Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ,

Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 193459

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE; RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL; DANILO
D. LIM; FELIPE PESTAÑO; EVELYN
PESTAÑO; RENATO M. REYES JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE
OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
UNION OF PEOPLES’ LAWYERS
(NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); AND
JAMES TERRY RIDON,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------x

COMMENT

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS RENATO M. REYES JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN

MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY

GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA,

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES’ LAWYERS

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(NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON OF THE CONFEDERATION FOR

UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

(COURAGE); AND JAMES TERRY RIDON, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF

FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), by counsel, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully state

that:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

Impeachment is the only constitutional accountability mechanism against our

impeachable public officials. Since 2001 this mechanism has failed to work
thwarted by a former president who has used her presidential powers to escape
accountability. The very issue in this case is not on the definition of initiation of
impeachment proceedings, or what constitutes form or substance. The main issue
in this case is whether or not the Honorable Court shall allow the
impeachment mechanism to be used as a shield by public officials from
accountability or, on the contrary, allow this constitutional mechanism to be
an effective mechanism that provides the people the opportunity to make an
impeachable official accountable, not criminally, civilly or administratively, but
accountable in the sense that at least, complaints against these public officials
may be discussed by Congress to see if indeed an impeachable offense or offenses
have been committed.

The holding of a public office, being a privilege and not a right, cannot be deemed
higher than the accountability to the people of the public official holding the said
office. But in the last five impeachment complaints since 2005, impunity has
trumped accountability and the truth. The Honorable Court is most humbly asked
to strike a blow against impunity, and pave the road to accountability of public
officials by dismissing the instant petition and making the constitutional
mechanism of impeachment accessible to the public. While prime ministers are
easily rid of in many countries around the world, we debate ‘till kingdom come on
a process that may or may not rid us of an impeachable official.

Herein private respondents are praying for just a level playing field, level playing
field for the interest of the Filipino people. The instant petition should be
dismissed as it requires an all encompassing favor of the impeachable officials
that will, except for a peephole, virtually shut the already very narrow window of
holding such public officials accountable under the Constitution.

In fact, the very stage being questioned by petitioner Ombudswoman Ma.

Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the stage on determination of sufficiency in form and
substance, is akin to the stage where a public prosecutor receives a letter-
complaint and is deciding whether or not he or she should ask the respondent to
file his or her counter-affidavit. The process that takes the public prosecutor a
very short period of time to decide has been transformed into a veritable
battleground by impeachable officials.

This misuse of legal and constitutional remedies and processes, the people will
never understand.

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(1) On preliminary matters, in a Resolution dated September 14, 2010, the Honorable

Court directed the following matters relative to the above-entitled petition, thus:

“Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated
SEPTEMBER 14, 2010, which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) REQUIRE the respondents to COMMENT on the petition within ten

(10) days from notice hereof; and

(b) REQUIRE the parties to observe the STATUS QUO prevailing

before the issuance of the September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010
Resolutions of the House Committee on Justice which found the
separate Impeachment Complaints filed by Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
et al., on July 22, 2010 and by Renato Reyes, Jr. et al., on August 3,
2010, sufficient in form and substance.

The Court further Resolved to NOTE the Urgent Motion for Immediate
Raffle dated September 9, 2010 filed by counsel for petitioner.” Carpio,
carpio Morales, and Sereno, JJ., dissented. Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion and Mendoza, JJ., on official business.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
FELIPA B. ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court”

(Emphasis and italics are in the Resolution)

(2) Herein private respondents, however, have not yet officially received a copy of the

foregoing Resolution as of the filing of this Comment. Their unofficial copy of the

foregoing Resolution has been provided to them by members of the media.

Nonetheless, herein private respondents most respectfully submit this Comment in

compliance with the foregoing Resolution of the Honorable Court.

(3) In another Resolution dated September 21, 2010, received by herein private

respondents on September 23, 2010, the Honorable Court directed the following

relative to the above-entitled petition, thus:

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 “Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated
SEPTEMBER 21, 2010, which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) xxx; and

(b) SET this case for ORAL ARGUMENT on September 30, 2010,
Thursday, at 2:00 p.m. at the New Session Hall, New Supreme Court
Building, Padre Faura St., Ermita, Manila.”

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
FELIPA B. ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court”

(Emphasis and italics are in the Resolution)

(4) Herein private respondents most respectfully state that the undersigned counsel is the

one who will argue on their behalf before the Honorable Court on September 30, 2010,

Thursday, at 2:00 P.M.

(5) On the crucial matters involving the above-entitled petition, petitioner Ombudsman

seeks the nullification of the September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 Resolutions of

the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (“House Committee on Justice”)

which found the separate Impeachment Complaints filed by private respondents Riza

Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. and herein private respondents Renato M. Reyes Jr., et al.

sufficient in form and substance, on alleged violations, albeit wrongly, of the 1987

Philippine Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(6) Herein private respondents hereby strongly refute and negate the petitioner

Ombudsman’s allegations in her Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court filed before the Honorable Court.

(7) On procedural matters, herein private respondents most respectfully submit the

following as grounds for the dismissal of the above-entitled petition, thus:

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 (a) Petitioner’s resort to a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition is untenable

and erroneous, as petitioner clearly has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law before the House Committee on Justice in assailing the

September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 Resolutions;

(b) The attachments of the Affidavits of Service on the copies of petitioner’s Urgent

Motion for Immediate Raffle and Petition, respectively, received by herein private

respondents through registered mail from petitioner, means that the person who has

executed the said affidavits may have committed perjury, and that the notary

publics who have notarized the same may have violated their respective notary

commissions; and

(c) The notary publics who have notarized the said Affidavits of Service may have the

knowledge that the said notarial transactions are unlawful and that the said

Affidavits of Service may have contain false information because such notary

publics are the two (2) counsels on record of petitioner, and representing petitioner

in the instant petition.

(8) On substantive matters, herein private respondents most respectfully submit the

following as grounds for the dismissal of the above-entitled petition, thus:

(a) The House Committee on Justice has validly acted within its powers, and without

disregarding the fundamental requirements of due process of law, in issuing its

Resolutions dated September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 which found the two

(2) Impeachment Complaints against petitioner sufficient in form and substance;

(b) The 1987 Philippine Constitution itself prescribes the requirements by which an

Impeachment Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form, and the House

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings reflect such requirements,

therefore the Rules are not violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the

petitioner’s right to due process, as the House Committee on Justice has afforded

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 petitioner the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the House Committee on Justice

hearing on September 1, 2010, in relation to the findings of sufficiency in form of

the two (2) Impeachment Complaints, is sa valid act of the said committee;

(c) The House Committee on Justice’s findings that the two (2) Impeachment

Complaints are sufficient in form do not violate Section 3 (5), Article XI of the

1987 Philippine Constitution for the following reasons, thus:

(1) First, in the constitutional provision stating the “No impeachment proceedings

shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one

year,” term “initiated” therein takes place by the act of the House of

Representatives of “transmitting and filing the Articles of Impeachment to the

Senate for the conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings to determine

whether the public official concerned is to be removed from office and

disqualified to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines;” and

(2) Second, granting arguendo that the very restrictive Francisco doctrine with

respect to “initiation of impeachment proceedings” is the valid constitutional

command, even the application thereof shows that no violation of Section 3 (5),

Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution ensues as at the time the Second

Impeachment Complaint has been filed, the First Impeachment Complaint has

not yet been initiated in the manner provided for in the Francisco doctrine, and

in fact, the two (2) Impeachment Complaints have been completely initiated at

the same time by the simultaneous referral thereof to the House Committee on

Justice, in accordance with the Francisco doctrine.

(d) The contemplated consolidation of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints does not

constitute a circumvention of the Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution for the following reasons, thus:

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 (1) First, it is not covered by the prohibition under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution and is, in fact, permissible by the clear import

of the said provision; and

(2) Second, petitioner has no cause of action yet to raise the same as an issue as it

has yet to happen, if it will happen in the first place, and there is no certainty

that the same will happen in the future. Therefore, the same is a matter

contingent to an event happening in the future to which there is no certainty of

happening, as petitioner herself admits that such consolidation is merely

“contemplated,” that is, an act that is still being reflected upon, imagined, or

studied by the House Committee on Justice.

(e) The 1987 Philippine Constitution prescribes the requirements by which an

Impeachment Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form, as reflected in the

House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. Thus, the direct

application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in the determination of the

sufficiency of form of an Impeachment Complaint is misplaced, as the Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as clearly stated in the House Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings, is only applied “as far as practicable,” that is, in

suppletory manner, which does not arise in the instant petition as the House Rules

of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings already reflect the requirements provided

by the 1987 Philippine Constitution by which an Impeachment Complaint is

determined to be sufficient in form; and

(f) As to petitioner’s allegations that the two (2) Impeachment Complaints do not meet

the standards for the sufficiency in substance, as petitioner alleges that none of the

allegations in the said Impeachment Complaints can be deemed as of the same

nature as the grounds for impeachment under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, and

that complainants have no legal right to compel petitioner to file and prosecute

offenses committed by public officials and employees, suffice it to state that this

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 issue goes into the merits of the Impeachment Complaints over which the

Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon, as clearly and categorically ruled

in Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261,

November 10, 2003).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

(9) Herein private petitioners admit petitioner’s allegations in the petition in its heading

“Statement of the Facts and the Proceedings, except with respect to the allegations in

the said heading pertaining to the events that transpired during the House Committee on

Justice’s hearings on September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010, as the proper

documentary pieces of evidence to prove the same are the official minutes of the said

hearings of the House Committee on Justice.

DISCUSSION

I.

Petitioner’s resort to a special civil action of

certiorari and prohibition is untenable and
erroneous, as petitioner clearly has a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law before the House Committee on
Justice in assailing the September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 Resolutions.

(10) Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide the circumstances where the

prayer for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition may lie, thus:

“Section 1. Petition for certiorari.

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

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 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.

When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.” (Emphasis supplied)

(11) As clearly and categorically stated in the foregoing quoted provisions, the prayer for the

issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition may only lie if, among other

requirements, there is no appeal, or the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This is very well-settled in our

jurisdiction with respect to the prayer for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and

prohibition.

(12) However, as glaringly shown in the factual circumstances of the instant case and as

openly admitted by the petitioner herself in the petition, there exists a plain, speedy and

adequate remedy for petitioner to assail the September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010

Resolutions before the House Committee on Justice itself. As openly admitted by

petitioner herself in the allegations in the petition under the heading “Statement of the

Facts and the Proceedings,” circumstances exist in the House Committee on Justice for

petitioner to avail of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,

thus:

“9. On 6 September 2010, petitioner Ombudsman attempted to file with

the Committee, a Motion for Reconsideration of the order declaring the
First and the Second Complaints sufficient in form, arguing in the main
that:

xxx xxx xxx

The Committee, however, refused to accept petitioner Ombudsman’s

Motion for Reconsideration upon the reasoning that the Motion was
premature. Petitioner Ombudsman was advised to await the “notice”

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 requiring her to answer, wherein she may include the grounds stated
in her Motion.” [Petition, paragraph 9, pages 13-14] (Emphasis supplied)

“13. At 5:05 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, 7 September 2010,
merely a few hours after the Committee found the First and the Second
Complaints sufficient in substance, and just as business hours closed,
summons and copies of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints were
served on petitioner Ombudsman. Petitioner Ombudsman was
directed to file her answer within ten (10) days. A copy of the Notice
and Summons is attached hereto as Annex “J.”” [Petition, par. 13, pp. 16-
17] (Emphasis supplied)

(13) Evidently, as openly admitted by petitioner herself in the petition, at 5:05 P.M. on

September 7, 2010, or a very short period of six (6) days after the finding of the

sufficiency in form of the Impeachment Complaints on September 1, 2010 and only a

few hours after the same have been determined to be sufficient in substance, the House

Committee on Justice promptly and immediately served on petitioner the summons and

copies of the Impeachment Complaints and directed the petitioner to file an answer

within ten (10) days.

(14) The House Committee on Justice did not consider petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration filed before it on September 6, 2010 and ruled that the filing of the

same is premature for the simple reason that it is premature, plain and simple, as the

House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings provide for the submission of

the Answer of petitioner only after the determination of sufficiency in form and

substance of the Impeachment Complaints. And at the time petitioner filed her Motion

for Reconsideration on September 6, 2010, the House Committee on Justice has not yet

determined the sufficiency in substance of the Impeachment Complaints, which was to

happen a day after, or on September 7, 2010. Thus the prompt and immediate service of

Notice and Summons to petitioner at 5:05 P.M. on September 7, 2010, only a few hours

after the Impeachment Complaints have been determined to be sufficient in substance.

(15) Thus, that remedy, that is, the remedy to file an answer within ten (10) days, is

unmistakably a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

for petitioner to assail the September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 Resolutions before

10
 the House Committee on Justice itself, among other additional remedies available to

petitioner before the House Committee on Justice, the plenary of the House of

Representatives itself, and the Senate, instead of the seeking of the extraordinary

writs of certiorari and prohibition before the Honorable Court. Thus, it becomes clear

now that the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition brought by

petitioner before the Honorable Court, under the circumstances presently

prevailing, is also manifestly premature.

(16) Additionally, as clearly and categorically put forward by former Chief Justice Reynato

S. Puno in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. v. House

of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003), “the coordinacy theory of

constitutional interpretation and prudential considerations demand that this Court defer

the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction on the issue of alleged violation of Article XI,

Section 3 (5) of the Constitution until after the remedies against impeachment still

available in both the House of Representatives and the Senate shall have been

exhausted.”

(17) In fact, in the subsequent case of Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. v. House Committee on

Justice (G.R. No. 169244, September 1, 2005), the Honorable Court en banc, in a

Resolution dated September 1, 2005, dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ

of preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. on August 31, 2005

seeking to nullify Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6, Rule II of the Rules on Impeachment adopted

by the 11th and 13th Congress of the House of Representatives, and to enjoin further

proceedings in the House of Representatives being carried out under the assailed Rules

on Impeachment; and to direct the House of Representatives to admit all impeachment

complaints against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Said petition claimed that the House Committee on Justice acted with grave abuse of

discretion when it treated the Amended Complaint (for impeachment) filed by Atty.

11
 Oliver Lozano, opposition representatives led by Representative Francis G. Escudero,

and heads/representatives of several non-governmental organizations as a second

impeachment complaint barred by the original complaint also filed by Atty. Lozano.

During the pendency of the said petition, the House Committee on Justice voted to

declare the original impeachment complaint filed by Atty. Lozano sufficient in form.

Subsequently, it decided that the original impeachment complaint was insufficient in

substance.

(18) The Honorable Court en banc, in the said Resolution dated September 1, 2005

disposing of the said petition by Atty. Francisco, has dismissed the said petition on the

grounds of prematurity and non-exhaustion of the remedies in the House of

Representatives, thus:

“The petition has not satisfied the threshold procedural requisite of

ripeness. Consequently, the petition must be dismissed on the ground
of prematurity.

Ripeness and prematurity are correlated matters. For a case to be

considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture. Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding. On the other hand, prematurity deals with the question of
whether all remedies have been exhausted before resort to the courts could
be had.

In this case, the resolution of the Committee on Justice to treat the

Amended Complaint as a second impeachment complaint is yet to be
passed upon by the House in a plenary session.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the Committee on Justice should submit to the House a report on its
action to treat the Amended complaint as a second impeachment
complaint and also on its determinations on the sufficiency in form and
substance of the impeachment complaint. Then, the report shall be
deliberated and acted upon by the House. The Court should, therefore,
wait until after all the remedies in the House are exhausted. Indeed,
this is not yet the auspicious time to resolve the issues raised in the
petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.”

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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(19) Verily, if Francisco v. House Committee on Justice, supra, has been dismissed

outright by the Honorable Court on the ground of prematurity and non-exhaustion of

remedies in the House of Representatives, when the said case and the above-entitled

petition treat of the same issue – the issue of the validity of the acts of the House

Committee on Justice in the treatment of Impeachment Complaints, why did the

Honorable Court, in the instant case, issue a status quo ante order which

effectively stopped the hearings in the House Committee on Justice, and proceed

to hear the instant case by setting the same for oral argument, instead of

dismissing the instant case outright on the grounds of prematurity and non-

exhaustion of remedies in the House of Representatives?

(20) Indeed, petitioner has been afforded the opportunity to be heard by the House

Committee on Justice relative to the Impeachment Complaints filed against

petitioner, and yet, petitioner, instead of availing such opportunity to be heard

before the House Committee on Justice itself through the filing of an Answer, has

brought the above-entitled petition before the Honorable Court and is now seeking

for the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition.

(21) The House Committee on Justice has never taken away from petitioner her

fundamental right to due process. In fact, the House Committee on Justice has afforded

petitioner the opportunity to be heard by directing her to file an Answer within ten (10)

days from receipt of Notice and Summons. Sadly, petitioner intentionally ignored such

directive and instead improperly sought the immediate intervention of the Honorable

Court to temporarily restrain the House Committee on Justice from continuing the

hearings on the Impeachment Complaints filed against petitioner.

(22) Alas, the Honorable Court, in a Resolution dated September 14, 2010, granted

petitioner’s prayer for a provisional remedy and issued a status quo ante order against

the House Committee on Justice to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the

issuance of the September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 Resolutions.

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 (23) The Honorable Court, with all due respect, should not have issued such status quo ante

order considering that, in the first place, the special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition brought by petitioner before the Honorable Court is untenable and

erroneous, and thus clearly premature and henceforth the acts of the House Committee

on Justice do not tend to render any judgment in the above-entitled petition ineffectual;

and secondly, petitioner is clearly not entitled to the reliefs demanded in the petition,

and that the continuance of the hearing before the House Committee on Justice would

not work injustice to petitioner as she has been afforded the opportunity to be heard

through the directive to file an Answer before the House Committee on Justice, and that

the acts which the House Committee on Justice is supposed to be doing or attempting to

do to continue the hearings for the petitioner to submit her Answer are not in violation

of the rights of petitioner for the simple reason that petitioner has been afforded by the

House Committee on Justice the opportunity to be heard therein.

(24) In light of the foregoing, herein private respondents most humbly pray that the

Honorable Court dismiss the above-entitled petition for being premature as

petitioner has plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law

before the House Committee on Justice in assailing the September 1, 2010 and

September 7, 2010 Resolutions, among other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies

that are available to her at the House Committee on Justice, the plenary of the

House of Representatives itself, and the Senate, at the proper time.

The attachments of the Affidavits of Service on

the copies of petitioner’s Urgent Motion for
Immediate Raffle and Petition, respectively,
received by herein private respondents through
registered mail from petitioner, means that the
person who has executed the said affidavits may
have committed perjury, and that the notary
publics who have notarized the same may have
violated their respective notary commissions.

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(25) For the information of the Honorable Court, the copies of petitioner’s Urgent Motion

for Immediate Raffle and Petition received by herein private respondents through

registered mail from petitioner contain the attached respective Affidavits of Service

for the said Motion and Petition.

(26) This is a grave issue considering that in the procedure for the filing of petitions before

the Honorable Court, a petitioner has to make a service of the pleading first on the

adverse party prior to the filing of the pleading before the Honorable Court. In light

with this procedure, when the petitioner serves a copy of the pleading on the adverse

party through registered mail, the petitioner has to comply with Rule 13, Section 7 of

the Rules Court, thus:

“Rule 13, Sec. 7. Service by mail.

Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the

post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with
postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the
mail to the sender after ten (l0) days if undelivered. If no registry service
is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service
may be done by ordinary mail.” (Emphasis supplied)

(27) Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a

sealed envelope, among others. Also, and this is the most important, an Affidavit of

Service is necessarily and logically executed only after such copy of the pleading has

already been deposited in the post office in a sealed envelope. This is so because the

nature and purpose of an Affidavit of Service is precisely to prove that “a copy of the

pleading has already been deposited in the post office in a sealed envelope.”

Therefore, the execution of an Affidavit of Service is naturally done only after such

deposit of the copy of the pleading in the post office, in a sealed envelope.

Thus, a copy of the pleading served on the adverse party through registered

naturally cannot have as an attachment an Affidavit of Service because such

Affidavit of Service is only executed after depositing the copy of the pleading in

the post office, in a sealed envelope.

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 (28) And the fact that petitioner’s Motion and Petition, which have been served on herein

private respondents through registered mail – deposited in the post office in Ortigas,

Pasig City on September 13, 2010 – have their respective attachments of Affidavit of

Service can only mean one thing: that the said Affidavits of Service have already been

executed and notarized prior to depositing such copies in the post office in Ortigas,

Pasig City. In that case, the person who has executed the said Affidavits of Service may

not have been telling truth in the said affidavits when he declared therein, under oath,

that “he deposited a copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, through registered”

prior to the execution and notarization of said Affidavits of Service, as the said

affidavits have already been executed and notarized prior to such deposit in the post

office in a sealed envelope.

(29) Thus, the notary publics who have notarized the said Affidavits of Service may also be

held liable for violating their respective notary commissions under the following

provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, thus:

“RULE IV, SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not

perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by
these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral;

SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not:

(a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the

notary to be false.” (Emphasis supplied)

The notary publics who have notarized the said

Affidavits of Service may have the knowledge
that the said notarial transactions are unlawful
and that the said Affidavits of Service may have
contain false information because such notary
publics are the two (2) counsels on record of
petitioner, and representing petitioner in the
instant petition.

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(30) The notary publics who have notarized the said Affidavits of Service may have the

knowledge that the said notarial transaction is unlawful and that the said Affidavits of

Service may have contain false information because such notary publics are the two (2)

counsels on record of petitioner, namely, Atty. Maria Rosario Z. Del Rosario and Atty.

Christian B. Diaz, who are representing petitioner in the instant petition.

(31) Atty. Del Rosario notarized the Affidavit of Service attached to petitioner’s Urgent

Motion for Immediate Raffle, which has been served on herein private respondents

through registered mail. And Atty. Christian B. Diaz notarized the Affidavit of Service

attached to petitioner’s Petition, which has been served on herein private respondents

through registered mail.

(32) Additionally, these notary publics may have likewise violated their respective notary

commissions under the following provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,

thus:

“RULE IV, SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified

from performing a notarial act if he:

(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;”

(Emphasis supplied)

(33) Said notary publics may be considered as parties to the documents – the Affidavits of

Service – that they have respectively notarized for the reason that they are also the

counsels on record of petitioner in the instant petition, and that by affixing their

respective signatures in the petition filed by petitioner before the Honorable Court, it

means that said notary publics have also drafted, by legal fiction, the said motion and

petition, which are the subject of the Affidavits of Service. Thus, said counsels may be

considered as parties to the Affidavits of Service attached to the Motion and Petition.

17
II.

The House Committee on Justice has validly

acted within its powers, and without
disregarding the fundamental requirements of
due process of law, in issuing its Resolutions
dated September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010
which found the two (2) Impeachment
Complaints against petitioner sufficient in form
and substance.

(34) The House Committee on Justice has validly acted within its powers, and has in fact

performed its constitutional duty, by complying with the fundamental requirements of

due process, in the issuance of Resolutions dated September 1, 2010 and September 7,

2010 which found the Impeachment Complaints sufficient in form and substance. Said

acts are validly within the powers of the House Committee on Justice, and the House

Committee on Justice enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of

its acts.

(35) Petitioner alleges that the House Committee on Justice, instead of suspending or

deferring the hearing on September 1, 2010 due to the non-publication of the House

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, if such publication is even

constitutionally prescribed, proceeded to conduct the same to determine the sufficiency

in form of the Impeachment Complaints on the said date, a day before the publication

of the said Rules on September 2, 2010.

(36) Granting arguendo that the publication of the said Rules is constitutionally prescribed,

petitioner is reminded of the fact that the House Committee on Justice has been

guided by the 1987 Philippine Constitution itself in its determination of the

sufficiency in form of the Impeachment Complaints. Section 3 (2) and (4), Article

XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution no less provides the standards by which an

Impeachment Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form, thus:

“Section 3 (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, xxx.

18
 xxx xxx xxx

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed

by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.” (Emphasis supplied)

(37) Thus, the foregoing Constitutional provisions require that an Impeachment Complaint

has to be “verified,” and that if the same is filed by a citizen, it must be upon a

“resolution of endorsement” by any member of the House of Representatives, or upon a

“resolution of impeachment” if an Impeachment Complaint filed by a citizen is

endorsed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives.

(38) Moreover, other the 1987 Philippine Constitution itself, the House Committee on

Justice has been guided by the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

of the Fourteenth (14th) Congress, the previous Congress, which Rules have been

validly adopted upon almost a month prior to the September 1, 2010 hearing, or on

August 3, 2010, as the Rules that shall govern the present hearings before the House

Committee on Justice. This fact has not been assailed and in fact, has been openly

admitted by petitioner in her petition under the heading “Statement of the Facts

and the Proceedings,” thus:

“3. On 3 August 2010, the Committee provisionally adopted the Rules

of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the Fourteenth (14th)
Congress.” [Petition, para. 3, p. 9] (Emphasis supplied)

Besides, the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the Fourteenth

(14th) Congress and that of the present Fifteen (15th) Congress are exactly the same and

identical in all respects, and are in consonance with the foregoing Section 3 (2) and (4),

Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

(39) Thus, the 1987 Philippine Constitution itself and the House Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings of the Fourteenth (14th) Congress have governed the House

Committee on Justice’s determination of the sufficiency in form of the Impeachment

Complaints on September 1, 2010, if, granting arguendo, the publication of the House

19
 Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the present Fifteenth (15th)

Congress is even necessary or constitutionally prescribed at all under the

circumstances.

(40) All other allegations of petitioner in her petition with respect to her first ground are

flimsy and resorting to unreasonable fault-finding in the acts of the House Committee

on Justice when said acts are within the valid and sound judgment and discretion

thereof, and the House Committee on Justice enjoys the presumption of regularity

in the performance of its acts. Nonetheless, herein private respondents hereby refute

and negate such petitioner’s other allegations in her first ground, thus:

(a) The alleged expressed apprehension of Rep. Roilo S. Golez that the Impeachment

Complaints may result in a constitutional issue later on is a mere expression of

opinion of the said legislator, and the House Committee on Justice is not bound by

such an expression of opinion by a member thereof;

(b) The House Committee on Justice has provided Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong and

other members thereof sufficient time to study the verification portion of the

Impeachment Complaints without suspending the hearing, as the time needed to

study such verifications clearly does not entail the suspension of the hearing, as it

may not require even five minutes for the members thereof to study the same;

(c) The rules for the determination of the sufficiency in form of the Impeachment

Complaints are prescribed in the 1987 Philippine Constitution itself and the House

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, validly adopted almost a month

prior to the September 1, 2010 hearing, and that the House Committee on Justice is

guided by its experiences in the five (5) Impeachment Complaints previously

referred to it in previous years. The 1987 Philippine Constitution and the said Rules

provide that an Impeachment Complaint has to be “verified” and that if the same is

filed by a citizen, it must be upon a “resolution of endorsement” by any Member of

the House of Representatives [Section 3 (2) and (4), Article XI of the 1987

20
 Philippine Constitution, and Rule II, Section 2 (a), (b) and (c)]. Thus, petitioner’s

contention that the “ground rules” for the determination of the sufficiency in form

of the Impeachment Complaints have been laid down only during the hearing on

September 1, 2010 is patently unfounded and has no basis at all;

(d) As can be clearly seen in the official minutes of the House Committee on Justice

September 1, 2010 hearing, the said committee validly conducted a deliberation as

to the determination of the sufficiency in form of the Impeachment Complaints.

Additionally, the members of the said committee have been guided by the

records of the Impeachment Complaints provided to them to determine for

themselves whether the same are sufficient in form, in accordance with the

1987 Philippine Constitution and the said Rules and the years of experience of

the House Committee on Justice on the matter, as in fact the majority of the

said members have found that the Impeachment Complaints are sufficient in

form;

(e) As can be clearly seen in the official minutes of the House Committee on Justice

September 1, 2010 hearing, the motion addressed to the Chair of the House

Committee on Justice to inhibit himself during the hearing has been declared as

“not a proper motion,” as the said committee has no jurisdiction to disqualify a

committee member and that voluntary inhibition is addressed to the sound

discretion of the member or members concerned, in accordance with the position

taken by House Committee on Justice on the matter in previous Congresses. In

Spouses De Guzman v. Pamintuan (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, June 26, 2003), the

Honorable Court has held that: “Suffice it to state that a mere filing of an

administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from

hearing a case;”

(f) The rules for the determination of the sufficiency in substance of the Impeachment

Complaints are prescribed in the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

21
 Proceedings, validly adopted almost a month prior to the September 7, 2010

hearing, and that the House Committee on Justice is guided by its experiences in the

five (5) Impeachment Complaints previously referred to it in previous years. The

said Rules provide that “[T]he requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of

facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the

committee [Rule III, A, Section 4 (2)]. And the members of the said committee

have been guided by the records of the Impeachment Complaints provided to

them to determine for themselves whether the same are sufficient in substance,

in accordance with the said Rules and the years of experience of the House

Committee on Justice on the matter, as in fact the majority of the said

members have found that the Impeachment Complaints are sufficient in

substance. Thus, petitioner’s contention that the elements of sufficiency in

substance have been laid down only during the September 7, 2010 hearing is

patently unfounded and has no basis at all;

(g) The House Committee on Justice acted has validly within its powers in overruling

the motions of Rep. Datumanong and Rep. Romualdo to reconsider the said

committee’s ruling that the Impeachment Complaints are sufficient in form, and to

suspend or defer the hearing on September 7, 2010. The House Committee on

Justice possesses that power to validly overrule any motion; and

(h) The prompt and immediate service on petitioner of the summons and copies of the

Impeachment Complaints a few hours after the determination of the sufficiency in

substance of the same on September 7, 2010 only shows that the House Committee

on Justice has afforded petitioner the opportunity to be heard by directing

petitioner to file an Answer to the Impeachment Complaints. Thus, such prompt and

immediate service of summons and copies of the Impeachment Complaints

manifestly shows that petitioner has not been denied of her fundamental right to

due process.

22
 (41) Again, to reiterate for fear of being redundant, the House Committee on Justice has

validly acted within its powers, and has in fact performed its constitutional duty, by

complying with the fundamental requirements of due process, in the issuance of

Resolutions dated September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 which found the

Impeachment Complaints sufficient in form and substance. Said acts are validly within

the powers of the House Committee on Justice, and the House Committee on Justice

enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of its acts.

III.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution itself

prescribes the requirements by which an
Impeachment Complaint is determined to be
sufficient in form, and the House Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings reflect
such requirements, therefore the Rules are not
violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
the petitioner’s right to due process, as the
House Committee on Justice has afforded
petitioner the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the
House Committee on Justice hearing on
September 1, 2010, in relation to the findings of
sufficiency in form of the two (2) Impeachment
Complaints, is a valid act of the said committee.

(42) As can be clearly gathered from the allegations of petitioner in her second ground in the

petition, petitioner is utterly desperate in trying to discredit the House Committee on

Justice and its finding of sufficiency in form of the Impeachment Complaints made

during its September 1, 2010 hearing.

(43) Again, to reiterate for fear of being redundant, petitioner is strongly reminded of

the fact that the rules for the determination of the sufficiency in form of the

Impeachment Complaints are clearly prescribed in Section 3 (2) and (4), Article

XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, as reflected in Rule II, Section 2 (a), (b)

and (c) of the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings validly

adopted almost a month prior to the September 1, 2010 hearing, and that the

23
 House Committee on Justice is guided by its experiences in the five (5)

Impeachment Complaints previously referred to it in previous years.

(44) The said Constitutional provisions and the Rules provide that an Impeachment

Complaint has to be “verified” and that if the same is filed by a citizen, it must be upon

a “resolution of endorsement” by any Member of the House of Representatives under

Section 3 (2) and (4), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, and Rule II,

Section 2 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. Therefore, petitioner’s assertion that there

are no comprehensible standards in the determination of the sufficiency in form of

the Impeachment Complaints is patently false and erroneous.

(45) Moreover, the members of the said committee have been guided by the records of

the Impeachment Complaints provided to them to determine for themselves

whether the same are sufficient in form, in accordance with the 1987 Philippine

Constitution and the said Rules and the years of experience of the House

Committee on Justice on the matter, as in fact the majority of the said members

have found that the Impeachment Complaints are sufficient in form.

(46) Evidently, under the relevant provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,

particularly Section 3 (2) and (4), Article XI thereof, nothing more is required as to the

form of an Impeachment Complaint other than the requirements that the same should be

“verified” and that if filed by a citizen, it must be upon a “resolution of endorsement”

by any member of the House of Representatives, or upon a “resolution of

impeachment” if an Impeachment Complaint filed by a citizen is endorsed by at least

one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives. These Constitutional

provisions are reflected in the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

validly adopted almost a month prior to the September 1, 2010 hearing.

(47) Apparent in the arguments of petitioner in the discussion of her second ground in the

petition is the fact that petitioner is demanding for standards in the determination of

sufficiency in form other than those that are clearly and categorically laid down in

24
 Section 3 (2) and (4), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which have been

properly reflected in the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings.

(48) Petitioner is hereby reminded that under Section 3 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, “[T]he Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively

carry out the purpose of this section.” Thus, the power of Congress to promulgate its

rules of impeachment is limited by the constitutional requirement that the same should

be only “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section,” which refers to Section 3,

Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

(49) As such, the House of Representatives, in promulgating its rules of impeachment, is

constitutionally mandated to conform to, and not go beyond, the standards provided for

by Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly as to the

standards for the determination of sufficiency in form laid down in Section 3 (2)

and (4) thereof. Otherwise, adding more than what is required by the constitutional

command means the House of Representatives undertakes to commit that which is

constitutionally proscribed, and thus illegal. For to demand more than “verification,”

“resolution of endorsement,” and “resolution of impeachment,” as the case may be,

already goes beyond the constitutional prescription and constricts the ultimate

objective of establishing a public office as a public trust.

(50) Again, there is no violation of petitioner’s right to due process. On September 7,

2010, a few hours after the determination of the sufficiency in substance and six (6)

days after the determination of the sufficiency in form, the House Committee on

Justice has afforded petitioner the opportunity to be heard by directing her to file

an Answer within ten (10) days from receipt of Notice and Summons. Sadly, it was

petitioner who chose not to be heard before the House Committee on Justice, and

instead file the above-entitled petition before the Honorable Court. Thus, petitioner has

only herself to blame for the same, and no one else.

25
 (51) Therefore, as the 1987 Philippine Constitution itself prescribes the requirements

by which an Impeachment Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form, and

the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings reflect such

requirements, the Rules are not violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and

the petitioner’s right to due process, as the House Committee on Justice has

afforded petitioner the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the House Committee on

Justice hearing on September 1, 2010, in relation to the findings of sufficiency in

form of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints, is a valid act of the said committee.

IV.

The House Committee on Justice’s findings that

the two (2) Impeachment Complaints are
sufficient in form do not violate Section 3 (5),
Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

First, in the constitutional provision stating the

“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year,” term “initiated” therein
takes place by the act of the House of
Representatives of “transmitting and filing the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate for the
conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings to
determine whether the public official concerned
is to be removed from office and disqualified to
hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines.”

(52) The House Committee on Justice’s findings that the two (2) Impeachment Complaints

against petitioner Ombudswoman are sufficient in form do not in any manner violate

Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. At the outset, said

constitutional provision states, thus:

“ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
(Emphasis supplied)

26
(53) Herein private respondents most humbly submit with strong conviction that the term

“initiation” therein takes place by the act of the House of Representatives of

“transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate for the conduct of the

impeachment trial proceedings to determine whether the public official concerned

is to be removed from office and disqualified to hold any office under the Republic

of the Philippines.”

(54) As such, as long as only one Articles of Impeachment has been transmitted to, and

filed with, the Senate for the conduct of one impeachment trial proceedings against the

same official within a period of one year, regardless of whether there is more than one

Impeachment Complaint filed before the House of Representatives constituting the

Articles of Impeachment, the constitutional provision in Article XI, Section 3 (5) which

provides for the one-year bar rule is complied with.

The prohibition speaks of more than one impeachment proceedings, which is

impeachment trial proceedings, and not of more than one Impeachment Complaint.

(55) Therefore, it becomes clear that the act of the House Committee on Justice of finding

that the two (2) Impeachment Complaints against petitioner Ombudswoman – the first

one filed by private respondent Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. and the second one

filed by herein private respondents – are sufficient in form does not contravene the

constitutional command on the one-year bar rule.

(56) Herein private respondents most humbly submit with strong conviction such

interpretation in accordance with the following reasons, thus:

27
The word “initiate” has been defined by
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “to cause or
facilitate the beginning of, set going.” This
definition conforms to herein private
respondents position that the term “initiation” in
Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution means “the transmittal and filing of
the Articles of Impeachment by the House of
Representatives to the Senate” to cause or
facilitate the beginning of, or to set going, the
impeachment trial proceedings.

(57) The word “initiate” has been defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “to cause or

facilitate the beginning of, set going.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary traced the origin of

the word “initiation” from “[L]ate Latin initiatus, past participle of initiare, from Latin,

to induct, from initium, and put its first known use in 1533.

(58) Indeed, this definition conforms to herein private respondents’ position that the term

“initiation” in Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution means “the

transmittal and filing of the Articles of Impeachment by the House of Representatives

to the Senate” to cause or facilitate the beginning of, or to set going, the impeachment

trial proceedings against the public official concerned.

(59) The interpretation that the term “initiation” means “transmittal and filing” is in

accordance with the principle of verba legis, or the letter of the law, that wherever

possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning,

except where technical terms are employed. Thus, the term “transmittal and filing”

means ‘to cause or facilitate the beginning of, to set going.”

Applying the foolproof yardstick of the principle

of ratio legis est anima legis, or the reason of the
law is the soul of the law, in constitutional
construction, an examination of the history of the
times and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed, and the
purpose sought to be accomplished by its
adoption and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented, reveals that herein private
respondents’ position is in full accord to the
principle of ratio legis est anima legis.

28
(60) There is no doubt that there is ambiguity as to the meaning of the whole constitutional

provision under Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, as the

members of the bar and the bench, and even legal luminaries, have diverse opinions on

the matter. Herein private respondent most humbly submit with strong conviction that

the said constitutional provision should not be construed in the manner by which it has

been interpreted in Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra, as “that the initiation

takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House

Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon.”

The application of the foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction, the principle

of ratio legis est anima legis, would show that the said Francisco doctrine is not in full

accord to the said principle of constitutional construction.

(61) If the said Francisco doctrine were to be followed, the constitutional provisions on

impeachment – a mechanism enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution in order to

hold certain public officials accountable – would certainly be rendered virtually, if not

completely, ineffectual, lacking in power or forcefulness, unavailing or impotent in

accomplishing the purpose for which the constitutional mechanism on impeachment

has been enshrined in 1987 Philippine Constitution in the first place.

(62) The constitutional mechanism on impeachment has been enshrined in the 1987

Philippine Constitution precisely for the very purpose of holding certain public

officials – public officials who are exercising critical, extremely significant,

supremely important, or of the essence public functions and duties – accountable

upon the commission of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,

graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

(63) Certainly, this constitutional mechanism on impeachment is enshrined in the 1987

Philippine Constitution to give life and vigor to the iron-clad principle that “public

office is a public trust,” especially to certain public officers who may be hold

29
 accountable only upon the process of impeachment. It is the fundamental wisdom

why such principle is the first provision of Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution on the Accountability of Public Officers, thus:

“ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Such constitutional mechanism on impeachment is the only process by which such

certain public officials, who may be hold accountable only upon the process of

impeachment, shall be made accountable to the people.

(64) If the Francisco doctrine were to be followed, the constitutional provisions on

impeachment would certainly be rendered virtually, if not completely, ineffectual,

lacking in power or forcefulness, unavailing or impotent in accomplishing its very

purpose because such Francisco doctrine is absolutely and unquestionably very

easy to circumvent in order to completely defeat or demolish such very purpose of

the constitutional mechanism on impeachment, and therefore render the

constitutional mechanism on impeachment itself entirely trivial, worthless,

insignificant and inoperative.

(65) A member of the House of Representatives or a citizen, as the case may be, has only to

file a complaint for impeachment containing sham and defective allegations in form

and/or substance, and that such complaint is included in the Order of Business and

referred to the House Committee on Justice as a matter of course, then the very

purpose of the constitutional mechanism on impeachment is already completely

defeated or demolished, and the constitutional mechanism on impeachment itself

is already render entirely trivial, worthless, insignificant and inoperative.

30
(66) If such very repulsive practice of abusing the said Francisco doctrine is done in order

to defeat the purpose of holding such certain public officials accountable to the people

through the constitutional mechanism of impeachment, as in fact what already

happened many times in the past and has become the general practice rather than

an isolated event, the constitutional mechanism of impeachment would be turned

into a trivial and superficial race – a “rat race” so to speak – of rushing to the

House of Representatives in order to be the first to file an Impeachment

Complaint, and of rushing for the referral of the said Impeachment Complaint to

the House Committee on Justice in order to be the first to be referred thereto.

(67) Certainly, if one is to imagine, such abominable situation of turning the

constitutional mechanism of impeachment into a trivial and superficial “rat race”

can never be the intention of the framers of, and the Filipino people who have

ratified, the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is no way that the framers and the

Filipino people would have enshrined the constitutional mechanism of impeachment in

the 1987 Philippine Constitution with the intention of making the same into a trivial,

superficial, insignificant and inoperative mechanism.

(68) Indeed, it is high time for the Honorable Court to end this abusive practice of turning

the constitutional mechanism of impeachment into a trivial and superficial “rat race” by

abandoning the said Francisco doctrine on the matter of initiation of impeachment

proceedings.

(69) Moreover, the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the

1987 Philippine Constitution was framed provide a very enlightening outlook as to the

intention and meaning of Article XI, Section 3 (5) thereof. The present Constitution

was framed and ratified immediately after the EDSA people power, an uprising of the

Filipino people to directly topple the long years of Marcos dictatorship.

The Filipino people have high hopes and dreams for good governance, for

accountability in public office, for public office to be really a public trust – due to

31
 years of social hardships, massive corruption, military rule and public neglect by

the Marcos dictatorship – after the dictatorship of the late strongman Marcos was

topped in the EDSA people power in 1986.

(70) Certainly, such history of the times and the condition and circumstances under

which the 1987 Philippine Constitution was framed and ratified do not in any way

permit the constitutional mechanism of impeachment to be merely interpreted in

accordance with the said Francisco doctrine, when such mechanism itself is the

only constitutionally permissible mechanism to hold certain public officials

accountable in order to avoid a repeat of the horrible experiences of the Filipino

people during the Marcos dictatorship.

(71) Thus, certainly, herein private respondents’ humble position that as long as only one

Articles of Impeachment has been transmitted to, and filed with, the Senate for the

conduct of one impeachment trial proceedings against the same official within a period

of one year, regardless of whether there is more than one Impeachment Complaint

filed before the House of Representatives constituting the Articles of Impeachment, is

more in keeping with the history of the times and the condition and circumstances

under which the 1987 Philippine Constitution was framed and ratified, and more

in keeping with the purpose sought to be accomplished by the adoption of the

constitutional mechanism on impeachment, and the evils, if any, sought to be

prevented by Article XI, Section 3 (5) thereof.

Again, the prohibition speaks only of more than one impeachment proceedings, and not

of more than one Impeachment Complaint.

Applying the principle of ut magis valeat quam

pereat, or that the thing may rather have effect
than be destroyed, in constitutional construction
that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole reveals that herein private respondents’
humble position stands on superior grounds than
the said Francisco doctrine.

32
(72) By applying the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat, or that the thing may rather

have effect than be destroyed, in constitutional construction that the Constitution is to

be interpreted as a whole reveals that herein private respondents’ humble position as to

the meaning of Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution stands on

superior grounds than the said Francisco doctrine.

(73) At this juncture, herein private respondents deem it wise to reproduce the provisions of

the entire Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which includes the mechanism

on impeachment to hold certain public officials accountable through the process of

impeachment, thus:

“ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive

power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by

at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall

33
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than

removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively

carry out the purpose of this section.

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall

continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman,

other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according
to the Civil Service Law.

Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office

of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens

of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years
old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the
Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office
in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten
years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and
prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this
Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the

President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy

34
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions,
and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during
their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of
seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for
any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from
office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or

omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information

necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so

warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,

and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

35
 Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.

Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully

acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation

for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any
government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress,
the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman,
or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their
tenure.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office

and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress,
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(74) The principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat in constitutional construction is best

exemplified in the following jurisprudence, thus:

“The members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated

a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.” [Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil 771 (1949)] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

“It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one

provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.

36
 In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.” [Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)].
(Emphasis supplied)

(75) The Honorable Court has to take notice that Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution on Accountability of Public Officers starts with overarching provision that

“public office is a public trust” and that “public officers and employees must, at all

times, be accountable to the people.” This is the overriding policy by which said

Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers has to be viewed and realized.

(76) The Honorable Court has to take notice also of the fact that the constitutional

provisions on the process on impeachment as laid down in the said Article XI on

Accountability of Public Officers are enumerated chronologically or has been

arranged in the order of time of occurrence, thus:

(a) First, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution stated the public officials who

may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, impeachable

offenses. Its also stated, as a consequence thereof, the public officials who may not

be removed from office by impeachment;

(b) Then it also stated the impeachable offenses;

(c) Second, it stated the overarching jurisdictional power of the House of

Representatives as having the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

This has be stated first certainly in order confer at the outset to the House of

Representatives its exclusive jurisdiction on the matter. As it is being taught in the

academe, jurisdiction is the “mother of procedures,” so to speak;

(d) Third, after conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the House of Representatives, it

started with the process on how an Impeachment Complaint is filed, who may file,

and the processes that shall be undertaken by the House of Representatives and the

37
 proper Committee as a matter of course concerning the said Impeachment

Complaint;

(e) Fourth, it stated the action that may be done by the plenary of the House of

Representatives concerning the action of the proper Committee. Notice should be

taken that this provision [Article XI, Section 3 (3)] already speaks of Articles of

Impeachment;

(f) Fifth, again, this provision [Article XI, Section 3 (4)] already speaks of Articles

of Impeachment, as it stated how an Impeachment Complaint shall already

constitute the Articles of Impeachment even without undergoing the processes that

shall be undertaken by the House of Representatives and the proper Committee as a

matter of course concerning the said Impeachment Complaint stated under

paragraph (d) hereof, and therefore even without undergoing the process that may

be done by the plenary of the House of Representatives under paragraph (e) hereof;

(g) Sixth, this is the most important, Article XI, Section 3 (3) and (4) which already

speaks of Articles of Impeachment, is immediately followed by the provision in

Article XI, Section 3 (5) regarding initiation of impeachment proceedings, that the

same shall not be made against the same official more than once within a period of

one year;

(h) Seventh, this is equally important in this discussion, Article XI, Section 3 (5) is

immediately followed already by the provision in Article XI, Section 3 (6) on the

trial already that shall be conducted by the Senate, and that the Senate has the sole

power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. It also stated the public official

who shall preside during the trial if the President of the Philippines is on trial, and

the manner of voting by which the public official on trial can be removed from

office;

38
(i) Eighth, Article XI, Section 3 (6) is immediately followed already by the provision

in Article XI, Section 3 (7) on the judgment already that will be rendered by the

Senate, and the penalty that shall be imposed by the Senate if the public official on

trial has already been declared guilty; and

(j) Lastly, Article XI, Congress has been conferred the duty – a duty that can be done

only after the 1987 Philippine Constitution has already been validly ratified by the

Filipino people – to promulgate the rules on impeachment to effectively carry out

the purpose of the mechanism of impeachment enumerated above. The Honorable

Court should take notice of the fact that this provision, Article XI, Section 3 (8),

employs the term “Congress” – which necessarily includes the House of

Representatives and the Senate – and the employment of the term “rule of

impeachment” which shall be promulgated by both Houses of Congress for the

proceedings in the House of Representatives and for the proceedings in the Senate,

as the case may be.

The Honorable Court should take notice that the said constitutional provision

employs the term “rules of impeachment,” not the term “rules of impeachment

proceedings in the House of Representatives” and not the term “rules of trial

proceedings in the Senate.” Thus, this only means one thing: that the term

“impeachment,” as it is employed in Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, covers both “the impeachment proceedings in the House of

Representatives” and “the impeachment proceedings, that is, the trial, in the

Senate,” regardless of the any technical definition that may be employed in the

term “impeachment.”

It becomes clear now that that the term “impeachment,” as it is employed in

Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, with respect to the proceedings

that impeachment covers, includes both “the impeachment proceedings in the

House of Representatives” and “the impeachment proceedings, that is, the trial, in

39
 the Senate,” regardless of the any technical definition that may be employed in the

term “impeachment.”

(77) As it can be clearly seen that the constitutional provisions on the process on

impeachment are laid down or enumerated chronologically, or has been arranged in

the order of time of occurrence, in Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it only means one thing: that a step can only be

made one after the other, or only in succession by following an order or sequence.

(78) Thus, it is untenable to interpret Article XI, Section 3 (5), in its employment of the

term “initiated,” that the initiation takes place “by the act of filing of the impeachment

complaint with the House of Representatives and the referral thereof to the House

Committee on Justice.” As Article XI, Section 3 (5) is immediately preceded by

Article XI, Section 3 (3) and (4) which already speaks of Articles of Impeachment

that shall be transmitted to the Senate, and Article XI, Section 3 (5) is immediately

followed by Article XI, Section 3 (6) and (7) which already speaks of the trial after the

transmittal of the Article of Impeachment, and the judgment after trial, it is very

logical and clear to conclude that the term “initiation of impeachment proceedings” as

employed in Article XI, Section 3 (5) means the “act of the House of Representatives

of transmitting and filing the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate for the

conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings.”

(79) Such is most logical interpretation of the ambiguity in the term “initiated” in Artcile XI,

Section 3 (5) as it has already been established in the previous discussion that the term

“impeachment,” as it is employed in Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, with respect to the proceedings that impeachment covers, includes

both “the impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives” and “the

impeachment proceedings, that is, the trial, in the Senate,” regardless of the any

technical definition that may be employed in the term “impeachment.”

40
 (80) Verily, this humble position of herein private respondents is more in keeping with the

overarching policy that “public office is a public trust” and that “public officers and

employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people.” And this humble

position is more keeping with the policy not to turn the constitutional mechanism of

impeachment into a trivial and superficial “rat race”. Evidently, this position stands

on superior grounds than the very restrictive, very limited Francisco doctrine on the

matter.

Second, granting arguendo that the very

restrictive Francisco doctrine with respect to
“initiation of impeachment proceedings” is the
valid constitutional command, even the
application thereof shows that no violation of
Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution ensues as at the time the Second
Impeachment Complaint has been filed, the First
Impeachment Complaint has not yet been
initiated in the manner provided for in the
Francisco doctrine, and in fact, the two (2)
Impeachment Complaints have been completely
initiated at the same time by the simultaneous
referral thereof to the House Committee on
Justice, in accordance with the Francisco
doctrine.

(81) It is equally true that granting arguendo that the very restrictive Francisco doctrine with

respect to “initiation of impeachment proceedings” is the valid constitutional command,

even if the Honorable Court applies the very restrictive doctrine laid down in Francisco

v. House of Representatives, supra, no violation of Section 3 (5), Article XI of the

1987 Philippine Constitution ensues as at the time the Second Impeachment Complaint

has been filed, the First Impeachment Complaint has not yet been initiated in the

manner provided for in the Francisco doctrine.

(82) The Francisco doctrine has been categorically laid down as follows:

“Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of

41
 Article XI becomes clear. One an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3
(5) of the Constitution.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(83) In fact, the two (2) Impeachment Complaints have been initiated at the same time by

the simultaneous referral thereof to the House Committee on Justice on August 11,

2010 at 4:47 P.M., as clearly indicated in the House Journal dated August 11, 2010.

This fact has been openly admitted by petitioner herself under the petition’s heading

“Statement of the Facts and the Proceedings,” thus:

“4. On 11 August 2010 at 4:47 p.m., the First and Second Complaints
were simultaneously referred to the Committee.” ([Petition, par. 4, p.
10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in the Petition)

(84) Thus, there is no violation of Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution even if only the very restrictive Francisco doctrine has been applied by the

Honorable Court with regard to the validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint in

this case. Again, the First Impeachment Complaint has not yet been completely

initiated at the time the Second Impeachment Complaint has been filed on August 3,

2010.

(85) Hence, following the very restrictive Francisco doctrine, at that time that the Second

Impeachment Complaint has been filed, the First Impeachment Complaint has not yet

been completely initiated as it has not yet been referred to the House Committee on

Justice at that time, thus the Second Impeachment Complaint has been validly filed on

August 3, 2010.

(86) Petitioner herself openly admits in her petition, as it is full of quotations taken and

lifted from Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra, that based on the very

restrictive Francisco doctrine, initiation takes place by both “the act of filing of the

impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial

action taken thereon.” Thus, herein private respondents are astonished why petitioner is

asserting to heavens that the mere filing itself of the First Impeachment Complaint,

42
 without any referral thereof to the House Committee on Justice, already bars the filing

the Second Impeachment Complaint.

(87) Again, the very restrictive Francisco doctrine does not state that “once an Impeachment

Complaint has been filed, another Impeachment Complaint may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period.” The very restrictive Francisco doctrine states

that “once an Impeachment Complaint has been filed and referred to the House

Committee of Justice, another Impeachment Complaint may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period.”

(88) Thus, the clear import of the very restrictive Francisco doctrine is that if an

Impeachment Complaint has been filed and not yet referred to House Committee

on Justice, another Impeachment Complaint may still be validly filed against the

same official, as it happened in the filing of the Second Impeachment Complaint.

Consequently, following the very restrictive Francisco doctrine, the starting date to

which the one-year bar rule shall be counted is the date on which an Impeachment

Complaint has been referred to the House Committee on Justice, as it is only at the time

of such referral that the initiation of impeachment proceedings has been completed, and

not at the time of mere filing.

(89) Hence, the two (2) Impeachment Complaints are the subject of only one impeachment

proceedings, and not of more than one impeachment proceedings.

(90) Verily, even if the Honorable Court applies the very restrictive Francisco doctrine,

there is no violation of Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, as

at the time the Second Impeachment Complaint has been filed, the First Impeachment

Complaint has not yet been initiated in the manner provided for in the Francisco

doctrine, and that the two (2) Impeachment Complaints have been completely initiated

at the same time as the same have been referred simultaneously to the House

Committee on Justice.

43
V.

The contemplated consolidation of the two (2)

Impeachment Complaints does not constitute a
circumvention of the Section 3 (5), Article XI of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

First, it is not covered by the prohibition under

Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and is, in fact, permissible by the
clear import of the said provision.

(91) Very clearly, as elucidated by herein private respondents in the discussion in the

foregoing chapter, the filing of the Second Impeachment Complaint may still be validly

made despite the mere filing of the First Impeachment Complaint, it is crystal clear that

the contemplated consolidation of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints is not covered

by the one-year bar rule under Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution.

(92) Verily, in accordance with the discussion of herein private respondents in the foregoing

chapter, such contemplated consolidation of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints is

constitutionally permissible by the clear import of Section 3 (5), Article XI of the 1987

Philippine Constitution.

(93) As initiation of impeachment proceedings takes place upon the “act of the House of

Representatives of transmitting and filing the Articles of Impeachment to the

Senate for the conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings,” the clear import

thereof is that more than one Impeachment Complaint may be validly filed prior

to such action of the House of Representatives. Therefore, all Impeachment

Complaints validly filed prior to such action of the House of Representatives may

be consolidated. And such Impeachment Complaints shall constitute the

complaints that form part of only one impeachment proceedings.

Again, the prohibition speaks only of more than one impeachment proceedings, and

not of more than one Impeachment Complaint.

44
 (94) And granting arguendo that the Francisco doctrine is constitutionally permissible, the

clear import thereof is that more than one Impeachment Complaint may be

validly filed prior to the complete initiation of the First Impeachment Complaint,

that is, upon referral thereof to the House Committee on Justice. Therefore, all

Impeachment Complaints validly filed prior to such referral of the First

Impeachment Complaint to the House Committee on Justice may be consolidated.

And such Impeachment Complaints shall constitute the complaints that form part

of only one impeachment proceedings.

(95) Therefore, the contemplated consolidation of the two (2) Impeachment

Complaints does not constitute a circumvention of the Section 3 (5), Article XI of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution, and is in fact permissible by such Constitutional

provision.

Second, petitioner has no cause of action yet to

raise the same as an issue as it has yet to happen,
if it will happen in the first place, and there is no
certainty that the same will happen in the future.
Therefore, the same is a matter contingent to an
event happening in the future to which there is
no certainty of happening, as petitioner herself
admits that such consolidation is merely
“contemplated,” that is, an act that is still being
reflected upon, imagined, or studied by the
House Committee on Justice.

(96) Suffice it to state that such consolidation of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints has

yet to happen. And there is no certainty that the same will happen in the future. It is a

matter contingent to an event happening in the future to which there is no certainty of

happening.

(97) Petitioner herself openly admits in her petition that such consolidation is merely

“contemplated,” that is, an act that is still being reflected upon, imagined, or studied

by the House Committee on Justice. Thus, petitioner clearly has no cause of action to

raise this matter of “contemplated consolidation” at this time.

45
VI.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution prescribes the

requirements by which an Impeachment
Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form,
as reflected in the House Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings. Thus, the direct
application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
in the determination of the sufficiency of form of
an Impeachment Complaint is misplaced, as the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as clearly stated in
the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, is only applied “as far as
practicable,” that is, in suppletory manner,
which does not arise in the instant petition as the
House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings already reflect the requirements
provided by the 1987 Philippine Constitution by
which an Impeachment Complaint is determined
to be sufficient in form.

(98) Again, to reiterate for fear for being redundant, the 1987 Philippine Constitution

prescribes the requirements by which an Impeachment Complaint is determined to be

sufficient in form, as reflected in the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings, validly adopted almost a month prior to the September 1, 2010 hearing.

(99) The House Committee on Justice is guided by its legislative jurisprudence or

experiences in the five (5) Impeachment Complaints previously referred to it in

previous years. Under Section 3 (2) and (4), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, nothing more is required as to the form of an Impeachment Complaint

other than the requirements that the same should be “verified” and that if filed by a

citizen, it must be upon a “resolution of endorsement” by any member of the House of

Representatives, or upon a “resolution of impeachment” if an Impeachment Complaint

filed by a citizen is endorsed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of

Representatives. These Constitutional provisions are reflected in the House Rules of

Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, validly adopted almost a month prior to the

September 1, 2010 hearing, under Rule II, Section 2 (a), (b) and (c) thereof.

46
 (100) Thus, petitioner’s resort to the application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in the

determination of sufficiency in form of an Impeachment Complaint is patently

erroneous and misplaced. The Rules of Criminal Procedure, as clearly stated in the

House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, is only applied “as far as

practicable,” that is, in suppletory manner, which clearly does not arise in the instant

petition as the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings already reflect

the requirements provided by the 1987 Philippine Constitution by which an

Impeachment Complaint is determined to be sufficient in form.

VII.

As to petitioner’s allegations that the two (2)

Impeachment Complaints do not meet the
standards for the sufficiency in substance, as
petitioner alleges that none of the allegations in
the said Impeachment Complaints can be
deemed as of the same nature as the grounds for
impeachment under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, and that complainants have no
legal right to compel petitioner to file and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials
and employees, suffice it to state that this issue
goes into the merits of the Impeachment
Complaints over which the Honorable Court has
no jurisdiction to pass upon, as clearly and
categorically ruled in Ernesto B. Francisco Jr. v.
House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003).

(101) As to petitioner’s sixth ground in her petition assailing the sufficiency in substance of

the Impeachment Complaints through the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition,

suffice it to state that said matters dealing with the sufficiency in substance of the

Impeachment Complaints go into the merits of the two (2) Impeachment Complaints

over which the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction.

(102) Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra, is emphatic on this matter when it held

the following, thus:

47
 “These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second Impeachment complaint

constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six

grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.” (Emphasis supplied)

(103) Therefore, petitioner’s sixth ground in her petition is utterly untenable and erroneous.

No doubt the Honorable Court must desist from taking over the mandate of the House

of Representatives in the determination of the sufficiency in substance of the

Impeachment Complaint. Such power is lodge exclusively in Congress by the 1987

Philippine Constitution. It is the classic example of a textually demonstrable power

dedicated to a co-equal body of government. Hence, the Honorable Court must desist

from taking cognizance of the instant petition.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of the premises, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable

Court the following, thus:

(a) That the Honorable Court recall and lift the status quo ante order dated

September 1, 2010;

48
 (b) That the Honorable Court dismiss the instant petition on the ground of

prematurity and non-exhaustion of remedies in the House Committee on Justice,

House of Representatives plenary, and the Senate;

(c) That the Honorable Court dismiss the instant petition for utter lack of merit; and

(d) That in the event the Honorable Court gives due course to the instant petition,

that the Francisco doctrine laid down in Francisco v. House of Representatives,

supra, with respect to the interpretation on the “initiation of impeachment

proceedings” be abandoned, and that the Honorable Court render that initiation

of impeachment proceedings takes place upon the “act of the House of

Representatives of transmitting and filing the Articles of Impeachment to the

Senate for the conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings.”

Other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Quezon City for Manila, September 27, 2010.

3/F Erythrina Building

No. 1 Matatag cor. Maaralin Sts.
Central District, Quezon City
(02) 920 6660, (02) 927 2812

JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG

Counsel for Herein Private Respondents
Roll of Attorney’s No. 55254
IBP No. 822604, 03-30-10
PTR No. 3258843, 03-17-10
MCLE Compliance No. III-0014341, 04-16-10

49
Copy furnished: Registered Mail

(Ret.) Justice Serafin R. Cuevas

(Ret.) Justice CUEVAS LAW OFFICE
Counsel for Petitioner
11th Floor Vernida IV Building
L.P. Leviste Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City

Attys. Anacleto M. Diaz,

Maria Rosario Z. Del Rosario,
Christian B. Diaz,
Luis Karlo R. Tagarda and
Daniel C. Doligon
LAW FIRM OF DIAZ DEL ROSARIO & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Petitioner
6th Floor Padilla Building
F. Ortigas Jr. Road (formerly Emerald Ave.)
Ortigas Center, Pasig City

EXPLANATION FOR SERVICE OF COMMENT

THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL

The copies of this Comment have been served on the counsels of the adverse party
through registered mail due to distance and lack of available personnel to personally serve the
same. This explanation is made pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG

50