Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PERTINENT LAWS
7. Lottery and gift enterprise defined; Caltex contest not a lottery nor
gift enterprise
The term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and
various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate v. Topacio, 44 Phil 278,
1922; citing various jurisprudence). With respect to the last element of
consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving
the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.
While an all-embracing concept of the term “gift enterprise” is yet to be spelled out
in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and
standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under
which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
In the case at bar, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given
for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is
there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The
scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
FACTS:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
monthly paid employees of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its
manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. Such employees, on 17 April
1982 charged the firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a
notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca,
president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living
allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without
proper permit. It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the
declaration of strike, including the 90 ballots (79, yes, 3 no). The strike began on 23
May 1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers
and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. 6 days later, there was a
motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners.
The motion to dismiss was denied. Hence the petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20
July 1982 order issued by the respondent Judge. It granted the writ of prohibition,
and enjoined the Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case
is assigned, from taking any further action on Civil Case 716 (2751), except for the
purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the TRO issued on 5 August 1982.
PERTINENT LAWS
Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3.
All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees'
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving
household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code."
Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction
of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a
court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts
beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the
suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. The plain
command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that possesses original
and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a
strike (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez; Ebon v. De Guzman; and Aguda v.
Vallejos). Further, unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, trend shows that
the choice should fall on an administrative agency (Philippine American
Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the
Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc.).
FACTS:
On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by DENR personnel in
Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from san Jose, Baggao, Cagayan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO’s Jovito
Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days
within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. De
Guzman failed to submit the required explanation. On 22 June 1989, Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan’s action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of PD 705
as amended by EO 277. De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration dated 28 June
1989, which was denied in a subsequent order of 12 July 1989.
The case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031,
was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), which issued a writ ordering
the return of the truck to private respondents. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss by the petititoners in an order dated 28 December 1989. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied.
A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the CA which sustained the
trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence,
the petition, with prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction was filed by the
petitioners on 9 September 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated 27 September
1993, the prayer for the issuance of TRO of petitioners was granted by the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October
decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining
order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to
resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
PERTINENT LAWS:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless
appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
FACTS:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise
Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to
possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano
Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms
and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors
or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law;
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any
clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption
of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption
of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused
to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the
ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos
Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who
died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under
Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent
spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code,
in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The
children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed
out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the
Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate
grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines
was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1)
of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating
through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by
blood relationship. (In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.) The present tendency,
however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment
is sustained to promote that objective.(Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160) Under
the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.( Child
and Welfare Code, Art. 28.)
FACTS:
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
Comelec resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on 14
October 1995, and set the recall election on 13 November 1995. At least 29.30% of
the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided
by law. The Comelec, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s
opposition. On 6 December 1995, the Comelec set anew the recall election, this
time on 16 December 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner
filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (SP Civil Action 2254-
AF), with the trial court issuing a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial
court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. On 12 January 1996, the Court issued a TRO and
required the OSG, in behalf of Comelec, to comment on the petition. In view of the
OSG’s manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the Comelec, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Paras thereafter filed
a reply.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become moot and academic,
as the next regular elections are 7 months away. The TRO issued on 12 January
1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.
PERTINENT LAW:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of
a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
FACTS:
Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine
sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workman’s
Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the
company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs
decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on
an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has
no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are
compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA
covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA
under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the
employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as
their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on
damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but
that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the
relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against
an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing
an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of
judicial legislation.
HELD:
The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not
legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of
the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and
2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as
the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to
Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”
Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do
and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,
like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply.
Digest: Republic v. CA and Molina (GR 108763, 13 February 1997)
FACTS
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and
gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family
rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause
the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at
the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the
time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
Digest: Aisporna v. CA (GR L-39419, 12 April 1982)
Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued
by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a
period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively
with the aforementioned policy.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent
of the Insurance Act
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
Haystack: Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982]
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued
by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a
period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively
with the aforementioned policy. For reason unexplained, an information was filed
against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an
agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from
the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to
renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on
top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the
appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR) finding the Aisporna guilty of a violation of the
first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, the present recourse
was filed on 22 October 1974. In its 28 October 1974 resolution the Court resolved,
without giving due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to
comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment filed on 20 December 1974,
the OSG, representing the CA, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as
having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. On 3 April 1975, Aisporna
submitted his Brief while the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in lieu of a Brief
on 3 May 1975 reiterating his stand that Aisporna has not violated Section 189 of
the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a
court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit
under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of
the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process.
Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower
court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim
Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment
issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March
1972, with costs against the petitioners.
Digest: Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista (GR L-37867, 22
February 1982)
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War
that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to
his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans
Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of
different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or
widows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension
under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that
he was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of
duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit
evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by
the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete
his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of
Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full
benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.
Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an
increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the
unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was, however, increased only
on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact
that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the
amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15
January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and
allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he
claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for
pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. The Board contends,
however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section impliedly
requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of
Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of
pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application.
Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18 December 1955 at
the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried
minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June
1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the
period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject
to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.