The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij
Dr. Saeid Golkar
I
n the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential electionin Iran, the Mobilized Resistance Force (
Niruy-e muqavemat-ebasij
, better known as the Basij) was thrown into the limelightwhen it was used by the Iranian government to crush and eventually control opposition demonstrations. For the pasttwenty years, the Iranian state has used Ideological-PoliticalTraining (IPT) in order to remold the Basij as a new securityforce, tasked with confronting internal unrest and socialrevolt. Given the increasing role of the Basij in Iranian societyand the increasing resort to it by the state as an instrumentof suppressing internal unrest, knowledge of what the Basij isand how it functions has become vital. While there are somepublications about the use of IPT with military forces in Iran,such as the Army
1
and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC),
2
less is known about the Basij. This Brief, the first of its kind, seeks to improve fundamental understanding of theBasij by examining the evolution of the organization’s use of Ideological-Political Training.
Background
The Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed (
Sazman-e basij-emostazafan
, or Basij) was established on the orders of Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeini in November 1979 to counteract the increasing domestic and international threats against the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran. In1981, less than a year after the beginning of the war with Iraq, the Basij becameSeptember 2010No. 44
Judith and Sidney Swartz Director
Prof. Shai Feldman
Associate Director
Kristina Cherniahivsky
Assistant Director for Research
Naghmeh Sohrabi, PhD
Senior Fellows
Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhDKhalil Shikaki, PhD
Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East
Nader Habibi
Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Kanan Makiya
Junior Research Fellows
Fuat Dundar, PhDLiad Porat, PhDJoshua W. Walker, PhD
President of Brandeis University
Jehuda Reinharz, PhD
2
Dr. Saeid Golkar is apostdoctoral scholar atthe Center on Democracy,Development, and theRule of Law at theFreeman Spogli Institutefor International Studies,Stanford University.
The opinions and findings expressed in thisbrief are those of the author exclusively, anddo not reflect the official positions or policiesof the Crown Center for Middle East Studiesor Brandeis University.
a unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (
vahed-e basij-e mostazafan-esepah-e pasdaran
) and the most important organization in Iran for recruiting and organizing volunteers and deploying them to the war front. In 1990–91, by orderof the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Basij unit of the IRGCchanged its name to the Mobilized Resistance Force (
Niruy-e muqavemat-e basij
) and became one of the five main divisions of the IRGC, the others being its air force,ground force, navy, and Quds corps. In 2009, the Basij changed its name back tothe Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed, and General Mohammad Reza Naqdi became its commander. With this last name change, came a changein mission: No longer one-fifth of the IRGC military forces, the Basij was nowa special organization with the specific objective of confronting political and cultural threats against the regime. According to Article 36 of the Basij constitution, one of its most importantresponsibilities is to train volunteers to “defend the country and the IslamicRepublic regime.”
3
As such, from its first days, military and IPT training of volunteers was considered the most important means of confronting internal and foreign threats to the regime. Although the first IPT program was designed in1985,
4
in the first decade after the revolution there was little need for it. The Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) and the strong religious and revolutionary beliefs of peopleduring that time made ideological training superfluous. The end of the war sawa shift in the mission of the Basij to a security force responsible for local defense,suppression of urban revolts and protests, and ensuring the internal securityof the regime, and at this point a course of ideological and political training wasadded to the Basij training system in order to strengthen the ideological beliefsof its volunteers. As time went on, the ideological component of the trainingbecame more important than the military one. Eventually, a new plan went intoeffect, on October 7, 1994,
5
according to which ideological-political trainingwas incorporated into all levels of Basij training, from basic training to refreshercourses.When, in 1997, 73 percent of Basij and IRGC members voted for the reformistpresidential candidate, Mohammed Khatami,
6
the Basij intensified its ideologicaltraining for its members. A new series of IPT courses was added to the Basijprogram:
velayat
(guardianship)
in 1997,
basirat
(insight) in 1998, and
marefat
(awareness) in 2001. In 2002–3, the IRGC updated its own Ideological-PoliticalTraining: Not only would IPT now account for about 20 percent of IRGC and Basij education, but it was also made a requirement during a member’s years of service and before any member’s promotion. Furthermore, some IPT courses,such as Quranic sciences (interpretation, translation, and reading) and moral and Islamic ideology were required on a weekly basis,
7
and IPT was made availableto the families of Basijis as well.
8
The result of all of these activities and policieswas the widespread internalization of the regime’s values and beliefs, and thecreation of a Basij voting block in support of right-wing candidates in subsequentelections.Shortly after the 2005 victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the presidentialelection, the Supreme Leader’s representative in the IRGC reviewed the existingIPT programs and designed a new one for IRGC and Basij members that wentinto effect in 2008. According to the Deputy for IPT Education and Training of the IRGC, the main change made was replacing the previous “training approach”(
amoozesh mehvari
) in these programs with an “educational approach” (
tarbiyatmehvari
).
9
In other words, the priorities of the IPT program shifted from trainingBasij and IRGC members to educating them in various ideological and politicalissues.
3Along with the Basij’s most recent name change, the Basij’sDeputy for Training (
moavenat-e amoozesh
) became theDeputy for Education and Training (
moavenat-e amoozesh va tarbiyat
), responsible solely for the organization’sideological and political training. Whereas before 2006only 33 percent of the activities of the Deputy for Trainingwere focused on IPT, with the transfer of the Basij’smilitary training component to the IRGC, this officefocused exclusively on IPT and management training.
10
Here again, organizational change went hand in hand withnew IPT policies. The proportion of training time devoted to IPT, especially for special Basijis, was increased from20 percent to 30 percent. Furthermore, Basijis had to takethe IPT programs every year during their membership,compared with every four years in the past.
11
Basij Membership
According to IRGC employment regulations, Basijmembers are divided into three groups: regular, active,and special members. This classification is based on theirtraining, the level of their involvement with the Basij, and their ideological commitment. According to my estimate,there are currently more than three million regularmembers of the Basij, 800,000 active members, and 200,000special members.Regular Basij members are those who only join the Basij,pass basic training, and become integrated. They usuallyhave little connection with Basij bases. Active Basijmembers are regular members who have engaged in at leastsix months of continued activity, passed complementarytraining, and cooperated with the IRGC in accomplishingmissions.Special Basij members (also known as honoraryRevolutionary Guards) are those regarded as havingthe military and ideological qualities of a RevolutionaryGuard, and are technically members of the IRGC. They aredesignated as such after having passed “guard” (
pasdari
)special training courses, both military and ideological; theyare committed to serving the IRGC full time, and are thecore members of the Basij organization.
12
According to the Basij constitution, ideological-political training is the responsibility of the Office of theRepresentative of the Supreme Leader (ORSL) within theBasij. The ORSL designs the programs, prepares the syllabi,writes textbooks, and trains IPT educators. Additionally,in collaboration with the Basij Deputy for Education and Training, it is responsible for implementing IPT programs.Within the ORSL, the Center for Islamic Researchwas established in Qom to produce and publish all thetextbooks and pamphlets needed for all IPT programsin the IRGC and the Basij. The Center also oversees thecontents of any publications published by the IRGC and the Basij to ensure that they are in accordance with Islamand with the political ideology of the regime.
13
IPT trainers in the Basij can be divided into three groups:organizational trainers, nonorganizational trainers, and invited trainers.
14
Organizational trainers are employed as full-time special Basij members, and their job is solelyto teach the IPT course. A majority of this group, whoconstitute IPT’s most important human resources, havehigh school diplomas or less, and have only passed shortcourses of ideological training (180 hours) in Qom and received a certificate from the Basij.
15
Some have studied atthe Basij College for Research and Analysis (
majma-e barresi va tahlil-e basij
), branches of which have been established inevery province in Iran. This “community college,” which iscontrolled by the ORSL, offers four semesters (two years)of education for Basijis who want to become IPT teachers.Founded in 1994–95, it is very similar to Shahid MahallatiUniversity, which serves a similar function for the IRGC.Its graduates specialize in ideological or political trainingand are sent throughout the country to teach IPT coursesto other Basijis. According to the ideological-politicaldeputy chief of the Basij, there are 30,000 organizationalIPT trainers
in the Basij,
16
10,000 of whom have graduated from the Basij College for Research and Analysis.
17
Nonorganizational IPT trainers are members of the Basijand the IRGC who are not official educators, but onaccount of their rank teach some IPT courses. Some areBasijis or Revolutionary Guards commanders who areselected to discuss political issues with elite Basijis such asstudents, professors, engineers, and doctors. And invited trainers are usually connected to conservative groups and communities such as the Imam Khomeini institution, runby Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi (a radical cleric believed to be close to Ahmadinejad); his disciples have taughtmany IPT courses, especially in the guardianship (
velayat)
program.To improve the political knowledge of IPT trainers, anetwork of political guides (
hadyan-e siyasi
) was established to streamline the ideological training in the IRGC and the Basij and to supervise the teachers. This network,which falls under the political bureau of the IRGC, wastemporarily established in 1996 and formally recognized in 2002. Political guides are the highest-ranked of IPTtrainers and teach political courses, while other IPTtrainers are usually responsible for the religious and Islamic courses. This reveals the priority given to politicalissues versus religious ones within IPT programs.According to the chief of the political bureau of the IRGC,the Basij had more than 8,000 political guides as of August
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The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij
In the Summer of 2009, the Mobilized Resistance Force or Basij was thrown into the limelight when it was used by the Iranian government to crush and eventually control opposition demonstrations. In this Brief, the first…
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