Summary: In his speech in Prague,Czech Republic, on April 5, 2009, U.S.President Barack Obama outlined hisultimate goal of a world without nuclear
weapons. Obama conrmed the U.S.
availability for dialogue with Iran and
that he is exible on missile defense in
Europe, which the United States wouldneed to pursue only if the Iraniannuclear threat materialized. He alsodelivered a strong message (“violationsmust be punished”) to North Koreaafter it had just renewed testing of along range missile.These proposals stand in almostcomplete reversal to the Bushadministration’s stance on nuclearissues. Europeans have in generalbeen frustrated by the lack of interestin arms control shown by the previ-ous administration. The importantfact in the aftermath of the Praguespeech is that the U.S. president haspresented U.S. allies with a number
of specic measures that serve both
sides’ interests and together provide amore viable view of the balance to beachieved between nuclear nonprolifera-tion and disarmament. They shouldconcentrate their energy on making thisagenda happen and transforming it intoviable policy.
Foreign Policy Program
In his speech in Prague, Czech Republic,on April 5, 2009, U.S. President BarackObama outlined his ultimate goal o aworld without nuclear weapons. However,Obama conceded that it could probably notbe reached in his lietime and proposed anumber o concrete steps to move nucleardisarmament orward and curb the proli-eration o nuclear weapons. These include:
The negotiation this year o a newStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement with Russiaproviding or deep reductions inRussian and U.S. arsenals, whichwould set the stage or the inclusiono other nuclear weapon states intothis process.
The ratication o the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty (CTBT) and thenegotiation o a veriable FissileMaterial Cut-O Treaty (FMCT).
A new international eort to securevulnerable nuclear material, whichwill include a Global Summit onNuclear Security hosted by UnitedStates next year.
The institutionalization o two non-prolieration cooperative schemes o the Bush era: the Prolieration Security Initiative (PSI) and the global initiativeto combat nuclear terrorism.
Measures to strengthen controls overthe civilian nuclear uel cycle and thecreation o a uel bank to the beneto non-nuclear weapons states.In addition, Obama conrmed the U.S.availability or dialogue with Iran andindicated that he was fexible on missiledeense in Europe, which the United Stateswould need to pursue only i the Iraniannuclear threat materialized. He also deliv-ered a strong message (“violations must bepunished”) to North Korea ater it had justrenewed testing o a long range missile.These proposals stand in almost completereversal to the Bush administration’sstance on nuclear issues. The Bush ad-ministration opposed the CTBT, whichthe Republicans had deeated in the U.S.Senate in 1998, showed little condencein the possibility o an eective FMCT,and had no interest in urther negotiatedcuts in oensive nuclear weapons. As orprolieration, the Bush administrationdevised measures to deny the illegal
America’s New Nuclear Disarmament Policyand the Transatlantic Relationship
by Gilles Andréani
1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 20009T 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E email@example.com
May 4, 2009
Gilles Andréani is a non-resident transatlantic fellow in Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Previously,he was director of the policy planning staff at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has served as an advisor to the ForeignMinister of France. Mr. Andréani is a graduate of L’École Nationale d’Administration and holds both a master’s degree in history from
the Paris IV Sorbonne and a law degree from the Paris II Panthéon Assas. The views expressed here are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of GMF.