effects of
political and military developments
in the regions surrounding the
country and the importance of the
transatlantic alliance will be further
highlighted through Turkey. America
and the European Union would
be well advised to treat Turkey as
a valued member of the alliance
and communicate to the Turkish
public their intentions and policies
in a more direct and constructive
fashion.
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by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — Many of the develop-
ments that shake the world happen
around Turkey. Iraq, Iran, and Georgia
all neighbor Turkey and Ankara’s
engagement with these countries is
multifaceted. As a direct connection
for the transatlantic alliance to these
troubled regions, Turkey’s views,
choices, and direction are important for
Western strategy and security.
Both the Turkish state and the nation
feel the direct and indirect effects of
political and military developments
in regions surrounding the country.
The public’s outlook on international
affairs is thus shaped. Similarly the
public’s assessment of the country’s
alliance relations reflects these
realities. Whether or not Turkey
receives the respect, consideration,
and understanding from its allies help
form the public’s vision of transat-
lantic relations. Turkey is also in the
unique position of being a secular,
democratic country with a majority
Muslim population that has been
institutionally a member of the
transatlantic alliance for over five
decades. Furthermore, the country is
engaged in accession negotiations with
the European Union.
Given how recent geopolitical develop-
ments and Turkey’s own constructive
engagement in its neighborhoods (the
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
last such move being the visit by the
Turkish President to Armenia ostensi-
bly to watch the soccer game between
the two national teams) raised Turkey’s
profile in international relations, the
views of the Turkish public on the
transatlantic alliance are more
pertinent than ever.
In that sense Transatlantic Trends, a
public opinion survey published by the
German Marshall Fund of the United
States, offers a number of important
findings about Turkey’s sense of itself
and how it views and evaluates its
allies. Perhaps the two most important
findings of the survey, similar to earlier
ones, are that the Turks see their coun-
try as a “lone wolf” and more alarming-
ly, consider themselves non-Western.
A Turkish diplomat, Bulent Nuri Eren,
once said that “Turkey is a lone wolf
without instinctive friends or allies.”
To prove him right, the Turks do not
have much sympathy for almost any
other people or country. According to
Transatlantic Trends, on a 100-point
thermometer scale reading of “Turkish
feelings toward others,” Turkey scores
80 degrees (so the Turks like themselves
as a nation despite their endless inter-
necine conflicts and fights) with the
second ranking held by the Palestinians
at 44 degrees. The rest of the countries
surveyed score less than 33 degrees.
Analysis
Almost half of the Turkish public (48 degrees) “felt that, on
international matters, Turkey should act alone.” Such degree
of unilateralism surpasses even the American tendency to go
it alone and reflects a combination of distrust in and disap-
pointment with its allies. Both of these are a function of the
perception in Turkey that the allies do not care much for Tur-
key’s interests, and do not keep their promises to help Turkey
in matters that it considers to be vital to its national security.
Add to this the fact that since the Gulf war of 1991, all U.S.
military threats and interventions have involved Turkey’s
neighbors, the alliance appears to be providing more inse-
curity than security. But one has to be concerned about the
strength of isolationism probably combined with self-righ-
teousness that permeates all strata of Turkish society (in this
as in many other such variables the Turks are more similar to
the Americans than they are to core European countries). A
healthier relation with the allies of the transatlantic alliance
will necessitate shedding this outlook and inclination.
Transatlantic Trends also shows that 55 percent of Turks do
not consider themselves Western, on the basis of having dif-
ferent values. This is an assessment that is shared by many
if not most Europeans. The survey does not specify exactly
what these values are. Other surveys taken in Turkey at dif-
ferent times showed that Turks identified themselves mostly
with Europe and the West and to a much lesser extent with
Middle Eastern countries or Central Asian republics. This
result may therefore reflect less the commitment of Turks
to democracy than the disenchantment with the Western
security system. In fact, the desirability of U.S. or EU leader-
ship in world affairs remained at 8 percent and 22 percent
respectively and those who saw NATO as essential were just
38 percent of respondents.
What is one to make of these results? Is the West losing Tur-
key? It is too early to jump to conclusions. While it is true that
many Turks see the Western alliance as detrimental to Turk-
ish security and the enthusiasm for EU membership seems
to have waned considerably, there is enough reason to think
that these are not unalterable conditions. To start with EU
membership, Turkish polls show that during the recent po-
litical crises in the country support for EU membership rose
considerably. Some of that rise may not have been reflected in
Transatlantic Trends. The real problem concerning the senti-
ment about EU membership is the absence of vocal political
support for it. In fact Turkey’s main opposition parties are
2
“The real problem concerning the
sentiment about EU membership is
the absence of vocal political sup-
port for it.”
staunchly anti-EU, or find it politically expedient to be so.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), as a result,
feels no pressure to revitalize the comatose accession process.
It sees no political payoff from the EU process, certainly not
until the all important municipal elections are out of the way.
Consequently Turkey’s substantial pro-EU public is without a
voice. Under these circumstances, the level of support for EU
membership should be considered solid.
As in the rest of the world the excessive negativism concern-
ing the United States and American foreign policy is more a
reflection on the Bush administration than the United States
per se. This year’s Transatlantic Trends data shows that
antipathy for the United States has already bottomed out. The
visible change in American policies vis-a-vis the separatist
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was a major factor in turning
the tide. The Turkish public deeply resented what it perceived
to be American support for an independent Kurdistan in
northern Iraq, and was infuriated by U.S. reluctance and
foot-dragging in fighting the PKK and convincing the Kurds
in Iraq to deny them cover. It was only after President Bush
called the PKK “an enemy of the United States” and the U.S.
military began providing actionable intelligence that the
mood changed significantly.
In this case as well, some political actors exacerbated the situ-
ation by vilifying the United States. For a long time since the
Iraq war some in particular influential circles, many of them
former military commanders, questioned the viability and
the benefits of the transatlantic alliance for Turkish national
security. Instead they proposed a so-called “Eurasian” alter-
native that favored closer cooperation with Russia, Iran, and
possibly China as well. The most prominent proponents of
such a line of thinking were pacified or neutralized within
and without the military, partly as a result of the so-called
“Ergenekon” trial. More importantly, perhaps, the new
Analysis

“In the wake of the Russian Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah

aggression against Georgia... the Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the

United States and the European

national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
Union would be well advised to
About GMF
treat Turkey as a valued member of The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
the alliance and communicate to dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
the Turkish public their intentions individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,

and policies in a more direct and and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
constructive fashion. in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the
Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance,
military top brass reiterated its commitment to the transat- GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
lantic alliance and judged the relations between the Turkish addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
and the American militaries as excellent. The government, in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
as well, has a much closer relationship with and much better Bucharest.
understanding of American concerns and the full dimensions
of that relationship than was the case at the beginning of its
term. How relations will evolve will be as much a function
of how the transatlantic alliance reformulates itself and the
choices Europe makes as the ability of Ankara and Wash-
ington to properly define their common interests, goals, and
limitations.

In the wake of the Russian aggression against Georgia and

the recognition by Moscow of the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the importance of the transatlantic
alliance will be further highlighted although Turkey and the
Turkish public do not wish to needlessly antagonize the Rus-
sians. In short, as the geostrategic picture changes and the
Turkish national security elite once more owns up to Turkey’s
transatlantic commitment, the public’s opinion and attitude
are likely to change for the better. To secure this the United
States and the European Union would be well advised to treat
Turkey as a valued member of the alliance and communicate
to the Turkish public their intentions and policies in a more
direct and constructive fashion.