Humanitarian Aid, Social Services and Conflict Dynamics: Exploring the case of

Sudan

By Robert Kevlihan
Ph.D Candidate in International Relations,
American University,
Washington D.C.

Paper prepared for delivery at the World International Studies Conference (WISC)
First Global International Studies Conference, Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey,
24 – 27 August 2005
Introduction

Sudan is a country that has suffered from civil war for most of its almost 50 years of

independence. The recent phase of the conflict began in 1983, and has been the subject of

considerable analysis (for examples see (Keen 1994), (Deng 1995), (Burr and Collins

1995), (Jok 2001), (Johnson 2003)). While most often portrayed as a conflict between the

Arab, Muslim north and Christian / Animist south, the recent upsurge in violence in

Darfur has highlighted the considerably more complicated nature of political violence in

Sudan, with centre / periphery issues in resource allocation, extraction and exploitation,

identity politics, mobilization around differences in confessional religions and

sectarianism within religious denominations all contributing the the dynamics of the

conflict.

Humanitarian assistance has been one of the most consistent and sustained

international interventions with respect to the Sudanese conflict, particularly since the

establishment of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) by the United Nations in 1989. This

assistance has been necessitated by considerable humanitarian needs caused or

exacerbated (in the case of natural disasters such as drought or floods) by the conflict and

the collapse of state provided services throughout most of the country, particularly in

those areas most affected by the war – the south, areas to the east bordering Eritrea, the

Nuba Mountains and most recently Darfur.

This paper seeks to explore the manner in which the provision of social services

(including humanitarian aid) has been influenced the conflict itself. It breaks with

existing literature on the subject in two ways – ontologically by bracketing humanitarian

2
assistance within social services more generally, rather than specifying it as a separate

type, and epistemologically by adopting a relational approach, drawing on the work of

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001), in an effort to begin to

identify causal mechanisms that are of analytical utility to the situation in Sudan and

possibly to other similar situations more generally.

Social Service Delivery and Humanitarian Aid

This paper frames social services to include both those services provided by the state and

those provided by non-state actors, including national and international NGOs and church

groups. While social services is a broad term, in practice in Sudan it refers to health and

nutritional services, education and housing / shelter. Framing social services to include

humanitarian aid draws on the work of both Duffield (Duffield 1999; Duffield 2001), and

Chandler (Chandler 2002) in their characterization of NGO activities. Both point to the

effective privatization of social welfare provision in developing states because of the debt

crisis of the 1970s and subsequent impact of structural adjustment in the 1980s, with

international NGOs taking on increasingly longer-term commitments for service

provision in weaker states. Duffield characterizes this development as part of the

hollowing out of developing states, with such institutional arrangements supporting the

interests of metropolitan states through the projection of authority through non-state

actors and non-territorial networks of international assistance.

However, hollowing out does not necessarily mean dissolution. As this paper

demonstrates, even hollowed out states can exercise considerable influence on the

manner on which services are provided. Bringing the state back in to the analysis

3
necessitates a turn toward considering humanitarian aid under the broader umbrella of

social services. This paper argues that the provision of food, health, shelter, educational

and other assistance to populations may be regarded as social services, regardless of the

institutional mechanism of delivery (i.e. government, NGO, church). Differences in

weighting between national and international sources of finance and institutional

mechanisms for delivery (between state systems and NGOs) certainly apply, but the

broad aim of these services is typically the same regardless of institutional delivery

structure or financing source – to provide a safety net for those most vulnerable.

Furthermore, the nature of services provided – health, nutrition, shelter, water /

sanitation, etc, are essentially the same in both instances - public goods that in the

broader international context are sometimes provided by states, in others by NGOs and

often, by a mixture of the two.

Furthermore, distinctions on the ground between state and non-state institutions

can become blurred, even in humanitarian emergencies. NGOs often operate out of semi-

functional government institutions – such as hospitals and health clinics, and work with

government staff. This has bearing on the nature of the state in such circumstances. Local

institutional configurations and, in particular, the way in which the state does or does not

influence the manner in which services are provided are also often not considered by the

current literature on this subject. In addition to determining geographical areas of NGO

operations, at the micro level a subtle form of patterning of how aid is provided can

occur, simply because of this tendency to operate out of pre-existing infrastructure.

Indeed, this patterning can go beyond pre-existing infrastructure.

4
 In situations such as Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) held areas of

southern Sudan, NGO planning for new operations often include reference to maps that

are long since out of date – settlement and service provision patterns established in

colonial times (through the establishment of government outposts and mission stations)

are often re-produced by NGOs – where these outposts were previously burned out and

deserted because of conflict. The processes involved in the reproduction of pre-existing

patterns while somewhat mundane at one level, are reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s

map derived imaginings in “Imagined Communities” (Anderson 2002)

Relational approach to analyzing social services in conflict situations

The issue of conflict as process; i.e. the manner in which conflict dynamics play out

during times of conflict, has been addressed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (MTT).

Examining what they describe as ‘contentious politics’1, MTT identify over twenty causal

mechanisms – including brokerage (defined as the linking of two or more currently

unconnected sites that operate and concatenate in different sequences - termed episodes),

resulting in different outcomes. By adopting a relational approach to analysis, MTT’s

concept of brokerage is central - it refers to the manner in which nodes in networks

interact with each other. The challenge, building on MTT’s work, is to identify different

forms of brokerage that have relevance to the manner in which social services are

delivered in conflict situations. Tilly’s book Durable Inequality (Tilly 1998) offers

additional concepts in this respect, with its focus on how certain mechanisms such as

exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation and adaptation act to create durable

1
MTT seek to reframe revolutions, along with nationalism and democratization, as well as social movements literature, as comprised
of contentious episodes with sufficient commonalities to allow for a unitary analytical approach instead of a vertically differentiated
thematic approach often presented by scholars of comparative politics.

5
inequalities within societies. While Tilly does not make this link, I argue that these

mechanisms can be described as different forms of brokerage that have relevance to the

case of Sudan.

Background to Social Services in Sudan

The current configuration of urban settlement and consequent service provision based out

of these urban settlements in Sudan owes much to the legacy of the Anglo-Egyptian

condominium that governed the country from the defeat of Mahdist forces in the late 19 th

century, particularly in the south. Urban centers in Sudan owe their existence to two main

historical processes – the establishment of centers as part of trade routes in the pre

colonial period, and the consolidation of these centers and establishment of new towns as

administrative centers in the colonial period. This consolidation led to the urbanization of

elites in ‘small centers’ that served as mechanisms of extraction from surrounding areas

(Ahmed and Abdel-Rahman 1979). While limited services existed in (mostly northern)

urban centers in the early part of the 19th century, notably those established while much of

Sudan was controlled by Egypt in the early 19th century (Trout-Powell 2003), it was only

in the later colonial period that a concerted effort was made to expand services of some

description throughout the country. The origins of modern elites in Sudan owe much to

access to state schools in the north and mission schools in the south (Ahmed 2003b).

Colonial policy favored northern elites in the central zone around the river Nile

and the capital Khartoum to the detriment of peripheral regions in the south, east and

west. This in part reflected previous centralization of control under the Mahdiyya and

compromises made by the colonial administration with local elites. Civil administration

in the north began to evolve in the 1920s, but unlike the south, was largely devoid of

6
religious overtones, as missionary activity in northern Muslim areas was circumscribed.

(Sikainga 2002). Sikainga also comments on the ‘rehabilitation’ of an educated class in

the north, with the 1930s seeing an expansion in educational facilities, particularly

teacher training institutes and in the establishment of the Gordon Memorial College. The

majority of educated Sudanese of the time being the sons of tribal and religious leaders in

northern and the central parts of the country. In the north this led to the creation of a new

urban elite with strong ties to traditional rural power bases (Ahmed 2003a).

Colonial policy with respect to southern Sudan also played a large role in how

services were established in that region. The Anglo Egyptian condominium portioned off

the southern part of Sudan and allocated zones to various missionary groups, who became

the primary providers of social services in many areas. Dinka areas of Bahr El Ghazal

went to the Catholic Verona Fathers; Equatoria and Upper Nile provinces were assigned

to Protestant and Non-Conformist Churches. This pattern of religious influence remained

in place until the expulsion of missionaries from south Sudan in 1962 (Gordon 1984).

Mission stations – typically comprising a church, school, infirmary and accommodation

for the missionaries (McLeish 1927), began to be established in parts of southern Sudan

in the first decade of the 20th century, but penetration was slow – paralleling the

difficulties in consolidation of colonial administration in the south. It was only in the

1920s that mission stations could be said to have been anything but a marginal influence,

both in terms of evangelism and service provision (Mawut 1983), (Hutchinson 1996).

Even then, Johnson argues that the main influence of Christianity came not in the number

of its converts, but in the subsequent strategic influence its converts achieved through

their educational qualifications, and their role in administration and politics in the late

7
Condominium and early independence periods (Johnson 2003). Muslim influence in the

south was restricted to larger towns, where ex-soldiers and civil servants often settled and

became involved in trade, often establishing religious schools (Johnson 2003).

Relational analysis at the national level

At the national level, opportunity hoarding by educated elites (with links to traditional

bases of power) from Arab areas of the river Nile and related clients in peripheral areas

appears to be a primary causal mechanism. A precursor to this mechanism occurring was

the differential access to the colonial education system afforded to northern Sudanese,

followed by access to junior and mid level posts in the colonial administration and the

subsequent inheritance by them of the state apparatus at independence.

In the post independence period the state has been, in effect, captured by educated

self-identifying Arab groups coming from particular areas of the Nile river that have

made differing strategic alliances with other groups in peripheral areas at different times

(Deng 1991; Deng 1995; Sikainga 2002). Economic development has largely favored

these ‘centre’ groups and their clients in the peripheries (Fawzy 1975). While political

shifts within this ruling class has brought differing political elements to the fore over time

(Sikainda 1993), it consistently favors this center over peripheral regions. Social services

that have been provided by the state in the post independence period have continued to

favor northern Arab populations living in the central region around Khartoum. Where

provided in other areas, services have frequently been used as a means to push

assimilation of other groups to northern Arab Islamic culture. The conflict itself has been

conducted mainly (though not exclusively, as the recent violence in Darfur demonstrates)

8
in southern Sudan. Indeed, the recent upsurge in western Sudan highlights the center /

periphery nature of conflict even further than heretofore.

Social service provision in Sudan since mid 1980s

In common with many other African countries, Sudan began to suffer from a debt crisis

in the late 1970s and early 1980s as interest rates rose. In Sudan’s case, this was

exacerbated by a decline in US government assistance – Sudan had been the largest

recipient of US aid in African outside of Egypt during the 1970s. With the government

increasingly subject to strict conditionality from international financial institutions

(Faaland 1987), the quality and scope of government provided social services began to

decline. The famine of 1985 saw a large influx of non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) into Sudan, and the beginnings of gamesmanship in the delivery of humanitarian

assistance by the Sudanese government, with extensive restrictions being placed on the

ability of NGOs and donors to deliver assistance to high need areas considered unfriendly

towards the government (Keen 1994). Government services in rural areas of the south

had largely halted in 1983-84 as a result of counter-insurgency operations. This collapse

of government services in rural areas where the SPLA held sway, combined with the

absence of NGOs from these areas until the establishment of OLS in 1989, meant that

international relief essentially supported government garrison towns during much of the

1980s (Johnson 2003). Again, an example of opportunity hoarding by the Sudanese

government at the national level – in this case, of the inputs afforded from humanitarian

aid.

9
 The response of populations that required access to humanitarian assistance in

SPLA controlled areas was one of adaptation. While humanitarian aid was not available

within most SPLA held areas of southern Sudan, it was available across the border in

Ethiopia in refugee camps for southern Sudanese. Gakmar reports a second type of

adaptation occurring at the micro level, claiming that the collapse in government services

may have assisted the SPLA, with many educated southern youths joining up because of

frustration over lack of opportunities in continuing their education (Gakmar 2002).

The establishment of OLS in 1989 (which allowed humanitarian assistance to be

delivered to SPLA held areas) came at a unique time – a relatively weak government

under Prime Minister Saddiq El Mahdi seemed on the verge of brokering a peace

agreement with the SPLA, and as such was susceptible to international pressure (Burr and

Collins 1995). However, in June 1989 a coup put the National Islamic Front into power

in an alliance with hardline elements of the military in the name of the ‘Revolution of

National Salvation’ and as a result the war in the south continued unabated (Deng 1995).

Mechanisms in social service delivery at the national level

Since the establishment of OLS international humanitarian organizations have been able

to work on both sides (i.e. government controlled and Sudan People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA) controlled areas) of the conflict in Sudan. It is generally recognized that the

SPLA has been quite successful in ‘taxing’ assistance going into its areas – particularly

food assistance, in order to support its insurgency (Prendergast 1996; Rone 1996; De

Waal 1997; Rone 1999a) – a form of exploitation in the sense that it does not prevent

others from accessing the assistance (as with opportunity hoarding), but does insist on its

10
‘cut’. In this respect the SPLA has not been successful in emulating the Sudanese

government, in terms of the degree of control it can exercise over assistance delivered –

particularly because the Sudanese government itself has a say over deliveries of

assistance by OLS into SPLA areas.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese government’s military strategy all too often has targeted

institutions (such as schools and hospitals) in SPLA held towns, while implementing bans

on OLS relief flights to areas not under their control. The Sudanese government also

typically maintains a tight control over the operations of humanitarian organizations in

areas which it controls, frequently allowing aid agencies only to work in areas that suit

government political and economic purposes and in some cases have denied access to

government held zones considered sensitive (Keen 1994; Jok 2001; Johnson 2003). This

combined strategy of opportunity hoarding (through tight control of assistance and

attempts to impede delivery of assistance in SPLA areas) and exploitation (through

benefiting directly and indirectly from the assistance delivered) represents a more potent

mix of mechanisms than the largely exploitation based strategies of the SPLA.

Nevertheless, social services, largely financed from external assistance, have served the

interests of both parties in a resource poor environment.

Micro level mechanisms: A Case study of famine in Wau, 1998

Wau, the capital of Western Bahr El Ghazal province, lies at the southernmost extremity

of a railway constructed from Khartoum by the British. The town first came under

colonial control in 1900, having been a centre for slave raiding for most of the 19th

century. Developed as an administrative center, it was home to the colonial

11
administration for the Bahr El Ghazal region in the 1920s; district commissioners based

in the town toured around smaller villages and settlements staying in government

constructed rest houses (Wyndham 1936). At independence, Wau was one of the larger

towns in southern Sudan and a stopping point on the overland route (as opposed to the

river route) to the southern capital of Juba.

The town itself is home to diverse tribal groupings including Dinka, Jur and Fertit

as well as Arab merchants and traders. The Catholic church has remained influential in

the town, having been originally ‘assigned’ Bahr El Ghazal as one of its zones of

operations during colonial times. Attempts have been made to increase the Islamic

influence in the town, particularly under the current government; during a visit by the

author there in 1999 local people commented on the construction of a mosque to a greater

height than that of the local Catholic Cathedral. Because of it’s status as a garrison town,

it also is home to large number of soldiers and other irregular pro-government forces.

In early 1998, conflict erupted in Wau and surrounding regions which led to a

major humanitarian crisis. This case study describes the events in Wau in 1998 and draws

some preliminary conclusions with respect to causal mechanisms of interest associated

with this episode. The immediate circumstances leading to the humanitarian crisis of

1998 are complex. Poor rains meant that populations in Bahr El Ghazal province were

due to face a difficult harvest year in 1998 (Santoro 1998; Murphy and Salaama 1999).

The dry season in southern Sudan, which stretches from January to June also heralds a

time of traditional conflict between Government forces and the SPLA in the south. The

situation in Bahr El Ghazal state was complicated by Government use of ethnic Arab

Murahileen militia from neighboring Kordofan state to harass civilian populations seen to

12
be sympathetic to the rebels and the varying loyalties of other local warlords in the area

(Rone 1999b). Recent research estimates that between 1983 and 2002, more than 12,000

people were violently abducted from areas of Bahr El Ghazal and Abyei as a result of

over 2,000 raids (Ryle, Jok et al. 2003). The events of 1998 were one peak in that on-

going series of violent encounters between government backed militias and the local

population living in regions north and northeast of Wau, especially in areas close to the

railway and adjacent to Arab dominated areas in Kordofan province.

In relation to the emerging crisis in Bahr El Ghazal in early 1998, the role of one

southern militia leader, Kerubino Bol, proved crucial. Formerly an SPLA commander,

and of Dinka extraction, Kerubino split with John Garang’s mainstream SPLA in 1994,

and aligned himself with the Government through the signing of a peace agreement in

April 1997. Post April 1997, Sudanese government strategy was characterized by the

deliberate and systematic raiding of civilian (predominantly Dinka) targets, in

collaboration with Kerubino’s forces and the Murahileen. In the course of these raids,

thousands of civilians were arbitrarily killed. Many more were displaced from their

homes. Villages were burnt and looted, cattle stolen and thousands of civilians, mostly

women and children, abducted for forced labor purposes to Arab areas (Amnesty

International 1999). As a consequence agricultural production was disrupted,

exacerbating an already precarious food security situation.

The combination of drought, sporadic flooding and the hostilities described above

led to a weakening of community structures and traditional coping mechanisms, and to

population movements. At the end of January 1998, fighting erupted in Wau, Awiel and

Gogrial (three major government held towns in Bahr El Ghazal) between Sudanese

13
government forces and those of Kerubino, who had re-defected to the SPLA. Within a ten

day period, more than 110,000 people fled the area, crossing combat lines into SPLA

controlled regions. This massive influx of people under strain further eroded

humanitarian conditions (Operation Lifeline Sudan 1998). The humanitarian situation

worsened from February through to early April, due to the refusal of the Sudanese

government to grant access to humanitarian agencies or relief flights under OLS auspices

(Department for International Development 1998). The month of May saw further

disruption in Bahr El Ghazal, with militias and other irregular forces continuing their

campaign of rural destabilisation and pillage (Operation Lifeline Sudan 1998), and the

beginning of a massive return of Dinka into Wau. In the space of approximately three

months, 72,000 Dinka (and some Jur) flooded back in to the town, although it is

estimated that only about one third of them were former residents of Wau or its displaced

camps (Rone 1999a).

Dynamics of social service provision in Wau

International NGOs, including World Vision, had been operational in Wau in response to

similar famines in the mid to late 1980s (Keen 1994), however, by 1997 there were no

western international NGOs in the town. UNICEF maintained a field office there, staffed

by a Sudanese national. Social services in the town were largely provided by the Catholic

church, and an assortment of local NGOs (including some Islamic NGOs and Sudanese

Red Crescent, which was receiving some support from ICRC). Médicins Sans Frontières

– Holland (MSF-H) had also conducted an assessment in late 1997 and planned to

establish operations there in early 1998. The MSF assessment focussed on the public

hospital in Wau, which was barely operational at the time and characterized by poor staff

14
attendance, unavailability of drugs and general absence of any public system of care for

patients.2

In the wake of the fighting and out-flux of (mainly Dinka) people from Wau in

January, the Sudanese government imposed a flight ban on all relief assistance from the

4th February 1998 until the 31st March 1998 (Franco 1999; Keen 1999), despite food relief

drops already having been started to those displaced from Wau by the WFP (UNDP-EUE

1998). This in effect cut Wau and surrounding areas off from humanitarian assistance of

any kind. While this had only a limited impact on the situation in Wau itself because of

the large scale out-flux of people from the town, the real damage was done by the

absence of OLS assistance in rural areas outside the town (airdrops being the only

feasible means of delivering assistance). While limited assistance did get in to some of

these areas through humanitarian agencies working outside of the OLS framework,

government restrictions drastically reduced what could be put in.

Meanwhile, in Wau, after considerable diplomatic efforts, MSF-H were allowed

to place one international staff person in the town in April 1998. The Sudanese

government subsequently refused access to other international aid workers into Wau until

mid July. As a consequence, the few agencies operational on the ground had to cope with

the massive influx of people in severe difficulties from May until July. It was not until

late July that other NGOs were able to begin to establish operations, with food relief

operations beginning to scale up in late July (World Food Programme 1998). The scale of

the disaster peaked during these summer months, with recorded malnutrition amongst

children under five reaching 43.5% in early August (IRIN 1998).

2
Interview with humanitarian aid worker based in Wau in 1998 / 99, Washington D.C., January 2005.

15
Towards a delineation of causal mechanisms at the micro level

So much for the historical chronology; let us now consider some underlying processes

associated with this episode – processes that may be replicated in similar situations

within Sudan and elsewhere. Returning to MTT concept of brokerage, we can see that in

the case of Wau, the Sudanese government exercised a key role. At the national level, the

authorities in Khartoum were able to block access by humanitarian agencies to

populations within its direct control (in Wau town) and to populations in rural areas

outside of its control.

In thinking about humanitarian actors as part of a single system of social service

provision, this reflects the types of institutional environments discussed by Scott, to the

extent that individual NGOs, UN agencies and donors ended up negotiating with

particular government units acting as gatekeepers to programming and / or access (Scott

1995).

The government gate-keeping unit in question in Sudan was the Humanitarian

Aid Commission (HAC). Access to Wau (and other war affected regions of Sudan) was

controlled through the issue of travel permits by HAC to international staff. HAC

procedures tended to be somewhat byzantine, with applications to sensitive areas

frequently being held up for significant periods of time, rather than being refused

outright. The Sudanese government has proved itself to be effective in turning access off

when it suits them, as in the first half of the year in Wau. Only one international NGO

worker was permitted into Wau between January and early July, and he was reluctant to

leave once he did get down in April because of fear that he would not be let back in

again.3 Eventually, after significant international pressure, further assistance was

3
Interview with humanitarian aid worker based in Wau in 1998 / 99, Washington D.C., January 2005.

16
permitted – but the Sudanese effectively exercised their ability to prevent sufficient

assistance reaching Wau over a period of six months. This parallels similar processes

described by Keen in the 1980s in the same region (Keen 1994), and represent de facto

opportunity hoarding. However, while Keen’s analysis emphasizes the material interests

of merchants and local military engaged in speculative trading as reasons for the

restrictions on assistance, in the case of Wau in 1998, it would seem that broader strategic

interests were at stake, as the restriction of assistance occurred at a time when a large part

of the population had fled the town and before humanitarian conditions deteriorated with

the new influx in May. It was indeed opportunity hoarding but with a different aim –

military success rather than commercial gain (at least until May). The denial of assistance

in rural areas around Wau placed increased pressure on populations in SPLA controlled

areas by depriving them of much needed food assistance, and as a result, consolidating

what had been their own tenuous hold on key urban areas in Bahr El Ghazal, including

Wau.

Equally at the local level, the government was able to exercise considerable

control. Authorities in Wau restricted NGO access within the town itself, through curfews

and by preventing access to areas outside a well defined security perimeter around the

town. NGOs in Wau were kept under tight control during this time, with close scrutiny of

personnel movements and communications. The actual locations where assistance could

be provided were also subject to the control of local authorities – as exemplified by

decisions taken in September 1998 to relocate internally displaced persons (IDPs) to

camps located outside of Wau, effectively placing them as human shields in the event of

further attacks on the town.

17
 In areas outside of their direct control, the Sudanese government was able to

exercise its sovereignty rights, confirmed under the terms of the OLS agreement, to deny

the UN permission to drop supplies to populations who had fled Wau. OLS has to request

flight permissions from the Sudanese government to fly supplies into southern Sudan,

even to areas controlled by the SPLA and other rebel groups. This did not prevent some

NGOs for establishing what the Sudanese government would regard as illegal operations

in SPLA areas – sovereignty rights in the absence of coercive capacity clearly have their

limitations, indicating the ways in which some NGOs on the southern side adapted

themselves to the situation, given their own humanitarian imperatives.

Within Wau itself, when NGOs did begin to establish operations, a substantial

portion of these activities overlapped with pre-existing structures - MSF-H, the first

international NGO on the ground, inserted itself into the near defunct hospital and

established therapeutic feeding activities for children and adults. GOAL, an Irish NGO,

provided manpower and drugs support to the Catholic health centers from August 1998

onwards. This shows evidence of the type of patterning previously mentioned, which

effectively comprises a form of emulation; agencies emulating pre-existing patterns of

service provision.

However, in the case of Wau, existing infrastructure was insufficient to meet the

overwhelming needs in the town – as a result a number of agencies, including

International Rescue Committee, CARE, Action Contre la Faim and ICRC established

their own operations independently when access was finally granted, again a form of

adaptation to conditions prevailing on the ground.

18
Conclusions

Tilly listed four basic mechanisms in Durable Inequality - opportunity hoarding,

exploitation, emulation and adaptation. In the case of Sudan, these analytical categories

appear to have utility, particularly at the local level. The analysis of the Wau case study

benefits from the analytical tools provided by Tilly; mechanisms described include gate-

keeping and coercive military force used as tools to facilitate opportunity hoarding;

similar gate-keeping on the SPLA side as a means of exploitation, the establishment of

illegal operations in SPLA areas by some international NGOs as an adaptive response;

and both emulation and adaptation by NGOs within Wau in establishing their operations.

In thinking through the relationship between the institutions of service provision

and populations affected by the war, it would appear that those institutions (or units

within broader institutional configurations) that have greater relative power (or at least

the power to prevent others from acting) in these situations – such as Sudanese

government departments tasked with overseeing humanitarian assistance, or SPLA

equivalents, primarily engaged in opportunity hoarding and exploitation. Indeed, it would

appear that at the micro level there may be something of a hierarchy mechanisms

available to these actors, with opportunity hoarding primarily available to the Sudanese

government, largely because of higher levels of coercive control in areas under it’s

control, it’s ability to exercise sovereignty rights with respect to OLS flights and its

attempted use of military power to prevent or disrupt deliveries of assistance in SPLA

areas. By way of contrast, SPLA tactics do not seem to have attained the level of

opportunity hoarding – primarily because of the SPLA’s inability to prevent the Sudanese

government from carrying on as it did. However the SPLA did attain the ability to exploit

19
the delivery of humanitarian assistance through ‘taxing’. It is noteworthy that even that

may have it’s limitations – as the influx of people into government held Wau from SPLA

areas may in part have been because of over taxing by the SPLA.4

On the other hand, for those institutions and groups with relatively less power,

adaptation and emulation appear to better define their courses of action. Adaptation, to

the extent that agencies respond to power realities while continuing to seek to deliver

assistance; and the extent to which vulnerable populations exercise their exit option as a

response to attempts by state or quasi state (as in the SPLA) institutions to coerce them

(Herbst 2000), and emulation – a process in much less evidence here, to the extent that

humanitarian agencies overlap with pre-existing indigenous infrastructure (both state and

non-state, in the case of Catholic Church run operations), in the process essentially re-

establishing the state social service system and reinforcing parallel local systems.

This latter process has some potentially interesting implications. Hutchinson, an

anthropologist that worked extensively with the Nuer in southern Sudan, mentions the

distinction they made by Nuer between the ‘government of the left’ and the ‘government

of the right’. The government of the left (police, regional networks of government chiefs,

courts, district officers and the like) were characterized as aspects of governance with

which people agree / which want people to live, and the government of the right - or

army, which brings only death (Hutchinson 1996). It is noteworthy that support to

defunct government social service structures such as the public hospital represented, in

the case of Wau, the virtual re-establishment of ‘the government of the left’ in a town that

for the preceding portion of the year, had been the sole preserve of ‘the government of

4
Per interview with humanitarian aid worker based in Wau in 1998 / 99, Washington D.C., January 2005.

20
the right’. What impact that may have had on inter-group and conflict dynamics in the

town is a subject for further analysis.

Bibliography

21