Wider Europe
Policy Brief
October 1, 2009
Summary: September saw a
major U.S. policy shift on missile
defense in Europe, revelations
of a previously undisclosed
Iranian nuclear site, threats of
sanctions against Iran,
and preparations for a new
discussion between Iran and
the West. But in the midst of so
much apparent change, many
facts remained constant.
Unfortunately, the two winners
seem to be Iran and its some-
time-supporter, Russia.
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America, Europe, Iran, and Physics
by Joseph Wood1
September was a big month for Western
efforts to deal with Iran’s nuclear
weapons ambitions. To recap: U.S.
President Barack Obama announced that
his administration would abandon Bush-
era plans to build a third missile defense
site in Poland and the Czech Republic,
arguing that the American intelligence
community now assessed that the
longer-range missile threat to much of
Europe and the United States had slowed
while Iran was pursuing short- and
medium-range missiles more rapidly
than expected. Obama announced a
“new” plan to focus on countering these
accelerated threats.
Iran, for its part, rejected talks on its
nuclear program as demanded by the
West but suggested broad talks on a
range of issues, an offer the West eagerly
accepted. At the opening of the United
Nations General Assembly, Obama
pushed his call for nuclear disarmament
and sternly warned Iran and North Korea
of consequences for failing to respond to
international calls for cooperation. With
U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, he re-
vealed the existence of a previously secret
site near Qom, Iran, thought to be part of
Iran’s nuclear program. Iran responded
that the site was not within 180 days of
being operational and thus not required
to be reported to international inspectors.
1
Joseph Wood is senior resident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed are those of
the author and do not represent the views of GMF.
In the midst of this, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev seemed to offer hope
that Russia would drop its resistance to
stronger sanctions on Iran, though other
Russian sources later seemed to walk
that point back, repeating earlier cases of
Russian rhetorical vacillation. After the
revelation of the secret site in Iran,
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov down-
played its significance and questioned
what exact sanctions should be discussed.
Iran responded to these events by
launching a barrage of short- and
medium-range missiles before its talks
with Western powers were to begin.
In the background, Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeated his
now familiar denials of the Holocaust and
his fervent wish for the disappearance of
Israel, while Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu reminded listeners
of the urgency of dealing with Iran.
Quite a month, and much seems to have
changed. In fact, much remained the
same, and the significant changes that did
occur were less obvious.
On the threat side, the existence of the
third site in Iran had been known for
some time. Iran’s missile display on
September 27 confirmed the long-known
validity of the short- and medium-range
threats that President Obama prioritized.
Wider Europe
Policy Brief
It is far from clear whether the West is closer to sanctions on
Iran, or to cooperation with Iran, than in the past. The previ-
ous behavior of Russia and Iran suggests not. Russian officials
announced their pleasure that the United States had agreed to
their own perception of the lack of threat from Iranian missiles and
described the episode as another failure of American intelligence.
Not much new in all that, especially the notion of inconsistent intel-
ligence conclusions on Iran, or on any possible threat.
Another non-change was the idea of developing defenses against
Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles. NATO has long been
committed to this concept, though programmatic progress has
been slow. Such defenses, including the possible use of existing
ship-based systems, were always part of a larger missile defense
scheme. Developing these systems did not require a shift away
from longer-range defenses in Europe. Indeed, that shift may
make it harder to develop and fund short- and medium-range
defenses.
A third non-change involves the laws of physics. Albert Einstein
showed that Newton’s “laws” were not the whole story, but they
are a fairly close approximation for most purposes, even for
rocket science. The missile defense locations in Central Europe
were not selected arbitrarily. Orbital mechanics is a well-studied
field. To provide an effective defense for a maximum of Europe
and North America, a missile defense site to engage long-range
missiles was needed in Central or Western Europe. Engaging an
object on an intercontinental trajectory is not like monitoring
rocket launches from nearby, where proximity can be helpful.
It requires, at least using the planned technology, the ability to
track and engage in a timely fashion, which requires distance
(not too much, not too little—like skeet shooting, to use an
oversimplified analogy). This fact was explained carefully to
European allies and to Russia, whose own physicists did not
need help grasping the science. Thus, if one were looking for a
reason not to proceed with the European missile defense site,
perhaps to garner Russian cooperation in other areas, the well-
known physics of the threat could not be altered. The threat
itself would have to change. Perhaps this problem is technically
surmountable, but the administration has offered no details as to
how that would be accomplished, and those systems tested and
known to work so far would not seem suitable.
A fourth item that did not change is the history of a few months
earlier, when Iran successfully launched an object into orbit.
Such a launch capacity is widely recognized as tantamount to
the capacity to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
2
This is not the same as having and being able to deliver a nuclear
warhead by ICBM. But those who have seen the films of the
many now-hilarious failures of American rockets in the 1950s
will recall that Sputnik provided a great scare to the United
States precisely because it signaled that America’s two oceans
were no longer reliable protection against long-range missiles.
But some things did change in this fast-paced month. One was
the quality of the transatlantic defense link. Missile defense
provided a needed update to the shared purpose of transatlantic
security. The Iranian threat was deemed to be real, to Europe and
the United States. It was, and is, a threat best faced by a unified
West. The concrete manifestation of the transatlantic defense
link, American presence in Europe, was set to change definitively
from a presence once oriented to Cold War armies to one ready
to counter 21st century threats, and to include in that defense
the allies who have joined NATO since the fall of the Berlin Wall
20 years ago. The American commitment to Europe is now in
greater question, at least to many in the region.
A second change was the boost given to Iranian and Russian
confidence. Iran was shown to have concealed nuclear facilities;
yet Western (especially American) uncertainty about the nature
of the Iranian threat was also evident for all to see. The Iranian
president repeated his hatred of Jews and of Israel. In return,
Iran faces only the vague prospect of possible sanctions and will
join other nations in a dialogue that Iran itself fashioned. Russia
sees President Obama’s decision as proof that its views on Iran
are vindicated and, at least as importantly, as a reversal of an
American and NATO incursion into the former Warsaw Pact
states. This is, therefore, a victory for those in the Kremlin who
argue that the West should, and will, allow Russia a sphere of
influence. Whether or not that was what Obama intended, this is
certainly how the decision has registered in Russia.
A third change was in American thinking about the appropriate
timing of any reaction to a potential Iranian long-range threat.
In defending the decision, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates said that the previously planned system would not have
been operational until 2017 anyway (a date much later than
previously planned), and the new system will be more flexible.
Again, given the laws of physics, the flexibility of short-range
defenses to attend to long-range threats is not immediately
obvious, and Gates did not elaborate. Moreover, the delay
suggests that the United States is content to wait until the long-
range threat from Iran is clearer.
Wider Europe

Policy Brief
Having just announced publicly that our estimate of the
Iranian threat has changed in a matter of months, one might Joseph Wood, Senior Resident Fellow, GMF
have thought that American policymakers would conclude that
Joseph R. Wood joined the German Marshall Fund of the United
the wisdom of relying on the precision of such projections is
States in November 2008 as senior resident fellow. His work covers
dubious. It would seem to make more sense to get defenses in
Europe, Eurasia, and transatlantic relations. From 2005 until coming
place sooner rather than later, especially given the fact that
to GMF, he was deputy assistant to the Vice President for National
trying to introduce defenses after Iran had, by surprise, acquired
Security Affairs at the White House, with responsibility for all policy
a long-range capability would seem to give Tehran an incentive
involving Europe, Eurasia, and Africa. He is a retired Air Force
to use its capability before it was negated, if they intended to use
colonel, and his career included operational and command fighter
it at all.
assignments in Korea and Europe; faculty duty in the Department of
Political Science at the Air Force Academy where he taught U.S. for-
So a fast-paced September brought no change, and much change.
eign and defense policy; service at the Pentagon as speech writer for
It was not a month when the laws of physics, or the intentions
the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; two years
of Iran and its sometime supporter Russia, showed much
as special advisor for Europe in the Office of the Vice President; and
mutability. The eventual effects, on the other hand, of the
temporary assignments in the Joint Staff, the U.S. Mission to the Con-
mutability of Western responses to those intentions may be
ventional Forces in Europe Talks in Vienna, the Office of the Secretary
profound.
of Defense, and NATO SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

About GMF

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-

. tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and
institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to
discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining
ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global
policy challenges. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a
permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a
strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its head-
quarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin,
Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.