Shari'a as De-Africanization: Evidence from Hausaland

Author(s): William F. S. Miles

Source: Africa Today, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 2003), pp. 51-75
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Shari'aas De-Africanization:
Evidence from Hausaland
WilliamF.S. Miles

Terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001

overlapped with ongoing movements of Islamic fundamen-
talism in sub-Saharan Africa; however, these movements
have not been identical, nor have they encountered uniform
responses from the governments overseeing them. This is evi-
dent in the Hausa borderlands of Niger and Nigeria, where
I conducted fieldwork (first begun in the early 1980s) two
months after the attacks. Differences in the application of
shari'a(Islamic law) on both sides of the border accentuate
differences in Hausa culture and society along national (i.e.,
Nigerien vs. Nigerian) lines. Traditional Hausa customs that
have flourished for centuries (praise-singing, drumming,
group dancing, and singing) are now proscribed in the north-
ern Nigerian state of Katsina, where shari'ais tantamount to
de-Africanization. In contrast, Zinder, a neighboring state in
the Republic of Niger, has so far resisted a comparable Islam-
ization of its legal code. Cultural differentiation across the
Niger-Nigeria boundary persists along religious lines, despite
the status of Islam as the common faith. This inflected glo-
balization of Islam highlights the significance of national
boundaries in delimiting the influence of religious revival-
ism. Other differences relating to Islamization are inferred
from comparing the extent of pilgrimage to Mecca and the
incidence of wife seclusion in neighboring Hausa villages on
each side of the Niger-Nigeria boundary.

Introduction:Politicsand Praise-Singing

How has Islam been evolving in West Africa, particularly in light of the
phenomenal rise of global Islamism? What light can daily life in rural,
borderline communities shed on this broadertrend?
This essay addresses these questions through the prism of a longitu-
dinal study of two neighboring Hausa villages on each side of the Nigeria-
Niger boundary. Initiated in the early 1980s, the study has investigated the
 impact of the colonial partition on the Hausa-the largest ethnolinguistic
group in all of Africa-with respect to national identity, economy, lan-
guage, education, and religion. Most of the differences distinguishing the
two communities were attributed to colonial continuity in the postcolonial
era (Miles 1994). Ancillary research focused on partisan politics on the
Nigerian side of the boundary, especially with regardto the incorporation
of traditional practices of praise-singing as a type of electoral campaigning
(Miles 1986a, 1989).
1-'.
The role of the balladeer in Northern Nigerian society was first
;z
) elaboratedby M. G. Smith (1957).In traditional Hausa society, the maroka
PI
0
(praise-singer,griot) would approachthe object of his praise and broadcast
-a declarations about the honoree's ancestry and "notability, his prosperity
and influence, the number of his dependents, his fame and its range....
Unfavourable references to the individual's meanness, fortune (arziki),
VI:
treatment of his dependants, occupation, reputation, and possible disloyalty
to his community ... are also liable to be made" (Smith 1957:39).
rn In Hausaland, praise-singing, when done properly, has a vigorous
:11- musical backdrop.In addition to the regular drum, Smith writes:

double-gongs(koge) of a silver-tin alloy, long trumpets of

:o
silver orbeatenbrass(kakaki),woodenhorns(fare,pampani),
z orreedinstrumentswhich soundlike bagpipes(algaita)figure
prominently in the praise-singing addressedto rulers and
z
0 senior title-holders.(Smith 1957:28)

In an age of national politicking and broadcastmedia, the persistence

of the maroka constitutes a conundrum. That praise-singing has now been
actually criminalized on one side of the Hausa border,even as it flourishes
on the other, is indicative of a sea change in indigenous cultural life. It
epitomizes the de-Africanization currently being wrought by Islamic fun-
damentalism, where de-Africanization is the suppression of indigenous
customs and folkways on the basis of their supposed incompatibility with
the Koran.

Islam in Hausaland:
Precolonial, Colonial, and Postcolonial Roles

Since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Islam has been spreading
throughout Hausaland, hitherto a land of polytheism and animism. From
the east, itinerant Muslim traders (wangawara) enthusiastically praised
their faith along with their wares. Since trade was concentrated even more
than now in the cities, Islam in Hausaland was at first adopted primarily
by urban and royal families. Only from about the middle of the eighteenth
century did Muslim missionaries make much of an attempt to evangelize
the commoner and rural populations.
 Even the oldest havens for Islam in Hausaland-the palaces-prac-
ticed a ratherunorthodox, "impure"version of the faith. Many pre-Islamic
practices and beliefs coexisted with their ostensibly Koranic-basedcounter-
parts. Men married more than four wives, did not pray "correctly,"and dis-
regardedIslamic law with regardto inheritance. Above all, institutions and
governance were not those characterized by Islam. Islamic (moreprecisely,
Sunni) purists felt compelled to declare war on the "decadent"custodians
of the faith. Their jihad was led by a Fulani and cleric, Shehu Usman dan
Fodio, who declaimed

Listen to this song and be afraid -I

Leaveoff following the many un-Islamic customs, 0

Let us repentand contain our hearts' desires,

w
Let us obey religion and stop putting off our repentance.
(Hiskett 1984:161)

From 1804 until 1812, dan Fodio and his followers successfully routed U,

the incumbent Hausa rulers and established a new caliphate, based in

Sokoto, over the sometimes confederated, sometimes battling kingdoms
that had reigned over what was to become northern Nigeria. Some of the
defeated kingdoms succeeded in establishing rump fiefdoms in exile on
the northern fringes of the caliphate, including what later became south-
central Niger Republic. It is important to note that the Fulani jihad of the
early nineteenth century was not one of conversion, but of reform. The aim
was not to turn nonbelievers into Muslims so much as to turn nominal
Muslims into Sunnah-following ones. After dan Fodio's death, the caliph-
ate unity came under great strain, as successors vied for preeminence. The
initial alliance between the literate class of Islamic morality (ulama) and
rulers quickly dissipated.
When the British invaded Hausaland, at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, religious rhetoric stoked the flames of Hausa-Fulani resistance.
"Fromus to you," replied Attahiru dan Ahmadu, the caliph of Sokoto, to his
European enemies' demand for surrender,"there are no dealings except as
between Muslims and unbelievers. God Almighty has enjoined war on us."
Yet after victory, and while crowning the defunct dan Ahmadu's successor,
LordFrederickLugarddeclared:

All men arefree to worshipGod as they please. Mosquesand

prayerplaces will be treatedwith respectby us.... Youneed
have no fearregardingBritishrule, it is ourwish to learnyour
customs and fashion. (Crowder1962:201)

This declaration epitomized the British policy of indirect rule. Religion, as

least the monotheistic variety, would be unmolested; indeed, to the extent
that it conformed to a British sense of justice, shari'a would be formally rec-
 ognized and applied. Indirect rule viewed the indigenous northern Nigerian
establishment, including its religious institutions and judicial systems, as
legitimate-indeed, expedient-tools for the colonial enterprise. Koranand
Sunna conformed to Pax Britannica.
The French in Niger, practicing direct rule, had little tolerance for
such multicultural colonialism. Although they were forced to rely on
indigenous political and religious institutions to enforce their overall
authority, French colonialists in general accorded them little intrinsic
respect. Chiefs and clerics were tolerated, not encouraged; controlled, not
pa
1-I supervised; suspected, not entrusted. French colonialism did not promote
Roman Catholicism over Islam; rather, its republican and secular spirit
0
distrusted any religious interference in colonial governance. Unlike the
"British in Hausaland[, who] came to regardthe traditional Islamic estab-
lishment as an ally[,] ... for many years over the borderin French territory
"Ic ... there was distance" and suspicion between le regime colonial and the
colonized Muslims; unlike the British in Nigeria, the Frenchin Niger were
U7
m.1 "emotionally involved with Islam" (Hiskett 1984:277).
0 Independence did not fundamentally change the respective attitudes
z
:D
r}
I.
between state and mosque in Nigeria and Niger. Forsure, Nigerian federal-
ism (itself a legacy of colonialism) gave much greater latitude to regional
norms than did postcolonial administrative centralism in Niger. First
Republic governance in Nigeria (1960-1966), both in the North and nation-
ally, was dominated largely by Muslim political leaders (Ahmadu Bello,
z
Aminu Kano, Tafawa Balewa), who invoked Islam even as they interpreted
it to different ideological ends.
The so-called Kaduna mafia-pro-Bello northern Muslim stalwarts,
who "represented the backbone of a new technocratic and bureaucratic
elite" (Loimeier 1997a:123)-preserved power even under the military
interregnum of 1966-1979 and regrouped during the Second Republic
(1979-1983). Meanwhile, grassroots Islamic fundamentalist movements
such as Izala, and modern-educated ones like the Muslim Students Society,
gestated out of the colonial-era and early-independence conservative reli-
gious establishment in response to civilian and military incompetence and
corruption. Millennial brands of Islam, extremist deviations from which
have spawned violent and pseudo-Muslim cultlike groups, such as the 'Yan
Tatsine (followersof Maitatsine), have also arisen (Christelow 1985;Hiskett
1980; Isichei 1987;Kastfelt 1989; Lubeck 1985; Watts 1996). "Debates over
the role of shari'a in a purportedly secular state" provided part of the con-
text in which the Maitatsine phenomenon arose (Predand Watts 1992:28).
Actual implementation of shari'a occurred in a social climate permeated
by millenarianism (Last 2000:143).
Thus, in northern Nigeria, postcolonial politicians have exploited
Islamic networks and symbolism for electoral gain during spurts of democ-
racy, and military rulers have courted Muslim leaders and associations in
their own way. Nig6rien rulers, in contrast-whether authoritariancivilian,
no-nonsense military, or democratically elected-have in essence contin-
ued the French colonial style of state subordination over Islamic leadership
and establishment.
Hamani Diori, Niger's first independence leader (1960-1973), was a
Westernized francophile who placed the Islamic schools (m6dersas) under
the ministry of the interior, not the ministry of education. Seyni Kountch6,
the lieutenant colonel who ousted him in a military coup, initially rehabili-
tated Islam to establish stronger pan-Muslim ties (especially with Libya),
but never removed his institutional control over it. Indeed, from 1974 until
1993 there was but one governmentally sanctioned Islamic organization,
the Association Islamique du Niger (AIN). Under Koutche's "Development -A
Society," the Association of Muslim Priests was but one of eleven organiza- 00
tions set up to structure input from civil society to government. No other U,
Nigerien ruler has maintained the grip that Kountch6, who died in 1987,
did. But even where their control has loosened overall, none of Koutch6's Un
Un
successors, military or civilian, has attempted to gain or preserve power
primarily under the symbol of the red crescent. This is so despite the growth
of alternative Islamic associations-Association nig6rienne pour l'appel et r-

la solidarite islamiques [ANASI], Association pour la diffusion de l'islam

au Niger [ADINI], Association pour le rayonnement de la culture islamique r-

[ARCI],Association des jeunes musulmans du Niger [AJMN])-concurrent

with political liberalization in the 1990s (Glew 1996). m

Approximatelyninety percent of Nigeriens are Muslim, making Niger

the most heavily Islamized of all nations of formerFrenchWest Africa after
Mauritania. The overwhelming majority of Nigerien Muslims are Sunni
and, since the colonial era, they have come to follow Maliki interpreta-
tions of the Koran. By constitution, Niger is a secular republic, though in
practice a good deal of domestic dispute (family, land, inheritance) is in fact
resolved by customary authorities, who at least nominally invoke Maliki
law (Lund 1998). Franco-Arabschools also operate with increasing govern-
ment tolerance, further compromising the ostensibly secular nature of the
Nigerien state.
Although the newly formed Islamic associations referred to above
(such as ANASI and ADINI) "regardthe current practice of Islam in Niger
as deviating from the correct way and therefore call for the practice of a
pure Islam" (Glew 1996:202), the theological influence of the postjihadic,
precolonial, anti-Fulani resistance persists, constituting a syncretic Islam
infused with indigenous African religion. Of the Sufi brotherhoods that
have emerged, the moderate Tijaniyya brotherhoodis the most widespread.
In the early 1980s, an Islamic university was established in the western city
of Say,seat of Islamic learning since the seventeenth century. While ethnic
and land-based tensions have long simmered (e.g.,Hausa vs. Zarma; Tuareg
vs. Hausa; nomads vs. agriculturists), resulting in periodic rebellions and
mutinies, Islam has generally been a unifying factor in Nigerien society.
Unlike in Nigeria, Islam in Niger does not serve as an identity marker
for portions of the population who wish to gain status, prestige, power or
wealth over other regions (i.e., non-Muslim).
 With regardto gender,BarbaraCooper has illustrated the differential
evolution of Muslim Hausa women in Niger vis-a-vis Nigeria, although she
gives more weight to the jihadic-antijihadic struggle than to the differential
legacies of British versus French colonialism (Cooper 1998; see also Miles
1994). In what was to become northern Nigeria, the jihadists downgraded
women's status, power, and wealth by suppressing bori (a spirit-posses-
sion cult) and promoting seclusion. Women of the aristocracy had enjoyed
important roles in bori (including titled positions) until the largely female
cult was forced underground.Seclusion, by forcing marriedwomen off their
-I
pC farmlands (and thereby out of public view) deprived them of an important
source of income. In Niger, however, bori has flourished, and women con-
0

;z
tinue to farm as of old. In their favor,the Nigerian jihadists did introduce a
0ax tradition of female scholarship in the Koran,one that was hardly matched
for Nigerien women.
0\

Izala: The Reformist Spirit

Izalain Nigeria
m

Underlying the strictly juridical changes in Nigerian Hausaland has been

z the emergence of a theopolitical movement for Islamic reform. Known as
Izala (Association for Elimination of Innovations in the Religion and for
o Reinforcement of the Sunnah), the movement was founded in Northern
z
Nigeria in 1978 by Ismaila Idris; the one personality most associated with
it, however, is the formerGrandKadiof Northern Nigeria, Sheikh Abubakar
Gumi (1922/4-1992) (Loimeier 1997b; Umar 1999.)
Gumi outspokenly advocated the enforcement of shari'a throughout
the land. He believed that British colonialism-inherently Christian and
therefore un-Islamic-had intentionally set out to undermine Islamic law
and culture. Merely adaptingWestern-derivedjurisprudenceto shari'a prin-
ciples was, for Gumi, logically untenable and culturally demeaning (Falola
1998:124-126). Promoting shari'a itself was not Izala's original or primary
mission. With its more than two million Nigerian followers, the movement
nevertheless created an overall cultural and political atmosphereconducive
to radical institutional change in an Islamist direction. Although socially
expansionist, the movement enjoys a particular urban sensibility.
The essence of Izala lies in the vehement rejection of local practices
and organizations that, while long viewed as properlyIslamic, are actually
haram, forbidden.Chief among these impure excrescences are Sufi Brother-
hoods (tariqa), believers' networks that promote devotion to elders and the
veneration of saints. In Nigerian Hausaland, the principal (and often rival)
brotherhoodsare the Qadariyya,associated with Usman dan Fodio himself,
and the Tijaniyya (a mercantilistic network stretching well into Senegal),
introduced by Alhaji Umar Tall in the 1830s and popularized by Ibrahim
Niasse a century later. Izala anti-Sufism produced volatile struggles over
denominational power in local mosques, struggles that resulted in the
establishment of separate, Izala mosques.
By extension, Izala also inveighs against all popular practices of
Islam that favor superstitious ritual (such as amulet wearing), as against
literalist study and understanding of the Koran. Abstractly, Izala favors
an "individualism in which people hope . . . to extricate themselves from
the tutelage of the religious and moral authorities" (Kane 1994:494). It is
"more in tune with the rugged individualism of capitalist social relations"
(Umar 1993:178).In practical terms, Izala entails a sweeping dismissal of 1-I

the traditional mallams, the largely rural-based clerics who, when called 0
upon (and compensated), provide Koranic instruction, prophetic guidance, ;,

and supernatural intervention. But even family elders may be "dissed" for
their ignorance and impiousness if they command obedience that (invari-
ably youthful) initiates do not accept as merited on purely Koranicgrounds. U,

Rural resistance is thus an important obstacle to Izala, although the move- U,

ment has made inroads in the countrysides of Bauchi, Kaduna,and Katsina

(Kane 1994:513). Under Mallam Yakubu Yahaya, the Katsina branch is
reputed to constitute "the most active and radical wing" (Sulaiman 1997:
59). Young men are particularly responsive to Izala's weighing in against
unnecessarily high expenditures for religious ceremonies, especially mari-
tal brideprice. "Dancing and playing the drums are also prohibited by the
'yan izala" for they represent satanic temptation (Masquelier 1996:231).
Gumi individually and Izala in general reflect the influence of Saudi
Wahhabism. Austere in doctrine but lavish in aid, petrodollars fuel the
supplanting of indigenous African Islam with Saudi-supplied books and
schools. The Izala message is propagatedby public and broadcastpreaching
and, especially, the sale of sermons on audiocassette. All these efforts will
eventually result, accordingto Izala aspirations,in an Islamic Nigerian state
(Kane 1994:501). Subsequent splintering of the movement into rival fac-
tions, led by Ismaila Idris and Musa Mai Gandu, the formerof which proved
susceptible to governmental cooptation, has tempered Izala's erstwhile
grandiose aims. Izala nevertheless remains a potential haven for the most
marginalized and dispossessed of the younger common folk (talakawa),who
bristle at the norms, strictures, and expectations fostered by the traditional
ruling 6lites (sarakuna).
Even though it favors purdah, Izala promotes universal literacy for
Koranic study in Nigeria and thereby advances a kind of Islamic quasi-
feminism. Women are not only permitted but encouraged to study; and
once they are used to studying, they should also feel free to vote. In the late
1970s and 1980s, Gumi viewed the mobilization of the Muslim electorate
as critical to his Islamist ambitions. Getting Northern Muslim women to
vote may have been culturally innovative but mathematically irresistible.
Still, in all, "the dominant view is explicit that Muslim women's political
activity should be to ensure that Muslim men get state control, after which
 matters can be safely left where they should be, in the hands of men....
Women's subordination to men and control by men is emphatically a part
of the Islamist program"(Imam 1994:134).

Izalain Niger

Izala has made inroads in neighboring Niger, albeit under the backdropof
less transformative economic and political change. With its traditional net-
works of social support, having been less disrupted by capitalistic and con-
0
I-I
sumeristic pressures than in the oil-driven Nigerian polity, its ethos shocks
pU
Nig6rien society all the more. "Becausethey claim that one's chief responsi-
0 bility is to care for immediate dependents, not to entertain neighbors, 'yan
00 Izala have earned a reputation for being tightfisted, selfish individuals who
U,
turn their backs on social obligations" (Masquelier 1999:233).
Classical African syncretism flourishes in Niger, making it a visible
zo
n
target of Izala. "Indigenous elements that have become an integral part of
local Islamic life such as wearing amulets, practicing divination, or drink-
ing the ink used to write Qur'anic verses" come under Izala opprobrium
LA
(Masquelier 1999:232). At the same time, in at least one Nig6rien mer-
0
TZ
chant town, Maradi,Izala has come to constitute a new distinctive identity
1-4
marker for young, upwardly mobile, pious businessmen. There, "the yan
izala ... act like new 'jihadists.' Advantageously combining religion with
Lo
business and social affairs, their doctrine is an ideology 'tailor-made-to-
z
fit' young, rich alhazai" (Gregoire 1993:111).In the town of Zinder, long
considered the Hausa "heart of Islam" in Niger, Islamist reformers have
formed their own distinctive association (Association pour la Diffusion de
l'Islam au Niger, ADINI), eschewing formal links with the Izala of Nigeria
(Glew 1996:195-196, 1998:129-146). Whether Izala in Niger will continue
to be viewed as an authentic religious alternative as opposed to a suspicious
Nigerian import remains to be seen.

Shari'a in Northern Nigeria

Impetus for "full shari'a" in northern Nigeria did not come from the
'yan izala (who did not think it was politically possible) so much as from
Western-educated Muslim politicians, who have done so, according to one
observer,to "demonstratetheir Islamic credentials"-credentials otherwise
impugned in a social space saturated by traditional and reformist brands of
Islam: "ByembracingIslamic fundamentalism, western-educated Muslims
equip themselves with the necessary Islamic capital to compete cultur-
ally, socially, politically, and economically against Muslim elite trained in
modern and traditional Islamic schools" (Umar2001:144).Another explana-
tion is more basic: shari'a represents cultural decolonization, at least from a
legal system embodying the legacies of Christian (qua British and Western)
jurisprudence (Last2000:141).
 Shari'a has long been a thorny political issue in Nigeria. Before and
during the First Republic (1960-1966) local Islamic district courts (alkali)
were used by the dominant political party in the North, the Northern
Peoples Congress (NPC), to repress its opponents (Last 2000:148). In the
lead up to the Second Republic (1979-1983),vehement political conflict over
integration of Islamic law within the constitutional-justice system threat-
ened the country's unity (Ubah 1990; Laitin 1982). Shari'a was accepted as
the basis of civil law adjudicationbetween Muslims in the northern states
of Nigeria, but proposals for a Federal Court of Sharia were scotched. SL)
In 1988, this time with the military in charge, a similar theopolitical
crisis (see Miles 1996) arose in discussions about revisions to the consti- -g
tution. Christian members of the Constituent Assembly insisted that all 0
references to shari'a be removed from the new constitution. Muslim mem- U,

bers countered by demanding that it should ratherbe extended throughout

the entire republic. So acrimonious did the affair become that the military
intervened, superseding the Assembly and deciding to limit the jurisdic-
U,
tion of the Shari'a Court of Appeal to civil matters in which only Muslims
were party. The military rulers also decided that shari'a would apply only to
states that had specifically requested it (Falola 1998:86-93). These debates U,

over shari'a, some believe, served as a catalyst for the emergence of Izala
(Yandaki 1997:45).
Since Zamfara (underan Izala governor)adopted shari'a for its crimi-
nal jurisprudencein 2000, eleven other Northern Nigerian states have gone
the same route. Particularly on account of the death-by-stoning judgments
meted out to two female alleged adulteresses, shari'a in Nigeria has received
great attention in the West. (One case has been dismissed on appeal; the
other is pending.) In November 2002, religious riots in Kaduna over the
Miss Worldpageant also had a shari'a spin to them: the state government of
Zamfara endorsed a fatwa (an Islamic decree) calling for the death of Isioma
Daniel, the female journalist who had imprudently written that the Prophet
Muhammad might have married one of the contestants.'
Shari'a, it may be noted here, is not a single compendium of Islamic
jurisprudence uniformly applied throughout the Muslim world. Based on
the hadith (sayings of the ProphetMuhammed) and the sunnah (customs of
the first Muslim community), four major legal schools have evolved, each
one identified with its signature commentator (Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shaf'i,
Ibn Hanbal). Particularly in terms of procedureand appeal, the schools have
been subject to a certain degree of local interpretation (Shapiro1981).Thus,
even in northern Nigeria, subtle variations in the codes have come to dif-
ferentiate the dozen states that have integrated shari'a into their criminal
legal systems.
The introduction of shari'a into state criminal law added more kin-
dling to an already volatile situation between Muslims and Christians in
northern Nigeria (Bienen 1986; Falola 1998; Gambari 1992; Hunwick 1992;
Ibrahim 1990, 1991; Ohadike 1992; Opeloye 1989; Ubah 1990). Between
2000 and the Kaduna riots of 2002, shari'a-related violence had already
 broken out in the states of Bauchi (Juneand July 2001), Gombe (May 2001),
Kaduna(February2001), and Kano (February2001). During the same period,
Borno and Jigawaalso experienced religious-based violence between Mus-
lims and Christians. In contrast, there has been little overt opposition to
shari'a in more homogeneously Muslim states.
Nigeria's self-definition as a secular state is problematic. Strength of
religious conviction and affiliation among virtually all Nigerians precludes
the separationist model of church and state as it is applied in the West. In
the Nigerian context, "secularism"more accuratelyrefersto an understand-
ing that the government will not favor one organized religion over another,
- while tacitly permitting (if not encouraging) religious activity within the
0
0
nation's various faith groups (Christian, Muslim, and animist). Inevitably,
however, "religious activity" sometimes assumes antagonistic overtones,
C11 as proselytizers of rival faiths target their competitors' adherents.
Several reasons can be invoked to explain the popularity of shari'a
in modern-day Nigerian politics. Simple consistency with Islamist reform
is one. Disillusionment with alien and corruptible Western-based systems
0 of law and order is another. Systemic despair at the Nigerian polity and
economy-corruption.and poverty-is a third.2 "[W]hathas been termed
the restoration of shariah in the northern states might be reframedas the
z
political and legal response to a sense of economic and moral crisis in
'Z

northern Nigeria" (Christelow 2002:198). Whatever the ultimate cause or

z causes, and even within an historical backdropof periodic Islamic reform-
-4
ism, it represents "an entirely new radicalization of Islam, testifying to a
no less new influence from Saudi Arabia and the forms of religiosity which
it advocates" (Nouhou 2002:82; my translation).
Forthe most radical Islamists, even the current trend of states' adop-
tion of shari'a is insufficient. The pro-IranianIslamic Movement, headedby
Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, aims "to bring about an Islamic revolution in Nigeria"
(Sulaiman 1997:64);short of that, the reestablishment of shari'a on a state-
by-state basis is theopolitically vacuous (Bach2003:124).

Damping Radical Islam in Niger

Niger, in contrast to Nigeria, has staunchly maintained a relatively clear-

cut separation of mosque and state. Shari'a may be used for civil matters,
but there is no statewide legal infrastructure comparableto that which has
evolved in Nigeria. As a result, some border towns and villages in Niger
have become havens for newly criminalized activities in Nigeria, especially
drinking, gambling, and prostitution (Onishi 2001).
Niger's current civilian rulers keep close tabs on Islamic activists,
just as the French colonial and indigenous military regimes did before
them. Government-sanctioned Islamic councils ensure pacifist preach-
ing in the recognized mosques, and nonlicensed preachers are monitored
through surveillance. But Islamist spillover from northern Nigeria cannot
be completely contained. Democratization, introduced in the early 1990s
and enduring despite a succession of disruptive military coups d'etat, has
also enabled some radical forms of Islam to emerge in Niger.
In the 1990s, a Nigerien expression of Izala arose in Dosso, creat-
ing tensions with the conservative Muslim elite in that midsize town. In
November 2000, Niamey was a site of violent protests against a fashion
show, condemned as profligate by the demonstration's religious leaders.
Unlike the protests against the Miss Worldcontest in 2002 in Nigeria, how-
ever, Nigerien security forces acted in a uniform, unified manner, arresting P-
-I
nearly 300 persons and keeping forty of them in custody.
It is in Maradi,one of the rump state holdouts against the nineteenth- 04
lz

century Usmanian revolution and still a more homogeneously Hausa com- 0

munity, that the Islamic challenge to Nigerien state secularism is greatest. 0'

It is here that Islamic influences from northern Nigeria and Iranhave made
their greatest inroads. In October 1999, riots broke out in Maradi follow-
ing Niger's ratification of the U.N. convention against gender discrimina-
tion. Introduction of shari'a in the neighboring Nigerian states of Zamfara
and Katsina has galvanized Maradi Muslim fundamentalists, confirming
Cooper's earlier observation that "if the [Fulani-led]reformists did not suc-
ceed in the jihad against Maradi, they are winning the postcolonial peace"
(Cooper 1998:33).
Aid agreements in the areas of energy, mining, and health have
introduced the Islamic Republic of Iran as a new player on the donor scene.
Private Iranian schools have been established in Maradi and extend an
allowance to parents who enroll their children.
Beyond Nigeria and Iran, Saudi Arabia is an important factor in
the changing nature of Nig6rien Islam. Pilgrimage to Mecca has been an
increasing religio-economic imperative for upwardly mobile rural Nigeri-
ens, many of whom spend years in Saudi Arabia before returning with sav-
ings, goods, and an expanded view of the outside world (Miles 1986b, 1990).
Youngerpreacherswho have spent time in Saudi Arabia, assimilating more
Wahhabiteperspectives, increasingly view indigenous African expressions
of Islam as backward and primitive, yet Islam in Niger has traditionally
been syncretic, combining local pre-Muslim beliefs and practices of ani-
mism and spirit possession.

The Evolution of Islam in Partitioned Hausaland

Two neighboring villages on each side of the Nigeria-Niger boundary pro-

vide empirical evidence of the differential evolution of Islam in partitioned
Hausaland. Yekuwa, in the province of Zinder, Niger, is only eight miles
from Yardaji,a gateway village into Nigeria. In recent years, Yekuwa has
been elevated to the status of arrondissement, and a district chief (hakimi),
the son of the canton chief of Magaria, has been posted there. Yekuwa has
thus converged even closer institutionally with its Nigerian counterpart
pa

0-g
0 a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;W
:t

0u

m
because Yardajihas long had a village-area chief (mai-gunduma). Population
-I growth since 1988 has been considerable in both communities, although
that on the Nigerian side of the borderhas come close to doubling. Indeed,
Z Yardajinow outdistances Yekuwa in combined population (table 1).
z
o
Table 1
Population of neighboring Hausa villages.
Yardaji Yekuwa
(Nigeria) (Niger)
1986 3,492 4,035
2001 6,682 6,525
Change + 91% + 62%

More surprising than the demographicgrowth on the Nigerian side of

the borderhas been the change in rates, both absolutely and comparatively,
of pilgrimage to Mecca and wife seclusion. Yekuwa in Niger still outdis-
tances Yardajiin the percentageof heads of household who have undertaken
the hajj, with nearly half now entitled to be called alhaii, yet the rate of
increase in Yardajihas been even more impressive, rising by 17 percent
between 1986 and 2001 (table 2).
Whereas pilgrimage has been more pronounced in the Nigerien vis-
a-vis Nigerian village, putting one's wife (or wives) in purdah continues
to be more emblematic of Yardajithan Yekuwa. Yet on both sides of the
borderthere has been a spectacular increase in the incidence of wife seclu-
sion, which has risen by nearly fifty percent in Yardajiand almost tripled
in Yekuwa (table 3).
 Table 2
Pilgrimage to Mecca made by heads of household
in neighboring Hausa villages.
Yardaji Yekuwa
No. % No. %
1986 142 21% 287 41%
2001 268 38% 513 49%

pC

Table 3 0
Wife seclusion: 0~
number and percent of married women in neighboring Hausa villages. a

Yardaji Yekuwa us

No. % No. % m
ON

1986 211 36% 76 11%

2001 942 84% 422 31%

While pilgrimage and seclusion are local symbols of economic status

and religious piety, it is less expensive to confine one's wife to the home
than to travel (with or without her) to Mecca. Although diminutive and
"bush" by Nigerian standards, Yardajihas a more pronounced urban char-
acter and reputation than does Yekuwa in Niger. Inasmuch as purdah is
more associated with urban Muslim life, it is not surprising that Yardaji
continues to overshadow Yekuwa in its frequency of wife seclusion. People
in Yekuwa, on the other hand, attribute their comparative advantage in
traveling to Mecca to their greaterwealth in livestock, which can be easily
sold to procure the price of a Saudi-boundair ticket.
Characteristics intrinsic to the villages may account for much of
the continuing religious differentiation between them. Perhaps of greater
importance, however, has been the progressive Islamization in Nigeria, a
process that affects Yardajimore directly than Yekuwa. On account of the
extension of shari'a to Katsina, of which Yardajiis a part, "singing, beating
of drum, blowing flute and all sort of evil vices have been banned [and]are
strictly forbidden" (Nuhu 2001). In short, many of the traditional Hausa
folkways, including public dancing, wrestling, and praise-singing, have
now been criminalized.
It is understandable that the most attention should be paid to legal
statutes that impose amputation of limbs for petty thievery and capital
punishment for extramarital sex. Such punishments offend an emerging
universal standardof human rights. Less recognized is the extent to which
shari'a, as applied in northern Nigeria, also represents cultural de-African-
ization.
 In 1983, differences in the observance of Islamic principles and rituals
in Yardajiand Yekuwa were already discernible. One example is the part of
a wedding ceremony where the bride is escorted to the groom's home. That
experience, as I witnessed in Yekuwa (Niger), bore out historian J. Spencer
Trimingham's observation that in this marital "rite of passage . . . the
indigenous element remain[s] dominant and the Islamic aspect negligible"
(Trimingham 1980:45). The teenage girl was wrappedin elaborate, colorful
cloths; a high-brim hat was put on her head; and a large pair of sunglasses
covered her eyes. She was then put on a horse, a younger sister sitting just
pO
behind. Drummers followed the girls as the horse was led to the groom's
house. Along the way, there was much singing and dancing.
0~ In Nigeria, however, this custom had alreadybeen declaredun-Islamic
-4 by the religious establishment. As a result, in neighboring Yardaji(residents
:o
of which have long married those of Yekuwa), it was no longer practiced.
Instead, the bride was driven in a minivan, accompanied by liberal horn-
honking. Today, the bridal horseback procession is no longer practiced in
Yekuwa either: "Its time has passed," an Islamic teacher (mallam) of the
0
village informed me. Nigerian norms of Islam are spilling across the border
and, even in the remote countryside, gradually de-Hausifying tradition.

z
"Dividendsof Shari'a"in the Borderlands
0

A weekly ritual demonstrates the reach of shari'a to the furthest reaches of

z
Nigerian Hausaland. Every market day, an impressively turbaned Islamic
district court judge (alkali) now rides circuit to Yardajifrom Daura, capital
of the emirate. He is accompanied by a scribe and a Nigerian policeman,
whose ostentatious display of handcuffs reinforces the state sanction of
shari'a.There is no equivalent to these proceduresin Yekuwa,where dispute
resolution is still conducted by the village chief (mai-gari) and the district
head (hakimi).
Even though the percentage of non-Muslims in Niger is quite small
(no greater than ten percent), people in Yekuwa express concern for similar
unrest should the government of Niger follow Nigeria's lead. In general,
Nigeria is viewed in Yekuwa as a corrupt, violent, lawless society and,
overall, an unsuitable model for Niger. "If a thief is caught [in Niger,] he is
severely punished. [In Nigeria,] there is only surutu-talk, talk, talk (Miles
1994:289). Applying shari'a would be ideal from a normative perspective,
but from a practical standpoint it might lead to unrest: "It is for the sake of
peace that we have not implemented sharia," the district head (hakimi) of
Yekuwa stated in an interview (Harouna2001).
While accepting that shari'a in Nigeria has long been subject to soci-
etal corruption, there is another viewpoint, expressed in Niger by an alha ii,
who said officializing it might put it under more careful judicial oversight
and control. This perspective trusts in the government's ability to monitor
what, because of the lack of regulation, is otherwise an easily corruptible
application of Koranic law.
 Even on the village level, the popular saying "Thereis no compulsion
in Islam" appears undermined by the loudspeakers that, beginning before
dawn, loudly and emphatically call the faithful to prayer. (Loudspeaker
prayer-call is more widespread in Yardaji,but is also practiced somewhat
in Yekuwa.). Since the late 1990s, the mosque of Yardajihas undergone a
major renovation, as if in expectation of heavier use.
During 2000-2002, the local government renovated and constructed
Islamic schools in and around Yardaji.Children attend in the afternoons,
after regular school. Teachers are paid by voluntary contributions. Across
the border in Niger, Yekuwa has also built a new Islamic ("Franco-Arab")
p;
school, thanks in part to Saudi funding. Unlike the Islamic school in 0
4

Yardaji,it is not an after-school program, but a full-day one. Rather than

viewing it as a competitor, the principal of the regular government school
takes the view that "as long as [the children] go to school, it doesn't matter
which one." This West African variety of "school choice" is attributed to
the democratic r6gime change that was reintroduced in Niger, following U,
Ln
elections in 2000. 0-

The modest garbfor women (hijabi)is also now donned in the villages,
especially by schoolgirls. In Yardaji(Nigeria), there are hijabi-style school !U,

uniforms. It is striking to see women wearing hijabis in Yekuwa, where,

well into the 1980s, women commonly performed household chores, par-
ticularly in dry seasons and hot periods of the day, with chests bared.3
State ratification of shari'a in Northern Nigeria has contradictory
effects in the borderlandsof Niger. On the one hand, it legitimizes Nigerien
Islamists who advocate greater orthodoxy in their own communities; on
the other hand, it has led borderline market communities to peddle goods,
services, and pastimes (alcohol, prostitution, gambling) that have been now
criminalized in nearby Nigeria. Such are the ironically dubbed "dividends
of shari'a" (Bach2003:121).

De-Africanization Debated

Within the house old rituals andhabits arebeing phasedout:

privateboriseems less common[,]... andcertaintraditionsat
childbirthareno longerpractised.The "traditional"domestic
culturethat I used to know thirty yearsagois no longerthere.
(Last2000:148)

To what extent is the Islamization of Hausa cultural life actually a form of

de-Africanization? Is it a voluntary process for all classes and genders, and
does this make a normative difference?
To be sure, de-Africanization is not an indigenous notion, at least not
in rural Hausaland. I use the term in this essay to refer to the deliberate
elimination of longstanding local customs and practices in the name of
religious orthodoxy. Yet the very idea of being African-indeed, of belong-
ing to a continent called Africa-is not, at least in the areas where I conduct
 fieldwork, widespread. (Among most of my informants in the early 1980s,
the very word Afirka was only vaguely recognized and understood, if at all.)
Local actors do not themselves view the expansion of shari'a as de-Afri-
canization, partly because they have little consciousness of any original
Africanization. Being Hausa, Muslim, Nig6rien, or Nigerian, yes; being
African, no (Miles and Rochefort 1991).The closest approximation to such
an identity-being black-does exist, but only in contextual contradistinc-
tion to the distant white or European world (Miles 1993). Only educated
C) West African elites are aware of KwameNkrumah and similar exponents of
transcontinental pride and solidarity. Ideological consciousness of expanded
0 categories of identity may be somewhat wider in Hausa cities than in the
countryside (see Barkindo 1993);but even there, disagreements over shari'a
are conducted more along Muslim-vs.-Christian lines than along Islamic-
-I vs.-African ones.
T1.t
Among the rural Hausa, there is little ingrained pride in pre-Islamic
culture. This is why one can always be assured a conversational laugh by
bringing up the Maguzawa, the "pagan"non-Islamized Hausa. When dis-
00D
a cussing pre-Islamic times, people commonly invoke the terms ignorance
and darkness-(jahilci and duhu); the same is true with references to the
precolonial era (Miles 1994:99-101). Even where bori cults of spirit posses-
~o sion persist (see below), they do so more in a context of mild embarrassment
z than cultural pride.That the de-Africanization paradigmhas not (yet?)been
integrated into local consciousness does not, however, invalidate it.
As should be clear from the earlier discussion of the precolonial era,
de-Africanization in the name of religion is hardly new to Hausaland. Two
centuries ago, the reformist jihad of Usman dan Fodio set out to achieve
a similar aim: the purification of Islam. Even if the specific practices the
Fulanis attempted to banish were not the same ones targeted now, the
spirit behind the shari'a campaign today, and the earlier jihad of dan Fodio,
is remarkably similar.4Even those who dismiss the shari'a campaign as a
political ploy by northern politicians to gain popularity must admit that
the Fulani-led jihad also resulted in a power shift, with benefits accruing to
a new group, albeit along ethnic, as opposed to demagogically democratic,
lines.
For sure, in the early 1800s, few maintained that indigenous African
culture possessed much intrinsic value. On this score, Europeanimperial-
ists and missionaries were in basic agreement with their Fulani counter-
parts. They would differ, of course, over the superior religion and culture
that ought to displace African varieties: Christian-based Western civiliza-
tion for the former, Arab-basedIslam for the latter.
African Islamists argue that Islam is more indigenous to Africa than
is Christianity; that position, however, overlooks the ancient lineage of
the Coptic Church in East Africa. It also delegitimates coastal Christian
movements in West Africa, even if they are of more recent vintage. My
overarching point is not that Islam is any more or less indigenous to Africa
than is Christianity; rather,both Christianity and Islam have, at different
points in history and in different regions of the continent, de-Africanized
indigenous mores, customs, and values.5 Neither religion is more imperial
than the other-but neither is less imperial. At this moment in African his-
tory, at least in Nigerian Hausaland, the suppression of indigenous culture
is coming from fundamentalist Islam. Is it because "Hausa culture ... has
been all too ready to be Islamicised" (Mazrui 1988:506)?There is, in any
event, decreasing local sympathy for the viewpoint, expressed two decades
ago, that African "pre-Islamicsurvivals ... characterisedas 'fringe' or 'mar-
ginal' Islam are, on closer inspection, sometimes so intimately connected
with 'core' Islam that they seem part of a single complex" (Lewis 1983:
56): "Formany northern Muslims ... reconciliation [ofI Islam with their 0
-C
traditional faiths ... is sacrilegious; they regardall things associated with
cultural revival and traditional religion as paganist, and therefore unholy 0~
and unacceptable" (Falola 1998:233).
Cultural flexibility, adaptability, and syncretism-the hallmarks of
African evolution and transformation-are being impeached. The most
tolerant of religions in Africa, the indigenous traditions, are on the down-
swing, under pressure from a "cockeyed phenomenon of Islam seeking to
rivet the chains of orthodox conformity on people" (Sanneh 1997:22).6
Is this de-Africanization voluntary? Does it make a difference?
Upholders of the tradition-in the case of the fieldwork site invoked here,
the emir of Daura-proudly proclaim new prohibitions to the people.
Implicit is the notion that a more advanced and mature version of Islam,
as practiced internationally, should be in place in Nigeria too. From this
perspective, shari'a represents a kind of development, a manifestation of
(Islamic) modernity. Just as there are now cybercaf6s in Kano, so ought
there to be sharia. Koranicpurity is on a par with computer literacy: each
is a manifestation of progress.From this perspective, the prohibition on tra-
ditional manifestations of culture (song, dance, praise-singing, traditional
medicine, etc.) is not de-Africanization, but an authentic African evolution-
ary tradeoff-for some, an African spiritual takeoff.
It is not clear that the ordinary people (talakawa) completely embrace
the cultural uprooting proclaimed by local 6lites (manya-manya). It is no
secret that when these elites gather among themselves, pleasurable excep-
tions are permitted: at a housewarming for a prominent alhaji's new resi-
dence in Daura, for instance, none of the highly placed guests objected to
the praise-singer's high-volume accolades. In fact, they encouragedhim by
handing over the customary acknowledgment in cash. Similarly, prosecu-
tion for more serious violations of shari'a-theft, adultery-is more likely
against ordinary people than 6lites.
Local elites are empowered to make discretionary decisions that go
well beyond the powers of ordinary people. Live singing is banned in public;
yet state radio continues to broadcast music. Ordinary people are submis-
sive to, or perhaps complicit with, the Islamic legislation that proscribes
local social practices; to posit that this de-Africanization is entirely volun-
tary, however, overstates the case.
 This is all the clearerwhen one considers gender.Women are arguably
more affected by emerging Islamist norms of behavior and comportment
than men-secluded wives can no longer farm, for instance-yet are the
least-consulted segment of the population. Historically, the expansion of
Islam, particularly in rural areas of Hausaland, has been commensurate
with a shrinking of female powers and prerogatives.For sure, Islamization
has also had some positive features: women are less likely to be drawersof
water and hewers of wood. It is the absence of female input into the Islamist
decision-making process that militates against its supposed voluntarism.7
Islamist-inspired de-Africanization can be viewed as on a par with
0p;
the cultural homogenization that accompanies Western globalization. The
"choice" of austere Islamism is tantamount to the steamrollering, culture-
0~
Co stifling process that, when occurring in the West, is pejoratively called
McDonaldization (Ritzer 1993; see also Barber1995; Barnet and Cavanagh
1994; Friedman 1999). Yet if global Islamization is to be a worthy competi-
tor to Western globalization, as some claim (see Mazrui 2001), it also must
:0
hold itself to equivalent standards. Western globalization is redeemable
,ill
via the benefits that accompany it, especially in terms of technology. For
its part, Islamism in Africa, to redeem itself culturally, must also proffer
something of value to replace the expressions of communal soul-dance,
iz music, song, etc.-that it is currently suppressing.
z Nigerian Hausa adepts of spirit possession ('yan bori) on pilgrimage
have been offered as rebuttal to the claim of Saudi-style globalization.
H
0 Marginalized and denigrated in their native Hausaland, bori specialists
have become valued, and consequently prosperous, experts in exorcism in
Saudi Arabia, which has lost its own indigenous mastery over disruptive
spirits: "Rather than enjoining more uniform conduct according to a set
of universal and authoritative beliefs, increased travel to Mecca in this
case has served to authorize and perpetuate very local practices and beliefs
which have long been condemned as un-Islamic" (O'Brien 1999:34). Yet
even in Saudi Arabia, where the 'yan bori are supposed to be especially
appreciated, they must work in secret: "'it is illegal there.... If they find
you practicing bori, they will catch you"' (O'Brien 1999:28). African spirit
exorcists' individual success in Saudi Arabia does not translate into insti-
tutional rehabilitation of bori back in Hausaland; indeed, it remains part
of the same deviant subculture encompassing prostitutes, homosexuals,
transvestites, and musicians (Besmer 1983:150). Bori remains subject to
the same Islamist drive of de-Africanization as do other cultural practices
deemed as being noncompliant with shari'a. The case of bori-practicing
Hausa migrants in the Middle East conjures the possibility of indigenous
customs surviving only in exile after they have been Islamically eradicated
from the Hausa homeland.
Does Saudi Arabian law, in fact, explicitly prohibit bori? Does legis-
lation in Kano, Katsina, or Zamfara, for that matter? Are the "evil vices"
listed earlier-singing, dancing, drumming, praise-singing-actually
outlawed by written statutes in Nigeria? These practices are not explicitly
mentioned in published shari'a legislation (see Peters 2001), and yet local
communities are convinced that indulging in them will result in punish-
ment. Even if the state has not formally singled them out for sanction, the
ban on them is, for all intents and purposes, real. Thus, there is an arbi-
trariness to the grassroots application of shari'a in northern Nigeria, an
indeterminacy between shari'a on the page and on the ground, the contours
of which require investigation.
Just as colonialism proved to be inexorable within a given historical
pa
epoch, neither the Western nor the Islamic types of globalization can, in
all likelihood, be stopped or limited. Artistic and literary critiques of the
process, however, do represent contributions to the human condition. The 0
-A

question, then, is not "Can de-Africanization be resisted in Hausaland?"

but, rather, "Will there be a Hausa Chinua Achebe, lamenting the passing
of the old ways in favor of the 'enlightened' new?" Another related issue a

is the Hausa response to Islamist violence that has been perpetrated, in a W<

collective religious name, against Western globalization.

Bin Laden in the Bush

Niger was the first African nation to publicly support the U.S. campaign
against the Taliban in Afghanistan. President Tandjatook decisive action
when leaders of two Islamic organizations (including the Nig6rien Islamic
Organization)composed a letter accusing the Bush administration of infring-
ing human rights and democracyand threatening retaliation. These organi-
zations were banned, and the letter writers suspended from their posts.
Nigeria, too, officially supported the United States in its military
actions immediately after 9-11, yet in Kano, by the third week of October,
pro-Bin Laden posters and stickers were already plastered throughout the
city, including on automobile bumpers and windows. A market clash at the
time of U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan degenerated into a lethal
anti-Christian, anti-American riot, leaving 200 dead. On the face of it,
pro-Bin Laden sentiment in Nigerian Hausaland would seem to have been
high.
In Yekuwa (Niger)fallout from 9-11 was contained as the government
wished:

If anyone here went around yelling, 'Bin Ladin Only!' the

chief would call him to order.If he continued,the chief would
have him arrestedby the gendarme.(Mansour2001)

Villagers unanimously condemned the attack on the World Trade

Center as an affront to Allah, and to commerce: "Islam does not condone
terrorism." Yet some did express doubt about the authorship of the act.
"Those who are not in anger should investigate and judge. Neutral par-
ties should decide" (A.M.H., preacher).Overall, the attack on the "market
 center of the world" (i.e., the Twin Towers)was also perceived as an assault
on majorHausa cultural values: not only on innocent life, but on trade and
commerce. Popular,too, was an ambiguous assimilation of 9-11 into Hausa
historiography:kunam baken wake (burning black beans). The black-bean
parableenjoyed great currency in Hausaland in the weeks and months fol-
lowing 9/11. Few persons knew the story with the detail and authority of
an elder of Yekuwa village, Mallam Ya'u, who recounted it to me, with
verve:
I-&.
C) There once was a tyrannicalrulerwho forcedhis subjectsto
p
-g carryhim long distances.He rodethem like horses,abusively.
0
A man named Daga, hearingwhat was happening,declared,
0
"Next time the prince is looking for a porter,put the saddle
on me. Therewon't be any more 'personriding'afterI do it."
So Daga found himself carrying the prince. Near the path,
10 the prince noticed a groupof people, and a fire blazing. The
prince orderedDagato bringhim closer,so that he could see.
:n
So Daga went 'trotting' forth-right into the fire, burning
himself-and the wicked prince-to death.
Daga-he was the first black-beanburner.(Ya'u2001)

0
z R. C. Abraham (1958)renders the expression burning black beans to mean
zo
"reckless courage." Village informants, however, described it to me more
as "demonstrationof manliness." While they condemn the killing of inno-
cents as terrorism and un-Islamic, "burned black beans" hardly suggests
an outright condemnation of suicidal action against injustice and oppres-
sion. Rather,it expresses an undercurrentof admiration-on the part of the
storyteller and the audience-for the self-sacrificial action of Daga against
the prince's tyranny. Self-sacrifice in the face of oppression appearsencoded
within Hausa legend, even if the standard for gauging the tolerance limit
of oppression is unspecified. It must be admitted, however, that the rural
Hausa with whom I spoke were skeptical about identifying the 9-11 hijack-
ers with Daga.

Conclusion

One of the allurements of shari'a is that it represents a persuasive source

of unity for neighboring Muslim communities in Africa otherwise divided
along sundry lines (Miles 2000). Such divisions, to take the case of Hausa-
land, can be national (Nigerian vs. Nig6rien), ethnic (Yoruba/Tuareg/Zarma
vs. Hausa-Fulani), doctrinal (Sufi vs. Izala), denominational (Qadariyyavs.
Tijaniyya),class (talakawa vs. sarakuna),and electoral (populist/progressive
[e.g.,NEPU/PRP8]vs. conservative/traditional [NPC/NPN9]).What Muslim
movement worthy of the name could oppose restructuring its society's legal
structure according to Islamic law?
 Still, despite the status of Islam as the common faith, cultural dif-
ferentiation across the Niger-Nigeria boundary does persist along religious
lines. This inflection of Islamic globalization highlights the significance
of national boundaries in delimiting the influence of religious revivalism,
despite the "hegemonic vocation" of sharia (Bach2003:121). It also reflects
the continuing role of colonial policy in influencing modern government's
responses toward Islam. Is there no relationship between the indirect rule
practiced by Britain in Northern Nigeria and the significant space occupied
by Islam in Nigerian civil society today?Likewise, even if Niger is currently
experimenting with democratic governance, can one not attribute the more 0
quiescent role of Islam there, in part, to the colonial legacies of militaristic 0
direct rule? Variousfactors, including the type of colonialism, influence the
extent to which shari'a succeeds in de-Africanizing particular societies.
Despite Islamist pressure to ban indigenous Hausa customs, distinc-
tions in Muslim practice and behavior between neighboring borderlinevil-
lages in Nigeria and Niger serve as a reminder that religion in Africa-fun-
damentalist and not-does not necessarily supplant norms and identities
based on the nation-state. Islam's interaction with national, economic, and
sociological realities forces it to adapt. Outsiders wishing to contain the
expansion of Islamic fundamentalism have a much greaterchance of influ-
encing these other factors than they do of directly shaping the theological
direction of the faith.'0It is perhapsat the margins of the Muslim world-in
sub-SaharanAfrica, for instance-wherein lies the greatest opportunity for
shoring up a redemptive Islam.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Fieldworkforthis articlewas conducted in November-December,2001,thanksto a travelgrantfrom

the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety. It extends researchinitiallyundertakenunder the auspices of
the Fulbrightprogramin 1983-1984 and the summerof 1986.A versionof this paperwas delivered
at the 45th annualmeeting of the AfricanStudiesAssociation,panel on CivilSociety and Grassroots
Politics,underthe title "IslamicFundamentalismin Hausaland:Nigeriaand Niger."Ithas benefited
significantlyfromthe comments and queriesof paneldiscussantPeterVonDoepp,copanelistDennis
Galvin,ProfessorMomodou Darboe,the editor of this journal(JohnHanson),and two anonymous
reviewers.Fordirectionalguidance (literally!)and outstandingaccommodationat the ASAmeeting
in Washington,D.C.,the authoris indebted to Dr.LarryDiamond.

NOTES

1. The informationministerof the federal government immediatelydismissed the fatwa as

"nulland void."
2. Falola(1998:81)mentions the sociopathology of anomie in this context.
 3. In richtheological and sartorialdetail, Masquelier(1999:237-239)discusses the advent of
the hijabiin a Nigerien,albeit non-Hausa,community.
4. Note, however,the view that, "mostof the Hausacustomarypracticeson the threshold of
Izala'sadvent"resembledthose that dan Fodiocondemned in writing(Yandaki1997:47).
5. Fora debate between two AfricanAfricanistsregardingthe thesis that "indigenous"Africa
has served as a pliant"culturalbazaar"for vying Westernand Islamicvalues and ideas (and
which also considersJudaismalongside Islamand Christianityin Africa),see Mazrui1984
and Habtu1984.
A) 6. See also Mazrui(1988:500-502),which refersto the toleranceof pre-Islamic(andpre-Chris-
tian) Africanreligionsas "indigenousecumenicalism."
0-A 7. Whitsitt(2003) makesa similarpoint in his analysisof the emerging genre of Hausamarket
romanceliterature;the audience for this, however,is urban.
8. Northern Elements Progressive Union and Peoples Redemption Party of the Firstand
Second Republics,respectively.
9. NationalPartyof Nigeriawas the Second Republicversionof the NPC.
10. Schmittand Shanker2002. The programenvisioned "settingup schools with secret Ameri-
can financingto teach a moderate Islamicposition laced with sympathetic depictions of
0$z how the religionis practicedin America."The next day,accordingto the same newspaper,
the WhiteHouse repudiatedthe plan.
IZ

22
I;
:z
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