Summary: Non-prolifera-tion efforts have swungwildly from successes tofailures. But the aim ofstopping the spread ofnuclear weapons is nota lost cause. In order tosustain its credibility andlegitimacy it is vital nowthat solutions of one formor another are found forthe main challenges thatare faced in India-Pakistan,North Korea and Iran.
Is Non-proliferation a Lost Cause?
Te non-prolieration regime is a cor-nerstone o international security. It is acomplex regime that includes not only the Nuclear Non-Prolieration reaty (NP), but international instrumentsmeant to guarantee the peaceul use o nuclear material and technologies aswell as high-prole institutions suchas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was recently comple-mented by provisions aimed at curbingthe illegal transer o nuclear weapons(or components o such weapons) suchas United Nations Security CouncilResolution (UNSCR) 1540, nuclearthreat reduction, cooperative initiatives,and the Prolieration Security Initiative,which seeks to acilitate the intercept o illegal transers at sea.Nuclear disarmament is also part o thatpicture. On the one hand, an eectiveand worldwide elimination o nuclearweapons would, in theory, bring a nalanswer to the prolieration problem.Short o such an ideal outcome, on theother hand, visible progress in nucleardisarmament could contribute to theeectiveness and legitimacy o the non-prolieration regime more generally.Specic disarmament agreements,however, either those in existence likethe ban on nuclear testing—the Com-prehensive Nuclear est Ban reaty—orthose that are planned—like the FissileMaterial Cut-o reaty—directly servenon-prolieration objectives by com-plicating the development o nuclearweapons by aspirant countries.Besides such universal arms controlagreements, non-prolieration is alsoserved by regional treaties, such as thoseestablishing nuclear weapons ree zones.Five currently exist: the latelolco,Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Semipalatinsk treaties.
From good times to badtimes
Te non-prolieration regime and its various components have experiencedan evolution marked by two deeply contrasting cycles over the last 20 years:a cycle o successes rom the end o theCold War to the indenite extension o the NP in 1995 and a cycle o crisesopened up by the 1998 Indian and Paki-stani nuclear tests. Te crises continueto conront us, with the Iranian stando currently posing the most serious chal-lenge to the non-prolieration regime o our time.Te successes o the 1985-1995 periodare well known: the renunciation by Argentina and Brazil o their nuclear
1 Gilles Andreani is a senior transatlantic ellow o the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF).Te views expressed are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the views o GMF.
Haliax Intnatinal Scuity Fu
Washington • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest