that intentional concepts are holistic rather than discrete - they becomericher and more productive the more deeply they are embedded inbackground networks of relationships to other concepts
given(ii), for a system to pass the Turing test, it must manifest the rangeof intentional states captured by human language to the same or greater level of richness as would be the case for a typical humansubject
that to be human is simply to be a subject that manifests a set of intentional states similar to those that would be associated with atypical human subject
to be superhuman is to manifest those intentional states mentioned in(iv), as well as to manifest a broader set of intentional states, or thesame set of intentional states to a greater degree of richness.
Conclusion 1 (given iii, iv and v, by modus ponens): any system capableof passing the Turing test is either human or superhuman.
any human subject should be accorded the same moral status accorded to other human subjects
any superhuman subject should be accorded the same or greater moral status as that accorded to human subjects
Conclusion 2 (given vi, vii, viii, by modus ponens):
any system capable of passing the Turing test should be accorded the same or greater moral status as that accorded to human subjects
.Taking each of these premises in turn:
that intentionality is a product of relations between a cognitive system and itsenvironment
The (psychological) notion of intentionality dates back to Brentano 1874.Intentionality is typically described in terms of 'directedness' or 'aboutness', or,as per the Oxford English Dictionary, "the distinguishing property of mentalphenomena of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real orimaginary”. For the present purposes, I will characterise as the mind's ability tobe directed toward phenomena; in short, to grasp semantics (meaning) ratherthan simply syntax. Intentionality is described by Brentano as being the ‘mark of the mental’; distinguishing mental entities which can have
(forexample, the thought that
stops signs are red
), with physical entities that have noaboutness of their own (for example, a red stop sign)
I take the view that broad (semantic) intentionality is underpinned by a morefundamental narrow (phenomenal) intentionality (a term coined in Horgan andTienson 2002) - but nothing in the current discussion turns on this.