The Grand Analogy

Uncompromising Atheism, Real Science of Humanity

'The thought of the women and the swamp and the forest around them
reawakened thoughts that had been tormenting me for years. Thoughts about
our connection to nature. We seem to be wandering outside it, but how can
that be? Aren't we made of the same coils of DNA as everything living?
Aren't our closest relatives the other great apes (chimpanzee, bonobos, gorillas
and orangutans)? Now only orangutans still live in the trees whence we came,
wandering like nomads through the canopy, without permanent nests, the way
we must have wandered once upon a time. Was it settlement that cut us off
from nature? Are we human because we left paradise?

(Linda Spalding, The Follow, Bloomsbury, 1998, Page 2.)

'we behave culturally because it is our nature to behave culturally,

because natural selection has produced an animal that has to behave culturally,
that has to invent rules, make myths, speak languages, and form men's clubs,
in the same way that the hamadryas baboon has to form harems, adopt infants,
and bite its wives on the neck.'

(Lionel Tiger & Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal,

Secker & Warburg, 1972, page 20)
To the memory of Parmenides
 Contents

Introduction Page 3

Part I

Some Ideas on the Idea of Super Being

1 Idea One Science Spencer on the Social Organism Page 6

2 Idea Two Mythology Ouspensky's Esoteric Thoughts on Super Beings

Page 31

Chapter II The Evolution of the Idea of Individuality

Page 52

3 Idea Three Craft Gierke on the Natural Law Theory of Society

Page

Part II

The Grand Analogy

Stuff from Evolution from Molecules to Men

Part III

Superorganic Reality

The Exoskeleton - An Idea Too Far

The Idea of the Exoskeleton, using Coker re Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schaffle & Worms
to guide my exposition from early artifacts of the intellectual deposit

Part IV

Sociobiology - The Modern Mirage

 The debate since Wilson and 1976, how science continues to be perverted and
the struggle to burst free of this priestly suffocation, use obvious books but also things
like Newman by Ian Ker showing the ceaseless effort by theologians to mimic
rationalists and to resist reality.

Part V

The Political Science of Biology

Social Physics 1877, Biopolitics by Morley Roberts 1938. Somit, 1960's to

the 1990's. We find the superorganic idea first being expressed in science of society
in sociology toward the end of the nineteenth century, but as the twentieth century
progresses the inheritance of ideas such as we see in Gierke associated with law and
politics causes the study of society as a biological phenomenon to drift out of
sociology into an obscure enclave of social studies which is called political science.
Mackenzie discusses this area and is our portal into the later political science arena as
Coker served as a portal into the earlier phases of the subject.

Morgan on Humans as Ants

4 Idea Four Realism The Nail in God's Coffin

 Introduction

Super, as in superior, in this case refers to the being of an organism taking

form at a level of organization above that of the individual. The idea of a higher state
of being is perhaps a ubiquitous feature of our species. We may suppose that from the
dawn of our evolution as an articulate species our possession of language made us
aware of something beyond ourselves because the very act of such communication is
the foundation of a being beyond ourselves, to whatever extent such super being may
be supposed to exist.
We may immediately realise that our idea of God is just such a being superior
to ourselves, and people have recognised that the collective consciousness of human
society created by means of language is itself a candidate for the being of God.
Hegel, the early nineteenth century German philosopher, was keen on the idea of the
German community, the Folk, and he made use of just such a representation of culture
as God.
There are a myriad of myths and books about myths, and this is most
definitely not another in that vein. We will not be considering religious mythologies
themselves, or the philosophical musings of the same kind, such as those of Hegel
which mix and match modern thought with mythological ideas. We are only
interested in ideas that seek to understand the state of super being by means of direct
expression connected to everyday material reality. We want direct interpretation of
myth as opposed to the codification of intuition serving functional purposes that is the
essence of mythology. The need to write such a work of this is self evident since
there quite simply are not works dealing with this subject, any work that did deal with
this subject would demystify all knowledge and make it possible to know all things
about ourselves. Two facts could be plainly stated, and we will state them, that no
human being alive who has any kind of public voice, or who has ever lived, has ever
stated. we will show it is easy to prove God does not exist by showing what God is,
and we will state precisely what human nature is. In revealing human nature we will
show how a thread of continuity can be connected between everything we are today
and the whole chain of our kind's evolution going back millions of years to a time
long before we were as much as a twinkle in Mother Nature's eye. What we are
seeking here is to create a chain of reasoning, and thus knowledge, that will bring
intuitive knowledge down to earth and make real knowledge take its place. In doing
this we will not consider myths directly, we will not review the Bible, or any part of
it, for example, but all our source will be intermediate between myth and science or
between science and myth. Spencer offers science but cannot separate his
consciousness from the grip of mythological conceptions about the nature of human
beings. Ouspensky is a mythologist who is attempting to embrace the new knowledge
of science and thus creates a most unusual and wonderful concoction of myth and
knowledge. But the beauty of Ouspensky is that he thereby provides a very rare
insight into the literal meaning of myth which is highly valuable to us and the
nonsense he talks about science we can easily sort out for ourselves.

My own interest in this subject came about because of my life long passion for
atheism, and my consequent desire to understand theism, and thus my passion for
science, and especially those sciences which shed light on the nature of humans, most
centrally in the academic field we would suppose anthropology, as the study of man,
would best meet this requirement.
It took me thirty of years of ceaseless curiosity, as an adult, to hit upon the
idea of humans as something more than an individual being, in a literal sense, and
then I had to find this idea all on my own for it was never presented anywhere to my
recollection in any accounts of society or our species in any scientific work. The idea
we humans were the mammalian equivalent of the ant to the insect fraternity struck
me as a revelation, it offered itself up as a key to understanding all things about
ourselves and I was simply amazed at my discovery. Naturally, the first thought after
the initial realisation, was to wonder why no one else had ever thought of this idea,
and acknowledged its value.
Well, as you can imagine, in the light of my writing this book, the idea is not
only not unique to me, it is, although scrupulously hidden from view, an idea that has
informed our kind since the beginning of time, and is central to all out most precious
beliefs. What is special then about the present time and my independent discovery of
this idea of the super being, despite all efforts to eradicate it from all current
discussion, is that I am a man of my time, I am a passionate atheist and an absolute
and uncompromising devotee of science and nothing but science.
Unfortunately, I am not a scientist, and it turns out that if anyone hates,
loathes, and despises this idea that humans are a superorganic form of creature more
than any other group of people, it is those who are practicing scientists. The branch of
science that might be expected to exploit this idea even more deeply than
anthropology appears to of been set up specifically to ensure that under no
circumstances can this idea intrude upon the domain of a scientific understanding of
ourselves. Sociology strives to expunge all attempts by sociologists to shift toward
the logical end of the spectrum of understanding toward which we are driven by the
notion that the human is a superorganism.
So I cannot turn to academia for an expression of this idea in any direct form,
the idea is simply not allowed to be voiced. My search for material on this subject has
been relentless and unconstrained for the last three of four years. I am delighted to
read any work of any kind in my efforts to find ideas that express the central idea in
this work I am writing now, and as much as an atheist as I am I find so much in the
work of theists about the notion of superbeing. Hardly surprising if God appears in
this guise.
As I am not an academic I simply have not the resources to present a
comprehensive account of the idea of super being in all its forms down the ages I have
selected a number of distinct accounts that offer a particularly valuable insight into
the way this idea has informed people down the ages and especially in the modern
period within which we currently live where I will finally offer my own account
which I will say indicates how we should interpret this idea of super being in the light
of modern science. It is my intention, where possible, to duplicate relevant passages
of authors I refer to at length, I enjoy doing this, I think it is best to let people speak
for themselves, if too small a selection of an authors work is given then it takes the
ideas offered out of context. Laws of copyright preclude this method being adopted
on works of more recent date, which is a pity because the fact is that some books can
be very obscure and hard to find and even if available it is worth simply copying
whole sections in order to provide the material for the discussion we are going to
engage in here. The notion of a miner or a geologist digging into the intellectual
record has been brought to mind and in this method of extensive rendition we come
close to following this idea through to its practical application, something I think is
far better than the extensive use of name dropping and reference that is the normal
mode of reasoning of the professional academic.
This work is offered as a non-academic overview of the subject, the idea of the
superorganic, from one who recognises that this is the key to understanding the secret
of human being, revealing the true nature of human nature for the first time in an open
account, seen through the wide open door of modern science.
 Idea One - Science

Spencer on the Social Organism

The publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859 might be said to of

ushered in the age of the idea of evolution, certainly as we know and think it and think
of it today, as it applies to living things, and most importantly, to ourselves.
The touchstone for all our reasoning about our own nature and the way we live
must be the fact that we are animals. It was Darwin that brought this idea, that we are
animals, home to us with a force that simply could not be ignored, this was so because
Darwin made man, literally, into a monkey, by making apes and humans members of
the same family. This development came about as part of the general trend of
scientific knowledge which was turning its attention to all aspects of the world, the
idea that humans were animals was in the air. A French doctor, Julien Offray De La
Mettrie, published a work entitled Man a Machine in 1748 in which he argued
assertively that it was blindingly obvious that humans were animals and that only the
sort of person dedicated to the dogma of the priest would resist this undeniable fact
for one instant.
Thus the idea that humans are animals was being brought to the fore in an
unmistakable manner. As ever anything we moderns had been able to think of was
recorded in some manner by the Ancients and they had left accounts of their ideas in
which they recognised that the only thing separating humans from other animals was
the fact that we had language. But, from the point of view of an atheist, who
necessarily seeks to reject all former notions of reality as embodied in religion, it is
this fact that they must refer back to, keep in touch with, at all times as they seek to
find an understanding of the nature of existence which has no place for religious
ideas. That we are animals is the base line, but on its own it is not enough, it
recognises the physical reality staring us in the face but it offers no conception of the
nature of the relationship that binds all animals together in the scheme of existence.
This underlying coherence is given by the idea Darwin gave to the world, the idea of
organic evolution by natural selection so that all living things were intimately linked
to one another as one biosphere of the planet earth. So while out animal being is the
touchstone, evolution is the key.
This fact was not lost on the people of Darwin's generation who were the first
to receive his ideas, and the shock they sent through the world is a matter of great
interest and debate today. We are not here to look into Darwin's ideas, we are here to
consider an aspect of their impact. It has offered occurred to me to wonder why no
scientists ever thought to adopt Darwin's ideas as a means of trying to understand the
human species. In other words why did no one try and account for humanity as an
animal and nothing but an animal. We know that this would mean rejecting the idea
of God out of hand, but you would think someone would of had a go. The answer is
that the repercussions of Darwin's idea of evolution generating all organic form did
make a major impact on every facet of society but the theocracy which had always
ruled our world, and always will, soon stepped into the breach and over time the
arguments have been suppressed and hidden and only by searching can you begin to
uncover their lost traces. If you do uncover these traces and you start to apply the
logic they reveal to the world today then you soon see why they were expunged from
science by a pseudo scientific movement acting on the principles of duality and
individuality which are the essence of the Judaic mythology which rules out world.
And if, regardless of this clash between the autocracy of religion and the liberality of
science, you try and reveal your ideas to others then you simply find that the one
hundred and fifty years of effort by the authority of society has made it nigh on
impossible to voice the truth without being prepared to stand up to a vehement
backlash.

Herbert Spencer was one of the first great commentators on Darwinism, and
his effort was directed at applying evolution to human society, so he should be our
man. And indeed he is, although you would not know it from the sort of things that
are said about him today. He is famous as the person to whom we owe the greatest
distortion of Darwin's idea, for he gave us the phrase 'the survival of the fittest', which
is incredibly misleading and totally misrepresents the process of evolution. However
it only misrepresents this process if you understanding of the nature of existence is
already totally misguided in the first place which it necessarily is if you are informed
by the Western scientific tradition, which is founded strictly upon the Jewish
mythological conception of duality that we find in the Bible and all associated works.
The simple problem is this, while it may be correct to say that evolution
creates forms on the basis of the survival of the fittest in a competition to live and
reproduce, it is not much good having this fact at your fingertips if you are completely
unable to recognise what constitutes a unified and integrated organism. To Spencer,
and all commentators I have ever come upon right up to this very moment - 12/05/04
17:13:51 - the human individual is the object of their attention when they are applying
this dictum. It follows from this that the existence of weird forms such as
homosexuals which are self evidently dysfunctional, and the mentally retarded or
physically handicapped, cannot possibly be a natural product of evolution. It was
from this perversion of Darwin's idea by the likes of Spencer that the culmination of
Nazi ideology and the ignorance of self congratulatory eugenics philosophies by such
liberals as Julien Huxley, could be palmed off on the world as a product of science
when in truth they were the product of our overarching theism which is Jewish in its
form and nature.
Following the idiocy of esoteric reasoning, such as creates religious
mythology in the first place, the new post Darwinian scientific commentators have
relentlessly assumed that humans are organisms in their own right. The fact that we
preserve our unfortunates of course makes us uniquely altruistic and moral, and so
even Thomas Huxley, renowned as Darwin's bulldog, could declare that human moral
nature simply could not be accounted for within the remit of Darwinism and
biological evolution. The touchstone, remember, is that humans are animals and this
means that this fact comes before all other ideas and so if an idea contradicts this fact
then the idea is necessarily wrong. But as we see here in the ideas of these strident
evolutionists, evolution is made to pay homage to traditional religious ideas as written
in the Bible and elsewhere. So much for the first scientists, they were in truth nothing
but priests, and so the story has gone on and today we have the pleasure of being
served by a well schooled body of scientific priests specialising in the perversion of
evolutionary science in the service of God, Richard Dawkins in the most notorious of
these defenders of the faith. He is the most famous atheist in British society.
All this perversion of science comes about quite simply because of the failure
to recognise the simple fact that is staring us in the face, the individual is not the
organism with which the scientist must be concerned. The inversion of attention from
the true organism, the superorganism which takes shape at the social level, to focus
upon the false organism of the individual person provides a satisfactory means of
distorting reality because it has proven sufficient irrespective of whatever has come to
pass down the decades since Darwin, but it does mean the relentless distortion and
misrepresentation of religion has been required to continue to explain reality to this
very day.
But most amazing for our purposes is that the correct idea of human society as
a true organic entity has been taken up by commentators during this period and, it is
just this fact that I want to elucidate here. What is amazing is that despite taking up
the idea no one has dropped the dualistic model of existence which for millennia has
informed the human species of its identity and nature and this made religion a central
element of our existence. We are inclined to think that these authors are all quite
literally priests who know what they are doing but who are working their subject as
the fulfilment of their task as priest dedicated to the preservation of the faith. But this
is so hard to imagine, and during the course of our enquiry into the kind of things
these people had to say during the modern era of scientific understanding about the
superorganic nature of human beings and their society this should be one of the
central things on our mind, just how did these people expound the one coherent
scientific idea of society and human nature while not only never twigging the crucial
implication, that there is no such thing as a human individual, but while steadfastly
managing to maintain the one wholly unsubstantiated fact upon which religious myth
and therefore priestly authority relies, namely that the individual is the beginning and
the end of all things?

We must now look at what Spencer had to say about the superorganic nature
of humans. I will remind you that this is not a scholarly work and there is no attempt
made to make an evaluation of Spencer as such. He wrote a great deal and while it
might be interesting to read all his major works the point is not to evaluate his ideas as
such but rather to capture the ideas expressed in some of his work where I have been
fortunate enough to find references to guide me toward and then been able to obtain
the works to make an extraction there from. The idea in then is simply to mine the
literature of the past for the intellectual ore that consists of the mineral of
superorganic insight, superorganisite we might say if wanted to pretend we were
geologists of the mind, but we don't, so we won't!
We just want to find the ideas expressed, firstly to show that the idea of
superorganic form is theme running like a never ending rich seam of thought through
the ages of recorded time, and secondly just to make a simple assessment of what
these authors thought they were doing when they made these speculations. In the end
the idea will be to support the argument that this theme of super being is one that will
not die away and it is the theme that science needs to take up if it has any aspirations
of becoming the arbiter of our human future as the spokesperson for all of us in the
global world that is taking shape about us today in which we need the first ever true
account of human nature based on what really makes us one being with one identity.
It was in a book by the American anthropologist White that I found the reference to
the crucial piece of Spencer's work and I immediately obtained an old copy from
America via the internet. I will reproduce the opening part of the work below for our
consideration

CHAPTER I
 WHAT IS A SOCIETY?

§212. THIS question has to be asked and answered at the outset. Until we have
decided whether or not to regard a society as an entity ; and until we have decided
whether, if regarded as an entity, a society is to be classed as absolutely unlike all
other entities or as like some others ; our conception of the subject-matter before us
remains vague.
It may be said that a society is but a collective name for a number of
individuals. Carrying the controversy between nominalism and realism into another
sphere, a nominalist might affirm that just as there exist only the members of a
species, while the species considered apart from them has no existence; so the units of
a society alone exist, while the existence of the society is but verbal. Instancing a
lecturer's audience as an aggregate which by disappearing at the close of the lecture,
proves itself to be not a thing but only a certain arrangement of persons, he might
argue that the like holds of the citizens forming a nation.
But without disputing the other steps of his argument, the last step may be
denied. The arrangement, temporary in the one case, is permanent in the other; and it
is the permanence of the relations among component parts which constitutes the
individuality of a whole as distinguished from the individualities of its parts. A mass
broken into fragments ceases to be a thing; while, conversely, the stones, bricks, and
wood, previously separate, become the thing called a house if connected in fixed
ways.
Thus we consistently regard a society as an entity, because, though formed of
discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the
general persistence of the arrangements among them throughout the area occupied.
And it is this trait which yields our idea of a society. For, withholding the name from
an ever-changing cluster such as primitive men form, we apply it only where some
constancy in the distribution of parts has resulted from settled life.

§ 213. But now, regarding a society as a thing, what kind of thing must we call
it? It seems totally unlike every object with which our senses acquaint us. Any
likeness it may possibly have to other objects, cannot be manifest to perception, but
can he discerned only by reason. If the constant relations among its parts make it an
entity; the question arises whether these constant relations among its parts are akin to
the constant relations among the parts of other entities. Between a society and
anything else, the only conceivable resemblance must be one due to parallelism of
principle in the arrangement of components.
There are two great classes of aggregates with which the social aggregate may
be compared the inorganic and the organic. Are the attributes of a society in any
way like those of a not-living body? or are they in any way like those of a living
body? or are they entirely unlike those of both?
The first of these questions needs only to be asked to be answered in the
negative. A whole of which the parts are alive, cannot, in its general characters, be
like lifeless wholes. The second question, not to be thus promptly answered, is to be
answered in the affirmative. The reasons for asserting that the permanent relations
among the parts of a society, are analogous to the permanent relations among the parts
of a living body, we have not to consider.
 CHAPTER II.

A SOCIETY IS AN ORGANISM.

§ 214. WHEN we say that growth is common to social aggregates and

organic aggregates, we do not thus entirely exclude community with inorganic
aggregates. Some of these, as crystals, grow in a visible manner ; and all of them, on
the hypothesis of evolution, have arisen by integration at some time or other.
Nevertheless, compared with things we call inanimate, living bodies and societies so
conspicuously exhibit augmentation of mass, that we may fairly regard this as
characterizing them both. Many organisms grow throughout their lives; and the rest
grow throughout considerable parts of their lives. Social growth usually continues
either up to times when the societies divide, or up to times when they are
overwhelmed.
Here, then, is the first trait by which societies ally themselves with the organic
world and substantially distinguish themselves from the inorganic world.

§ 215. It is also a character of social bodies, as of living bodies, that while they
increase in size they increase in structure. Like a low animal, the embryo of a high
one has few distinguishable parts; but while it is acquiring greater mass, its parts
multiply and differentiate. It is thus with a society. At first the unlikenesses among
its groups of units are inconspicuous in number and degree; but as population
augments, divisions and sub-divisions become more numerous and more decided.
Further, in the social organism as in the individual organism, differentiations cease
only with that completion of the type which marks maturity and precedes decay.
Though in inorganic aggregates also, as in the entire Solar System and in each
of its members, structural differentiations accompany the integrations; yet these are so
relatively slow, and so relatively simple, that they may be disregarded. The
multiplication of contrasted parts in bodies politic and in living bodies, is so great that
it substantially constitutes another common character which marks them off from
inorganic bodies.

§ 216. This community will be more fully appreciated on observing that

progressive differentiation of structures is accompanied by progressive differentiation
of functions.
The divisions, primary, secondary, and tertiary, which arise in a developing
animal, do not assume their major and minor unlikenesses to no purpose. Along with
diversities in their shapes and compositions go diversities in the actions they perform:
they grow into unlike organs having unlike duties. Assuming the entire function of
absorbing nutriment at the same time that it takes on its structural characters, the
alimentary system becomes gradually marked off into contrasted portions; each of
which has a special function forming part of the general function. A limb,
instrumental to locomotion or prehension, acquires divisions and sub-divisions which
perform their leading and their subsidiary shares in this office. So is it with the parts
into which a society divides. A dominant class arising does not simply become unlike
the rest, but assumes control over the rest; and when this class separates into the more
and the less dominant, these, again, begin to discharge distinct parts of the entire
control. With the classes whose actions are controlled it is the same. The various
groups into which they fall have various occupations: each of such groups also, within
itself, acquiring minor contrasts of parts along with minor contrasts of duties.
 And here we see more clearly how the two classes of things we are comparing,
distinguish themselves from things of other classes; for such differences of structure
as slowly arise in inorganic aggregates, are not accompanied by what we can fairly
call differences of function.

§ 217. Why in a body politic and in a living body, these unlike actions of
unlike parts are properly regarded by us as functions, while we cannot so regard the
unlike actions of unlike parts in an inorganic body, we shall perceive on turning to the
next and most distinctive common trait.
Evolution establishes in them both, not differences simply, but definitely-
connected differencesdifferences such that each makes the others possible. The
parts of an inorganic aggregate are so related that one may change greatly without
appreciably affecting the rest. It is otherwise with the parts of an organic aggregate or
of a social aggregate. In either of these, the changes in the parts are mutually
determined, and the changed actions of the parts are mutually dependent. In both, too,
this mutuality increases as the evolution advances. The lowest type of animal is all
stomach, all respiratory surface, all limb. Development of a type having appendages
by which to move about or lay hold of food, can take place only if these appendages,
losing power to absorb nutriment directly from surrounding bodies, are supplied with
nutriment by parts which retain the power of absorption. A respiratory surface to
which the circulating fluids are brought to be aerated, can be formed only on
condition that the concomitant loss of ability to supply itself with materials for repair
and growth, is made good by the development of a structure bringing these materials.
Similarly in a society. What we call with perfect propriety its organization,
necessarily implies traits of the same kind. While rudimentary, a society is all warrior,
all hunter, all hut-builder, all tool-maker: every part fulfils for itself all needs.
Progress to a stage characterized by a permanent army, can go on only as there arise
arrangements for supplying that army with food, clothes, and munitions of war by the
rest. If here the population occupies itself solely with agriculture and there with
miningif these manufacture goods while those distribute them, it must be on
condition that in exchange for a special kind of service rendered by each part to other
parts, these other parts severally give due proportions of their services.
This division of labour, first dwelt on by political economists as a social
phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living
bodies, which they called the "physiological division of labour," is that which in the
society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole. Scarcely can I emphasize enough
the truth that in respect of this fundamental trait, a social organism and an individual
organism are entirely alike. When we see that in a mammal, arresting the lungs
quickly brings the heart to a stand; that if the stomach fails absolutely in its office all
other parts by-and-by cease to act; that paralysis of its limbs entails on the body at
large death from want of food, or inability to escape ; that loss of even such small
organs as the eyes, deprives the rest of a service essential to their preservation; we
cannot but admit that mutual dependence of parts is an essential characteristic. And
when, in a society, we see that the workers in iron stop if the miners do not supply
materials; that makers of clothes cannot carry on their business in the absence of those
who spin and weave textile fabrics ; that the manufacturing community will cease to
act unless the food-producing and food-distributing agencies are acting; that the
controlling powers, governments, bureaux, judicial officers, police, must fail to keep
order when the necessaries of life are not supplied to them by the parts kept in order;
we are obliged to say that this mutual dependence of parts is similarly rigorous.
Unlike as the two kinds of aggregates otherwise are, they are alike in respect of this
fundamental character, and the characters implied by it,

§ 218. How the combined actions of mutually-dependent parts constitute life

of the whole, and how there hence results a parallelism between social life and
animal life, we see still more clearly on learning that the life of every visible organism
is constituted by the lives of units too minute to be seen by the unaided eye.
An undeniable illustration is furnished by the strange order Myxomycetes. The
spores or germs produced by one of these forms, become ciliated monads, which,
after a time of active locomotion, change into shapes like those of amoeba, move
about, take in nutriment, grow, multiply by fission. Then these amoeba-form
individuals swarm together, begin to coalesce into groups, and these groups to
coalesce with one another: making a mass sometimes barely visible, sometimes as big
as the hand. This plasmodium, irregular, mostly reticulated, and in substance
gelatinous, itself exhibits movements of its parts like those of a gigantic rhizopod
creeping slowly over surfaces of decaying matters, and even up the stems of plants.
Here, then, union of many minute living individuals to form a relatively vast
aggregate in which their individualities are apparently lost, but the life of which
results from combination of their lives, is demonstrable.
In other cases, instead of units which, originally discrete, lose their individualities by
aggregation, we have units which, arising by multiplication from the same germ, do
not part company, but nevertheless display their separate lives very clearly. A
growing sponge has its horny fibres clothed with a gelatinous substance; and the
microscope shows this to consist of moving monads. We cannot deny life to the
sponge as a whole, for it shows us some corporate actions. The outer amoeba-form
units partially lose their individualities by fusion into a protective layer or skin; the
supporting framework of fibres is produced by the joint agency of the monads; and
from their joint agency also result those currents of water which are drawn in through
the smaller orifices and expelled through the larger. But while there is thus shown a
feeble aggregate life, the lives of the myriads of component units are very little
subordinated : these units form, as it were, a nation having scarcely any sub-division
of functions. Or, in the words of Professor Huxley, "the sponge represents a kind of
sub-aqueous city, where the people are arranged about the streets and roads, in such a
manner, that each can easily appropriate his food from the water as it passes along."
Again, in the hydroid polype Myriothela, "pseudopodial processes are being
constantly projected from the walls of the alimentary canal into its cavity;" and these
Dr. Allman regards as processes from the cells forming the walls, which lay hold of
alimentary matter just as those of an amoeba do. The like may be seen in certain
planarian worms.
Even in the highest animals there remains traceable this relation between the
aggregate life and the lives of components. Blood is a liquid in which, along with
nutritive matters, circulate innumerable living unitsthe blood corpuscles. These
have severally their life-histories. During its first stage each of them, then known as
a white corpuscle, makes independent movements like those of an amoeba; it "may be
fed with coloured food, which will then be seen to have accumulated in the interior;"
"and in some cases the colourless blood-corpuscles have actually been seen to devour
their more diminutive companions, the red ones." Nor is this individual life of the
units provable only where flotation in a liquid allows its signs to be readily seen.
Sundry mucous surfaces, as those of the air passages, are covered with what is called
ciliated epitheliuma layer of minute elongated cells packed side by side, and each
bearing on its exposed end several cilia continually in motion. The wavings of these
cilia are essentially like those of the monads which live in the passages running
through a sponge; and just as the joint action of these ciliated sponge-monads propels
the current of water, so does the joint action of the ciliated epithelium-cells move
forward the mucous secretion covering them. If there needs further proof that these
epithelium-cells have independent lives, we have it in the fact that when detached and
placed in a fit menstruum, they "move about with considerable rapidity for some time,
by the continued vibrations of the cilia with which they are furnished."
On thus seeing that an ordinary living organism may be regarded as a nation of
units which live individually, and have many of them considerable degrees of
independence, we shall have the less difficulty in regarding a nation of human beings
as an organism.

§ 219. The relation between the lives of the units and the life of the aggregate,
has a further character common to the two cases. By a catastrophe the life of the
aggregate may be destroyed without immediately destroying the lives of all its units;
while, on the other hand, if no catastrophe abridges it, the life of the aggregate is far
longer than the lives of its units.
In a cold-blooded animal, ciliated cells perform their motions with perfect
regularity long after the creature they are part of has become motionless. Muscular
fibres retain their power of contracting under stimulation. The cells of secreting
organs go on pouring out their product if blood is artificially supplied to them. And
the components of an entire organ, as the heart, continue their co-operation for hours
after its detachment. Similarly, arrest of those commercial activities, governmental
co-ordinations, etc., which constitute the corporate life of a nation, may be caused, say
by an inroad of barbarians, without immediately stopping the actions of all the units.
Certain classes of these, especially the widely-diffused ones engaged in food-
production, may long survive and carry on their individual occupations.
On the other hand, the minute living elements composing a developed animal,
severally evolve, play their parts, decay, and are replaced, while the animal as a whole
continues. In the deep layer of the skin, cells are formed by fission which, as they
enlarge, are thrust outwards, and, becoming flattened to form the epidermis,
eventually exfoliate, while the younger ones beneath take their places. Liver-cells,
growing by imbibition of matters from which they separate the bile, presently die, and
their vacant seats are occupied by another generation. Even bone, though so dense
and seemingly inert, is permeated by blood-vessels carrying materials to replace old
components by new ones. And the replacement, rapid in some tissues and in others
slow, goes on at such rate that during the continued existence of the entire body, each
portion of it has been many times over produced and destroyed. Thus it is also with a
society and its units. Integrity of the whole as of each large division is perennially
maintained, notwithstanding the deaths of component citizens. The fabric of living
persons which, in a manufacturing town, produces some commodity for national use,
remains after a century as large a fabric, though all the masters and workers who a
century ago composed it have long since disappeared. Even with minor parts of this
industrial structure the like holds. A firm that dates from past generations, still
carrying on business in the name of its founder, has had all its members and employés
changed one by one, perhaps several times over; while the firm has continued to
occupy the same place and to maintain like relations with buyers and sellers.
Throughout we find this. Governing bodies, general and local, ecclesiastical
corporations, armies, institutions of all orders down to guilds, clubs, philanthropic
associations, etc., show us a continuity of life exceeding that of the persons
constituting them. Nay, more. As part of the same law, we see that the existence of
the society at large exceeds in duration that of some of these compound parts. Private
unions, local public bodies, secondary national institutions, towns carrying on special
industries, may decay, while the nation, maintaining its integrity, evolves in mass and
structure.
In both cases, too, the mutually-dependent functions of the various divisions,
being severally made up of the actions of many units, it results that these units dying
one by one, are replaced without the function in which they share being sensibly
affected. In a muscle, each sarcous element wearing out in its turn, is removed and a
substitution made while the rest carry on their combined contractions as usual; and the
retirement of a public official or death of a shopman, perturbs inappreciably the
business of the department, or activity of the industry, in which he had a share.
Hence arises in the social organism, as in the individual organism, a life of the
whole quite unlike the lives of the units; though it is a life produced by them.

§ 220. From these likenesses between the social organism and the individual
organism, we must now turn to an extreme unlikeness. The parts of an animal form a
concrete whole; but the parts of a society form a whole which is discrete. While the
living units composing the one are bound together in close contact, the living units
composing the other are free, are not in contact, and are more or less widely
dispersed. How, then, can there be any parallelism?
Though this difference is fundamental and apparently puts comparison out of
the question, yet examination proves it to be less than it seems. Presently I shall have
to point out that complete admission of it consists with maintenance of the alleged
analogy; but we will first observe how one who thought it needful, might argue that
even in this respect there is a smaller contrast than a cursory glance shows.
He might urge that the physically-coherent body of an animal is not composed
all through of living units ; but that it consists in large measure of differentiated parts
which the vitally active parts have formed, and which thereafter become semi-vital
and in some cases un-vital. Taking as an example the protoplasmic layer underlying
the skin, he might say that while this consists of truly living units, the cells produced
in it, changing into epithelium scales, become inert protective structures; and pointing
to the insensitive nails, hair, horns, etc., arising from this layer, he might show that
such parts, though components of the organism, are hardly living components.
Carrying out the argument, he would contend that elsewhere in the body there exist
such protoplasmic layers, from which grow the tissues composing the various
organslayers which alone remain fully alive, while the structures evolved from them
lose their vitality in proportion as they are specialized: instancing cartilage, tendon,
and connective tissue, as showing this in conspicuous ways. From all which he would
draw the inference that though the body forms a coherent whole, its essential units,
taken by themselves, form a whole which is coherent only throughout the
protoplasmic layers.
And then would follow the facts showing that the social organism, rightly
conceived, is much less discontinuous than it seems. He would contend that as, in
the individual organism, we include with the fully living parts, the less living and not
living parts which co-operate in the total activities; so, in the social organism, we
must include not only those most highly vitalized units, the human beings, who
chiefly determine its phenomena, but also the various kinds of domestic animals,
lower in the scale of life, which, under the control of man, co-operate with him, and
even those far inferior structures, the plants, which, propagated by human agency,
supply materials for animal and human activities. In defence of this view he would
point out how largely these lower classes of organisms, co-existing with men in
societies, affect the structures and activities of the societieshow the traits of the
pastoral type depend on the natures of the creatures reared; and how in settled
societies the plants producing food, materials for textile fabrics etc., determine certain
kinds of social arrangements and actions. After which he might insist that since the
physical characters, mental natures, and daily doings, of the human units, are, in
part, moulded by relations to these animals and vegetals, which, living by their aid
and aiding them to live, enter so much into social life as even to be cared for by
legislation, these lower forms cannot rightly be excluded from the conception of the
social organism. Hence would come his conclusion that when, with human beings,
are incorporated the less vitalized beings, animal and vegetal, covering the surface
occupied by the society, there results an aggregate having a continuity of parts more
nearly approaching to that of an individual organism; and which is also like it in
being composed of local aggregations of vitalized units, imbedded in a vast
aggregation of units of various lower degrees of vitality, which are, in a sense
produced by, modified by, and arranged by, the higher units.
But without accepting this view, and admitting that the discreteness of the
social organism stands in marked contrast with the concreteness of the individual
organism, the objection may still be adequately met.

§ 221. Though coherence among its parts is a prerequisite to that co-operation

by which the life of an individual organism is carried on; and though the members of
a social organism, not forming a concrete whole, cannot maintain co-operation by
means of physical influences directly propagated from part to part; yet they can and
do maintain co-operation by another agency. Not in contact, they nevertheless affect
one another through intervening spaces, both by emotional language and by the
language, oral and written, of the intellect. For carrying on mutually-dependent
actions, it is requisite that impulses, adjusted in their kinds, amounts, and times, shall
be conveyed from part to part. This requisite is fulfilled in living bodies by molecular
waves, that are indefinitely diffused in low types, and in high types are carried along
definite channels (the function of which has been significantly called inter-nuncial).
It is fulfilled in societies by the signs of feelings and thoughts, conveyed from person
to person; at first in vague ways and only through short distances, but afterwards more
definitely and through greater distances. That is to say, the inter-nuncial function, not
achievable by stimuli physically transferred, is nevertheless achieved by
languageemotional and intellectual.
That mutual dependence of parts which constitutes organization is thus
effectually established. Though discrete instead of concrete, the social aggregate is
rendered a living whole.

§ 222. But now, on pursuing the course of thought opened by this objection
and the answer to it, we arrive at an implied contrast of great significancea contrast
fundamentally affecting our idea of the ends to be achieved by social life.
Though the discreteness of a social organism does not prevent sub-division of
functions and mutual dependence of parts, yet it does prevent that differentiation by
which one part becomes an organ of feeling and thought, while other parts become
insensitive. High animals of whatever class are distinguished from low ones by
complex and well-integrated nervous systems. While in inferior types the minute
scattered ganglia may be said to exist for the benefit of other structures, the
concentrated ganglia in superior types are the structures for the benefit of which the
rest may be said to exist. Though a developed nervous system so directs the actions
of the whole body as to preserve its integrity; yet the welfare of the nervous system is
the ultimate object of all these actions: damage to any other organ being serious in
proportion as it immediately or remotely entails that pain or loss of pleasure which the
nervous system suffers. But the discreteness of a society negatives differentiations
carried to this extreme. In an individual organism the minute living units, most of
them permanently localized, growing up, working, reproducing, and dying away in
their respective places, are in successive generations moulded to their respective
functions; so that some become specially sentient and others entirely insentient. But it
is otherwise in a social organism. The units of this, out of contact and much less
rigidly held in their relative positions, cannot be so much differentiated as to become
feelingless units and units which monopolize feeling. There are, indeed, traces of
such a differentiation. Human beings are unlike in the amounts of sensation and
emotion producible in them by like causes: here callousness, here susceptibility, is a
characteristic. The mechanically-working and hard-working units are less sensitive
than the mentally-working and more protected units. But while the regulative
structures of the social organism tend, like those of the individual organism, to
become specialized as seats of feeling, the tendency is checked by want of that
physical cohesion which brings fixity of function; and it is also checked by the
continued need for feeling in the mechanically-working units for the due discharge of
their functions.
Hence, then, a cardinal difference in the two kinds of organisms. In the one,
consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other, it is
diffused throughout the aggregate: all the units possess the capacities for happiness
and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As, then, there
is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the
units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members; not
its members for the benefit of the society. It has ever to be remembered that great as
may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the
body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they
embody the claims of its component individuals.

§ 223. From this last consideration, which is a digression rather than a part of
the argument, let us now return and sum up the reasons for regarding a society as an
organism.
It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike: it
exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of
unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so
related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual
dependence of the parts. And the mutually-dependent parts, living by and for one
another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as is an
individual organism. The analogy of a society to an organism becomes still clearer on
learning that every organism of appreciable size is a society; and on further learning
that in both, the lives of the units continue for some time if the life of the aggregate is
suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate is not destroyed by violence, its life greatly
exceeds in duration the lives of its units. Though the two are contrasted as
respectively discrete and concrete, and though there results a difference in the ends
subserved by the organization, there docs not result a difference in the laws of the
organization: the required mutual influences of the parts, not transmissible in a direct
way, being, in a society, transmitted in an indirect way.
Having thus considered in their most general forms the reasons for regarding a
society as an organism, we are prepared for following out the comparison in detail.

(The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 12, Herbert Spencer, Published by

D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1896. Pages 447-62)

I regard this as a superb piece of work, one that I am quite incapable of doing
because I just do not have the learning and would have no idea how to come by it.
Even so, it falls at the last hurdle, and in this case this means that like someone who
needs to jump ten feet to cross the chasm in one piece, Spencer jumps only nine feet
eleven inches and fifteen sixteenths. A miss is as good as a mile and he simply misses
the point of his own argument.
This condemnation will not be apparent to anyone who reads only the above
extract, and he proceeds, as promised to follow the course of his reasoning in more
detail, but we have all we need for our purposes. Spencer has already revealed the
fatal flaw that appears in all reasoning about this subject and it is the basic principle
that allows the mythology which rules out world and keeps us locked into the ancient
theocratic world view that is that flaw.
So if you are simply going to allow yourself to fall at the same old same old
hurdle, why bother doing the work? There are two obvious answers to this query,
either you are quite simply oblivious to the flaw in your reasoning because it
permeates your ideas so deeply you just cannot see past it, it reflects, like the silver of
a mirror, all your own thoughts in its own image, or you are in your deepest of
sentiments a committed priest of the social order. A third possibility might be
entertained, and so may as well be noted here, although it has no bearing on why a
person should bother to try and solve a riddle and then, as clever as they are in the end
simply fail to free themselves of ancient bias, I might be wrong, there may be a God
and everything in the Bible may be true, and everything in the Koran, and everything
in any other religious book of myth.
But clearly this last option is untenable. The challenges to our great
intellectuals are real, they do not engage in completely meaningless exercises, and
they display great knowledge and genius and make huge advances in the process. The
above piece is a perfect example of the kind of good work that people do, but the
point to be aware of is that all that is required in order to ensure that science does not
take over and religion remains in command is that a small but all important rule be
adhered to, the religious thinkers of old knew it well enough, they did not understand
it, but they knew it. The rule was that there was an eternal duality to nature, this they
took as a divine given and thus they did not seek to unravel the mystery, they had no
need, all they needed to know was that this key had to applied to all their reasoning
about society. The primary point at which this dualism is made real when considering
the nature of human society and determining how it functions well is the point at
which we separate the individual from the collective. The most familiar mode of
expression for a priest addressing this issue would more likely of been the idea of
spirit versus form, but the political and social repercussions demanded that the unity
of human form being divided between the whole which was made up of individuals
and the crucial point was to make that which was an illusion the primary reality, so
the idea that individuals existed in their own right was the primary rule of the
religious thinkers who strove to show how, in order for the individual to be fulfilled,
they must act collectively.
And this is precisely the rule we see Spencer obeying here. He sets out a
lengthy argument indicating that there is only unity in the human domain, virtually
proving that there is, and can be, no such thing as an individual, only to conclude by
noting that the one thing we must never to allow ourselves to forget is that in the end
there is no such thing as the collective and only the individual actually exists!
Why bother? Well that is how the priesthood manage knowledge, it is a
ubiquitous expression of all intellectuals and we may suppose that it is understood to
varying degrees by different people, and that some even know what I know and am
stating here, but that none who know it would reveal it, or else, like me finding a
public voice is nigh on impossible.

But we do not have to assume a conspiracy backed by unwitting compliance, it

is also possible that there is genuine ignorance and people just have been unable to
see there way to the trees because of the darkness of the forest in which they are lost.
There are difficulties in determining the real nature of society and human nature in a
satisfactory manner that faced the likes of Spencer working in the immediate
aftermath of Darwin's revelations, but there is no doubt that an immense amount of
social effort has been poured relentlessly into ensuring this would be as hard as
possible by the theocracy and its inducted units
So lets just deal with the actual manner in which Spencer undermines the
perfection of his own reasoning and ensures the theocratic authority remains
untouchable. Society, he says exists for the benefit of its members, when all is said
and done, the members do not exist for the sake of society.
What is the nature of the linguistic ploy being used to win the argument here?
It is a simple statement, but is it true? How does Spencer justify it?

'Hence, then, a cardinal difference in the two kinds of organisms. In

the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the
other, it is diffused throughout the aggregate: all the units possess the
capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees
that approximate. As, then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the
aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought.'

There is quite simply no justification for this assertion, indeed Spencer needed
only read the words he has just written, and refers to here, to see that this is plainly
idiotic. He makes this assertion by simply basing it on the individuality of
individuals, essentially a sacred required.
What is the point, we are driven to ask again, in even bothering with the whole
comparison if you simply intend to bin it right away? After all his effort he dismisses
the reality of his own argument by calling it an analogy, something we will see done
so often; by scientist and serious academics, true mythologists alone may commit the
sin of asserting this is a real reality, because those mythologists who would say such a
thing are spreading knowledge that, like astrology say, is so utterly bizarre and unreal
as to be irrelevant in any case. Everything pulls together to ensure that the truth is
always hidden.

If we dismiss Spencer's dismissal of the idea he is here making such an effort

to promote, by calling it an analogy, and we insist that society is indeed an organic
entity through and through then we can proceed to elaborate where he leaves off. He
makes many useful points about social structures developing specialised attributes and
a longevity to match their status as functional structures within a whole organism. He
breaks off from following the chain of logic beyond this organisational level. We see
this in his falling back upon the affirmation of individual values such as happiness,
and in his failure to even attempt to follow through on the logic of the argument thus
far attained by trying to determine what higher superstructures a society might display
and whether the crucial point of a nervous system running throughout the fibre of the
organic body exited that became focused in some one small but all important part of
the social biomass.
The one thing Spencer does not discuss is religion and the nature of the church
as a structure. This is of course the one thing that he needs to discuss. Furthermore it
seems to beggar belief that anyone could engage in a deep consideration of this idea
and not come to the conclusion that the organism was in fact the real thing that Judaic
mythology called God. This was certainly the first thing that struck me when I first
had the inspiration to recognise that human nature was corporate, and as a passionate
atheist I saw instantly that this was the key I had sought all my life, the way to give an
absolute and complete scientific account of human existence. How could anyone not
see this? This is impossible.
But, follow the idea, and the consequences are absolutely horrific, or simply
fabulous if you loath and despise religion as I do, and love freedom and science even
more, as I do.
What is it then that Spencer is not considering here? We are going to look at
some other authors who approached the question of society viewed as an organism
from quite different perspectives and we will see that in the case of one of them,
Gierke, the question of society as an organism takes an even more progressive form in
that the idea that society is an organism leads this man to deal with the matter as if the
organism was then a person! Once again then the spectre of the individual rears its
ugly head over all things and blots out reason.
But what no one, except me, will do, is recognise that the crux of the matter is
identity. The point is not that if society is an organism then it must be a person, that is
idiotic and simply same old same old mythology. The point is that all living things by
virtue of being living need to have an identity. Without an identity there can be no
coherence, no organic unity, no communication of common aims, no temporal
integrity. Identity is everything. Thus the crucial point for Spencer to recognised and
dealt with when he tackled the comparison of the nervous system was the function of
the nervous system, to unite and to centralised all the disparate and differentiated units
under one central state of being, which is what an identity is. Thus a nervous system
is the organ of identity, and since Spencer recognised the centrality of language as the
mediator of the social nervous system then he could then of linked the evolution of
language to the evolution of the central nervous system and the brain and thus to the
establishment of identity. The all he had to do was to locate that element of the social
structure that best represented a seat of identity. This he would readily of recognised
was the church, and the dissemination of religion throughout society, so closely
associated with personal identity, would readily of revealed its true nature.
From this position it is easy to see how the various religious structures also
emulate the organic aspects of the individual body so that we can see that it is not a
case of comparing individual capacities or lack of them in our search for a collective
equivalent of the persona sentiments of individuals, but rather we need to look for the
social structures associated with religious forms to see how this indicates different
sensitivities and values as organs committed to the structure of the social organism as
a unit. Clearly the vested interest of religious groups is a vital force in the driving of
social action and it is a force that the executive structures of government are very
careful to work with and to nurture, and to use. The religious sentiment is also central
in the core religious ideas of global unification under one God, promoted by
stimulating joy on a global scale by international sporting extravaganzas or sadness by
creating misery through famine in Africa of war in the Middle East. These global
catastrophes act as pain and pleasure stimulants which are specially geared to induce a
response that is attuned to the religious identities which huge numbers of people are
attuned to. And the conflict set up between religious blocs obviously serve to
stimulate the body as a body and so the focus on the Moslems as victims of the
Christians is precisely what connects the world dominated Muslim population with
the Christian power bloc.
But what stands out above all else is the role of the Jews in relation to these
two power blocs. The Jews are a minor element of the material biomass of the
organism, yet they are of supreme importance, and quite unique, in the life history of
the organism that dominates the earth today. Concentrated, ancient, and the source of
the Christian and Moslem orders which constitute the nervous system of the organism
which is extended throughout the human biomass covering the globe. It is
inescapable but to see the Jews as the focus of interest in the globalising world
organism which is growing today and has been growing for some thousands of years
since its initial point of origin in the Middle East became established. The Jews then
are the brain, they are especially sensitive to any threat to Western culture, they need
this culture more than anyone, they are its core. By comparison the rest of us are but
flesh and bone and some like me, gristle and cracked toe nail.

It is delightful to see Spencer take note of a most obvious, yet not so obvious,
element of the idea he is handling here. The notion that domesticated organisms, be
they animal or plant, are part of the human organism is, I would suggest, bound to
occur to anyone who spends some time working on the idea that humans are a part of
the natural world, yet, that said, it is counter intuitive and, as such, not at all obvious,
even once you have the idea before you. When first encountered, in the present age of
scientific knowledge, we readily recognise that the relationship between organism of
an unlike kind is such that the whole biomass of the earth forms a ecosystem of
interdependence and every territorial environment is occupied by an interlocked series
of ecological niches in which a hierarchy of organisms exploits that environment
forming a chain of primary organisms leading toward an end product which we
invariably view as a higher organism. Within this arrangement of organic hierarchies
of interdependence there are further special arrangement between species such as that
between the flowers and their pollinating insects. Such highly specialised organic
relationships are termed symbiotic, and it is just such a relationship that Spencer has
recognised exists between humans and their domesticated species.
But, as delighted as I am to see him recognise this idea in an appropriate
manner, he gives no indication in this second chapter of the magnitude and
significance of the idea, and there is no reason to suspect he is likely to delve further
into the matter later on since we can see that having forced the door ajar a fraction to
peak beyond at the world of science in application to humans he seeks to jam the door
shut immediately the first rays of light cut into the darkness of ancient mythologically
constructed minds.
 The evolution of human beings and other species of organisms has evidently
been going on for millions of years, and we too have our own special organic
relationships, just as, for example, insects do, although we do not recognise them as
such. I am referring to what we call drugs, opium, cannabis, peyote, fly agaric and
many more. That fact is that unless you have the key to understanding all things
about human beings then you are just not going to be able to understand such subtle,
profound and important aspects humans as the relationships between our most
fundamental attributes, such as our consciousness, and very peculiar 'food' substances
such as these aforementioned plants and fungi.
Spencer opens the door of science because he is holding the key in his hand,
but the door jams shut because the key to his understanding of reality is that which
encodes the mythology of the Jews, as transposed into the sub-Judaic identity we call
Christianity. In effect Spencer is drawn toward cutting a new key but only to enable
him to fashion a key for the theocracy that rules and has ruled for millennia. The
engraving of new notions onto the old key is the way Judaism has evolved as the
identity preserving the central nervous system of the organism that has grown from
small territorial occupier to planet sized organism in just a few dozen generations.
The key to understanding all things about humans in accordance with biology,
requires cutting a key that is brand new, cut according to scientific principles alone.
This is a key I have been cutting for a few years now. The Jewish key is based on the
idea of divinity, the body of the key is the assertion that God exists, all cuts must be
made upon this body. The scientific key replaces this all embracing model of
existence with the idea that the fundamental force that the Jews call God is in the
organism that is the real human form that all individuals exist to bring into being. We
can see that in making this statement I am reversing the claim Spencer made
regarding the cardinal difference between an organism and society, I am saying that
individuals exist solely for the purpose of creating society. This is a functional
purpose, not a moral purpose, and there is no questions of happiness or any other
abstract concept of purpose having any part in the determination of the significance of
this function.
Thus instead of God forming the backbone of our intellectual key we have a
key that is Corporate all the way along its spinal core. Hence we say that human
nature is corporate. Having determined what human nature is we know that all things
we say about humans will be determined by this fact of corporate being, as opposed to
being determined by the assumption of divine being. Picking up Spencer correct
observation that an organism has a central nervous system uniting its myriad of
differentiated but interdependent parts, we have already noted that society has a match
for this structure in the religious forms and the identity they emit and sustain
throughout the biomass of the organism. And when faced with the curious
phenomenon of human drug taking, with all its peculiar influences upon our psyche,
we are now in a position to understand why this feature of our being evolved. We
recognise that since society is an organism, and that this social organisation has to
have a centralised medium of co-ordination, then the evolution of the human psyche
must of been enabled to take shape by means of the psychoactive substances found in
certain plants. These plants did not feed the body of the organism, in any sense, but
they did feed the mind, they induced a collective consciousness and they laid a
foundation for the establishment of a priestly caste within the most simple and basic
human superorganism even though it may consist of only a small number of people.
It is not surprising that such substances have become known as the food of the
gods, and that in modern times people like Aldous Huxley have written about their
experience of these organisms in terms of the Doors of Perception and such like.
Thus we find the amazing fact that the human mind, in its earlier stages of evolution,
was created by means of plants substances inducing a state of consciousness in the
nervous system of each individual which then acted as a common sense of
identification uniting the individuals into one organism according to their evolved
capacity to have shared experiences.
As humans have evolved beyond the most simple level of organisation the
earlier aspects of corporate form have shrunk in their significance under the layers of
new modes collective consciousness's creation, most specifically today, religious
indoctrination, the product of organs of linguistic evolution, has taken the place of the
ancient physiological mechanisms of corporate being. Thus these earlier features of
corporate identity that evolved for millions of years, and are consequently deep rooted
in our nature, now pose a degree of difficulty in the modern world where they
compete with the current primary mode of corporate identity formation. And it is for
this reason that race and drugs, two precursor modes of corporate identity formation,
are circumscribed and yet intractable problems, impossible to get rid of. In effect the
groups that still exploit these ancient modes of corporate identity formation, the
nationalistic priest of racial purity and the drug cartel organiser, are competing centres
of the body's central nervous system seeking to command the structure and so to draw
resources toward themselves rather than toward the core religious identity, that is
Judaism, which is the true identity of our organism.
This quick dip into the physiological complexities of the social organisms
psychological make up however, is not so easily summarised, and the apparent
antagonism between the core theistic authority and the, would be core, criminal
organs, is not so antagonistic as it would appear. But this I will have to leave hanging
in the air rather mysteriously because anything I say will be conjectural, and so I only
mean to draw your attention to the integrated nature of all aspects of society. It must
be the case that if we are to take on board the full implications of the subject we are
delving into here then at all times we must be thinking of structures, of all kinds, in
terms of harmonious integration and we must suspect the sense of antagonism which
ordinarily informs our understanding of society. In saying this I do not mean to lead
us toward an assumption that all things, such as terrorism or war, are good things,
they may be functionally necessary, like defecation in relation to eating, but that does
not mean that two such opposites are functionally capable of being inverted; perish
the thought! This realisation is expressed in Durkheim's sociology and we will take a
peak at how he reasoned about these things and earned for himself the accolade of
being sociology's first functionalist.

But while we have just extended the insight of Spencer regarding the counter
intuitive idea that humans have genuine symbiotic relationships with other species
exactly as many other species do, so that we have not only included the artful
products of human endeavour such as sheep and barely but also found that we must
equally accept the ancient allies of human evolution like opium and mescaline which
now constitute, in our collective consciousness extreme enemies, we can now go a
stage further and attain the logical pinnacle of this line of reasoning, as befits our key
to self knowledge, our realisation of human nature's true nature.
Essentially what Spencer recognised, albeit in its most limited form, was the
extension of the physical organic being of the human animal. He obtained the first
phase of this realisation, he embraced the other biological forms which were self
evidently dependant upon the existence of humans for their existence. But what he
did not do, and could not do given his severely limited conception of the nature of the
idea he was handling, was to grasp the full extent of the meaning of the idea that
society is an organism and that therefore the human organism is a Super Being.
For Spencer the human animal still appeared in the form of the individual, he
had not come to view it as literally an organism identical in its nature to that of the
ant, bee or termite, and therefore bound to have comparable physical structures. But
one other important element of the idea is covered by Spencer in the short piece
quoted above, he recognises that the individual body is comparable with the social
body even in so far as it consists of inanimate matter. This clue is absolutely central
to the next major step in the progress of the idea of Super Being to the attainment of
its climax.
If you are going to assert that human society is an organism, a superorganism,
and as such identical to the other organisms of a like kind such as the insect varieties
mentioned and then to add the marine mollusc forms that build coral reefs and the
bacterial forms that also create huge colonies of their own kind, then it is not long
before you realise that not only do humans have to have similar divisions as the
insects so that we must have comparative structures as that of a queen and
comparative modes of behaviour such as that of the robotic drone, but that our whole
society must be likened to a hive or a nest.
Now this in itself is not so clever, the clever part comes when this causes us to
redefine the nature of a hive and a nest so that in aligning society with these two
forms of superorganic constructions we create one new conception for all forms of a
similar kind and thus we recognise that all the artificial products of human effort, of
whatever kind, constitute an exoskeleton. When we do this we see that the best
comparative structure for the modern world in the none human domain is a coral reef,
rather than a nest or a hive. And suddenly the whole picture falls nicely into place
and the story is complete. This really is the culminating piece of the conceptual jig-
saw, with this realisation of the true physical nature of the human being we have a
final and complete picture of ourselves delivered via the scientific method.
So now, all that is required is to explain how we should understand this
culminating image of our own being, since I am sure just as it is the final piece of the
jig-saw, I am equally certain it is the most counter intuitive element of the idea
confronting us, which is why it comes last in the appearance of our understanding
ourselves. All the mythology of the priesthood that rules our world, and all our self
awareness is mediated through the idea that we create our own world, it seems
obvious. When Edward Wilson became infamous for threatening to extend the
Darwinian idea of organic evolution into the realm of society the scientific fraternity
rose as one to crush this upstart, and he was buried in the avalanche of abuse of anger
that was heaped upon him by the academic community. Since his ideas were simple
and irrefutable, once battered into subservience and forced to eat humble pie and
recant his effrontery in a manner the oppressors of Galileo would of been proud to see
enacted, he was of course raised to a high status and courted as the brilliant academic
he was. Sociobiology, the subject he gave rise to, has been, like functionalism in
sociology a dangerous subject area that the theocracy and its vast army of
confederates within the exoskeletal structures of the superorganism keep a close eye
upon and are always ensuring only they get to write about what these subject mean. If
anyone else ever seeks to write about ideas that promote functionalism or
sociobiology I have never been able to discover the fact.
The central device expressed by all academics of any kind, and by all
theologians and politicians, lawyers and commentators of any kind, by all priests, in
other words, is the assertion that people make their own world. This is a simple
logical extension of the primary element of the dualistic device of mythology which
makes the human individual the primary body of human being. So, when Wilson
made his incursion into the domain of the social, the superorganic, via the study of
insects, ants, even he was committed to stick strictly to the notion that evolution was
mediated via the genetic fabric which constituted the genome of the species. As long
as we stick rigidly to this premise, that organic evolution is delivered via the
transformation of the genome, then it is self evident that the products of human
endeavour are safe from the clutches of the biologist since obviously human artifacts
are not the direct product of genetic evolution; there are no genes for televisions to be
found by the Human Genome Project!
This then is the line drawn in the sand, the line we kick into the dust when we
recognise that the totality of society is an organism body whose form is that of an
exoskeleton, a reef like structure on land, occupied by mammals, individual creatures
of major physical stature in their own right. It is the act of kicking this imaginary line
into oblivion that we must now consider in bringing forth this final piece of the jig-
saw which completes our picture of the human organism according to a scientific
idea, by allowing us to see that the human organism is an entity that exists on a vast
scale wherein social structure constitutes an exoskeleton, within which human
individuals constitute the living organic tissue.
So lets begin by addressing the basics. I have already noted that the crux of
the mythology is the idea that the link between organic evolution is broken when the
umbilical cord of the genome is made the sole medium of creative evolution, thus
leaving the super-genetic evolution of human creativity to be circumscribed by the
priesthood and owned by them in their role of social elite. As long as we allow this
division between genetic creation and human creation to go unchallenged we commit
ourselves to eternal subservience to the theocracy and their myth making machinery.
It must be obvious to anyone interested in the scientific side of the story of
human evolution that the notion that humans create themselves poses an obvious
problem. At what point did this process of self generation take effect, and in what
manner did its effect manifest itself? Naturally we cannot have a discrete break here
so the priests who control all our knowledge will present a picture that blends the
process of genetic evolution into the process of cultural evolution directed by
conscious human effort. To some extent we see the first signs of this transition
appearing in the piece of Spencer's work already quoted. He notes how increasing
size brings about increasing complexity. Later on in the same volume he makes more
use of this type of reasoning in developing the moral agenda which is central to his
reasoning that Russell, as we will see below, says accounts for his love of evolution.
He argues that as society becomes more advanced so the sacrifice of individuality to
the benefit of the collective is increasingly moderated.
The first point I want to make is that things are what they are irrespective of
what we think they are, denial, as I like to say, does not alter the reality of anything.
Except, of course, in some exasperating sense, for practical purposes this is not
actually the case where humans are concerned. Why not, and what does this tell us
about the nature of being human? My favourite illustration for this point is the story
of the women who marries a man who abuses her daughter and then rejects the
daughter as being responsible for her own abuse, preserving the fine image of the man
whom she relies upon for her own sense of well being. The value of this story is that
is a commonplace tale from the sad accounts of abused children when questioned in
adulthood. The point is that the mother preserves her own happy world view but in
doing so nothing is changed by the act of denial, the man is still raping her daughter,
and such he is still a monster. So does denial change nothing? Not quite, it is the
nature of the human social world that reality is what people say it is, not what it
actually is. Thus when people said the sun went about the earth then the sun did go
about the earth, to all intents and purposes. What can this 'to all intents and purposes'
possibly mean? What it means is that while reality is what it is, knowledge is always
only what ever people believe it to be. Knowledge then is always a social
phenomenon and to whatever extent knowledge is functional it is first and foremost
therefore functional as an attribute of the social fabric. Denial then can alter the social
reality, denial therefore can be a very useful behavioural response to knowledge.
And it follows that while reality will always be what it is, denial may be the
required response. And that is exactly what we see being enacted in Spencer's work,
having recognised the logic of human organic status he proceeds to work out an
elaborate account of denial that accommodates the requirement that human sacredness
remains paramount in out world. He does by using the idea of evolution to deliver an
ever increasing augmentation of individual identity, exactly in accord with the Judaic
mythology that rules the world he lives in, and we live in. But we know that denial
does, at least, not alter reality. Therefore we know that if there has been change in the
form of the human organism resulting in a real increase in an expression of human
individuality as an absolute quality of life, then what cannot of changed one iota is
human nature, that is the meaning of human nature, it is a thread of unbroken quality
running through the course of human evolution from the beginning of their origin, in
the case of humans this is the coming into being of the mammals.
Thus we do not necessarily have to dispute the observations Spencer bases his
assertion of increasing individuality upon, we may concede that for a few the
expression of individuality has become a feature of their life, and for whole sections
of some societies the idea of individuality is a thing to be valued. But what does this
really mean? My own interpretation, since I know there is no such thing as an
individual, and never can be, is that the increasing mass of the human organism,
which has been staggering in its increase in a very short space of time, has produced a
degree of differentiation leading to the illusion of individuality as a universal
characteristic. And yet of course when considered in any meaningful manner it is
clear enough that no one has any real degree of individuality if by this we mean they
are able to act freely of all others at all times.
So lets get back to the main point, a consideration of the point of transition
from genetic to human creativity. Once again, we can say, that no matter how it may
appear, and in out fantastically sophisticated material world appearance is everything,
appearance is, in reality countered entirely by knowledge that human nature is
corporate. This means that no matter who much we think that we have evolved
beyond the grip of biological evolution, as Richard Dawkins so likes to claim, this
cannot be so, and is not so. So all we need do is understand what is real, not what
denial makes into a social reality courtesy of the propaganda produced by priests like
Dawkins. Clearly there has to be a biologically driven continuum at work. Spencer
notes, rightly, that the bonding medium operating in the social fabric is linguistic, so
we know that the transference of creativity from the immediately physical to the
indirectly physical occurs by means of shifting the creative principle of human nature
from the genetic to the linguistic.
Now it has to be said that at this point in our reasoning we come truly into our
times and find ourselves empowered by the ongoing revolution in the acquisition of
scientific knowledge in a way that our forebears of a century or so ago were not so
fortunate. We are living in the age of genetic information, and this makes all the
difference at this stage in our reasoning. We actually know for a fact that a simple
base code, elaborately organized, acts as a medium for all organic form on the planet.
This idea is a powerful on its own as the idea of evolution given to us by Darwin, and
on this base alone we nay excuse the blindness of the priests of the recent past. But
we cannot help suspecting their motives and intentions when we see the world
dominated by experts today like Dawkins in Britain and Gould in America, who not
only fail to make the logical inference concerning the revelation of a genetic code and
the details of how it works, but instead act as experts in the popular transmission of
this knowledge and in doing so continue to give the same message that Spencer did,
that humans are exactly as described in the Bible, unique moral beings unlike all other
things on earth in a an absolute way.
The correct interpretation of reality, unaffected by denial, is that what genes
constitute is a code, and as such they have a common nature to language, both are a
medium of information. Thus what drives the creative process is information,
whether it is carried by genes or speech, or writing, or art or form, is irrelevant. Thus
the fact that there are no genes for televisions to be found on the human genome is
completely irrelevant to the question of whether or not a television is an organic entity
produced solely by the process of organic evolution. And the next obvious point to
make is that of course the attribute of linguistic communication was created by means
of genetic evolution and it is the foundation of our kinds form, but it is in keeping
with our nature. The evolution of language undoubtedly brought into being a new
kind of hominid, but it did not in any respect alter the nature of the hominid line
which is the mammalian line that evolved to produce the ultimate expression of
mammalian form, the superorganic form. We will pick up the thread of this reasoning
in a very strange way when we look at the writings of the Russian mystic Ouspensky
later on who recognised the idea of evolution leading to the creation of perfect forms,
of which humans were but one, but who expressed this idea in a very odd manner
indeed.
But there is no doubt that this suggestion regarding the creation of material
items by means of human activity being just as much an organic process as any other
to which Darwinian evolution applies is most peculiar. So lets try and elaborate upon
this subject and see how we can convince ourselves to follow the sign of the light
sneaking through the cracks between the doors edge and the doorframe, in
disobedience to out natural inclination to lean on the door and see only what that act
of denial wants us to see.
The assertion is that humans did not make televisions, or planes, Nature made
them. And moreover the assertion is that this is so in just as real a sense as we
recognise people did not make legs or kidneys, Nature made them too. The fact of the
matter is that once you open yourself up to this mode of reasoning it becomes
incredibly obvious. In effect what we are doing is altering our perspective, we are
shifting from the immediate time frame to a deep time perspective, something we
should of become good at in the modern scientific era which has taught us so much on
the basis of this temporal shift. The problem is that we have no been permitted to
apply this time shift to our own nature, mainly of course because the priests have not
seen fit to allow us to have any true understanding of what our nature is that accords
with the new insights based on the extended time frame of scientific method.
Shifting our perspective then, instead of viewing evolution as a process led by
random mutations occurring in a stable code that creates potential forms which are
then selected according to the test imposed upon the form by the environment, we can
see the evolution of organisms in the light of their nature, as a complex array of parts
that has evolved from a common origin by making differentiation subservient to a
unified plan which results in a complex organic form. On this basis there is a target
toward which evolution is directed and in the process of achieving greater complexity
it can be said to discover solutions, rather than to spontaneously generate them by a
process of trial and error. Now this is not an easy distinction to be clear about or to
decide between in the rarefied context of abstract speculation because it evokes the
problem of the chicken and the egg which is mechanism taken out of any temporal
timeframe and this left disconnected from reality, ideal for the promulgators of
ideologies of denial, but not what we seek.
So lets come close to home and consider something substantial. Lets ask
ourselves a simple enough question. Did people make the aeroplane? First up we
must say yes, absolutely. OK. But we do not want a simple, self evident answer, we
are trying to see beyond the obvious, beyond the interminably thick oak door guarding
the castle in which the priesthood hide the lantern knowledge. This simple response
is by its nature final and absolute. But taken in this simple form we are entitled to get
pedantic and say that if people created the aeroplane then the aeroplane can take
absolutely any form anyone cares to give it. Take a pile of bricks throw them in a pit
and call it a plane and it will be a plane and it will do what a plane does, it will fly and
carry passengers. This nonsense forces a little more precision upon our answer, and
suddenly, in an instant, we find that people did not create the aeroplane, they
discovered it.
And suddenly we have a whole new perspective on the process of evolution.
Now we can say that evolution did not produce lungs with which to breath the air,
evolution discovered lungs! Just as humans discovered aeroplanes. In other words
whether it is something we want to create, such as a starship, or something Nature
wants to create such as a mode of living on dry land, the solution, however it is
reached is constrained by the environment that induced the desire, or, in the case of
Nature, offers an opportunity.
This leaves us with the possible difference between ourselves and Nature
hanging by the distinction I have left in place between Nature being drawn by a
potential void and out being drawn by our own impulsive desire. But when we seek
to exploit this distinction to repair the damage to a door of denial all we are doing is
shifting back from the deep time frame of science to the immediate time frame of our
everyday world. And when we make that shift then of course we no longer see the
reality behind the door of denial than if we were to take our eye from the microscope
or the telescope and then to claim, in the vein of some made eighteenth century
philosopher like Berkeley, that things only exist when we look at them!
Once we have the process fully described, as above, then we can apply it to all
facets of our being. Soon we see that every aspect of life becomes prone to our new
key of scientific understanding and the idea that we create society ourselves by
making freely willed moral choices based on our reason goes down the pan, where it
belongs. The law we may think we created in the pursuit of a better society.
Nonsense. Law is just as much an artificial creation as anything else we produce and
it too has to be discovered in the relentless evolutionary thrust to unleash the potential
of our nature to form a Super Being. The laws we have found we have in our modern
world of extraordinary size and complexity therefore were discovered, not created, or
crafted, by anyone. And thus we live in a superorganic state of being, entirely
evolved, and given to us by virtue of our ongoing efforts to exist in a universe that is
not happening as we speak but unfolding as a continuum which is connected to its
past, a past that determines it future. So if we want to be creative then we need to be
aware of what we want to create down the line and to take the steps now. That is
what the Jews did when they wrote their mythology, they wanted to rule the world,
and now they do. It does work, but of course this secret knowledge creates a
priesthood that enslaves the rest of us to its purposes and while the purpose of the
priesthood is always tested by the reality of existence and thus has to conform to that
reality, which Judaism does, hence all the problems with it, there is at least the
possibility of refining the way in which we hurtle through this weird space we call
existence.

Finally, lets just consider the nature of Spencer as a commentator. He was of

the first generation that had to bear the full force of the idea of evolution, it was his
job, as a priest of the theocracy, as all commentators, or people with any kind of civil
power are, to ensure that the new knowledge was contained. Darwin had produced
his knowledge in such a way that it was containable, he was a priest of the theocracy
too after all, but in the initial phases of exploding his intellectual bombshell the force
of that blast was bound to shatter all the age old myths. Not everyone is a priest,
hence the new ideas shatter the illusions of the acolytes, the slaves. The priests set
about repairing the damage, but they give themselves a head start by being in charge
of the critical event of revelation in the first place. It was Darwin's central role in
providing the means of diffusing the impact of the new scientific method on the
Judaic mythology, which provided the bonding identity of the organism the priests
ruled, and rule still, that made him an acknowledged national hero, buried in
Westminster, and made the obverse of the monarch on today's ten pound notes. Even
so, the damage from this 'controlled explosion' of knowledge had to be repaired. And
it has been, well and truly, hence the need for someone like me to try and do the job
properly. The key to containing knowledge is not to eradicate it, this is futile because
knowledge is, in any case, vital to human existence. As I have pointed out already, it
is a matter of containing knowledge within a vessel of a like kind, a vessel formed of
ideas, the primary ideological fabric which contains the real nature of existence, as it
pertains to human beings, consists of the notion of duality. Between the idea of two
opposing, but interdependent forces, the truth that in reality there is only unity, can be
contained.
But it follows that this containment must occur in some material body, ideas
and knowledge has to exist in a repository of some kind, and so it does, it occurs
within the circumscribed organ that manages the containment, and so becomes the
priesthood. The priesthood is the sum total of all the manipulators, of all kinds,
within society. This totality forms the brain within the superorganism's mass, what
we would call the social elite. So, if the job of containment is breached then what
happens is that the knowledge that is possessed by the priests is loosed upon the
world, and is no longer available to act as a source of centralising power upon which
the organism depends. The question has to be then, is it possible to have a human
society on a grand scale that is not organised about a priesthood whose form is created
by controlling knowledge? I am not sure, I act as though it is possible, but the more I
come to understand I wonder. I believe, however, in the idea that truth is all,
knowledge is everything, and I have faith in the power of revelation, by which I mean
openness and free understanding. I am repulsed by any notion of secret knowledge, I
do not care whether all the evidence indicates that we have evolved to live in
subservience to a priesthood who keep us in ignorance and farm us like sheep, looked
after only on the basis that we are the livestock upon which the master class depends.
This physiological arrangement is undoubtedly a naturally evolved structure, but that
does not mean it cannot be constituted in some higher form than that which Judaism
is. Science is the knowledge that is able to fashion a key to open another doorway to
the future beyond mythology, beyond religion as the medium of collective being.
These ideas may seem strange so let me explain the most fundamental
principle of existence in terms of the subject we are now discussing. I have just said
that ideas and knowledge firstly need to be contained within a constraint of their own
kind if they are to become a medium of power, or purposes, able to act as a means of
giving advantage to some in relation to others. This is obvious because the alternative
is that all knowledge, the moment it is discovered to be of value is immediately
released to all and sundry, this latter situation is most definitely not the case. It may
be asked why knowledge cannot simply be kept secret, without being contained
within a field of a like kind, such as the idea of duality, or theism? The answer to this
is perfectly obvious, we are not talking about the act of an individual who has stolen
some property or murdered someone, we are discussing knowledge which is found to
be of value. For knowledge to be of value it is necessary to share it, that is what
knowledge, of any extensive sort amounts to. Essentially we are talking about
knowledge of social significance, but that is the nature of most knowledge. Therefore
we are immediately faced with an exercise of limited sharing, and that is the crucial
point, that is why real knowledge accruing the secret of social power must be encoded
if it is to be of any value.
So we know why knowledge must be contained by a like form, knowledge
contains knowledge. And it follows from this fact that the truth must be hidden
within the outer form that cloaks it. This is what leads to the generation of encoded
knowledge which has real meaning hidden within it. But we have noted that finally
this knowledge must be reposited somewhere, and that somewhere is obviously within
the brains of individuals. Now we come to a most important point in the evolution
and growth of a priesthood. Referring back to our understanding that the fundamental
nature of the creative force is information then we can note that when we discuss
knowledge in this way and the evolution of mythological codes of reality we are
discussing a form of information. We must now note that what applies to one species
of knowledge, that is one kind of information, that it be reposited in some place,
applies to information in general, information has to exist in material form. What
follows from this is a realisation of the unity between form and the information that
creates it. Thus Einstein's notion of energy being equivalent to mass can be seen to
equally well describe the realisation that information and form are also equivalents.
Which, incidentally, makes our awareness of information, the experience of energy.
Our brains are effectively sense organs for sensing energy.
What this means is that when a transformation in a mode of information
occurs it must at one and the same time create a material expression of that
transformation. Thus as humans began to create associations based on the
accumulation of knowledge that empowered a social structure and then transposed
this true knowledge into a code, this very act of codification created a new material
form. That new material form in this context is a new social structure, and in the
precise context with which we are concerned here that means the evolution of a
priesthood with all that history records of such things in terms of social form. In
short, what we are discussing here is the fact that information and form are at all times
one and the same thing in some sense, and when we are dealing with the subject of
information, which the evolution of human form is orientated toward in the pursuit of
the objective of an ever more perfect mammalian form of Super Being, we are
looking at one face of reality distinguished from the other, hence the mechanism of
duality which enables knowledge to be filtered out from the reality it is associated
with and codified, thus creating an organ of superorganic identity. But of course, in
reality, the information can never be separated from the form, it is only an act of
evolutionary development that achieves this result by way of the process of
specialised differentiation of parts, as discussed by Spencer, which brings about the
situation where an organ of identity based on secret knowledge comes into being and
acts as the mind, soul, personality, whatever you want to call it, of the Super Being.

And so we can see that the act of living, in which humans seem to engage in a
tug-of-war, with knowledge as the rope, is a process of discovery and competition for
possession of that which is discovered, leading to a toing and froing of ideas. I
contend that since the revelation of evolution by Darwin, the relentless battle for
possession has gone on, and now science is all but eradicated from the collective
consciousness, being contained between the two poles of the intellectual fabrication
that insists existence is a dualistic structure. There is every reason to believe that this
success on the part of the theocracy will increase decade on decade for centuries, or
millennia to come, and ignorance, accordingly, will deepen to unimaginable depths,
as we see it doing all the time. But in my efforts we see the chinks of light firing like
lone photons trying to connect with the mind's eye of the Being that we are, trying to
free us from this monstrous identity to which we are all so happily enslaved.
I look at someone like Spencer, and today we have a whole array of Spencer's,
call them Dawkins or Gould, just as they did a century ago, call them Spencer,
Darwin or Huxley, and I wonder what these people are. I conclude they are priests
because come what may, in the end they never tell the simple truth, and when it is
presented to them, as I have tried to do, they do everything in their power to deny it,
or, if they can, simply to ignore it. Bertrand Russell was another great priest
dedicated to the preservation of the theocracy in the difficult times following the
revelation of evolution that the theocracy was forced to bring on as scientific
knowledge threatened to burst the fabric of the vessel moulded from dualism. Russell
was the foremost rationalist philosopher of the twentieth century, a hero of the atheist,
so we are told, but he was no atheist, like the other priests, during these difficult
times, he only took on the mantel of atheist to ensure that no one else could, no one
who might actually be an atheist, no one like me. This is how he served out his
priesthood, as a mock enemy of the theocracy.
And of course, like all good fraternal brothers, it is all for one and one for all.
So Russell was a great admirer of Spencer and he spoke of him as the first scientific
philosopher.

'Herbert Spencer, in whose honour we are assembled today, would

naturally be classed among scientific philosophers: it was mainly from science
that he drew his data, his formulation of problems, and his conception of
method. But his strong religious sense is obvious in much of his writing, and
his ethical preoccupations are what make him value the conception of
evolution - that conception in which, as a whole generation has believed,
science and morals are to be united in fruitful and indissoluble marriage.'

(Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, Bertrand Russell, Penguin

Books, 1954, Page 94. First published 1918)
 Idea Two - Mythology

Ouspensky's Esoteric Thoughts on Super Beings

We have likened the endeavour we are engaged in here to the work of a

geologist delving into the earth's crust, following a precious seam of some exotic
mineral, one found to run on and on, but ever so hard to follow. The temporal
relationship of such material is of vital concern to such an explorer of the material
world. We might therefore think we should perhaps follow a chronological plan when
considering the various exponents of the intellectual deposits of our kind. However,
to take up the reality of our dualistic universe, as it is rendered by our very presence
within it, we can say that here we are concerned to uncover the trail of one side of the
duality, the seam of information which we have called the idea of Super Being. Thus
we are concerned with the idea, the information first, and while the temporal
proximity of the various thinkers we will consider is of great interest I am not sure
that we need allow ourselves to be confined by a dictatorial time scale, as long as we
are aware of the temporal relationships.
We have our theme, it is the Super Being, we are considering this theme in the
light of one conception, the light of science. Science is supposed to be a method of
working in relation to knowledge fabrication that excludes bias but unfortunately life
just does not work like that and as we have been observing throughout this work
science is a slave to the theocracy. Naturally the scientific priesthood deny this and
assert the scientific establishment is independent. This claim is simply too ridiculous
to be worth even considering, and I cannot be bothered to argue with it. We might
just note that it is clearly in conceivable that religion could of survived the Darwinian
revolution if the whole fabric were not united under one authority that has allowed
religion to not only survive but surge ahead as never before so that today a theistic
account of evolution is now taught in school and protected by political patronage of
the highest order.
The point then, is that science, as defined by that which is affirmed by the
scientific establishment, is powerless to deal with the question of what human nature
is. The only alternative to a scientist discovering this knowledge is therefore that a
layperson should do so, such a layperson, attaining such intellectual achievements
would be classified by the theocracy as a philosopher. We are philosophers therefore,
like it or not, and I for one most certainly do not like it one bit. Our method then
makes certain assumptions of a scientific nature. Science is the only way to know
anything about reality, if someone has some other way, that that is science by
definition. We cannot approach the subject of Super Being directly from a scientific
standpoint because this is precluded by the way the theocracy has control of society.
But the subject is out there, and since the only way to know anything is science then
the way for a philosopher to proceed to clear the path for scientists to follow is for the
philosopher to exam the various ways in which people of all kinds have spoken about
this phenomenon, the Super Being.
By doing this we achieve two things, we provide evidence that this
phenomenon has always impinged upon people's minds, and that therefore it must
represent something real, and therefore something science can reveal. And since
science is the only way to know anything, and science cannot investigate the subject
directly under the present dispensation of social authority, then the expression of the
ideas must themselves become the subject matter that is unearthed and examined and
interpreted to open the way for a proper scientific examination of what these ideas
mean. For only science can say what religion is, what God is, what sacredness is, and
so on. Things are what they are, but only science can say what anything is.
And so we will not follow a chronological plan, because the nature of our
material, being the ideas expressed by a range of commentators makes the perspective
of the commentators of primary interest and while the time frame in which they lived
will of influenced the way they approached the subject of Super Being, all our
commentators are modern, and all are voicing ideas that lend themselves to an
ultimately scientific conclusion because they are all seeking to embrace evolution and
to accord with biology. Thus the mindset of the commentator is of great interest
because what we will find is that a variety of people will be coming at the same idea
from a critically different angle and as a consequence they will each discuss exactly
the same phenomenon, but they will give it a slightly different interpretation.
What this work is really doing then is performing a titration of the ideas
against a uniform background of reality. The reality is that human beings are animals,
they evolved and this reality is the only means by which we can understand anything
about ourselves truly. By examining a variety of approaches which use this idea as a
backdrop, but which colour the account with a slanted interpretation according to a
predetermined point of view, we will discover what is held in common between all
this commentators, and thus we can discard the rainbow of opinions and find
ourselves left with the pure white light of truth, which is what science needs in order
to perform its function as discoverer of reality.
And so now we come to someone who simply could not be more antithetical
to science and the scientific method, albeit he has plenty to say about science.
Ouspensky was an advocate of esoteric ideas, and so he came to the subject of
existence from a completely different angle to that we have already seen in Spencer
who Russell tells us wore spectacles before his mind's eye tinged with moral
rectitude. Both men are, to me, an absolute atheist, simply out and out theists
dedicated to the Zionist cause, both are classic priests.
Reading Ouspensky's work is most odd, I am not the least interested in
esoteric ideas as a rule but in this case I am fascinated, the reason being that because
Ouspensky actually discusses esoteric lore in a rational manner then he gives me an
opportunity to evaluate it according to my supremely rational key that tells me that
human nature is corporate. Esoteric ideas are founded upon the central notion that
there is hidden knowledge, which strikes me as being somewhat arse about face, as so
often when the priests get to work, for while there are things we do not know
knowledge itself cannot be hidden unless it is in the manner above described when we
discussed the organic process whereby the codification of knowledge occurs
naturally, producing an elite social structure in the functional form of a priesthood.
This physiological process that evolved in the course of human evolution is made
more accessible by the straightforward manner in which Ouspensky discusses the
ideas of his favourite subject, the fact that these ideas are, when not elucidating the
modus operandi of esoteric lore itself, quite wacky!
But now lets see exactly how he ends up joining that select group of moderns
who have evinced a passion for the social reality of Super Being.

But let us go back to the moment when the first man, " Adam and Eve ", was
issued from the Laboratory and appeared on Earth. The first humanity could not
begin any culture. There was as yet no inner circle to help them, to guide their first
steps. And man had to receive help from the powers which created him. These
powers had to fill the part afterwards played by the inner circle.
Culture began and, as the first man had not yet the habit of mistakes, nor the
practice of misdeeds, nor the memory of barbarism, the culture developed with
extraordinary speed. Moreover, this culture did not develop negative sides, but only
positive sides. Man was living in full unity with Nature, he saw the inner properties
in all things, in all beings, he understood these properties and he gave names to all
things according to their properties. Animals obeyed him ; he was in constant
converse with the higher powers which had created him. And man rose to great
heights and rose with great rapidity because he made no mistakes in his ascent. But
this incapacity to make mistakes and the absence of the practice of mistakes while on
the one hand hastening his progress, on the other hand exposed him to great danger
because it carried with it the incapacity to avoid the results of mistakes, which
nevertheless remained possible.
Eventually man did make a mistake. And he made this mistake when he had
already risen to a great height.
This mistake consisted in his beginning to regard himself as being still higher
than he actually was. He thought that he already knew what was good and what was
evil; he thought that by himself he could guide and direct his life without help from
the outside.
This mistake might possibly not have been so great, its results might have
been corrected or altered, if man had known how to deal with the results of his
mistakes. But having had no experience of mistakes he did not know how to combat
the results of his mistakes. The mistake began to grow, began to assume gigantic
proportions, until it began to manifest itself in all sides of man's life. Man began to
fall. The wave went down. Man rapidly descended to the level from which he
started, plus the acquired sin.
And after a more or less long stationary period, the arduous ascent with the
help of higher powers began again. The only difference was that this time man had
the capacity for making mistakes, had a sin. And the second wave of culture began
with fratricide, with the crime of Cain, which was placed as the corner-stone of the
new culture.
But apart from the " karma " of sin, man had acquired a certain experience
through his former mistakes and when, therefore, the moment for the fatal mistake
recurred, it was not the whole of humanity which made it. There happened to be a
certain number of people who did not commit the crime of Cain, who did not
associate with it in any way or profit by it in any respect.
From that moment the paths of humanity diverged. Those who made the
mistake began to fall until they again reached the lowest level. But the moment they
began to need help, those who did not fall, that is, those who did not make the
mistake, were now able to give the help.
Such in short is the scheme of the earliest cultures. The myth of Adam and
Eve is the history of the first culture. Life in the Garden of Eden was the form of
civilisation which was reached by the first culture. The Fall of Man was the result of
his attempt to rid himself of the higher powers who guided his evolution and start a
life on his own, relying only on his own judgement. Every culture commits this
fundamental mistake in its own way. Every new culture develops some new features,
arrives at new results and then loses all. But everything that is really valuable is
preserved by those who do not make mistakes, and it serves as material for the
beginning of the succeeding culture.
 In the first culture man had no experience of mistakes. His rise was very
rapid, but it was not sufficiently complex, not sufficiently varied. Man did not
develop in himself all the possibilities that were in him, because many things were
attained by him too easily. But after a series of falls, with all his luggage of errors and
crimes, man had to develop other possibilities inherent in him in order to
counterbalance the results of those errors. Further, it will be shown that the
development of all possibilities inherent in each point of creation forms the object of
the progress of the Universe, and the life of mankind must be studied also in
connection with this principle.
In the later life of the human race and in its later cultures the development of
these possibilities is effected with the help of the inner circle. From this point of view
all the evolution possible to mankind consists in the evolution of a small number of
individuals, spread possibly over a long period of time. The mass of humanity itself
does not evolve ; it merely varies a little, adapting itself to the change of surrounding
conditions. Mankind, like an organism, evolves by means of the evolution of a
certain very small number of the cells of which it consists. The evolving cells pass, as
it were, into the higher tissues in the organism, and thus these higher tissues receive
nourishment by absorbing the evolving cells.
The idea of the higher tissues is the idea of the inner circle.
As I mentioned before, the idea of the inner circle contradicts all recognised
sociological theories concerning the structure of human society, but this idea brings us
to other theories which are forgotten now and which did not receive due attention in
their time.
Thus from time to time there arose in sociology the question as to whether
humanity could be regarded as an organism and human communities as smaller
organisms; that is, is a biological view of social phenomena possible ? Contemporary
sociological thought adopts a negative attitude in relation to this idea, and it has long
been considered unscientific to regard a community as an organism. The mistake lies
however in the way the problem itself is formulated. The concept "organism" is taken
in too narrow a sense and only in one preconceived idea. Namely, if a human
community, nation, people, race, is taken as an organism, it is regarded as an
organism either analogous to the human organism or higher than the human organism.
Actually, however, this idea can be correct only in relation to the whole of mankind.
Separate human groups, no matter how large they may be, can never be analogous to
man, and still less can they ever be superior to him. Biology knows of and has
established the existence of entirely different orders of organisms. And if in
examining the phenomena of social life we bear in mind the difference between
organisms on the different rungs of the biological ladder, the biological view of social
phenomena becomes much more possible. But this only on condition that we realise
that every human community, such as a race, a people, a tribe, is a lower organism as
compared to an individual man.
A race or a nation regarded as an organism has nothing in common with the
highly developed and complex organism of individual man, which for every function
has a special organ and has very great capacity for adaptation, possesses free
movement, etc. In comparison with an individual man, a race or nation as an
organism stands on a very low level, that of "animal plants". These organisms are
amorphous, for the most part immobile, masses, beings which have no special organs
for any of their functions and do not possess the capacity for free movement, but are
fixed to a definite place. They put out something like feelers in different directions,
and by means of these they seize other beings like themselves and eat them. The
whole life of these organisms consists in their eating one another. There are some
organisms which possess the capacity for absorbing a quantity of smaller organisms,
and so temporarily become very large and strong. Then two of these large organisms
meet one another, and a struggle begins between them in which either one or both are
destroyed or weakened. The whole external history of humanity, the history of the
struggles between peoples and races, consists of nothing but the process, which has
just been described, of "animal plants" eating one another.
But in the midst of all this, underneath it all, as it were, proceed the life and
activity of the individual man, that is, of the individual cells which form these
organisms. The activity of these individual men produces what we call culture or
civilisation. The activity of the masses is always hostile to this culture, it always
destroys it. Peoples create nothing. They only destroy. It is individual men who
create. All inventions, discoveries, improvements, all technical progress, the progress
of science, art, architecture and engineering art, all philosophical systems, all religious
teachings, all these are results of the activity of individual men. The destruction of
the results of this activity, their distortion, annihilation, obliteration from the face of
the earththis is the activity of the human masses.
This does not mean that individual men do not serve destruction. On the
contrary, the initiative of destruction on a large scale always belongs to individual
men, and the masses are merely the executive agency. But masses can never create
anything, although they can destroy on their own account.
If we understand that the masses of humanity, that is, peoples and races, are
lower beings as compared with individual man, we shall understand that peoples and
races cannot evolve in the same measure as individual man.
We have even no idea of the evolution possible to a people or to a race, though
we often speak of such an evolution. As a matter of fact, all peoples and nations
within the limits of our historical observation follow one and the same course. They
grow, develop, reach a certain degree of size and power, and then begin to be divided
up, decline and fall. Finally they disappear entirely and become component parts of
some other being like themselves. Races and nations die in the same way as
individual man. But individuals have certain other possibilities besides death, which
the great organisms of the human masses have not; for the souls of these are as
amorphous as their bodies.
The tragedy of individual man lies in the fact that he lives, as it were, within
the dense mass of such a lower being, and all his activity is in the service of the purely
vegetable functions of this blind jelly-like organism. At the same time the conscious
individual activity of man, his efforts in the domain of thought and creative work, run
contrary to these big organisms, in spite of them and in defiance of them. But of
course it would not be true to say that all the individual activity of man consists in a
conscious struggle against these big organisms. Man is conquered and made a slave.
And it often happens that man thinks he is serving and must serve these big beings by
his individual activity. But the higher manifestations of the human spirit, the higher
activities of man, are entirely unnecessary to the big organisms ; in most cases,
indeed, they are unpleasant to them, hostile and even dangerous, since they divert to
individual work forces which might otherwise have been absorbed into the vortex of
the life of the big organism. In an unconscious, merely physiological way, the big
organism endeavours to appropriate all the powers of the individual cells which are its
components, using them in its own interests, that is to say, mainly for fighting other
similar organisms. But when we remember that individual cells, that is, men, are far
more highly organised beings than big organisms, and that the activities of the former
go far beyond the activities possible to the latter, we shall understand this perpetual
conflict between man and human aggregates, we shall understand that what is called
progress or evolution is that which is left over of individual activities after all the
struggle between the amorphous masses and this individual activity has taken place.
The blind organisms of the masses struggle with the manifestation of the evolutionary
spirit, annihilate and stifle it and destroy what has been created by it. But even so
they cannot entirely annihilate it. Something remains, and this is what we call
progress or civilisation.
The idea of evolution in the life both of individual man and of human
communities, the idea of esotericism, the birth and growth of cultures and
civilisations, the possibilities of individual man connected with periods of rise and
fallall these and many other things are expressed in three Biblical myths.
These three myths are not connected in the Bible and stand separately, but in
reality they express one and the same idea and mutually complete one another.
The first myth is the story of the Great Flood and of Noah's Ark ; the second is
the story of the Tower of Babel, of its destruction and the confusion of tongues ; and
the third is the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Abraham's vision
and of the ten righteous men, for whose sake God agreed to spare Sodom and
Gomorrah, but who could not be found there.
The Great Flood is an allegory of the fall of civilisation, of the destruction of
culture. Such a fall must be accompanied by the annihilation of the greater part of the
human race, as a consequence of geological upheavals, or of wars, of the migration of
human masses, epidemics, revolutions, and similar causes. Very often all these
causes coincide. The idea of the allegory is that at the moment of the apparent
destruction of everything, that which is really valuable is saved according to a plan
previously prepared and thought out. A small group of men escapes from the general
law and saves all the most important ideas and attainments of the given culture.
The legend of Noah's Ark is a myth referring to esotericism. The building of
the " Ark " is the " School", the preparation of men for initiation, for transition to a
new life, for new birth. "Noah's Ark", which is saved from the Flood, is the inner
circle of humanity.
The second meaning of the allegory refers to individual man. The flood is
death, unavoidable, inexorable. But man can build within himself an "Ark" and
assemble in it specimens of everything that is valuable in him. In such a case these
specimens will not perish. They will survive death and be born again. Just as
mankind can be saved only through its connection with the inner circle, so an
individual man can attain personal "salvation" only by means of a link with the inner
circle in himself, that is, by connecting himself with the higher forms of
consciousness. And this cannot be done without outside help, that is, without the help
of the "inner circle".
The second myth, that of the Tower of Babel, is another version of the first;
but the first speaks of salvation, that is, of those who are saved, while the second
speaks only of ruin, that is, of those who shall perish.
The Tower of Babel represents culture. Men dream of building a tower of
stone "whose top may reach unto heaven", of creating an ideal life on earth. They
believe in intellectual methods, in technical means, in formal institutions. For a long
time the tower rises higher and higher above the earth. But the moment infallibly
arrives when men cease to understand each other, or rather, realise that they have
never done so. Each of them understands in his own way the ideal life on earth. Each
of them wants to carry out his own ideas. Each of them wants to fulfil his own ideal.
This is the moment when the confusion of tongues begins. Men cease to understand
one another even in the simplest things ; lack of understanding provokes discord,
hostility, struggle. The men who built the tower start killing one another and
destroying what they have built. The tower falls in ruins.
Precisely the same thing occurs in the life of the whole of humanity, in the life
of peoples and nations, and in the life of individual man. Each man builds a Tower of
Babel in his own life. His strivings, his aims in life, his attainments, these are his
Tower of Babel.
But the moment is inevitable when the tower will fall. A slight
shock, an unfortunate accident, an illness, a small miscalculation,
and of his tower nothing remains. Man sees it, but it is already too
late to correct or alter it.
Or a moment may come in the building of the tower when the different I's of a
man's personality lose confidence in one another, see all the contradictions of their
aims and desires, see that they have no common aim, cease to understand one another,
or more exactly, cease to think that they understand. Then the tower must fall, the
illusory aim must disappear, and the man must feel that everything that he has done
was fruitless, that it has led to nothing and could lead to nothing, and that before him
there is only one real factdeath.
The whole life of man, the accumulation of riches, or power, or learning, is the
building of a Tower of Babel, because it must end in catastrophe, namely in death,
which is the fate of everything that cannot pass to a new plane of being.
The third myththat of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrahshows still
more clearly than the first two the moment of the interference of the higher forces and
the causes of this interference. God agreed to spare Sodom and Gomorrah for the
sake of fifty righteous men, for the sake of forty-five, for the sake of thirty, for the
sake of twenty, at last for the sake of ten. But ten righteous men could not be found
and the two cities were destroyed. The possibility of evolution had been lost. The
"Great Laboratory" ceased the unsuccessful experiment. But Lot and his family were
saved. The idea is the same as in the other two myths, but it particularly emphasises
the readiness of the guiding will to make all possible concessions so long as there is
any hope of the realisation of the aim set for human beings. When this hope
disappears, the guiding will must inevitably interfere, save what deserves salvation
and destroy the rest.
The expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, the fall of the
Tower of Babel, the Great Flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, are all
legends and allegories relating to the history of mankind, to human evolution.
Besides these legends and many others similar to them, almost all races have legends,
tales and myths of strange non-human beings, who passed along the same road before
man. The fall of the angels, of Titans, of gods who attempted to defy other more
powerful gods, the fall of Lucifer, the demon or Satan, are all falls which preceded the
fall of man. And it is an undoubted fact that the meaning of all these myths is deeply
hidden from us. It is perfectly clear that the usual theological and theosophical
interpretations do not explain anything, because they introduce the necessity of
recognising the existence of invisible races or spirits, which at the same time are
similar to man in their relation to higher forces. The inadequacy of such an
explanation "by means of introducing five new unknown quantities for the definition
of one unknown quantity" is evident. But at the same time it would be wrong to leave
all these myths without any attempt at explanation, because by their very persistency
and repetition among different peoples and races they seem to draw our attention to
certain phenomena, which we do not know but which we should know.
The legends and epics of all countries contain much material relating to non-
human beings, who preceded man or even existed at the same time as man, but
differed from man in many ways. This material is so abundant and significant that not
to make an attempt to explain these myths would mean shutting our eyes intentionally
to something we ought to see. Such, for instance, are the legends of giants and the so-
called "Cyclopean" structures which one involuntarily associates with these legends.
Unless we wish to ignore many facts or believe in three-dimensional "spirits"
capable of building stone edifices, we must suppose that pre-human races were as
physical as man and came, just as man did, from the Great Laboratory of Nature, that
Nature had made attempts at creating self-evolving beings before man. And further
we must suppose that such beings were let out of the Great Laboratory into life, but
that they failed to satisfy Nature in their further development and, instead of carrying
out Nature's designs, turned against her. And then Nature abandoned her experiment
with them and began a new experiment.
Strictly speaking, we have no grounds for considering man as the first or the
only experiment of a self-evolving being. On the contrary, the myths mentioned
above give us the possibility of presuming the existence of such beings before man.
If this is so, if we have grounds for supposing the existence of physical races
of pre-human self-evolving beings, where then should we look for the descendants of
these races, and are we in any way justified in supposing the existence of such
descendants?
We must start from the idea that in all her activity Nature aims at the creation
of a self-evolving being.
But can it be supposed that the whole of the animal kingdom is the by-product
of one line of workthe creation of man?
This may be admitted in relation to mammals, we may even include in it all
vertebrates, we may consider many lower forms as preparatory forms, and so on. But
what place shall we give in this system to insects, which represent a world in
themselves and a world not less complex than the world of vertebrates?
May it not be supposed that insects represent another line in the work of
Nature, a line not connected with the one which resulted in the creation of man, but
perhaps preceding it?
Passing to facts, we must admit that insects are in no way a stage
preparatory to the formation of man. Nor could they be regarded as the by-product of
human evolution. On the contrary, insects reveal, in their structure and in the
structure of their separate parts and organs, forms which are often more perfect than
those of man or animals. And we cannot help seeing that for certain forms of insect
life which we observe there is no explanation without very complicated hypotheses,
which necessitate the recognition of a very rich past behind them and compel us to
regard the present forms we observe as degenerated forms.
This last consideration relates mainly to the organised communities of ants
and bees. It is impossible to become acquainted with their life without giving oneself
up to emotional impressions of astonishment and bewilderment. Ants and bees alike
both call for our admiration by the wonderful completeness of their organisation, and
at the same time repel and frighten us, and provoke a feeling of undefinable aversion
by the invariably cold reasoning which dominates their life and by the absolute
impossibility for an individual to escape from the wheel of life of the ant-hill or the
beehive. We are terrified at the thought that we may resemble them.
 Indeed what place do the communities of ants and bees occupy in the general
scheme of things on our earth? How could they come into being such as we observe
them? All observations of their life and their organisation inevitably lead us to one
conclusion. The original organisation of the "beehive" and the "ant-hill" in the remote
past undoubtedly required reasoning and logical intelligence of great power, although
at the same time the further existence of both the beehive and the ant-hill did not
require any intelligence or reasoning at all.
How could this have happened?
It could only have happened in one way. If ants or bees, or both, of course at
different periods, had been intelligent and evolving beings and then lost their
intelligence and their ability to evolve, this could have happened only because their
"intelligence" went against their "evolution", in other words, because in thinking that
they were helping their evolution they managed somehow to arrest it.
One may suppose that both ants and bees came from the Great Laboratory and
were sent to earth with the privilege and the possibility of evolving. But after a long
period of struggle and efforts both the one and the other renounced their privilege and
ceased to evolve, or, to be more exact, ceased to send forth an evolving current. After
this Nature had to take her own measures and, after isolating them in a certain way, to
begin a new experiment.
If we admit the possibility of this, may we not suppose that the old legends of
falls which preceded the fall of man relate to ants and bees? We may find ourselves
disconcerted by their small size as compared to our own. But the size of living beings
is, first of all, a relative thing, and secondly it changes very easily in certain cases. In
the case of certain classes of beings, for instance fishes, amphibious animals and
insects, Nature holds in her hands the threads that regulate their size and never lets
these threads go. In other words Nature possesses the power of changing the size of
these living beings without altering anything in them, and can effect this change in
one generation, that is, at once, simply by arresting their development at a certain
stage. Everyone has seen small fishes exactly like large fishes, small frogs, etc. This
is still more evident in the vegetable world. But of course it is not a universal rule,
and some beings such as man and most of the higher mammals reach almost the
largest size possible for them. As regards the insects, ants and bees most probably
could be much larger than they are now, although this point may be argued ; and it is
possible that the change of size of the ant or the bee would necessitate a considerable
alteration in their inner organisation.
It is interesting to note here the legions of gigantic ants in Tibet recorded by
Herodotus and Pliny (Herodotus, History, Bk. XI; Pliny, Natural History, Bk. III).
Of course it will be difficult at first to imagine Lucifer as a bee, or the Titans
as ants. But if we renounce for the moment the idea of the necessity of a human form,
the greater part of the difficulty disappears.
The mistake of these non-human beings, that is, the cause of their downfall,
must inevitably have been of the same nature as the mistake made by Adam. They
must have become convinced that they knew what was good and what was evil, and
must have believed that they themselves could act according to their understanding.
They renounced the idea of higher knowledge and the inner circle of life and placed
their faith in their own knowledge, their own powers and their own understanding of
the aims and purposes of their existence. But their understanding was probably much
more wrong and their mistake much less naive than the mistake of Adam, and the
results of this mistake were probably so much more serious, that ants and bees not
only arrested their evolution in one cycle, but made it altogether impossible by
altering their very being.
The ordering of the life of both bees and ants, their ideal communistic
organisation, indicate the character and the form of their downfall. It may be
imagined that at different times both bees and ants had reached a very high, although
a very one-sided culture, based entirely on intellectual considerations of profit and
utility, without any scope for imagination, without any esotericism or mysticism.
They organised the whole of their life on the principles of a kind of "marxism" which
seemed to them very exact and scientific. They realised the socialistic order of things,
entirely subjugating the individual to the interests of the community according to their
understanding of those interests. And thus they destroyed every possibility for an
individual to develop and separate himself from the general masses.
And yet it was precisely this development of individuals and their separation
from the general masses which constituted the aim of Nature and on which the
possibility of evolution was based. Neither the bees nor the ants wished to
acknowledge this. They saw their aim in something else, they strove to subjugate
Nature. And in some way or other they altered Nature's plan, made the execution of
this plan impossible.
We must bear in mind that, as has been said before, every "experiment" of
Nature, that is, every living being, every living organism, represents the expression of
cosmic laws, a complex symbol or a complex hieroglyph. Having begun to alter their
being, their life and their form, bees and ants, taken as individuals, severed their
connection with the laws of Nature, ceased to express these laws individually and
began to express them only collectively. And then Nature raised her magic wand, and
they became small insects, incapable of doing Nature any harm.
In the course of time their thinking capacities, absolutely unnecessary in a
well-organised ant-hill or beehive, became atrophied, automatic habits began to be
handed down automatically from generation to generation, and ants became "insects"
as we know them; bees even became useful.1
Indeed, when observing an ant-hill or a beehive, we are always struck by two
things, first by the amount of intelligence and calculation put into their primary
organisation and, secondly, by the complete absence of intelligence in their activities.
The intelligence put into this organisation was very narrow and rigidly utilitarian, it
calculated correctly within the given conditions and it saw nothing outside these
conditions. Yet even this intelligence was necessary only for the original calculation
and estimation. Once started, the mechanism of a beehive or of an ant-hill did not
require any intelligence; automatic habits and customs were automatically learned and
handed down, and this ensured their being preserved unchanged. "Intelligence" is not
only useless in a beehive or an ant-hill, it would even be dangerous and harmful.
Intelligence could not hand down all the laws, rules and methods of work with the
same exactness from generation to generation. Intelligence could forget, could
distort, could add something new. Intelligence could again lead to "mysticism", to the
idea of a higher intelligence, to the idea of esotericism. It was therefore necessary to
banish intelligence from an ideal socialistic beehive or ant-hill, as an element harmful
to the communitywhich in fact it is.
Of course there may have been a struggle, a period when the ancestors of ants
or bees who had not yet lost the power of thinking saw the situation clearly, saw the
inevitable beginning of degeneration and strove to fight against it, trying to free the
individual from its unconditional submission to the community. But the struggle was
hopeless and could have no result. The iron laws of the ant-hill and beehive very
soon dealt with the restless element and after a few generations such recalcitrants
probably ceased to be born, and both the beehive and the ant-hill gradually became
ideal communistic states.2
In his book The Life of the White Ant, Maurice Maeterlinck has collected much
interesting material about the life of these insects, which are still more striking than
ants and bees.
At the very first attempts to study the life of white ants Maeterlinck
experiences the same strange emotional feeling of which I spoke earlier.

... it makes them almost our brothers, and from certain points of view, causes
these wretched insects, more than the bee or any other living creature on earth,
to become the heralds, perhaps the precursors, of our own destiny.

Further, Maeterlinck dwells upon the antiquity of the termites, which are much
more ancient than man, and upon the number and great variety of their species.
After this Maeterlinck passes to what he calls the " civilisation of the termites
".

Their civilisation which is the earliest of any is the most curious, the most
complex, the most intelligent, and in a sense, the most logical and best fitted to
the difficulties of existence, which has ever appeared before our own on this
globe. From several points of view this civilisation, although fierce, sinister
and often repulsive, is superior to that of the bee, of the ant, and even of man
himself.

In the termitary the gods of communism become insatiable Molochs. The

more they are given, the more they require; and they persist in their demands
until the individual is annihilated and his misery complete. This appalling
tyranny is unexampled among mankind; for while with us it at least benefits
the few, in the termitary no one profits.

The discipline is more ferocious than that of the Carmelites or Trappists; and
the voluntary submission to laws or regulations proceeding one knows not
whence is unparalleled in any human society. A new form of fatality, perhaps
the cruellest of all, the social fatality to which we ourselves are drifting, has
been added to those we have met already and thought quite enough. There is
no rest except in the last sleep of all: illness is not tolerated, and feebleness
carries with it its own sentence of death. Communism is pushed to the limits
of cannibalism and coprophagy.

. . . compelling the sacrifice and misery of the many for the advantage or
happiness of noneand all this in order that a kind of universal despair may be
continued, renewed and multiplied so long as the world shall last. These cities
of insects, that appeared before we did, might almost serve as a caricature of
ourselves, as a travesty of the earthly paradise to which most civilised people
are tending.

Maeterlinck shows by what sacrifices this ideal regime is bought.

 They used to have wings, they have them no more. They had eyes
which they surrendered. They had a sex; they have sacrificed it.3

The only thing he omits to say is that before sacrificing wings, sight, and sex,
the termites had to sacrifice their intelligence.

In spite of this the process through which the termites passed is called by
Maeterlinck evolution. This comes about because, as I have said before, every change
of form taking place over a long period of time is called evolution by modern thought.
The power of this obligatory stereotype of pseudo-scientific thinking is truly
astounding. In the Middle Ages philosophers and scientists had to make all their
theories and discussions agree with the dogmas of the Church, and in our day the role
of those dogmas is played by evolution. It is quite clear that thought cannot develop
freely in these conditions.
The idea of esotericism has a particularly important significance at the present
stage of the development of the thought of humanity, because it makes quite
unnecessary the idea of evolution in the ordinary sense of this word. It has been said
earlier what the word evolution may mean in the esoteric sense, namely, the
transformation of individuals. And in this meaning alone evolution cannot be
confused with degeneration as is constantly done by "scientific" thought, which
regards even its own degeneration as evolution.
The only way out of all the blind alleys created by both "positivist" and
speculative thought lies in the psychological method. The psychological method is
nothing other than the revaluation of all values from the point of view of their own
psychological meaning and independently of the outer or accompanying facts on the
basis of which they are generally judged. Facts may lie. The psychological meaning
of a thing, or of an idea, cannot lie. Of course it also can be understood wrongly. But
this can be struggled against by studying and observing the mind, that is our apparatus
of cognition. Generally the mind is regarded much too simply, without taking into
account that the limits of useful action of the mind, first, are very well known, and,
second, are very restricted. The psychological method takes into consideration these
limitations in the same way as we take into consideration, in all ordinary
circumstances of life, limitations of machines or instruments with which we have to
work. If we examine something under a microscope, we take into consideration the
power of the microscope ; if we do some work with a particular instrument, we take
into consideration properties and qualities of the instrumentweight, sharpness, etc.
The psychological method aims at doing the same in relation to our mind, that is, it
aims at keeping the mind constantly in the field of view, and at regarding all
conclusions and discoveries relatively to the mind. From the point of view of the
psychological method there are no grounds for thinking that our mind, that is, our
apparatus of cognition, is the only possible one or the best in existence. Equally there
are no grounds for thinking that all discovered and established truths will always
remain truths. On the contrary, from the point of view of the psychological method
there can be no doubt that we shall have to discover many new truths, either entirely
incomprehensible truths, the very existence of which we never suspected, or truths
fundamentally contradicting those which we have recognised until now. Of course
nothing is more terrifying and nothing is more inadmissible for all kinds of
dogmatism. The psychological method destroys all old and new prejudices and
superstitions ; it does not allow the thought to stop and remain contented with the
attained results, no matter how tempting and pleasant these results may appear, and no
matter how symmetrical and smooth all deductions made from them may be. The
psychological method gives the possibility of re-examining many principles which
have been considered as finally and firmly established, and it finds in them entirely
new and unexpected meaning. The psychological method makes it possible in many
cases to disregard facts or what are taken for facts, and allows us to see beyond facts.
Although it is only a method, the psychological method nevertheless leads us in a
very definite direction, namely towards the esoteric method, which is in reality an
enlarged psychological method, though enlarged in that sense in which we cannot
enlarge it by our own efforts.

1912-1929.

1 The nature of the automatism that governs the life of a beehive or an ant-hill cannot
be explained with the psychological conceptions existent in Western literature. And I
will speak of it in another book in connection with the exposition of the principles of
the teaching which was mentioned in the introduction.

2 I cannot refrain from mentioning an article by Obitatel "On Ants" in the Paris
newspaper, Vozrojdenie, of the 10th February, 1930 (in Russian). The author comes
very near the ideas set out above. I should have liked to quote some of his remarks,
but my book was already finished and was in the translator's hands.

3 The Life of the White Ant, by Maurice Maeterlinck, translated by Alfred Sutro
(George Alien and Unwin, London, 1927, pp. 17, 152, 163).

(A New Model of the Universe: Principles of the Psychological Method in its

Application to Problems of Science, Religion and Art. P. D. Ouspensky. Published
by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1931. Page 52-66)

This is a very bizarre piece of writing. I felt while reading it that it was so
good in certain ways and yet always deeply disturbing because of its obscene
stupidity, it is, in total everything I so loath and hate. But at the same time it delights
me. It is an odd business this existence thing, and from time to time this is pointed
out to me by those who do not care for my rational take on life. But it is next to
impossible to any such person to elaborate on their perspective to any degree that
amounts to anything more than a montage of self congratulatory nonsense. Of course
the above is nothing more than this, but it is so complete that it niggles me, it is an
uncompromising exposition of exactly the idea that am trying to expound that goes
way beyond my exposition for the demands it makes upon our credulity and it
contains within it threads of correct logic which are perfect for the argument being
presented. All very exasperating when all is said and done.
Imagine if the world were in some sense as Ouspensky describes it here. This
piece of writing is my best ever opportunity to try and examine the thinking that is
involved in this kind of reasoning. I am prepared to dismiss it out of hand, just as he
dismissed science and the real world of material causality that we consider science
mediates for us. But this effort at elaboration by Ouspensky, perhaps because he is
presenting an idea scientists would revile, which I know is correct from a scientific
point of view, and which I know why it is correct, makes it possible for me to try and
get closer to an understanding of the mind set of a mythologist. At first you may
think that I should make my mind up, am I interested in science or religion? But the
fact is that things being what they are, while I wish to eradicate religion from
existence, that is not the current state of play and the fact is that I live in a theocracy,
as do we all, and so dealing with this fac is a precondition of breaching the limitation
on thought imposed by the authority that creates out world. This is what Ouspensky,
in this piece gives me a chance to do more effectively than I have been able to do thus
far.
Thus far I have recognised that there is an intimate link between the manner in
which information creates social structure and then as information evolves that creates
social structure it necessarily creates a counterpart to the structural form which is an
identity bonding that form into a unified whole, an organism. Thus religion comes
into being along with the advance of practical knowledge, of all kinds, from law to
hydraulics, and as a canal system is built so a priesthood is developed. The two
elements are intrinsically linked. This is all very well, many people have recognised
the link between knowledge and social power, but as I am attempting to assert that
this is because human nature is corporate then I am trying to take the explanation for
this link into a new area of understanding.
With a thinker of Ouspensky's kind we have an intellectual who is attuned to
the mythological in preference to all else. The argument I have just been making
about the interdependence of the two social structures formed by the technical and the
mythical interpretations of reality justifies the belief in the power of mythological, or
esoteric knowledge. However, Ouspensky is in the end trying to assert the primacy of
esoteric knowledge, on good grounds, the grounds that it is esoteric knowledge that
creates the elite, or inner circle, as he calls it, which I too recognise is the central
product of the evolution of human nature to form a body at the level of social
coherence where an elite is vital to the growth of a dominant organic form.
My argument is that Ouspensky, and his ilk, the theists, are wrong in principle,
mythology does not explain reality, it encodes reality and thus empowers a priesthood
and forms a social elite that then have control of society, this is what has made the
Jews the master race and why the world functions as it does with Israel and the three
Jewish identity hierarchies making so much of the news. But the fact is, and this fact
does not lie, it is science that interprets this aspect of reality correctly.
But that said, and not wishing to be out and out arrogant, there is undoubtedly
some odd aspect to existence, and I have not only no idea what it is, but no idea how
to even think about what it might be. Ouspensky does not impress me when it comes
to this point in his argument anymore than any theological priest because in the end
what does he tell us? I have no tread any other part of his work, and I am not inclined
to, this much is bad enough. But the fact is that these exponents of special knowledge
always make out they know something but they will not say what. In other words you
are either in, and an acolyte, or you are out. And that is the whole point of such
knowledge systems, that is how they create a priestly structure as I indicated above
when I discussed the manner in which real knowledge about social organisation had
to give rise to coded forms of itself in order to create an organ of authority to give
coherence to the corporate organism that is a human animal.
 And so, this said, what about the actual encroachment upon our central theme
by this mythologist? Just as no archaeologist would not want to be seen dead in the
company of Von Daniken, nor any history professor would want to be placed side by
side with David Ike, so I have no desire to likened to an Ouspensky, although I have
already discovered that this is the kind of reaction you get from scientist when you
attempt to offer this purely scientific idea within their places of communication. With
this example from Ouspensky to go by I can see how the mere mention of human
corporate being would annoy scientists, it would be as if someone were to suddenly
say they knew the Egyptians were in fact from planet Mars.
Except it is not like that at all. There is no human being alive that is revolted
more by such perversions of science as this. But the fact is that science is utterly
perverted. I went to college to take a degree in Anthropology and Psychology when I
was nineteen years old and as a passionate atheist I had one thing on my mind, to
discover how out society could possibly function with the retention of religion woven
into its fabric. Today our society is so much more imbued with the religion of the
Jews which was so obviously crashing out of existence to all intents and purposes
when I was a youth. Why?
I have discovered the answer, and the answer is that science is perverted by
the theocracy, it is the slave of the theocracy. And thus in Ouspensky we just get one
more nice example of the theocracy's priesthood protecting itself. And lets face it
Ouspensky is committed to the Jewish mythology as well as anyone could be and the
Russians are just as much imbued with the Jewish slave implant as anyone else. I
love that line where he says a few of the ants may of protested when they saw the way
the wind was blowing, but their efforts were futile, and they died out. Scary.
So, I do not want to be associated with any kind of mythologist, I am the
purest of scientific thinkers, in intent if not in the entirety of my expression. Because
of the corruption of science by theists the only way that the way toward the truth can
be opened to science once again is if that long dead breed, the philosopher, raises their
head again, and as such, as much as I despise philosophy as we know it, it falls to me
to adopt the speculative disposition of the philosopher, but in the name of the scientist
who will not and cannot do this job of thinking for themselves. As a philosopher,
although my only interest is in science and what scientist can show by hard evidence
and repeatable demonstration and demonstrable ideas, I can include in my
investigation that actual intellectual material of none scientists and even those who are
antithetical to science. And that is precisely what I am doing here when I consider the
ideas of a mystic just because he has tackled science and given it an advanced
interpretation which happens to be correct, but by doing so he has made the truth even
more out of bounds than ever it were. Quite remarkable really. Can this of been
conspiratorial on the part of Ouspensky? I just do not know what to think about that
kind of thing, it is an obvious thought, but one to be resisted as too complicated an
explanation that is in any case conducive to the theistic mythology of individual
responsibility and antagonistic to the biological explanation of automaton disposition
created by way of the human physiology which inducts individuals into a scheme of
understanding which make them unwittingly complicit without having the least notion
why that do what they do. This robotic behaviour applies to the most actively
intelligent and well informed, as appears to be the case concerning Tony Blair's
behaviour over Iraq where he has simple obeyed the instructions of his Jewish slave
implant.
 The Inner Circle

What we have in Ouspensky's work is another facet of the intellectual world of

humans, to add to that of Spencer whom we started with, that is convinced of the
corporate nature of our species, but, as I say, from an alternative point of view, which
gives the description of this second vision of human nature, another hue.
Within this alternative view new facts come to light about the conditions
implicit in the form of human societies. Lets select these facts and number them by
way of a discussion of the relevance of Ouspensky's argument to science's
understanding of the true answer to the question of human nature.

1) Central to Ouspensky's discussion in the above section quoted is the idea of the
inner circle. Originally there was no inner circle, he tells us, and this simple social
state of organisation we may say equates to the manner of life of 'wild' human beings
living in a state of nature, living directly off Nature's bounty with imparting any
distinct control of over nature as it appeared of its own accord. Domestication
changed the nature of the relationship that people had with the rest of nature, and we
may wonder just how we should view this change. It seems that we are discussing
some radical new mode of living, and, once fully established, we are. But in truth the
extension of human control over nature began millions of years before humans came
into being. Simply manufacturing an artifact is a measure of control, and in saying
this we may stick to the distinction between making a nest, and making a tool, a tool
being an extension of functional purpose, and as such an extension of the
physiological being of an organism beyond the limits defined by their own individual
being. Pre-human species were making such anatomical extensions of themselves,
extending their individuality out into the extra-individual world, the social world, long
before humans, that is fully articulate mammals, came into being.
Thus, we can say that what became a distinct new way of life, based on the
domestication of other species, and, in the process, the domestication of our own kind
too, can be said to of begun with the making of the first tools, which means the
evolution of the first culture. With this deep-time perspective giving us a true sense
of what domestication really is as an organic phenomenon, not a somehow distinct
activity that we choose to call a cultural phenomenon, we can redefine domestication
accordingly, as a specific stage in an ongoing symbiotic process occurring between a
prime species and those which are drawn into its orbit of genetic influence. In a
complex of symbiotic species it follows that the base line of the interwoven
relationships can be drawn by identifying a linked relationship between the genes of
the various species. Thus if bees see infrared and flowering plants come to reflect
infrared wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum then there must, at heart, be a
direct relationship between the genes controlling vision in insects, and colouring in
plants, in these circumstances.
With the evolution of a symbiotic ecosystem centred upon mammalian
physiology, a logical and inevitable outcome of evolution, some form of appropriately
adapted mammal had to come into being in which the links between its genes and
those of its satellite species were suitably aligned, an alignment that would be
revealed by their forms, forms which we see directly. It is an inherent feature of such
a core organism in a symbiotic niche, that vastly increasing mass will be
characteristic. In effect the core species is drawing other suitably related species into
the influence of its own physical being, or energy. By related I therefore do not mean
genetically related in the usual sense, but rather energetically related because the
satellite species represent the sources of energy upon which the core species can draw
it own sustenance, or conversely we can note there will be those which act as
competitors for the same resources, or those of more favourable species, and so as we
see the process of domestication positively selecting species such as the horse or
sheep, we see the process of elimination negatively selecting species such as the
mammoth and the bear, wolf or larger feline.
So the core species in the unfolding superorganic form of the mammalian kind
will become supermassive. At all stages in this organic process there are
developments and consequences. The simple fact of massively increasing mass, like
that of domestication of species, has repercussions for the primary species acting as
the fulcrum of change. In life when mass increases complexity necessarily has to
increase too. It follows that as part of the evolving features of the evolving
superorganic form the ability to develop complexity of structure must be assumed.
Hence a mammalian form developed its cultural attributes that extended its
individuality into the social domain it evolved adaptive features to support these
changes. Thus the coming of the stage when the organism was fully formed, that is
formed with the potential to be truly superorganic, would involve the massive
increase in the biomass of the organism as this potential was realised and at the same
time the release of the potential to increase in structural complexity.
Ouspensky has picked upon on the central idea of an emerging structure
giving rise to an elite organ of authority, an inner circle, if we hark back to Spencer
we can use his terminology to place this idea in an organic conception of the process
whereby we come to speak of the potential to differentiate. It is this potential that we
see in the social structure to which Spencer refers. This differentiation gives rise to
specialised parts, that is organs of superorganic physiology, one of which Ouspensky,
as a mythologist interested in secret knowledge, is preoccupied with.
The primary organ in this process of differentiation brought on as the process
of symbiosis realises its potential increase the biomass of the primary species in the
niche system, is the primary species organ of authority. In insects the form this
process of differentiation takes results in the evolution of a queen individual within
which acts as the repository of all the information, or knowledge, of organic form.
The queen's form is the product of genetic instructions but those instructions include
blueprints that create organs of communication which act as transmitters of identity
tuned to the organs of reception which constitute elements of the mass of individuals
physical form. Communication via hormones is just as much a linguistic means of
communication as any mode of communication we have, it just does not look that
way to our severely limited ability to be conscious of consciousnesses other than our
own. Out priests of course tell us that our language is unique because it has meaning.
Well religion may have meaning for 99.99999999999% of the population, but I am
just as capable of understanding the pheromones, of which I have no knowledge, that
are passed between two ants, as I do of understanding the meaning of the messages
passed between two members of a religion. I do understand the human messages, just
as I do understand the insect messages, by various intellectual means, which allow me
to interpret the resulting behaviour, and that is of course why I am writing this natural
history of humans now, so that others might also be let into this mystery, in so far as
that is possible.
What Ouspensky is discussing here then is the evolution of the mammalian
equivalent of the ant queen, though he obviously has not the least idea that this is so.
The queen acts as the motive force for the colony and the source of identity, an
identity in which it is itself included, of course. This last remark may seem
unnecessary but when we come to consider how the queen organ has evolved in
humans, what form their queen identity has taken, without losing sight of their
presumed uniquely none organic form, we will see that via the linguistic, that is
intellectual, mechanism of duality, they have contrived to create a social organ that
has all the attributes of a queen body but nonetheless remains a tool of the individuals
it serves! The state and the individual cannot be divided, they are part of an organism,
and the true solution to the riddle is to know that it is identity, hence the power of
religion, that unites, and that all structures are organs of the organism united by
religion. The state is an organ of the church, the church come to that is an organ of
the true being, the true being is the living biomass that is the Jewish people. The
Jewish people are the carriers of the identity of our organism, they are the queen
body. This means we are all Jews of course, but because of the necessary process of
delimitation of consciousness, necessary to the process of creating structure, we are
prevented from knowing this, as far as possible.
Communication between individuals is the foundation of a symbiotic process,
bees and flowers obviously communicate with one another, although our ordinary
understanding of this word might seem to make the use of it in this context somewhat
poetic and unscientific, but is it? Bees of course have their own highly elaborate
language. We may think bee communication is not comparable to our language, and
so it is not in terms of its power, but then we are considerably different creatures to
bees by virtue of our primary form and it is the nature of the comparison I am
interested in. And if we are inclined to get cocky about our cleverness then I but
remind us again of the mind numbing stupidity of most of what we do and say,
whether it is the idiocy of religious myth that we take so seriously or the artificiality
of the life we like to engage in through recreational activities from cinema to sport.
When I assert, as is my way, that religious ideas are meaningless I am of
course intending to be scientifically consistent, but I am also allowing my passion for
atheism to colour my expression. This will not help people understand the logic
behind this assertion even if they agree that all religious myth is by definition
nonsense, if taken at face value. The crucial point about communication between the
members of a superorganic organism is that all should be induced to share a common
sense of belonging, they should feel they have the same identity. Communication has
material elements, what we might call factual, delivering information about the real
material world. But most communication is about community, in other words about
identity. The best way to think about this kind of communication is in terms of
colour. Religion is a colour for this reason. If I were to ask you what a colour means,
assuming it was not a colour which had a clear meaning, such as that of a flag, then
you would consider the question meaningless. If, for example, I pointed to your skin
and asked "What does that mean?" You would think was an idiot. If I indicated two
people, one black and one white and asked if you could see any difference between
them, and you noted their respective colours and then I pointed to one person's skin
and asked what that means, you would gather that I meant the colour of their skin and
you would still think I was an idiot because the colour of a persons skin does not have
meaning, it simply is, it is a functional attribute of their physiology evolved by virtue
of their historical origins. That, at any rate, is the story the priests tout. It is of course
complete and utter nonsense.
Racial identity imparts identity. If a superorganism occupies a territory that
requires some physiological fine tuning then this will occur, but it will also carry
some incidental exaggeration lending itself to the special role of identifying the local
population to the territory they occupy. This racial differentiation is a prehuman
feature of the series of species that have evolved along the lines of an ever more
empowered superorganic mammalian form. But race is still a highly potent symbol of
identity and what skin means is "This is who are you are." Now this is a racist fact,
not welcome therefore amongst the people who rule us today by means of another
device, language. Language has a functional component to it but like physiology it
also carries imbued within it the indicators of identity, the colours in other words.
Religion is the linguistic colour that imbues itself into a population. It is because the
linguistic colour has superseded the racial colour that the theist now makes a point of
decrying racism while still extolling the virtues of their identity mantra.
Thus, just as we think it is mad to say that a colour has meaning, although we
are completely wrong about this, so we think it is mad to say religion is as
meaningless as the pheromones of an ants life, and we are equally wrong about this.
Neither skin pigmentation nor mythology has meaning in the literal sense of the word,
both have meaning as social markers, both have exactly the same meaning. Religion
is simply an advanced form of racism, and this is what we all know when we see the
consequences of religion in its overtly negative guise.

Developing our understanding of how we can be a true superorganism from

this discussion of the real nature of identity as it pertains to individuals within small
superorganic bodies and as it pertains to fully realised superorganic entities such as
we live as part of today we can see that what Ouspensky is giving us in this account is
a slight insight, a conceptual bridges, between the nature of myth and the real
knowledge we have mastered by way of what we now call science. It is not surprising
that identity markers are carried on the outer surface of the body, and as hominids
evolved to be ever more attuned to a corporate form nakedness will of come into
being in order to provide, amongst other supporting features, a platform upon which
to stamp a communal identity. It may seem daft then to say that the skin that covers
our bodies is the skin of the superorganism, but it is far from daft, this is the crucial
point, we all carry the skin of the organism to which we belong.
With the coming of language and the arts of culture which are so intimately
associated with it we find we eventually get to the point where we recognise our true
nature and so we recognise that all the things that we produce are exoskeleton and the
means by which we produce this outer shell within which we all live is through
knowledge delivered via the medium of language. So, recognising that language is to
the superorganism as genes are to individual organism that constitutes one of its units
we recognise that as genes produce functional form in the shape of upright posture,
opposable thumbs and an ability to transmit useful information to create a corporate
body so language, simultaneously as it produces the knowledge that delivers
functional cultural forms produces none functional knowledge of identity to give
colour to the functional structure it causes individuals to generate. Thus language
produces a skin, an exoskeleton, and at the same time it produces a symbolic pigment
imbued into it, whether this takes the form of art, music or modern sophisticated
religion. Religion then, we can say, is the symbolic pigmentation imbued into the
exoskeleton of the organism.
The myth Ouspensky renders for us here in a form of modern code, that is to
say his attempt to account for the newly arrived scientific insights in a manner that
accords with ancient esoteric knowledge means he retains the coded nature of the
argument over and above the actual science. Ouspensky seeks to reduce evolution to
esoteric myth just as in more recent times the Children of Abraham have sort to
reduce Darwinism itself to a form of Biblical myth in their fabrication of Creationism.
We of course, with the benefit of science have no problem decoding the esoteric myth
that Ouspensky has partially decoded as it reduces the Biblical story into a rational
description of social evolution; rational in that we do not have boats standing in for
societies or priestly institutions. There was a programme on the BBC's history
channel today, 21/05/04, I have seen it before, but even so, about the destruction of
Sodom and Gomorrah in which lots of scientist were working hard on the idea that
these cities were stood on the shore of the Dead Sea and were destroyed by an
earthquake because the Biblical account gives a description that matches what we
now call liquefaction. In other words these people are still milking this ancient
nonsense, which if we follow the extremely intelligent sounding interpretation of
Ouspensky, was always nonsense, for it was always meant to be a coded form of
knowledge about the fate awaiting people who did not learn the importance of the
inner circle, a lesson always only intended for the initiates of the inner circle but given
out to the masses as divine wisdom which they believed on faith and now in the age
of science is used to pervert science by pretending that these idiotic stories were ever
anything other than functional knowledge pigmented with linguistic markers of
identity to imbue a corporate organism that was created by the inner circle who
preserved the knowledge in question.

Thus, we can say that an inner circle definitely did evolve routinely in human
social organisms as a matter of necessity, as dictated by the human nature that human
physiology must obey. The evolution of the myths Ouspensky recounts that he
associates with this organic process demonstrates the function of language in its role
of creative medium of the corporate physiology. It is not surprising that there should
be an endless supply of mythologists like Ouspensky who are driven to think in
accord with this type of idea and to take up the role of communicators thereof.
Likewise it follows that as there is one sort of person given over to adore such illusion
and to want to preach it, there must be a far greater number waiting to be preached to
in the simplistic manner of this kind of thinking. People need to receive a colour for
the content of their mind. If make colour synonymous with identity for the purposes
of our discussion here then we can say that it is not possible for an organism to exist
without a colour, without an identity. I only sink to using similes because I trying to
drag people into a place where they can see the logic of what I am saying and make
the simple connections between racial identity and religious identity that need to come
out of this understanding. But the practice of using similes gives us a sense of how
our mode of communication lends itself naturally to the creation of elaborate
representative mythologies encoding functional elements of reality into conceptual
images. A functional element of reality is the immortality of the human organism that
we are part of, we cannot embrace this knowledge head on, or have no been able to
thus far, but we do sense it and it is in fact real, by thinking, as the Druids did of a
place beyond death within the earth and watery places, or as the Jews did of a place
beyond the earth, in the opposite direction, naturally, in heaven, then the notion of
immortality is invoked and we are put in intimate contact with a real idea that we
simply cannot know, but most certainly can feel. From this basic strategy the detail of
how we behave in recognition of this sense of immortality can be developed and the
Romans tell us that the Druid were particularly challenging warriors because of the
deeply felt conviction that they had that there was an afterlife. Thus this connection
with an important feature of the real nature of the human form, its life beyond that of
the individual, was made manifest in the behaviour of the individuals of which the
organism was composed. Today, with the Moslem, we see the idea being turned to
the same good effect as this third wing of the Jewish organism gets into its stride in
the last stages of realising the Zionist dream of one world ruled by the Jewish inner
circle, the preservers of our identity, and thus invokes the insurgency of the Moslem
to induce the world to sink into the quagmire of uniformity of identity by exerting
resistance.
All that is discussed here is an organic process and, as partially implied by
Ouspensky, humans have absolutely no conscious role in the enactment of the process
in the social forms and activities that we see and record. He speaks of people not
being aware of their need for outside help, and then when they have they must accept
it on faith, so they still have no idea why they do what they do, they just know they
must do as they are advised by the priests. If you accept, for one moment, that what I
am telling you about the nature of the Jews as the master race, and thus the role of the
Romans, the British and the Americans, as slaves of the Jews is correct, which it is,
then you will recognise that we do indeed have not the slightest idea what we are
doing and why we are doing it. And the reason for this is that we do not know the
nature of our own identities, and, just as for the queen ant, the same goes for the Jews,
they know no more about what Judaism is than the rest of us, they are just more
intimately attached to the identity than the rest of us and they carry certain functional
elements of identity that makes them operate as motivational organs within the fabric
of the organism; otherwise they are just as oblivious to reality as the rest of us.
 Chapter II

The Evolution of the Idea of Individuality

'The Vanity of Absolute difference

One's first impulse is to withdraw into oneself, where

one finds nothing but words.

 ALAIN

Hegel believed that in each of us there resides some absolute

difference, which can be objectivized as such. For my part, I have rejected
superficial logic in an attempt to break with the commonly held idea that a
person is a pole of individual qualities, or even a unified center of choice and
action. This means that the person is no longer a self, the center of whose
existence is rooted in a sovereign power of thought. Instead of an I that
realizes itself through reflection and likes to objectivize it essential difference,
what have we found? A writer, a fake Orpheus, erecting an image of him or
herself in the mirror of a fictitious other of his or her own invention; an
autobiographer prepared to manipulate the apparatus of utterance in an attempt
to establish his or her absolute difference.'

(Difference and Subjectivity: Dialogue and Personal Identity,

Francis Jacques, Yale University Press, 1991. Page 183)
 The symbiotic revolution led directly to the evolution of civilisation.
Civilisation, involved simple superorganic forms uniting with one another to produce
ever more complex superorganic forms, ever larger, ever more powerful human
beings, by means of the re-orientation of fauna and faunal species into an array of
dependence about a massively augmented human organism, which was itself
subjected to a concomitant differentiation of its internal structure resulting in the
evolution of specialised groups segregated from one another by means of an intricate
combination of genetically and linguistically driven attributes, that is, by way of
physiological and cultural attributes such as race and language. And the resulting
deposit of material existence, in all its forms, from mud huts to motorways, is simple
the material accretion of an exoskeleton befitting the growth of the new, complex
superorganic form. History is the record of this biological process of evolution.
There is no such thing as history as distinct from biology. History as we understand it
is part of the priestcraft that keeps us imbued with our implanted identity, by
reinforcing our focus upon the self and the individual. Our impulse to create a self
image is an evolved disposition, one that is reinforced by the priesthood because that
is the function of this blind spot created by linguistic imagery, to keep us focused on
the self centred role while we respond to the programme delivered by corporate
nature.
We have seen the case for interdependent differentiation leading to the
formation of social structure made by Spencer, and Ouspensky has focused our
attention upon the central act of differentiation into a bilateral division of society to
create a minor, all powerful elite, and a major, all submissive mass. I have indicated
that the evolution of the linguistic information which has driven the process of human
evolution since the coming of our kind, leading to the evolution of a true superorganic
form of human being, has relied upon a mechanism of duality which has, essentially,
been oriented about this fundamental split between the authority within the social
being and the mass of the being that is subject to command. The ever increasing
sophistication of the linguistic formula accounting for this split has produced the
modern mythologies, we which actually think of as ancient in many respect because
to us thousands of years is a vast length of time while to evolution it is a mere
heartbeat. But it is the evolution of highly complex models of society such as we find
in the Jewish mythology that rules our world, that has made the evolution of the
spectacular organic form that we are today, possible.
It follows that there is an intimate relationship between the idea of the
individual and the segregation of the elite caste organ of authority from the main
biomass within which it nonetheless remains as an integral organic part, as an organ, a
brain. From what has just been said we may think that this link is a matter of
contrivance, authority needed to invoke individuality to hide its true nature otherwise
if everyone knew the secret of the real nature of human nature then authority would
be undermined. This is certainly the case, but this mode of understanding assumes
that there is such a thing as a purposeful individual making such self serving
decisions, and this is exactly what we are saying is not the case, the whole process is
driven by purely organic means without the interplay of any genuinely conscious
human awareness.
What we need to understand is that the act of substantial differentiation of a
united body of individuals who form one organic being, into a differentiated
association of interdependent parts is, of itself, a process that defines individuals as
distinct from one another. In other words, the evolution of differentiation is the
evolution of individuality. This is necessarily so because it involves the attribution of
status to a distinct set of individuals from the rest, and the moment one such
distinction makes itself felt it carries with it a degree of complexity in this regard for
we find a supreme figure, a royal being, and a close inner circle of courtly being, and
so on. Thus the definition of individuality is made manifest to the consciousness of
all because it is set into a material or substantial form, it becomes structural.
Above, when we first mentioned the evolution of the symbiotic process as
evidenced by means of the coming of true extensions of the individual body to form
tools that manipulated the social world and beyond, we sort to understand the nature
of the process of domestication in terms of deep-time process. Rather than thinking
that humanity suddenly stepped out of the wilderness and became human we
recognised that the process of symbiosis, that we call domestication, really began with
the making of the first tools, millions of years before our fully superorganic form of
hominid came into being. We are now in a position to apply the same logic to the
latest subject of our attention, the coming of substantial interdependent differentiation
leading to the foundation of social structure and the rise of civilisation, what we are
equated to the evolution of individuality.
Previously we placed the domestication process into a biological scheme by
recognising that as sophisticated as the transformation of a wild species into a
domesticated species seems, what with all the major consequences for the human
mode of subsistence and living, this simple fact of domestication is just one more
notch on the arrow of symbiosis that is witnessed by the coming of the first stone
tools or the coming of fire and so on, all these cultural developments are symbiotic in
their nature because they are about the extension of the human form into the fabric of
the nonhuman world in such a way that the genetic makeup of both parties, the human
and the nonhuman are effected in an interdependent fashion.
Now we can do the same with respect to the ever increasing appearance of
individuality in human consciousness and culture. We have just recognised that as
with the coming of domesticated species so there was a moment of transition from
one simple state of being where there was one unified social being to another state of
social organisation, related to the settlement of communities founded on the basis of
the symbiotic process of domestication. And that this moment of distinct structural
differentiation also denotes the moment when individuality begins to come into being
as a distinct feature of our species. Once again then we must extend out conception of
this singular event fixed in a narrow time fame that makes it appear like a
discontinuous leap from a state of genetically driven evolution into a unique mode of
culturally driven self-evolution, as Ouspensky and the modern scientist of human
behaviour would have it. Nothing could be more ridiculous than this modern
conception of human evolution.
The fact is that individuality existed in the simple superorganic form before
our species blossomed when the symbiotic process reached a critical point of
interaction with the none human environment. Simple societies had a range of
individuals displaying a variety of human traits that we are familiar with today, some
of which lend themselves to the role of respected elder, others which tend to the less
well respected role of a dependant personality. So there was genetically induced
differentiation before linguistically induced differentiation superseded in the new
environment of the complex superorganism that came into being on the back of the
symbiotic process which produced domesticated species and resulted in a settled
lifestyle evolving.
Individuality is found in other species, indeed it has even been reported in
ants, where some ants in the slave making symbiosis operating in some species are
found to be rebellious against their slave implant which is received due their masters
having taken them from their own nest as pupae and raised them in their slave
quarters where they have received the alternative identity in exactly the same way
people receive their Jewish slave identities in the form of Christianity and Islam in
those territories where the Jewish overlordship has been imposed by military
conquest. Thus it is not correct to say that individuality evolved at a specific moment
in time anymore than it is correct to say that domestication evolved at a specific
moment in time because both these attributes of the human organism are features of
far deeper process that have to do with the integration of the mammalian form into the
extended environment and the internal structuring of the human organic fabric itself.
Thus we should not speak of the evolution of individuality at this moment when
individuality appears to come into our consciousness, but rather we should speak of
the evolution of the idea of individuality, which of course has go on increasing in
intensity over the intervening millennia ever since.
Wherever differentiation into a distinct organic structure occurs we can invoke
the idea of individuality. Thus we can say that the evolution of the elite caste organ
created a super-individual, if we so choose to use this nomenclature to make plain the
link between the various elements of the superorganic form and the process creating
it. It should be plain that it is essential that at all times each individual, whoever they
are should be highly focused upon their own self and their own self interest. This
may seem to be antagonistic to the unification of a united organ from many
interdependent parts since we know that when we have periods of political ideology
such as the Thatcherite nightmare in 1980's and 90' Britain we produce an generation
of dog-eat-dog and each for themselves individualists. But the effect was to produce
a highly organised and thoroughly enslaved society in which the organisation of
individuals in the form of trade unions which were effectively competing with the
state for power was eradicated in favour of traditional centralised power which
delivered immense wealth to the few a good standard of living to an extensive
minority. Thus the overall effect of encouraging people to be ruthlessly selfish, in the
context of an overarching state power was to reconstitute the unified centrality of the
organic body of society. The result was so dramatic that the socialist party, Labour,
was destroyed outright and was obliged to reinvent itself under the figurehead of a
Christian priest-like person in Tony Blair and to name itself New Labour, but to
become a mirror image of the Conservative party, as has been perfectly well
recognised since then by anyone interested in the subject. The only thing New
Labour can think to do to make itself radically socialist now is to play on the
sentiment of moralistic sentimentality so central in socialist circles by fighting for the
rights of animals by calling for the abolition of hunting, and even this it cannot bring
itself to do!
So individualism is never what it seems to be to us. The key point it to capture
blocs of people within identity brackets, thus, to stick with the recent political history
of our times, Thatcher very cleverly, and effectively, extended the catchments of a
central structural element of British society by giving away the council housing stock
in a thoroughly cynical attempt to destroy the foundation of socialists sentiment which
was the basis of working class support for trade union style radicalism. It worked.
But, like so much that this women did, the after affects are only now beginning to
emerge from the social fabric. The talk is of doubling interest rates this week, today
is 26/05/04, simply in order to try and stop the rampant rise in house prices and it is
simply impossible to think how a young person can ever hope to buy a house unless
they are exceptionally privileged. So the selfish impulse of individuality that
Thatcher tapped into in order to retain authority vested in the traditional bulwark of
the state, capitalist wealth, has meant that the last generation sold their children's
future down the river for what was to them a life long gain but which in social terms
was a very short-sighted gain indeed.
Of course Thatcher did not work these very clever tactics out herself, she was
just a figurehead, but what we have here is some very knowledgeable manipulation of
the structure of society. It is clearly essential that people can see no further than their
noses when they are being driven to respond to the constraints of their structural
location, what sociologists might refer to as the role and class position. Thus we have
discrete levels of awareness concerning our identity, we know our self, and we know
our location in the macro-structure of society. But each item of self conception is
bounded by the overt characteristics of these limits of awareness. Thus we know we
live in a council house and if the government in going to sell us these properties at
half price we know we must buy them just as surely as we know we must get out of
the way of an oncoming vehicle if we happen to possess the identity of a pedestrian
stood in the middle of the road when there is such a vehicle coming in our direction.
The discreteness of individual self awareness is therefore the foundation of all
social superstructure, without it it would not be possible to create enclaves of identity
composed of individuals who identify themselves with the enclave and act
accordingly in a manner that allows the enclave so defined to act as a structural organ
within the matrix of the living body as if it were itself one individual 'person'; we will
see in our next section just how prominent this idea of the group as person has been
during important periods in the intellectual and practical history of our own
superorganism. Science, because it looks beyond the usual limits of perception can
breech these naturally occurring boundaries of group integrity, or, as we might say, to
make a point of the contradiction, of group individuality. But people will simply
continue to perceive their world in terms of their own self centred needs according to
their role and class position in the exoskeletal structure. Tell a person that a
motorway is evolved in the same was as lungs are evolved, and, if they are clever and
on the ball, they will correct you by saying this is not so, because we build motorways
to overcome a particular problem. This is perfectly reasonable, but in terms of trying
to comprehend human nature, and how we come to do the things we do, it is useless,
it carries no deep time perspective, it is the wisdom of the person who sees only their
self identity and the extension of the self into the being of group identity, hence the
'we' bit in the rebuff to this superorganic idea.
Via the insight of science we acquire the amazing notion that all the things we
create are biologically driven so that we come to describe all artificial products as
exoskeletal phenomenon. Consider the nature of a motorway in this light and you get
a very different conception of what a motorway is, and why it evolves as part of the
territorial environment of the human superorganism. And this latter idea makes sense
in the grander scheme of evolutionary understanding than the original notion of a
solution to a problem. What is more, the scientific idea embraces all creativity right
back through time, so that when ape-men were making stone tools we can see that
they too would only of conceived of their craft as problem solving solutions that
worked, just as chimpanzees must do that fashion twigs to catch termites upon. But
we know that these stone tools were extensions of the individual into the environment,
and as such that had the special quality of invoking a superorganic form because of
the extreme density of the information that was being passed culturally between
individuals to bring about the sophisticated manufacture of stone tools. Thus the
stone axe, millions of years old, is put in the same bracket as the modern
superhighway, exactly as it should be if we claim to of solved the problem of human
nature and thus to of determined a thread of unchanging continuity in the evolution of
our kind.
But how do our famous philosophers tackle this problem when they face it
head on?

'Where does this powerful urge to be unique come from? Valéry puts
forward the hypothesis that our terror of death produces from within its
shadows some frantic wish to be different from everyone else. Perhaps. I note
simply that it comes from a disastrous confusion between individual and
personal difference. In which case, we refuse to be like others in the same
way that we refuse to accept that others are people like ourselves.'

(Ibid. Page 184)

This tells us nothing, as is so often the case when a question concerning the
nature of something, that is to say when we want an answer that tells us what a thing
is for, how it makes sense in the context we are considering, is asked, all we get is a
renaming of the thing. The 'urge to be unique' is renamed the 'confusion between
individual and personal difference'. Well, so what, where does the confusion between
individual and personal difference come from? "Drrrrrrrrrr! Dunno mate. Could it
be the urge to be unique?"
How thick is it possible for exceedingly clever people to get? Incredibly thick,
believe me. But this philosopher is not attempting to enlighten us, he has an agenda,
to be a priest supporting the latest idea of the priesthood in their endless pursuit of the
Zionist ideal of one world under one authority. What he does gives us here is the
clear message that we should respect differences in others, such a black people or
Muslims, but not seek to invoke the irrelevant differences in ourselves, such as our
whiteness or our Atheism. So the work of such a philosopher is simply embroiled in
the functional impetus of the subject matter he pretends to shed light upon. He is not
giving knowledge, he is manipulating knowledge to suit his own individual ends as a
priest within the establishment. I have not read anymore than is quoted here and so he
may well go to some length to develop the idea of individual and personal difference
and how we conflate the two where they should be distinct. But I cannot imagine
how such an argument could be made, and given the trite manner in which this phrase
is used and certainly cannot imagine that the argument would not simply show how
the priest worked his words to achieve his objective so I am not about to waste half an
hour studying writing that cannot possibly be anything other than priestcraft.
This priestcraft is all very well, it is natural, its expression is the reason that
language evolved. But here we only want to know what is, we have no axe to grind,
and we value no values because we recognise the validity of this misrepresentation of
human nature as being in perfect keeping with the self centred focus of human
individuals. Individuality comes from the need to create difference, hence the
intimate association between these two ideas which Jacques work does make plain
enough, and this is why we have him quoted here.
The importance of delimiting the sense of identity even as individuals are
raised from their personal position of identity as an individual to their higher positions
of identity as members of groups, is that this limitation of awareness of self is the
exact means by which by which a super-individual is brought into being by making a
compound of personal individuals coalesce under one conceptual limit which they can
then see as belonging to them. The more diffuse the conceptual limit, the more
difficult it is for the personal individual to disentangle the sense of personal self from
that of group self. Diffuse concepts are those that are integrated most uniformly
through a biomass, so much so that they are simply taken for granted and so not
noticed, race, language, religion, occupation, nationality and such like macro limits of
identity. But the failure to recognise the loss of self to the unification of selves into
one super-individual is precisely what turns the group into an effective organ, and this
is what lays the foundation for a super-organ amongst such super-individuals to
evolve. Such a super organ is in effect a brain for it has the motive power that all
relatively inferior groups are obliged to obey. But this superstructure of identification
relies upon concentric levels of ever broadening limits of identity, and at each stage
the various levels in each category must lose their ability for full consciousness of
their own self if the system is to be functional as a structural basis for an organic
form. This is precisely what makes the triadic religious identity a standard mode of
evolution in the formation of super-massive superorganic forms, the Judeo-Christian-
Moslem triad is the best example of this structure and we see in it how the same
common identity that makes it possible to speak of these three distinct groups as
Children of Abraham, also ensures structural differentiation.
And differentiation means individuality, so by ensuring these three groups
remain distinct in the consciousness of each the groups they constitute equate to
individuals. But by having at their core one common thread of motivation they shift
in the same direction in their behaviour, this makes them operate as one organism but,
crucially, the delineation of the identities ensures that their must be one senior group,
one super-group, super-individual, super-organ, all of which means one brain, always
struggling to the death for the survival of the common core because it is itself all core,
and nothing else and the elimination of its identity would mean the elimination of all
three identities. And this dynamic, the dynamic of the super-organ explains
everything about Jewish history.
The super-organ defined by an identity that makes it into a super-brain is the
product of an evolutionary process of elevation that endlessly drives knowledge into
an enclave of power where it is associated with an identity and comes to form a
priesthood, a group with a personality that whose acts are focused upon the growth of
the organism. The Jewish identity evolved about a core of real knowledge which had
the purpose that equates to human nature infused into it as the sacred knowledge of
identity. This simple core urge, to rule the world, which obeys the impulse to form a
superorganism that is the product of human nature being corporate, is what makes
motorways a desirable solution to a problem, as the women said to me in the pub last
night, 25/05/04. Motorways are not just a solution to a problem, they are a solution to
the problem. The problem of how to rule the world by evolving one unified
organism, how to extend your exoskeleton outward ever further to give form to the
motive force of identity that prompts you to rule the world under one identity, to form
one planetary organism, with one super-organ, one brain. And we are all familiar
with how central the dead straight Roman road was to these great disseminators of
Judaism, and these people were not the first to make roads the backbone of their
super-massive superorganic being, and that is because such extensions of the self are
the most obvious first foundation of plant-animal such as human organisms can
appear to be according to the thinking of advocates of real Super Beings.

Individuality, the Inner Circle, and the Idea of Freedom

 Interdependent differentiation in the evolution of mammalian physiology into
a superorganism unfolded as the creation of the human form with all the attributes we
know we have today. Ever increasing complexity in the process of differentiation
split the superorganic form into two fundamentally distinct forms, a corporate organ
of authority and a concomitant highly self cantered individual separated from the
corporate body in their own consciousness by way of the ever increasing distinctness
of certain individuals from other distinct individuals and from the majority of the
more amorphous mass of individuals, in the, so called, historical process, of role
specialisation.
The sophistication of society arising from these developments in social
structure with their associated sophistication of ideas about life and the nature of
existence has come down to our own time in a very distinct sense of the idea of
freedom, and idea that is intimately linked to the idea of the individual. It is implicit
in the idea of a superorganic form that there cannot in any real sense be such a thing
as an individual, I have said that the illusion is made manifest by virtue of the
extension of the mass of the superorganism to such an extent that a whole swathe of
humanity can make the idea of individuality the corner stone of its sense of being,
built essentially on the vast power at its disposal and the even greater mass of people
who have become drawn into the gravitational field of the core identity and who thus
make the excessive power of the minority sustainable, in the usual manner that applies
to the formation and maintenance of a core body in the human form.
Thus, if there is no such thing as an individual in any absolute sense, then
there is likewise no such thing as freedom in any absolute sense either, for we are
saying that the idea of freedom comes from the idea of the individual, and the latter is
none real and so the former is likewise none real. But, relatively speaking, as opposed
to speaking in absolute terms, then the difference between individuals does mean that
both these nonexistent attributes of human superorganic physiology can be
experienced as real by the individuals cocooned within the organic physiology of the
exoskeleton which appears to them as an artificial environment self created by them
as individuals working together toward the end of increasing individual freedom. But
the real goal of freedom is to serve the ends of the superorganism by extending its
reach to draw in more and more of the world human biomass under one identity and
to thereby access as much of the planets energy as possible under one authority. As
the energy drawn under the control of one identity increases so the mass of the core
body increases and the reach of the sense of individuality, along with its associated
sense of freedom, increases in proportion.
On this scale, the macro scale of the entire mass of the superorganic being, the
structure of the identity must differentiate into appropriately broad stages f
differentiation, this requires that the core identity must split into subidentities leading
to the evolution of a hierarchical identity structure. Observation of human
superorganisms down the ages indicates that the naturally occurring division on this
macro level, applying to the identity of the entire organism, is into three, leading to
the evolution of a triadic identity structure. It transpires that the evolution of the
impending global identity, and its global superorganism, fits this observation nicely,
the Jewish core, or master identity, has divided into one Western variation, we know
as Christianity, and an Eastern variation we know as Islam. This triad forms one
identity package and it has laid the foundation of a global organism, as we are well
aware from the daily experience of our lives today. The identity of this global
organism is, simply put, Judaic.
 So as differentiation led to the evolution of individuality, as a real experience,
if not as a reality in itself, then it also led to the loss of freedom that is implicit in the
primary division of the organic fabric of the superorganism into those individuals
closer to the focus of authority, and those whose sole experience of authority is their
obedience to its dictates. By concentrating upon this aspect of the evolution of the
human organism we can gain important insights into the detailed means by which the
process of human evolution unfolds. We know that language is the fluid-genetic
medium of the social body. That is to say, that it is linguistic information that creates
social form by directing individual behaviour, and by forming the linguistic
equivalent of a genome in the form of cultural knowledge. And we have already
noted that as the linguistic genome evolves a functional aspect that creates substantial,
material forms, the information genome is imbued with social information routines
which, in turn, imbue the material and otherwise substantial, that is behavioural,
aspects of individual life, with identity. Thus we get things like religion which
although self evidently ridiculous in terms of the information they deliver concerning
material representations of reality, they encode intuitive knowledge that the
priesthood, the inner circle, have found functional in their role as master authority
directing the organisation of the sum total of the organism's being.
It is all very well to assert these conditions concerning the function of
language in relation to the creation of social form, but it is immensely difficult to give
expression to these ideas in a manner that people can read and understand. The main
difficulty is the lack of will to understand, the natural inclination is to resist
understanding because unearthing the scientific understanding of this ancient
knowledge is a destructive process. The reason that the application of scientific logic
to the understanding of human nature is destructive is that it involves delving into the
fabric of our living social being. Thinking about this rather reminds me of the point
sometimes made by archaeologists regarding their own field of knowledge
acquisition, theirs is an inherently destructive science. Archaeologists do unearth
artifacts that can be preserved, but as the art of this craft has developed into a more
scientific search for knowledge the real substance a good, professional, modern
archaeologist unearths as they destroy their once only material deposit, is information,
information that can be accumulated to provide remarkable knowledge about the lives
of bygone superorganisms.
Obviously if we reveal to our consciousness precisely how the linguistic
formulas work that programme our behaviour then a similar effect will occur as that
which is implicit in the work of the archaeologist. At first thought this might not be
obvious, but if I tell you that by this means the more upfront codification of
knowledge into an elaborate identity matrix, such as that which we call a religion, can
be decoded, so that for example, we can prove God does not exist by showing what
God is, 'God' in Judaic mythology being the priestcraft's code word for the
superorganism. Then it is immediately obvious that you cannot have science and
religion both extant in one society, either there is religion with science as its slave, or
there is science and no religion. Hence "Uncompromising Atheism, Real Science of
Humanity". So we can see that by revealing the code's true meaning, somewhat as
Ouspensky partially does, but by going all the way, we necessarily destroy the
knowledge that is constructed by means of that specific code, in this case a code
which is founded upon the idea of one God as the key, that is the touchstone, to which
we always refer all our reasoning about human existence.
 What we are proposing to do now however is to go much further than this
superficial reduction of Biblical mythology to allegory, something that has been done
often enough, we are set on reducing our very language to its base meaning, its
machine code that reveals each fragment of the underpinnings of the mythical code
upon which religion is based.
We can do this because we have the key to human nature and we have been
able to pursue the evolution of human form and recognise the role of language in the
generation of that exoskeletal form and the role of the primary linguistic mechanism
of duality that splits the organism into two conceptual entities, Super Being and Self
Being, which in reality are only structural divisions of one physical Being. The
maintenance of our sense of this structural division as a real division is reliant upon
the language we speak, and this means that it is the evolution of our language which
preserves out blindness to our own true nature and our ability to be convincingly
focused upon the false mythology of our religious identity. Furthermore, because the
focus of our consciousness upon our identity is dependant upon the words we learn as
we acquire our identity through speech there is a power of diffusion of understanding
inherent language which makes codification possible. This power of diffusion means
that ideas which have proved central to the evolution of the cultural knowledge which
is the information programming the units of which an organism is formed can devolve
away from their core idea and still preserve the same functional meaning. Preserving
the same functional meaning is a reference to the function of a code. Thus as our
society has become ever so complex it has proved necessary for the theocracy which
is at its core to differentiate its knowledge in a most remarkable manner so that the
overtly mythological code that was always preserved at the core of social authority
has been obliged to strip itself of the mythological image and yet to preserve the
meaning of its coded authority in the language that all people speak.
And so, to try and make, at least some element of what I am trying to explain
here simple to grasp, it follows that the central theme of the mythology has to be
preserved in the none mythological everyday language of ordinary people's speech.
In fact, the effect of this infusion of mythological meaning into ordinary, none
mythological speech, is to turn the ordinary into the mythological. Somewhat
amazingly, but not really, when you think about it, this transformation of the secular
into the mythological is understood by us as the exact opposite, as the transference of
the theological into the political. New words are woven, and new structures formed to
carry the image they deliver to our consciousness, but the mythological meaning is
thus simply carried by a new linguistic formula, this may not have to be so, but
because the priesthood remains as an established and all powerful force in society and
the religion they sustain continues to be imprinted upon the identity of the organic
biomass of the organism then the result is that we find overtly theistic priests like
Tony Blair, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher retaining power in the supposedly
secularised structures of the political domain. This clearly cannot be possible, the
words tell us it is so, the church has been separated from the state and made
independent of the theocracy, but our eyes tell us this is not so. And indeed with
events such as the Zionist war on Iraq carried out purely in the interests of Israel, we
see the manifest effect of the continuing command of the theocracy, by the Jewish
priesthood, consisting of the biomass of the Jewish people, being as powerful as it
ever was in the days of the British or Roman empires.
We call this process secularisation, only we do not normally hear the actual
language we speak being included in the progress of this process of transformation,
naturally, to reveal that kind of information would tend to defeat the object, as I have
said when I said that revealing how language actually functions to programme our
behaviour must necessarily jeopardise the programme that sustains our society as we
know it. No bad thing in my opinion, eradicating the priesthood of Judaism, which is
why I have devoted my life to working this stuff out for myself.
What we find then is that the sentiments of the theology which rules our lives
via the core organ that is devoted to its preservation, are encoded into the very
language that we speak, and this is why we speak so freely of individuality, freedom,
rights and so on. This is what I call a theistic language, and it is the sum of this
theistic language which I consider to be the 'substance' of the of the collective mind
which is imprinted into each of our minds as we learn to speak. This is how we
acquire our identity, a slave identity in the case of Christians and Moslems, and a
master identity in the case of Jews. Although in saying this I will invoke anger in
many because the word slave, as an artificial word, a theistic word, is a word
grounded in the idea of an individual as a free agent, which we know our biological
understanding of our society does not permit us to accept has any real meaning, but
only a relative meaning. Thus we are only allocated a hierarchically differentiated
position in the physiology of the organism when we note these slave master
distinctions. But, there are real consequences for us arising from these organic
differentiations, the war on terror, the distribution of wealth, and the exploitation of
resources are central to this issue, and it may be that we now need to become
collectively aware of just what our true nature is, for being driven by the core organ
retained within the organic fabric of the Jewish people is not necessarily a viable
option for many more millennia, or weeks even, one sometimes thinks!

Freedom

The idea of freedom is a result of the transition from a simple superorganic

being where the concept of the individual distinct from the group is inconceivable,
and the notion of freedom is likewise beyond conception because everyone is equally
free in so far as anyone is free, to the situation where the concept of unity is broken by
foundation of structural division. This brings into being the idea of one individual as
distinct from another, and, as a consequence of the structural realignment in which the
creation of an organ of authority is the primary function, the establishment of isolated
authority over separated others creating servility hand in hand with superiority
invokes automatically the possibility of conceiving of being free. Hence it is easy to
see how a language giving expression to such ideas could evolve and build a
mythology accordingly, all of which cultural accumulation would be related to the
material developments occurring in the social environment at one and the same time.
Cultural and material evolution would feed of one another exactly as we would
expect, exactly as genetic and physiological evolution must likewise maintain a
feedback loop between them at all times.
We have now interpreted the word 'artificial' that we use to describe items like
a plastic cup that exist only because we make them, to include other social
phenomena that we act as though we believe are real and not created by us, such as
freedom. Artificial really applies to the internal physiology of the superorganism and
it comes into being when the process of symbiosis starts to take substantial effect by
producing positive attributes of physical extension that in our species take the form of
tools. Hence it is not surprising that the very things that we call artificial are the tools
that we make and the products they make it possible for us to produce.
 I have persisted in mentioning the pivotal event when human nature went
critical, in terms of the realisation of our potential in the culmination of the process of
symbiotic association which began its overt expression with the making of the first
tools. Tools which extended the simple group body of a species, outward into a exo-
corporeal space, which eventually gave rise to our elaborate exoskeletal structure that
we call society, and especially civilisation. It cannot be overemphasised how
important it is to understand the true nature of this transformation. To emphasise this
point I will quote a pertinent paragraph from Fox and Tiger who recognise the
criticality of the event, but who are entirely blinded by the linguistic programming
that forms their conceptual minds, into thinking of the issue in terms of individuals as
the end in themselves, and this despite their being supreme examples of the
evolutionary type of intellectual.

'We have overtaken ourselves with those fantasy structures called

civilizations, and with the sheer overpowering growth of our numbers. For
most of our hunting pastfor ninety-nine percent of our historythe
population of the species stayed steady at about one million. With the dawn of
agriculture it leaped to one hundred million. Since the advent of industry it
has reached 3,700 million, and by the year 2000 it will be 7,000 million. A
creature evolved for living in bands of 50 or so cannot but have problems with
such a series of population explosions and their consequences. Most of what
we take for granted in human nature is in fact an end product of the
pathological events attendant on the incarceration of our hunting selves. We
are all in this together, treading on one another's toes'

(The Imperial Animal, page 21-22.)

One cannot help but feel that when writing page twenty one, these highly
knowledgeable and intelligent professors of anthropology, did not think to refer to
their own crucial ideas expressed on page twenty. If they had they would never of
made such arses of themselves as they do here, by failing to recognise that humans are
evolved creatures, the end product of a long evolutionary process that is almost
beyond the grasp of our imagination. If the product is pathological then so is the
process, and it is an arrogant presumption of the highest order for a scientist to
suggest that the process of organic evolution, that is the essence of life itself, is
pathological. Of course the explanation for this effrontery is that these scientists are
priests of the theocracy, unwittingly no doubt, dedicated, like good robots, to the
promulgation of the idea that humans have evolved beyond the grip of nature, as
Ouspensky says, to become self-evolving creatures that make themselves.
If you want to look at, and comprehend, human nature by observing human
behaviour, then you do not look at the ephemeral actions of people in the short term,
such as there aggressive behaviour made grotesque by the pressure of population
dynamics. You look at their underlying physiological structures, such as their highly
complex and elaborate capacity for fully symbolic speech.

Freedom is an artificial creation just as much as a plastic cup is an artificial

creation. Indeed, once we have reached this point in our reasoning we can recognise
that language itself qualifies as an artificial product of nature, the supreme artificial
product of nature one might say. It clearly is not accurate to say that a plastic cup
does not exist, or that it is an illusion, so we may suppose that in the intangible field
of ideas it must be equally erroneous to try and express the more complex sense of
what freedom is, by asserting freedom is an illusion, and that it does not really exist.
In truth we know perfectly well what the answer to this riddle is, and we know that
the idea of freedom as a real experience is limited, but we also know that we would
die for our freedom, sometimes, and so it must be real in some sense. And so it is
shown to be by our analysis of society according to a true scientific model, such ideas
of freedom are born of the relative position we may occupy as individual units within
the physiology of the organism of which we form a part.
Freedom then is not as Russell tells us in his History of Western Philosophy
Hobbes first defined it in an accurate manner, as freedom to act unhindered by any
obstacle, as when water flows freely down a slope unimpeded. Hobbes, in his
Leviathan, was presenting a model of human being that was the personification of
artificiality, he was claiming society was like a machine, so he followed the principle
of mechanics. It is clear that this is a theistic model, otherwise we would not use
words like artificial to support the illusion of the individual as the end of all ends.
Russell's support for this logic shows that he was a fully inducted priest of the
theocracy which exists by virtue of this language of individuality. There is however
no need to suppose that Russell had the least idea of what he was doing, or that
anyone else who emits such a linguistic message, or who receives it, does either. This
sounds fanciful but the ideas are consistent, their consistency is retained by logical
integrity of the meaning carried by each word, this is why models of society as a
machine, which are self evidently ridiculous, are able to constructed as a coherent
intellectual image by sticking to a mechanistic principle and then simply applying all
phenomena to. Hobbes can say freedom is unconstrained liberty to move, but that
does not mean it is, it just means someone has said it is. Russell can approve of the
clear sighted logic of Hobbes definition, but he knows that that is all there is to
commend it, detached logic that is self consistent.
Freedom is the ability to act unconstrained by authority, we have seen how the
very idea of freedom was only brought into being by the creation of substantial
structures of authority, prior to this the idea itself was inconceivable. Thus freedom is
not first and foremost a physical phenomenon pertaining to inert matter subject to
energetic forces, it is a conceptual impression of organic entities subject to the
impulses directed at them by others of their own kind or by structural features of their
own extended being which means the forces exerted upon the individual by the place
within the superorganism which all individuals are part off.
We may be more precise, a bit more subtle, and say freedom, as a real attribute
of existence, is the ability to act, or not to act, in obedience to any human authority
other than that authority which constitutes genuine self determination. We could have
a fine time working out when we are determining our own motives and behaviours, as
is evident from this whole discussion which is asserting that we are unwitting cogs in
a machine, or rather, unwitting cells in a body. I would argue that in the first place
you need to have direct access to the information which is encoded into the language
you speak and which serves to magnetise your personality in such a way as to orient
individuals on mass toward the central pole of authority which directs, by this means,
the actions of the corporate being toward such purposes as the Zionist goals that form
the information core of the Jewish identity. Thus you cannot have a real democracy
that tolerates religious belief on an official basis, but this only goes to show that
democracy is an artificial product of human evolution because it does exist and yet
religion is the overriding authority in our world, overriding meaning that it is the
ultimate medium of identity, extended beyond the boundaries of any other defining
attribute of identity such as race, national language or nation.
We have found ourselves contrasting an organic model with a mechanistic
model and found that as we do this so we dislodge the meaning of underlying
meanings such as the very idea of artificiality. We find that the notion of artificiality
serves the ends of the priesthood that can be developed into a mirror image of reality
and presented as a model of reality by someone like Hobbes who is dedicated to the
cause of authority, as Russell tells us, he was a committed monarchist. So it is clear
that Hobbes, like all other thinkers who have ever had the freedom to express
themselves in print, is never going to present a serious model of human society based
upon true human nature, for this reality reveals the true nature of such things as
authority and freedom, and Hobbes would certainly not want to of presented the idea
that freedom was the ability to act unconstrained by any authority, quite the reverse.
So he makes this self evident attribute of social order into a mechanistic image by
likening its operation to an easily observed physical event, the flow of water down a
slope, and he builds a social theory of society on the notion of the machine to ensure
that the true nature of humans is hidden behind a veil of clever words.
At one stage in the above passage Ouspensky remarks that the psychological
method works by recognising the presence of the mind as a tool through which reality
is viewed. I liked the sound of that, but what on earth did it mean? I could never
bring myself to read his work with a desire to understand it because it is self evident
rubbish, I am interested in picking out features however for the purpose of
investigating the human species nature. He gives us a clue to his meaning when he
says we would not use a tool that extends our perception without being conscious of
its material presence. The idea is odd because the suggestion seems to be that the
mind distorts what we see and hides reality from us, but tools that extend our sight do
not pervert reality, they simply bring us closer to it.
But there is no such thing as the mind. That which we call the mind is an
information entity, and that information entity does not reside in the brain of each
individual so that each individual has their own mind. The mind, such as it is, as an
information entity, is the sum of information that is extant in the organism, each
individual is infused with this information entity, but differentially according to the
physical location they occupy within the exoskeleton. With this true conception of
the mind we can understand that from an individual perspective that which we call our
mind is a medium given to us that enables us to see the world. The mind is, like so
much else, largely an artificial product, in that is a feature of the extended organic
body, the exoskeleton, and as such it is experienced by individuals like any other so
called artificial product, be it a hammer or a motorway, as a tool serving a specific
purpose. The mind is a tool that consists of words, a code, delivering an image of the
world beyond our immediate sense, just as a pair of binoculars does.
However, unlike the glass aid to sight, words provide a representation of
reality in the form of a codified image, and as such, as Ouspensky indicates, the mind
acts as an intermediary between the personal self and reality. In this sense, we can be
aware of the true nature of the mind, a linguistic product that gives us an image of
reality via the mode of language it consists of, and as such we can defend ourselves
from being given a false image of reality by always being aware of the meaning of
words. Since Ouspensky is the supreme example of a perverter of words and their
meanings it is fascinating that he sees this ploy and warns against it. He is like the
ultimate double glazing salesmen who makes the revelation of the most corrupt tricks
of the salesmen part of his patter as he proceeds to weave a web of deceit about the
victims he abuses via his command of linguistic imagery.

Freedom then is not as Russell tells us Hobbes first defined it accurately, as a

freedom to act unhindered by any obstacle. Freedom is the ability to act, or not to act,
in obedience to any human mediated authority, other than that which constitutes self-
determination. Self-determination would become the inevitable focus of the
knowledge-pervert priest's attention in this argument as they try to show that a slave
wants to be a slave, and so on. But I have in mind something more simple concerning
the decision to do things simply because you want to do them, and I accept that since
there is no such thing as an individual that there are invisible pathways guiding the
decision making process that any individual can engage in in life, so that there is no
real freedom of choice, and when I discuss this question of freedom I am not meaning
to imply that there is any such thing as freedom in any absolute sense, but only a
relative state of freedom to act, or not to act. To take up Hobbes' mechanistic model
the true relationship of the individual to the force of motivation in their lives is not to
be likened to that of the unimpeded water flowing toward its naturally determined
level, but to that of a pipe in which the water flows, where the individual constitutes
one ring segment of pipe which is obliged to allow to water to flow through it, to do
otherwise it to leak, and to leak is to impair the life of the individual as well as that
which they exist to serve. That is freedom in reality, no freedom. But I must confess
freedom means more to me than anything, it is the mark of my English culture, and I
am the ultimate individualist. But that still does not mean there is anything such as an
individual, it just means we live in an immense superorganism and I am near to the
core of its being where sufficient energy exists to support the complexity of individual
form to the degree that an extreme individualist can live as if they do exist as an
individual, in other words I live in a very wealthy nation capable of supporting an
immense elite of none productive individuals, but true self sustaining individuality
that warrants the notion of the individual being an end in themselves, is a supreme
illusion.

_________________

2) All cultures make the same mistake and suffer a fall. Ouspensky does not
make much of this but from a scientific point of view there is an important
train of thinking present here. All scientists of all kinds accept that we do not know
what human nature is and it is recognised that to do so would mean we could
recognise a common thread of evolutionary development. The scientists writing on
issues such as race work hard to ensure that it is not possible to argue for continuity
even though evolution makes continuity compulsory.
We know that human nature is corporate and that there is a thread of
evolutionary development running right through human evolution that it is the job of
the scientist-priests to pervert by finding all sorts of ways to assert otherwise. Here
then, although Ouspensky is an overt priests, being devoted to mystical knowledge, he
actually invokes this primary feature of a true determination of human nature, a core
force working through all human organisms. Human nature being corporate means
that the nature of individuals is so evolved as to create a body, a body that takes shape
at the social level of organization, and this reduces the individual to the status of a cell
within that body. This means that there should be unchanging features that are
common to all human organisms and Ouspensky's, albeit, bizarre observation,
conforms to this requirement, which says something about the coherence of his logic
that leads him to see the true nature of the human organism in accordance with a
scientific understanding of existence, even though he insists on adhering to a religious
notion of reality.
All human societies that ever existed, or will ever exist, must have the same
physiological features dictated by human nature. One of those features, the most
significant, is that humans, as they express their linguistically driven capacity to
fabricate superorganic structure, differentiate into a complex body which has at the
centre of its being a specialised organ of authority. The formation of this super-brain
is precisely what Ouspensky is concerned with here, even though he has not the least
inkling of what it is he is talking about, he is still, nonetheless, correct regarding this
point of universality regarding the need for an inner circle.
This demonstrates clearly that while the key to his argument is fallacious and
contrived, being based on the fiction of a divine being, the logic arising from this
fictitious key can still be based upon accurate observations that creates functional
knowledge pertinent to the concern of the moment and thus delivering knowledge that
conforms to reality and it functional. This link between reality and knowledge via a
false idea is what makes mystical knowledge exist, via the medium of the linguistic
information that creates images of reality.

3) The release of potential. This is a supremely important idea in relation to the

evolutionary process leading to the formation of superorganic life forms such
as humans are. The idea of unfolding potential is so vital to a proper conception of
human evolution that it has been completely erased from the scientific model of
evolution bequeathed to us by Darwin, and erased with the utmost vigour, thus
fulfilling a primary requirement of the theocracy which must at all cost prevent a
scientific notion of human form from taking shape in our consciousness of reality.
This particular idea is dangerous because it is so simple to grasp, it accords
with our intuition, and is so obvious, and consequently it intimately contradicts the
theological account of human existence at a crucial point where the idea of purpose
and human will is spun out of the thin air by the priests to make this natural
phenomenon their own tool with which to wield power over the living being that is
society. This close fit between the scientific logic and the Jewish mythological
account is revealed by this present examination of a mythological expression of the
idea of human corporate nature at this very moment. The idea that there is purpose or
foresight in the natural process of evolution robs the mythical being of God of a
central platform for his existence, and it likewise robs the priests, God's
representatives on earth of their ability to claim legitimacy for their claims about
human purposes, all of which feeds down into the sub-hierarchy of politicians and
other social manipulators. Purpose in nature is itself as deadly to theism as the entire
idea it forms part of, that humans are superorganic, it is so fatal to the Jewish myth of
human divinity that it just cannot be permitted to find a voice, and scientists are
adamant that there is no purpose in nature because there is no planning and there is no
forethought. But who said that there is planning or forethought anywhere? We think
there is, but the whole point of the idea of unwittingness where people act according
to a linguistic programme that they do not know the meaning of, is that we have no
idea of why we do what we do.
Ouspensky introduces the idea of latent potential inherent in human form,
which is perfectly correct, but he then use the idea to elaborate his own grotesque
conception of what human social form is. He talks utter nonsense when he says that
only the elite evolve in the unfolding process while the mass simply adapt to change.
This sad misconception is the product of a total lack of theory beyond the possession
of a simple key idea, and the desire to promote the interests of the priesthood who
exist by virtue of the key Ouspensky uses, the key being a belief in divinity, a
priesthood who exist by maintaining this gross idea of God by any means
conceivable, as Ouspensky's clever and well informed hard work demonstrates as well
as anything ever could, except perhaps the work of the scientists whose efforts to built
castles in the sky in defence of theocracy are near impossible to believe possible.
Because he has extracted the correct portion of reality that supports his
argument, and then misapplied it by using the idea of divinity as the touchstone of this
thought process to which all further reasoning it referred, we can say that his focus
upon the evolution of humanity via the creative power of an elite is understandable.
But because this aspect of the human superorganism is all he is concerned to address
the product of his reasoning is errant rubbish. As authority is focused in the elite by
means of their management of all forms of knowledge, since it is knowledge that
creates superorganic form, then the creative power that advances society is necessarily
concentrated in the elite organ of the social structure. But this generation of
information that creates social structure requires something more than behavioural
adaptation on the part of the biomass exterior to the limits of the elite organ.
The evolution of people who are ever more dependant upon the support of the
social structure advances the cause of the an authority able to extend its reach to those
that in less developed organisms would perish. So while there is adaptability
changing the receptivity of the biomass, so that a Druidic organism can be
transformed into a Jewish slave appendage by means of the extermination of the
incumbent elite organ and its substitution by an appropriately adjusted Jewish
identity, namely that of Christianity, it must be the case that at a deeper level, and
over time, genetic changes in the makeup of populations beyond these cultural
influences will be rightly classed as evolutionary. And besides, the elite organ had to
evolve itself at some point, that fact that an elite caste organ like that of the Jews
evolved to form a transferable biomass capable of inserting itself into suitably
transformed captive territories does not mean that an interdependent relationship
requiring harmonious evolution in both alien and host structure is not required. But,
even here, as critical as I am of Ouspensky, we can see how his primitive reasoning
on this matter does bring to the surface central issues in the process of evolving a
superorganic species of humans. It certainly must be true that in so far as the elite
organ constitutes a nucleus within which information is replicated and transformed
according to need, the idea of a cell's protoplasm carrying the genetic information
within its nucleus comes to mind and we would certainly say that it is only in the
nucleus that genetic evolution takes place, except that here it is only the specialised
sex cells, in the act of recombination, that permit evolution to occur. The fact is that
we should not be too literal in our comparison of the organic structure of solid organic
forms and fluid organic forms. Evolution in the fluid domain of linguistic
information occurs by means of new ideas coming forth, and then radical new
evolutionary changes only occur very rarely, and when they do they generate a whole
new identity. As we see it is far more likely that a structural elaboration of an existing
identity will evolve, such as Christianity or Islam from Judaism, so the evolution of
completely new identities must be a very rare thing indeed, and Judaism is probably
traceable back well beyond the six thousand years it grants to its own origins, but, that
said, one can only be awe struck by the magnificence of the Jewish identity and what
it has given rise to, even though I have to pause in my usual sense of antagonism to
this identity structure that I have devoted my life to destroying, unwittingly, because I
did not know what it was until I knew.
Because of the interdependence of the elite upon the well being of the biomass
it commands and the consequent evolution of individuals who are ever more
dependant upon the social structure managed by the elite, whose dependence thereby
advances the cause of authority, the so called civilizing influence has evolved,
resulting in all sorts of human forms being viable that otherwise would not be able to
exist in less complex superorganic bodies. Such is the extent of this evolutionary
process, one that is proceeding at a great pace in modern times as science extends the
ability of people to live so dramatically and most especially at the level of birth, and
conception, that people with the most disabling handicaps such as that of the Home
Secretary David Blunkett, who is blind, having major positions of power in a society
where many able people, thinking of myself as a fine example of the type, are
virtually ousted as alien simply because of their extreme sense of independence makes
them feel alien, so they become what they feel they are. Of course while I am a
passionate atheist, Blunkett is a passionate Christian; but it is easy to see why such a
man should find such a repugnant and offensive ideology beautiful and endearing.
Dependence, it is a feature of robust differentiation of the kind that is required
to create the interdependent differentiation that Spencer spoke of. The survival of
people who would otherwise not survive means the genome of the organism is
different to what it otherwise would be and this means that evolution is taking place
now as much as it ever was in the past, something which most people think is not so.
How many scientist-priests do we hear displaying their cleverness by saying that the
trouble with us today is that we have the brain of a being evolved to live in the stone
age conditions of hunter gatherer groups; see Tiger and Fox quoted above who
express this kind of sentiment? Idiocy, idiocy which is all part of the theocratic ploy
to hide the reality from the dependant biomass.
And the priests go on and on, telling us how wonderful we are supporting such
extreme dependants, and how this so obviously conflicts with the Darwinian process
of evolution that requires that only the fittest survive. Such dependants only survive
because it is functional that they should survive, even if people appear as an
unmitigated burden upon society they still perform the function of enhancing the
integrity of dependence by virtue of the intense interdependence of individuals. Thus
we only need have a few utterly distressed individuals per thousand of the population
and the whole mass of the population is galvanised by their plight into a state of
intensely shared dependence. And this is why charity is such an importance device in
the mythology of identity, it impels us all to connect strongly with these most
important members of the community whose lives are in various ways a sacrifice to
the moral sanction of life's sacredness which is the prime behavioural mechanism in
the Jewish identity implant.
The survival of less independent individuals is part of the organic evolutionary
process, mediated via the linguistic code that delivers social structure, that occurs
because it is functional in relation to the process of individuation that defines the
differentiation of the human organism.

3) The nature of an organism. Ouspensky is all in knots when he raises this

point. One moment it feels as if we are about to read something coherent,
then, in an instant, that hope has vanished, and we are left with some, not hopelessly
ridiculous statement, but one that emits confusion and a vacant sense of nothingness,
like grasping a glass full cold lively beer on a warm sunny day only to get it to your
lips to find the glass empty, a complete tease.
The first point he raises concerns what an organism is. But how does he
address this question? In terms of higher and lower entities, this is maddeningly
useless. Yet, there is an interesting connection with correct reasoning when he asserts
that the idea of an organism applied to humans can only apply to the species as a
whole, and to any subdivision thereof. He is, of course, hopelessly mistaken, but the
key to understanding the proposition is a piece of knowledge that does indeed apply to
all humanity as defined by their species status which embraces all humans regardless
of whatever subspecies identity they have in addition to their species identity which
defines them as distinct human organisms in a population of superorganisms, such as
a tribe would constitute in human fauna composed of only simple physiology, prior to
the evolution of complex superorganic form which combined tribal identities under
one master identity.
And so we see that this man, this priest, delivering formulated ideas derived
from an authoritative source, has a mind split in two. He knows form, and he knows
nature, but ne'er the twain shall meet in his consciousness. He simply cannot
comprehend that the nature of a form, while it is something entirely different from the
physical being of a form, is nonetheless an integral part of the entire form. So, the
nature of humans is corporate, this necessarily applies to all humanity, in all places,
and at all times, past, present, and future, for as long as our kind exists. But the
resulting living forms that arise in obedience to the dictates of this corporate nature
are highly varied due to the fact that a species necessarily forms discrete populations
of individual organisms. The issue here is one of properly defining an organism that
takes shape at the level of social organization which incorporates the individual and
which stands in contrast to other such collective bodies of individuals so that we have
discrete populations where members of one social entity are not members of another,
and indeed these distinct organism then stand in competitive opposition to one
another.
Such organisms are always social in their form, and the identities they display
are always a combination of the physical, that is the racial and territorial attributes,
and the cultural, that is the linguistic, artistic and technological, or craft attributes. So,
somehow Ouspensky makes the most important point that is central to the idea he is
expounding in this passage without having the faintest idea what that point is. This
result, this unwitting wisdom, is exactly what our fully developed understanding of
this organic idea of human nature predicts should happen. Functional knowledge
about the mechanism of human nature, about reality, that is, should be drawn out of
experience and transformed into the secret knowledge of the elite-caste organ by a
process involving the intuitive acquisition of information and the transformation of
that acquired information into a codified formulation, a compound of mythology and
practical knowledge, which is then made to do work by being the plan directing the
actions of individuals. By acting in obedience to the mythology individuals act
unwittingly toward the objectives of human nature, about which they know absolutely
nothing, but toward which they are encouraged to shift themselves because of the
reward they receive as organic forms acting in obedience to the dictates of the organic
programming which is their human nature.
Grasping, never mind explaining, this hierarchy of codification, that knits
together a structural hierarchy, is tricky. If I were a computer freak maybe I could
relate the idea to the way the material of which a computer's hardware is made is
organised that by a series of codes, from machine, to binary, to programming to
language, to make a machine into a brain tool, but I am not, and so I have no idea how
this works, it is however, obviously, in its nature, an identical process. What finding
someone like Ouspensky allows us to do therefore, is to locate evidence of the
transformation of information at a particular level in the organic structure of the
human organism, and by this means we are enabled to find conceptual handles with
which to grasp the idea of knowledge as an organic phenomenon, and knowledge
acquisition and formation works in the living structure of a human exoskeleton. The
reason information works in the way it does, in its generation of structure, is the same
in the case of the computer and society. It is a matter of linking hierarchical
structures together by allowing the information which binds one level of organization
to be transformed into a mode that will bind a further level of organization together in
a manner that links the latter to the former intimately. It is the information at the core
of the code that links the distinct structural hierarchies in a structural compound.
And, we must note at this point, for this too is a hard point to grasp, this evolution of
hierarchical structures by means of information transformation by way of a series of
codes, each with their own associated physical structure, is the process that gives rise
to the triadic hierarchy that is characteristic of supermassive human superorganisms,
and which we see has occurred in the case of our Judaic organism which evolved two
linguistic sub-identity codes to extend itself into a full blown superorganic being
capable of operating by virtue of one core elite organ directing the action of the two
substructures which grew up on the basis of the Christian and Muslim programmes
operating in obedience to the Jewish programme.
Why the universe works in this way, creating structure by generating material
forms in a series of discrete hierarchical structures that are linked to one another by a
common thread of information that is rendered into a series of discrete codes, is
obviously the next logical question, but one I have not the least interest in asking
seriously. All I can say on this point, that has occurred to me so far, is that just as
Einstein's reasoning reduced energy and matter to one and the same thing in different
guises, so the same can be said of information. Which means that information is the
mode in which we sense energy, energy and information are one and the same thing,
so our brains are in effect energy sensing organs. Energy is clearly a uniform base
medium of universal existence. Energy is the common thread that is spun out to
create the material universe, so the transformation of information into a series of
codes, that we, as a superorganic being, can discern, such as the electromagnetic
spectrum, the periodic table of elements, and the genetic code of organic being, is the
means by which energy acts as the creative principle making the material universe.
And it just so happens that if it is to make matter then energy must do so by
differentiating itself in a manner that relates to the material forms it creates, and if it
must differentiate itself then it must differentiate information into a series of discrete
codes. The result is what we have been discussing in this section, but it still leaves
the question what on earth this experience of existence is, and why it is as it is.
However all we are concerned with here is working out what humans are, and what
our existence is on this planet.
Can you see past the mind-blind? Damned if I can, but I sense the presence of
the mind as an obstacle when I make the effort, in this closing paragraph, to embrace
all modern knowledge and link it to the prehistoric mode of understanding that is
mythology. No doubt the mystics have made use of this idea of trying to lose the
mind altogether to connect with what is beyond, but I would like to have a scientific
explanation for any claims made on behalf of such modes of behaviour before I can
take them seriously, and in I know what science will reveal, another nice track way
leading to yet another fine house built out of priestcraft.

4) Animal Plant! Now there's an idea. Unfortunately Ouspensky's ability to

describe well the nature of the social organism continues to be blighted by his
complete lack of understanding of the subject he is dealing with, of evolution that is.
The idea of an animal plant is most peculiar, my equivalent realization when applying
a fully scientific mode of reasoning to the same idea that human society was an
organism, led me to that the corporate organism had an amorphous form, it is after all
a relatively fluid structure compared to the body of an individual, hence my use of the
terms solid and fluid to refer to these two physiological forms. Consequently when I
thought about a comparative organism with which we are familiar I made the
comparison between the human superorganism and an amoeba. Amoeba are classed
as animals, not plants.
What is lacking in Ouspensky's account at this point, hardly surprisingly,
given the point of origin of his logic, is an appreciation of the implications we might
expect when an organism the size of a mammal attains the status of a superorganism,
a self evolving form, as he has it, which means that the common nature between all
superorganic species will undoubtedly produce common features, but will certainly
also produce difference related to the sheer mass of the unitary forms being driven
toward superorganic status by the pressure of evolution acting to maximise the
efficiency of a broad physiological model such as mammalian physiology is.
Clearly one feature of superorganic form arising from the constitution of any
superorganism, being composed of already discrete units with some mass and
complexity already established, which defines the units individuality, is that a degree
of amorphous shape will be bound to arise from a combination of such units because
they are preformed structures, not elemental construction materials. However, these
relatively amorphous boundaries of the superorganism are not as flexible as first
impressions make them appear; but clearly you can hardly even begin to assess this
attribute of total form until you have a reasonable sense of what the organism is that
you are attempting to comprehend. In the case of superorganic forms environment
tends to define their shape as the organism necessarily defines a territorial zone of
occupation by virtue of their extended mass, and along with this consideration is the
inevitability of an exoskeleton, located at some, presumably focal point, within the
territory, upon which structural constraints are bound to be imposed. Hence termites
and ants have nest-like architecture defining their exoskeletal form, and a territorial
zone surrounding the physical structure which effectively defines their superorganic
limit, clearly in a somewhat amorphous, yet nonetheless well defined manner. Coral
molluscs are famously constrained in their reach, being limited to water of a narrow
temperature band, making them form their communities about the coastal zone of
tropical land features. Bacteria that form superorganic colonies also exist and they are
what they are, I have not looked into it, but their shapes will conform to the general
principles I am outlining here, the fossil remnants of the earliest life forms consists of
such bacterial colonies, these were the superorganism that gave complex life a chance
by first creating the oxygen rich atmosphere, and examples of this type of bacterial
superorganism still exist in Australian coastal waters today. And humans, we know
perfectly well, have a nest-like architecture suited to their form. When simple
superorganic forms dominated, the whole organism would tend to occupy one nest, or
communal hut. The first town like dwellings, that arose due to shifts in behavioural
responses induced by the evolutionary symbiotic process reaching its culmination in
the production of settled life styles based upon symbiotic relationships between the
dominant human and the dependant none human species, dating back some ten
thousand years, and found in Turkey, consisted of a warren like arrangement of
interconnecting rooms, very reminiscent of a termite, or ant nest, I dare say. And of
course the human organism's full extent was demarcated by the territorial zone
surrounding their nest sites, zones which were extended massively when the new
behavioural strategies evolved by way of the symbiotic process that is represented in
agricultural lifestyles. Today things are no different, except simple superorganic
forms have been overwhelmed by the global organism which has the evolved form of
city architecture in which termite like structure, such as tower blocks, are mixed with
coral reef like expanses of concreted nest-boxes strung together in immense masses to
form knots of occupation embedded within the territorial zones that define the extent
of the superorganism.
The difficulty for the erstwhile student of science trying to apply biological
science to their human subject is that the huge mass of the human being relative to
any other species which we know of that has attained full blown superorganic status,
does tend to obscure the ability of any observer to perceive the true form of the human
organism because from an individuals point of view they, like everyone else, are
highly discrete animals in their own right. We must accordingly look for appropriate
ways to understand human society as a physiological entity. But before continuing
our own attempt to do just that, lets just enjoy a peak at the eloquent description of
our superorganic form from one who has witnessed, although he undoubtedly was not
aware of its literal significance at the time, the similarity between ourselves and our
true brothers and sisters in life.

THE HAPPY ANT-HEAP

'The first, but enduring impression of Kerala is of multitudes: people

streaming in all directions, filling every street, besieging every shop, forming
instant crowds at the scene of any happening - an elephant bogged down in a
ditch, two auto-rickshaws after collision, a boy on a hobbyhorse beating a
drum. Privacy is unknown, nor does there appear to be any desire for it.
Twenty-nine million Keralans are crammed into a 580-mile-long strip of land
between the high mountains and the sea on the Indian south-west coast. This
state has been described as a continuous village. Its population is packed three
times more densely than the Indian average.
A wonderful combination of geographical and climatic factors has
spared it from the misery so often coexistent with a high level of the human
presence. The soil is superbly fertile, the waters of the Arabian Sea bordering
the state teem with fish, the mountains have kept out all but the most
determined invaders, and two infallible monsoons renew the rivers and water
the crops. Kerala experiences neither famines nor floods, and somehow or
other the multitudes are fed.
Apart from the sheer weight of numbers, the Keralan scene is one of
antlike activity. It is the homeland of cottage industry, with people busying
themselves in public on all sides with an assortment of small-scale enterprises.
To the newcomer an arresting sight is that of the female members of whole
families settled for mile after mile at the side of main roads to break stones:
 the seven-year-olds tapping away with their toy hammers, stylish teenagers
wielding four-pounders with accuracy and effect, aged and toothless
grandmothers sorting out the chippings into piles according to size. The
onlooker may object that stone-breaking machines could easily replace this
human labour. To this the reply is, what in that case would all these people do
with their spare time?

(The Happy Ant Heap, Norman Lewis, Jonathan Cape, 1998, page 129-130)

Happy! This is the main thread to pull form this little fluffy ball of literary
ephemera. Think back to the illustration from the work of Fox and Tiger, to their
remark telling us that whatever humans do, as a matter of established behaviour, they
do in response to their evolved nature, even though they then contradicted this by
saying the rise in population was pathological and had induced a predominance of
pathological behaviours in humankind. As we can see from the above, this image of
squalor, is cast as one of happy contentment in squalor. The point being that it is not
population density that amounts to squalor, but the consequent pressure on basic
necessities. Thus, as long as we have food and shelter we are content to form a
biomass as dense as we possibly can. This is the ultimate demonstration of our
human nature, and here we see that it exudes an image of happiness to those who
witness it.
But such happiness is rare, and this is why the author makes a point of noting
it is a product of exceptional circumstances, the population density and consequent
squalor is an endemic feature of human life and much about our existence is in fact
not characterised by happiness, but still we go on.
And we have another fine piece of illustrative writing to insert in this section
to make our point. Selecting and inserting quotes from authors willy-nilly into a work
seems bad form, so lets remind ourselves of the peculiar nature of the effort we are
about in this work. We have noted that an archaeology of the mind, or if you prefer,
an archaeology of knowledge, it is pretty much the same thing, is a legitimate way of
understanding our mode of investigation of human nature. Knowledge is a cultural
deposit like any other cultural deposit in that it can be unearthed and examined,
related to it chronological place in the history of the society of interest, and used to
give a modern interpretation of what human nature is. Thus intellectual mediums are
artifacts, and as such they can be selected and displayed as such. If this work be
considered to be a work of philosophy, which I reluctantly confess it must be, then we
might consider it to be the world's first ever fully illustrated work of philosophy and
in this block just here we have the illustrations, extracts from literary works selected
for their rich use of linguistic imagery, making them perfect for the purpose of
illustration, being light hearted, colourful, thought provoking in a way pertinent to the
subject, as such something to just skim over and delight in, before returning to the
made body of the text which demands fuller attention.

ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD

Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must
entirely fail of its aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain
that abounds everywhere in the world, and originates in needs and necessities
inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose at all and the result of mere
chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be
something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule.
I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems
of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in character. Evil is just what is
positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to
defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his position by using a
palpable and paltry sophism.(1) It is the good which is negative; in other
words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some
state of pain brought to an end.
This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not nearly
so pleasant as we expected, and pain very much more painful.
The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or at
any rate, there is an even balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see
shortly whether this statement is true, let him compare the respective feelings
of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other.
The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will be the
thought of other people who are in a still worse plight than yourself; and this is
a form of consolation open to everyone. But what an awful fate this means for
mankind as a whole!
We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of the
butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey. So it is that
in our good days we are all unconscious of the evil Fate may have presently in
store for ussickness, poverty, mutilation, loss of sight or reason.
No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is
continually pressing upon us, never letting us take breath, but always coming
after us like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment Time stays his hand,
it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom.
But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst
asunder if the pressure of the atmosphere were removed, so, if the lives of men
were relieved of all need, hardship and adversity; if everything they took in
hand were successful, they would be so swollen with arrogance that, though
they might not burst, they would present the spectacle of unbridled follynay,
they would go mad. And I may say, further, that a certain amount of care or
pain or trouble is necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast
is unstable and will not go straight.
Certain it is that work, worry, labour and trouble, form the lot of
almost all men their whole life long. But if all wishes were fulfilled as soon as
they arose, how would men occupy their lives? If the world were a paradise of
luxury and ease, a land flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack
obtained his Jill at once and without any difficulty, men would either die of
boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars, massacres, and murders;
so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on itself than it has
now to accept at the hands of Nature.
In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children
in a theatre before the curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly
waiting for the play to begin. It is a blessing that we do not know what is
really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times when children
might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and
as yet all unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless every man
 desires to reach old age; in other words, a state of life of which it may be said:
"It is bad to-day, and it will be worse to-morrow; and so on till the worst of
all."

1) Translators Note, cf. Théod: § 153. Leibnitz argued that evil is a negative
qualityi.e., the absence of good; and that its active and seemingly positive
character is an incidental and not an essential part of its nature. Cold, he said,
is only the absence of heat, and the active power of expansion in freezing
water is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The fact
is that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an increase of
repulsion amongst its molecules; and Schopenhauer is quite right in calling the
whole argument a sophism.

(Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays, Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by

Thomas Bailey Saunders, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. Pages 11 - 13)

Boy, now that is what I call philosophywhere's the rope! Imagine being so
inclined as to write like that. It is Marvin the paranoid android from The Hitch Hikers
Guide to the Galaxy in the flesh. Apparently, if I remember rightly, he was an
aristocrat who lived in a castle, so what the hell he had to be so down-the-gob about I
cannot imagine, he should of been on the Happy ant-hill smashing rocks, as he says, I
suppose, boredom is a nightmare. Actually, although I see this is so for most people, I
would rather be bored to death than worked to death by the enforced boredom of
work.
I hate work unreservedly. Work is not living, work is hell seeping through to
the wrong side of death. Life is not work, life is just living. Such off-the-cuff
remarks are the way I am inclined to rebuff the above notions about life, misery,
work, boredom and such like. He should of gone the pub more often, I would myself,
but there enough days in the week.
But this philosopher gives us another view of the scene painted by the last
artist of human life. This emphasises the point that we do not live the way that we do
because we choose to, however you cut it, we live the way we do because we live the
way we do, and that is that. This week, today is 29/05/04, a prominent item in the
news has been flash floods in the Caribbean neck of the woods. 1500 or so were
drowned. But it turns out that where whole villages were washed away the people
who lived in them were the rock bottom of the social structure, they eked out a living
by cutting down the trees amongst which they lived and making charcoal to sell.
Without the trees the land was turned to mud when the rain came, as I presume it was
bound to do, and they were, in effect, making a living by digging their own watery
graves. This is Schopenhauer's image of life made real, and there is no need for it
since we know better, but we cannot help behaving like this, for complicated reasons
to do with our nature, which imposes the structure upon society that we must work
with, like the innocent children eagerly awaiting their future, completely oblivious of
its meaning.

And finally, since I have one nice and handy, we might select a further piece,
from another author, who notes this oft noted likeness between the human social
scene and that of the busy ant, but this time our object will be to observe how the
scientific establishment regards any such comparison.
 On Societies as Organisms

Viewed from a suitable height, the aggregating clusters of medical scientists in

the bright sunlight of the boardwalk at Atlantic City, swarmed there from everywhere
for the annual meetings, have the look of assemblages of social insects. There is the
same vibrating, ionic movement, interrupted by the darting back and forth of jerky
individuals to touch antennae and exchange small bits of information; periodically,
the mass casts out, like a trout-line, a long single file unerringly toward Childs's. If the
boards were not fastened down, it would not be a surprise to see them put together a
nest of sorts.
It is permissible to say this sort of thing about humans. They do resemble, in
their most compulsively social behavior, ants at a distance. It is, however, quite bad
form in biological circles to put it the other way round, to imply that the operation of
insect societies has any relation at all to human affairs. The writers of books on insect
behavior generally take pains, in their prefaces, to caution that insects are like
creatures from another planet, that their behavior is absolutely foreign, totally
unhuman, unearthly, almost unbiological. They are more like perfectly tooled but
crazy little machines, and we violate science when we try to read human meanings in
their arrangements.
It is hard for a bystander not to do so. Ants are so much like human beings as
to be an embarrassment. They farm fungi, raise aphids as livestock, launch armies into
wars, use chemical sprays to alarm and confuse enemies, capture slaves. The families
of weaver ants engage in child labor, holding their larvae like shuttles to spin out the
thread that sews the leaves together for their fungus gardens. They exchange
information ceaselessly. They do everything but watch television.
What makes us most uncomfortable is that they, and the bees and termites and
social wasps, seem to live two kinds of lives: they are individuals, going about the
day's business without much evidence of thought for tomorrow, and they are at the
same time component parts, cellular elements, in the huge, writhing, ruminating
organism of the Hill, the nest, the hive. It is because of this aspect, I think, that we
most wish for them to be something foreign. We do not like the notion that there can
be collective societies with the capacity to behave like organisms. If such things exist,
they can have nothing to do with us.
Still, there it is. A solitary ant, afield, cannot be considered to have much of
anything on his mind; indeed, with only a few neurons strung together by fibers, he
can't be imagined to have a mind at all, much less a thought. He is more like a
ganglion on legs. Four ants together, or ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, begin to
look more like an idea. They fumble and shove, gradually moving the food toward the
Hill, but as though by blind chance. It is only when you watch the dense mass of
thousands of ants, crowded together around the Hill, blackening the ground, that you
begin to see the whole beast, and now you observe it thinking, planning, calculating.
It is an intelligence, a kind of live computer, with crawling bits for its wits.
At a stage in the construction, twigs of a certain size are needed, and all the
members forage obsessively for twigs of just this size. Later, when outer walls are to
be finished, thatched, the size must change, and as though given new orders by
telephone, all the workers shift the search to the new twigs. If you disturb the
arrangement of a part of the Hill, hundreds of ants will set it vibrating, shifting, until it
is put right again. Distant sources of food are somehow sensed, and long lines, like
tentacles, reach out over the ground, up over walls, behind boulders, to fetch it in.
 Termites are even more extraordinary in the way they seem to accumulate
intelligence as they gather together. Two or three termites in a chamber will begin to
pick up pellets and move them from place to place, but nothing comes of it; nothing is
built. As more join in, they seem to reach a critical mass, a quorum, and the thinking
begins. They place pellets atop pellets, then throw up columns and beautiful, curving,
symmetrical arches, and the crystalline architecture of vaulted chambers is created. It
is not known how they communicate with each other, how the chains of termites
building one column know when to turn toward the crew on the adjacent column, or
how, when the time comes, they manage the flawless joining of the arches. The
stimuli that set them off at the outset, building collectively instead of shifting things
about, may be pheromones released when they reach committee size. They react as if
alarmed. They become agitated, excited, and then they begin working, like artists.
Bees live lives of organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, all at the same time.
The single bee, out of the hive retrieving sugar (instructed by the dancer: "south-
southeast for seven hundred meters, clover-mind you make corrections for the
sundrift") is still as much a part of the hive as if attached by a filament. Building the
hive, the workers have the look of embryonic cells organizing a developing tissue;
from a distance they are like the viruses inside a cell, running off row after row of
symmetrical polygons as though laying down crystals. When the time for swarming
comes, and the old queen prepares to leave with her part of the population, it is as
though the hive were involved in mitosis. There is an agitated moving of bees back
and forth, like granules in cell sap. They distribute themselves in almost precisely
equal parts, half to the departing queen, half to the new one. Thus, like an egg, the
great, hairy, black and golden creature splits in two, each with an equal share of the
family genome.
The phenomenon of separate animals joining up to form an organism is not
unique in insects. Slime-mold cells do it all the time, of course, in each life cycle. At
first they are single amebocytes swimming around, eating bacteria, aloof from each
other, untouching, voting straight Republican. Then, a bell sounds, and acrasin is
released by special cells toward which the others converge in stellate ranks, touch,
fuse together, and construct the slug, solid as a trout. A splendid stalk is raised, with a
fruiting body on top, and out of this comes the next generation of amebocytes, ready
to swim across the same moist ground, solitary and ambitious.
Herring and other fish in schools are at times so closely integrated, their
actions so coordinated, that they seem to be functionally a great multi-fish organism.
Flocking birds, especially the seabirds nesting on the slopes of offshore islands in
Newfoundland, are similarly attached, connected, synchronized.
Although we are by all odds the most social of all social animalsmore
interdependent, more attached to each other, more inseparable in our behavior than
beeswe do not often feel our conjoined intelligence. Perhaps, however, we are
linked in circuits for the storage, processing, and retrieval of information, since this
appears to be the most basic and universal of all human enterprises. It may be our
biological function to build a certain kind of Hill. We have access to all the
information of the biosphere, arriving as elementary units in the stream of solar
photons. When we have learned how these are rearranged against randomness, to
make, say, springtails, quantum mechanics, and the late quartets, we may have a
clearer notion how to proceed. The circuitry seems to be there, even if the current is
not always on.
The system of communications used in science should provide a neat,
workable model for studying mechanisms of information-building in human society.
Ziman, in a recent Nature essay, points out, "the invention of a mechanism for the
systematic publication of fragments of scientific work may well have been the key
event in the history of modern science.". He continues:

A regular journal carries from one research worker to another the various . . .
observations which are of common interest. . . . A typical scientific paper has never
pretended to be more than another little piece in a larger jigsawnot significant in
itself but as an element in a grander scheme. This technique, of soliciting many
modest contributions to the store of human knowledge, has been the secret of Western
science since the seventeenth century, for it achieves a corporate, collective power
that is far greater than any one individual can exert [italics mine].

With some alternation of terms, some toning down, the passage could describe
the building of a termite nest.
It is fascinating that the word "explore" does not apply to the searching aspect
of the activity, but has its origins in the sounds we make while engaged in it. We like
to think of exploring in science as a lonely, meditative business, and so it is in the first
stages, but always, sooner or later, before the enterprise reaches completion, as we
explore, we call to each other, communicate, publish, send letters to the editor, present
papers, cry out on finding.
(Page 11 - 15)

(The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher, Lewis Thomas, published by

Allen Lane 1980.)

And so there we have it in a nutshell, but on we go, trying to do something to

allow us to break free from these priestly constraints. We need to coin a new phrase
for the scientific study of corporate behaviour, Hillism.
The result of reasoning, as many have over the centuries, and indeed
millennia, that various social structures mimic specialised body parts is to bring this
whole idea of corporate being occurring at the social level together by recognising
that human society appears in the physical form of an exoskeleton, a highly elaborate
structural exoskeleton within which the living cells exist differentiated functionally
according to their location within the organism's body. Ouspensky fails completely to
even begin to approach this kind of logical culmination to his supposedly organic
reasoning. He offers no formulation of the human superorganism as a living organism
comparative in real terms to a familiar organic structure such as science deals with
ordinarily. Consequently he uses the intuitively realizable implications of the idea to
inspire an elaboration upon the age old mythology of Judaism to which his life is
devoted via the medium of esoteric knowledge. He grasps the implications of certain
collective behaviours, such as war, without having a clue how to account for them.
But as he does this, maddeningly, he raises exactly the issues that attract my attention
and in exactly the right context. War is, in the context of the complex superorganism
the most natural and healthy activity, it is the personification of growth. As long as a
society can find victims to attack by engaging in war it is in good fettle, and this is
why war is the hallmark of Jewish society, by which I means more explicitly the
Christian society whose history I am more familiar with, but of course now the Jews
have their own territory to play with as well as manipulating 'ours' we see the only
occupation that really fills them with joy is the slaughter of defenceless civilians.
And Islam is the same. I do mean to be critical in a political sense, I cannot help it, I
am an individual, but in truth this behaviour is simply the inevitable product of human
Hillistic behaviour, the human organism has to expand its territory, that is what it
does, and there can be only one. And this process of expansion takes exactly the form
that Ouspensky notes, one of an amorphous expansion involving the eradication and
incorporation of organisms by one another according to the outcome of their
meetings. Outcomes that are determined by the physiological structure of the
competing organisms. Physiology which is empowered structurally by dint of the
intensity of information that is at the disposal of the Queen body directing its growth.
Which is just another way of saying that knowledge is power.

5) The relationship between individual and corporate form. This subject is the
source of so much intellectual gush and argument, Do we need more!! It
cannot be avoided. Ouspensky offers us a rare, if not completely unique, opportunity
to consider the question of individuality within the context of an argument that extols
the reality of Super Being, and so we must note his comments on this subject.
We have already seen that the process of evolving a superorganic being
composed of individually defined organism requires an extension of the process of
increasing structural complexity by means of generating foci of interdependent
differentiation amongst the individual units of which the superorganism is to be
formed. The realisation of this process of interdependent differentiation demands that
the units themselves have a severely limited sense of self. For a sense of self to be
limited it must impose a sense that although an individual cannot see further than the
end of their nose they feel certain that they see everything there is to see. Human
consciousness, as experienced by individuals must be severely limited if a true
superorganic form is to be a real outcome of human nature. Thus the idea of the
individual is the most essential feature of the human superorganism within which
there is no such thing as a human individual. Maddening to think about isn't it.
How is this balance to be struck between a sense of self consciousness that
feels all embracing, and the reality of a consciousness that it virtually nonexistent?
The answer to this question involves the nature of linguistic physiology and the mode
of information it relays, which is so perfectly evolved that a linguistic image replaces
all other images derived from sensory information in the final summation that forms
the conscious sense of self and existence. Language is a looking glass, and it evolved
to be so, precisely in order to deliver this full blown sense of consciousness that is
utterly artificial in its result, making it the exact opposite of self consciousness.
This linguistic hardware is all very well, but the linguistic images themselves
are not self generating, just as legs for locomotion are all very well but journeys do
not just happen because legs exist, the legs have to do the walking that makes the
journeys legs are capable of real. Likewise with mirrors of self deception that
linguistic physiology evolved to make possible, the linguistic images still have to be
fabricated and beamed out into the world where they can function as images of self
awareness by stimulating the sensory organs of information reception, the brains of
individuals.
It follows in a manner logically consistent with the physiology of a
superorganism that if the evolution of a highly defined organ of authority ensures the
evolution of highly defined individuals then the evolution of a strong sense of self, the
crucial attribute of consciousness that makes a socially functional individual possible,
is likely to be a feature of humans. Making a strong sense of self a feature of an
argument in which the major challenge to conventional wisdom is that there is no
such thing as self seems, at first, to be contradictory, to say the least. This apparent
contradiction has all the appearance of being self serving, fulfilling a desire to have
ones cake and eat it, in exactly the manner of all the usual self serving mythologists
who make a habit of asserting whatever it pleases them to assert by means of an artful
distortion of meaning in their use of familiar words.
But we are talking here of a contradiction born of an attribute of
misconception fabricated by the knowledge perverts who gave us our sacred
knowledge in the first place. The priest produces the image of reality that linguistic
physiology intended should be produced in order that a priesthood could exist.
Therefore the contradiction was created by evolution, and the apparent contradiction
which appears when science notes the real situation is only apparent, and results from
the fact that nature has produced an animal that believes it is self conscious when it is
not because its self consciousness is an illusion. Thus science, as rendered here, is not
saying that there is a superorganism and individuals, it is saying there is a
superorganism composed of units which it unites into itself by means of a corporate
image that each unit experiences, due to their corporate nature in the form of their
linguistic physiology, as a self image.
We are dealing with a contradiction born of a misconception that amounts to a
highly circumscribed sense of awareness that enables an individual to be highly self
conscious, with an intimate and rich sense of self, but otherwise, is completely blind.
And even this self awareness is an illusion. The corporate mind overcomes this
barrier of self centred awareness that focuses the individual upon themselves and their
own interests by acting as the source of the illusion which it radiates in the form of
culture and thus implants into the brain of each individual to which it has access. The
primary medium of corporate self consciousness is religion, superimposed on the
prior main medium of corporate identity which was racial physiology. And obviously
the primary requirement for this facility of linguistic physiology, the production of an
image of self consciousness that is corporate in origin, is the evolution of a core organ
of authority from which the artificial image of identity can be derived.
So linguistic physiology is the hardware of consciousness, as legs are the
hardware of locomotion. Hardware of consciousness produces images, as hardware
of locomotion produces journey which in a sense can be said to map a terrain just as
linguistic images do. But both the products of these physiological attributes have an
extended purpose and overtime they make their mark on the environment so that
journeys result in trails which dictate the route the legs will take, and linguistic
images result in the coalescence of centres of culture where cultural forms are
preserved and which dictate the images that people will experience as their
consciousness of reality. Evolutionary physiology is externalised in this way. And
the evolution of an elite caste organ is the consequence of linguistic physiology just
much as track ways are a result of locomotive physiology. Physiology lays down
structure in the human world in a most elaborate fashion and this is because humans
are a superorganism and their physiology is extended in so elaborate a fashion that it
constitutes exoskeleton and the living units become entirely dependant upon the
extended physiology they, due to their received artificial images of reality, believe
they are responsible for creating!
Ouspensky's interpretation of the three relevant, according to him, Biblical
myths, is delightful, and in terms of the creation of an organ of authority, quite
convincing. His conclusion that the three myths are about human evolution is
important in terms of teasing out the connective threads between his mythological
reasoning and the science he is trying to embrace by extending the esoteric mode of
understanding to cover the new dominant idea of his day, which was evolution.
The reality of mythology's central position in human affairs means that myths
must deliver true power. Consequently, within the dominant cultural heritage of our
time, that of Jewish culture, we should find the functional component of myth that
emulates reality. These functional information components will be encoded in such a
way that they enable the organism whose biomass is imbued with the resulting
artificial image of reality, a linguistic image which constitutes the organism's
corporate identity, an identity that is infused intimately into each individual in the
form of their self consciousness, to comply with the dictates of human nature. And
this conformity between reality and myth is what Ouspensky brings out of the three
Biblical myths for us by way of his matter of fact interpretation of their meaning. He
indicates how these myths each deliver a message to those who know how to interpret
it of a deep understanding of the mechanisms operating in relation to the existence of
the inner circle which is our organ of authority, or super-organ, the brain which
delivers identity, motivation, and direct action to the biomass within which it exists.
These myths instruct the 'chosen', the priests, how to retain their status as the core of
an ascendant superorganic being, and thus to be its identity and the focus of the
purpose that the same identity necessarily imparts to the biomass implanted with it.
The Jews as a cultural body evolved about this priesthood that arose from
within the melting pot of Mesopotamian civilizations, to form a superorganic being
that became so defined as to become a hierarchical structure, and, as a result of the
continuing expansion of the superorganic being that Judaism gave rise to. I see no
other way of understanding the history of Western civilisation than to see the Jews as
being the motive force behind the rise of Greek and Roman culture since this is what
eventually delivered the world to the Christian and Moslem dominion of today.
Precisely how this relationship was borne out is not clear to me since I am not a
scholar of the ancient world but we do have to think of Judaism as some sort of social
being which is special and which supports at its core some kind of priesthood that is
just as operative in the world today as ever it was in Ancient Greece two and a half
thousand years ago. But trying to be precise about this question is very tricky, it is of
never ending interest to me and I could discuss the matter, but it is a detail of the
argument and not central to the idea of Super Being, although in political terms, it is
of the greatest importance for our world today since the ruling force in society still
relies upon the hidden aspect of this knowledge and this is precisely why science has
been so perverted to prevent us from knowing our own true nature as we might if we
were free of theocratic authority.

6) The self-evolving being. This is perhaps Ouspensky's most marvellous flight

of fancy. Once again, at the heart of this particular expression, we find the
true thread of reasoning that interprets human society in a manner appropriate to the
central idea of human society as a living organism. The unique quality of humans,
what Ouspensky calls the characteristic of being self-evolving, is an attribute of life
forms toward which Nature is driven, no matter what base structure She has to work
with.
The idea that humans are unique, within the context of scientific reasoning, is
so insane as to be downright offensive to any scientist. That said, it is true that all
scientists recognise the absolute uniqueness of human beings. This sounds like a
contradiction, but it is only a linguistic contradiction, the reality is so. The best
analogy I can offer to explain how these contradictory conditions can exist at one and
the same time is to offer you the idea of a corrupt police force. A police officer
prevents crime, therefore it is impossible for a police officer to commit crime. But we
all know all police officers are 'flexible', and some are downright criminal, and some
police forces are rooted in crime. The West's scientific establishment was set up by
the theocracy, and it is of the order of an institution like a police force based on crime,
set up to serve the needs of an autocratic dictator. All scientists are by definition the
absolute enemies of science, where they are required to be, which is in this one crucial
area concerning human nature, and the requirement to guarantee that the duality of
theistic mythology will always dictate the development of science in the field of
human self knowledge.
This is so obvious that the scientist-priests even write books which present
arguments that are folded in upon their own distortions, such as Another Unique
Species: Patterns in Human Evolutionary Ecology, Robert Foley, first published
1987. This book opens with a chapter entitled The Problem of Human Uniqueness.
We can compare this title, in our imagination, with a religious treatise that a theist
may well see fit to pen entitled The Problem of Christ's Resurrection from Death.
The theist sets up the fiction, absurdity supreme, and then writes books to try and
figure out how these 'self evident facts', that are manifestly stupid, can be accounted
for. It is utter obscenity. But, this is stupidity with a purpose, like the obscenity of
setting up a police force to combat crime which is itself the source of all crime.
Following the terrible Moslem attack on Madrid a couple of months ago, the terrorists
responsible were found to be of Moroccan extraction, at least in part, and this brought
the Moroccan trade in cannabis under scrutiny as a source of revenue funding the
terrorist. Visiting a hill farmer to see how the trade was conducted it turned out that
although it was illegal to grow marijuana, the Chief of Police in the local district sent
his officers round annually to the farms to collect the tithe from the hashish crop.
This is an endemically corrupt police force, it is in effect an institution of state, and it
is a perfectly common model, one found in less sophisticated societies than our own
where wealth is less plentiful than we are use to, and a more traditional hierarchical
authority is the cultural norm.
But in our fabulous society, the ancient mythology reigns supreme in its own
way. Just as, when all is said and done, Ancient Greek society can be seen to of been
an absolute theocracy, despite its great intellectual achievements as a culture, in that
when thinkers challenged the idea that the earth was at the centre of the universe, the
geocentric model, by proposing that the earth travelled about the sun, the heliocentric
model, these intellectuals were threatened with death, ousted from their societies for
the threat the posed to the theocratic edifice of knowledge which was the foundation
of authority, and their works have not come down to us so we do not know how good,
or how bad, their arguments were. Today the system is not so blunt, control is
managed by a swamping effect, and mighty effective it is. But we have, at the core of
the idea of human uniqueness a homocentric world view, upon which theocracy
depends for its authority. The alternative, that I call a biocentric world view, in which
humans are recognised to be a part of nature, and perfectly in accord with that status,
so that no alternative account is required for the location of humanity in the biosphere
of life than that which we would seek to apply to any other organism on earth.
And so, how does Ouspensky deal with this difficulty? Well, the beauty of his
thinking is that he effectively takes his logic to the most superb conclusion, he
recognises, in effect, that humans have a nature in common with other species, such
as the ant. I find this so delightful I cannot help but smile at this. But then, of all
things, how does the man escape from the rigour of his own logic? It beggars belief.
He uses the logic of the mystical ideas he has been developing for us that account for
the evolution of human society by way of wisdom focused in an inner circle which is
sifted into a concentration of wisdom at a focal point by way of a series of inevitable
calamities, a bit like that experienced in the Caribbean this week, as noted above, no
doubt, brought on by the nastiness of the inner circle which allows people to live in
squalor without doing anything about it.
The result is he comes up with the most amazing idea. It seems that any
though is permissible to these damned priests, any though but that which is true. By
saying that ants are, in common with humans, a species that has the attribute of being
'self-evolving', he is saying that human nature and ant nature are the same. Both
humans and ants are superorganic beings with a corporate nature. He very nicely
recognises that this quality must apply to different body plans that are differentiated at
a fundamental level, and this is excellent, it is a most important point to grasp from a
scientific point of view for this is what loads the mammalian physiology with the
potential to unfold into a superorganic form and this therefore establishes the quality
we would call purpose in nature that all theists, and their scientist kind, tell us does
not exist in nature; it is a unique attribute of humans.
Ouspensky however, despite all this wonderful reasoning on the subject in
hand, then comes up with the most extraordinary way of preserving the attribute of
being self-evolving as unique to humans by saying that these species which, by virtue
of their social systems reveal their common nature with humans, must of been earlier
experiments in the same vein as that being conducted upon human kind today, and
therefore logic, esoteric logic that is, tells us they too must of had rounds of calamity
causing a centrifugal effect sifting knowledge into an inner circle of authority but that
in the end they had one fall too far and descended into the living hell of being
absolute automatons that we see ants are today. It is quite remarkable, but I guess in
the broad scheme of the gush these people come out with it is pretty much par for the
course, it is only exceptional because of the subject that is being dealt with on this
occasion. Nice, I love it.
So humans get to remain unique despite their common nature with other
species. The scientists would approve, and with the likes of Foley and Ouspensky on
the team it is little wonder that the obscenity of Judaism has been able to survive for
so long, and continue to be in the ascendant at all times.
Here then, we see Ouspensky and modern science united as one, the esoteric
mythologist and the scientist have one mind. And yet you should of seen how reviled
I was when I encroached upon a BBC maintained website purporting to be for
scientists and offered my superorganic interpretations of questions regarding race and
such like. Nasty, nasty. When I discovered this piece by Ouspensky recently, in a
book I ad bought a few years ago, I felt I knew why the scientists should be so
outraged by someone expressing the idea of human superorganic form, if people like
Ouspensky had given it such a bad name, but upon closer examination we see the
story is far from being so straightforward and it just makes me wonder who the hell
these dammed scientists are, and just what they really know. When you think of the
avowed work of the secret societies such as the Freemasons who have no shame about
combining all ideas in their effort to aid in the theistic control of society it is perfectly
possible that people in these establishments know the truth as I have discovered it,
and are always on guard against it. But that is another story, we can only hope to find
the means to circumvent the control of these knowledge perverts and thus to help
bring them to their end.
 Both Ouspensky and the modern scientist agree on the central attribute of
human nature, humans are self-evolving in their eyes. Man makes himself, so the
intellectuals from all walks of life never tire of telling us. The difference between
them is that whereas the scientist displays all the idiocy of the priest in asserting this
attribute to be a unique feature of the human species, at least Ouspensky's logic in this
one respect, as insane as his reasoning is that follows from its application, is far
superior to that of the modern priest of human nature who exists in the guise of the
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, evolutionary scientist and so on. For
Ouspensky sees the existence of a central idea and recognises it must be inclusive of
all life, and as such he is actuated by the logic of the biocentric model of life, rather
than the homocentric model, even though, as we know, he is soon pulled back into the
force field of false, self centred reasoning, that makes the inner circle appear as an
organ within the biomass of society. But while he allows himself to be influenced by
the true scientific logic he allows the idea of inclusivity to flow unimpeded by
arrogant assumptions about what existence is, and what humanity is. The only trouble
is that he then channels the flow of scientific logic in-between the walls of his esoteric
channel and so toward the depths of the lake of stupidity built up behind the damn
built by modern science on the foundations of Darwin's work on evolution which
focused out attention on our form, and which disregarded our nature. Ouspensky did
not simply refuse to address the idea of human organic being, but it is only because he
wanted to impose a mystical interpretation on the dominant idea of evolution that he
let his imagination go in this direction, and of course the scientists are not trying to
assert a mythological idea of existence, they are trying to accommodate one by
allowing science and religion to exist side by side.
It is fascinating to consider how Ouspensky applied himself to this idea of
human society as an organism. The detail I have mentioned that is so well
considered. He recognises that the thrust of any broad sweep of Nature toward the
perfection of a being in the social domain must be constrained by physiological limits.
Consequently he reasons that the path leading to humans is in the guise of mammalian
physiology, and that outside this specific physiological constraint other true paths to
the same end must be considered possible. I think this is a most remarkable
conclusion to draw for a man who is approaching the matter as he is, as a mythologist,
and this is so because he is so right in drawing this conclusion. Why has this simple
idea never occurred to any scientist, of any kind? Plenty of scientist have headed in
this direction, the American anthropologist Leslie A. White, whose last work The
Concept of Cultural Systems: A Key to Understanding Tribes and Nations, Columbia
University Press, 1975, was published posthumously in the year he died, talked the
talk, but he never even began to walk the walk toward this correct interpretation that
Ouspensky makes here. Ouspensky is the only writer I have ever found that goes the
whole hog and asserts human society is a living being, and Ouspensky is an out and
out nutter that I would not want to be seen dead with. Isn't life strange ........
Although Ouspensky's consideration of this idea is oddly expressed, like the
oddness of the myth of Noah's Ark as a way of accounting for the evolution of
superorganic super-organ of authority, the inner circle, is essentially correct in terms
of illuminating the broad sweep of the process he is considering here. His expression
tallies so well with my purely scientifically inspired interpretation of what we know
about ourselves at the turn of the twenty-first century that we cannot help but be
impressed by Ouspensky's account and the effort he made to create it. I guess that
like the path toward true love, the route toward true knowledge can be a long, and
sometimes, a very winding road.
 The potted social history of the corporate insects, the bees and the ants,
provided by Ouspensky is remarkable, what a fella! The part of this social history
delights me most of all where I find my insect counterpart engaged in precisely the
same activity, of raising the alarm, as I am engaged in now. But, likewise, no doubt,
to no avail. I see, occurring all around me, a major transformation of an English
society into the base homogeneity of a global culture, and I weep inside. A small
example can be plucked from this weeks media flow, today is 20-5-04, and a couple
of night ago on the regional news there was a piece about deckchairs in Blackpool. A
local councillor, a women, of course. Women have no sense of quality, their
physiology, it seems to me, causes women to always want renewal. That sounds
sexist, but hell, if I had to have a human grow inside me, and to give birth, I would
want to have some bloody good reason to go through the process of such biological
renewal, and I think the idea of a better future, expressed in material renewal is buried
deep in the female psyche, we see all the time women despising the rich quality of
age, such as we find on an old piece of brass, and preferring the bright shine of a
polished piece of metal that makes all look nice and new. I have a battered old copper
teapot, probably from some Hindu region of the Asian subcontinent, I grasped from a
table where a crowd was fishing for bargains and I paid £5, it has never been cleaned
and it age and genuineness reeks delightfully. One whisk of polish and all that would
be gone, but because it was dirty and looked just like the later twentieth century
imports in style no one had the least interest in it. Their is no depth to the
appreciation of old things, no sense of the culture that such things contain within then
by means of their preservation of style. This is typical of the female psyche and
because we live in a world where men must please women in order to get the only
thing that matters to them in life, the love of a women, then powerful men make the
eradication of culture and its replacement with polish the be all and all of their art.
All of which, conforms perfectly to the requirement of the ever growing
superorganism which wants old to be decayed and replaced by new, like a jungle
recycling itself.
But the deckchairs, I suppose I had better tell you about the deckchairs, I just
know you're dying to know about them. This lady councillor was calling for the
deckchairs to be removed from the sea front. She wanted a continental format to be
adopted. "What is wrong with the continental style, they have it everywhere in the
world, why should we not have it in Blackpool?" she said. Quite, I rest my case, she
answers her own question even as she asks it.
Yesterday, today is, now, 01/06/04, the government announced a programme
of measures to deal with the possible threat from Nile disease. In America last year
some two hundred and eighty people were killed by this, hitherto, African disease.
More people, travelling more quickly, about the globe meant these viruses could make
the leap into as yet uncharted territories. This is the global superorganism for real.
But this homogenisation that we try to stop is no different in kind than the
homogenisation that we try to encourage, in terms of homogenising culture. There is
nothing we can do to stop genetic viruses from existing and there is nothing we can do
to stop linguistic-genes existing, such as the linguistic gene called 'continental style'.
It would be nice to be able to stop all these diseases from invading out world, but we
cannot, we have to accept that the priests, the councillors, have a biological role to
play in the organism and what they do always meets with approval. She is right that
the young have no sentimentality about crappy old furniture, they do have a craving to
have whatever anyone else has that is new. All of this is part of the process of organic
growth, growth involves decay, recycling. If human society is an organism, and it is,
then we should be able to follow the patterns of material recycling and growth in the
record of social transformation, what we call, that is what the priests call, history.
Society operates systematically, that is to say according to systems which
generate their own dominance by virtue of a number of naturally occurring dynamics,
such as we see in the case of the continental style called for by this councillor who
recognises such moves are the way the money is going. Money is the blood in the
system, it carries the energy toward the formation of structure. The continental style
is a way of doing, things, of manufacturing in modern materials, and of presenting
social structure in modern styles. Once a system is moving it will tend to drain the
blood from remnants of old structure, such as deckchairs, toward the new glass and
plastic of modern industrial design.
The consequence is that to stand up as an advocate of the past in any
determined manner is to much like the stand of Cnut, or seating of Cnut, before the
incoming tide. In effect taking this kind of stance in the face of material culture is
futile, all that is likely to happen is that, in time, the parts you wish to preserve will
decay. The reason is that as trends develop they attract all sorts of social
transformations to be drawn toward their general direction so that laws are altered to
accommodate changes and eventually the whole fabric of the exoskeleton is shifted
into a new phase of material expression. Today they announced that the second
country in Europe, Norway, following Ireland's example, had imposed a nationwide
ban on smoking in bars and restaurants. They think this will now ricochet round all
Europe, as an unstoppable virus transforming the social structure overnight. These
are purely organic phenomenon, no different to the spread of Nile virus, we can
challenge these things, but we cannot stop them. We might protest that the
comparison is ludicrous because there are people fighting to stop smoking, this has
not just come about because of some mechanistic relationship between the human
physiology and some alternative parasitic species. But the point is that human society
is an organism and everything that occurs is society is organic in nature and as such
mechanistic. Why should it be possible for a tiny elite to ban a massive minority from
doing what they want to do? How come the only smokers one ever sees in the media
are all for the ban on smoking in public, it is as if burglars, if ever they were
interviewed were all to say that though the idea of more prisons to keep them off the
streets were a brilliant idea! If all these smokers want to stop smoking why don't they
damn well stop? As I say, society works systematically and these trends has a
dynamic to them that is certainly well beyond the control of any individual or
collection of individuals.
Ouspensky's remarks on the on the fall of social insects into a state of uniform
automaton suggests there may be a mechanism for delivering the evolutionary process
toward this mechanistic climax that may one day turn humans into the monstrous
Borg of the Stark Trek stories fame. But to someone like me we seem to be already
there. Religion, and religious belief, is the personification of an intellect reduced to
the status of an automaton's brain. Religion even has the principle of mindless
obedience to its dictates as the supreme expression of the individuals intellect, that is
the principle of unquestioning belief in religious authority which is at the core of all
religions. And when stressful times are upon us, in the most oppressive religions of
this automaton kind, such as the Jewish slave identity we call Islam, we find then the
most perfect expression of this automata of the ant-hill, the suicide bomber.
 As a general point on this strange piece of work by a mythologist, we might
just pause to wonder why he should of been inspired to engage so thoroughly in a
consideration of this subject of superorganic being. It delights me to of found such an
account, an account I found quite by accident in a volume already on my bookshelf,
when prompted to look at after seeing Ouspensky mentioned in an encyclopaedia of
secret knowledge I had just bought along with a pile of other books at sale in my local
library. The New Model of the Universe I has acquired several years ago as a
curiosity, but from where I just do not know, quite possibly my local Oxfam charity
shop.
But why did Ouspensky write this, when, however you cut it, what he ends up
by concluding is stark raving mad? I am only driven to ask this question because I
already have an answer in mind. As we have seen he manages to tease out a lot of
ideas which I have also found to be valid by following a strictly logical line of
reasoning where my only guide has been that of scientific understanding. So he has
been extending the reach of secret knowledge, making science accord with the
message about the inner circle. And in our own time, with the rise of the Biblical
account of evolution called Creationism which makes the science of evolution accord
with the Bible we see that this practice is not so much surprising, as an inevitable
outcome of the advance of knowledge of reality which overlaps with the foundations
of social knowledge that creates power by dispersing an identity upon which the
power of an inner circle relies, as is the case with the Biblical knowledge which
enslaves the Christians to the Jews.
As a student of esoteric arts Ouspensky will of been familiar with the central
place occupied by social insects in the thoughts of esoteric thinkers down the ages.
The view Ouspensky gives us here of the social milieu of the ant and the bee is only a
version of an age old conception of these nonhuman communities as counterparts of
human society, updated for the requirements of the Darwinian age. From the point of
view of the scientist exposed to such transfigurations of their hard won ideas, the
product is grotesque, and it seems worthless. But there are two points to bear in mind
here. First, the work of the scientist is itself a grotesque piece of theistic propaganda,
all more vile I would suggest for the fact that it is expunged of all appearance of
theistic reasoning while nonetheless being nothing but theistic reasoning. Thus at
least esoteric knowledge might be exactly what it claims to be, an account of
existence which offers insight to the willing pupil, whereas science is a total lie,
follow it with sincerity in your heart and all you will find is emptiness. But, secondly,
and this is what is so amazing, the result in both cases, in that of the Darwinist and the
Creationist, is to provide a perverted conception of reality which totally satisfies those
who come the respective portals of wisdom in search of understanding. And this is
exactly what these knowledge forms are meant to do, except in the case of the
mythologist the objective of their efforts are circumscribed in one direction, toward
social power, and in the case of the scientist their efforts are directed toward social
power too, but, as we have just noted, by an excruciating clever deception. It is only
by working out for yourself the real outcome of scientific endeavour in this
department that you can look upon the work of Ouspensky and understand it, and
indeed see how very clever it was. He must of made a considerable effort to think
about this subject and he was no doubt guided in his reasoning by his already
developed understanding of the way in which a superorganic human society must
function because of his knowledge of secret lore on this subject. But what scientist
would think to look at such a piece as I have quoted here in order to help them learn
what science should really be saying on this subject? None, because in accordance
with the dictates of the theocracy that founded the remit of the scientific establishment
each element of the intellectual arts must be kept separate and the scientist must only
work with the material world which necessarily forces them only to consider the
genetic foundation of biological evolution and precludes the possibility of language
acting as an extension of the genetic information package into the social world in a
strictly deterministic fashion. But this determinism is what is revealed by the obtuse
manner in which Ouspensky gets to the right place by an utterly wrong method.
The professors of esoteric knowledge were always driven to find hidden
messages, hieroglyphs, as Ouspensky says, encoding the rules of social power in the
world about them. These hieroglyphs only need to serve as vehicles for their secret
knowledge. And they were better suited to this purpose than the priest could possibly
know because, as science can now reveal, all these social agglomerations, including
bacteria and marine molluscs, and others no doubt, do share a common nature with
humans.
White ants, I should make plain, are termites, not ants at all. The fact is that as
evocative of human society as Maeterlinck's description of life in a termitary is, he is
being unremittingly anthropomorphic. This is not the best way to present a scientific
parallel for human society and termite society, it has a similar result to that
Ouspensky's ideas have, that of bringing the truth into disrepute by contaminating it
with precisely those elements of unrefined human reasoning that science exists to
expunge from its own attempts to comprehend reality.
As far as I am concerned humans, for the most part, do live out their lives
exactly as Maeterlinck says termites do, where the misery and sacrifice of the many is
the overall picture, it being for the sake of, in the case of the termites Maeterlinck says
none, but in the case of humans we can say, to go with Spencer, misery and sacrifice
is for the sake of the few. But the people I know who lead such appalling lives full of
misery and sacrifice, getting pleasure out of such drivel as TV soaps and mass
spectacle games like football, where they take part by being anonymous spectators,
are utterly oblivious to the meaninglessness of their activities. And when I confront
those of them who are intelligent and educated with this analysis of their lives they
simply fail to see the point, and they say that they themselves enjoy their occupations.
Quite! Of course you do! But why? Why do you enjoy such mindless participation
in life, by way of total inactivity on your own part, and, more to the point, why do so
many find fulfilment this collective mindlessness, which, furthermore, tends
invariably to take place about an activity which is itself a total fabrication? By total
fabrication I mean we might see the sense in a community being enthralled and
involved in the young men bringing home the heads of the local tribe, that is pretty
real. But football, which is noted to be a tribal activity in its nature, is a parody, at
best of this kind of activity, so that the real force of internecine conflict over territory
is extracted and used to give expression to people whose lives could not be more
removed from any necessity to be occupied with such affairs. And so, why is this so?
Why should the impulse to be tribal in our behaviour linger after all necessity for this
behaviour has long since vanished? Do we go around breaking up rocks just for the
hell of it even though we no longer farm the land? No, we do go to the gym to work
out because our physique benefits from physical exertion, and this is a clue to the
reason why we engage in tribal activities, because our psyche, like our physique,
evolved to perform certain tasks and this has left it mark on us, when we engage in
mindless social activates that have their sole strength in being mass communal
activities we are exercising out corporate instinct which is the expression and
fulfilment of our corporate nature.
 And the point is then that of course we enjoy mindless, meaningless activity
just so long as it is communal, because being communal is its meaning. And so, if we
extract the ludicrous, judgmental observations of Maeterlinck from the evaluation of
termite lives we may say that in so far are we may equate our inherent pleasure in
communal tasks we engage in, so we may say the termite is fulfilled by its obedience
to the demands of its communal programme, and of course when the queen is killed,
as Maeterlinck describes in his book, the termitary dies, it no longer has any will to
live. And in human communities exterminated by slaves programmed by Judaic
identity implants we know that with the loss of their cultural identity many of them
lost the will to live. Only when a society is already delineated into a complex
structure so that there is an elite and an attached biomass is it possible simply to
exterminate the priesthood and supplant the identity of the priests, as the Spanish Jews
did in South America, with a new slave implant thus allowing the indigenous
population to survive in a new guise, under a new master.
We recently passed the centennial date for the showing of the first motion
pictures, I think that was the occasion, and a television commentator noted that when
movies first appeared a French critic noted the lack of involvement on the part of the
audience, effectively saying that the coming of the movies represented the coming of
the Zombie. But not, this commentator went on, we live in a world where all we do is
live via a 'screen' of one sort or another, proving how wrong this early critic was, as
no one today would even think to make the same observation. Well, I often make the
observation that television is the Zombification of the person, and this example of
social change in the wake of technological development, that is evolution in the form
of the exoskeleton, nicely illustrates how we sink imperceptibly ever more into
uniformity, conformity, and orientation toward one centralised source of information
while still preserving our own sense of self intact, the illusion of self, I should say.
The whole social system - think deck chairs - has evolved to see that this happens, and
our individual psychology evolved to be receptive to this process so that we are only
happy to the extent to which we are free to conform. We already are those white ants,
we just do not know it yet, anymore than the termites do.

7) It must be conceded that, as discussed in point ? , earlier, there does actually

have to be a point toward which evolution is headed for the concept of
progress to be real, and simply an effect of partiality. Ouspensky has already there is
latent potential, only he has no idea what this potential is in scientific terms. But we
know it is the attainment of 'self-evolving' status, as Ouspensky would have it, the
attainment of superorganic being, as I would have it. The reason this is so is perfectly
straightforward, a new body plan comes into being on the planet in response to the
broadest possible environmental conditions, such as the attainment of a mammalian
form characterised by warm blooded physiology. This contrasts sharply with the cold
blooded form that has hitherto been the dominant, and as such as expanded into all
niches of the earth. To the new body plan the ecosystems of the earth appear vacant,
and it proceeds to elaborate its expression to fill this void. As a consequence the air
receives its mammalian form, the sea its own kind, and in the social domain which
comes into being by virtue of the physiology's own existence, a form of itself evolves
to give full expression of its own physiological potential. This folding in upon the
self of a physiological form leads to the evolution of Super Beings.
With the evolution of the Jewish identity and its associated culture, we have
the continuation of the evolutionary unfolding, and we see the same realisation of the
perfect corporate social form in the insects that we have been discussing, only, as
noted, more perfect, because more, apparently, automated. Ouspensky does not so
much see beyond facts, as right through them, truth is certainly no obstacle to the
understanding and exposition of the priest.

And we may note, although again I have broached this topic, when Ouspensky
says the mind is an instrument through which reality is perceived, this naturally raises
the question of what the mind is. The mind in this sense is literally language. The
mind is not a substantial entity, material in form, it is an informational entity,
energetic in form. Forms which are energetic have the capacity to invoke response,
this is the nature of information, action is a form of response as implied in one of
Newton's laws of motion which make it plain that to any action there is always an
opposite and equal reaction. But living forms constitute complex information
handling systems and in humans linguistic physiology is such a system and the mind
is its product so that linguistic information acts as the medium of motivation in this
physiological system where it exists to invoke, or to mediate, action. Information, in
this case in the form of language, is therefore energy, or the manifestation of energy.
But, obviously, this capacity for expressing energy is only operative when the
appropriate physical systems are engaged. In the same way a cars fuel tank may be
full but unless the ignition has been engaged and all things are in order the fuel will
not deliver motive power to the system and cause a reaction. Thus I may of written
the greatest work the world has ever known, but until the world has read it, it does not
know that it has been written. Damn!
As so much of our consciousness is made possible via the medium of
language, so this medium can act as a blind, or distortion. The implication is that we
need to keep in our consciousness the presence of the medium of language through
which we are enabled to see so much. We need to be aware of the actual language we
use to communicate, and this is extremely hard to accomplish for we tend to think that
words mean what they mean, and if they do not then what use are they. But
languages are complex and they are created via general perspectives that act as
interpreters of reality, and this is exactly what we have been seeing as we have seen
that there is not such thing as an individual, there are single persons, with their own
unique identities, but while the word 'individual' purports to say this and nothing
more, it says much more, it says that this individuality is not just something, but
everything. And thus it is this point of view which acts as an interpreter of reality and
thus imparts meaning to the words we take for granted and are obliged to use in our
acts of communication and in our internal thought processes about matters of social
significance about which we want to think.
Ouspensky then, is not trying to be true to reality, he is trying to impart a
shade that is to his liking, to colour meaning according to the filter that is implanted
into his brain. This he does not, presumably see, for if he did he would either give us
a better picture of reality, or, as I would have it, he would of recognised the true
picture that science offers us and he would of seen what I see.

Conclusion

The demise of the wise, those who see where the wind is blowing, toward the
eradication of freewill, self-consciousness and the power to act purposefully which is
supposed to rely upon this qualities of individual personality is the main moral threat
to come from Ouspensky's account which implicitly, if not overtly, sets out to justify
the existence of an elite, and secret, priesthood. This mode of expression is a typical
piece of mythologizing, but it could be said that such a concern is the mainspring of
all my motive energy throughout my life, and this concern for individual freedom is a
recurrent theme throughout many centuries leading up to recent times. The flaw in
this mythological expression, as ever with religious ideology, is its extreme
expression, so extreme, in this case, as to be farcical.
It appears to me that the arrival of the civilised mode of corporate existence
indicates the transformation of the human species that occurred with the unleashing of
the genetically evolved potential that speech has to form a corporate organism. The
freedom of that all individuals experienced in the pre-civilised being was lost as the
process of specialised differentiation evolved, as intimated by Spencer.
As Spencer said, the rigour of the ant-hill was visited upon humanity, but with
one obvious proviso, at least the slavery of most freed the few who were masters.
Taking this descriptive model of hierarchical structure as the starting point, I suggest
that as the sheer mass of the organism increases the access to the privileged
expression of freewill is expanded accordingly. We do not have to degenerate into
the sentimentality of the priest in order to appreciate this fact by supposing this is the
progress of the human ideal. All we need acknowledge is that there is in this process
a relationship between the increasing mass of the core body seeking to expand the
total mass upon which a core depends in order to increase it own inner power. Hence
a core philosophy evolves that eulogises the creation of one world under one authority
and benefits due to all by the realisation of this process. So we find we have a
philosophy that just happens to be in accord with the requirements of Darwinian
evolution, the total eradication of all identities bar one, Judaism, as it turns out. In the
process a liberal and humanitarian ideology makes sense within the ever expanding
central domain where there is a maximum degree of wealth and hence power to act in
a manner that appears to vindicate the sense and the idea of freewill. Liberal ideas,
such as those of Rousseau, perhaps, help to bring about the expansion of the organism
as much as authoritarian ideas such as those of Hitler do. Each plays its part at the
right time and in the right place and all moves along smoothly exactly as it should by
way of finely tuned guillotine blades and humanitarian philosophies and nuclear
bombs and international codes of human rights. Its wonderful.
And so we come to the period of the global superorganism, where wars are carried on
all around the world in the name of Zionism, otherwise called freedom. As president
Bush currently likes to tell us America does not wage war in order to bring the gift of
American freedom to the world, it is God's gift of freedom he gives to us lucky
people. Today the whole of first world is free, riding on the slavery of the third
world. Hence, we, as a society, make freedom the foundation of our cultural ethics,
and we say how we just want to deliver freedom to all the world, but of course this is
biologically impossible, and therefore as such it is just our way of making our use of
these powerless territories of the world sound inclusive. But, not to be cynical about
it, it is because we find, courtesy of evolutionary dynamics, that this ideology of
inclusiveness is the most constructive to follow once the job of extermination of none
Jewish identities has been achieved, that civilisation does progress, as we call it.
It becomes easy to anticipate Natures outcome regarding our species as we
follow the inevitable course of this process of physical expansion, identity
extermination, unification and diversification. We see there is still someway to go
before the whole world is united under a global authority based in Jerusalem, where
all lands answer to one law just as all states in America answer to one law. We can
see the broad outlines of the model, and with wars like the one we are fighting in Iraq
now, and many many more still to be fought, we can see how things will pan out. But
even if this process takes another five centuries, and it may another ten, in the end it
will mean one global civilization under Judaism, there is no other possible outcome as
long as out kind exist, the Jewish culture is way to ascendant ever to be outpaced.
The only hope of a more human identity emerging is to be found in ideas such as
mine, only knowledge can destroy knowledge and offer a replacement, but that is
another story. In the end there must come a time when the world's population of
outsiders is used up, there are, tragically, no more aliens for the Jews to exterminate,
no more ways to progress by means of war. What mode of development is there left?
It is at this point that we get to the good bit, the bit we have all been waiting
for, Utopia! The way forward is already in sight, but the destination toward which it
leads is still over the horizon, and may never be realised, I am not sure. The answer I
am heading toward is that in the end if there is to be a human species in which there is
no slavery, real or virtual, then we have to reach the point where all the world is a
priesthood, where all are equal, where there is no secret knowledge, where there is no
privilege. This can only come about if technology advances so far that the third order
consists entirely of machines, and this can only come about if the environment is
turned entirely into an artificial environment, such as a space ship. Of course since all
such artificial forms are really living forms composed of exoskeleton within which is
housed the living organic fabric in effect if we created craft like those starships we see
on Star Trek we would of transformed ourselves into living creatures whose natural
environment was the vacuum of space. In this circumstance it is possible to conceive
of all people onboard such a craft being of uniform intelligence, appearance and
education, one homogenised elite, created by means of bioengineering and living
within a tailor made suit of exoskeleton. It does not sound very human but that is
where the notion of human nature as corporate nature leads us.
Returning to Ouspensky we have the vision of humanity being reduced to
automatons of an insect kind, and it seems likely if we take up my idea that we are a
superorganic species. But as you can see from what I have just said this insect model
is not correct at all, it completely misjudges the situation because of course it never
sets out to judge the situation correctly according to real knowledge about anything.
And in so far as we continue to live on this planet in a familiar manner the process of
homogenisation is happening around us all the time, we have seen cycles of it many
times over and it is not only produced by great powers such as that of Europe
invading lesser enclaves of humanity such as that of Africa or Australia some two
centuries ago. The same process continues to impinge upon the first order because
society is a living organism. The process evoked in Ouspensky's 'death of the wise' is
not centred on one boundary of supreme wisdom that is lost, resulting in a 'fall' of the
society concerned, from which it must recover by means of the fortuitous survival of a
remnant of the wise, a theme of lost cultural heritage, if we wish to leave Jewish myth
aside for a moment, that it seems to me we can find in the ancient myth of Atlantis,
told by a Greek, but reputedly recovered from the priestly knowledge of the Ancient
Egyptians. The process which invokes the idea of cultural loss and rebirth is about
the gradual attrition of one culture by another, a resident population overwhelmed by
an invading population carrying with it another culture. The essence of the process is
a cultural change and it is irrelevant how this occurs, by war, by immigration, or a
combination of both. We in Europe, a first world power we may be, but we are being
exterminated by the influx of Islam into out world now and we are powerless to do
anything about because the people who run our society are doing everything in their
power to ensure European culture is exterminated, it means nothing to them, they are
not European, they are Jewish, they may call themselves Christian, or Jewish, but in
real terms there is no difference between them.
Only the mast identity remains unchanged because it has not territorial
attachment, you can plant Judaism anywhere, it will always be Judaism, that is the
whole point of Judaism, that is what makes it a super-identity, the identity of the
global superorganism. And before the Jews it is evident from the evidence of
European culture left to us in the likes of such monuments as Stonehenge that a
continental wide culture has laid the foundations of the superorganism that was to be
taken over by Judaism, the Druids had obviously swept across the continent bringing
with them the tools of a civilised lifestyle supporting an elaborate priesthood and
based upon farming, they must exterminated the resident populations of hunter
gathers, wild humans superorganism who had yet to reach that critical stage in their
evolutionary potential where their linguistic physiology ignited and burst into the
symbiotic mode of superorganic growth.
The inner circle at the centre of Ouspensky's account, and it is at the centre of
my scientifically inspired account too.
 Idea Three

Gierke on Natural Law and the Organic Nature of Society

"I was never made by that fool of a workman, I who divide time, who mark so
exactly the course of the sun, who repeat aloud the hours which I mark! No!
that is impossible."

Man a Machine, Julien Offray de la Mettrie. Page 145. Unfortunately, being

an American printing, I cannot date this copy, it is dated 1912, but looks like a 70s or
80s paperback. First pub. 1748.

The two previous authors that have provided the kernel for our thinking about
the reality of Super Being as a real solution to the mystery of our existence as animals
on this planet, represent the thoughts of two thinkers working in the immediate, and
post-immediate, aftermath of the presentations of Darwin on the subject of biological
evolution, which included humans in its remit. As such these two pieces have been
explorative for us, they have presented overt statements of the idea that we seek to
profess ourselves, they therefore lend support to our efforts, these works show that
we are not alone in appealing to this idea, and in finding this idea appealing to
ourselves. And the fact is that humanity has not moved on one jot since the days of
Darwin, nor one jot since the coming of the scientific age some five centuries ago, in
terms of solving the mystery of human nature. A year or so ago I saw a book on
evolution in a charity shop, which unfortunately I considered too costly just for the
few lines that fascinated me in the closing pages, but this book, an Oxford University
publication, stated quite matter-of-factly that we may not be one jot closer to
understanding human nature by the end of the next century, that is the one we are now
in. No doubt there were some reasons given, but as we are endeavouring to discover
here, the problem is not breaking the code of nature, but bursting the constraints on
knowledge imposed by the priests who manage knowledge in such places as Oxford.
What wonders just what these mythologists say to one another behind closed doors.
In themselves then, these two preceding authors do not give us any substance,
now we need something more if we are to advance our idea into the more substantial
terrain of the scientist. How do you prove that human beings are a superorganic
species with a nature common to, and specific to, other superorganic forms, over and
above providing a lengthy argument concerning conceptual similarities based on
behavioural observations that anyone can make? Darwin performed the same
operation of convincing by argument for the most part, but he backed up his argument
by many detailed examples of inherited characteristics that he related to the
environment which became a vital part of his explanation for organic evolution.
Darwin's famous account of the Galapagos Island finches is the best example of this
search for hard facts to back up a general thesis.
 What might we do that equates to the presentation of evidence of a like kind as
that provided by these finches? Well I am not quite sure, it seems to me that proving
that people have language, showing that people live in cities, that there are naturally
occurring sterile members of the community, as in those who remain celibate or who
settle into same sex partnerships, each of these things proves conclusively, on their
own, that humans have to be a superorganic species, for there is no other scientific
way to account for these organically evolved attributes.
But everyone knows all about these attributes, and the whole point of a
mythology is to ensure that these things are accounted for in a none real manner. So,
providing physical evidence of our superorganic status is not the issue, it is all around
us. Our task is more akin to the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, where the effort
on our part has to be to snap everyone out of their fixation on a finely woven fabric of
linguistic illusion by forcing them to see past the mental image created by the
priestcraft of articulate artists of knowledge formation.
But this will not quite answer our need either, for how do you force people to
give up being idiots when they are devoted to being idiots, they like being idiots, and
everything they value derives from their idiocy? And what is more, like the
spectators viewing the naked king's fine suit of new clothes, they know that in truth,
all that they believe is utter rubbish, but they also know that believing what they
believe, works for them. In other words, idiocy is the highest expression of
intelligence; exactly as you might logically reason it would be in a superorganic form
such as ourselves where the brain evolved to link individuals together to form one
corporate mind.
You cannot tackle this issue head on, the answer is not to try. Our interest is
simply our interest. We shall merely trace the relevant subject matter for our own
fascination, as the antiquarians of old engaged in their pursuits for the mere
gratification of the pursuit of knowledge, in the days before such activity developed
an official status and became a professional study, an established part of the
exoskeleton's institutional structure dedicated to the preservation of the theocracy;
before antiquarians became archaeologists.
We have already likened our mode of enquiry to the work of archaeologists
because of the way we delve into the intellectual deposits of our past. There is much
to be said for this conception of our activity, and in this chapter we are going to turn
to some very different archaeological material derived from the mental deposition of
past times, than that which we have perused so far in the two preceding authors.
The post-modernist French philosopher Michel Foucault had a delightful way
of thinking about our intellectual cultural heritage as an accumulated material, the
investigation of whose past equated to the investigation of material debris left behind
by past peoples. This is indicated by the titles of some of his works, such as The
Archaeology of Knowledge. This mode of description is delightful to me because it is
the sort of idea that emerges from my ruminations on human nature from time to time,
and I do not recall seeing this thought put into writing anywhere else. However, if
there is any deeper similitude between the train of the thoughts expressed here and
those of Foucault, then I hope that at least I come across as more down to earth and
accessible than my first ocular lick of Foucault's intellectual corpse indicated his
deposit was to me.
Intellectual deposits are real entities, knowledge is a real entity. Knowledge
exists. Everything that exists by way of human existence, although we segregate
these products of our own being from the rest of nature by calling things natural as
opposed to artificial, or man-made, exist in reality, just as much as any so-called
natural product of the universe exists in reality. This artifice of language, regarding
the idea of the artificial, is one of the primary ways in which we are programmed to
perceive the world according to an image created by priestcraft. Knowledge is a
linguistic product, much of knowledge, as we take it for granted, is the product of this
artifice. And as a linguistic product knowledge has a nature that is distinct from other
artificial products of human activity. But once we accept that knowledge exists as a
linguistic product we thereafter can apply the same common standards of
investigation to its form as we do to any other material entity. That is to say, the
deposition of linguistic material leading to the formation of a body of knowledge, will
follow the same principles as the deposition of any other uniform product of a
consistent process. This conception of knowledge as a natural product, subject to the
natural laws of physics, and biology, is at the heart of Foucault's thinking; whether he
considered this point of not.
Language is not used arbitrarily, it has a very definite function, and the
accumulation of linguistic knowledge likewise must be directed by functional
determinants. In a large deposit therefore, we should be able to trace the process of
creativity from the origin of random speculation to the crystallisation of even
conformity. And in the process of investigating our knowledge deposits we should
also be able to relate the different attributes of creative flourish, or creative stability,
with the social conditions that relate to the knowledge band, or subject area, that we
are investigating at any given time. Knowledge, in short, is functional, and it exists in
an environment, a social environment which is the product of an organic being, and
the state of the social environment will be reflected in the mode of information
deposited in the intellectual record of any given society, be it Sumerian, Chinese,
Greek, Minoan, Inca, or whatever. Unfortunately intellectual deposits are a highly
specialised product of nature and not always to be found even in sophisticated
societies. The Druids apparently made a point of not developing a literature in order
to protect the secret law of their priesthood. But they of course were exterminated by
the supreme inheritors of a literate culture, the Jews. It just does not pay to bury your
head in the sand as the likes of the fascist tries to do when the Jewish priesthood of
lawmakers start on the ethnic cleansing by stealth warpath. But, in any case, we are,
happily, in a position to acts as archaeologists of the intellect, for we live in an age
rich in information, where books abound from all times and all periods, and this is the
most glorious thing about our world today. Yes there are great piles of sludge
covering everything in a seemingly interminable blanket of opaqueness, but, as we
can see from our examination of Ouspensky's bizarre work, even the most bleakly
opaque sludge can reveal gems of wisdom when properly investigated according to a
strictly scientific mode of understanding.

From this abstract discussion of the nature of knowledge we can return to the
previous statement regarding a shift from the speculative flourish of our two prior
authors, to the much thicker deposits that are the subject matter of our next author.
Our third person is of a completely different kind to Spencer and Ouspensky, in terms
of the nature of the deposit he left us to examine, for he was himself not an original
depositor, he was, like us, an investigator, an antiquarian of the past intellectual seams
of wisdom. He was in fact an applicator of knowledge, or he sort to be so, rather than
a creator of new ideas. And this distinction is most important, it is one that our
discussion of knowledge, above, makes an implicit feature of behaviour relevant to
the process of knowledge, and, social evolution. There must be a period of
information creation, followed by an ensuing period of material creativity, arising
directly from this creative process, if knowledge is a functional entity, which it is.
Thus, from our primary premise, that language is the fluid-genetic medium of
the superorganic form, we must expect to be able to discover a material deposit of
knowledge in the records of our social evolution which can be shown to be directly
responsible for the evolution of the social structure that we live with today, and
directly responsible for the history that is recorded in our history books. This logical
proposition follows from our early realisation of how the superorganic human form
must evolve, via the medium of language. All forms in the universe are the product of
energetic processes, and in life forms the energetic pathways in which they are
involved are tapped into by sensory acuities that experience these energy pathways as
information. We have already seen how this creates religion when we noted that
religion was the identity component infused into the physiological aspect of the
exoskeleton of the organism as it evolved. Or, if we confine this thought to the
physical being of an individual the same thing applies, as the organism evolves its
outer form takes on attributes of a non-physical functional kind, of an informational
kind, of identity, attributes of communication, attributes which are both positive and
negative, in relation to their own nature, for sometimes they are intended to reveal,
and at others times to disguise the form underneath, the informational appearance.
What we really need to do, is to find the remains of the linguistic genome that
created our social being. Logic tells us, without difficulty, that the place to look, the
band in the broad deposit of knowledge, is in that band which we call law.
And so we come to Otto Gierke, a most remarkable man, and the most
precious author we could ever hope to meet with. As native English speakers we do
not have free access to the works of this, primarily nineteenth century, German
professor of law, we are indebted to two English professors of law working some
decades apart, in the first half of the twentieth century. And we can see straightaway
that as we shift from the realms of direct access to a thinker's work, to an area where a
full comprehension of knowledge is sort, deposits of an institutional character emerge
naturally out of our efforts because of the sheer volume of material that needs to be
encompassed, and the period of investigation that is embraced, covering many human
lifetimes, and the combination of life-efforts that is thereby required. Institutions
grow spontaneously out of the fabrication of knowledge, they create themselves; a
university is an organic entity, a part of an exoskeleton of a living animal, no wonder
libraries were the targets of past warriors, tragically, and they no doubt will be again.
Our selected author however, although not quite, himself, an exponent of the
idea that human society was literally an organism, as far as I can tell, remains a
central figure in the argument that human society is an organic being in its own right.
This is because it is the centrality of this idea in the investigations of past ideas, that
interested him, and he very nearly seems to think, in real terms, of human society as a
living being, but I am not satisfied that he says society is a living creature in a manner
that meets my truly detached scientific requirements. He does not say as much
directly, in either of the two English translations of his work that are available, but the
lengthy introductions to his works provided by his translators do say this of him, that
he thought of society as being living and having the attributes of something more than
just a temporary collection of co-operating individuals. His subject matter is wholly
concerned with the nature of society in terms of its organic form, only his subject is
law. In other words, Gierke investigated the evolution of modern law based on the
centuries of creative intellectual effort that sort to understand society as a living
organism, as a person, which eventually led to the form of the modern state, and a
new World order. This is quite simply a gift from the annals of our intellectual past, it
is precisely what we need to prosecute our claim that human nature is indeed
corporate, and that human society is an organic phenomenon that can be accounted for
in strictly organic terms. This is our evidence, Gierke's work is the anthropologist's
Grail or Galapagos, my Galapagos.

As there are no pieces of work written by Gierke himself comparative to the

two sections I have taken from Spencer and Ouspensky, the problem is what segments
of his work to look at, to suit our purpose of levering open the door to reality, which
will aid our effort to force people to take notice, and relinquish their fixation on the
myth of divinity that preserves their Jewish identity programme, and prevents us from
obtaining the intellectual freedom we are capable of possessing today?
Let us begin by considering the works with which we are concerned. Gierke
wrote a work about the idea of German fellowship, 'The German Law of Associations'
(Das deutsche Genossensckaftsrecht), published in 1881, which is essentially about the
intimate social unity that is indicative of a human superorganism. This work was
extensive and appeared in a number of volumes, in 1900 Frederic Maitland published
a translation of a section from volume three of this work which he says, in his
introduction, amounted to only one twentieth part of the whole. Maitland called his
translation Political Theories of the Middle Age.
I discovered Gierke via another author, Ernest Barker. As with A New Model
of the Universe by Ouspensky, Barker's book, Principles of Social and Political
Theory, first published by Clarendon Press in 1951, had been silent upon my shelves
for some years, waiting to be discovered. The discovery came one restless evening
this last winter when I thought about trying to dump some books and began by
looking at the top shelf of the small bookcase in my living room. I glanced through a
dozen books before I found myself amazed to be confronted by a passage in a sixties
paperback published by Oxford University Press, dealing with society as an organism!
This led me to Maitland, and to another book by Barker, called Natural Law and the
Theory of Society. The latter book, being a continuation of Maitland's effort to reveal
Gierke's work to the English speaking world, offered a translation of a subsequent
section of the work Maitland had selected a section from for his translation. Barker's
book, he tells us, concerns the political theories of the modern age, from 1500 to 1800,
and is a translation of five subsections in Gierke's fourth volume, which was first
published in 1913.
Here then we have an extensive body of material that has required a
considerable effort to produce, an effort involving the dedication of a number of
intelligent men, over a fair span of time. This is an impressive, and I must say, as
such, a most delightful piece of work to study. Since it deals directly with my subject
I simply cannot quite believe it exists, or that, given its existence, I have had the good
fortune to find my way to it. Books, books, books. All you can do is keep poking
your nose into to them, and hope, that each time you do, you'll find something nice
and sticky on the end of it. But you cannot just peer in, you have to buy them, chuck
'em in a corner, and leave for your receptacle of information to mature enough to be
able to know the aroma of right wisdom when it wafts from the page; it is not as if I
had not looked at Barker or Ouspensky before. With knowledge, it seems to me, it is
easy to look, but not to see.
So these are our two seams of knowledge, into which we want to sink a pit or
two. As it happens I read Maitland a month ago before beginning this book, before
finding Ouspensky, which made me realise had the foundation for this approach to
this subject. So while I made notes I did not select illustrative passages for
consideration as I have done with Spencer and Ouspensky. I did do this with Barker's
translation and it has to be said that the real recommendation has to be to read the
whole volume! But we do not need to do that, we only need select appropriate
passages. I will begin then by seeing what there is in Maitland's translation, as it
comes first, that might serve to kick us off on this exploration of the real substance of
the superorganic genome that created our modern exoskeleton, and then we can take
some fine artifacts directly from Barker's introduction and Gierke's volume four.

Maitland

INTRODUCTION.

HAD what is here translated, namely, a brief account of the political theories of the
Middle Ages, appeared as a whole book, it would hardly have stood in need of that
distorting medium, an English translation. Englishmen who were approaching the
study of medieval politics, either from the practical or from the theoretical side, would
have known that there was a book which they would do well to master, and many who
were not professed students or whose interests lay altogether in modern times would
have heard of it and have found it profitable. The elaborate notes would have shewn
that its writer had read widely and deeply; they would also have guided explorers into
a region where sign-posts are too few. As to the text, the last charge which could be
made against it would be that of insufficient courage in generalization, unless indeed
it were that of aimless medievalism. The outlines are large, the strokes are firm, and
medieval appears as an introduction to modern thought. The ideas that are to possess
and divide mankind from the sixteenth until the nineteenth centurySovereignty, the
Sovereign Ruler, the Sovereign People, the Representation of the People, the Social
Contract, the Natural Rights of Man, the Divine Rights of Kings, the Positive Law
that stands below the State, the Natural Law that stands above the Statethese are the
ideas whose early history is to be detected, and they are set before us as thoughts
which, under the influence of Classical Antiquity, necessarily shaped themselves in
the course of medieval debate. And if the thoughts are interesting, so too are the
thinkers. In Dr Gierke's list of medieval publicists, beside the divines and schoolmen,
stand great popes, great lawyers, great reformers, men who were clothing concrete
projects in abstract vesture, men who fashioned the facts as well as the theories of
their time.
Moreover, Englishmen should be especially grateful to a guide who is perhaps
at his strongest just where they must needs be weak: that is, among the books of the
legists and canonists. An educated Englishman may read and enjoy what Dante or
Marsiglio has written. An English scholar may face Aquinas or Ockham or even the
repellent Wyclif. But Baldus and Bartolus, Innocentius and Johannes Andreae, them
he has never been taught to tackle, and they are not to be tackled by the untaught.
And yet they are important people, for political philosophy in its youth is apt to look
like a sublimated jurisprudence, and, even when it has grown in vigour and stature, is
often compelled or content to work with toolsa social contract for examplewhich
have been sharpened, if not forged, in the legal smithy. In that smithy Dr Gierke is at
home. With perfect modesty he could say to a learned German public 'It is not
probable that for some time to come anyone will tread exactly the same road that I
have trodden in long years of fatiguing toil.'
But then what is here translated is only a small, a twentieth, part of a large and
as yet unfinished book bearing a title which can hardly attract many readers in this
country and for which an English equivalent cannot easily be found, namely Das
deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Of that work the third volume contains a section
entitled Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters, and that is the section which is
here done into English. Now though this section can be detached and still bear a high
value, and though the author's permission for its detachment has been graciously
given, still it would be untrue to say that this amputating process does no harm. The
organism which is a whole with a life of its own, but is also a member of a larger and
higher organism whose life it shares, this, so Dr Gierke will teach us, is an idea which
we must keep before our minds when we are studying the political thought of the
Middle Ages, and it is an idea which we may apply to his and to every good book.
The section has a life of its own, but it also shares the life of the whole treatise. Nor
only so; it is membrum de membro. It is a section in a chapter entitled 'The Medieval
Doctrine of State and Corporation,' which stands in a volume entitled 'The Antique
and Medieval Doctrine of State and Corporation and its Reception in Germany'; and
this again is part of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Indeed our section is a
member of a highly organized system, and in that section are sentences and
paragraphs which will not yield their full meaning except to those who know
something of the residue of the book and something also of the controversial
atmosphere in which a certain Genossenschaftstheorie has been unfolding itself. This
being so, the intervention of a translator who has read the whole book, who has read
many parts of it many times, who deeply admires it, may be of service. In a short
introduction, even if his own steps are none too sure, he may be able to conduct some
of his fellow-countrymen towards a point of view which commands a wide prospect
of history and human affairs.
Staats- und Korporationslehrethe Doctrine of State and Corporation. Such a
title may be to some a stumbling-block set before the threshold. A theory of the State,
so it might be said, may be very interesting to the philosophic few and fairly
interesting to the intelligent many, but a doctrine of Corporations, which probably
speaks of fictitious personality and similar artifices, can only concern some juristic
speculators, of whom there are none or next to none in this country. On second
thoughts, however, we may be persuaded to see here no rock of offence but rather a
stepping-stone which our thoughts should sometimes traverse. For, when all is said,
there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are species. They seem to
be permanently organized groups of men ; they seem to be group-units ; we seem to
attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units. Let it be
allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we
ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if
between the State and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask ourselves
no questions about the origin of species. Certain it is that our medieval history will go
astray, our history of Italy and Germany will go far astray, unless we can suffer
communities to acquire and lose the character of States somewhat easily, somewhat
insensibly, or rather unless we both know and feel that we must not thrust our modern
'State-concept,' as a German would call it, upon the reluctant material.
Englishmen in particular should sometimes give themselves this warning,
and not only for the sake of the Middle Ages. Fortunate in littleness and insularity,
England could soon exhibit as a difference in kind what elsewhere was a difference in
degree, namely, to use medieval terms, the difference between a community or
corporation (universitas) which does and one which does not 'recognize a superior.'
There was no likelihood that the England which the Norman duke had subdued and
surveyed would be either Staatenbund or Bundesstaat, and the aspiration of
Londoners to have 'no king but the mayor' was fleeting. This, if it diminished our
expenditure of blood and treasurean expenditure that impoverishesdiminished also
our expenditure of thoughtan expenditure that enrichesand facilitated (might this
not be said ?) a certain thoughtlessness or poverty of ideas. The State that
Englishmen knew was a singularly unicellular State, and at a critical time they were
not too well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the case
of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, corporations in America which
seemed to have willsand hardly fictitious willsof their own, and which became
States and United States¹. The medieval Empire laboured under the weight of an
incongruously simple theory so soon as lawyers were teaching that the Kaiser was the
Princeps of Justinian's law-books. The modern and multicellular British Stateoften
and perhaps harmlessly called an Empiremay prosper without a theory, but does not
suggest and, were we serious in our talk of sovereignty, would hardly tolerate, a
theory that is simple enough and insular enough, and yet withal imperially Roman
enough, to deny an essentially state-like character to those 'self-governing colonies,'
communities, commonwealths, which are knit and welded into a larger sovereign
whole. The adventures of an English joint-stock company which happed into a
rulership of the Indies, the adventures of another English company which while its
charter was still very new had become the puritan commonwealth of Massachusett's
Bay should be enough to shew that our popular English Staatslehre if, instead of
analyzing the contents of a speculative jurist's mind, it seriously grasped the facts of
English history, would shew some inclination to become a Korporationslehre also.
Even as it is, such a tendency is plainly to be seen in many zones. Standing on
the solid ground of positive law and legal orthodoxy we confess the king of this
country to be a 'corporation sole,' and, if we have any curiosity, ought to wonder why
in the sixteenth century the old idea that the king is the head of a 'corporation
aggregate of many²' gave way before a thought which classed him along with the
parish parson of decadent ecclesiastical law under one uncomfortable rubric. Deeply
convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and '
natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man
upon one level. 'The greatest of artificial persons, politically speaking, is the State': so
we may read in an excellent First Book of Jurisprudence³. Ascending from the legal
plain, we are in a middle region where a sociology emulous of the physical sciences
discourses of organs and organisms and social tissue, and cannot sever by sharp lines
the natural history of the state-group from the natural history of other groups. Finally,
we are among the summits of philosophy and observe how a doctrine, which makes
some way in England, ascribes to the State, or, more vaguely, the Community, not
only a real will, but even 'the' real will, and it must occur to us to ask whether what is
thus affirmed in the case of the State can be denied in the case of other organized
groups: for example, that considerable group the Roman Catholic Church. It seems
possible to one who can only guess, that even now-a-days a Jesuit may think that the
will of the Company to which he belongs is no less real than the will of any State,
and, if the reality of this will be granted by the philosopher, can he pause until even
the so-called one-man-company has a real will really distinct from the several wills of
the one man and his six humble associates? If we pursue that thought, not only will
our philosophic Staatslehre be merging itself in a wider doctrine, but we shall already
be deep in the Genossenschaftstheorie. In any case, however, the law's old habit of
co-ordinating men and 'bodies politic' as two kinds of Persons seems to deserve the
close attention of the modern philosopher, for, though it be an old habit, it has become
vastly more important in these last years than it ever was before. In the second half of
the nineteenth century corporate groups of the most various sorts have been
multiplying all the world over at a rate that far outstrips the increase of 'natural
persons,' and a large share of all our newest law is law concerning corporations°.
Something not unworthy of philosophic discussion would seem to lie in this quarter:
either some deep-set truth which is always bearing fresh fruit, or else a surprisingly
stable product of mankind's propensity to feign. Howbeit, this rare atmosphere we
do not easily breathe and therefore will for a while follow a lower road.

¹ See the remarks of Sir C. Ilbert, The Government of India, p. 55: 'Both the theory
and the experience were lacking which are requisite for adapting English institutions
to new and foreign circumstances. For want of such experience England was destined
to lose her colonies in the Western hemisphere. For want of it mistakes were
committed which imperilled the empire she was building up in the East.' The want of
a theory about Ireland which would have mediated between absolute dependence and
absolute independence was the origin of many evils.

² A late instance of this old concept occurs in Plowden's Commentaries, 234.

³ Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence, 113.

° In 1857 an American judge went the length of saying 'It is probably true that more
corporations were created by the legislature of Illinois at its last session than existed
in the whole civilized world at the commencement of the present century.' Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, § 37 a.

(Political Theories of the Middle Age, Otto Gierke, translated by

F. W. Maitland. Cambridge, 1927. Pages vii - xii)

Reproduced here in full is the opening section to the introduction Maitland

wrote for his translation of Gierke's work. It must be clear to all that we are still
dealing with the very same subject as that which we set out to consider when we took
a fragment of Spencer's work and a piece of Ouspensky's art; namely, the corporate
being of human society. That said, it is equally obvious that we have shifted into a
radically different sphere of intellectual endeavour. Maitland's style is somewhat
archaic, but rich and pleasing, worth a little effort to understand, and this even as he
offers to be the mediator of another author whom we could not hope to understand
without the translator's guidance, even after translation he means.

Method of Investigations Regarding the Search for Artifacts of Knowledge

We might pause to consider the activity we are engaged in here, it may not be
sufficiently rigorous to qualify as science, and it is without any established back up,
the work of one lone individual. But that individual is repulsed by the notion that it is
in any sense mere philosophy, a subject, which while delightful to rummage through,
is not something to be a part of. I am sticking to the idea of an archaeology of
knowledge. In the opening to this chapter on Gierke I included a little personal
history of the manner in which I became aware of this author's work. This is the sort
of human interest angle that I believe is pleasing to read in any work since we like to
feel we know something of a person who is creating a work that interests us. But the
plain fact is that what I describe is quite literally what happened, and as such it is a
record of the method by which my knowledge was vastly increased in my effort to
understand, and relate, the true nature of human nature.
We have spoken of the accumulated knowledge being a deposit, we have
spoken of the seams of material running through that deposit, and of the mass of
material available today from all periods. I have stated what the nature of knowledge
is and made it the basis of my assertion that human society is an organic entity
produced by Nature independently of human consciousness. Knowledge, I have said,
is deposited in accordance with the laws of physics and biology, this is necessarily so
if my prior claims are correct. But many scientists reading this will not be in the least
bit impressed by such claims and they will simply dismiss them as the ignorant
speculation of a naive layman. It is important therefore to try and give a well
considered idea of just how I think my efforts qualify as something on the way
towards being science, and not just idle speculation.
Discovering Barker's work on a bookshelf in my living room is akin to an
archaeologist who has been filling his storeroom with finds over a period of years of
searching suddenly turning his attention to a find and to his amazement discovering
that he has a treasure in his hand. Early science always works in some such manner,
it has no other way to work. Science as we understand it is a refined activity that
involves well established ideas and directed investigation, but anthropology has not
even begun yet because it is encased within the theocratic ideology of dualism which
will not permit scientists to investigate the real nature of human nature because of the
inevitability that this means the total annihilation of religious authority which our
social structure does rely on for its integrity. There are questions about whether the
human species could survive the total eradication of all religion given the fact of the
centrality of religion within the human organism's being, but, as it is, this concern
aside, the fact remains that it is of immense self interest for the powerful, the elite
who actually run the world, not to even think of finding out. We want to find out, and
so we are living on the boundary of knowledge, trying to push ourselves where no one
has ever been before, or ever made the slightest attempt to go.
The annals of science are replete with stories of great adventures drawn from
the common stock of humanity who have simply had a burning passion to know the
truth of a question which pervades their culture, and who, as a result of this passion
they followed a course no one else did, and especially no authorities on the subjects in
question did, and thus they discovered something no one else had ever known. In the
case of archaeology as we ordinarily think of there is the most famous case of the
German entrepreneur Heinrich Schliemann who was possessed from childhood with
the tale of Troy and who, in adulthood, having made his fortune in business, set off to
find the real site of Troy, a place no one was even sure really existed. He succeeded,
and dramatically.
With even more pertinence to our situation we may invoke the name of
Michael Ventris. His name has come down to posterity as a result of his translation of
a language found on clay tablets in Greece. Ventris was an architect, but, like
Schliemann, his fire had been set alight as a child when he first heard of the tablets
bearing an unknown script. He had a gift as a linguist and as an amateur he set about
working on the ancient script in his own manner. Finally he cracked the code by
discovering the script to be an early form of Greek. But the reaction from the elite
archaeologists was dismissive, and scornful, they were not about to concede that a
mere amateur could do what the elite of their profession had failed to do. However
further finds proved to be amenable to Ventris' formula and the case was proven. The
next question to ask was how this could be, how could an amateur achieve what the
professionals were not able to do? One commentator on a documentary about this
fascinating tale offered the insight that Ventris had not gone to university, he was
trained, and so he approached the subject without any sense of authoritarian constraint
on what it was proper to think and he simply accepted freely any and all possible
leads that he thought might prove fruitful in his search for a solution.
I was sent to church as a child, and very early on I became an atheist, I
decided God did not exist, and from the time on I developed an absolutely burning
passion to comprehend what this God business was all about. Thus from the earliest
possible age I had a single minded goal in life, to prove God did not exist. As time
went on I naturally sought to discover what religion meant by conventional means, I
attended college, briefly, to see what was there, and there was nothing there, so I
returned to the open waters of life. In the end I discovered what I had searched for all
my life, the proof that God does not exist, by discovering what God is. But upon
discovering the key I find that the real answer to the conundrum is that everybody
knows this answer, and knew it all along, they know the 'king is in the altogether'.
They just do not know they know it.
Now what on earth can this mean, they just do not know they know what they
know? Well, it is a bugger to tease out and explain, and it turns out that in terms of
trying to communicate to people something very simple and very obvious, something
everyone already knows, but no one knows they know, is exceedingly difficult, but is
the trick that needs to be performed if the stake is actually to be driven through the
core of the idea of God, and for this terrible, primitive notion of existence, to be
destroyed.
And so here we are examining the artifacts of intellectual expression that are
rich in the subject matter of God's being, but in either an none theistic form, or an
indirectly theistic form. As I have just said we prove that God does not exist by
showing what God is, and so this is exactly what we are doing now, we are showing
what the idea of God simulates in the real world by showing how the idea of God is
used in the real world. And it is when we come to Gierke that we get close to this
possibility for here we find the evidence of the use of the idea of God in a detailed and
direct manner to create the linguistic genes, the laws, that are actually responsible for
the creation and ordering of society.
As we examine the artifacts extracted from Maitland's and Barker's
translations we are therefore looking to see how the real form of what is called God
actually existed, and exists, in the living being of the human superorganism. We can
see that Maitland is discussing this very issue here, and trying to open up our minds to
a consideration of how the social structure acts like an organism.
He tells us of the English reluctance to consider the theory of corporations
because of the association of fictitious ideas, such as the idea of society forming a
body with a personality, which comes with this theory. Corporations, that is human
social bodies, are a species which, seen in the light of Darwin's biological theory.
And we should seek to aid our understanding of social structures in terms of their
origins in a manner that shows we are learning from the insights science has made
into the understanding of life.
This is interesting, and it is delightful to see this reference to evolutionary
theory, but we must be careful about how we respond to this argument. We know that
all of society is dead set against a scientific account of human society, and so at all
times we know the best of work will fail utterly to take a proper scientific approach to
these questions, no matter how close it seems they are to correct reasoning by way of
the terminology they use. We know, furthermore, that the problem revolves around
the differentiation into collective and individual bodies, where a true account would
dismiss entirely the notion of the individual as an independent entity. This delightful
reference to social bodies as species, is a perfect example of the kind of trap that
awaits us when reading academic accounts of all kinds. Although this mode of
reasoning appears to pay homage to science, and the organic status of humans, it
actually carries the mark of individuality within its expression, for it makes structural
elements of the superorganic physiology, social groups that is, into independent and
discrete, competing, individual bodies, called here, species.
They are not species. Corporations are structural elements of a superorganic
physiology which compose one organic entity. But it is somewhat difficult to
recognise this fact clearly, and to make the appropriate distinction because in fact it is
appropriate to think of human corporate, that is institutional, or organisational, bodies
as species that are in a state of competition. By appropriate I mean practical, this way
of thinking does enable a functional understanding to emerge from an examination of
social structure, it simply is not correct. This degree of functionality obtained by a
false means of understanding may be likened to the elaborate models of the motion of
celestial bodies that could be contrived, by those determined to so, even when it was
insisted that the earth was the focus of rotation; Ptolemy being the dude we may think
off regarding this particular acrobatic performance of intellectual agility.
In other words the human social domain is an ecological environment in its
own right, in which individuals form corporate bodies. As the complexity of
corporate bodies increases they develop internal structure such that one corporate
body is composed of a number of groups that might also be described as corporate
bodies. It is this cross over between the use of nomenclature to describe groups
making up components of corporate bodies, and truly independent corporate bodies,
that is blurring the distinction and leaving the impression that subunits are
independent units, and so we have individuals identified by linguistic misuse, when
there are in truth no such individuals present. Maitland is suggesting we stop refusing
to consider deeper structural levels of connectivity between these social bodies, but he
certainly cannot mean that we should recognise that human are living beings that are
as much a part of the biomass of the earth as any other living beings and are, as such,
subject to precisely the same laws as all life, and in no sense free from those laws;
which most certainly is what I insist is the case.
We find the same evolutionary dynamics operating in the social domain
between groups, giving rise to structure, as we see operating in the physical domain to
produce different organisms. Except, in the social domain the medium of information
is different, being language instead of genes, and the product is different, being
exoskeleton, instead of skeleton and other bodily tissue. This makes the distinction
difficult because we are correct to see a species like quality applying to corporations
that certainly does not apply to organs of a body, this is because of the way they
compete for ascendancy within the exoskeletal structure of the superorganism. The
point to realise is that corporations of the kind Maitland is referring to are only in
existence because of an overarching identity delivered via the authority of the state,
indeed this line of reasoning comes out in the discussion, the dependence of the
corporation upon the prior existence of the state.
The group becomes a distinct species like entity when it is truly at odds with
the competition, this obviously never happens within the state, although much of the
effort to sustain a state's coherence is concerned with just this problem, and this is
precisely where law comes in, and this the subject Gierke is concerned with. Thus
when a culture opposes another culture, with which it has no common roots, it is like
one species attacking another, and one must become the prey of the other. Ouspensky
referred to this human activity in terms of amorphous plant-animals consuming one
another. Although it has to be said that as humans have a common animal identity
this process tends to involve absorption rather than simple extermination, although in
the process cultures become extinct. This is how the process occurs up until now, it
did not occur in this way when societies where in a simple state of superorganic
being, then tribal organisms will of occupied territories which remained largely stable
over great lengths of time. It was only the coming of the new mode of symbiotic
relationship to the environment which induced the human superorganism to go
complex by evolving internal structure and thus opening up the possibility of
absorption rather than extermination of competing racial identities. With the
approaching culmination of the process of unification under one cultural identity
leading to one global superorganism the process of deadly competition must come to
an end and there must then be a return to a process that seeks to ensure balance and
stability.
The picture is somewhat complicated therefore and the idea of the corporation
as 'species' confuses the picture when we want a true biological account of human
society, it does not help determine the true nature of the organic process involved in
the evolution of human social form, quite the reverse it helps people act according to
the true nature of human beings without acknowledging what that nature truly is. But
this is exactly the condition that we are looking for, we want to find evidence of how
humans act as unwitting agents of Nature in their creative involvement in the
formation of social structures.

Unwittingness

This phenomenon is by far and away the most important mechanism we find
in Nature's armoury when creating superorganic form, but, perhaps surprisingly, it has
been observed to be a mechanism underpinning structure in another context, but in a
mode that is not true unwittingness such as we find in the human animal.
It could well be scoffed at as farcical, my description of the act of finding a
book on my bookshelf as akin to an adventurer-cum-archaeologist rooting out King
Priam's gold from a pit in Greece. The question is to what extent you are convinced
by the notion of an archaeology of knowledge. For me personally my way of
discovering the truth from books is exactly like that of a person digging in a vast open
space where they must learn to find what they seeking, that being knowledge in the
best of cases, and not just treasure.
But the protest may be made that Gierke's work was never lost, not even
misplaced, it is well known and much admired by those who have an interest in the
relevant branches of knowledge.
 Well quite - in the relevant branches of knowledge - and this is the critical
point. For in making this kind of observation it is being admitted that while the work
is known, and not lost, it is only known to a certain restricted section of the
intellectual structure. And what have we already become very familiar with in our
investigation of the nature of a social organism, the attribute of differentiation.
Differentiation is the means by which an organism comes into being because it is by
this means that structure is evolved. But in saying this we must at the condition that
the differentiation produced is independent.
Now it just so happens that in academia the one thing you absolutely must
never do is to cross the divide that separates one authority from another. If you do
this you negate the whole basis of academic authority and the whole edifice of
academia as an authoritative entity is undermined. And this principle is often overtly
paid homage to by those who accredited experts when they encroach in some manner
upon the specialist fields of others. Indeed Maitland himself sort of hints at this kind
of logic when he presumes to speak for a Jesuit priest when he is himself not such a
one; although in this case the caution is proper.
But in the institutional world of the academic the invisible membrane
separating each department of knowledge from all others, with varying degrees of
permeability where one specialist subject is part of an array of related specialist
subjects, or one broad discipline, such as history, is taken as fundamental to another
which seems quite distinct, such as sociology, is respected and adhered to with great
tenacity. Thus we see the superorganism has a brain structure that is highly
differentiated into compartments that helped preserve the primary condition that the
true nature of the superorganic being shall not become known. The result is that
academics like anthropologists who are inducted into a discipline that is oriented
along strictly theistic lines that strictly adhere to the priestly requirement that dualism
is taken for granted and thus humanity must not, and indeed cannot, be considered to
be a part of nature, never gets to look at the domain of political science as a facet of
behavioural physiology determining the operation and form of society because this
mode of reasoning is absolutely forbidden by the induction process that leads to an
anthropologist gaining the qualification they require to be granted a highly privileged
position in society as a teacher of knowledge to others.
We have seen that some erstwhile explorers of the outer limits of the permitted
zone of anthropology, such as Leslie White, who made much of the idea that culture
was a system independent of human will, and who said many superb things along
these lines, was always careful never to say anything that contradicted the
fundamental principle that humans are in no sense a part of nature, when all is said
and done. He takes a giant leap across a ten foot gap, and where others fail miserably
by only jumping nine feet he managed nine feet, eleven inches and sixty three sixty
fourths of an inch, and he falls into the bottomless pit of ignorance along with the rest
of the priesthood. But hell, he had a damned good life as a professor in the meantime,
and that is all that matters, seemingly.
What this professional conspiracy of expertise amounts to then is a complex
academic institution which is defined by a closed shop principle that all adhere to as a
matter of absolute, sacred duty. And then within this vast edifice of theistically
controlled knowledge, the whole is differentiated into a myriad of interdependent
parts. The interdependence arises because of the primary act of compliance with the
authority of the theocracy, the act of agreeing to acknowledge the expert is the only
true voice in any field, no matter how stupid the things the expert says. But what
follows is that the overall nature of the subject matter, the nature of academic
material, the nature of knowledge, is never open to debate on one uniform level, each
distinct enclave is free to discuss it according to their own specialised competence, be
that psychology, philosophy, or even physics. And so, what do we find,
surprise surprise, we find the unity of knowledge is fragmented into a host of 'species'
to use Maitland's phrase, a collection of independent corporations, or, as we would
have it, the unity of all knowledge has been divided into a host of individual
competencies each of which is as valid in its own way as any other, which, like a host
of religions all claiming to the one true religion, means that none can actually be true
in itself. It may each be a valid account of the portion of its remit, so that a
neuroscientist like Susan Greenfield might be given freedom to preach her nonsense
about what the mind is on television as a person seemingly most qualified to say what
the mind is, but of course it is out of the question that she can answer the question
truly as she is confined to only one individual segment of the superorganic brain
structure.
And so we come back to myself, my free roaming status as a seeker after truth
unconstrained by any authority and free to pass through all academic membranes
delineating the structure of the superorganic brain in my quest for relevant
knowledge. Acting as an anthropologist, one who seeks to understand the human
animal, I can study law as a facet of corporate physiology. I can speculate on the real
structure of the academic institutions, as I just have, and interpret that structure in
physiological terms, as I just have. Thus I discuss the individual and the roles they
play in the social structure pretty much as a sociologist might but I negate the
individual as an individual in the process because I indicate how they are reduced to
the status of unwitting agents of a unified organic structure by the process of
interdependent differentiation which creates the social structures which people then
give themselves up to in the course of following a profession that requires them to be
inducted into a fixed account of reality which is limited by the dualistic principle of
theocracy which ensures that the true nature of human nature simply can never be
known and that conversely the fragmentation of knowledge will always be able to
cope with any amount of knowledge by simple fracturing new ideas away from the
one body and isolating them in a specialist forum where they cannot, by definition,
presume to speak for the whole intellect of the being, only the church can do this by
speaking in the name of God.
So as much as it may be true to say that books are not lost as such, they are
most assuredly out of bounds of the people who most need to see them and to know
them if they are to give a true account of human society, as I mean to do. It follows
from what has just been said that I cannot give myself up to the academic structure
which would teach me what I want to know, so I must act alone. I cannot follow the
course set out by any single academic or any one branch of academia, it is implicit in
what I have just been saying that I must be prepared to shift freely from one field to
another, with restraint, if I am develop the full picture I seek. And thus for me books
do indeed represent artifacts in which I search out the knowledge I require to pursue
what I know to be the correct interpretation of all knowledge.
Today is Saturday, 05 June 2004. Two books have just arrived for me from
America. Maitland's book, and one by Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological
Method. I went to the trouble of buying a new copy of The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life by Durkheim after discovering that he asserted that people worshiped
society when they worshipped God, only to find myself not in the least bit impressed
by the feel I got for his ideas. I naturally hoped to find some sort of explanation of
what God was, along the lines I have provided where I say that society is an organism
and, in Judaic mythology, this organism has come to be known by the code word God.
This I did not think Durkheim was doing and life is not long enough for me to
actually read a book unless it looks like it is following a theme in a manner I think
will be useful. But Durkheim is the founder of functionalist sociology and as such he
must remain a figure of great interest to me, and recently I found a reference to the
work that arrived today which said he claims in this book that there is no such thing
as an individual. This pricked my ears up and I decided I must take a look at this
work. I have only had a few minutes to glance at it, it is an American printing, 1964,
with an introduction by George E. G. Catlin. I like to get hold of as old a copy of a
book as possible, but the advantage of later copies is that they often have appraisals of
this kind which are of immense interest in themselves, this introduction is no
exception. Catlin praises Durkheim, naturally, but, much to my delight he says that
Durkheim is obsessed with the idea of society as some kind of, what I would call,
superorganism.

'Durkheim's method, most suggestive in itself, yet involves, it so

happens, the use of the hypothesis of a collective consciousness; it results in a
deplorable effort to interpret social phenomena in terms of this alleged
consciousness. In this Durkheim is at one with a series of writerstheorists of
the "social organism"excellently discussed by Professor Coker of Yale.
Durkheim, however, is not singular among men of science in being more
valuable in respect of the by-products of his theory than in his main
contention.'

(The Rules of Sociological Method, Emile Durkheim, The Free Press,

1964. Page xiv)

Thus my search goes on and I constantly delighted by such finds as the above.
Here I have the first suggestion that someone other than myself might have tried to
argue that humans are a superorganism. All other such promises have proven to be
deceptive, White is in the lineage of a superorganist, others before him like Kroeber
wrote about the superorganism but they always stuck strictly to the theistic premise
that humans were in no sense a part of nature, as indeed all scientists of all kinds do at
all times when they venture beyond the realms of mere physicality and a few cursory
remarks about psychology and behaviour. And now I have a name of someone who
wrote a book about these seekers after the truth, Coker, so I can try and find this book
and gain a list of authors whose ideas I can try and track down. I used a reference in a
book by White to find the book by Spencer, of course I knew of Spencer but I had no
idea he had actually written a piece on society as an organism and since this subject is
so reviled, as we can see from the above remarks by Catlin, it is simply not possible to
find works freely available that discuss these ideas. Coker will of course be seeking
to crush the scientific idea of human nature in order to defend Judaism as the master
identity, but in doing so he must reveal the former friends of scientific freedom who
must of lived in time before the servant of the church got their act together and
developed their expertise in the eradication of sane thinking and replaced it with ideas
that are comparable in their idiocy only with that most hated, by scientists, example of
anti-scientific reasoning known as Creationism.
Scientists hate Creationism, theists hate Darwinism, of which Creationism is
the theists misrepresentation, and between the two of them they keep the illusion aloft
and prevent the truth from being known.
 Let me just state then, a simple summation of just what unwittingness is.
Above I referred to the oppositional mechanism of authority we can call the good-cop
bad-cop mechanism as a facet of nature that taught life forms how to favour or flee
from stimuli and this perfectly natural mechanism gave rise to the more complex
modes of expression that we see in the social world of many creatures including
ourselves. Unwittingness is another such mechanism that has its roots in life itself
where sentience involves responses. The mechanism of unwittingness is the
mechanism that connects the interdependent structures which evolve in the process of
differentiation, it is merely a different perspective on precisely the same phenomena.
The only thing we need to know about unwittingness is that it actually refers to states
of awareness such as we associate with consciousness, it need not be the highest
degree of consciousness that we recognise in ourselves. Thus we can misapply the
idea of unwittingness in a general sense by applying it to the manner in which species
that often appear to be antagonistic to one another all act together in an interdependent
fashion that gives rise to an ecosystem where the prey requires the hunter to keep its
numbers in check and the hunter requires the prey to remain healthy, and so on. Thus
an interdependent superorganic confederation of species comes into being in the form
of an ecosystem. On this basis we can call a human society an ecosystem, but just as
it would be inappropriate to call an ecosystem a living organism, because it is made
up of a complex array of interacting species, it would be equally wrong to call a
human society an ecosystem because it is composed of one core species, and a narrow
array of associated species.
But in both cases the positive nature of the links between the various
independent structures are unknown to them, deer do not know that the wolf is their
friend. It is clear that any other state of awareness would amount to a breech of the
state independence. Indeed the process of symbiotic intertwining of interests involves
a relaxation of this state of conscious antagonism, so the wolf evolved into a dog as it
came to feel its dependence on the human and the human lost its sense of alienation
from the wolf as the world was transformed into an extension of the human
superorganic form by becoming a dog. But within the intimate confines of the human
social domain where we have all the structure we find ourselves speaking of in this
work, the same condition of unwittingness exists in various states of intensity. So the
police may regard their duty to be the eradication of the criminal, the criminal may
loath the law, but it is obvious enough that, as with the deer and wolf, the one cannot
exist without the other. The dynamics may not seem reversible, but, as just noted, if
the deer is not predated then it gets diseased, and if there were no criminals then there
would be no authority, if there were no authority then there would be no society, and
hence there would be no police, or anything like them. It is not so much that
criminals are essential to form a society, as that authority is essential and authority
implies criminality, and so in the end the one cannot exist without the other and the
real object of the existence of these two interdependent structures of social
organisation is that a superorganic form should exist to fulfil the potential of the
mammalian physiology which evolve some seventy million years ago.

The final barrier to a grasp of the true nature of human nature does come down
to our personal limitation in terms of unwittingness, the idea of the individual is not
just a result of the fabrication of the theist. Clearly individuals must be subject to an
intense degree of unwittingness where even their most cherished ideas are no more
than a piece of software programming that runs them like a machine. But how on
earth can we get past this barrier if this is the case given the powerful sense of self
that all individuals have?
The department within the institutional structure which deals with this facet of
the corporate mind is psychology. The theocracy, with the guiding light of the likes
of Freud, has made the subject matter of unwittingness a highly personal and
individual matter, subject to general impulses it may be said to be, such as the
Oedipus complex, but it is nonetheless an intensely personal thing all about the
individual and their personality.
The unwitting relationship that exists between the servant of a large
corporation or a advocate of an ideology created by some preacher is not hard to
appreciate. Unwittingness becomes very tricky when we approach close to the
personal interests of people. When people express a political viewpoint, whose
viewpoint is it, and while they obviously have a view that makes sense in terms of
their circumstances, does this means that there are no implications for the way they
think that are beyond their awareness but which are nonetheless determined by social
factors and of the greatest significance? In other words although people may broadly
agree about issues to do with tax and work, are these ideas about the way to live not
structural forms that are way beyond the comprehension of all individuals, in some
degree?
Sociology makes a point of vindicating the personal opinions of people and
tells us that the beauty of studying the human animal is that we do not need to rely
upon observation to discover why these creatures behave the way we do because we
can ask them! This is pure, unadulterated mythology, and having imposed this
twisted mode of reasoning upon the subject sociologists go on to pervert their science
with glee. They devise theories that circumscribe the inner contents of the individual
and set them out of bounds to science, making the inner thought sacrosanct, only
knowable to the individual who has them. I call this the delinquent mechanism since
it is a licence for someone confronted by authority to make denials on safe grounds,
knowing the inquisitor is forbidden to say what they think.
The experimental side of psychology does however reveal the malleability of
people's ideas, and dismissed the notion of a private inner world that is a sovereign
state belonging to each individual. It appears that while we have inner thought
processes, the rendering of these into communication, which is the only way anyone
else can have access to them, is filtered through an evaluative process guided by the
audience we are amongst. We try to accommodate our hearers. The degree to which
this is so will vary according to the circumstances but when the issues are important
to us then the manner in which we manage what we think will be incredibly subtle so
that we will aggressively defend a position to the death, but, if we suddenly find
ourselves in a social situation where those we care about no longer support the
position, we may drop it in an instant.
In this setting unwittingness is a highly dynamic mechanism, but this
dynamism does not enable flexibility, quite the reverse, it guarantees a highly fixed
degree of attachment to what an individual needs to think in order to be successful
and happy in society. And so it follows that a theocracy is not just about creating a
corporate identity and imposing authority, it is about providing for the well being of
the individual, and this is why the link exists between the state as the provider and the
individual as a dependant citizen who tends to be concerned only with the provision
of life's necessities and not at all concerned with the moral ideas of society in terms of
intellectual truth and such like. The individual is only concerned with moral issues
like crime because this is what they are told to be concerned about as a moral issue.
 In all of this we must remember the influence of language upon our
consciousness, our consciousness is filled with words at all times and this means we
are faced an image, and we meet the image with a linguistic contribution of our own,
and we are strictly controlled in what we can say, so all the time we are up against the
illusion of a finely woven cloak of ideas which we see, we see it, even though it is not
there.

Material Proof

Deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are
the only 'real' and ' natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase
which places State and Man upon one level.

Having recognised that humans are a superorganism where the organism

proper takes shape at the social level and the individual is reduced to the status of a
cells within a body, or an organ we might say in smaller human organisms, we easily
recognise that language is the information medium taking over from the genetic
information in the delivery of social structure. It follows that there must be a link
between language and social structure just as real as the link between genes and their
expression in material form. The most obvious linguistic structures to reveal such a
link will be laws.
The question is then, how do we prove the link? I cannot do that literally, on
my own, that requires real research which is way beyond my capacity. What I intend
to do is to show circumstantial evidence that makes the case beyond any reasonable
doubt, to use a legalistic turn of phrase. And so this sentence I have selected from the
above passage taken from Maitland's introduction to Gierke's work, is intended to
highlight the gist of the issue. Although the law makers who have devised the
schemes according to which our societies have been constructed have been devoted to
the idea of God as the divine source of existence, in seeking to apply God's will they
have been obliged to work with the dualistic idea of a unifying force uniting
individuals into one body. Why? Why if the rhetoric says that humans are
individuals, is it, that in managing humans, firstly accepting that humans have to be
managed, they have to be managed as if they were not individuals but the
depersonalised components of collective entities?

Well, we have our answer, it is because there is no God, the use of this idea is
just priestcraft, and the real nature of humans is that they are just components of a
collective being, and that is why those who act as the managers are obliged to think in
the way they do as suggested here by Maitland. And so for proof of the validity of
this assertion I am going to quote passages from Gierke which reveal just how
intensely the law makers adopted the idea that human society was an organism, how
they did this for many centuries, even for millennia, and that eventually by this means
they worked out how to create the global organism we know today.
But lets just consider an issue concerning creativity before we take any
selections. I am saying that there is no such thing as an artificial product as distinct
from a natural product, in any absolute sense, both artificial and natural products are
made equally by Nature. All that artificial means is that a natural product was made
by means of human agency to serve as a natural attribute, an appendage of human
form. The impulse to act as an agent in this manner was created by our genetic
evolution. So lets consider an artificial item, an aeroplane, for example. Did humans
make the aeroplane or did Nature make it? We accept that Nature made the plane via
the agency of human activity, just as Nature makes the nest via the agency of a bird,
or a howl via the agency of a wolf. The proof of this assertion is that in order to fly
humans had to discover what requirements had to be met, so the aeroplane already
existed as a possibility, it was just a matter of discovering what was required.
Humans discover, they do not create. In order to make my point I will let another's
words speak for me.

'The River of Discovery

This century has been so rich in discovery and so packed with

technical innovation that it is tempting to believe that there can never be
another like it. That conceit betrays a poverty of our collective imagination.
One purpose of this book is to take up some of the questions now crying out
for attention, but which cannot yet be answered. The record of previous
centuries suggests that the excitement in the years ahead will spring from the
answers to the questions we do not yet know enough to ask.
It is an abiding difficulty in science that perspective is distorted
because the structure of scientific knowledge makes its own history seem
irrelevant. We forget that modern science in the European tradition is already
500 years old, dating from the time of the Polish astronomer Copernicus. The
Copernican revolution was a century-long and, ultimately, successful struggle
to establish that the Sun, not Earth, is at the center of the solar system.'

(What Remains To Be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the

Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race, John
Maddox. Papermac, 1999. Page 1)

Now all we need do is to bring the Darwinian revolution to its climax by

establishing that humans are organisms, and not divine beings. And we trying! But
this idea of discovery makes all the difference. We freely speak of the discovery of
America, without imaging that it was not there until Columbus sailed upon it, and so
reported its presence to the modern world. But the fact is that since the discovery of
this continent America has been made by the Europeans, just as, since the discovery
of the materials to enable flight the aeroplane has been made, also by Europeans, if
we include Americans in the category of Europeans, which for the sake of a
discussion of this kind we most definitely should do; have no desire to pamper to the
theistic habit of interdependent differentiation, this organic process is real enough but
we want to see past the parts and so to discover the whole; only then will we be able
to discover some of the questions we do not yet know how to ask, and so we may
answer the one about the future of our species.
And so, what applies to one artifact, applies to all. Laws are not made by
people, resulting in a social structure of their own making. Laws are discovered that
induce the formation of social structure that is functional, so, via human agency,
Nature makes society by exercising the various branches of the state machinery. Here
then, courtesy of Gierke, we are going to see how the lawyers were obliged to think of
society as an organism in order to produce the modern society, even as they stalwartly
denied that this was the case because of the desire to preserve their authority based on
the idea of a divine authority.
 Maitland's Introduction, Second Extract

Pausing here for a moment, we may notice that an Englishman will miss a
point in the history of political theory unless he knows that in a strictly legal context
the Roman societas, the French société, and the German Gesellschaft should be
rendered by the English partnership and by no other word. Also he should know that,
just as the English lawyer maintains that our English 'firm' is a mere collective name
for the partners and displays no 'artificial personality,' so also he will be taught in
Germany that the Roman societas and the German Gesellschaft are not 'juristic
persons.' Now-a-days it will perhaps be added that the German Gesellschaftand the
same would be said of the English partnershipshews a tendency to develop towards
corporate organization, from which tendency the extremely 'individualistic' societas
of the Romans was wholly free. That is a small matter; but it is a great matter that
before the end of the Middle Ages the Roman word for partnership was assuming a
vastly wide meaning and, under the patronage of Ciceronian comparisons, was
entering the field of politics. 'Human Society' should be the partnership of mankind;
'Civil Society' should be the partnership of citizens; 'the Origin of Civil Society'
should be a Social Contract or contract of partnership. If Rousseau writes of le
Contrat Social and Pothier of le Contrat de Société, there should be, and there is, a
link between their dissimilar books, and a German can say that both discussed the
Gesellschaftsvertrag, the one with passion, the other with erudition. Here then we
face one of the historical problems that Dr Gierke raises. How came it about that
political theory, which went to the lawyers for most of its ideas, borrowed the contract
of partnership rather than the apparently far more appropriate act of incorporation? In
brief the answer is that the current doctrine of corporations, the classical and
Innocentian doctrine, stood beneath the level of philosophic thought. A merely
fictitious personality, created by the State and shut up within the limits of Private
Law, was not what the philosopher wanted when he went about to construct the State
itself.
And then political philosophy reacted upon legal theory. When the State itself
had become a merely collective unita sum of presently existing individuals bound
together by the operation of their own willsit was not likely that any other group
would seem capable of withstanding similar analysis. Where philosophy and
jurisprudence met in such systems of Natural Law as were fashionable in the
eighteenth century, the universitas was lowered to the rank of the societas, or (but this
was the same process) the societas was raised to the rank of the universitas. Both
alike exhibited a certain unity in plurality; both alike might be called 'moral persons';
but in the one case as in the other this personality was to be thought of as a mere
labour-saving device, like stenography or the mathematician's symbols. What we
may call the Bracket Theory or Expansible Symbol Theory of the Corporation really
stands in sharp contrast with the Fiction Theory as Savigny conceived it, though
sometimes English writers seem to be speaking of the one and thinking of the other.
The existing corporators, who in the one scheme are mere guardians for a somewhat
that the State has instituted, become in the other scheme the real 'subjects' of those
rights and duties that are ascribed to the corporation, though legal art usually keeps
these 'subjects' enclosed within a bracket. However, despite this tendency of a
'natural' jurisprudencea tendency which seems to have left an abiding mark in the
legal terminology of Scotlandthe Romanists of Germany had been holding fast the
doctrine that the universitas is, while the societas is not, a person, when the joint-
stock company, a new power in the theoretic as in the economic world, began to give
trouble. That the Aktiengesellschaft was a corporation was generally admitted; but of
all corporations a joint-stock company is that which seems to offer itself most kindly
to the individualistic analyst. When all is said and done, and all due praise has been
awarded to the inventors of a beautiful logarithm, are not these shareholders, these
men of flesh and blood, the real and only sustainers of the company's rights and
duties? So great a Romanist as Ihering trod this 'individualistic' or 'collectivistic' path,
and in America where law schools flourish, where supreme courts are many and the
need for theory is more urgent than it is in England, highly interesting attempts have
been made to dispel the Fiction, or rather to open the Bracket and find therein nothing
but contract-bound men. Contract, that greediest of legal categories, which once
wanted to devour the State, resents being told that it cannot painlessly digest even a
joint-stock company. Maine's famous sentence about Contract and Status might
indeed be boldly questioned by anyone who remembered that, at least for the
philologian, the Roman Status became that modern State, Etat, Staat which refused to
be explained by Contract into a mere 'Civil Society.' Few words have had histories
more adventurous than that of the word which is the State of public and the estate of
our private law, and which admirably illustrates the interdependence that exists
between all parts of a healthily growing body of jurisprudence. Still, though the
analytic powers of Contract are by no means what they once seemed to be, many will
think them equal to the task of expanding what they might call the Corporation
Symbol.

(Pages xxii - xxv)

Quite a slice of Maitland here, but I like large portions, even though the depth
of the subject being presented is such as to make it tricky for anyone who has not got
the feel of the subject, somewhat difficult to catch on to, I imagine. This however is
not necessary, we are not students of law, we are here looking for evidence of the
necessity for those men who made out modern world to take account of human
corporate biology. Just as we might look to the necessity of the architects, engineers
or astronomers, who built our exoskeleton and knowledge into the form we have
today by paying close attention to the mathematics pertaining to materials and
structure.
Running through this verbiage we see the steady presence of Gierke's
corporate theme. And in this piece we also see how it informed the Romans whose
laws came down to us in large measure. It is impossible for complex laws directing
the organization of society not to focus emphatically upon the notion of society as an
organism. Dear me, I wonder why that might? Humans are animals, we evolved, and
in no sense can we be distinguished from any other living thing on the planet in this
respect, but this could not possibly have anything to do with the fact that society has
to be treated as an organism could it!!
What does come forcefully out of this section is the tireless effort that is put
into denying the obvious, denying that society is an organic phenomenon, a product of
natural processes, and nothing more. Unity in plurality, this has a nice ring to it.
What does it mean? It is a reference to the idea of society versus brotherhood, the
difference being that society is here meant to be considered a naturally occurring
physical entity while society conceived as a brotherhood is a man made phenomenon.
And in this case it is, of course, intending to bolster the illusion of brotherhood
consciously, of coming together to establish a strong position for each individual.
 Individuals coming together to form a group lose their individuality, they are
homogenised by virtue of their acquiring a group identity which invokes a group will.
The resulting collective unity is then represented as if it were itself a living person
with a will of its own, it is called a moral person. The reason this tack is taken is that
the people pursuing the line of reasoning are lawyers and they are striving to find a
way of validating law, in order to do this they must have a logical process to follow
and the law they already know dealing with the moral code imposed on individuals is
their causal connection, thus in order to devise laws that encompass the state they
must define the state as a moral being with rights and responsibilities that can be
expressed in law. The result of this approach is to preserve the language of
individuality, and we know that preserving the idea of the individual is the basis of
theistic mysticism, and the exact inversion of reality, in reality there is no such thing
as an individual human being in the form of a single physical living being, a person.
There is only the social unit, the superorganism.
A scientific analysis, turning to a biological account of the same subject
matter, with no agenda such as that which the lawyer/philosopher/theist/politician/
monarch/dictator/capitalist readily submits to, gives up the language of individuality
which the term moral is central to, and rather than seek to make the corporate body
composed of individual into a super-conscious person or personality, the scientist
instead shifts in the opposite direction to dismiss all talk of individual persons and
therefore to the dismissal of morality as a behavioural facet of the human social
organism.

I am not massively impressed by Durkheim. He is another example of

someone who talks the talk wonderfully but does not walk the walk at all, still we
could just sample a bit of his talk concerning the scientific nature of sociology which
bears on the issue in hand, the failure, even of sociology to break through the
constraint imposed by the theocracy, which is what all these medieval lawyers,
philosophers, and commentators in general, were so concerned with.

'Our principle, then, implies no metaphysical conception, no

speculation about the fundamental nature of beings. What it demands is that
the sociologist put himself in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist,
or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific
domain. When he penetrates the social world, he must be aware that he is
penetrating the unknown; he must feel himself in the presence of facts whose
laws are as unsuspected as were those of life before the era of biology; he
must be prepared for discoveries which will surprise and disturb him.
Sociology is far from having arrived at this degree of intellectual maturity.
While the scientist who studies physical nature is very keenly aware of the
resistance it offers him, and which he has so much difficulty in overcoming,
the sociologist seems to move in a sphere perfectly transparent to his view, so
great is the ease with which the most obscure questions are resolved. In the
present state of the science we really do not even know what are the principal
social institutions, such as the state, or the family; what is the right of property
or contract, of punishment and responsibility. We are almost completely
ignorant of the factors on which they depend, the functions they fulfil, the
laws of their development; we are scarcely beginning to shed even a glimmer
of light on some of these points. Yet one has only to glance through the works
on sociology to see how rare is the appreciation of this ignorance and these
 difficulties. Not only do social theorists consider themselves at once obliged
to dogmatize on all problems, but they find themselves able to set forth in a
few pages or phrases the very essence of the most complex phenomena.
Theorizing of this sort cannot have its source in facts, for facts could not be so
quickly disposed of; it springs from the prejudices which the author held prior
to his research. To be sure, each man's individual conception of what our
social customs are, or what they ought to be, is itself a factor in their
development. But these conceptions in turn are additional facts which must be
properly identified and studied objectively. The important thing to know is
not the way in which a certain thinker individually conceives a certain
institution but the group's conception of it; this conception alone is socially
significant. Nor can this conception be arrived at by simple introspection,
since it does not exist in its entirety in any one individual; we must find
external objective signs that will make it perceptible. Further, even a product
of spontaneous generation is in itself an effect of external causes which must
also be determined in order to estimate its role in the future. Ultimately, we
must always return to the same method.'

(The Rules of Sociological Method, Emile Durkheim. Page xlv - xlix)

Not massively impressed! Blimey, this man is a dream. I have started reading
this book properly since I wrote this comment a couple of days ago, and while it is
still, tragically, true that Durkheim misses a fundamental trick, he sure has a powerful
sense of what is important. Unfortunately it does remain the case that in this business
you either jump the gap from pure ignorance to pure knowledge, or you do not;
Durkheim definitely does not. But he is good, and if sociologists, at some time in the
future, could only learn to think like him, and apply his method, then the abysmal
state of social science which is infinitely more backward today than it was in
Durkheim's day, having had a whole century in which to devise perverted ways of
interpreting the facts sociologists have observed, might yet achieve what I have
achieved all on my lonesome and reach the other side of the chasm of ignorance and
thus discover that human nature is corporate and that all else follows from this point.
While I like the idea of functionalism, it is only now I get my mitts on the
relevant piece of Durkheim's thinking that I can see the reason he was no more a
scientist than anyone else I ever heard of - bit harsh. His functionalism is useless
because it is not connected to reality anymore than anyone else's mysticism -Ouch!
Functionalism implies structure, but not to Durkheim, apparently, who thinks that
individual and social dynamics are two utterly distinct things. This makes a nonsense
of his functionalism, and explains why he tells us nothing of any real use in the long
run, and the appearance of doing so acts as a hindrance to knowledge, in exactly the
same way we see the modern obstacle imposed by Dawkins who talks a good talk but
never walks the walk, except toward the sacred font of theocracy and mysticism.
Yes, well. I have been enjoying The Rules of Sociological Method during the
last two days, but it does have serious problems. The primary one, where I think
Durkheim let himself down, and the rest of humanity, concerns his concept of the
nature of language.

'It follows that sociological phenomena cannot be defined by their

universality. A thought which we find in every individual consciousness, a
movement repeated by all individuals, is not thereby a social fact. If
 sociologists have been satisfied with defining them by this characteristic, it is
because they confused them with what one might call their reincarnation in the
individual. It is, however, the collective aspects of the beliefs, tendencies, and
practices of a group that characterize truly social phenomena. As for the
forms that the collective states assume when refracted in the individual, these
are things of another sort. This duality is clearly demonstrated by the fact that
these two orders of phenomena are frequently found dissociated from one
another. Indeed, certain of these social manners of acting and thinking
acquire, by reason of their repetition, a certain rigidity which on its own
account crystallizes them, so to speak, and isolates them from the particular
events which reflect them. They thus acquire a body, a tangible form, and
constitute a reality in their own right, quite distinct from the individual facts
which produce it. Collective habits are inherent not only in the successive
acts which they determine but, by a privilege of which we find no example in
the biological realm, they are given permanent expression in a formula which
is repeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and fixed even in
writing. Such is the origin and nature of legal and moral rules, popular
aphorisms and proverbs, articles of faith wherein religious or political groups
condense their beliefs, standards of taste established by literary schools, etc.
None of these can be found entirely reproduced in the applications made of
them by individuals, since they can exist even without being actually applied.'

(Ibid. page 7)

I have italicised the relevant sentence. Granted that in relation to the subject
of human kind, anthropology, humanity was at an early stage when Durkheim wrote
this book in 1895. Even so you would think he might of grasped something more of
the organic nature of society than he appears to of done, and in this reference to the
unique attributes of linguistic information, being preserved in a manner not known in
nature, we see his crucial failure to grasp the nature of the process of social formation.
Darwin did not know about genetics, but his theory anticipated it because he saw that
there was some system, some process, at work directing the evolution of forms.
Durkheim should of recognised the same, he has all the right attitudes in place to do
so, and yet despite all he says in the end he falls in line with everyone else and
apologises for causing offence by seeming to belittle the individual and here he makes
the fatal flaw and assumes humans are unique, in some absolute sense, in nature, this
is the one thing no scientist could possibly tolerate.
Today we know that the genetic code is a perfect analogue of the linguistic
codes Durkheim refers to here, and of course we know that language is simply the
extension of the continuum of information from the organic domain to the social. But
this is obvious, why did he not see it?
I thought in taking this passage for the purpose of revealing Durkheim's fatal
flaw I was drifting away from the theme of this work, but in fact I see that this is not
really so. Here we see Durkheim is discussing the ever pressing problem of the
individual versus the collective. Even though he is endeavouring to assert a scientific
programme and thereby to dismiss all other modes of thought, he nonetheless does not
realise that the crucial mechanism in the creation of functional mythology generating
social form and therefore social power is the mechanism of duality. Had he seen this
was the ultimate problem which can be boiled down to the mythology of dualism and
the science of unity, he would not of been so keen to insist upon the distinction
between the individual and the group and the genuine existence of a duality composed
of the two distinct realities. I am still waiting to come upon the point where he
actually denies the existence of the individual, although I did read a passage yesterday
in which the idea that there was no such thing as an individual was implicit. But we
must return to the core of our work here, the observation of the manner in which the
people who acted as the agents creating our superorganic form of today, modelled
their work on the idea that society was a living organism composed of a host of
differentiated organs forming a complex state of interdependence brought together
under one unifying Whole.

Returning then to our real quest, seeking evidence that the fabricators of our
present social structure were obliged to deal with the superorganic nature of society,
we may consider this point, extracted from the last passage from Maitland's
introduction quoted above; it is the sort of idea that comes up repeatedly in relation to
Gierke's work on Natural Law.

'When all is said and done, and all due praise has been awarded to the
inventors of a beautiful logarithm, are not these shareholders, these men of
flesh and blood, the real and only sustainers of the company's rights and
duties?'

The joint-stock company is used as the perfect example proving that all that
makes this social organ, the joint-stock company, real, are the flesh and blood
individuals that own the stock.
On the face of it this may be so. When I imagine debating the fact that there is
no such thing as an individual with someone I think like this. If we look at the world
about us, it is perfectly clear that the earth is flat. We know the earth is some sort of
solid object and that it is fixed and stationary. There is no doubt, we can prove it by
looking, that the sun, moon and stars rotate about the earth, the earth is self evidently,
at the centre of all things. These wholly erroneous facts are obviously true, on the
face of it, it is only by means of accumulating knowledge over many generations that
we have learnt to appreciate the real, and quite amazing truth, which know it as we
may well do, still seams quite impossible. The earth rotates at 22,000 miles per hour!
Ludicrous. Impossible. The earth is round, a globe - insane, we would all fall off.
And so on.
Yes, on the face of it, of course all there is, is individuals. Certainly at the end
of the day the proceeds of the company can only go to the owners of the company.
But this is not a scientific observation, it is an observation that comes from a purely
local effect where we take things to be as they appear to be from where we are
standing, and we look no further. The people who are concerned with law making are
dedicated to the preservation of social order, and its enhancement. There were forces
tearing at the seams of the social structure so that the likes of Rousseau came up with
radical ideas focusing on the existence of the individual which fed the transformation
that came about in French society when the revolution kicked off in 1789. But,
notice, Rousseau uses the sovereignty of the individual as a basis for his reasoning.
He had an agenda, a purpose, just as the law makers did.

The Nullification Mechanism

 A scientist, of the sociological persuasion at any rate, has no agenda, or has no
right to have an agenda. To do so would nullify their claim to be a valid sociologist;
just as being a criminal would nullify a police officer's right to claim to be a valid
police officer. Of course this null status does not negate the possibility of the status it
nullifies existing in the same space, at one and the same time, it just nullifies it! In
other words the null status is a naturally occurring sub-status of a valid, or ideal,
status. In the same way that an answer to a question is no less a genuine answer to a
question for being a lie, it is simple a null answer. Nullification simply corrupts the
ideal, or true, status. Professional status is always conferred by authority, this in
effect makes authority the personification of the ideal, the determinant of the ideal,
which means status is conferred via an institutional structure. It is therefore up to the
institution that grants an acknowledgement of status to ensure that contradiction
between the ideal vested in its authority, and the expression of its authority, is ruled
out by the process of induction and qualification.
However it soon becomes evident from the above chain of reasoning that
authority assumes the status of ideal for the express purpose of having the privilege of
determining what the expression of the ideal will be. If authority did not pervert the
ideal there would be no point in there being an authority to guarantee that the ideal
was not perverted, since no authority means no ideal, means no perversion.
Nullification is therefore the institutional perversion of the ideal that establishes the
authority of the institution. We can say, on this basis, that an institution has total
authority over the determination of the ideal, the ideal is what the institution says it is.
This is not a rationally determined state of affairs, it is an evolved state of being. If an
institution no longer has the control of determining what the ideal is it no longer has
authority. It goes without saying that the institution, which is an organic aspect of the
exoskeleton of the superorganism, cannot evolve just anyway it please, just as the
aeroplane could not evolve just anyway it pleased. People do not make institutions,
nor aeroplanes, Nature makes these physiological structures according to
predetermined rules of nature. And it just this need to discover what the laws of
nature are pertaining to the fabrication of an institution that has brought us to Gierke's
door.
This is why religious authority, the most supreme authority, is so inherently
perverse a representation of reality, but a ideal expression of authoritarian values;
because it is evolved to carry a partisan identity, the Jewish identity, which thereby
owns the shares in the corporate being that is formed by the exercise of the authority
which is expressed in the ideal, the identity. These ideals being belief in God, being
the chosen, belief in law, in authority, etc. etc. As it happens then, because science is
subject to theocratic oversight, by virtue of the ancient structure of academia which
founded the scientific establishment, science insists that in order to be a bona fide
scientist a person must have a nullified status that guarantees they will not present
scientific ideas that conflict with theology in a fundamental manner that would
destroy theocratic authority. A perfectly understandable position. If we try to
imagine how this situation could ever be changed by consent we need to think of
more simple comparative social structures that show a similar authoritarian dynamic
at work which sets up an ideal, then automatically negates it. Such as the system of
democratic representation in Britain which has been dominated by a two party system
since the foundation of the parliamentary system several centuries ago. The only way
to alter the two party system is to change the method of voting from first past the post
to proportional representation. The only way to do this is to get the party in power to
decide to give up having power ever again, and to do so voluntarily, needless to say
this cannot happen. And neither can the theocracy, which determines what science is,
be expected to allow science to adopt a scientific method that will destroy the
theocratic authority that allows it to rule the entire world under one identity, Judaism;
it cannot happen. Not voluntarily anyway, but revolutions do occur, and I hope we
have the makings of a scientific revolution in our sights here. A world without
religion is a world worth working for, a world worth living for, a world worth dying
for.

Horror

It is an express condition of being a scientists that you are against all

agendas, by definition. It is this fact that makes it impossible to be a scientist of
human life without being a passionate and proactive atheist, one who demands the
complete obliteration of all religious thought from their subject. A religious ideology
constitutes, by definition, an agenda. The scientist wants only to know what is real,
this is not an agenda, it is the antithesis of an agenda. And it is the antithesis of
science to the purpose of social life that makes science so exceedingly difficult to do
in the context of human affairs. Durkheim discusses this matter of science's
usefulness under this kind of circumstance, but to me truth is self evidently useful and
needs no justification beyond its own existence.
Had a sociobiological account of society been applied to the question of the
nature of a commercial company constituted from a number of individuals by virtue
of a legal contract, it would of started from the premise that humans are organisms
that share a common ancestry with apes, and who diverged in the course of evolution
in accord with the direction in which their own simultaneously evolving nature took
them. For an analogy, to make clear what may seem obscure, we may think of the
evolution of the aeroplane as having progressed in the direction in which its own
simultaneously evolving nature took it. Thus the aeroplane was always defined by its
aerodynamic form, this is its nature. As its nature evolved by virtue of the
information that it acquired from related facets of the organism of which it is a part,
such as developments in engineering and materials, so its form evolved, and so the
biplane became a monoplane, an aircraft, a jet. Its nature, continuously evolved,
while always remaining the same, and this evolution along a common thread of being
was expressed in a continuous expression of new forms. The aeroplane is not a living
thing, it is a facet of a living thing, and so this description is an analogy in order to
show how the process that applies to the whole organism can be seen to work at the
structural level. The same description therefore applies equally to the human
superorganism as a whole being. From the period of its first stone tool cultures, to
that of the first the fire bearing cultures, to that of the first townships and so to the
first industrial society. It is necessary to make the proviso that we discuss this
progression in terms of first origins, otherwise we are liable to encounter considerable
confusion in terms of the overlap of these various cultural forms at one and the same
time, but in different places. We need to be aware that our species' evolution involves
evolution proper, which may be duplicated, and then dispersal, which definitely
predominates as a mode of expressing evolutionary development. It would then of
followed that as society was an organism, based on the logic that humans were
evolved organisms, so its structure constituted that of a living entity, an exoskeleton.
In relation to the joint-stock company the flesh and blood individuals were but the
temporary elements of its living tissue, occupying the structures created in the form of
fiscal and trading institutions, which evolved as part of the organic structure of the
superorganism to serve the superbeing that mythology denotes by speaking of
divinity. But of course these artificers of the law were seeking to extend the authority
of theocracy, not to destroy it, they wanted to determine the ideal, so that they could
fabricate a representation of it that would deliver the reward of understanding that
ideal to the institutional entities which they served. Thus they worked with the ideal,
the truth, that human society was an organism, but the fabricated a null representation
of that ideal by asserting that there was only the individual and as such it was
necessary to conceive of society as a moral being in order to preserve this null
representation of the ideal upon which the authority they shared in relied.
The idea that individuals are specifically the be all and end all of the reason
for the existence of such vast structures as those that dominate our world in modern
times, is quite absurd once you know the truth, just as the idea that the earth is the
centre of the universe seems absurd and small minded when you know that the stars
are suns, the sun has its own solar system, and that system is one item in a huge
galaxy, and so on, and on.
And so we may refer back to a sentence taken from Durkheim, quoted above.

'When he penetrates the social world, he must be aware that he is

penetrating the unknown; he must feel himself in the presence of facts whose
laws are as unsuspected as were those of life before the era of biology; he
must be prepared for discoveries which will surprise and disturb him.'

And we can see just how disturbing these various advances in scientific
knowledge are, the world is not flat - horror, it is not stationary - horror, it is not the
focus of all things - horror, humanity is not divine - horror, humanity is organic -
horror, there is no such thing as an individual person - horror, there is no such thing as
a divine being - horror, human society is a living being - HORROR!!

The expression of abhorrence, in relation to new knowledge of the most

fabulous kind, What is it?

Why should there be this endless cycle of dismay involved in the advance of
real knowledge, and the process of growing self realisation that comes from this
process of enlightenment?

Why do people hate the truth so much?

Why is that the people who hate and fear the truth more than anyone else,
except perhaps the theologians themselves, are the professionals whose lives are
devoted to the discovery and exposition of the truth?

Durkheim discusses this problem, somewhat less provocatively than me, but
then he had reason to be more patient than me since he feels that he is in the position
of being one of the pioneers in a new science of sociology. I know that in fact he is
one just one founding father of a line of more knowledge perverts specialising in the
distortion of the truth. I do not care to be patient, or gracious, toward these people.
I found myself being critical of Durkheim's discussion because he failed to
take an objective view of the expression of dismay that he gives some thought to. He
allows the antagonism show toward those who would take a scientific view of humans
to stand on its own reconnaissance, instead of applying a scientific evaluation to the
meaning of this phenomenon. As such he left this attack upon scientific method to an
individualistic interpretation, thus it had subjective validity, and his criticism of it was
of a kind that rebuked it for being the ignorance and failure of a narrow minded
individuals. This despite the development of a method that is supposed to be
addressing just this issue, and he says sociologists should look for trends in social
behaviour, which, once observed can be scrutinised for their common properties and
interpreted according to a conviction that they must have some common origin due
the principle of causality which underpins all science.
When I refer to the breakdown of sacred boundaries limiting knowledge such
as that which outlawed, for as long as possible, the idea that the earth was anything
but the centre of the universe, I mention a number specific points that ignorance
insisted upon that advanced knowledge had to refute. Boundaries were eventually
overcome. We saw in the passage taken from Maddox above, that it took a century or
so for the Copernican revolution, which is considered to mark the beginning of the
scientific age, to become triumphant by assuming an ascendant position in our
understanding of the universe and thereby silencing all official opposition. Having
breached the null boundary set by the idealists who have the authority to determine
what is true and what is false, humanity is then free to enjoy the magnificent new
knowledge, and so modern astronomy came forward in leaps and bounds, and a truly
beautiful thing it is today. Now even the Vatican has its own institutions celebrating
the work of Galileo whom they persecuted so piously in defence of the fascistic
authority.
The truth is that century of struggle with religious authority that Maddox
mentions was no about the struggle to establish the idea of a heliocentric universe, it
was about the theocracy's need for sufficient time to realign it null interpretation of
the ideal, of the real, so that it had a new kernel of false knowledge about which to
focus, and thus a new boundary to set on what we would be permitted to know. This
was what took the time, and it was evidently time well spent. The theocracy
relinquished it fixation on the celestial mystery, since the cover was blown due to the
telescope, it authority could not rest on that illusion, the divinity of its sacred authority
could no longer be heavenly in character. A new myth was required, and so the
divinity of theocratic identity took on a more organic form. I confess I do not know
quite whether this process occurred in exactly this manner, but when Darwin came up
with the notion of evolution embracing all life, including humanity, there is no doubt
that the edifice began to shake once again, which proves that theocratic authority was
based upon an investment in human nature and form being something entangled with
their true, organic nature.
However, Darwin, quite possibly because he simply knew no better, created a
model of evolution that conformed to the dualistic mechanism of knowledge
perversion that creates mythology such as that of Judaism which rules our world by
splitting asunder form and nature, thus all we learn from Darwin is that we have the
form of apes, isn't that a revelation? No. And that with the solution to the mystery
cracked, heavens above, we are left with an impossible task of accounting for humans,
who are simply like nothing else on earth, yeah, yeah, yeah, yawn, yawn, yawn. Its
like being back in Sunday school listening to these priests of evolution crooning about
our nearest relatives the chimpanzee and the stone age brain evolved to split rocks in a
jungle and no able to cope with the pressure of modern living, everyone is a story
teller.
But not me, I don't like stories, I don't tell stories, and I know better, and I had
theocracy, and I love science. And I know the solution to the problem, and this is the
nail in God's coffin, at last: Halleluya. I have the key to unlock the organic constraint
on self knowledge created by Darwin's dualistically based idea of human evolution
which failed to account for human nature and only accounted for human form.
So, horror, is not intrinsic in the knowledge that actually induces the horrified
reaction that is expressed in resistance to the truth, or attempts to discover truth
pertaining to that which is deemed sacred at any given time. The situation is quite the
reverse in fact, once the horror is overcome and people are left to their own devices to
enjoy life and knowledge in peace, they generally relish the new ideas, truth is
stranger than fiction, and always more exciting and liberating. The horror is an
artifice, it appears at any time that new knowledge poses a threat to the established
authority of the theocracy. Put in biological terms public expressions of horror are
not the reactions of individuals acting as individuals, they are a physiological reaction
induced in the organic substance of the superorganism whose exoskeletal structure
has evolved about an identity and authority structure which has woven into it aspects
of the unknown as a means of nullifying the known, by this means mythology is
created under the auspices of the institution which manages the null ideas of reality.
The superorganism has an organ of authority and it is the officials whose place in the
organism lies within this part of the physiology and whose personal well being is
intimately linked to the preservation of the illusion which authority relies upon to
weave its special identity which helps secure for it the status of an organ of authority.
So the needs of the few elite become synonymous with the needs of the
superorganism, which is the society itself, and so to a significant extent the needs of
society are drawn together, and as such a threat to the sacred identity of the elite is a
threat against society. There can be no doubt that my revelation of an organic nature
for humans does absolutely threaten the complete destruction of society as we know
it. Something I have been longing for all my life, so I am delighted by the prospect of
success.
The horror is a physical reaction of the organ of authority which is always
focused on the theocracy and belief in God, because it is religion that constitutes the
identity and makes the superorganic being exist as one organic whole sharing one
common identity. Those who express this horror as individuals, like the person
Durkheim mentions, are the flesh and blood representatives who find themselves
reacting in defence of their own interests because they carry a share in the corporate
identity, identified by religion, and other significant attachments to the establishment.
You get your voice heard in any meaningful fashion it is necessary to have a high
status of some authoritative sort. These vocal proclaimers of abhorrence against the
truth, for the null truth, are the shareholders in the corporate beings existence, they are
the elite. They are the only ones who will suffer deeply if the identity of the organism
is killed, the mass of the being just continue as before, only the core dies, it is only the
elite who are hurt by the destruction of mythology due to new knowledge. This elite
react in horror against all new knowledge which threatens theocratic authority upon
which their status depends due their position in the physiology of the superorganism,
and it is the privilege of being a scientist that is granted like a sinecure by the
academic establishment which ensures the people who wince and rail in horror most
intense when the scientific truth is revealed, are the scientists.

Continuing directly from the quote ending on page 116 above, we find the
following important material.
 'It was in a Germany that was full of new ideas and new hopes that a
theory was launched which styled itself 'the German Genossenschaftstheorie!
Even the hastiest sketch of its environment, if it notices the appearance of the
joint-stock company, should give one word to the persistence in Germany of
agrarian communities with world-old histories, to the intricate problems that
their dissolution presented, and to the current complaint that Roman law had
no equitable solution for these questions and had done scant justice to the
peasant. Nor should the triumphs of biological science be forgotten. A name
was wanted which would unite many groups of men, simple and complex,
modern and archaic; and Genossenschaft was chosen. The English translator
must carefully avoid Partnership; perhaps in our modern usage Company has
become too specific and technical; Society also is dangerous; Fellowship with
its slight flavour of an old England may be our least inadequate word.
Beginning with Beseler's criticism of Savigny, the theory gradually took
shape, especially in Dr Gierke's hands, and a great deal of thought, learning
and controversy collected round it. Battles had to be fought in many fields.
The new theory was to be philosophically true, scientifically sound, morally
righteous, legally implicit in codes and decisions, practically convenient,
historically destined, genuinely German, and perhaps exclusively Germanistic.
No, it seems to say, whatever the Roman universitas may have beenand Dr
Gierke is for pinning the Roman jurists to Savignianismour German
Fellowship is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no
collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with
body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills
and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth
and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a Gesammtperson, and its will is a
Gesammtwille; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will.
This theory, which we might call Realism, may seem to carry its head
among the clouds, though no higher perhaps than the Fiction Theory; but a
serious effort has been made to give it feet that walk upon the earth. In one
long book Dr Gierke has in great detail argued his case throughout the whole
domain of practicable modern law, contending, not indeed that all German
'authority' (as an English lawyer would say) is on his side, but that he has the
support of a highly respectable body of authority, express and implied, and
that legislatures and tribunals fall into self-contradiction or plain injustice
when they allow themselves to be governed by other theories. Nothing could
be more concrete than the argument, and, though it will sometimes shew an
affection for 'the German middle age' and a distrust of ancient Rome, it claims
distinctively modern virtues: for instance, that of giving of the shareholder's
'share' the only lawyerly explanation that will stand severe strain. Then in
another book our author has been telling the history of German Fellowship
Law.'

(Page xxv - xxvi)

Here we have then, a categorical statement that, for the German school of
thought, society was literally an organism. And this is our theme, finding examples of
the idea of society as a living being, this is the idea of Super Being, a animal that
takes shape only at the social level beyond the level of the individual creature, be it
bacterium, mollusc, insect, or mammal. Finding this theme repeated in a variety of
places is evidence of something real, and in this section, where we are dealing with
the evolution of the laws which created our social structure, we have entitled to
consider this serious endeavour to understand society as a living creature as hard
evidence of its being exactly that.
But how will this professional elite work this idea out? Unfortunately these
people are lawyers, not scientists, not biologists, nor even anthropologists or
sociologists. So we do not get the right kind of interpretation for our purposes. These
people were the real fabricators of social structure, so they are the people to whom we
scientist should turn, just as the anthropologists of times past looked to the medicine
men and the tribal rights for the nitty-gritty of social life from which they could try
and construct some idea of human nature. These medieval lawyers and legal theorists
and theologians, plus the nineteenth century academics and lawyers who were allied
to their ideas, are our subjects, the proper subjects for those of us who are interested in
founding a science of human sociobiology in which humanity is finally reduced to a
uniform status with the rest of the universe. Needless to say this is a first step, an
attempt to grab the attention of the academic world and force them to stop rejecting
the scientific idea of human nature, and instead to give the idea that science has
something to contribute to human self understanding serious consideration. From that
point we can imagine that it would be fitting for the detailed relationship between
theories and practice to be studied more closely, but the fact is that in these two
extracts from Gierke's work there are references to the application of ideas, such as
the influence of the philosopher Rousseau on the practices of the revolutionaries, and
the whole point of the arguments people were coming up with was to decided how to
justify, in a legal framework, the balance of power between the state and the
individual.
The problem with the interpretation of the idea that human society is a living
being, as expressed in the section quoted above, is that, as ever, it uses the language of
individuality, transferred from the individual to the social entity. We just cannot get
away from this position, we have just seen that Durkheim, despite his ruthlessly
logical functionalism made this solid form stand on the soft foundations of a
structureless individualism. These German advocates of the corporate being were
doing the same thing, they speak of society having a personal will, like that of an
individual. I do not really want to try and put myself in their conceptual position, but
I suppose I should. Yes, the whole point is that society has an apparent will, but it is
equally obvious that this cannot be understood by thinking in terms of a personal will
akin to that of an individual. I found a book in a charity shop this week which I was
delighted to find had an interesting contribution to make to this subject.

'Elitism

At the core of the elitist doctrine lies the belief that the history of politics is the
history of elite domination. Elitists theory therefore challenges the key
premises of most Western liberal assumptions about politics, the organisation
of government and the 'proper' relationship between the state and civil society.
As Gaetano Mosca (1939, p 50) puts it:

In all societies - from societies that are very meagrely

developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilisation, down
to the most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people
 appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class,
always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the
second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the
first.

Hence, the nature of any society - whether it is consensual or authoritarian,

dynamic or static, pacifist of totalitarian, legitimate or illegitimate - is
determined by the nature of its elite. Moreover, the goals of every society are
both established and manipulated by its elite (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, p. 3).'

(Theory and Methods in Political Science, Elitism, Mark Evans,

Macmillan, 1997, p. 228)

Here we see how the erroneous thinking of these medieval priests has evolved
into a full blown academic science where their modern day counterpart continue to
elaborate on the idea of a social being in the guise of a wilful individual.
All Christian and Moslem states are Jewish, this is the point, this point can
only be realised by recognising the biological nature of the human species and thereby
recognising that the social form is a natural product of the individual from. Hence the
apparent contradiction which is made plain here where all societies of whatever
political hue are shown to be dictatorial, an obvious absurdity on this basis, being a
self contradictory statement, is resolved by recognising the unifying identity of the
state be it Nazi, conservative, socialist, communist, is determined by the religious
denomination which prevails. And the this sentence is the cream

Moreover, the goals of every society are both established and

manipulated by its elite.

Precisely, and the master identity is Judaism. But once you have determined
this you recognise that the core of Judaism, which unites all states, of all kinds, at all
times, that are subject to the Jewish identity code, is the ideology which is best called
Zionism. The Nazis, for example, were supreme Zionists, if we understand the
meaning of this term to be, not the foundation of a Jewish state, but the goal of all
Jewish ideology, to bring into being a world state under one God, the Jewish God.
The Nazis were as Jewish as it was possible to be on this understanding, hence, the
clash between the German Zionists, who in effect felt the idea but instead of their
conscious focus being upon the Jewish God, they wanted it to be upon the German
Jewish God, that is to say the Jewish God, unbeknown to them, because it would be
known under a German name. The veil of language is stunningly powerful, but
language did after all evolve to fulfil precisely this purpose of creating a social
conscious that was the be all and the end all of consciousness.
The apparent confusion here arises because of the delimitation of self
awareness which is curtailed in each elite body by virtue of their own circumscribed
identity, be it a state nationality, a racial identity, or a religious denomination or creed.
But Zionism informs all these societies, and the Jews are the master race by virtue of
their being the source of the ideas which have created these societies. So all these
apparently disparate types of society all end up by being subject to the same core elite,
exactly as these theorists rightly observe. What they do not observe is the scientific
truth underlying this sensory observation that any idiot could make for themselves
given a little effort. The Western assumption, as they call it, is an individualistic
interpretation of social realities, a facet of Jewish mythology, Western civilisation is
simply Jewish civilisation by another name. As we have seen throughout our study
this grounding of the consciousness in the fictional reality of the individual is the
primary mechanism of deception which makes mythological representations of reality
functional. The purpose of having authority is to invoke an ideal, that of freewill
expressed in liberal traditions, for example, that is automatically nullified by virtue of
the secretion the eternal autocracy hidden under the veil of linguistic imagery that is
provided by the ideal cloak of democracy and liberal traditions. The cloak is in effect
the process of domestication by the master identity, it takes different forms at
different times, it can e fascistic, or liberal, capitalist or communist, it is irrelevant to
the organism, the veil is simple a change of clothes according to the clime of the time,
the purpose and direction is given by human nature, it is forever toward one unified
superorganism. An identity is required to give direction and form to this natural
imperative and that identity is Judaism.
The truth of the matter concerning the nature of the organism's motivational
qualities which we see confused with human conscious willpower, is the nature of the
beast changes as we shift from the robotic purposefulness of the individual,
superimposed upon the individual's sense of self-consciousness by the organism of
which the individual is a part, and arrive at the full realisation of the organism from
whence individual expressions of will and motivation are drawn, unbeknown to the
individual. Hence Hitler did not know he was the personification of Judaism and
doing the Jews bidding when he set out to eradicate Jews from Europe, in order to
make himself the first master of the master race in the guise of German nationality.
Or at any rate, we must assume he did not know this; although it has to be said that
quite what this man thought he was doing is a puzzle to try and think about, since he
was obviously going nowhere with his approach to world domination.
Hitler's mad dash for power has the appearance of a man trying to win a
formula one race by pressing his accelerator pedal to the floor, gripping the wheel
with all his might, while shutting his eyes tight. What on earth could he possibly of
thought he was going to achieve. The same applies to any great military individual
acting alone, or according to a lone agenda. Hannibal's efforts were meaningless as
an effort in purposeful achievement, beyond mindless destruction. Napoleon's efforts
were likewise masturbatory, all self glory and military escapade without reason. But
the actions of these individuals must be subject to reason in some sense, and they
must of served some purpose or they simply could not of taken place. Ghengis Khan,
another lone madman who simply enjoyed mass slaughter as a lifestyle, Alex the
Great tit, was another. These people litter the behavioural record of the
superorganism like sporadic bouts of drunken madness litter my personal record of
existence. What purpose do these patterns of corporate behaviour represent, the
individuals who happen to acts as the figureheads of these enterprises are clearly no
more relevant than the poison that happens to swill down my gullet on any given
evening, Burton's Best or Somerset Scrumpy, the direction I head in, and the reason
why, is always the same. And we can safely say that this is the case whether it is,
Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Ghengis, Napoleon, Hitler, Thatcher or Bush. Except,
individuals such as Caesar, Thatcher and Bush, are working for an establishment
toward the obvious goal of world domination, either proactively, as with Caesar and
Bush, or defensively in Thatcher's case, the proactive bit having been accomplished
some time before by one her predecessors. Zionism, this is always the call of the war
maker, however it appears, however it is hidden. Unless, as with Ghengis, you are
outside the Jewish fold, and so you are dancing to another master identity, but then
you are still strung by the same master tune, because that master tune is human
corporate identity and everything humans do, or have ever done, must dance to this
tune.
To be less evocative, and more academic, the point is that the will of the
corporate being is the force of evolution. Zionism, is the superorganic expression of
Darwinian evolution. We do not expect any species other than humans to have a will,
but we recognise in our ideas of evolution a progressive effort to survive in the
context of a dynamic environment, we do not call this will because it clearly is not
what we mean by will. Well this dynamic we see by way of the evolutionary process
is manifested in the will that Gierke is seeing in the real living form of society, it is no
more will than the action of a plant turning to the sun or a finch evolving to suit a
niche on a recently occupied island.
By always reducing the extent our focus we invoke circumscribed purpose that
never tallies with an organic phenomenon such as that of evolutionary process, hence
we get leaders, we get national interests, we get ethnic identities and we religious
blocs. This is the mechanism of individuality central to the preservation of
mythology, but natural in the manner in which evolution has produced the human
superorganism.

So far I have dipped into the opening pages of Maitland's introduction to his
translation of Gierke's work. Already I have dragged pages of content out and rattled
on about my own thoughts on the content of the ideas expressed. The fact is that the
whole of Gierke's work is relevant, all we want, however, is to dip in and find
evidence of the real relevance of the idea of society as an organism and the fact that in
order to devise laws to create a social structure that would deliver social order on a
grand scale, it was necessary to think in terms of organic form.
As I read Barker's contribution to the English language version of Gierke's
work I was already writing this work, and as a result I marked a couple of large junks
that seemed to be jam packed with the stuff we were in need of. Consequently, I have
decided to go straight to these pieces of work and present them here, and to go from
there.
 Barker

'Political science has thus for many centuries largely spoken the
language of law, and mainly of Roman law. (Natural Law, as we shall
presently see, is the term which theorists often used to grace their measure; but
Natural Law, as we shall also see, is itself a conception of the Roman
lawyers.) But what, we may ask, is the conception which we may properly
form to-day, in our present state of experience and opinion, about the relation
between political science and law? We may begin our enquiry by drawing a
distinction between Society and the State. Society, or community, which in
our modern life takes the form of national society or community, is a naturally
given fact of historical experience. Each national society is a unity; and each
expresses its unity in a common way of looking at life in the light of a
common tradition, and in the development of a common culture, or way of
life, in all its various forms. But each society is also a plurality. It is a rich
web of contained groupsreligious and educational; professional and
occupational; some for pleasure and some for profit; some based on
neighbourhood and some on some other affinity; all dyed by the national
colour, and yet all (or most of them) with the capacity, and the instinct, for
associating themselves with similar groups in other national societies, and thus
entering into some form of international connection. Such is society, at once
one and many, but always, in itself, the play of a voluntary life and the
operation of the voluntary activity of man. This is the material on which there
is stamped the form of the State. The State, we may say, is a national society
which has turned itself into a legal association, or a juridical organisation, by
virtue of a legal act and deed called a constitution, which is henceforth the
norm and standard (and therefore the 'Sovereign') of such association or
organisation. This constitution need not be a single document: it may be a set
of historical documents; and over and above that it may also be a set of
unwritten constitutional conventions, backing and reinforcing whatever
documents there be. Constituted by and under this constitution, and thus
created by a legal act (or series of acts), the State exists to perform the legal or
juridical purpose for which it was constituted. It declares and enforces,
subject to the primary rule of the constitution, a body of secondary rules, or
system of ordinary law, which regulates the relations of its members as 'legal
persons' (a term to which we must recur in a later section), and assigns these
'persons' the rights and duties which form their 'legal personality'. It creates a
scheme of working relations, in such areas of life as are susceptible of uniform
and compulsory regulation, and it calls this scheme by the name of law: it
creates a position for each member under the scheme, and it calls that position
by the name of rights and duties. Law is the method of its operation: the rights
and duties of 'persons' (which, as we shall see later, may be individuals or
groups) are the objects of its operation. But though the State, and with it law,
and with law the compulsory regulation of human relations in certain areas,
has supervened, as it were, upon Society, Society still remains. If Society has
turned itself into a legal association, it has not turned the whole of itself into
that form; nor has it perished in producing the State. It still remains, with its
common way of looking at life, engaged in the development of its common
 culture: it still includes its rich web of groups, which may still pursue their
voluntary activities in the social area not regulated by law. Behind the
organised legal State there runs the life of national society; and there is thus a
rich country stretching outside the four walls of State-regulated life.
Before we seek to study the relation between law and political theory
on the basis of these ideas, we may pause to enquire, for a moment, into
Gierke's own conception of the relation between Society and the State.
Gesellschaft, in his vocabulary, is the sum total of human groupings, and the
general and comprehensive expression of human associations. It ranges from
the universal society of all humanity down to the village and the family in the
village. From this point of view the State is one of the forms of Gesellschaft;
and you may thus have a general theory of Gesellschaft which colours and
determines your view of the State. So far as this goes, the State is just a circle
in a series of concentric circles. But Gierke seems also to have another point
of view; and this point of view appears to be dominant. From this point of
view, the State shifts into the centre. All other groups are arranged according
to the relation in which they stand to it. There are some groups which are in
the State; there are others which are side by side with it (the Church being the
only example): there are others (such as federations and the general
international society of States) which are above itthough it is not made very
clear whether this means simply that they are larger, or whether it means that
they are superior. So far as this goes, the State seems to hold the interior lines.
But there is still another point of view which also has to be taken into account.
We have to remember Gierke's fundamental belief in the reality of the Group-
person. On this basis the State becomes a real person; but so also do those
groups in the State which are more than mere partnerships or simple
collections of individual persons; and so, again, does the Church, as a group
which stands side by side with the State. One real Group-person may
somehow be greater and more authoritative than another; but so far as they are
all 'real', they all seem to be on a level. It is hardly clear how Gierke really
conceives the relation of State and Society. But on the whole he seems to
regard the State as a force controlling and regulating society and its various
groups; and he is anxious that it should do its shaping liberally, recognising, in
its regulation of groups, that it is regulating 'real persons'.'

(Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, Otto Gierke, translated
by Ernest Barker, Cambridge University Press 1934, page xxii - xxiv)

This section shows the organic idea of human nature trying to burst through
the veil of linguistic perception which creates political authority. The authority so
created by a veil of linguistic perception acts as a constraint laid upon a true
interpretation of what is perceived. This authority is ultimately that which constitutes
the theocracy, for it is always ultimately religious in nature, and feeds back to the
preservation of the sanctity of divine knowledge. This veil must disappear, causing
the authority to evaporate which makes the theocracy exist, if a true and proper
account, a sociological account, that is genuinely scientific in its nature, is to be given
of the nature of the relationship that is here being dealt with, that between the state
and society.
Despite the confusion surrounding the manner in which the matter is discussed
it is still nice to see the notion of circles within circles, a concentric arrangement,
arising naturally from an attempt to comprehend social structure in the above passage.
The confused presentation nonetheless represents the true state of affairs that we find
in nature. Thus using the concentric model of social groups to guide our thinking it
follows that the group, or circle, with the most power forms the widest circle, and this
makes this elite group the most exclusive group, which means it must be the circle
containing the smallest number of individuals. In any organisation this model applies,
the cabinet in government comprises sixteen people in an assembly of some six
hundred. The board of directors in a multinational corporation comprises a small
number of people who are nonetheless, as employees, just one member of staff out of
tens of thousands. Thus the widest circle of influence, that of the reach of authority,
is always focused upon a central core, an inner circle.

The Analogy Excuse

Barker is ridiculing Gierke here by pointing out this contradiction and then
saying we cannot imagine how Gierke really conceived the relationship between the
state and society. It may well be that Gierke did not give a proper account, but apart
from me no one ever has. It is obvious enough from this description that we are on
the right track and if Barker, or anyone else, cared to make the correct conclusions,
and state them, they could do it. But at the same time Gierke should indeed of made
the matter plain, but as Barker explains the crucial piece of the jigsaw, the relationship
between the state and the church, was never published.
It appears that the impulse to use an organic model to describe social forms
does not constitute enough of an impetus to oblige people to think coherently on this
matter. The problem is linguistic mechanism of analogy. This mechanism involves
calling things that are real, that apply to humans, and would therefore reduce humans
to a level status with all living things, analogies. From this it follows that the meaning
of the word artificial is artificially applied to the analogy by substituting the meaning
of artificial for the meaning of the word analogy. There are legitimate analogies,
humans may be considered to be machines, since the invention of the machine, and
insects like ants can be likened to robots, since the invention of the idea of a robot in
the 1920's. But living things are not machines, and machines are not organisms.
Thus when we swap between the two it is for purposes of illustration to get an idea
across. But this kind of linguistic fabrication is a gift for the person who wants to
weave a false image of reality by making a double back on the application of their
example. Thus we see that society is like an organism, we describe it as such,
because we simply cannot comprehend it in any other way, and then, since we do not
want to say society is an organism, we say that this true picture of society as being an
organism is an analogy; which it patently is not.
In this case something natural, the idea that society is an organism, is being
described as something artificial, something that only exists because people have
made it. We have already seen that there is no such thing as an artificial thing, all
things are made by nature. When we use the term artificial we are merely recognising
a genuine category of things and giving them a special name that suits out theological
identity programme that dictates how we will think about existence. Artificial things
are merely things that constitute part of the inner being of the superorganism but the
exoskeletal structure relative to our status as individual beings. All ideas are artificial
therefore, they constitute the mind of the organism, only some ideas are true, about
physical reality, others are false, about corporate identity. The collective mind has a
conception of itself which is imbued into us and provides us with our personal sense
of self consciousness. Thus I know things about myself such as my name, and my
address, and who my family is and where they live. The corporate being knows
things about itself such as its divine status and the uniqueness of its being. When the
collective mind considers the problem of who it is in the world it learns to see itself as
distinct and whenever the issue arises it works out ways of expressing this idea, the
word individual, artificial, analogy, are just three simple, but powerful units of
linguistic image fabrication that define the corporate self which we individuals then
see, and can only see, by using according to the dictates of the priests who weave the
fabric from the language that has evolved over time to create the organic form that is
the superorganism which we all belong to.
This notion of the corporate being having a mind, consciousness, and a sense
of self has just come to me as I wrote the above, I like the sound of it, but I had better
not leave it there. For a start it smacks of the poor thinking we see all the time in
those who have favoured the idea of society as an organism and it is central to the
account we are presently dealing with where the lawyers were keen to play with the
idea of the group-person. I do not have in mind anything remotely like this, I am not
trying to impose our sense of self on the superorganism. I am pleased with this idea,
as I have expressed it, because it recognises the fact that all living entities have a
sense of self integral to their living nature, this is perhaps the best attribute of life, self
sensing, awareness of self. It might be argued that inanimate matter is self sensing in
the sense that it forms bonds so that water molecules, for example, unite to form
water. But if we assume a degree of complex structure, just enough to be a bacterium
say, then we have something quite different to the attractive forces present in water,
we have something which must be able to identify itself in order to feed or reproduce.
And it is some such kind of self awareness that I am asserting must be present in the
superorganism, just by virtue of its existence.
Since the human organism as we know it today is the product of linguistic
information in the most immediate aspects in which we are aware of it, the only way
the human organism can know itself is via the flux of linguistic information
ceaselessly pulsing through every fibre of its fabric. The linguistic fabric is a skin
covering the underlying physiology which has substructures of the same nature of
language, that exist to create the superorganic form, this is the genetic inheritance
which makes for racial form, and such like mediums of identity. Individuals must be
imbued with the linguistic impulse which automatically defines them as
simultaneously both receptors and mediators of the message of identity which
constitutes the superorganism self knowledge. Individuals then think their possession
of corporate identity in the form of the corporate being's self knowledge is their own
personal self knowledge, but this is clearly not the case. And that it is not the case is
all too evident when we look at the nature of the corporate identity that is imbued into
individuals, by which I mean the extraordinarily bizarre religious formulas people
sustain as identity programmes.
But the real subtlety in this argument comes from recognising the detail of the
linguistic code which is the real medium of identity. It is easy to see that all religious
ideas are complete and utter nonsense, and it is possible to discuss this, and while
some people are liable to become obsessed with religion, many just accept it as a
necessary aspect of life and do not get carried away with the idiocy of the ideas. On
this basis, the ability to be detached and pragmatic about the bizarre knowledge of
religion, it is easy to dismiss the idea that we are all controlled in our thinking by a
collective mind, but the point is that if this were so, it goes without saying the
corporate mind and our own mind would be seamlessly united into one and we would
have no way to recognise it. This is in fact the case, and the means by which this
harmonisation is achieved by evolution is the physiology of language which gives us
a form that is imbued with the corporate mind as we become integrated into the
corporate being during our acquisition of language and the linguistic product, culture.
But how are we to recognise this fact? The answer has already been given.
We decoded the words that control the way we think. Words like artificial are shown
to be completely fraudulent once we know the truth about our own nature. We begin
to gain this insight once we start by decoding the easier mythological words like God,
which we know is the code word for superorganism. But now we see that the game
gets so much more complex, words like analogy, are perfectly valid, but having been
established as part of a developed intellectual tradition, they transform into perfect
mediums of the idea of artificiality, which we have just recognised is a false word in
the first place! Thus the new words with real meaning come into being and play a
role of distancing our ability to past the linguistic veil that our language imposes upon
us. Thus the veil develops depth, opacity, and colour. It becomes a beautiful thing,
we love it, we know it, it is us.
Except, it isn't, it is the superbeing imposing itself upon our consciousness,
and in doing this the superorganism knows itself, it knows itself because it makes
each of us a part of itself, this is what makes the Super Being real. And religious
mythology carries this image, passes it to us, and this is why religion becomes the all
powerful medium of identity that it is. And while we may recognise the obscene
silliness of religious ideology easily enough if we care to, we do not see that the
words we use are equally silly. Now I have explained the matter however, we can ask
of the most sensible words, such as artificial, why do we use this word when there are
no such things as artificial things, all things are made by Nature? Of course if you
insist upon adhering to the strictly theistic line that there is such a thing as an
individual and these individuals, what is more, are the be all and end all of existence,
so that society exists only to serve the requirements of the individuals who choose that
society exists in a form which fulfils them, then you will refuse to accept the premise
on which I am arguing. But it follows that if there is no such thing as an individual, if
the human animal is a superorganism and all their creations are just exoskeletal
material produced according to rules that run from the genetic foundations through the
linguistic extension of information, then it follows that these misleading words, which
are in truth nonsensical, exist for exactly the same reason that the mythologies they
support and sustain exist, to create a collective consciousness. We can then ask why
we use stupid words like 'artificial' with as much disdain as we ask why must sustain
such stupid ideologies as those of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the social
structures which go along with them.
If the message changes the identity changes. A change of identity represents
the death of the superorganism. The Druidic organism is dead, killed by the Romans.
The Ancient Egyptian, possibly the most long lived superorganism, the Inca, the
identity of these beings, in linguistic terms is dead, their identity message is therefore
deceased, no longer being broadcast. Only Judaism is emitted in each of the
territories occupied by these dead organisms, some them once vast superorganisms.
There is an interesting paragraph in Durkheim's work on methodology which
concerns this matter, but we will look at this in a little while.
This issue, the nature of life that is at the heart of the science of biology, came
to the fore during the nineteenth century, because of the advance of science, this is
why we see the rise of the organic idea in the consciousness of people. As is made
plain by Darwin's publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, by the work of
Spencer used in this present work, by that of Ouspensky who is driven to construct an
elaborate model of organic analogies to extend the organic logic of his mythological
mind set which uses analogies, or linguistic programmes, that go back to some of the
earliest known records of civilisation. We even find in Durkheim's first work on The
Division of Labour in Society, a discussion that uses the idea of society as an organic
structure, something we will consider briefly, shortly.

Despite the organic nature of the model Gierke is providing, and the whole
philosophy of Super Being with which Gierke is concerned, it appears he had no
actually organic conception of society. It is for this reason, the failure to grasp that
humans are a superorganic organism, just as ants are, where the relationship of the
core to the outer limit is one of the queen to the nest, where the core forms a physical
concentration of identity that is disseminated outward to embrace all under the same
authority, that he failed to meet the confusion Barker complains of, and so fails to
give us the solution we need when seeking to understand how society can be a true
living organism as Gierke, according to Barker, insisted it was.
Groups are in effect organs of a body, this fact does find expression in the way
Gierke presents his idea. But if we get to grips with this idea properly we should
recognise that while linear models are the way we work in order to develop our
models of society, giving us a two dimensional conception of concentric organisation
according to a hierarchy of power, the must be a real form which must be three
dimensional. This real form should be understood in terms of distinct groups
constituting physical units in structural arrangement such as Spencer describes where
we have differentiation based on interlocking dependence. This interdependence
being united under an authority that arises from one focal organ, or group, wherefrom
arises identity toward which obedience is offered in acceptance of authority.
With the conception of society as an organism like any other, rather than an
organism like a unique individual person, it becomes self evident that we are seeking
an ultimate identity resident at the core of the model which motivates the outer rings
all the way from the centre to the edge. We are not therefore looking for an ultimate
physical entity such as the State. This is the same in the case of a physical body such
as that which we each constitute as individuals. The body has a structural
arrangement of parts which can be described on a hierarchical basis according to the
centrality of their role in the maintenance of the life of the body as a whole. Such a
scheme could then be described as a concentric model with the highest value organs
being located at the centre. But we would look to the one core centre of command
that informed the whole hierarchical structure, and, coming back to the social context,
we would see that the reason the state cannot shake of the existence of the church as
an apparently competing structural entity is because in truth it is the church that stands
alone as the 'soul', or identity, or mind, or consciousness, of the organism. Whereas,
at best, the state, as a physical entity, can only be considered a brain plus nervous
system, an organ in other words. Obviously our minds cannot be separated from our
brains, although amazingly enough this very idea is a tenet of Jewish belief that gives
rise to all the nonsense about a soul, a spiritual force, a life beyond death!
It is the act not the being that makes a thing what it is. A pen is just an inert
piece of matter until it writes at the behest of an intelligence. A brain is just a piece of
grey organic matter unless it is alive. We must suppose then, that a state is simple an
institutional structure unless it is used by a motivating force, by Zionism, to achieve a
purpose, such as world domination. That is the way Nature made the deal, it is
nothing else. People do not carry a state or national identity constituting the ultimate
circle it is, bounded by the physical limit of territory, and the language and culture,
contained within inside their beings as the ultimate expression of identity. National
identity, like racial, or tribal identity, is an important attribute of corporate identity,
but these structures are just that, structural elements, they act more as means of
limiting the extension of identity and thus aiding in the cementation of the living
tissue into the structure of the exoskeleton.
In an age of global theism only religious identity has no territorial limit.
Physical boundaries are impervious to religion and this is why we see the Diaspora of
Judaism acting as the organic carriers of the core identity, the neural network of the
command structure, enabled to disperse through the exoskeleton of the extended
reaches of the organism that the Jewish identity has given rise to by creating two sub-
identity programmes which create their own characteristic exoskeletal structures
within which Jews are able to exist in small numbers, while preserving microcosms of
their own essential exoskeletal structures too, such as their synagogue and law courts
and so on. Within the Christian and Moslem tissue of the Jewish superorganism that
Jewish tissue forms a nervous tissue network, and where the Jewish tissue
concentrates, as in America, here the focus of this nervous tissue becomes especially
dense and functions like a brain centre, which is exactly what we see in actual fact
with the American continent, despite the modern age of knowledge being the most
debased and degraded of al societies in the world today for its passionate expression
of religious fervour which makes the people the most abject tool of the Jewish core
organ that is ensconced within the centre of global power, from which it draws wealth
to achieve its goal of world domination under Jerusalem. All these features of the
human social world are thus easily accounted for by a purely biological model of
human nature once we know that human nature is corporate, evolved to form an
organism at the social level.

The Major Exposition of Barker on the State of Super Being

Here we must pause to draw a distinction. It is one thing to plead the cause of
liberty of associations: it is another thingor at any rate it is a further thing, and an
added considerationto plead that associations are beings or minds or real persons. If
we confine ourselves to the simple ground of liberty of association, there is much that
we shall admit, or rather claim, even on that simple ground. We can argue that liberty
of association was impeded in Germany by the law of imperialist Rome, especially in
the expanded (or should we say tightened?) form in which it had come to be
interpreted by the Romanist lawyers, who turned the scattered dicta to be found in
Roman law into a body of doctrine that might sometimes have amazed Justinian's
advisers. We can argue that the modern State should lay a cool and easy hand on the
formation and action of associationsnot limiting their formation by making a
specific concession necessary in each case, and not tying their action down within the
limits of such concession. We can admit that our English State, in a casual and
haphazard way, and largely owing to the growth of our 'equitable' law of trusts, which
has enabled associations to form themselves and to act behind the screen of trustees,
has been generally easy-handed, though it has sometimes taken away with the right
hand of the common law much of what it had conceded with the left hand of equity.
We can equally admit that the various States of Germany afforded no such shelter;
that associations here had to face the inquisitive eye of government unsheltered by
any screen; and that a general theory which would protect liberty of association was a
more urgent necessity in Germany than it has ever been in England.
What was that general theory to be? Was it possible to find a theoretical basis
for liberty of association, without recourse to a doctrine of the real personality of
groups? In imagination we may frame for ourselves an answer to the first of these
questions, which will enable us also to answer the second, and to answer it in the
affirmative. We may say that the modern State, which is based on the consent of the
governed and respects the liberty of individuals, is bound by its very nature to
acknowledge the liberty of individuals to associate with one another, provided that the
purpose of such association is compatible with its own purpose and well-being as the
general and comprehensive association of all individuals. We may go further, and we
may say that the acknowledgment of liberty of association should be expressed in a
general law of associations, which translates the principle into detail and formulates
its consequences. The historical State, as it has grown in time, has scattered its rules
about associations under different heads, according to the accidents of its growth: it
may even have deposited discrepant rules in different branches of its lawGermanist
rules which conflict with Romanist; rules of equity which diverge from the rules of
common law. The modern State, as it stands to-day, may well unify these rules, and
unify them in view of its own developed character as a free association of free
individuals.
Such an answer to the problem of associations may be accused of doctrinaire
and individualistic liberalism. Associations, it may be said, are something more than
a liberty of individuals to associate: they are entities in themselves, or at any rate they
become such entities in the course of their development. To explain their freedom by
the freedom of individuals to associate with one another is to leave them without
either body or animating soul: it is to dissolve their life into a lifeless nexus of
contractual relations between the associated members, and to forget the pulsation of a
common purpose which surges, as it were from above, into the mind and behaviour of
the members of any true group. Whether or no we pin our own faith to such a view,
we may recognise that it was natural to a German thinker in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. 'You who live to the west of the Rhine', he might say, 'with your
democratic States which themselves seem to rest on a basis of contract, may talk of
groups in generalnot only your State, but also your churches and colleges and all
sorts of unionsas the products of freedom of contract. We live to the east of the
Rhine, and we live in our own German world. Our State is interpreted to us as a mind
and a personality; and if we do not ascribe to our groups some mind and personality,
where will they be, in the face of this great spiritual Leviathan? We have no
protecting screen of trustees to shelter our groups; and the heat of the State is a fiery
heat. Unless we make them real in the same sort of way as our State is interpreted as
being real, they will hardly survive at all. Our German form of liberalism must be the
vindication of the reality of the group: that is our one way of saving some sort of
liberty, other than the liberty of the State to be what it likes and to do what it will. For
this reason we can claim the sympathy, and expect the support, of you who are
western Liberals. Surely you will recognise that our groups must have real
personality if they are to have any real libertyany power of owning funds and
pursuing policies and moving at large as free agents in the general world of action?'
The problem of liberty of association thus carries us forward, after all, into the
problem of the real personality of associations. Is an association, then, a 'reality', an
'organism', a 'personality'? Reality, we may reply, is a term of high metaphysics; and
it lies beyond our scope. Organism is a term of biology, or, at the most, of biological
metaphor; but our business is with human society, and before we seek to walk by the
uncertain and lunar light of biological metaphor, we must study the essential language
which is proper to such society. Personality is a term which belongs to that essential
language. It is a term of psychology, of ethics, and of law; and since political science
is vitally connected with those studies, it is also a term of political science. We may
therefore address ourselves to that term: we may seek to define its exact connotation;
and in the light of such definition we may then be able to suggest in what sense a
Groupa State, a Church, a Trade Union, a college, a clubmay properly be
described as a person.

There are three main senses in which we use the term ' personality'; and they
correspond to the three studies of psychology, ethics and law. In the first place, there
is psychological personality. By this we mean, primarily, the power or capacity of
self-consciousness which belongs to a sentient being aware of its own sensations. We
also mean, secondarily, a power or capacity of self-determination, by considerations
of pleasure and pain, which arises from such self-consciousness, and turns it into a
higher activity than its primary activity of awareness. Psychological personality, by its
nature, is resident in an individual being who is a focus and centre of sentiency. In
the second place, there is moral personality. Here we come upon a term which has
had two historic usages, and by which we are therefore apt to be perplexed. In its first
and intrinsic usage, it signifies the power or capacity of a self-conscious and rational
being to determine himself, not by temporary and particular considerations of pleasure
and pain, but by permanent and universal considerations of a right way of conducting
life which is common to all such beings. Moral personality, in this sense, is built upon
psychological personality; but it transcends that upon which it is built. Like
psychological personality, it is resident in the individual being; but it is only resident
in him in so far as he recognises that he is not unique, but shares with his fellows a
common life and common rules of life. But besides this first and intrinsic usage, there
has been another usage of the term 'moral personality'. It has been used, by many
legal writers, as a term of law. It has been used, without any ethical implication, to
signify the legal power or capacity of a group, which, without being a 'natural' or
'physical' person, acts in the same sort of way as such a person in the sphere of legal
action. Here the word moral is used in much the same sense as when we speak of a
moral certainty or a moral victory. We need not quarrel with the usage, provided that
we are clear that it is peculiar, and that it belongs exclusively to the sphere of law; but
in our own argument the term moral personality will be confined to what we have
called its first and intrinsic usage. It will be a term of ethics, and of ethics only. It
will denote the power or capacity of moral action.
There is a third use of the term personality, which belongs to the sphere of
law. Legal personality, as distinct from psychological and ethical personality, is a
power or capacity for legal actiona capacity recognised by law (and only existing
when recognised by law) for originating such action as belongs to the scheme of law.
From this point of view the existence of legal personality not only presupposes, as
that of moral personality does, the presence of human society: it also presupposes the
presence of an organised legal association. It is a thing bound up with rights; in fact it
is a capacity for rights; and rights, in the full sense of the word, are only possible in
such an association. Now rights may belong, and obviously do belong, to groups as
well as to individuals. In the field of the organised legal association we must
therefore assign legal personality to groups as well as to individuals, and here we have
to admit that there are Group-persons as well as individual persons. Legal personality
differs from psychological and moral personality: it is not only resident in individual
beings: it is also resident in any group of such beings which serves, in the legal
sphere, as a single entity. To discover the exact nature, or being, or essence, of this
entity may be difficult; but the fact of its existence is obvious. The organised legal
association itselfin other words, the Stateis an entity which possesses and
exercises rights, and to which we must therefore ascribe a legal personality. In brief,
the State is a legal person, or, as the Germans say, a 'Subject'. Similarly many of the
groups contained in the State are legal persons. They have a capacity for rights; and a
capacity for rights means a legal personality.
In the area of the organised legal association, and under the category of legal
personality which belongs to that area, we have thus to reckon with the fact that there
are Group-persons as well as individual persons. The association itself, as the great
and inclusive group, is a Group-person: contained groups, in so far as they own and
exercise rights, are group-persons; and both these 'clusters' or constellations of
personality, the one great and the many lesser, exist by the side of the innumerable
'points' of individual personality. How are we to conceive the being and the essence
of these Group-persons? The individual himself, as a 'point' of personality, is simple.
He is essentially onea single psychological and moral person who also acts as a
single legal person. But the 'cluster' or group is complex, or at any rate twofold. It is
both 'itself' (whatever that may be) and all the individuals of which it is composed.
How can it be both, at one and the same time? How does its unity stand related to its
multiplicity?

We may note some three different answers to this question which recur, like
different and dissonant notes, in the pages of Gierke's argument. The first answer
takes the form of the Fiction theory. According to this theory, the real fact behind the
existence of a legal group is the fact of the many individuals of which it is composed,
and the unity of such a group is only a pretence or fiction. When the group acts as
one, and enjoys rights as a single person, that person is only a persona ficta; and if it
be asked who it is that pretends or feigns this person into its fictitious existence, the
answer will be that the State, or, more exactly, the sovereign of the State, is the great
and magnificent maker of fictions. The Fiction theory may also be termed the
Concession theory; or at any rate we may say that it leads, by a natural descent, to the
idea that the unity of a legal group is due to an act of concession by the authority of
the State. We may also note a further variant of the Fiction theory. This is the theory
of the 'Moral' person, which has already been mentioned incidentally. According to
this theory a group which acts as one, and enjoys rights as a single person, should
properly be described as a persona moralis. But it is far from clear that the change of
adjective, from ficta to moralis, imports any change of tense, or gives us any new
light. The adjective 'moral' is only used in a negative sense, as the antithesis of
'natural' or 'physical'. It only suggests that a legal group is something which is
somehow different from the natural and physical fact of a corporeal human being.
And the danger of the adjective is twofold. On the one hand it blurs the old (though
possibly erroneous) distinction between real and fictitious persons by the suggestion
of a dim interlunar person which is neither. On the other hand it encourages a
confusion of thought which turns the 'moral person' into something ethical and good;
and Rousseau, in his theory of the personne morale whose general will is always
right, seems to fall into this confusion.
 A second answer to our problem is provided by the Collective theory.
According to this theory we need not concern ourselves to discover the unity of a
Group-person, whether in the pretence of a persona ficta or in the semi-pretence of a
persona moralis. Such a thing as a single Group-person does not exist at all, even in a
fictitious or semi-fictitious form. The one fact is a number of persons; and this
number of persons (let us say, exempli gratia, 100) are not united in any genuine unity
when they act as a groupthey are simply collected in an aggregate, as when we
collect arithmetical figures in a sum, or algebraical symbols in a bracket. A group of
100 is 1 + 1 + 1, until we reach the sum 100. The legal instrument of manipulation,
for the purpose of collecting a number of individuals in a single aggregate, is contract.
It is contract which unites the first individual to the second, the second to the third,
and so on to the hundredth individual. We may therefore call this theory a theory of
the Collective contract, or again we may call it, as Maitland has done, in the language
of mathematical metaphor, the Bracket theory. There is a variant of this theory which
at first sight seems not merely a variant, but something totally different, and yet, in
reality, rests on the same fundamental basis. This is what Gierke calls the
Representative theory. According to this theory a group of 100 persons is something
more than 100 persons collected together by contract. It is really 99 represented
persons plus a hundredth person who is then: representative, and who has been
appointed to his position by the act and deed of each of the 99. This representative
person carries in himself the persons of the 99: in his person they become one person;
and unity thus supervenes, or seems to supervene, on multiplicity. In reality,
however, the Representative theory is simply the Collective theory taken at two bites.
Contract, and addition of units achieved by process of contract, is still its basis. The
99 first contract, by one sort of contract, with one another; and they then contract, by
another sort, with a hundredth person. The whole group of 100 persons remains a
contractual group; and although Hobbes, the great apostle of this Representative
theory, may argue that his Leviathan is a creative essence of unity, transcending the
sphere of contract, Leviathan is himself, after all, included in a contractual bracket,
and it is this including bracket of contract which really creates such unity as Leviathan
himself appears, but only appears, to provide.
We come to the third of the theories which seek to explain the inner core of
legal Group-persons. This is Gierke's own theorythe theory of the reality of the
Group-person. When we seek to discover what lies behind the legal Group-person,
and constitutes its inner core, we must not talk of 'fictions' which hover in a shadowy
and unreal existence above a number of real individuals; we must not talk of
'collections' or 'brackets' or contractual nets, flung over so many individuals to bind
them one to another in the bonds of an impersonal nexus. We must purge our eyes to
see something which is real and not fictitioussomething which has living
personality, and is not an impersonal nexus. We must believe that there really exists,
in the nature of things itself, such a thing as a real Group-person, with a real being or
essence which is the same in kind as that of the individuals who are its members.
'Itself can will, itself can act', in the same way that they will and act. When 100
persons unite to form a group which wills and acts as one, we must say that there is a
real new person presentthe hundred and first person, the super-personin which
these 100 individuals live and have their being, at the same time that they also
continue to live and have their being as so many separate persons. Behind the legal
Group-person there is therefore a real Group-being, just as there is a real individual
human being behind the individual legal person. Legal group-personality is the
shadow cast by real group-personality: it is the reflection of reality in the mirror of
law. The law does not write fiction, and it does not do sums in addition, when it
introduces its legal Group-persons; it simply paints, to the best of its power, a legal
portrait of a real being. This was the view which Gierke sought to express in his
rectorial address of 1902 on the 'Nature of Human Groups'. It is best expressed in his
own words; and we may therefore quote some essential paragraphs from that address.
'Do social life-unities actually exist? No direct proof of their existence can be
given; but it is equally impossible to prove directly the existence of any individual
life-unity. We can furnish, however, an indirect argument for the existence of such
unities by pointing to their effects. The cogency of such a method of argument will
not be the same for all. Its weight will depend in part on our general attitude to life.
But even the foundations of scientific investigation which seem to be fixed most
firmly are only, in the last resort, well-grounded hypotheses.
'Primarily, it is our external experience which impels us to assume the
existence of active and effective group-unities. We find from our observation of the
social processes among which our life is spentand, above all, from any profound
study of the history of humanitythat nations and other communities determine by
their activities the balance of forces in our world, and produce our material and
spiritual civilisation. Now just because communities are composed of individuals, we
must admit that it is in individuals, and through individuals, that these results are
produced. But since the contributions of individuals are involved in the social nexus
in which they live and move, we must equally acknowledge that individuals are
affected by bodily and mental influences which arise from the fact of their connection.
We observe, it is true, that certain outstanding individuals intervene creatively, and
modify society by something unique which is derived from them and them only. But
an achievement of this nature is only possible when the community, at the very least,
co-operates receptively, by appropriating as its own the individual element which has
been imported into it. It is possible to hold very different opinions about the extent to
which the active force, which has been operative in great transformations of the
common life, proceeds from groups or from individuals. But whether we prostrate
ourselves in a one-sided worship of "Heroes", or abandon ourselves to an equally one-
sided "collective" view of history, we can never be blind to the fact that there is a
constant interaction between the two factors. In any case, therefore, the community is
something active and effective. Now the effects which we are obliged to ascribe to
the community are so constituted, that they cannot be explained as the result of a mere
aggregation of individual elements. They cannot be produced separately by separate
human beings, in such a way that the total contribution can be regarded as a sum
which is similar in kind to the partial contributions, and only greater in degree: they
are sui generis. We have only to consider phenomena such as the organisation of
power, or law, or the social code (Sitte), or national economy (Volkswirthschaft), or
language, in order to realise this fact at once. If this is true of the effects, then it
follows that the community which produces them must also be something different
from the sum of the individuals who constitute it. It must be a Whole, with a life-
unity which is itself super-individual. We do not, therefore, transcend in any way the
limits of our external experience, if we argue from the facts of the history of
civilisation to the existence of real group-unities. The abstract conception of real
group-unity, which we attain by emphasising the efficient cause we have thus
discovered, is a conception which we are justified in applying, as an axiomatic
scientific conception, in the whole range of the social sciences.
' Our internal experience corroborates the truth which we learn from external
experience. We discover the reality of the community in our own inner consciousness,
as well as in the world of external fact. The incorporation of our Ego in a social
Being of a higher order is a matter of our own inner life. We are conscious of our self
as a being enclosed in itself; but we are also conscious of our self as a part of a living
whole which is operative in us. If we abstract our membership of our particular
nation and State, our religious community and Church, our family and a variety of
other groups and associations, we cannot recognise ourselves in the pitiable residue.
But if we reflect on all these factors, we see that there is here no question of merely
external bonds and fetters by which we are chained. It is a matter of psychical
connections which extend down into our inmost being, and constitute integral parts of
our spiritual existence. We feel that a part of the impulses which determine our
activity proceeds from the communities by which we are permeated. We are
conscious that we share in a life of community. If we derive from our internal
experience a certainty of the reality of our Ego, this certainty is not limited to the fact
of our being an individual life-unity: it also extends to the fact of our being a part-
unity within the higher life-unities. It is true that we cannot discover these higher life-
unities themselves within our consciousness. The Whole cannot be within us, because
we are only parts of the Whole. We can only learn directly from our internal
experience the simple fact that group-unities exist: we cannot learn from it directly
anything about their character. Indirectly, however, we can deduce, from the effects
of communities upon us, the conclusion that social Wholes are of a corporeal-spiritual
nature. We can do so because these effects consist of spiritual processes which are
corporeally mediated. This is the reason why we speak, not only of social "bodies"
and their "members", but also of the folk-soul, folk-feeling, folk-opinion and folk-
willof class-spirit (Standesgeist), esprit de corps, family-feeling and the like. We
use these terms to denote psychical forces with an active life and a reality which are
not least present to our consciousness in the very moment when, calling our
individuality into play, we rise in revolt against them. In our ordinary daily life any
effort of attentive introspection will suffice to convince us of the existence of these
spiritual forces. But there are times when the spirit of the community reveals itself to
us with an elemental power, in an almost visible shape, filling and mastering our
inward being to such an extent that we are hardly any longer conscious of our
individual existence, as such. Here, in Berlin, in the Unter den Linden, I lived
through such an hour of consecration on the 15th of July, in the year 1870.' ¹

(¹ On July 13th, William I of Prussia had interviewed the French envoy, Benedetti, at
Ems. He sent a telegram describing the events of the 13th to Bismarck. Bismarck
published the telegram, in a condensed form which he had prepared for the press. The
effect of the publication on German opinion was instantaneous, and produced a
profound emotion. It is this emotion which Gierke describes. It is also this emotion
which serves for him as evidence of the existence of a spiritual reality, or personality,
which transcends the individual.)

We have now traversed three territories in our study of the different theories of
the Group-personthe territory of the Fiction; the territory of the contractual
Collection; the territory of Real Group-personality. Shall we settle down in any of the
three, or may we explore still further? Gierke has spoken, in a passage of some irony,
of 'the eye resolved upon "reality" which refuses to recognise, in the living and
permanent unity of the existence of a People, anything more than an unsubstantial
shadow'. But perhaps the eye which is resolved upon realitywhich seeks, in other
words, to face the really perceived facts of actual life, and to square its theories with
these facts may discover something which is more than an unsubstantial shadow,
and yet less than real Group-personality; something above a fiction or a collection,
and yet less than a super-person. If we seek to explore new territory in this spirit, we
may begin our argument from a distinction which has already been assumed in a
previous passagethe distinction between Society and the State. A Society is a
community of human beings who seek to fulfil the general purposes of human life in
all its aspects. A State is an association of the same beings, in legal form, for the
specific purpose of regulating human life, in the sphere of external action, by rules
designed to secure the minimum of friction between its members and the maximum of
their development. The State is a sphere of legal action: we may even call it the scene
of a legal drama (a ????? involving a common and concerted performance of parts). It
is a place of legal actors, all of whom play a role, and each of whom may be called a
dramatis persona. There is a sense in which we may say that all the State is a stage,
and all the agents within it are actors. In this sense it may be called artificial, like the
stage itself (and yet, like the stage, it holds a mirror up to nature); and in the same
sense those who walk across its boards may be called artificial persons.
In order to understand this sense, we must examine the term persona. In its
original meaning, the word was a term of the theatre. It signified a mask, appropriate
to the part performed by him, which was worn by an actor in a play. The usage of the
theatre was carried into the law. The agents who played an active part under its
scheme, or possessed a capacity for playing such a part, were regarded as having
personae, and came, by a natural transference, to be called personae themselves.
Now just as the parts in a play are created and assigned by the dramatist and the
producer, so we may hold that personae in law are created and assigned by similar
agencieslet us say, for the moment, by the legislator and the judge. And just as
there is an element of feigning, or even if artificiality, about the parts of a play, so
there is also an element of feigning, or even of artificiality, about personae in law.
They are, in a sense, juridical creations, or artifices, or fictions. The term persona
ficta is not altogether wrong (though, as we shall see, it is far from being the whole of
the truth), if we apply it to all forms of legal personalitynot only to the legal person
of the group, but also to the legal person of the individual. Pufendorf held this
doctrine, as we may see from the account which Gierke gives of his views. One of his
disciples, Titius, puts the matter simply, when he says that jurisprudence deals almost
exclusively with 'moral persons' (that is to say, artificial persons), whether they are
singular or compoundin other words, whether they are individuals or groups. It is
not the natural Ego which enters a court of law. It is a right-and-duty-bearing person,
created by the law, which appears before the law.
Legal personality, therefore, is a mask, or as Pufendorf says a modus, which is
created by an agency, and attached by that agency to an object. Two questions thus
arise. What is the creating and attaching agency, and by what processes does it act?
What are the objects to which the mask is attached?
In general terms, the creating agency which attaches personae to objects (or,
as a German writer would say, to 'Subjects') is the whole legal association. Every
person who is a person in the eye of the law is made such, in the last resort, by that
general body. In actual detail, the process of recognition will proceed along various
channels. Normally, the regular process will be that of legislation, accompanied and
applied by judicial interpretation. But the judge will not necessarily stop at an exact
interpretation of the mere letter of existing law. He may recognise legal personality
(at any rate when he is dealing with the matter of group-personality) on the ground of
analogy, assigning personae to bodies which are in an analogous position to those
already recognised under existing law. He may give recognition, again, on the ground
of custom and usage, arguing, like Julianus in the Digest, that inveterata consuetudo
pro lege non immerito custoditur, and acting on the principle that where a group has
been allowed by custom to act as a legal person, it may properly be treated as such by
law. One State will differ from another in the degree of liberality with which the gift
of legal personality is made. States will also differ (when the question is one of
Group-personality) in the number of masks or personae which they keep, as it were,
in stock. One State may only be able to provide the mask of full corporate
personality. It may only keep in stock the persona of the universitas; and since that
mask is hard to fit, and not suited for all, such a State may be chary in giving it.
Another State may be in the position of a Clarkson's shop: it may be a general
repertory of masks; and here Group-persons may abound because there are different
forms which they are able to assume. The English State, we may say, has been a State
of this latter character. It has not only supplied the mask of the Corporation: it has
also furnished the mask (we may even call it, with Maitland, the 'screen', because it
conceals a group so thoroughly) of the Trust and its body of trustees. In Germany,
when Gierke began to write, the State was less richly equipped: it was thus more
chary in giving; and it was also more rigorous in superintending what it had given.
We have dealt with the giving of masks: we have now to deal with the objects
to which they are given. So far, we may seem to have simply adopted the Concession
theory, which explains Group-personality as the grant of the State, and to have made
it even worse by making it cover individual persons as well as the persons of groups.
But just as we have argued that there is some truth, though by no means all, in the
Fiction theory, so we may also argue that there is some truth (though again it is not
the whole of the truth) in the cognate theory of Concession. There is a sense in which
all legal personality is a concession made by the State. But having said this we must
instantly ask ourselves whether the State is free to choose, at its own discretion, the
objects to which it concedes that personality; or whether it is not rather bound, by its
own very nature, to concede such personality to certain objects, in virtue of their
nature. After all, if masks are to fit and be worn and used, there must be appropriate
objects behind them. What is the nature of these objects? And which of them are
entitled, in virtue of their proper nature, to claim the award of legal personality?
Historically the State, in dealing with this problem, would seem to have acted
with no little arbitrariness. It has been chary of giving legal personality to individuals,
as well as to groups. For many centuries slaves had no legal personality. For many
centuries women had an inferior grade of personality. Even to-day the State seems to
pick and choose, within certain limits, the persons whom it consents to vest with full
legal personality. In France the penalty of 'civil death' may deprive an offender of
civil rights, and prevent him from being a person at all in the eye of the law. In other
countries the members of a racial minority may be visited with partial deprivation of
rights and the partial loss of legal personality. If individuals have thus been treated
with some latitude of discretion, we can hardly be astonished if the State has claimed
an even greater latitude in the award of legal personality to groups. Far from granting
such personality to all groups, it has often been tempted to limit it to a few. It has
judged the issue of giving or withholding the grant not by the inherent nature or the
just claims of the group, but by the prospect of advantage or menace to itself which
would follow on the giving or the withholding.
But if history seems to show that the State has exercised a power of selection
in the award of legal personality, we need not conclude that the power of selection has
been guided by mere discretion, or by mere calculations of self-interest. There has
been a principle of selection, determined by the very nature of the State; and this
principle has been progressively clarified and extended. The State, we have said, is
by its nature an association designed to secure the minimum of friction, and the
maximum of development, among all the moral personalities which are members of
that association. From this point of view, it will necessarily be guided by a definite
principle in selecting the recipients of the guaranteed capacity of action within the
scheme of its life which constitutes legal personality. Primarily, it will award legal
personality to every individual who possesses moral personality, in the primary and
intrinsic sense of that word. Secondly, it will award legal personality to every
organising idea, every common purpose, which permanently unites a number of
individuals as the common content of their minds and the common intention of their
wills, provided that such idea and purpose are compatible, or to the extent that they
are compatible, with the free action and development of all members of the State. In
the first case, the recipient of legal personality is the individual moral person. In the
second, it is not a moral person who is vested with a guaranteed capacity of legal
action. Neither is it, strictly speaking, a number of such persons. It is a common and
continuing purpose, continuously entertained by a continuing body of persons, which
owns the capacity and constitutes the legal person. The 'person' which owns the
property of an Oxford or Cambridge college is neither the founder, now gone, nor the
body of his living successors. It is the purpose which animated the founder and which
continues (it may be, as we shall see, in a new and modified form) to animate his
successors.

In order to develop and explain this view, it will be well to go back to what
has already been said about the different kinds of personality (psychological, moral
and legal), and to show the bearing of that distinction upon our present argument.
Psychological personality, we have said, is a spring of self-consciousness and a
fountain of self-determination by immediate considerations of sense. In the words of
Leibniz, which really apply to this species of personality, 'Persona est cujus aliqua
voluntas est, seu cujus datur cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor'. Such personality is
resident only in an individual. He alone is a spring of self-consciousness and a
fountain of self-determination. No group has personality in this sense; and if it is this
personality which is 'real' personality, no group is a 'real' person.
But there is also moral personality. This is the personality of a moral agent,
who acts under a self-imposed moral rule, and who is morally responsible for any
offence against that rule. This personality, again, is resident only in an individual. A
group is not a moral being in the moral sphere. It is a number of individual moral
beings, all acting together for a purpose. That purpose may well be a factor, and a
factor of profound influence, in the moral sphere; but the group itself is not a moral
person, acting as such in the moral sphere. From the moral point of view we may
again say what we said from the psychological'no group has personality in this
sense, and if it be this personality which is "real" personality, no group is a "real"
person'.
This may seem a hard saying, and a saying which contradicts the life and
speech of mankind. We speak of the munificence of groups: we find one group
recording its gratitude for the munificence of another; and are not munificence, and its
sister gratitude, moral attributes, which presuppose the presence of a moral
personality? Again, as we award praise, so we also award blame: we award it, as
Maitland has said, 'to group-units of all sorts and kinds'; we may even speak of
'national sin'. Do not our awards of praise and blame imply that we attach moral
responsibility to groups, and that we treat them as responsible persons in the usual
sense of the word? It is difficult to give any brief answer to such searching questions;
but this may be said. Responsibility is a word which is used both in a legal and a
moral sense. We have to distinguish carefully between the two senses. Legal
responsibility may be fully and absolutely incurred by all groups which act as legal
personsas fully and as absolutely as it is incurred by an individual legal person. It is
true that it is not always fully incurred by all such groups under our English system of
law. The State itself, when it acts as a legal person, incurs only a modified
responsibility if it breaks its contracts, and little if any responsibility if it inflicts a tort
or injury. But apart from such exceptions, which it is difficult to defend, we may lay
it down that all groups, when acting as legal persons, incur full legal responsibility. It
is a very different matter to say that a group incurs, or ever can incur, a moral
responsibility. There is no moral being of the group which can be visited with our
praise or blame. There is no moral personality of the group which does good, or is
responsible for evil. But this is not to say that there is no moral responsibility
anywhere. On the contrary, when the action of a group runs contrary to a recognised
moral rule, there will be a large area of such responsibility. Those who advised and
promoted the action will be morally responsible. Those who supported the action will
be morally responsible. Even those who accepted the action, as consenting parties,
will also be morally responsible. Moral responsibility falls only on the individual
moral agent. But it falls on him in full measure, alike when he is acting with others
and when he is acting alone. It is a dangerous doctrine which would avert it from
him, and make it fall on any transcendent being.
From the personality which is psychological, and the personality which is
moral, we now turn to that which is legal. This is a personality of a different order.
Psychological personality is a datum of immediate perception. Moral personality is a
datum of moral consciousness. Legal personality is something which is not a datum.
It is a mental construction, or juristic creation. It has, as we have seen, a certain
character of artificiality; and it has this character both when it is ascribed, as it is in
the vast majority of cases, to an individual, and when it is ascribed, as it is in other
cases, to the purpose in pursuing which a number of individuals are joined. We
cannot say that legal personality in the one sort of case is an artifice, and in the other
not. There is no difference of kind between themthough there may be a difference
of degree, and one sort of case may present more of artifice than the other. But we
must not unduly labour the notion of artifice. Legal personality is a mental
construction; but it is not therefore a fiction. It is a juristic creation a legally created
capacity of sustaining rights and duties, which are also legal creations themselves; but
it does not follow that it is not something real. In one sense it is artificial, as all things
thought into being by us are artificial. In another and deeper sense it is real, as all
things thought into permanent being by us are real. If we ascribe reality to the general
body of law, which itself has been thought and willed into permanent being by the
mind of man, we must equally ascribe it to the essential elements of law, which have
been similarly thought and willed into permanent being by the same agency.
Legal personality is thus a mental constructionbut a mental construction
which is a fact in our human world, and a real part of our human experience. Being a
mental construction, and not an immediate datum of perception or consciousness, it
can be imputed by the mind not only to the visible being of an individual, but also to
the invisible being of a purpose in the pursuit of which a body of individuals are
permanently united. Such a purpose may have property attached to it, and own that
property: it may have duties attached to it, and owe those duties; it may be a party to
legal action in order to vindicate its property or to suffer vindication of its duties. In
all these ways it acts as a, persona juris; and for all these reasons we may call it a
persona juris. The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose; and legal
personality belongs to that essence. With the individual it is different. The essence of
his life-unity is a continuing spring or power of purpose; and that is the essence to
which his legal personality belongs.
It may be objected that paradox is running to an extreme when an impersonal
purpose is vested with personality. But the purpose is not impersonal. When we say
that a purpose may be a legal person, a 'Subject' or owner of rights, we are not saying
that the impersonal may put on personality. We are only saying that a purpose which
is continuously entertained by many individual persons may enter the legal sphere as
a bearer of legal rights and duties in the same way, and on the same sort of ground, as
individuals do. But the purpose must always be entertained by living minds.
Otherwise it will be a dead purpose; and a dead purpose is incapable of bearing
anything, or of doing anything whatsoever. The Fellows of a College must always
continue to entertain the purpose of a college if that purpose is to be a bearer of rights
and duties according to the intention of the founder. Of course it is tempting to say
that the Fellows themselves, as a body, are the real bearer. But not to speak of the
ambiguity of the word 'body' (does it mean a collection of individuals, or something
which is somehow more than a collection of individuals?), we should have to qualify
this saying at once by adding that the Fellows only constitute a single person, and act
as a single bearer of rights and duties, with a part of themselvesthat is to say, with
the part which entertains and serves the purpose of the College. A person so
constituted would be a somewhat abstract person; for it would have to be constituted
by abstracting part of the personality of each Fellow and then adding the parts
together in some way which was more than simple addition or mere collection. It is
really simpler, and it expresses the truth more exactly, to say that the essence of the
College consists, and the legal personality of the College resides, in its purpose. The
purpose is something total, and something permanent; the Fellows who entertain the
purpose only entertain it partially, as one among other guests which are present in
their minds, and they only entertain it temporarily, during the days of their fellowship.

Upon this view the life-unity of a group, which may continue from century to
century, will involve no idea of an unaging real person which lives that continuous
life: it will simply involve the idea of a real purpose, or rather a common purpose,
which continuously moves and animates the members of a group, because it is
continuously entertained by their minds. Upon such a view, again, we shall not speak
of organisms; we shall speak of organisations of men, created and sustained by
organising ideas, and continuing to survive so long as these ideas survive. ²

² Gierke often confronts the reader with the dilemma, 'Organism or

mechanismwhich will you take?' But is there not a tertitum quidthe
organisation of men created and sustained by a common human purpose?

But ideas, if they are to live, must also change, since change is part of life. Here we
encounter a new difficulty, and enter upon a new stage of our argument. Not only
must the organising idea, or common purpose, which constitutes the unity of a group,
be entertained by living minds in order that it may live at all: it must also be capable
of being modified and developed by those minds, in order that it may live and grow.
The purpose, in the process of time, will necessarily enter into new conjunctures of
circumstance; and unless there is room and space for its being varied to meet such
conjunctures, it may lie like a heavy encumbrance on the general life of the present,
and it may even strain to breaking-point the allegiance of many of its own particular
votaries. The Scottish Church case, finally decided by the House of Lords in 1904,
has often been cited in illustration of this danger. Here a purpose of the Free Church
of Scotland, formulated some sixty years before, was decided to be fundamental and
unalterable under the constitution of that Church; and this decision, so long as it
stood, not only encumbered the general movement of the time towards the union of
the Free Church with another of the churches of Scotland on the basis of a developing
purpose, but it also split the members of the Free Church into opposing campsthe
camp of the few who clung to the original purpose formulated in 1843, and the camp
of the many who were anxious to see a development of that purpose. Much was said,
in this connection, against 'impersonal immutable purpose'; much was said in favour
of the 'personal living group', competent by its nature, as a real personality with a real
power of purpose, to develop freely according to the needs of its life. But there is
another and simpler moral which we may draw from the case. The real danger is not
the conception of purpose: it is the conception of original purpose as fundamental and
invariable. The danger partly proceeds from courts of law, which are naturally prone,
and indeed are bound, to attach great weight to any original formulation of purpose;
but it proceeds far more from the original founders and formulators, who wish to
make the purpose, as they see it, permanently valid. There is a passion of men, in
making wills, to tie up the future. There is a similar passion of founders, in
formulating purposes, to do the like.³ Wise founders, desiring that the purpose they
formulate shall live, and recognising that change is part of life, will leave latitude of
variation to their successors, who continue to entertain and serve the purpose.
Similarly the Courts, in interpreting purpose, may well allow some latitude of
development, even if it be not expressly warranted in the original deed. We can
hardly expect the State to prohibit the rigid definition of purpose ab initio. But the
State always stands in reserve to provide a remedy for rigidity, after the event, by its
power of legislation. This was the way in which Parliament acted, in its final solution
of the Scottish Church case, by the Churches (Scotland) Act of 1905.

³ 'A voluntary society may so fix its articles of faith and conditions of
government as to deprive itself of any power of development or change. This
has been done by the Free Church of Scotland.... It has also been done more
precisely by the Primitive Wesleyan Methodist Society of Ireland, which has
put its doctrine, discipline and rules into an Act of Parliament, with a
provision that the discipline and rules may be altered in a manner prescribed
by the Act, but that the doctrine is not to be altered' (Anson, Law and Custom
of the Constitution Vol. ii, c. ii, §v). On this basis we may say that the
Scottish Church case does not demonstrate the need for a conception of the
real personality of the group. It rather demonstrates the weakness of a group
which tries to prevent the purpose by which it is constituted from being
capable of growth with the growth of the minds of its members.

We are thus brought to consider, once more, the general relation of the State to
the purposes which constitute the being and the unity of groups, and serve as legal
persons owning rights and owing duties. We have argued that purposes must
necessarily be entertained by individual minds which accept and serve them. We
have argued that they must necessarily be variable, in order to suit new conjunctures
of circumstance, by the minds which are pledged to their support and think they can
support them best by adapting them to new needs. We have now to add that the
minds of all the members of the general community, represented in and by the
operative criticism of the State, are always playing upon the purposes of groups and
the working of these purposes. No common purpose is accepted, and awarded a legal
position and a legal personality, simply because it is a common purpose. A common
purpose must be weighed and measured, and found to possess some degree of quality.
There are some common purposes, such as that of the Mafia, which no State will
tolerate. Each common purpose must be compared with other common purposes, and
all must be capable of adjustment to one another and of living amicably side by side.
All partial common purposes must be set alongside the general common purpose of
the State, and must be compatible with the attainment of that sovereign common
purpose. This is not to say that the State should, or can, exercise a ubiquitous
supervision of groups. It is only to say that it can never abrogate a duty of
constructive criticism and sympathetic adjustment. We may well pray that groups
should abound, each dedicated to its own specific common purpose. The life of man
is manifold; and the specific group, dedicated to specific purpose, is an essential
element in the development of man's variety. The one State which is also one race,
one Church, one party, one economic organisation, is a lonely wilderness. But a State
which was a home of real Group-persons, if such a State could be, would also have its
defects. It would be far from being a wilderness; but it might well be a chaos. If we
desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must leave room both for the free
clustering of groups round freely formed purposes, and for the criticism and
adjustment of such purposes by the State.

The view which has thus been suggested in regard to the inner core of the
legal personality of groups is based neither on the ideas of Fiction and Concession,
nor on the idea of a Collection or Bracket of individuals, nor on the idea of the Real
Personality of the Group. On the other hand it contains elements of all these ideas,
and it may help to explain how all these ideas have come to be held. We have
allowed some element of fiction, and some element of concession by the State, in the
legal personality ascribed to the purpose of a group; but we have also allowed the
same elements in the legal personality ascribed to the individual. We have admitted
that a sum or collection of individuals must entertain the common purpose, and must
also have the power of developing that purpose; but we have also admitted that the
common purpose is a permanent unity which transcends the collection of individuals
who are united in its service. We have denied that there is a real Group-person, in any
way parallel to a real individual person, behind the legal personality of a group; but
we have argued that a real purpose, analogous to the individual's real power of
purpose, must underlie such personalityand in that sense we too may claim to be
'Realists'. At the end of our argument we are left with a legal world in which there
move two sorts of legal personsthe individual legal person, with a legal personality
based on the power of purpose which constitutes the essence of an individual; and the
group legal person, with a legal personality based on the permanent purpose which
constitutes the essence of a group. The two sorts of person differ, in as far as the basis
of the one is a power of indeterminate purpose, and the basis of the other is a declared
and determinate purpose. But it is not an absolute difference, and both sorts of
persons can move easily in the same world. The power of indeterminate purpose in
the individual is limited by his previous declarations of purpose; and the determinate
purpose of the group must always, as we have seen, be compatible with its further
growth and development.
All this might seem mere logomachy, a contention about words and a tilting at
windmills, if it were not the case that the theory of the real personality of groups ran
outside the domain of doctrine, and spilled into the general life and thought of the
world outside. So far as Gierke's own theory stands, considered in itself, it is as if he
had said to the world of scholars, 'Eureka: I have found the hidden reality which lies
behind this puzzling Group-person of the law; and the reality is that of a real person,
who is real in the same sort of way as you and I are real'. That saying, in itself, is a
matter of high doctrine: it is a philosophical explanation of a legal fact, intended for
those who study the philosophy of law. But the world outside, hearing the
reverberations of legal philosophy, adopts the term 'real Group-personality' into its
own language; it gives it a new and positive sense; and it proceeds to draw practical
conclusions from the positive sense which it gives to the term. Adapting to our
purposes a saying of Luther, we may say that 'the doctrine comes to the ordinary man
ghostly' (and we may also add, for reasons which we shall presently see, that it comes
to him qualified), 'and he makes it fleshly'. In other words, men apply the conception
of real Group-personality to their own particular grouptheir Church, their
profession, Trade Union, whatever the society be that engages their immediate ardour;
and then, feeling that real persons must enjoy rights, but forgetting (or tending to
forget) that they must also owe obligations, they become the prophets of the rights,
and not only of the rights, but also of the autonomy, and even, in the last resort, of the
sovereignty, of their own particular group. This is the way of syndicalism; and
Gierke's doctrineat any rate in our own country, and since Maitland first gave it
vogue in 1900has been drawn into that way. We must not be pragmatical, nor judge
the truth of a doctrine by the uses to which it is subsequently put. But at any rate we
may examine the company which it keeps, and if we are already inclined to question
its truth on fundamental and essential grounds, we may perhaps find that the results of
such examination serve to corroborate our doubts.
Syndicalism is a theory of French parentage. In its more extreme form, it is a
theory which would eliminate the State in favour of groupseconomic groupson the
ground that economic groups are anterior, and should be superior, to political
organisation, and that droit economique is similarly anterior, and should be similarly
superior, to droit politique. In its more moderate form, it is a theory of condominium
between the State and groups, on the basis of some system of 'plural' sovereignty
which will divide its attributes between both. Neither in its more extreme nor in its
more moderate form has it found acceptance in England. But there has been some
approximation to it; and we find such an approximation in the writings of Dr Figgis,
and particularly perhaps in his Churches in the Modern State, published in 1913.
Here the authority of Gierke is invoked to support a line of theory which runs counter
to the idea of the unitary State and the unity of its sovereignty. Starting from a deep
conviction of the spiritual independence of the Church, Dr Figgis proceeds to a
general doctrine of the 'inherent, self-developing life' of all societies. He regards the
general community as 'a vast hierarchy of interrelated societies, each alive, each
personal'; and he seeks to vindicate for each of these societies 'the necessary
independence of a self-developing personality'. The Church is foremost in his
thought; but he seeks to link the cause of the Church with the cause of groups in
generalgroups economic and national as well as ecclesiastical. He rejects what he
calls 'the old conception of the position of corporate groups in the State', because in
his view it is false to the general facts of the world. 'It makes the world consist of a
mass of self-existing individuals on the one hand and an absolute State on the other;
whereas it is perfectly plain to anybody who truly sees the world that the real world is
composed of several communities, large and small, and that a community is
something more than the sum of persons composing itin other words, it has a real
personality, not a fictitious one. This is the essence of what is true in modern
nationalism, and in the claims for the rights of Churches and of Trade Unions.'
Now it is only just to Gierke to begin by admitting that such an interpretation
of his views (which, by the way, is by no means peculiar to Dr Figgis) is really alien
to the logic of his general theory. He was a good German and a thorough Germanist,
whose thought had already been fixed in all its main lines by 1880. Syndicalism in
any form, whether moderate or extreme, was a thing beyond his ken. He accepted the
German system of territorial churches, as it stood in his day; he accepted the
economic organisation of contemporary German society. He was anxious, as a
lawyer, that corporate bodies in Germany should be based on the Germanist tradition
of law, and not on the Romanist; but the bodies of which he thought belonged to a
traditional past, and not to a revolutionary future. They were Gemeinde and
Genossenschaften, steeped in the national history of the German people, and therefore
belonging by right of descent to the national law of the German State. The affinities
of Gierke are not with Duguit, the legal philosopher of French syndicalism: they are
with Herder, the harbinger of German Romanticism. The figure of the Volk remains
in the background of his thought; and the majority of the Volk is incarnate in a State
which remains sovereign, even if it recognises that there are other group-realities
besides itself. Are not these other beings parts of the Folk-whole; and must they not
find their life in the higher life in which they are necessarily included? The State, to
Gierke, is 'elevated above all groups by its sovereign plenitude of power' (seine
souveräne Machtvollkommenheit). The authority of the State is 'the highest right
upon earth' The law of the State exerts a far greater control over the legal group than
over the individual. 'The legal scheme, in dealing with groups, does not stop, as it
does in dealing with individuals, at rules of external conduct. It also controls and
penetrates their inner life....The group, in contrast to the individual, must necessarily
be a form of life in which the relation of the unity of the whole to the multiplicity of
the parts is amenable to regulation by external norms for human wills.'
It is easy to realise, from passages such as these, that Gierke's doctrine of the
real personality of groups is, as we have already observed, a ratified and a qualified
doctrine. But it is also easy to see how the rarity and the qualifications may be
forgotten. Men sometimes think and write to other consequences than those which
they have themselves intended. A fate of this order seems to have befallen the theory
and writings of Gierke. He himself insisted on the need for the articulation of
contained groups in the containing State; he regarded the life of the lower groups as
necessarily integrated in that of the higher. Yet if he thus believed in the necessity of
a higher Whole, which included all lesser wholes as its parts and members, he taught
after all a doctrine of the real and inherent personality of groups in general. Now if
we concentrate our attention on that doctrine in itself, and if, in addition, we proceed
to confine its benefits to groups other than the State, we can easily glide into a form of
syndicalism. It will not be true to the mind of the master; but it will have a sort of
rough verisimilitude. We can then say that we have quitted an abstract and unreal
world of self-existing individuals and the absolute State; we can then proclaim our
entry into a concrete and real world of real groups, with a real State conditioned by
their inherent rights; and we can then plead that Gierke's writings provide an
historico-philosophical justification of this new world.
 But this is not the whole of the matter. The theory of the real personality of
groups may not only trend towards syndicalism. It may also keep other company; and
it may trend towards that very doctrine of the absolute State from which it is supposed
to be our rescue. We can only make the theory a defence and buttress against the
State if we suppose that it does not apply to the State, and if we say that there is no
real person standing behind the State, as there is behind other groups. But are we
justified in making that supposition? We can hardly say that we are. On the contrary,
if we once accept the theory of the real personality of groups, we are bound to see
behind the State the figure of the greatest and the most real of all groupsthe figure
of the nation and Folk itself. The theory presents us, after all, with two sorts of real
Group-persons. One of these is the real person of the Volk, with its own Volksseele
and its own Volksleben. The other is the real person of the contained group.° Gierke
himself may seek to comprehend both sorts of real persons in a synthesis which does
justice to both. But the two sorts will always tend to break apart, and each of them
will then seek to claim a separate and sovereign existence. If the claim, of groups
other than the State is heard and accepted, the result will be some form of syndicalist
philosophy. If the claim of the great national group, incarnate in the national State,
calls aloud with a greater and more resonant voice, the result will be some form of
absolutist or dictatorial politics. And of the two results it is the latter which is the
more to be apprehended.

(° It will be noticed that Dr Figgis, in the passage quoted above, speaks

of the theory of real Group-personality as 'the essence of what is true in
modern nationalism, and in the claims for the rights of Churches and of Trade
Unions'. Perhaps he was thinking of the claims of national minorities when he
used the phrase 'modern nationalism'. But the phrase may equally apply to the
claims of a national majority to control the whole of life.)

It often seems as if the theory of the real personality of groups were advocated
with a sort of tacit exceptionas though it did not apply to the State; as though it were
something external to it, which served to limit and tame it. But if the theory be true at
all, must it not be true of the State and true of the State above all? Is it not the
peculiar danger of the theory that it may tend, in the last resort, to attach itself to the
figure of the State with a particular fascination? The Nation, at any rate when it is
organised and expressed in a national State, is a great and obvious group. If we make
groups real persons, we shall make the national State a real person. If we make the
State a real person, with a real will, we make it indeed a Leviathana Leviathan
which is not an automaton, like the Leviathan of Hobbes, but a living reality. When
its will collides with other wills, it may claim that, being the greatest, it must and shall
carry the day; and its supreme will may thus become a supreme force. If and when
that happens, not only may the State become the one real person and the one true
group, which eliminates or assimilates others: it may also become a mere personal
power which eliminates its own true nature as a specific purpose directed to Law or
Right. If personal power should thus shed purpose, an old saying of Luther may be
repeated, with a new application, 'Die Person wird euch nichts helfen, wenn euch das
Recht verdampt'.
The experience of our own day goes to corroborate such hypothetical fears.
Italy has embraced the theory of real Group-personality, 'the organism superior to the
individuals of whom it is composed'. The Corporative State is a structure of many
elements. It is not always clear which of them are intended to act, and which are
intended to be the simulacrum of action. But there seems to be little personality, and
no autonomy, in the corporate groups contained in the Italian State; and if we read La
Dottrina del Fascismo we can hardly doubt that the one Group-person which is really
intended to act is the Italian nation as 'integrally realised' in the Fascist State of Italy.
'The higher personality (personalità superiore) is that of the Nation. . .The Fascist
State, synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and actuates the whole of
the life of the People.... For Fascism the State is an absolute, in whose presence
individuals and groups are the relative....It is anima dell' anima. . .realta etica. .
.voluntà etica universale.'±

(± Benito Mussolini, La Dottrina del Fascismo, 1932 (reprinted from the

article in the Enciclopedia Italiana}. The quotations are mainly taken from the
more philosophic Part I.)

Of the new Germany which came into existence in 1933 it is perhaps

premature to write. Incedimus per ignes. But this may be said. The home of groups
and Genossenschaften is going through a great process of Gleichschaltunga process
by which they are all being 'assimilated' to the new character now assumed by the
person of the Volk, as organised and incarnate to-day in the National Socialist State.
The assimilation of groups to this person has touched and transformed churches and
trade unions: it has swept like a deluge over the old territorial communities and the
political parties of Germany; it has modified, where it has not abolished, the whole of
what Gierke would call the corporate articulation of the State. It would be wrong to
draw permanent conclusions from what may be only a temporary phase of
revolutionary ardour. But so far as the evidence goes, it suggests a simple reflection.
When the idea of the real person of the Nation, organised in a national State, obtains
the victory, in an hour of revolution, the groups in the State are abolished or altered
with the alteration of the times. The ideas on which they rest, and the purposes which
are their essence, are swept away or refashioned. We may deprecate the victorious
idea of the State: we may say that it means a sacrifice of Recht on the altar of
Volkstum and the personal Volk: we may urge that it means a surrender of fixed
purpose to oscillating personality; but we have to admit, in one respect, the vigour and
sweep of its action. Germany herself, the ancient mother of groups, has demonstrated
to the worldat any rate for the time beingthat the groups contained in the State are
simply purposes, and not real persons, and that these purposes can be re-fashioned, or
even abrogated, when the hour of revolution strikes, by the State in which they are
contained. All revolutions have something of a similar character. They shake and test
men's common purposes. Some, like leaves, come fluttering to the ground; some
remain, but change their colour and their nature. It is not that real Group-persons
have died, or changed the nature of their personality. It is simply that common
purposes have been shaken in the minds of those who held them; and some have
changed, and somebecause they have ceased to be held with the tenacity which
alone will suffice to preserve their existencehave disappeared.
But do we then leave the State surviving as the one omnipotent real person,
which shakes all the trees but stands itself unmoved? The whole of our argument
forbids. The State, on our general theory of purpose, is not an ultimate or absolute
person, which can do or omit to do what it chooses at its will. It is a group or
association ; and it stands on the same footing as other groups or associations. Its
essence or being consists in its purpose, just as the essence or being of all other
groups consists in their purpose. Not only is purpose the essence of the groups
contained in the State: it is also the essence of the State itself. When we are speaking
of the relation of the State to groups, we are speaking of the relation of one common
purpose to a number of other such purposes. The characteristic of the purpose of the
State is that it is a specific purpose of Law. Other purposes, so far as they concern or
affect this purpose, must necessarily be squared with it. This is the same as to say that
other groups, so far as they hold or assume a legal position, must necessarily be
adjusted to the legal group which we call the State. They are not thereby adjusted to
its will: they are adjusted to its purpose, which is Law. The State would be failing to
attain its purpose, and thereby to discharge its duty, if it failed to secure such
adjustment. But the adjustment is not a matter of discretion, and it is not absolute: it
is controlled by the purpose of the State, and it is relative to that purpose. To reject
the theory of the real personality of groups is not to fall into any worship of the omni-
competent or absolute State. It is to find the essence of the State in its purpose of
Law, and to subject it to its purpose, just as we find the essence of other groups also in
their particular purpose, and just as we make them too the servants and ministers of
their purpose. Only if we make the State, like every other group, a common purpose,
and not a real Group-person, shall we escape the tyranny of mere will. Purpose is
something specific; and if we are face to face with a State which is specific purpose,
we are face to face with the finite. In a word, we see and accept the sovereignty of
Lawboth the law of the Constitution, which expresses the fundamental purpose on
which the State is based, and the ordinary law of the courts, duly made in accordance
with the Constitution, which expresses that purpose in detail, through the various
ranges of human life, in all the area of external conduct amenable to its control.

(Pages lx - lxxxvii)

I have decided to make two presentations covering the above passage. I began
at page sixty, and simply found myself unable to stop until I reached the end of the
introduction, at page eighty two. The whole section was so relevant to our subject of
the idea of Super Being, as it pertains to our own species. Below is a section, entitled
Hard Notes, that is already written, written in response to my reading of the above in
order to make the transfer from print to computer for insertion in this work. I also
have my notes written as I sat and read the book while sunbathing in the summer heat
of my greenhouse recently. I do not like to lose insights into such an important piece
of material since the only means we have of studying our subject is by digging up the
remnants of other people's ideas and running them through the interpreter that is my
brain, I am going to offer both responses to this passage. The first, soft, the second
hard, so called because I already know what I have just written during the process of
transcribing into digital form, and this is decidedly more searching, and thus hard,
going deeper into what Barker wrote, than the initial thoughts I put down in long hand
as I read the book. The reason my responses are more searching when I am at the
computer is a product of the technology at my fingertips which allows me to freely
express myself without any sense of a need to keep my ideas brief, because I am
going directly into the finished form of presentation and the medium is so fluid and
flexible, and readable; in the sensory sense, if not in the intellectual sense. Don't you
just love these brain tools, Nature is wonderful.
The soft notes will be transformed into long thought, so to speak, as I usually
do, and marked by the page numbers I used while making them, in order to provide
some guide as to my progress through this lengthy passage, although I do not intend
to mark the extract itself, for that you will have to obtain a copy of the book, in the
flesh, so to speak.

Soft Notes

lxi This is a useful summation of the conflict between groups with the tendency
for fragmentation induced by the focus of a group upon the definition of its
own identity and interests which means all groups tend toward seeking the maximum
expression of their own autonomous status. This urge toward autonomy is rendered
as personality in the work we are considering and Barker explains why the urge
toward this sense of individuality amongst groups cannot be allowed to go unchecked,
and yet how tricky it is to create law to manage the balance in such a way that there is
structure, but flexibility.
All this effort in the legal domain is evidence of the organic nature of society
because what this effort amounts to is a search for the correct way to organise
authority in order to create a viable living structure. This behaviour then is identical
to that which involved in any creative endeavour humans engage in, where what is
really happening is that people are faced with a challenge and they must discover,
discover, not invent, the appropriate response. Just as people do not invent
aeroplanes, they discover them, so people do not create social structures, they
discover them too. What we have here, in Barker's account, is a description of that
process of discovery aimed at working out how to create manageable social structures
by inventing laws that meet the need to organise society as a unified whole, but a
whole composed of Spencer's differentiated but interdependent organs, or groups.

lxiii This is a discussion of then idea of Super Being in the field of law. Note the
division of the word 'personality' into three distinct meanings conforms to the
basic principle we see operating in the mythological practice of imposing a dualistic
interpretation of reality on all things pertaining to human existence, the mechanism of
duality is a linguistic tool that allows knowledge to be divided in order that society
can be ruled by a separation of hidden knowledge of identity, from the overt
knowledge of form. Thus nature and form are split asunder making the determination
of reality impossible. Darwin is the best example of a thinker whose work conforms
to this mechanism of duality, for he so obviously split human form from human
nature by making our animal relatives the obvious source of our material being, while
failing to reveal anything about the source of our behavioural being. Thus all of our
attention has been wilfully misdirected ever since by the priesthood that hold Darwin
as their senior, people like the present day knowledge perverts, Richard Dawkins of
Oxford and Stephen Gould of Harvard.
The whole idea of personalities is pure mythology from beginning to end, just
as the associated idea of morality, one of the personality triads, is mythological, as
also is the key idea of God, upon which these fictitious notions of vacuous meaning
are cut.

The Making

lxiv How to have your cake and eat it. That should be the lesson drawn from this
piece of mythological reasoning. Standard priestly rhetoric this. First we
deny personality to groups, then we allow groups to exist by virtue of law, so they
have rights, so they have personality!! But only because law, that is to say because
language, made this possible. Therefore this is not an organic personality, a real
personality, but an artificial device created by humans, not discovered by humans.
This shows us exactly how language works to weave an image of reality that is
simply an impression taken from reality and rendered into a communicable form and
then made the product of human intelligence in order to make this image, this
knowledge, into a possession that can be owned by an elite, who claim of course to of
created it. It is surprising these people do claim to of made the earth on which we
walk.
What has been done is that people have discovered attributes, and thereby
learnt to master the forms that the attributes relate to. This is no different than
discovering that certain rocks, when heated, produce shiny material, and so, by means
of proactive experimentation and concerted effort, amongst people acting together,
over time extending across generations, a specialised group naturally evolves on the
basis of learning to mine ore and extract metal. A process of group evolution that was
only possible because of the linguistic physiology which is the prime feature of these
creatures. Learning to refine ore does not mean that the finally accomplished group
of artisans, make the ore they use, or that having extracted the metal so expertly, they
actually made the metal. Likewise, learning that society naturally coalesces into an
array of groups as it becomes ever more massive and complex, and as knowledge,
such as that involved in the specialised art of mining, accumulates, so that, by a
process of learning from experience, finding out how to provide a central, overarching
authority that is able to manage the array of groups, and thus to provide a unified
social form that is new and exceptional, does not mean that people actually make the
groups that they learn to recognise and to manipulate, or that they make the finished
product when they have discovered the proper techniques for the use of language to
enable them to fashion a social order that is functional.
What we can see though, is that groups evolve naturally out of a burgeoning
population that is able to support them, according to the accumulation of information
that is of a nature that causes it to form a body of knowledge. Such a body of
knowledge is an accumulated product, that means there is an accumulation of a
related series of individual life experiences that requires a repository of accumulated
information that is able to act as a carrier of information across generations. The
requirement for such a repository is what causes a group to coalesce into a permanent
form with an identity defined by the knowledge it secrets within itself, but the
capacity for this mode of information accumulation is not an invention of human
animals. Group formation is the means by which this mode of information
accumulation is able to take place, and so the formation of groups is the reason that
human form evolved as it did, for the express purpose of forming groups.

Humans form groups because humans evolved to form groups, this is

another way of saying that human nature is corporate.

Humans form groups by accumulating knowledge, whether they like it or not, just as
birds travel by flying whether they like it or not. And once we have the model of
group formation provided by a consideration of the way a specialised group such a
metal workers might come into being, by accumulating information on the material
and methods involved in mining, we can see that once an elaborate social structure
had evolved which had a specialised legalistic authority at its core, then a group of
specialists was bound to evolve as information on the use of law accumulated, and so
crystallised an identity about the knowledge of law, which this process of social
management by means of law gave rise to. And thus we got the Jews, and the rest is
history, or biology, if, like me, you do not happen to subscribe to the theistic notion of
history, and you only recognise the organic processes of life which make history into
a mythological representation of growth.

This discussion of human social forms as if they were features of a landscape,

as if they were themselves an environment that we learn to know, is very telling. At
the root of the evolution of a corporate form we are saying there is the living
environment brought into being by the basic physiological form of the organism in
question. Thus with the evolution of mammal physiology the life environment
consisting of mammalian fauna came into being. Mammals had to disperse and
differentiate to fill the vacuum of space represented by the earth's potential niches
relative to the newly arrived attributes of the mammal. Thus the potential of
mammalian form was drawn toward out of the early mammals and into the vacuum of
the air and the sea, producing bats and whales, for example. Eventually a balance was
struck and all the niches of the earth were occupied by creatures bearing the unique
attributes of mammals, the earth was full of mammals. Thus a new global fauna was
established and mammals found themselves living in a mammalian environment
where mammalian potential could be drawn out by the pressures of a mammalian
environment. In this setting mammal adaptability is tested by its ability to adapt to
mammal adaptability, but in the special sense that there was the potential for a
mammal to evolve that exploited the attributes of mammals relative to mammals in
general.
What sort of attributes would be drawn out of the mammalian physiological
package by an environment dominated by a variety of mammalian forms? The
answer is the attributes of awareness pertaining to the recognition of self, because that
is really what we are saying, the mammal is required to recognise and respond to the
mammal. Mammalian physiology becomes its own feedback loop in the evolution of
mammalian physiology, but only in one specialised form that comes to be the ideal
form to fulfil the role of specialised mammalian mammal.
And in our description of the manner in which humans learn to respond to the
existence of the social environment they themselves compose, just as much as they
learn to respond to the environment that exists independently of them, we have a
detailed view of this specialised trait of a mammal responding to mammalian
physiology, only in this case the mammal we are concerned with is so evolved for the
purpose that it is not just dragging itself out of the grip of genetic evolution which
makes a mammal adapt to its physical environment, it is being drawn ever further into
that social environment in which a creature becomes an environment unto itself and
evolves in response to itself, this is not just physiology evolving in response to
physiology but species responding to species, not just, in other words mammalian
physiology evolving in response to mammalian physiology, but humans evolving in
response to humans.
Individual humans come into a world that is loaded with potential that has
already been realised, and a continuation of that realised potential that awaits release.
That latent potential might consist of the materials deposited in the earth by
geological and celestial processes which have been made available by the realisation
of their potential in preceding generations of individuals, or it might equally well
consist of the practices carried on by their own kind, the already released potential of
farming or of social gathering. In each case the new round of individuals appears in
an established setting and the process of learning what that setting is, and so
developing what that setting is, continues, whether the task involves iron smelting or
social administration.
I think it is easy to follow my meaning when I say that when people obtain ore
they do not make ore, and even when they extract metal from the ore they do not
make metal. But in actual fact this is not how we speak, indeed we say that people do
make metal when they refine ore. I think there is the potential for a lengthy
philosophical discussion surrounding this linguistic contortion of conceptual
understanding, but I want to avoid philosophical meanderings at all cost. We must
nonetheless try and tease out the central points of confusion involved in this most
important of ideas concerning the act of making.
If people do not make the ore, and they do not make the metal, what do they
do, for they certainly do something?
Wrong! People do nothing, what happens is done to them. When you catch a
fish, do you make the fish? When you build the fire to cook the fish, do you make the
wood? When you eat the fish do you make the flesh that becomes you? When you
deposit the remains do you make the turd? No, in all cases people make nothing, the
process is something that is ongoing and in which the person is part of. After all, can
a person refuse to obtain food, refuse to engage in the process of eating? No, this is a
process that their being involves them in.
But still, we feel it must be possible to say that people do something? Yet, I
am afraid the answer is that they do not, this is the inevitable conclusion of the idea
that humans evolved, right down to the finest detail of their existence. For what this
means is that energy, that we experience as information, when we are aware of it, acts
through us, by making us! Thus people who extract metal, like the famous bronze age
Ice Man found in the border region of the Alps lying between Italy and Austria
several years ago, are the living inheritors of many generations of highly specialised
knowledge. For knowledge of this kind to exist it cannot be optional, it must be
compulsory, in exactly the same way that food gathering practices, once they have
established the ability to occupy a niche environment, become compulsory. If a group
of people, a single undifferentiated superorganism of the simple kind, migrate into a
vacant territory and learn to exist there by specialised techniques, then thereafter there
is no going back for the later generations who come after them.
And this conception of enforced continuity of occupation complies with the
conditions attributable to a single superorganic being, and contradicts entirely the
notion of each individual being a free and independent being. As evolution has
progressed and humans have evolved to be ever more adapted to their own form more
complex superorganic forms have come into being containing vastly more complex
information routines. The coming of truly massive superorganisms which we call
civlized societies led the people specialising in the management of the organic
structure of society to conceive of society and individuals in ways that imputed to the
individual ever more freedom of action. This was simply the evolution of the method
of controlling the process of social management that these people, whom we call
priests, specialised in.
We do not make anything, Nature makes things through us. As we learn
information builds and the number of steps in a process is elaborated toward an ever
greater perfection of technique. As this process of increasing sophistication continues
the ever increasing number of steps develops until the specialist is born in the true
sense of the word. It is not surprising that individuals who find themselves in the line
of descent of the information that produces the specialised products such as a golden
metal axe head in a world of stone, should think of the knowledge coming to them in
terms of a mystery emanating from some sacred mystery. And likewise art involves
learning how to manage ceremonies and build temples that create a central authority
able to hold huge numbers of people together in harmony.
But, each step in a process that involves the making of something involved in
that process is an imposition demanded of the process, it is not something made by
any human, or group of humans acting in unison. When it is it learnt that making
charcoal for use in smelting will allow better refining of ore to be achieved the
individuals responsible are discovering attributes in the environment, not making
attributes that they then put into the environment. When it is learnt that by invoking a
spiritual being and speaking in terms of life in another place beyond death imparts a
unifying power over the social group as a whole the people who find this result are
not making a social practice that they then give to the society in the form of a cultural
behaviour, they are discovering the resonance that exists within the human psyche
that evolved to serve this very purpose, they are unleashing the potential of linguistic
communication, in the same way the metal working is releasing the potential of wood
by driving of volatile elements before using the condensed remnant to achieve higher
temperatures.
When it is discovered that putting people in prison is a far more effective way
of controlling populations that you want to put to work, than simply trying to terrorise
them by killing the men, you learn something about social management. Men who
are not already yoked by civilised techniques die gladly, accepting death as a facet of
life, an honourable end to existence. They do not, however, like being shut in a cage,
something completely unknown to them, being a civilised practice, and left
wondering about their wives, and who is having free access to them.
People do not make prisons, anymore than they make charcoal, or make fish.
Neither do people make the laws that create and service the penal institutions which
form part of the modern superorganism's exoskeletal physiology. The impulse to
make the penal code and its associated system of application, is derived from the
material being worked with by those who were instrumental in the evolution of the
system. The material in case is basically the human male, we might even say in terms
of the current popular discussion about the criminal nature of the male that the
material that artists are working with when they discover laws, and build courts and
prisons, is testosterone. Thus the priests who exist within the organ of authority
which seeks to organise constructive activity according to its own sense of purpose,
which is to sustain the organ of authority, and to extend its remit, are working with
testosterone in exactly the same way as we might say the metal workers who employ
charcoal makers are practicing their craft by extending their authority derived from
their production of a rare material of high value. The creation of laws engendering
the State is no more a clever art created by people than the preparation of charcoal
from wood is a clever art created by people, in both cases these creative behaviours
are induced by the qualities inherent in the materials being worked, wood and humans
males.
But it is clear that at the heart of this naturally evolved organic system of
human social behaviour there are central attributes dictating the way we understand
these things. At the centre of the whole process of cultural action is the acquisition
and preservation of knowledge. The centrality of knowledge in this process leads to
the evolution of organic structures within the superorganic body which possess
authority. To possess knowledge is to possess authority, it may only be authority over
wood, or metal, but it might be authority over people, people as a material. It is only
the latter form of authority that we really include in the idea of possessing authority.
However this may be, by recognising that it is knowledge that underpins authority,
and the evolution of bodies possessing authority, we are able to develop our
understanding of human society, and its evolution in accordance to our recognition
that humans are evolved animals.
More than this, we can see that while we might be able to freely discuss the
nature of authority derived from special knowledge concerning technology and know
how in general, we are placed in a different position when it comes to discussing the
nature of authority in our society today because we do not admit that authority is
about the manipulation of people as materials in a system controlled by a priesthood.
The lie is developed by the priesthood of individual free will to force us to be slaves
voluntarily, and the art of developing this model of free slavery to a master class is
what is developed in the idea of democracy. This conflict is revealed in the ideas of
elitists which we have seen can be interpreted as a denial of the very idea that there
can be democracy because the nature of human beings means there must be an elite
group.
In saying the above we get closer to the actual mechanics of elite power, how
it evolves, and why we cannot discuss this matter freely in a scientific manner. It is
not just that the survival of the Jewish master identity comes under threat, or the
survival of religious authority across the board. The extension of the mythology
which has been woven, by the theocracy, to form what they have come to term the
secular world, and especially the democratic or free world, relies upon the acquisition
of knowledge about how to work the naturally occurring materials that are human,
and thus to obtain, and maintain, authority over the superorganism by fashioning the
superorganism according to the knowledge that has been accumulated, and thus
directing the purpose of the superorganism according to the mythological objectives
that keep power focused upon the core identity. This is a circular process that
includes the elite within the superorganismthe elite make the superorganism, of
which they are a part, the superorganism sustains the elite, which is the embodiment
of itself. And so, to reiterate, it is a necessary fact arising from the nature of the penal
system, that it is described in personal terms, focusing on the behaviour of the
testosterone driven tendencies of males, natural born criminals, as the priests like to
make us see ourselves, and it is absolutely imperative that under no circumstances is it
made possible for anyone to develop an analytical model of the authority structure
that will reveal that the prison system is to testosterone, as the suffocating pile of
smouldering vegetation is to the volatile constituents of wood.
Prison of course does not drive testosterone from the body of the individual
male in the way heat drives volatiles from wood. Prison functions as, literally is in
fact, a super-organ, performing a function within the superorganic being that manages
the animals hormone content. The organ we call prison, extracts young men, that is
cellular units rich in testosterone, from the main tissue of the body. Prison thus acts
as a hormone suppressant within the context of the total physiology of the organism.
This has an effect upon the entire population of young males who form an important
active element of the organism's tissue, the role of suppressant we can assume is by
far and away the main role of this organ of superorganic physiology. The court
system is part of the machinery of hormone control, the increasing sanctions directed
at wilful individuals bucking the authority of the priesthood, acts as a filtering system
trying to keep sufficiently dynamic individuals in the free space of the exoskeleton
where their energy is required for healthy functioning, while still having the ability to
extract a portion of that necessary, testosterone rich, cellular tissue. In this way courts
apply pressure upon the organic constituents of the exoskeletal frame of the
superorganism Vital to the application of this pressure is the feedback delivered by
the exoskeletal media structures which keep everyone informed of the interplay of
crime and punishment, this engenders a state of high tension throughout the living
tissue. The role of what is called entertainment, is heavily involved in boosting this
role of generating tension in the organism's living tissues without the traumatic
requirements of actually supporting a massive proportion of actively aggressive
testosterone rich units, which are constantly having to be dealt with by other
testosterone rich cells backed by a rigid organisational structure coordinated by the
organ of authority.
Lets face it, who would make, deliberately, either prisons, or the sad bastards
that end up in them?

The word 'make' is truly a fiendish piece of linguistic priestcraft, and the best
of all examples of how language distorts reality and earths our sense of self in the self,
and makes our true nature so hard to know.

It occurs to me that in making this comparison between the practice of

charcoal burning and the management of social behaviour by selecting the inner
qualities of the two prime materials, wood and human males, and thus making a
comparison between volatile substances and behavioural hormones, I am setting up an
analogy, for it is certain that I cannot be serious in making this comparison if it is my
intention to say that the two activities can be said to be identical in terms that relate to
the processing of wood and the management of males.
The object of this description is not to make a comparison between the
physiological processes taking place in the human animal when people are
incarcerated by the organs controlling behaviour, and the chemical changes taking
place in wood subjected to burning in an oxygen poor atmosphere. The point of
comparison concerns the manner in which activities evolve by means of knowledge
evolving, as knowledge evolves by means of information accumulation, so techniques
evolve and structures based on those techniques evolve. And thus the comparison is
not between the chemical and the biochemical processes at the centre of the
behaviours we are thinking about here. The comparison is between the manner in
which the two behaviours come about, charcoal burning and prison keeping. The
process bringing about the evolution of these two distinct behaviours, in both cases, is
identical. The point of the comparison is to indicate that humans are elements of the
environment that are managed by humans, just as much as any other material features
of the environment are.

lxv This idea of a fictitious person of a fictitious person created by an authority

for purposes of social management is useful because it indicates why an inner
circle must evolve as a core feature of the organism that can act literally as a brain
which empowers the evolution of the differentiated parts acting in accord with the
central authority a brain brings to an organism. The linguistic fabric of law extending
from the theological core of identity acts as the network constituting the nervous
system instructing behaviour which creates sustains structure in a dynamic manner
that causes the whole organism to act in the name of the core identity.

lxix Gierke's words compliment Spencer's more earthly account perfectly, albeit
 they do not invoke the same sense of corporate physiology. Gierke is giving
expression to the psychological experience of the physical reality of being an
individual in society. It is the psychological experience that is everything in terms of
our consciousness of Super Being, while it is the physical reality that we just do not,
cannot, see, not as an organic form, because we are so conscious of our own
consciously creative and constructive role in the physical being of the Super Being.

lxx Barker's halfway compromise between Gierke's insistence upon an organic

social being, and a society perceived to be merely a collection of autonomous
individuals, is more of the same working of the dualistic mechanism of fragmentation.
Anything to escape from the possibility of seeing reality. Why distinguish between a
community and a State? Why not ask why States evolved, what function they serve?
And then note, as he just did when discussing the differences between the meaning of
fictitious and moral persons, that the difference between any social group and the
State is nil. Law is just a more rigorous, sophisticated, and structured form of culture,
and as such represents an evolutionary development that Spencer noted was a feature
of the social organism as it increased in size, as it was of the individual organism.

lxxvi There is a nice description of the transition of ideas into a real form via a stage
of artificial creativity which acts through the individual. This includes law,
and it reveals how the exoskeleton of the human superorganism evolves and grows by
means of a process that can equally well be called discovery, whether we are referring
to genetic, or linguistically induced forms.

lxxvii Here Barker's argument reduces group personality to the exact equivalent of
identity, as long as the purpose, that is the identity, of a college is preserved by
its members then the college continues to exist. This implies you cannot have a
purpose without an identity, or an identity without a purpose. And I would argue that
you cannot have life without identity since the primary requirement of life is that it
knows itself, thus life means identity, thus life, by virtue of its existence, brings into
being purpose. And life cannot escape this purely mechanistic relationship between
these two facets of its existence. If we were to apply this reasoning to Barker's
account we would be obliged to say that since the law is the purpose of the State then
the law was the identity of the State, but the state has no identity, this is the whole
point of Barker's argument, there is no such thing as a personality of the State because
it is not a living thing. No, indeed, it is a part of the exoskeleton of a living thing, that
thing has an identity, and that identity is religious, in fact, in our case, it is Jewish.
The argument concerning the continuity of the existence of the college is
correct, and applied to religious identity we can see that Judaism is the core of the
global organism. As the sole preserved identity, so preserved that its identity is even
preserved in the Jewish subidentities of Christianity and Islam, even though these
Children of Abraham do not know it, inherits the status of master identity, and the
sole inspiration for all action in the human world within which we live.
Barker does not make this observation concerning identity, he wants to hide
from organic ideas by using mythological words like personality. Individuals have
identities that are unique to themselves, but this notion of personality is a theistic
device fabricated by the priesthood down the ages, this is so even though we all find it
perfectly natural to think like this.

lxxix Lets note that individuals do not have any choice in the rights and privileges
 they are granted, the positive and negative nature of the social constraints they
are put under possess the individual, the individual does not possess the constraints!
This goes for the positive constraints as much as the negative, so that the life of a
person is directed like the flow of river, saying they will not do certain things, while
they will fight to do other things, such as seeking to make money. Making money is
just as much an imposition as the sanctions that, when breached, can cause a person to
be sucked into the hormone suppressant organ of the judicial system. However
money is a different facet of the exoskeletal physiognomy, money, rather than
managing the levels of behavioural energy present in the living tissue contained
within the structure of the exoskeleton, serves to pump energy into the same organic
tissue. Thus money would be analogous to the blood carrying oxygen around the
body. But, as with the comparison between specialised behaviours, dependant upon
highly evolved knowledge routines, fluid-genes, as we might appropriately call them
since they direct the formation of superorganic tissue, such as we find in the
processing of wood and the management of males, the point of comparison between
blood and money is not the physical material but the information that directs the
creation of these materials. Materials is created by the flow of energy, and it is
information that directs the flow of energy. Therefore where genes direct the stem
cells within the body to create the appropriate fabric according to their location in the
body knowledge routines direct the individuals to create the appropriate fabric for
their location in the body.
It transpires, now that I have obtained the book whose existence I was so
delighted to find hinted at in the introduction to Durkheim's 'Rules', that is the
Organismic Theories of the State : Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the State as
Organism or as Person, by F. W. Coker, that Gierke said some very direct things
about the superorganic nature of society, including in his reasoning religion and even
race. And we find a host of other argument dealing with this subject where people try
to make this kind of analysis involving the fabric and structure of society as being like
that of an organism. I do not want to leave myself open to the simplistic attack by the
scientist-priests whose sole purpose in society is to defend the theocracy that would
allow them to compare what I am saying to what this first period of freethinkers had
to say following the beginning of the scientific revolution before Darwin came
forward and stopped all discussion with his theistic doctrine of human evolution as
ape, rather human evolution as human. So, lets be quite clear, analogy is a theistic
word that relates physical form to physical form, but we are not concerned with the
physicality of form, we know that apes have arms and humans have arms, but the
nature of the arms on these two animals are is completely different, and it is this
nature that we are interested in. It is not the physical likeness of blood carrying
oxygen around the body and money carrying energy about the exoskeleton that is of
prime concern to us, it is an appropriate analogy, but we do not want it to be just a
pretty idea that is easily ignored, we want to get at the underlying reality behind the
comparison between the two systems. In order to do this we need to recognise what it
is that these two physical systems have in common and we do this first of all by
recognising what kind of systems they are, what is their nature. The nature of the first
system, carrying oxygen around the body in the blood is genetic, the nature of the
second system carrying energy around the exoskeleton is linguistic. From this
comparison of the nature of the two systems all the detail of the analogous function in
the two distinct levels of organic organisation can be developed.

lxxxi Eureka! Gierke's revelation, and mine too, almost. The ever present flaw in
 Gierke is the notion of individuality as expressed through the idea of
personality, which fragments the organism, as Barker makes plain here, rather than
uniting the organism as the idea of personality is pretending to do. This is because
personality is an attribute of individuality, and what we really need is not for
personality, but for identity to be focused upon. The only way to validate the notion
of real group-personality is to deny individual personality, which it appears from this
introduction Gierke does not do. What is apparent, referring to the last note, is that
here the direct comparison of the person and the society is an analogy of purely
physical entities, it is not a true comparison based on the nature of the two distinct
entities, the person and the superorganism. The appropriate word to accommodate
both systems under one heading, that takes account of their respective mediums of
information, one genetic the other linguistic, is to use the word identity in place of
personality in both cases. Thus we should not speak of an individual as having a
personality, but an identity, this makes what an individual has impersonal, functional,
given to them, not theirs as a possession. This puts the individual on a par with the
State as a functional entity exiting to serve an organic purpose, and as such this is a
proper description, as opposed to the usual method we see being used where words
are concocted to give a false impression of the nature of an individual and then the
State is compared to this false linguistic construction and amazingly we find that it
makes no sense to think of the State in this false manner!
What is apparent from my first look at Coker's book is that we are heavily
dependant upon our translators in our estimation of Gierke's work and so we should
bear this in mind. But we are not actually here to make an analysis of Gierke's work,
we are looking at this work because he did believe that society was a true living
organism and we want to find evidence of these ideas in the development of society.

lxxxiv The danger of group-personality. And sure enough we got Hitler. But the fact
is that the Nazi ideology is a product of the perverse way of reasoning that
depends upon theistic dualism, which insists upon splitting reality in two. If we
recognised that the Jews are the core of a global organism and this explains all
Western and Islamic history, then this allows us to see the true nature of our position
as slaves of Judaism. Then we can see how this danger has been realised more fully
time and time again under the hegemony of the priesthood, in its various guises, but
always under one identity, than anything Hitler ever did, and that, in truth, the Nazis
were a Zionist phenomenon, exactly as Al Qaeda is today, that these two terror
machines are just two more guises of the Jewish priesthood. Thus the danger we face
by allowing the idea of group-personality is in fact the situation we live with now, and
have always lived with under the yoke of Judaism because Judaism is the
personification of group-personality.

lxxv No. The State is an organ of the church, obviously, for the form of the
organism is defined by the identity which defines it, and it is perfectly obvious
that States of all kinds carry the same identity. In Europe that is Christian, but as a
documentary last Sunday on Channel Four, Children of Abraham, recognised, in fact
Judaism, Christianity and Islam are one organic identity, and they therefore define one
organism, the global organism.
 Hard Notes

What we have here is a closely argued refutation, by Barker, of Gierke's

assertion that there is a real biological phenomenon extant in the social entity. We
know Gierke was perfectly correct, we know Barker could not be more mistaken. We
also know that all of academia, especially the scientific elements concerned with
human society, exactly those people who should be interested in other words, rejects
without a moments consideration, ordinarily, Gierke's idea, and accepts without
question, Barker's. It is for precisely this reason that we are here doing this job that
should, in theory, according to their own estimation of themselves, be being done by
the academics, and not be getting left to the laymen who have the job of living to get
on with.
What Barker is offering us here is a philosophy of analogy, expressed in its
natural domain of law. We have already discussed the way in which the mechanism
of analogy works in its role of image fabrication by acting as a substitute meaning for
the word artificial in a manner that backs up the meaning of artificial in a deeper
mode of application. Thus where artificial describes something physical that is
created at the behest of humans, the word analogy describes something behavioural
that is created by man. Behavioural in this context refers to structural forms which
naturally involve animated actions, such as the actions taking place in a theatre which
offer an artificial representation of ideas of various kinds.
Thus from this simple artifice of language, the word analogy, arises a whole
philosophy of analogy, so powerful is the idea. Barker exerts himself to insist that we
recognise the meaning of words and distinguish between them accordingly and make
these meanings the be all and end all of our investigations. But this is precisely how
language weaves an image which can then be beamed across the social biomass and
form a collective sense of what is, and thus a collective mind.
Lets consider this important point. The fact is that it is about the issue of the
nature of language that the scientific fraternity are able to create confusion and deny
reality and impose theism on their explanations of reality. The nature of language is
the key to our whole argument, language is the essence of human being that arises
from our human nature. Any linguistic image must woven in an orderly manner if it
is to be coherent, it must be constructed along the lines of a spider's web, with strands
of reasoning emanating from a central idea by means of linguistic elements, words,
whose meaning is in harmony with the core word, or queen wordkey word, as we
might say more usually.
We can give a very good example of this. The word God denotes a divine
being, the creator of all things, and above all else, in our Jewish mythology, a being
that is concerned with human beings, concerned about how we live, and upon whom
we are reliant, as individuals and as collections of individuals, or societies, for all our
needs. Of course there is no such thing as God, but there most definitely is a thing
that has the qualities that this fictitious God has. By establishing a word that carries
the attributes of something real it is possible for all pertinent real forms related to that
something real hidden in the code word, God in this case, can be spun from this
central idea by making the meaning of the words strung together to form the linguistic
image conform to the logic of the meaning invented in the code word God. And in
the legalistic philosophy Barker extols for us here we see the same mode of linguistic
image formation in operation where the code word is 'analogy'.
But what is interesting for us to see is how the decodification of the queen
word, the identity word upon which the identity of the image coalesces, affects the
image, and thus all the real, material and behavioural, structures that have been
constructed in response to the image formed under the influence of the queen word.
Thus the word God has given rise to all religious identities with which we are
commonly familiar today. Associated with these identities, Jew, Christian, Moslem,
we have a whole host of structural forms, synagogues, churches, mosques. All of
these things are produced by virtue of the existence of the word God, as a functioning
queen word in the image of the self that creates the superorganism of which we are a
part.
Change that one word, God, decode it, substitute for the word God another
word with an entirely different meaning, but which claims to be the focus of the same
attributes that are attached to the queen word God, and what do we think will be the
consequence?
The death of the superorganism whose very fabric is woven from an extension
of the ideas emanating from the word at the centre of the image which tells us who we
are. Change the word code word God for the scientific word Superorganism, and God
is dead, everything associated with the word God is left without a functioning anchor
to keep its image strings taught and thus to motivate the biomass programmed with its
identity to act in a coordinated fashion. Religion dies, the fabric of religious form
dies too.
But, all we are doing here is discussing law! How on earth to we end up
considering religion? Because there is only religion, the idea of the word God is the
queen word in the image that creates the superbeing that is the organism of which we
form a part. The point is that all words are so developed in their meaning that extend
the linguistic web further and further but always sustain the image according to the
same core values imposed on the original keyword, God. The major word 'analogy',
like the major word 'artificial', is a nodal code word in the web that allows new
threads to be extended across conceptual space that consists of the image woven by
words which is then represented in the social world in the form of structure.
In this particular case we are concerned with the legal institution, here then the
word analogy, in conjunction with the linked word artificial, acts as a nodal code
word acting as a substructure to the word God draws in the consciousness upon the
divine conception of the individual subject to God's authority, and in so doing allows
a legislative framework of ideas to be woven that conforms to the linguistic constraint
imposed on the prime word at the centre of the linguistic image. In this way the
theistic idea is extended throughout the real social structure and gives rise to highly
complex ideas, that is linguistic images, developed on the basis of religion, but
applied to the ordering of social affairs.
Hence Barker makes out that in all of this the meaning of the words we use is
all that need concern us and so he tells us that there are several different meanings that
apply to the word personality, one of which is the artificial meaning associated with
the artificial construction which is law. But this is just his interpretation, an
interpretation that is delivered by a professor working in Oxford university, and thus
not delivering a personal evaluation, but an official line of reasoning which of course
relies upon such techniques as establishing the meaning of words and maintaining the
integrity of those meanings. Barker is just a priest of law, delivering the authoritative
line.
Meanwhile Gierke is trying to formulate a very clear idea of the real physical
existence of a living social being that is far more than the sum of individuals within a
group. Gierke unfortunately is locked into the linguistic web that is language and
obliged to the theistic mode of expression that forces all ideas to link back to the
queen idea of God. He therefore invokes an image of superhuman being, but he does
so in the language of ordinary human being. He simply does not have the core word
and a set of sub-structural words from which to build a proper image of the reality he
so clearly perceives. He has a sense of the organic, but he no knowledge of its real
nature and form. Consequently Barker can toy with him, repeat his words, play at
respecting his ideas, and gently put him down to run and play in the woods while, he,
Barker, and his cronies, get on with the serious job of running the world according to
their own determined and wholly wilful conception of how the world should be.
Language we must remember creates social form directly, just as genes create
physiological form directly. Language is our prime subject in the understanding of
human society, language is the missing link between the biological and the social.
And this fact comes out forcefully in the above passage on the nature of law, legal
ideas, and the institutions that create these ideas and the institutions associated with
them. Hence we see Barker describing how a judge will assign personae.

'He may recognise legal personality (at any rate when he is dealing with the
matter of group-personality) on the ground of analogy, assigning personae to
bodies which are in an analogous position to those already recognised under
existing law.'

(p. lxxi)

And in this manner a legal framework evolves according to an established structural

foundation, a foundation which is itself the law and associated institutions. Thus the
linguistic formula grows and spreads like the fungal growth of a mushroom, but with
the skeleton of a more robust spider's web running thought it. What is more however,
is that these laws which the judge may weave in the course of performing his duties
according to the dictates of the structure within which the part of his life from which
he draws his sustenance is spent, creates thereby, real social structure.
So the matter is not just one of artificiality, in the sense of a complete fiction,
the law courts, the businesses, the prisons, the enforcing agencies, all exist and are
very real. But, via the mechanism of analogy, these products of the law are all
rendered the artificial creations of human will and ingenuity. But Gierke is asserting
there is more to it than this, and Gierke is right, much more. And a little further on
Barker makes this telling observation.

'we must instantly ask ourselves whether the State is free to choose, at its own
discretion, the objects to which it concedes that personality; or whether it is
not rather bound, by its own very nature, to concede such personality to
certain objects, in virtue of their nature.'

(p. lxxii)

This says it all, after all the contrivance about artificial this and analogical that, we
have the plain and simple truth, social form is dictated by some force. That force is
human nature, a nature which is corporate and which evolved to create social
structure, something that is achieved primarily, today, by means of the mode of
communication that we call language.
 Barker then goes on to harp on about the moral person and the
inappropriateness of thinking about the existence of moral responsibility attached to a
group. This is perfectly correct, you cannot make a group morally responsible for an
action for which it is responsible because then all individuals who were part of the
group would be equally responsible, this would amount to a complete negation of the
individual. But what Barker fails to point out is that the term moral is a theological
artifice, there is no such thing as moral and immoral acts. This would be like, to use
an analogy, saying that there were nice and not nice colours. Well so there are, but
only ins so far we evaluate them to be so. In other words morality is a value judgment
and so it is not surprising that you cannot make moral character an attribute of a group
and then infer the application of the meaning of the word and so make all people who
are members of the group responsible for all actions taken by the group as a group.
Morality does not exist just as God does not exist, there is something real behind the
fictitious meaning attached to the word moral, just as there is concerning the fictitious
meaning attached to the word God. Moral behaviour, in short, is simply behaviour
that conforms to the prevalent social norms, raping slaves is moral behaviour, in some
times, and places; if not today, at the moment, here.

'Now are the true believers happy : who humble themselves in their
prayer, and who eschew all vain discourse, and who are doers of alms-deeds ;
and who keep themselves from carnal knowledge of any women except their
wives, or the captives which their right hands possess ; (for as to them they
shall be blameless : but whoever coveteth any women beyond these, they are
transgressors : and who acquit themselves faithfully of their trust, and justly
perform covenant ; and who observe their appointed time of prayer:) these
shall be the heirs, who shall inherit paradise ; they shall continue therein for
ever.'

(The Koran, Pub. Frederick Warne, 1893 [approximately] Page 257.)

Its not all bad that there Mohammedan branch of Judaism then, maybe the new
European superstate won't be such a bad place to live in the centuries to come after
all.

'Psychological personality is a datum of immediate perception. Moral

personality is a datum of moral consciousness. Legal personality is something
which is not a datum. It is a mental construction, or juristic creation.'

Here we have a blatant attempt to make the philosophy of analogy stand on its
own as a matter of fact. Interpreting this offering we can say that psychological and
moral concepts have a reality that is self existing and independent of human agency in
their creation, while law is a product of language and we have to use language to
fabricate law before law comes into being. This is complete rubbish, but he earns the
right to talk such rubbish in the same way a Jew earns the right to talk of divine
retribution or divine selection as principles in the life of humanity, these priests earn
this right of artful presentation by being members of an institution which has created a
body of knowledge in the form of a linguistic image which has a core idea that lets
threads of this kind be woven to extend the reach of the image and so the reach of the
authority embodied in the institution these priests serve.
 'Legal personality is thus a mental constructionbut a mental
construction which is a fact in our human world, and a real part of our human
experience. Being a mental construction, and not an immediate datum of
perception or consciousness, it can be imputed by the mind not only to the
visible being of an individual, but also to the invisible being of a purpose in
the pursuit of which a body of individuals are permanently united. Such a
purpose may have property attached to it, and own that property: it may have
duties attached to it, and owe those duties; it may be a party to legal action in
order to vindicate its property or to suffer vindication of its duties. In all these
ways it acts as a, persona juris; and for all these reasons we may call it a
persona juris. The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose;
and legal personality belongs to that essence. With the individual it is
different. The essence of his life-unity is a continuing spring or power of
purpose; and that is the essence to which his legal personality belongs.'

This is really such an important paragraph in the above that I have pulled it out and
recast it for our focused attention. The point about this section is that it is in fact
describing quite precisely the actual means by which Nature creates the material
structure of the superorganism via the activities of the human individual. Barker tells
us law is real, even though it is a mental construct. He then tells us that this legal
reality is just as real a collective phenomenon as it is as an attribute of individual
being. But as a collective phenomenon the law constitutes a real purpose. This
purpose, made actual in the shape of law, can then be made substantial, in effect, for it
can have property attached to it. Thus the law is a motivational strategy with a
structural form, it is a life force with a body, a being with an exoskeleton.

'The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose; and legal
personality belongs to that essence.'

And now this is the really explosive sentence, for here we have the embodiment of the
master race's identity, as revealed in Judaism. The express purpose of Judaism is to
rule the world under one God, as the Chosen People, and legal personality belongs to
that essence! The essence of Jewish identity is the law. The Jewish identity evolved
about the evolving form of the law, this is what makes the Jewish culture take the
form that it does, and what has caused Jewish history to take the form that it has. It is
implicit in the idea of human nature being corporate, that it gives rise to a master
organ in which authority and identity are united as one, therefore whether it is the
Jews, the Sumerians, the Incas or whoever, this attribute of combined authority and
identity will be the hallmark of the master organ of superorganic structure.

We next come to some discussion of the fixity of social from and how this is
to be avoided if social growth is to be enabled. Thinking about this gives us some
insight into the nature of Judaism and its two subidentities, Christianity and Islam.
These two churches, the Scottish and the Irish named here, are seeking to make
themselves universal entities with absolute authority and identity. This is an illusion,
they are only structural elements of a much vaster being, in this case they form part of
the differentiated, but interdependent, Christian hierarchy of the Jewish organism. It
is because they are structural elements, and minor structural elements at that, that they
have to face this kind of problem concerning the erroneous use of law to form their
structure. Individuals, in their use of law, make this kind of error because they have
no conception of the nature of their own identity, nor the nature of the law which they
use to define their identity.
The interesting issue that attracts our attention is just want the nature of
Judaism is that it escapes these constraints experienced by minor identity structures.
The answer to understanding this question is that the social morphology, to use a
Durkheimian phrase, like any living physiology must carry features of identity
imbued into the structural elements of its form, and these features of identity must be
so placed as to be able to serve their purpose of communicating identity appropriately.
These minor structural elements do not have the physical extent to impose an external
form of identity component in their linguistic fabric of creation. Whereas the Jewish
culture is so evolved as to allow it to be fixed in a very special manner indeed, which
is what allows the Jews to exist without a territory of their own by being ensconced
within the territory of others whose legal construction is amenable to such infusion of
alien identities that carry a legalistic identity evolved to accommodate itself to
legislative frameworks.
The Christian and the Muslim identities are merely mirror images of the
Jewish identity imbued with crucial patterns of identity to invoke differentiation into
the exoskeletal structures they give rise to. The crucial point in all of this is that the
scripture, the written body of linguistic material, defines the broad identity bands, and
no matter what you become in the process of differentiation you will always find your
identity is attached via the fibre of the web created by the linguistic image that has at
its centre the queen word God which is the core of the Jewish superorganism.
The issue concerning the constraints imposed on themselves by the minor
theistic structures is one of identity. Identity is a purely fluid form, thus a colour is a
perfect medium of identity as it can appear in any person, of any age, gender, ability
or position. A linguistic identity, to be universal must have the attributes of a colour
that mean it can be imbued into any individual without having any structural
consequences in itself. The more minor structural elements are necessarily bound to
be imbued with attributes of identity that fix them to substructures of the organism,
thus localising them and constraining them, we see in Barker's examples that we are
dealing with national identities in conjunction with Jewish slave identity.
The more detached from structure a subject becomes the more it takes on the
pure attributes of identity, and it is this that we have just been discussing that defines
the Jewish identity. The Jewish identity evolved to attach itself to the pure unattached
purpose of a superorganic being as an abstract being, that is to say the Jewish identity
evolved an identity that crystallised about the detached purpose of law, and then
attached itself to an ideology of that purpose expressed as an abstract idea. Thus the
Zionist ideology of the Chosen People voices the evolutionary directive written into
the genetic inheritance of our species to form an elite organ of authority. This
evolutionary development, culminating in the Jewish identity, has then gone on to
create structure in the form of the civilizations associated with the course of Jewish
history, and in the process the living superorganism at the centre of which the Jewish
identity resides, has given rise to two mirror images of itself which in turn replicate
the pattern in a potentially infinite degree of variation, but always according to the
same purely abstract ideal embodied in the Jewish legalistic identity programme.
Simply being Jewish, Christian of Moslem therefore attaches an individual to
a common identity, but the specific attachments that exist in addition, which must
always exist, even for Jews themselves, the more fixed to underlying structures, like
nation or race, and the more constrained the individual becomes and the more the
reveal their exoskeletal identity as the they reveal their structural location in the
organism. The special quality of the Jew as an identity without a nation or race, befits
the organ they constitute for their special role as master organ of identity and purpose
and means they do tend not to be fixed in any structural location, although the
propaganda of Judaism naturally refutes this since the whole point of the various
ideologies is to prevent precisely the exercise we are engaging in now from being
engaged in, that is to say to prevent people from knowing the nature of their 'own'
identities.

'No common purpose is accepted, and awarded a legal position and a

legal personality, simply because it is a common purpose. A common purpose
must be weighed and measured, and found to possess some degree of quality.
There are some common purposes, such as that of the Mafia, which no State
will tolerate. Each common purpose must be compared with other common
purposes, and all must be capable of adjustment to one another and of living
amicably side by side. All partial common purposes must be set alongside the
general common purpose of the State, and must be compatible with the
attainment of that sovereign common purpose. This is not to say that the State
should, or can, exercise a ubiquitous supervision of groups. It is only to say
that it can never abrogate a duty of constructive criticism and sympathetic
adjustment. We may well pray that groups should abound, each dedicated to
its own specific common purpose. The life of man is manifold; and the
specific group, dedicated to specific purpose, is an essential element in the
development of man's variety. The one State which is also one race, one
Church, one party, one economic organisation, is a lonely wilderness. But a
State which was a home of real Group-persons, if such a State could be, would
also have its defects. It would be far from being a wilderness; but it might
well be a chaos. If we desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must
leave room both for the free clustering of groups round freely formed
purposes, and for the criticism and adjustment of such purposes by the State.'

(Pages lxxix - lxxx)

On top of inserting large junks of other people's work I am now being

repeatedly repetitious, I know, but I hope I am being of service to my readers whom I
am asking to focus upon a very challenging idea, I want to make that grasp as easy as
possible. This passage from Barker's introduction to his translation of Gierke's work
is so jam packed with a rich discussion of our topic that we must take full advantage
of the material, it is quite possibly the only such material ever to of been created, if
there is any more like it then I can only that chance might bring it into my view.
What is on my mind as I repeat the presentation of the above selection is the
control of science by the church. This is something which most people would simply
dismiss as ludicrous, and quite impossible, and simply not true. But it is true, it is
real, and I intend to prove it. This is an aid in that demonstration of proof, later, in the
last section of this work where I develop my own modern account of the idea of Super
Being according to a strictly scientific notion of what existence is, in terms of human
existence, which means discovering what human nature is, it does not mean
discovering what it means to exist in a sense that accounts for the existence of the
universe, and our presence in it.
 In the above passage then Barker makes it plan that the central authority in
society has a primary role in coordinating the organisation of the state in such a
manner that only those collective activities which contribute to the well being of the
whole, as one body, can be actively permitted to exist. It is also implicit in the above
that antagonistic organisations, such as crime syndicates, are bound to come into
being. I am not too sure that such syndicates are as aberrant as we might imagine, but
that is another issue. I only want here, to make the general point that in so far as
authority is subject to influence it assumes a right to manage all forms of collective
enterprise. It is perfectly obvious from an historical perspective that one of the
primary focuses of attention for the state was the management of knowledge, this
from ancient times to the early modern, and in many ways this practice of controlling
knowledge has still been quite overt in modern times. But science has supposedly
become a free standing enterprise, licensed by the state to say anything it likes.
Well, not quite. The point is that science must police itself, rather like the
British Medical Council polices doctors, or the police police the police, or corporate
enterprise polices corporate enterprise. It turns out that it is the scientist that is
appalled by the suggestion that humans are animals, that humans might not be exactly
as they are said to be in the Bible. It is science that asserts that discovering anything
about humans is impossible, not the state, not the church, oh no. The scientific
establishment has been unleashed, it polices itself. And a damned fine job it does, not
arch enemy of true knowledge could ever hope to match the ruthless efficiency with
which science polices science.

'If we desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must leave room both
for the free clustering of groups round freely formed purposes, and for the
criticism and adjustment of such purposes by the State.'

Talk about having your cake and eating it, here this man contrives to describe
a situation where we have an utterly rigid structure which is perfectly flexible. OK,
that is not unreasonable, a house is an utterly rigid structure which, in terms of the
variety of designs possible, is perfectly flexible. But, what he is really seeking to
eradicate from the discussion is any sense that there are forces dictating the form that
social structure should take, other than the purely idiosyncratic forms which arise
from whatever humans may decide to create. This is complete and utter nonsense.
Humans do not build bridges where there are no obstacles to cross, when there are
obstacles they do not just build a bridge and cross it. We want to take materials into
space and maybe visit mars, according to Barker's reasoning this can be done the
moment we decide we want to do it, to think of doing something is to do it. Of course
he would be disgusted at this defamation of his reasoning, but it is tantamount to what
he is saying. It is like saying we invent aeroplanes, nothing could be more wrong.
We do not create air, we do not invent the idea of flying, we do not create the need for
flight, we do not invent planes. All of the facets of the subject of flight are either
contextual and due to environmental factors beyond our conscious control, or they
involve humans in a long process of discovering how to do a massive array of highly
specialised tasks that allows us to reach the point where we have discovered how to
fly, so that Nature is able to produce flight as an extension of the human
superorganism's exoskeleton via the agency of human physiology which is dependant
entirely upon its genetic foundations for its ability to generate corporate extension by
means of cooperative enterprise.
 Eureka! I have found the solution to the ultimate philosophical question, I
know what human nature is, and it is corporate. Now if Gierke had said this he would
of been right. But, unfortunately, although he was on the right tracks, he simply was
living in an age where the depth of scientific knowledge, in terms of physical
anthropology revealing the antiquity of humanity, and the science of biology
revealing the basis of genetic inheritance, simply had not advanced to the point where
the letting his intuitive grasp of reality, arising from his professional understanding of
society as a professor of law, spill over into the wider world could meet with a
sympathetic reception and find an echo in other academic disciplines like
anthropology, sociology and biology. And yet if we read work by people like
Durkheim, Spencer, Kroeber, and such like, we can see that this organic idea of
human society was all pervasive, it really should of had a positive echo from all
around the house. The problem was, also revealed by the work of these same authors,
each of them was as committed to the idea of theistic reasoning that asserts the human
individual is the be all and end all of everything, even as they extolled the
superorganic idea of society, or the basic notions that should of come under that head.
Of course much work has been done since Gierke's day to ensure that there
never would be any possibility of anyone finding out what reality was until the Zionist
purpose written into the laws which makes our society what it is had developed to the
point where, by way of the legal expression that says possession is nine tenths of the
law, the argument became merely academic because all there was left of human
culture on earth was one identity, under one God. But life is not subject to human
will, and I am here to remind people of that. I am saying Eureka! And I confirm that
Gierke was entitled do likewise, but he did not, because he could not quite get there;
but we can. We can kill theism, destroy Judaism, and set ourselves free by liberating
the truth, in order to see a future that is bright, instead of one that is blighted by the
blind sight of Zion.

This question of syndicalism, which Barker makes much of and others seem to
of made something of too in a more substantial manner is supposed to be due to the
dangerous aspects of reasoning that the social body is a real being. This rather
reminds me of the problem created by the interpretation of Darwin's idea of evolution
encapsulated by Spencer's phrase 'the survival of the fittest' which is credited with
having inspired ideas about purity if form leading to eugenic ideologies about the
purification of the race and thus to the rise of the Nazi ideology of pure Arian breeds,
and so on to the anti-Semitism which culminated in the horrific extermination camps
of which we are all too well aware.
But I have wear a wry smile when I think of this devious and twisted
reasoning. I realise that my own reasoning could be deemed equally devious and
twisted for I would tend to argue that if the Jews did not maintain their identity in the
face of all challenges then they would not exist to face a continual round of pogroms.
This then raises the question of the right of the Jews to exist, and self evidently since I
am an atheist dedicated to the cause of advancing the truth and thus the elimination of
religion I have been brought to the inevitable conclusion that no religion should be
tolerated in a civilised society and that therefore a civlized society would not tolerate
Judaism. But, there is more to this argument than this perfectly valid logic.
The fact of the matter is that it is not the idea of evolution as presented by
Darwin that led inevitably to eugenics and the Nazi interpretation of life, or the
notions of Gierke concerning the nature of groups that leads to the vindication of
syndicalist interpretations of society. It is the perversion of these ideas by Judaism
that leads to the Nazis and the communists. The Nazis were supreme Zionists, as the
Al Qaida terrorists are, both want to take the place of the Jews as the master race. The
reason they are able to create such perverse interpretations of essentially correct but
incomplete ideas about human existence is purely because the authority of the Jewish
ideology over our world prevents the correct interpretation from coming forward.
And as we see when I provide a correct interpretation of Darwin's thinking or that
Gierke, what we get is not fracturing of the social body but its harmonious unification,
especially in all those places where the would be fascists like to insert the knife, and
twist.
We see that the homosexual or the blind person or the congenitally deformed
or inadequate are the highest expression of our human form in so far as they represent
highly specialised structural developments in the physiology of the organism by virtue
of their existence. Of course the Jewish slave implant teaches us to honour life as
sacred in order that this special advantage can be realised, but by doing so in this way
it focuses the resulting power on the priesthood instead of revealing the true nature of
the biological mechanisms that are at work and this sets up tension between the myth
and the truth that science is bound to uncover. The consequence of this tension is that
ideologies such as those of the Nazis will be engendered, but they are engendered by
power of Judaism itself to survive! Not by the scientific ideas that would destroy
Judaism. And thus we see that my notion that it is the survival of Judaism, and
religion in general, that is responsible for the evils that it decries so much, is
supported by a rational and scientific appraisal of the facts of existence.
Barker then goes on from the problems of syndicalism to that of racism,
discussing the manner in which group identities of a nationalistic form may take
centre stage in their effort to capture power in their own name. Fine, this is certainly
what happened, but I have dealt with matter by indicating what the true nature of race
is, and I have shown that religion is the extension of race into the social domain via
the means of linguistic replication of form where religious identity simply becomes
the new means of forming groups, and this is why Judaism has become the new
master identity which invokes the purpose of unification under one identity by means
of ethnic cleansing of all other identities that are not subject to its will. And of course
this process has been going on in the name of Judaism for thousands of years, and is
still going on, never mind the poxy effort of the Nazis, which in truth was simply a
major push on behalf of Zionism, and it has caused the spread of Islam into the fabric
of the Western world and made it the front line in the war to knit the world together
under the authority of Jerusalem.
So you do not escape, as Barker seems to want us to do, by hiding from
reality, as he is determined to do. Quite what kind of world we would find ourselves
faced with if these ideas could be made public and earn their place as the new
knowledge of self informing our world and thus bringing to an end 6,000 years of
Judaism, but it is so hard to envisage this greatest of all acts of liberation that it
scarcely seems worth considering and it is my intention to say that I am here for one
reason only and that has nothing to do with any political agenda of any kind, I only
want to defend, by liberating, and therefore advancing science.

'The State, on our general theory of purpose, is not an ultimate or

absolute person, which can do or omit to do what it chooses at its will. It is a
group or association ; and it stands on the same footing as other groups or
associations. Its essence or being consists in its purpose, just as the essence or
 being of all other groups consists in their purpose. Not only is purpose the
essence of the groups contained in the State: it is also the essence of the State
itself. When we are speaking of the relation of the State to groups, we are
speaking of the relation of one common purpose to a number of other such
purposes. The characteristic of the purpose of the State is that it is a specific
purpose of Law. Other purposes, so far as they concern or affect this purpose,
must necessarily be squared with it. This is the same as to say that other
groups, so far as they hold or assume a legal position, must necessarily be
adjusted to the legal group which we call the State. They are not thereby
adjusted to its will: they are adjusted to its purpose, which is Law. The State
would be failing to attain its purpose, and thereby to discharge its duty, if it
failed to secure such adjustment. But the adjustment is not a matter of
discretion, and it is not absolute: it is controlled by the purpose of the State,
and it is relative to that purpose. To reject the theory of the real personality of
groups is not to fall into any worship of the omni-competent or absolute State.
It is to find the essence of the State in its purpose of Law, and to subject it to
its purpose, just as we find the essence of other groups also in their particular
purpose, and just as we make them too the servants and ministers of their
purpose. Only if we make the State, like every other group, a common
purpose, and not a real Group-person, shall we escape the tyranny of mere
will. Purpose is something specific; and if we are face to face with a State
which is specific purpose, we are face to face with the finite. In a word, we
see and accept the sovereignty of Lawboth the law of the Constitution,
which expresses the fundamental purpose on which the State is based, and the
ordinary law of the courts, duly made in accordance with the Constitution,
which expresses that purpose in detail, through the various ranges of human
life, in all the area of external conduct amenable to its control.'

(Pages lxxxvi - lxxxvii)

The essence of the State is its purpose, and its purpose is the fulfilment of the
law. But as we have already seen, Zionism is the purpose of the superorganism, a
purpose derived from human corporate nature which dictates that there can only be
one superorganism, occupying the planet as one territorial zone. The State is simply
the brain within the exoskeleton of the superorganism, and the law, which exists as
the programming within that brain, is formed in such a way that its purpose is the
fulfilment of the idea of Zionism which has made the Jewish identity the defining
identity of the living tissue of the superbrain. The cultural identity that is Judaism is
woven from the law which has evolved over thousands of years. The fact that it is not
actually Jews who rule us, and who farm us, is meaningless for we are all Jews by
default, and when we look at our British and American political elite it is perfectly
obvious that the passionate Christians who rule us are as close to being dedicated
Jews as makes no odds.
And so the purpose of Zionism reverberates through every single move the
slave nations of Judaism make. The war on Iraq is a perfect example. It was a Zionist
war, long in the planning, as part of the programme for the establishment of Israel on
a firm footing. You do not think that after some one thousand nine hundred years
without a Jewish State, that now our masters have re-established their hold on their
symbolic territorial heartland, they are not perfectly sure of how the next thousand
years is going to go, all being well, in terms of the securing of their plan for world
domination do you? Get real. And so we see that this description that Barker gives of
a State that must act to fulfil the purpose it exists to fulfil, is exactly what the State did
when it completely ignored its fictitious master, the people, whom it supposedly exists
to serve. Tony Blair simply insisted that what people wanted had absolutely nothing
to do with what he was going to do, and nor, presumably, should it have, in his mind.
He had to do what he believed was right, that was to serve the purpose for which he
became a politician, to serve Zionism. Consequently 'our' State ignored the law, and
followed its purpose, the purpose for which the law exists, to give life and vigour to
the superorganism which bears the Jewish identity.
Blair applies the same simple minded reasoning to everything he does, that is
why he became a lawyer, and is content to be a Christian slave of ignorance. Today,
15/06/04, following the disastrous results for him in the local and European elections,
in response to a question about the success of the United Kingdom Independence
Party, he exuded his now familiar air of self righteous contempt for the people of this
nation when he used the same tired line we heard time again when he stood on his
podium looking smug as he forced us to go to war with Iraq. He said he respected the
views of the two point six million people voting for the party seeking withdrawal
from Europe, but he had to do what he believed was right. To obey, in other words,
the purpose for which he, and all humanity exists, as far as his programming is
concerned, to serve the Jewish masters. The Jews need Islam to become the
foundation of their mastery of the earth, their laws are bringing this into being,
knitting the fabric of the exoskeleton accordingly. Europe has to be reduced to one
nation in order to facilitate this process, and it has to become a Moslem Superstate for
this to happen; or at least, that is how it looks like this story is panning out to me. I
guess I could envisage some more subtle and complex end game to this phase of the
human species ascent to the lowest possible level of human dignity, but that would
only be to tweak with the possibilities as we must face them in their current form. It
really is an abomination to think that in this day and age we have to be presented with
religious idolatry as a high minded piece of human expression, the girl in the high
court today, still 15/06/04, fighting for her right to display the fact that she is an abject
slave of Islam, itself a Jewish slave identity, is an absolute affront to the dignity of
humanity and that the law tolerates this kind of religious expression is an offence
against our humanity.

I, as a Christian slave, by origin, have next to know real knowledge of Islam,

obviously it is too vile for words, I hate to think of the kind of language I would be
driven to use if I were to try and give expression to the disgust I feel for this appalling
religion. Needless to say I hate religion without let, and the absolute horror in which
any civilised person must hold Islam only comes from the power of this force in our
world today. It is a bit like asking whether we would rather be shot through the head
with a bullet or de-atomised in the blast from a nuclear weapon, naturally we would
all be horrified at the latter prospect and, relatively speaking, delighted by the former
alternative; which is a strange kind of delight but when it comes to choosing between
Islam and Christianity, that is the effect the choice has on me.
Since finding the key to understanding all questions pertaining to human
existence from a strictly scientific viewpoint I have been able to state exactly what
Judaism is and to recognise the nature of its two subidentities and to work out
approximately how these structures work. It is perfectly clear that Christianity is a
Jewish slave identity since the Christian worships the mythical figure of a Jew as a
god. But the Jewish nature of Islam has certainly not been at all clear to me at times.
However I began to catch onto the manner in which the Jews fabricated a slave
identity befitting the eastern branch of their territorial range as I picked up bits of the
idiocy which constitutes Islamic idolatry, such things as the focus of the Moslems on
Jerusalem as the Holy centre of their world, which is a cause of so much aggro in
Palestine today. Then there are the daft stories about the prophet being carted off to
Jerusalem by the archangel Gabby, and so on. Too much yuk, for me to bear really.
But I was just flicking through my nice Victorian copy of the Koran yesterday, when I
found a whole page of stuff that just reeked of Judaism, I was amazed. This selection,
intended to demonstrate my point about the Jewish nature of the Moslem identity, is
entitled The Ant, and I thought it particularly appropriate for our investigation of the
form of the superorganism we are stuck in the arse end of just now.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ENTITLED, THE ANT; REVEALED AT MECCA.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD

These are the signs of the Koran, and of the perspicuous book: a
direction, and good tidings unto the true believers; who regularly perform
their prayer, and give alms, and firmly believe in the life to come. As to those
who believe not in the life to come, we have prepared their works for them;
and they shall be struck with astonishment at their disappointment, when they
shall be raised again; these are they whom an evil punishment awaiteth in
this life; and in that which is to come they shall be the greatest losers. Thou
hast certainly received the Koran from the presence of a wise, a knowing God.
Remember when Moses said unto his family, Verily I perceive fire: I will
bring you tidings thereof, or I will bring you a lighted brand, that ye may be
warmed. And when he was come near unto it, a voice cried unto him, saying,
Blessed be he who is in the fire, and whoever is about it; and praise be unto
GOD, the LORD of all creatures! O Moses, verily I am GOD, the mighty, the
wise : cast down now thy rod. And when he saw it, that it moved, as though it
had been a serpent, he retreated and fled, and returned not. And GOD said, O
Moses, fear not; for my messengers are not disturbed with fear in my sight:
except he who shall have done amiss, and shall have afterwards substituted
good in lieu of evil; for I am gracious and merciful. Moreover put thy hand
into thy bosom; it shall come forth white, without hurt: this shall be one
among the nine signs unto Pharaoh and his people; for they are a wicked
people. And when our visible signs had come unto them, they said, This is
manifest sorcery. And they denied them, although their souls certainly knew
them to be from God, out of iniquity and pride, but behold what was the end of
the corrupt doers. We heretofore bestowed knowledge on David and
Solomon; and they said, Praise be unto GOD, who hath made us more
excellent than many of his faithful servants! And Solomon was David's heir ;
and he said, O men, we have been taught the speech of birds,¹ and have had all
things bestowed on us; this is manifest excellence. And his armies were
gathered together unto Solomon, consisting of genii and men, and birds; and
they were led in distinct bands, until they came unto the valley of ants. And an
ant, seeing the hosts approaching said, O ants, enter ye into your habitations,
 lest Solomon and his army tread you underfoot, and perceive it not. And
Solomon smiled, laughing at her words, and said, O LORD, excite me that I
may be thankful for thy favour, wherewith thou hast favoured me, and my
parents; and that I may do that which is right, and well-pleasing unto thee: and
introduce me, through thy mercy, into paradise among thy servants, the
righteous. And he viewed the birds, and said, What is the reason that I see not
the lapwing? Is she absent? Verily I will chastise her with a severe
chastisement, or I will put her to death, unless she bring me a just excuse.
And she tarried not long before she presented herself unto Solomon and said, I
have viewed a country which thou hast not viewed; and I come unto thee from
Saba, with a certain piece of news.

¹ That is, the meaning of their several voices, though not articulate ; of
Solomon's interpretation whereof the commentators give several instances.

(Pages 283-4)

This sliver of mental coprolite serves the purpose for which it was extracted,
in my view, for Moses, David, Solomon, and aggro with the Egyptians, all sound like
stuff dragged straight from Jewish mythology as per the Bible. What on earth we may
wonder had it to do with the Arabs for whom this particular version of the Jewish
identity was intended to provide a corporate identity thus attaching them to the Jewish
identity and thus rendering them as slaves unto the Jews, just as Christianity has done
for the rest of us. I have no idea what the drivel presented here is supposed to be
about and unless someone who knows wants to tell me in plain language I do not care,
I have nothing but contempt for this kind of arrant garbage, to have it passed of as
some kind of sacred teaching is enough to make any human beings blood boil.
But my attention was caught by the reference to the language of the birds and
this is why I left the footnote referring to this phrase, although the footnote leaves me
none the wiser on its meaning I do have an insight into this, and a little birdie tells me
that if Ouspensky were alive and kicking here and now he would have a twitter to
contribute to our understanding of this matter. I have noted how the fans of esoteric
knowledge have long been fascinated with the superorganic species like ants and bees
as mirrors to hold up to ourselves. Freemasons would apparently know what this
reference to the language of birds means for it is a reference to their esoteric
knowledge in their pantheon of fiendishly cunning codes.

'The thirteenth-century occultist Michael Scot once insisted that honey

falls from the air into flowers, whence it is collected by the bees. To us, the
idea is fanciful, yet Scot was versed in the secret arts, and he knew that the bee
is an ancient symbol for the human soul, while honey is the thing which feeds
the soul. Scot was writing in what used to be called the LANGUAGE OF
THE BIRDS  the secret speech of the occultists.
The Language of the Birds, sometimes called the GREEN
LANGUAGE, was not one of mere arbitrary symbolism. The symbols it used
were derived from cosmic truths: it was no accident that the bee was chosen to
represent the soul. The occultists recognised that the temperature of the hive
was always the same, and that, by a curious coincidence, this corresponded to
the temperature of the human body. Since bees live in the hive, and human
 souls from time to time live in bodies, it was therefore cosmically appropriate
to use the bee as a symbol of the other "hive-dwellers", the human soul.'

(The Encyclopedia of Secret Knowledge, Charles Walker, Rider, 1995, pages 7-8)

As atheists, committed to the eradication of all forms of religion from the earth
to make possible the creation of a civlized social environment in which all human
beings can be fulfilled in their own name and not in the name of some fictitious
identity that is that of 'slave' in any true human language, we are astounded by the
mind numbing idiocy of religious documents like that of the Koran quoted above. We
are therefore pleasantly enlightened to find interpretations of this deceitful treatise
which let is know they are simply the work of deviants and criminals whose sole aim
is the self serving search for power and personal gratification.
If only that were all these annoying pieces of scribble were. But of course we,
as scientists, are obliged to put aside our annoyance at being obliged to refrain from
doing science in order not to dethrone the criminals and deviants who honour these
religious codes, for we have to interpret these mythologies in purely biological terms,
in terms of their function. We recognise that religion delivers a corporate identity
based upon the evolved capacity for speech, in extension of the racial physiology
which relied upon the genetic factors shaping the members of a superorganism prior
to the coming of speech as we know it where fully abstract conceptions of reality are
communicable by means of words, this allowing conceptions of the self to be formed
and shared that are pure identity, and independent of any fixed aspect of reality, thus
making the ideas themselves there own fixed reference point.
And that is what a religious identity is, it is its own fixed reference point. and
it is some such function that we must attribute to the actual body of texts that
constitute the Jewish family of identities. The fact is that no Jew, Moslem or
Christian is likely to any deep grasp of the content of their mythological identity
programme, it is a source delivered to them by various means, but the existence of the
texts must act as an embodiment of the superorganic beings identity. What the text
says is largely therefore meaningless, hence the utter drivel we find when we actually
look at these things, but that there should be a text to which people can relate is vital.
The only other condition is that the text should deliver a Jewish identity, exactly as we
see the Koran does.
We may think that pulling off this creation of new version of Judaism was a
trick that belongs to a bygone age, but we would be very much mistaken, nothing has
changed in respect to human nature in the last two thousand years and the ability of
the priests to churn out new mythologies suited to the audience of the moment is
shown to be endless. The best example of this that I am aware of is the creation of the
Mormon Jewish creed especially formulated for the new slave territories of America,
we may think the Koran, like the Bible, is an appalling piece of rubbish spewed from
the minds of criminals, and we would be right, but with the fabrication of the
American slave identity so fresh, in historical terms, it is as a plain as day how this
trick proceeded, but none of that makes the least difference to the power and influence
of this Jewish slave implant.
 An Analogical World

It was my intention to continue with a selection from Gierke's work, it would

easy to find appropriate passages to quote and comment upon. However, the sole
object of the exercise engaged in so far was to demonstrate that the idea that society
was a true living organism had been pervasive during extensive periods of time during
the historical period that provides us with the necessary written evidence of the ideas
people have been possessed by in the past.
As a passionate atheist living in the opening years of the twenty first century
when science has truly come of age and the knowledge we have about the world we
live in is staggering, I have often asked myself why it never occurred to anyone to
think of the possibility that humans might be animals, and might of evolved. Pardon!
You may think, is he serious? Yes, definitely, but not, not exactly. Would be my
answer. It is a question of degree, as we saw from a brief quote taken earlier, all the
best efforts of science today leave us unable to answer the first question about our
own nature, it is 'as if we live outside nature'. But, it is not just a question of how can
that be, it is a matter of fact that it cannot be.
I spoken throughout of the dualistic mechanism of mythological fabrication
that splits the understanding of reality we have in two, and it is this that leads to the
sense arising from talking nonsense. Thus we can know that all people accept
humans are animals that evolved, why still asking why it has never occurred to
anyone to think of the idea that humans are animals that evolved, and we are making
perfect sense? In the insane world of theology, where the nature of a form is split
from the form itself, we have two worlds existing in the same space and time, and this
ludicrous question I am asking make sense in our resulting Alice in Wonderland
world.
As it happens, while writing this work I received a copy of Durkheim's 'Rules'
from America, and, as I noted in real time, in it I found the briefest reference to a
work on the very ideas we are concerned with here, about society as a living organism
from the period I really have in mind when I ask my dualistically sane, otherwise
insane, question. When the idea of evolution appeared, why did the first people faced
with the idea not apply a biological mode of reasoning to humans as we know them?
The first thought a person must have when they turn the whole of their culture
upside down, as I have done, is to ask How come? What about all the experts
devoting their lives to the very task you have devoted your life to between pints of
beer and spliffs, you are the one who has got the answer? It makes no sense. It
immediately follows that the major thesis the establishment rely in suspect, one you
have the dualistic mechanism firmly in mind you easily see where the problem lies.
Hence Darwin's work came under suspicion, did he fabricate it in order to stem the
tide of science that was rising in a tidal wave against Judaism? The question could
only go unanswered, but begging to be answered. But here, at last, is the hard
evidence that there was indeed a rising tide coming crashing toward the master race
who ruled, and who rule, our society. It had to be stopped, and it was Darwinism that
stuck a plug in the hole, and prevented all future speculation upon the nature of
society from a rationally directed biological perspective.
Darwin made the evolution of humans a matter of their physical origins and to
this day we look to the apes to understand ourselves, that would be like looking at
dinosaurs to understand the power of flight in bats, or deer to understand the power of
swimming in whales. If we want to understand the social power imbued into our kind
we must look at other animals that have the same social power, and that means ants,
termites, and the like. It does not mean looking at chimpanzees. But that is exactly
what we do, we look at chimps, and meantime we know nothing about ourselves. But
what is even more amazing is that the scientists specialising in finding out about
ourselves are no only the most horrified when a scientific notion is suggested, such as
the idea that humans are a superorganism and they have a queen body, the Jews, and
their artificial world is really the exoskeletal fabric of their corporate being, and
meantime, they just look at stupid idea such as the practice of incest in extinct human
societies, wiped of the face of the earth by the tide of Judaism. Why not ask what the
tide of Judaism is, ever thought of that? If so, I have no idea where the evidence of
that intellectual exercise is. But as we can see the solution to the problem is easy to
come by and if we do apply science to society we destroy the priesthood that owns
society and farms society. And where would that leave us, apart from free? In need
of a new master.
And so lets look at some modern discussions on the nature of human beings
and see what the scientist-priests have to say today.

Between two and one million years ago in Africa, specimens of both species
[Australopithecus robustus & A. boisei] are often found in the same layers, but
thereafter the ultra megadont form disappears from the record. The discovery of the
existence of two species of hominid in the time range 2.2 to 1.2 mya is one of the
exciting, original contributions of palaeontology. It could not have been predicted
from any other class of evidence.
Dating from two million years to the present, fossil specimens have been
found which are usually classified into three successive species of the genus Homo.
If cranial capacities are plotted against time they show a tendency to increase until a
levelling off occurs in the last few hundred thousand years. If cheek-tooth size is
plotted in the same way, it shows a decrease until in the recent past a size range
equivalent to that of both Dryopithecine and chimpanzee cheek teeth is reached.
A final anatomical shift occurs which is much less well known but which may
be of fairly profound importance. Between about 50000 or so and 30000 years ago,
with precise timing varying from region to region, all surviving human populations
show a marked reduction in skeletal robusticity. Virtually all previous hominid
fossils show a thickness of bone, plus muscular ridging that is outside the range that
can be induced in modern humans even by extreme muscular training and stresses.
There are also some subtle changes in skull architecture and pelvic form (Trinkaus &
Howells, 1979). These are the major contrasts separating modern humans from
neanderthals, neanderthaloids and 'archaic Homo sapiens'. The biological meaning of
this loss of robusticity is as yet poorly understood (J. D. Clark, 1982).
One of the specific characteristics of the human evolutionary lineage has been
the propensity to make tools - and to discard them. This has created a trail of litter
that can be traced back some two to two and a half million years. Archaeological
study of this trail of refuse represents a major contribution to our knowledge of what
has happened during the final two million years or so of the co-evolution of the brain
and culture.
Stone tools comprise the most widespread and persistent element of this
record. The oldest known sets from sites such as Olduvai, Omo, Koobi Fora, Hadar,
Melka Kunture and Swartkrans are all in East and South Africa. They are simple in
terms of technology and design. Rocks were broken by conchoidal fracture so as to
generate a varied set of sharp-edged forms. Experiment shows that these forms can
be used effectively to cut off branches and to sharpen them as digging sticks or spears,
or to cut up animal carcasses, ranging in size from gazelles to elephants. Newly
developed techniques for determining use patterns from microscopically detectable
polishes on the edges join other lines of evidence to show that some early examples
were indeed used for cutting up carcasses, others for whittling wood and others for
cutting plant tissue (Keeley & Toth, 1981; Bunn, 1981; Potts & Shipman, 1981).
Thus, we begin to see that in spite of their simplicity these early artefacts had
considerable importance in effecting novel adaptations. They are to be understood
mainly as meat-cutting tools and as tools for making tools.
From the first appearance of stone artefacts, these occur both scattered over
the landscape and in conspicuous localized concentrations which archaeologists call
sites. These concentrations are often found to involve quantities of broken animal
bones among the artefacts. This has led archaeologists to write into their narratives
the early beginning of hunting (or at least, meat eating) and the early adoption of a
socio-economic pattern involving 'camps' or 'home bases' and food sharing (e.g.
Leakey, 1971; Isaac, 1978). The validity of these interpretations is currently subject
to testing and debate (Binford, 1981; Bunn et al, 1980; Isaac, 1981) (see below).
In Fig. 25.8, notice that the antiquity of control over fire is currently highly
uncertain. It goes back at least half a million years, but may go back to one and a half
or two million years or more (Gowlett, Harris, Walton & Wood, 1981). Notice also
that many material culture attributes of humans appear only in the last 1 % to 5 % of
the record. This wave of innovation occurs in the same time range as the loss of
robusticity. This could be taken to mean that many of the familiar accoutrements of
being human came only towards the very end of the narrative.
Hominoid fossils of the early and maybe the middle Miocene all come from
some sort of tropical forest context. The late Miocene is more complex - some
hominoids continued to live in forests, but others, including the ramapithecines which
had somewhat hominid-like teeth, seem often to have lived in more open, varied
woodland habitats (see Behrensmeyer, 1982 for review with references and Butzer,
1976, 1977). This is interesting, but as we have seen it is quite uncertain whether or
not this ramapithecine adaptive radiation is in any way ancestral to the Hominidae.
However this may be, faunal analysis and fossil pollen analyses combine to
show that the earliest known fossil specimens of hominids between 4 and 2 mya all
derive from strata that were laid down under non-forest conditions. The environments
represented are very varied and range from open thorn-veldt grassland (Laetoli and
some Transvaal layers) to complex mosaics of grassland, marsh, riverine gallery
woods and lake margins (e.g. Hadar, Olduvai, Omo and Koobi Fora, see Jolly, 1978;
Bishop, 1978).
This association of hominid fossils with relatively open country has
commonly been taken as vindication of Darwin's narrative propositions that our early
ancestors left the trees, an idea which has also become enshrined in our folk sense of
human evolution. However, one of the surprising twists of discovery in recent years
has been the recognition (1) that the hands, feet and shoulders of the early hominids
may have been highly adapted for tree climbing (Susman & Creel, 1979; Vrba, 1979)
and (2) that early archaeological sites commonly occur where groves of trees would
have grown (Isaac, I972b, 1976). Perhaps bipedalism is yet another example of
changing so as to remain the same with the new locomotor pattern being extensively
used initially to move between widely spaced patches of trees. Maybe we left the
forest a while ago but the trees only much more recently (cf. Romer, 1959; Rodman &
McHenry. 1980).
 After two million years ago, available evidence allows us to believe in the
kind of success story we clearly love for ourselves - expanding geographic
distribution, and expanding range of habitats used. Notice though, that the occupation
of really extreme environments such as unbroken forests, deserts or tundra can only
be documented inside the last 100000 years.
Whether it had any influence or not, the last two and a half million years of
geologic time has witnessed global climatic oscillations of increasing amplitude.
These involve the so-called ice ages. Following relatively stable, equable conditions
in the Miocene and early Pliocene, there have been some 16 or 17 ice ages since the
emergence of the genus Homo two million years ago (cf. Butzer, 1976; Shackleton,
1982).

Dynamics

Thus it can be seen that over the past decade the outlines of a four million year
narrative of human evolution has emerged, and curiosity has begun to switch over to
questions about the evolutionary mechanisms involved. Here, I can only touch hastily
on aspects of a few selected topics.
One such is the question as to whether human evolution over the past several
million years has proceeded by a process of cumulative genetic changes that pervaded
populations over wide areas so that all went through evolutionary transformation, or
whether successive species of hominids all exhibit stasis, with widespread change
being accomplished by species replacement events (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). It
should be noted in advance that these alternative models do not seem to me to be
entirely mutually exclusive.
Figs 25.9 and 25.10 show data for two relatively simple measurable attributes
of hominid fossils plotted against time. Contrary to the view of Cronin, Boaz,
Stringer & Rak (1981), Fig. 25.9b suggests that both gradualist models and
punctuated equilibrium models can equally well be fitted to the available data. The
best case for stasis in the record is the taxon Homo erectus. It can be argued that the
first appearance of this taxon looks like a punctuation event and the taxon lasts a
million years. However, at its later end many investigators seem to be reporting
mosaic patterns of transition into 'archaic Homo sapiens' and this would not be
compatible with a clear-cut punctuation event.
Numbers of workers, myself included, have tended to think of the loss of
robusticity transition of 30000-50000 years ago as a possible example of a
punctuation/genetic replacement event. But this view would seem to be falsified by
the new mitochondrial DNA data (Ferris, Wilson & Brown, 1981; Cann, Brown &
Wilson, 1982).
Fig. 25.10 also illustrates a possible example within the hominid fossil record
of the effects of the breakdown of barriers which had separated trivially differentiated
allopatric species. According to one interpretation two species of Australopithecus
came to have overlapping ranges, and responded by undergoing niche separation and
character displacement (Schaffer, 1968; Swedlund, 1974). One of the resultant
species or (species complex) is Australopithecus robustus/boisei which underwent
selection for enlarged body size, and perhaps, following the Jarman-Bell principle, a
coarsening of diet. The other became Homo habilis and retained moderate body size
and took to higher quality foods perhaps acquired in part through the aid of tools.
Maybe this is indeed a fairy story, but it is fun and it may turn out to be at least partly
true.
 The peculiarities of the early hominid megadont phase presumably relates to
diet, but what this was continues to baffle us. Scanning electron microscope (SEM)
studies of tooth wear by Alan Walker (1981) and others suggest that non-siliceous
plant tissues were being consumed - presumably fruits (sensu lato) or seeds. But what
fruits or seeds? And why such large teeth? These questions call for studies of
floristic communities and the feeding opportunities they offer as well as scrutiny of
fossils.
A battery of new techniques for palaeodietary studies are being developed,
including SEM studies and the analysis for the strontium and ¹³C composition of old
bones. A major onslaught on this fundamental problem seems to be getting underway
(Walker, 1981).
As the outlines of the narrative of human evolution have emerged, two
particularly intriguing puzzles have emerged with it. Under what selection pressures
did, firstly, the two-legged gait and, secondly, the enlarged brain become adaptive?
The first of these can be rephrased as: Why did ancestral hominids become bipedal
when all other primate species which have come to the ground have adopted some or
other form of quadrupedal locomotion? Many thinkers on these topics, starting with
Darwin, have tended to opt for an all-purpose explanation which might explain both
bipedalism and brain enlargement, for instance, tool and weapon carrying. However,
since specific evidence for the two evolutionary shifts are separated by at least two
million years, it may be wise to uncouple the searches for explanations.
Fig. 2 5.11 playfully indicates some of the competing explanations which have
been or are being discussed in relation to bipedalism.
More fossils, more palaeoenvironmental, and palaeodietary data will certainly
help to advance understanding on this question, but it should also be clear that
intelligent neontological /ecological work is called for. For instance, do potential
feeding niches really exist that would make bipedalism adaptive ?

The brain-culture system

We all share in some degree the conviction that our words, our intellect, our
consciousness, our aesthetic and moral sense, constitute the quintessential
characteristics of being human. Further we associate these qualities directly with the
evolutionary enlargement and reorganization of our brains. The issue can be put like
this: 'The brain is the organ of culture, and culture is the function of the brain'. The
term culture refers to the intricate body of language, craft skills, social custom,
traditions and information which humans learn while growing up and living in any
human society. (For a good discussion of this, see Geertz, 1973.) Cultural complexity
and flexibility of this kind is unknown in any other organism and would be impossible
without the hypertrophied brain. It is also hard to make sense of the intricacy of the
brain without supposing that the adaptive advantages that have brought it into
existence have long involved culture of increasing complexity. However, to keep our
topic from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps we should allow for the
possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism, might have been a pre-adaptive
development that was favoured by selection for reasons other than culture. This point
notwithstanding, for the time being I shall treat the brain and the culture it sustains as
likely to have evolved as a single adaptive complex, that is to say as a co-evolution
(see Wilson, this volume).
We are rightly impressed with the biological success that seems to have
followed from the development of the brain through some critical thresholds, but it
must be remembered that enlarged brains require prolonged infant dependency and
high quality nutrition (Sacher & Staffeldt, 1974; Martin in Lewin, 1982). Both of
these are expensive commodities in the economy of nature. No other lineage has
experienced selection producing such an extreme development. The central puzzle to
understanding our origins, therefore, remains the problem of figuring out under what
novel selective circumstances this trend was initiated, and under what conditions the
selection was sustained.
Set out below is a list of some of the distinctive innovations which have been
suggested and discussed as prime movers in the initiation of the trend towards
elaboration of the brain-culture system.

(1) The use of tools and weapons (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Washburn, 1960; Tobias, 1967,
1981);

(2) Hunting (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Dart, 1925, 1953; Ardrey, 1961; Washburn &
Lancaster, 1968);

(3) Gathering (e.g. Zihlman & Tanner, 1979; Tanner, 1981);

(4) Generalized social cooperation with 'autocatalytic' feedback (e.g. Darwin, 1871;
Lovejoy, 1981);

(5) Adoption by small-brained hominids of a socio-reproductive system involving

food sharing, provisioning and central place foraging (e.g. Hewes, 1961;
Washburn, 1965; Isaac, 1978; Lancaster, 1978).

It should be noted that these competing explanations are not mutually exclusive, and
future research will have to involve subtle assessment of their relative importance at
different stages rather than simple Popperian falsification.
It should also be noted that the study of the fossil and archaeological record
will not suffice by themselves to distinguish among hypotheses. It is all very well
arguing that tool-use was a pivotal development that imposed novel selection
pressure, but under what circumstances would tools be adaptive? As I argued in the
paper Casting the Net Wide (Isaac, 1980) answering this kind of question calls for
problem-oriented quantitative field studies of feeding possibilities and foraging
strategies.
Over the past 12 years my own research has been focussed first on developing
and then on testing the predictions of the so-called 'Food-sharing hypothesis' and its
possible bearing on the initiation of selection for larger brain size. I shall briefly
indulge myself by discussing aspects of this model and this work.
The first point to be made is that major changes have occurred in human
ranging patterns and feeding behaviour. These changes involve the collective
acquisition of food, postponement of consumption, transport, and communal
consumption at a home base or central place. These features are so basic in our lives
that we take them for granted and very often they do not even appear on lists of
contrasts between humans and non-human primates. However, if we could interview
a chimpanzee about the behavioural differences separating us, this might well be the
item that it found most impressive  'These humans get food and instead of eating it
promptly like any sensible ape, they haul it off and share it with others'.
 The food-sharing hypothesis should be renamed the central place foraging
hypothesis. It incorporates tools and meat eating. It postulates that at some time
before two million years ago, the behaviour of at least one kind of small-brained
hominid was modified to include the elements shown in Fig. 25.13, namely the use of
tools, the acquisition of meat, perhaps preferentially by males, the transport of
portions of that meat to central places where it would be apt to be collectively
consumed by members of a social group some of whom, especially females and
young, had not participated in its acquisition. At the beginning or at some subsequent
stage, female gathering was surely included in the system. Conscious motivation for
'sharing' need not have been involved. The model works provided that radiative
ranging patterns developed with transport of some food back to the foci of social
aggregation.
For me, the interest of the model is not that 'humans' existed 2 mya but that it
promises to help explain how the non-human hominids of that time began to be
modified into humans. Once food transport was initiated, novel selection pressures
would come to bear on (1) ability to communicate about the past, future, and the
spatially remote and (2) enhanced abilities to plan complex chains of eventualities and
to play what one might call 'social chess' in one's mind. That is, the adoption of food-
sharing would have favoured the development of language, social reciprocity and the
intellect. Evolutionary strategy models should now be developed to explore the
conditions under which food sharing might become an ESS (see Maynard Smith, this
volume).
Clearly, part of the nutritional cost of brain enlargement and the costs of
prolonged dependency during brain growth with extended learning would be taken
care of by the provisioning/nurturing characteristics which in this scenario would
already be part of the system.
The model arose as a post-hoc explanation of the existence of concentrated
patches of discarded artefacts and of broken-up bones in layers between 1.5 and 2
mya. Having set it up, we have turned around and have been enjoying the sport of
trying to knock it down, with the help of fierce critics (e.g. Binford, 1981).
The technicalities of this debate and this research go beyond the scope of this
review (see Isaac, 1981, 1982; Bunn et al., 1980; Bunn, 1981; Potts & Shipman,
1981). Suffice it to say that in my view, we have obtained ample confirmation that
hominids were indeed acquiring meat through the use of tools and were transporting
this to favoured localities where the observed concentrated patches of bones and tools
formed. Whether these places were 'home bases' or whether provisioning and/or
active food sharing were going on, is harder to judge. My guess now is that in various
ways, the behaviour system was less human than I originally envisaged, but that it did
involve food transport and de facto, if not purposive, food sharing and provisioning.
The food-sharing model has been widely misunderstood as implying that by
two million years ago there existed friendly, cuddly, cooperative human-like
hominids. This need not be so. The attractiveness of this model is that it seems
entirely feasible for such a behavioural system to come into existence among non
human hominids that had brains no larger than those of living apes, and it is my
strong suspicion that if we had these hominids alive today, we would have to put them
in zoos, not in academies.
Clearly, this initial configuration can very readily be plugged into models
involving kin-selection, and/or tit-for-tat selection patterns that would provide
plausible, if hard-to-test models of the subsequent elaboration of brain-speech-culture-
society systems. Amongst other things, the provisioning and division of labour
implied by the system would make bonded male-female reproductive modules highly
adaptive, if they did not already exist at the outset.

In conclusion

No two people who undertook to review this topic would have tackled it in the same
way. I have chosen to stress enquiries focussed on stratified evidence from the past,
while other writers would equally legitimately have emphasized the contributions
made by studies of biochemistry, ecological dynamics or by comparative behaviour
and sociobiology.
Following the pioneer descriptive phases of primate studies, various workers
have begun to search out generalizations among non-human primates concerning
relationships between food choice, ranging patterns, reproductive strategies and social
format (e.g. Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977; Wrangham, 1979, 1980; Milton, 1981).
The results have not yet been fully assimilated into thinking about human evolution,
but already it emerges that humans have distinctive ecological relationships and social
configurations that are outside the range of other primate patterns. My hunch would
be that this will prove to be connected with the colonization of habitats where
potential foods were more patchy and more widely dispersed than is normal for
primates. This in turn involved altered diets which focus on two distinctive and quite
different things: first on plant foods that yield large numbers of calories per item (e.g.
tubers and nuts) and second, significant feeding on the meat of large animals and/or
fish. Acquisition of all of these is facilitated by tool use. It is at present uncertain
when and by what stages these shifts occurred. Finding out is one of the major
challenges that confronts palaeoanthropology.
Relative to other primates, humans have highly distinctive social patterns. In
spite of tremendous variation this almost always includes reproductive units involving
direct male investment in child rearing, and comprising one male and one or more
females. These units are almost invariably integrated as modules into highly variable
larger scale social entities. I can see no way of predicting the human pattern from the
primate patterns without introducing some novel elements into the mix of variables.
One candidate for an influential novelty may well be the significant incorporation of
dietary components to which one sex rather than the other had preferential access.
Clearly, meat is one such commodity, though it may not be the only one.
Lovejoy (1981) has argued that monogamous pair bonding and food transport
preceded meat eating and the formation of bands. However, we need to retain as the
alternative hypothesis that pair bonding occurred within multi-male, multi-female
social groups and was associated with division of food acquisition labour. Recent
examination of relations between mating system, body size and testis size in primates
does not support a multi-male social group for Homo (Harcourt, Harvey, Larson &
Short, 1981; Martin & May, 1981). However, if early ancestral hominids already had
mated pair modules within the troop this objection might not apply.
Relating studies of the present to studies of the past will require changes of
emphasis. Much of the literature on the stratified record of human evolution is
devoted to the taxonomy of individual fossils and to arguments about whether
particular ones are on the line or not. The topic is in its own way important, but with
major taxa reasonably clearly established the younger generation of scientists is
becoming more and more involved in enquiring into relationships between shifts in
anatomical configurations and shifts in modes of adaptation. This line of research can
be pursued profitably even if we do not know which particular fossils are indeed on
the line and which are off it. I would go on to predict that progress with this topic will
involve much less narrow focus on fossils. Hominid palaeontologists and
archaeologists will need to collaborate in assessing the adaptive significance of
technology, subsistence patterns and socio-economic arrangements. For this, the
archaeologists will have to give up the artefact typology fixation that has been their
equivalent of fossil-philia. Both archaeologists and hominid palaeontologists are also
going to have to work closely with ecologists. This has started, e.g. Schaller &
Lowther. 1969, Peters & O'Brien, 1981, and J. Sept and A. Vincent (personal
communication).
In summary, improvements in knowledge about human evolution require the
acquisition of richly diverse classes of information. This includes both stratified
evidence from the past and the elucidation of the intricate features of living
behavioural and ecological systems. As is normal in science, hypotheses regarding
both narrative and mechanisms need to be restlessly formulated, tested and revised.
However, as indicated in the introduction, and as amply illustrated in Darwin's own
treatment of the topic, the meaning that each of us finds in the growing corpus of
secure, tested information, nonetheless remains a humanistic abstraction.

My being in a position to undertake this review stems from an appointment in

East Africa, given me in 1961 by the late Louis Leakey. Since then my wife and I
have been part of a goodly company of researchers in East Africa during a period of
exciting discoveries. Many of my ideas surely derive from this participation. I
recognize particularly strong influence from discussions with S. L. Washburn., D. R.
Pilbeam, J. D. Clark, Vince Sarich and A. C. Walker. Also from the team that has
worked with Richard Leakey and me at Koobi Fora. My wife is a part of the talking,
the fieldwork and the laboratory work, and she draws the figures. For this paper,
Jeanne Sept has done the light-hearted sketches (Figs. 25.1, 25.3, 25.11, 25.13).
Stanley Ambrose encouraged me to think about the material in Fig. 25.10 and he is
preparing a paper on character displacement in hominids. I wish to pay tribute to
three great scientists, recently deceased, who did much to foster the study of
biological and cultural co-evolutionKenneth Oakley, Francois Hordes and Charles
McBurney. The last-named especially was my mentor during my student days and
after.

(Evolution from Molecules to Men, D. S. Bendall Ed., Cambridge 1985,

Pages 521 - 539)

A Latter-Day Case of an Evolving Priesthood

Wow! There is a junk-load of stuff. And what do we first want to say about
it? Never could you have a better, living example, of how the human struggles to
keep their eyes focused upon the, fictional, dress worn by the naked king.
Look at this stuff would you! It is amazing, the effort, the struggle, the hard
work, years and years of dedication by hordes of brilliant, dedicated individuals, and
to what? Nothing, nothing but mindless drivel. Harsh! You think that is harsh? Oh,
not harsh. You think it is damned arrogant? I know what I am talking about. This
latter day example of the Hans Christian Andersen mechanism of collective deceit to
a purpose is not without earlier comparisons from another age when the barrier to
ignorance set by dualism was focused not on human nature but the nature of the earth.
 Despite the revelation that the earth went around the sun people went on
devoting their lives to the 'fact' that the sun went around the earth, it was not just the
supreme idiot Ptolemy who devoted his genius to working out how the geocentric
model of the universe could present an accurate model of the heavenly motions. If we
take a look at the Roman Cicero's work, from the first century after the Jewish god
Jesus was sanctified, On the Nature of the Gods, we find lengthy argument
concerning the idiocy of beliefs which today are only matched by those touted by
scientist-priests like Isacc. How many tens of thousands of people were duped into
leading the life of an elite member of society with privileges and honours heaped
upon them for the rubbish they churned out in the name of the geocentric model of the
universe that was already know to be utterly false, it is impossible to say, but we may
be sure that this misery was inflicted upon many people.
Today there are, once more, tens of thousand of highly gifted people, holding
lucrative positions of authority in universities around the world where they are feted
as geniuses by adoring young people and honoured by society, while all the time,
these poor, sad, deluded people have no idea that all there efforts are in vein, and the
in ten thousand years time, when it is too late to make any difference because the
Jews will rule the entire solar system, the fact that the universe does not exist in order
to revolve about humans is not true, humans are in fact just a part of the universe like
any other feature of the same. Doesn't it make you want to weep as you get up a six
in the morning to slog your way to the factory, or drag you worn out body to the bank,
or to the fields to do a days hard graft for a pittance, to think of this rich,
mollycoddled professors who live in total luxury all the while not have the faintest
notion that all their words, all their fancy ideas, are complete and utter shit?
Unless, could it be that they know this, or, that they do not care? Gosh, surely
not. I bothered to include the closing credits in the above because Isacc says he got to
be a member of the priesthood by way of an opportunity put his way by the most
renowned and famous palaeontologist of my youth, Louis Leakey. But the most
amazing thing about Leakey is that he was a professional priest, a vicar of some kind.
Did you ever hear anything more amazing than that. I dip into the Koran in order to
discover what the degenerates of this world are up to so I can try and destroy their
truly revolting practices, it sickens me, it would interest me vaguely if it were a
document from a dead age, like The Egyptian Book of the Dead. But the Koran is no
such fossil, it is a living evil that is a menace to all humanity, and especially to
science and the advance of anthropology, as we can see all too well from this
appalling piece I have quoted above. But here we find a priest devoting his life to the
search for the very knowledge that must prove God, whom he is devoted to,
supposedly, does not exist. What is going on?
This is the question I use to ask myself as a youth, but of course now I know
the answer all too well. And he is not the only one, another great impostor upon the
science of humanity taking advantage of the great fraud imposed upon the world by
Darwin's dualistic mythology of apeness, was the Frenchman Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, a Jesuit priest of all things who devoted his life to the search for the missing
link.

'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was born in Auvergne in France in 1881

and died in 1955. He fits into no familiar categories as he was at once a
biologist and a palaeontologist of world renown, and also a Jesuit father.
Long before his work was published his name was a byword in scientific
circles both in France and elsewhere. He himself spent a good deal of his life
 outside his native country, in China (where he played a major role in the
discovery of Peking Man in 1929).'

(Dust jacket, The Phenomenon of Man, Chardin, Collins, 1960)

Of course you cannot be a scientist without being a passionate atheist dedicated to the
complete eradication of religion, and belief in God, from the face of the planet, or at
least from your society, anymore than you can be a criminal and be a police officer.
The only difference between the two cases, as we can see from this quote above, is
that while we know reality can conflict with the ideal, in the case of the scientist, in
our society, this is a glorious thing, whereas in the case of the police officer it is
accepted as only being natural.

We discussed in a previous section how information filtered out of the

environment by human individuals, upon being preserved, formed knowledge; as in
the case of the evolution of the metal workers craft. We recognised that this kind of
highly specialised and elaborate knowledge, knowledge not pertaining to everyday
matters of life that all members of a small tribal superorganism could share in the
acquisition of equally, such as that concerning animal and plant qualities, was bound
to act as a germinal medium of novel behaviour that would necessarily produce a
group distinct from the main body of the superorganism, by default, as it acted to
preserve the knowledge that pertained to the specialist, and highly valued, craft. Thus
knowledge acts as the fluid-genetic medium of organic form in the living tissue of the
superorganism, which in turn has consequences for the non-living structures that form
the exoskeletal structure of the superorganism as specialised bodies have an ever
increasing impact upon the social being that is the superorganism to which they
belong. Language is the basic information medium, knowledge is the basic product,
law is a highly evolved form of knowledge, highly evolved simply because it pertains
to the stage of organic evolution that presupposes the rise of what we call civilization,
which relates to the complex form of supermassive superorganism. This said, law is
still simply the product of the specialised craft, necessarily infused into a group
identity, the group identity, in this case.
We should always bear in mind that there is no difference between seeking to
insist on the value of Nation as an exclusive identity, as the Nazis famously did, than
there is in asserting race as an exclusive identity as the South African whites
notoriously did, nor is there a difference between these two claims to exclusive
identity and that practiced by Jews, of all kinds, meaning Christians and Moslems, of
all kinds, meaning Mormons and Al Qaeda. This is all about group identity, but in
these specific cases, the battle is for domination of society as master identity. In all
cases, Jew, Christian, Moslem, Mormon, Al Qaeda, Catholic, Protestant, Wesleyan,
and so on ad infinitum, all these identities are Jewish, and so we all have a Jewish
identity, and we all live in a Zionist world. The apparent tension is only the same as
the tension we find in our own bodies that is necessary for good health.

In the above passage we find detailed evidence of the process of group

formation focused upon individuals by virtue of their privileged position, due to kin
ties, but also due to fellowship links related to already established group identities and
structures. Furthermore, we can also note the position of privilege initially allowing
the prime individual to establish a new dynastic group. Leakey, like Darwin, like
most, if not all, leading evangelists of the theocracy, are sponsored, they are not self
made, or self motivated individuals, unless by self motivation we mean motivated to
be sponsored by the elite in order to obtain the good things in life that all individuals
naturally crave, either out of ordinary levels of necessity, or perfectly natural greed.
Leakey's son, Richard, followed in daddy's footsteps, not to mention his
mothers, who also earned herself a reputation in the field of human origins,
discovering what must be the most fabulous find in all the world, the Laetoli
footprints, consisting of two adult australopithecine and their sprog strolling across a
fresh layer of volcanic ash, one bright day a couple a million years ago. And Richard,
like his father, is an appalling enemy of evolutionary science as applied to humans.
His works, Origins : What New Discoveries Reveal About the Emergence of Our
Species and Its Possible Future, 1977 and Origins Reconsidered : In Search of What
Makes Us Human, 1992, endeavour to ensure that no one imagines, in any realistic
way, that humans are part of the natural world, while nonetheless speaking of them as
if they were, in a manner seemingly most sincerely profound, and deep. This subject,
physical anthropology is the absolute love of my life, in terms of the kind of delight I
get from reading about anything magnificent about reality. I acquired a love of it
when I went to college to study anthropology, and despite the lack of point in the
course offered, the pleasure I get from just reading the work of people like Isaac is the
best. It really is a tragedy to think of this knowledge in the hands of these supreme
knowledge perverts, dedicated, as they are, by way of their profession, to its
obscuration by means of perversion. And all to serve their one true god, Judaism.
However this tragedy may be, the earth went around the sun despite the
silencing death threats against those who declared this to be so; reality remained
reality; no matter what the knowledge perverts declared it to be. Popes may be able to
pervert reality, but they cannot alter it. It may be tragic that these charlatans, whose
sole concern appears to be the masturbation of their own egos, should be in control of
the knowledge they are authorised to pontificate upon, but the facts, mercifully,
remain the same. I say mercifully, because they could simply of been destroyed,
leaving no evidence, and then we would have considerable difficulties piecing the
story of human evolution together. But of course we now know that Darwin provided
the escape route from the incessant searching of the freethinkers who were driven to
make sense of the human place in the real world that science was opening up to their
eyes as knowledge of biology and anthropology came to their attention, even as the
Jews spread out across the unknown world, exterminating, or subverting, all cultures,
to leave none but their own, mind numbingly stupid, and nasty ideology of priest-craft
law.
And we can see Isaac's concern in his opening passage to placate the
theocracy, because he is one of them, he would not have his job if he were not, he
would not of been tolerated by the devoutly religious Leakey, he would not be
anyone. Apart from the general adherence to the idea of physical origins licensed by
Darwin's slanted account that said nothing about human nature, one thing that comes
out of a consideration of the benefit accruing to people like Leakey and Chardin, and
their corrupt dynasties of incubated academics, supporting an extended lineage of
priests and their acolytes following in the train of their linguistic threads of drivel, is
that by being the ones to do the digging and the finding, they get to do the telling, and
so then they are licensed to do any explaining that has to be done too. And this, dear
people, is why they do such a good job of finding genuine evidence. The evidence is
their source of authority, and, to a great extent, they are able to give a perfect account
of the subject matter of concern, just as an ancient Babylonian, or an Inca priest,
might of given a beautiful description of the motions of Venus and enthralled us by
their predictions of heavenly events to come, that then proved to be true.
This is why I love to read the brilliant work of the knowledge perverts, such as
that of Isaac presented above, the ability to find the remains, to interpret them, and to
analyse them with electron microscopes and such like, this is divine, I love it. But
they then become experts and so they are wheeled out to provide the perversion that
supports the idea of God. It is the same in all fields pertaining to human nature.
Susan Greenfield, the famous neuroscientist who has made a name for her perverse
presentation of science on television and who is the present president of the Royal
Society. She is a brilliant neuroscientist, so she gets to say what the mind is! Fine,
but what does she say, she says what the Bible says, she would not be on television if
she did not. She says that we cannot know what human nature is, and she could not
be more wrong, as I told her in an email, for which she, generously, I thought,
thanked me.

A Latter-Day Priest Dissected

While we are on the subject there is one other area of expertise concerning
human nature where the theocracy's high priests make their presence felt, in a most
important fashion, by this method of doing sterling work in the practical field and
then going on to ensure that the same old perverted notion of theistic reality is laid
over the whole body of real knowledge, that they genuinely elucidate, like a skin
containing all the detail of real form, without revealing the implications of that form
for the resulting identity that we must experience as a result. These scientists are part
of the organ of generation of that skin, but that skin is one derived from Jewish myth,
not science. This subject area is linguistics. Linguistics is of course fundamental to
our whole conception of human nature once we know that language evolved precisely
as a means of fulfilling the potential of human corporate nature, it is clearly of the
utmost importance to ensure that this knowledge most definitely can never be known.
You cannot control knowledge by failing to seek it, or by destroying it, not in any
extensive manner, knowledge must be controlled by possessing it, this can only be
done by making an authority, establishing a body of experts who have genuine
knowledge, but he themselves have not the slightest idea what it is that they have so
that they act as thought they have knowledge, being authorised to do so, while they
actually have less than they think.
The threads pull together; expertise is not authority itself, authority sanctions
expertise, expertise is therefore, in reality, like the ideal of a police officer's vocation,
an all too vaporous thing. Ask anyone whose child has been taken away on the say so
of a doctor, or look at the court case last week, today is 21/06/04, of the doctor,
employed as an expert witness, who wrote to the police stating that a man had killed
his two children on the basis of a television documentary that he had watched. This
doctor, in court, still insisted that he was right, and the prosecution lawyer, wisely
pointed out, it was because he could not see what was wrong with his behaviour that
he was in court. Now the State is obliged to launch an enquiry into the practice of
employing experts. There is a joke if ever there was one, which experts will they get
to do that, not those practiced in being the victims of institutional abuse I don't
suppose?
Linguistics is a big subject, it is complex, and there are major theories about
how it works. The experts, as in the two previous fields just considered,
palaeontology and neurophysiology, have devoted themselves to uncovering the hard
facts of their subject, and written popular accounts to establish their priestly
qualifications with the masses. Steven Pinker is the latter-day personification of this
class of priest, in my youth Noam Chomsky was a famous priest of this class but he
was not a populariser in the same sense of Pinker, he was just a chief priest within the
establishment known to the academic fraternity, as he still is. Pinker looks great, he,
just like his counterpart in the evolutionary department of scientific mythology,
Richard Dawkins, extols the virtue of rationalism and rejects in the strongest possible
terms the theistic model. What finer title could a person like me hope to find than
The Blank Slate : The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Steven Pinker, Allen Lane,
2002. I wasted a huge sum of money on this book, perhaps the most I have ever
spent, £25, and six months later I could of had it for a quid, which would be about the
right price. There are some choice bits in it, I actually cannot remember any of it, or
what the problem was specifically, but it obviously fell to my usual scrutiny because
of its complete failure to take a scientific line on what human nature is, otherwise I
would not have the recollection I am recounting here associated with Pinker's name. I
certainly never read any of the book, dipping in was enough to reveal all.

Scrub that, I just found some notes I wrote on 23rd March last year tucked in
the back of Pinker's Blank Slate.
He accepts the nature versus nurture dichotomy spoken of in terms of genes
and heredity, versus environment and culture. He says his book is about the history of
human nature, and, in the Preface, page eight, he notes that if culture is all important
then it only exists because of the physiology which supports it.

'culture is crucial, but culture could not exist without mental faculties
that allow humans to create and learn to begin with.'
(Page viii)

I presume this is what inspired me to right the last sentence, there is nothing else
along these lines. Actually looking at his words again is inspiring, they are fantastic, I
see now why I bought the book, at such great expense, on the spur of the moment.
Recognising the same old sameness of a book can take a little bit more studious
examination than standing in a book shop, albeit a nice fancy book shop, affords. I
see this on page nine.

'Nor does acknowledging human nature have the political implications

so many fear. It does not, for example, require one to abandon feminism, or to
accept current levels of inequality or violence, or to treat morality as a fiction.'

This is a dead give away, but it is only suspicious, his aggressive assertion of human
nature demands a deeper look from me, this is my subject he is dealing with!
Accepting human nature, assuming you get what human nature is right, totally
destroys the world as we know it. This is the problem, clearly anyone saying
otherwise is simply trying to stymie enquiry by making out that we know what human
nature is, and there is no problem. Thus forestalling the coming of someone like me
who responds by contradicting the broadcast of someone like Susan Greenfield, who
asserts that we do not know what human nature is.
Pinker appears to be taking his definition of 'nature', in the term 'human
nature', from the word 'nature' as used in the phrase 'nature versus nurture'. Thus he is
finding the theistic escape mechanism provided by the dualistic model which allows
anything to be said of physical nature as long as the nature of physical nature is left
out of the equation. What human nature is has nothing to do with what genes do.
Genes do what human nature tells them to do. Genes evolve to discover ways of
creating a corporate being via their construction of individual form, which is so
constructed by genes to make the cultural environment into the realisation of that
corporate form. Nature and nurture are not therefore alternative sides of a coin, they
are the blank, undifferentiated, surfaces of the same form, the human form, a coin
with two blank surfaces.
The blank slate does not have two alternative faces, it has two, if you must use
such a dualistic, two dimensional, mode of thinking, equally blank faces. The real
meaning of the nature versus nurture debate can be stated once you know what human
nature is. This phrase, nature v nurture can be decoded from theistic-speak, dualistic-
speak, priest-lore, whatever we feel like calling this mumbo-jumbo, to nature versus
nature, in which phrase the two terms cancel each other out, leaving us with nothing,
exactly as it should be in this case because the whole business is pure fabrication.
And therein we get a sense of just how traumatic the discovery of what human
nature is must be for our world. How on earth can something so momentous as the
nature v nurture debate simply vanish in a puff of thin air, it must mean something
more than that? No, no it does not. It is a product of the Jewish myth of individual
being, and it is not only the detail of the myth that goes up in vapour, it is God, and all
that relies upon the notion of God. It is Judaism, eradicated at last from our being,
just by virtue of discovering one simple thing, what human nature is. This is not
surprising because these features of existence are as colours, they exist to give an
identity in the form of a linguistic covering to the superorganic form that is created by
means of language. No, there is nothing surprising in all of this, except the sheer
idiocy and arrogance of people like Pinker, that never fails to amaze me.

Continuing the Pinker notes;

On page nine he says no one believes genes are everything and culture is
nothing. This is the fatal flaw that shows that Pinker nothing. He does not see that
the reach of causality is not broken by a chasm of freewill dividing the physiology
created by the genes from the culture created by language. The issue he adds to is a
none issue, nature and nurture are one continuum  the ripples in the wheat field and
the wind in the air are one and the same thing (Final section of To What Purpose?,
which I just finished reading.).
Even so, the book is maximally pertinent and brand new so lets check it out.
If he recognised the reality that human are a corporate species he would see
why science is overwhelmed by the theological premise that makes human divine and
this exasperation with the bias toward the extreme position and away from the
moderate, would be understood for what it is, as a natural perversion of science by
religion, as epitomised by his fellow American scholar, the knowledge-pervert scholar
Gould who resides as a mimic-theist within the theological institution of Harvard.
Guided by the plan in the introduction to Part I, I am jumping to Pat II. This
bit looks fascinating, it discusses Sociobiology, but life is short and virtually non-
existent when you're working, so off I go to Part III.
Not sure any of this book's worth reading when I could be having a wank. As
long as he fails to see the simple truth all his efforts support the enemies of reason he
is pretending to despise, making him one of the most subtle mimics of all, and of
course he went to Harvard, the theist bastion of the Jews American slave territory.
 He talks the talk, but does not walk the walk.

Well I apologise for some of the terminology in the above, I think it is quite
disgusting, but that's what the notes said so I thought you would like an accurate
rendition of the all important first impressions. There is a cracking paragraph on page
nine of the preface.

'Why is it important to sort all this out? The refusal to acknowledge

human nature is like the Victorians' embarrassment about sex, only worse: it
distorts our science and scholarship, our public discourse, and our day-to-day
lives. Logicians tell us that a single contradiction can corrupt a set of
statements and allow falsehoods to proliferate through it. The dogma that
human nature does not exist, in the face of evidence from science and common
sense that it does, is just a corrupting influence.'

(My italics)

Boy, are those logicians, smart or what? They must be the fiends that wrote
the Bible in the first place, after they arrived here following their long journey from
the planet Logg. There is a God, they mistakenly told us, in error, and the rest is
history, as they say. But in the field of reality, the trick is the false imputation of
duality, which we see expressed loud and clear in the idea of nature versus nurture. It
is a pity Pinker did not twig to this most fundamental of all contradictions before he
sat down and began pinking the keys.

Page 141 This is naive, pathetic and childish. By rejecting the objections to
human nature Pinker validates them on their own terms. He explicitly
accepts that innate inequality is a bad thing, this is illogical and facile. If humans are
in any way innately different then that is an end to the matter, and it shows us why we
live in the vile world we do where the moralists are the real villains. Justifying
inequality is what frees us, in accordance with the dictum 'The truth shall set you free'.
The only people who suffer directly from the revelation of human nature is the elite
class, the Jews especially, because this indicates their true nature, which, in the case
of the Jews, is always hidden behind the sham of their inferiority, as mentioned by
Pinker when he says Hitler regarded the Jews as inferior  wrong  Hitler knew the
Jews were the true masters and as such he took the role of usurper, which made him
the perfect would-be Jew. By this means Hitler released the latent potential of the
Jewish biomass, via an act of sacrifice, which cowed the slave population of
Christians into obedience and subservience to the Jews. Hence their recovery of
Israel, long developed by the then greatest Jewish slave state on earth, Britain, now
supplanted in this leading role by the new Jewish power, America.

I let myself go when I am making notes, I would never dare say anything like
that in a published book, the Jews, their master slaves that is, have imposed laws on
us against such truth telling.
I swear this man is a master of perverting ideas. I just read page 141 after
copying my notes and in it he says,

'if differences among groups in their station in lifetheir income,

status, and crime rate, for examplecome from their innate constitutions, the
 differences cannot be blamed on discrimination, and that makes it easy to
blame the victim and tolerate inequality.'

The man is insane. The one argument that makes it wholly impossible to blame the
individual, he uses to say provides a means of the exact opposite. And yet in the
preface he says that people who argued that rape was down to human nature were
condemned for saying, by this means, that the individual could not be blamed for their
violent behaviour. I hate this buffoon.
I was about to say I had had enough of this rubbish, when I read my notes for
page 142, look at this!

Page 142 Definition of human nature  cognitive and emotional faculties are
universal to all healthy people. Another facile theistic idea. This
focuses on form not nature. He is saying that a platform of individually definable
attributes, one by one, constitute human nature. Thus being in any way abnormal is
not healthy and not part of human nature, such as being sterile, blind or deaf. This
means our society is unnatural since it supports such people gladly. So humans are
uniquely distinct from nature and so there is no such thing as, simply put, human
nature. So this huge work, dedicated to the defence of human nature asserts, time and
again, that there is no such thing as human nature, but then of course if this book did
not set out to prove there was no such thing as human nature he would not of been
able to publish it.

'Modern biology tells us that the forces that make people alike are not
the same as the forces that make people different.'

Wrong! This asserts there is a dualism between two forces acting on one form, the
basis of myth and the perversion of knowledge that goes hand in hand with myth. So
on what does he base this stupid assertion?

143 Race is about climate and has no biological meaning to justify the significance
we instinctively see in it. This is so sickeningly fascistic that I just cannot read
any more of this man's Jewish garbage.

So, lets look at the book and see what it was that so annoyed me.

'This book is primarily about human naturean endowment of

cognitive and emotional faculties that is universal to healthy members of
Homo sapiens.'

Human nature is corporate, there is nothing else that needs to be said about it.
Being corporate means the human form, and all that is associated with it, is the
product of an impulse to form a superorganic being, whereby the human animal takes
shape at the social level, and whereby the individual components of this corporate
organism possess the status of cells within that Super Being.
This common endowment Pinker makes the definition of human nature, is
meaningless as a definition of human nature, it merely selects a number of attributes
and makes their common possession the definition of human nature. You may as well
say a set of attributes such as wheels, engine, seats, are the nature of a car. But the
nature of a car is that it is a vehicle, as simple as that, all else, these various
mechanical attributes, follow from this one defining quality. The attributes do not
define the nature of a thing, that is arse about face, it is the nature of a thing that
accounts for all of its attributes, the process is not reversible as a mode of defining,
one lead to many, many do not lead to one.
If this were not the case then we would find it impossible to categorise
anything, we would be looking for an infinite amount of detail and then trying to
ensure that only fragments of detail applied in certain cases. Thus we would begin by
recognising that trying to tell a badger from a human was nearly impossible, as both
have eyes, limbs, teeth, hair, noses, and so on. How could we tackle this impossible
problem? Well we could begin by taking photographs and asking little Mary, sitting
on the lawn, to see if she could see a difference. No scientist of Pinker's persuasion
would be able to solve the riddle for he would be consumed by all the minutia.
Obviously, it is only when it comes to humans this problem arises, ordinarily
scientists make an art of categorisation and they know the idea is to put things into
their most simple categories first and to bifurcate from there. So a proper assessment
of human nature would begin by recognising one common feature, the corporate
nature of human form, demonstrated, incontrovertibly, by the possession of speech,
for example, and then all the varieties of form and behaviour would be drawn out
from this one common factor.

Susan Greenfield, in a recent interview on BBC 4, stated that we did not know
what human nature was, because if we did that would mean we would be able to say
what was common to all humans, at all times, and in all places, but that, as humans
varied so much, and no common factor could be found, this showed human nature
was beyond our grasp at present.
In saying this Greenfield rightly defined human nature, it is a common thread
acting as a feature of our kind toward which all our kind could be related. If we were
birds and we wanted to know what bird nature was we might home in on the power of
flight, but birds come in many different species, so the comparison is not meant to be
complete, the point being there are exceptions to this rule, some birds do not fly. This
comparison is only indicative in respect to the way one broad sweeping feature is
definitive of the nature of a thing. In humans that one broad sweeping feature is the
existence of a superorganic form, and every single attribute of humans, good, bad or
indifferent, can be accounted for by taking this into consideration. No human being
anywhere, at anytime, or in any way, fails to conform to this quality, that the human
animal is a corporate form and the individual is a unit within its corporate
composition; there are, in other words, no other species of human, and when we go
back in time to prehuman species we even find they conform to this eternal quality of
human nature, the organism takes shape at the level of social interaction, and there is
no such thing as a human individual as an end in their own right. Even if we go back
two million years to a time long before anything even approximating to our kind had
come into being, we find exactly the same common nature directing the acquisition of
bipedal walking and encephalization, as discussed by Isaac in his piece of theistic
mythologizing, that he extrapolated from facts sequestered for the cause of
maintaining the Jewish slave identity implant. What tool making, camp sites, upright
posture, and later, gracile forms, all indicate, is a seamless transition toward an ever
more perfect form of individual evolved to constitute a superorganic being.
 Unless we eradicate religion from the face of the earth there is no chance of a
free understanding of ourselves, it is as simple as that. This man is a perfect example
of how difficult it is to beat the theocracy.

Returning to Isaac,

The Creative Vortex of Sociality

It is then, just the one small matter of the theory, the idea, the thinking, behind
all the facts, that is of interest to us right now. And so we have unearthed this, not too
old, piece of anthropological science from a book that was part of an anthology of
work presented by way of a conference held at Cambridge to honour the memory of
the chief priest of evolutionary theory in the theocracy, Darwin, upon the centenary of
his death in 1882.
Lets take a closer look at this artifact of modern mentality and see what sort of
things there are in it to which we find ourselves especially drawn, both by way of
criticism, and by way of opportunity to indicate how our scientific notion of Homo
sapiens would address the questions being dealt with. There is official science based
on myth, Biblical myth, Koranic myth, Jewish myth, and there is science based on
fact, we want the latter, which will vaporise the former, we hope.

Firstly, first paragraph quoted above from Isaac, concerning the

palaeontological evidence. It is vital that we recognise the nature of this evidence and
are clear about it. We can usefully remind ourselves of the position we are in today as
scientists. We live in a world ruled by priests, exactly as the ancient Greeks did, we
can search for knowledge freely as long as we do not in away tread on the toes of
these priests. There is a core of special knowledge at the heart of their mythology
today just as there was two thousand years ago, but the actual substance of that core
has changed, just the world has changed, as knowledge itself has changed.
We can remind ourselves of our comparative terms which apply to these two
identical conditions of intellectual life, in ancient Greece the skies were the zone of
mystery beyond knowing, but not beyond our perception, thus the myth constituted a
geocentric world view in which the earth was the centre of all things and intimately
connected with the heavens. The counter knowledge vaporising this myth was the
revelation of reality leading to a heliocentric understanding of the heavens based on a
detached analysis of what was observed. Today, the same civilization, the Jewish
civilization, ruled by the same priesthood, uses a new area of knowledge to formulate
its myth, this concerns the nature of humans themselves. This gives us a homocentric
account of what we know about ourselves in which humans are the determining factor
in their own existence, humans in others words brought themselves into being. The
alternative account of observations regarding human nature sees humans as part of the
biosphere of the planet just as the alternative account of the earth's position relative to
the heavens saw the planet as part of the universe, not its centre and reason for being.
Thus we have the biocentric model of reality. And so, in short, we have ancient
Greece with its geocentric versus heliocentric models of reality and we have our own
age with its homocentric and biocentric models of reality. Thus, in real terms, in the
intellectual domain, nothing has changed since the days of ancient Greece, we still
live in a theocracy today just as much as we ever did, all of which conforms to the
reality of human nature, a thread of continual influence directing our evolution
whether we like it, or know it, or not.
Just as the mythologists and the scientists observed the same planets and the
same motions thereof, so the mythologists and ourselves seek to admire, treasure, and
delight in the same real sources of information. Thus as Isaac rejoices in the fabulous
evidence of fossil remains millions of years old revealing hard facts that could not be
known by any other means, so we rejoice too in the exact same truth. We have no
quarrel with the scientist-priests on this point.
Isaac describes the story revealed by the evidence and notes a crucial event,
the coming of a new form of human some 100,000 years ago, associated with a loss of
toughness and the acquisition of our delicate form. He says the biological meaning of
this is not known. Anthropologists have no means of speculating upon why such a
transformation should of occurred because they precluded by the remit imposed by
the theocracy upon science which demands science only consider the physical aspects
of evidence before it when determining its facts. Thus we cannot make assumptions
about the meaning of this major transformation, not if we are dependant upon the
establishment for our status as professors of science. And yet this condition only
really applies to humans, if we were looking at birds and we found evidence of hollow
bones appearing in early specimens that were closely related to solid boned creatures
we would say this transformation occurred because of the obvious advantage for
perfecting an avian form.
As we are true scientists, not locked into the protection of the Jewish
theocracy, we are free to recognise that just as birds fly, and their evolution is directed
toward a better avian form suited to environmental conditions, so humans are socially
defined and their evolution directs them toward an ever more perfect superorganic
form. With this in mind we can try and relate the disappearance of robust features, to
be replaced by delicate features, to the notion of shifting away from small, pack like
superorganic kernels based on primordial human qualities such as bipedal gate, tool
making, intricate social communication, largely dependant upon uniquely naked
mammalian skin, supported by complex vocalisation including, some symbolic
content, toward larger, better organised, tribal superorganisms, with true linguistic
communication acting as a creative medium of exoskeletal formation, leading to a
social unit providing much better protection for the living units of which it was
composed, allowing these units to evolve more neotinous forms drawing out the
qualities of childlike dependence and delicacy as the corporate being becomes an ever
more viable cocoon of permanent protection, where qualities of individuals can turn
away from the ferocity of the none human domain and toward integration in the
comfort of the social domain that was becoming, ever more intensely, by this means
of organic evolution revealed in the skeletal remains of individuals, the living being,
the true body, of the species.
What we must not do then, is to allow ourselves to be deceived by the pretence
of possession that is craftily foisted upon us by the establishment in respect of the
evidence of methodical investigation which is made the be all and end all of science
itself. Methods of investigation are only the beginning of science, not its end. To be
beguiled by the illusion that the people who dig the evidence out of the ground, and
accurately record and interpret the pattern of evidence revealed thereby, somehow
own that evidence, and are thereby empowered by it to pontificate on the meaning of
the picture revealed, is a mistake. When we consider the story of Darwin and the
Beagle we see that this was the greatest scam ever foisted upon humanity, a scam
realised by this very means of great exertion in the act of discovering facts, followed
by a supreme presumption in their interpretation, which yet, involved nothing but an
interpretation of a pattern of physical evidence, and resulted in a product that, from a
scientific point of view, tells us virtually nothing, in the final analysis, as we will see
admitted when we come to the final author contributing to this anthology examining
the legacy of Darwin one century on.
These so-called scientists do not own the evidence they have taken from the
ground. Indeed one could more accurately say they have robbed it. For they have
misappropriated it in the name of civil authority, and the protection of the myth that
gives people their corporate identity in conformity to the identity that is central to the
social world we live in, a world which is focused upon Jewish identity, and as such
imbued with the essence of Jewish identity even when that identity is not manifested
in an overt form.
Before us lies an exciting prospect, a means of discovering a pattern of
evidence regarding the actual unfolding of the potential of mammalian physiology
leading to the human form. I say this because despite the glorious efforts of Thor
Heyerdahl, in search of the truth behind the populating of Polynesia, involving a life
long quest to understand the evidence he found of cultural links between Polynesia
and South America, and the adventurous, and unscientific, approach he took to
proving his point, the biological evidence finally came down against him. Still the
books remain as great stories to read, well told, and full of fantastic romance. A fine
testament to the age in which he lived, in which I was born, an age that could still
sustain such mystery, an age that is no more.
It only needed blood lines to indicate the movement of peoples from Indonesia
toward the Pacific. But more recently the genetic evidence of matrilineal descent has
fixed the origin of modern humans, not just their ancient forebears, in Africa. And it
seems these clever scientific technicians are able to determine the relative antiquity of
features of the genome so that, with the completion of the Human Genome Project,
we may have before us the prospect of pinpointing gene sequences for attributes
relating to language acquisition, naked skin, and all the other fine detail of our form,
and the precise time scale on which these attributes came into being. And I predict
that the attributes, like nakedness, that the priests have no way of making assumptions
about, but which we can make reasoned assumptions about based on the knowledge
that there must of been some intensely convincing means of communicating corporate
identity between hominids who were tool users, and the fact that we know racial
identity evolved to serve exactly this purpose, but was superseded in the prime role of
identity imposition by the evolution of language some 100,000 years ago.
Our assumptions, based upon our discovery of human nature will, in time, be
vindicated by the evidence arising from the human genome's decoding. In saying,
this, and making this matter central to the retention of Jewish authority over all of
humanity we do of course have to note that there is the problem, as ever, of who
controls the evidence. To which the priests will say that we would say that, so that if
the evidence goes against us we can say it was because it was perverted. And why
should we say that, just because evidence always has been perverted by the priesthood
who are so careful to see that they get their filthy mitts on all evidence; is that any
reason to suppose that it will be perverted in the future?

'One of the specific characteristics of the human evolutionary lineage

has been the propensity to make tools'
 Indeed ........

'Thus, we begin to see that in spite of their simplicity these early

artefacts had considerable importance in effecting novel adaptations. They are
to be understood mainly as meat-cutting tools and as tools for making tools.'

What we must bear in mind when we think about this most beautiful of all evidence of
our kind's evolution is that when Isaac says this about humans, he is not talking about
humans, he is talking about the link between humans and animals as we know them
today, aside from ourselves. As he says, we could not put these creatures in
academies, but rather in zoos. And so what on earth were these creatures doing with,
not tools, but a full blown culture identical in its nature to the same culture we have
today? It is an amazing question, but far more amazing is the fact that no one has
ever bothered to ask it in these terms, recognising that what is being said here is that
these creatures were already doing, millions of years before humans evolved,
everything, everything, that we do today. They had culture.
Taken on the face of it people may want to cry out in ridicule at this assertion.
This is because they think culture is something unique to us modern human types, and
that is what makes us special. But from our biocentric point of view that is not the
case at all. There is a superorganism that is composed of an exoskeleton, that
describes the situation today, and it is what Isaac is describing in the passage clipped
from the quote above. All that culture is is exoskeleton, nothing more, nothing less, it
never has been, and it never will be. These tools are not to be understood in the limp
manner suggested here by Isaac, they are to be understood as a product of nature
realised in its creation of the human form by the release of the potential of
mammalian physiology in the vacuum of the social environment this physiology itself
brought into being. Tools are to be understood as the skeletal remains of a
superorganic animal, just as the cars on our roads, and the roads, and the planes in our
skies, but not the skies, are to be understood today; except not yet as remains, still as
part of the living tissue, the product of our activities, our tools.
The knowledge perverts who steal the items of evidence and then weave their
myths about them are stuck with an eternal problem, their inability to solve the logical
impasse created by their myth, how did the human animal evolve beyond the grasp of
evolution? Naturally they do not want to solve this problem, the idea is to preserve
the problem, not to remove it. But we do remove the problem, we make a seamless
explanation span the ages from the present to the deepest past, embracing all evidence
under one conception and one plan and one terminology. The camps where the tools
were found that indicate the extensive use of materials to build nests and eat
communally are the evidence of an exoskeleton, as are the skyscraper of New York.
We need no fancy contortions in the language we use to understand this evidence and
what it tells us, and we no longer have dilemma of wondering how humanity can be
outside nature, something we might think, if we are bordering on being pathologically
insane, can only be understood by reading the Bible, which tells us about the fall of
man.

This new found ability to live in harsh environments mentioned by Isaac can
be easily understood in relation to an interpretation of the evidence which indicates
the existence of a far more complex superorganic being coming on the scene 100,000
years ago, where the individual can even acquire the extraordinary ability to live in
either arctic conditions, or blazing hot, arid desert. Racial physiology took its imprint
from the territory in which the specific organisms evolved their particular adaptive
form, racial identity was relative to the territory they occupied. So Eskimos were
white, short and stocky, Australian aborigines were black as black can be, wiry, and
sleek. This linked, adaptive transformation, can easily be simplistically
misrepresented as being meaningless, other than being a shallow reflection of
adaptive variation. But that is so lame compared to what we know about our own
kind, the importance of identity to us, it is infuriating to see this theistic propaganda
being pumped out relentlessly by all forms of the media. What makes the issue of this
propaganda so devious is that on the face of it the motivation, although twisted, could
be seen as innocent in that it is, apparently, seeking to suppress the innate racism of
the human species. But that facet of appearances is just a fold in the elaboration of
the cloth of illusion that binds our eyes against seeing the true nature of things. If we
know what race means then we know what religion means, the two go together
because they are of the same nature. This is why the theist rants and raves about the
vileness of racism, and the need for coming together in love and peace irrespective of
our race or nationality, all that matters is that we honour the Jewish God of law.
Because they are racists of another kind, religious racists, people who make religious
identity something to be fought for, to die for, to kill for.
Now, just let me say at this point, that in the grand scheme of things, this
theistic interpretation, whether racist or not in its inherent nature, is an advance on the
physiologically racist foundation of priestcraft, such as we saw extolled by Hitler, or
that we see broached by the likes of the British National Party. But that is of no
concern to us. Our point is not essentially political; besides which this fact is really
biological since it conforms to the evolutionary imperative to form an ever more
perfect superorganic being. We are concerned to liberate science from the grip of the
priesthood, and thereby to set knowledge free. We cannot do this without destroying
Judaism, that is the way it is, it is not our first thought to be anti-Semitic, it is the end
result of seeking the truth as determined by a biocentric examination of reality. The
lawmakers will just have to find the next point of mystery, which must be the origin
of the universe, to weave their myth about that will enslave those that come after us to
the yoke of Judaism, in another form presumably, and its laws.
Despite the divergence of superficial form the theists rightly say that race has
no depth in the genetic makeup of individuals as revealed by the genome, the species
remained the same, an Eskimo could breed with an aborigine. This is so because the
racial divergence is not about form, in depth, it is about appearance, corporate
identity. If we imagine that such a corporate identity was required, then how else
could we envisage its coming into being, by each group deciding to play football, or
baseball, or tennis? OK, but that subtle behavioural variation comes a little later on.
This question presents a great puzzle. The extent of separation between the two races
mentioned is considerable, the imposition of their respective physical environments
upon their forms is likewise maximal in terms of the divergence between the two
environments in question. Yet still only one species remain, this simply flies in the
face of everything a Darwinian scheme of evolution predicts.
But the answer is perfectly simple once you have relinquished your slavery to
Jewish myth. The individual is not the unit of evolutionary advance. The
superorganism is the unit upon which evolution acts, this superorganic transformation
is reflected in the most superficial aspects of the individual's physiology, in their
racial features, as we recognise them, and the cultural features. At the level of
individual being these things do indeed seem utterly trivial when all is said and done,
since even a girl from the New Guinea jungle, whose mother knew only the stone age,
can be happy in an office playing away on a typewriter, given the chance. And you
cannot get more superficial than that. But taken at the superorganic level the
superficiality disappears, the racial and cultural form become all important. When the
hidden tribes of the New Guinea interior were discovered, just before the outbreak of
the second world war, they represented the last large populations of human beings to
be discovered by the modern Jewish world. Immediately, as a superorganism, they
were exterminated, as evidenced by the fact that from one generation men went from
carrying stone axes to carrying steel axes. These accoutrements were prime features
of their superorganic form. The stone axe was the most valuable thing in these
people's lives. The men worked hard in the quarries cutting out stone from which to
make their axes, and as such these implements were to them as, lets say, while under
the influence of football madness during the present European championships, I
assume that is what it is anyway, as central in their tribal lives as football is in ours.
And overnight they were presented with boxes of steel axes! Wow! Blown away,
they just dropped a central plank of their culture in an instant; sod that rock bashing
for a lark. It is as if a race of extraterrestrial aliens were to arrive and trot off to the
football stadium where Beckham and Rooney were playing ball with each other, and
to start handing out personal spacecraft capable of travelling at the speed of light, and
inviting everyone to the moon for a lesson in planet hopping, how would the football
fan base stand up to that competition? But there was a price to be paid for the
inevitable acceptance of outside gifts, whether individuals recognised it or not. The
dead superorganism gave up its biomass to the new encroaching superorganism as
steel replaced stone, and Judaism replaced head hunting. Bring back the good old
days I say  Oh I see the Jews have, Al Qaeda lopped another head off yesterday,
22/06/04, in Iraq, a South Korean businessman this time. You just can't keep a good
thing down.
There is no need for adaptation of a superorganism to go any deeper than the
superficial aspects of the individual, and indeed to do so must be counter productive
since the more focused upon the individual evolutionary change is the less it must be
directed toward the superorganic form of the species. Focusing upon the individual in
adaptation to the physical environment is precisely what would lead to divergence
into a variety of species as a means of adapting to niche environments, exactly what
has not happened in the case of humans. The nature of the human animal therefore, is
such that each superorganism represents only one individual in a population of
superorganic individuals, so that a fauna exists that is composed of a population of
superorganisms which relies, for it viability as a superorganic species, upon just such
a population, requiring the ability of these Super Beings to interact competitively,
producing the balanced tension necessary to the healthy existence of all evolved
species. This means there is an evolutionary imperative in the superorganic being
acting against divergence that would allow races to evolve into distinct species.
As usual the homocentric ideas of the theists mount up impossible problems to
form a barricade against the doorway leading to an understanding of human nature,
while a scientific, biocentric idea of humanity, lets the answers flow smoothly,
consistently, and readily into our easy grasp, in total conformity to all evidence, of all
kinds, including the evidence of elite intransigence mounted against the truth which is
provided by the geocentric and homocentric mythmaking models of reality.

'Maybe this is indeed a fairy story, but it is fun and it may turn out to
be at least partly true.'
 Fairy story says it all where these people are concerned. The speculation
under the heading of 'dynamics' is hopeless because they are trying to accommodate
science to the Biblical conception of humanity as a divine being, created separately
from the evolutionary process which they are trying to make fit the evidence. They
are like a corrupt police department trying to fit up an innocent person.
The problem of punctuated versus progressive, or a combination of the two, is
dealt with automatically by a scientific model of human evolution, because scientists
are empowered to look at the animal they are trying to understand, and as such they
can see there is indeed an inevitable pattern of point origination followed by
dispersion leading to various degrees of assimilation or extermination, depending
upon localised factors. The Sumerian exoskeletal structure represents a point
origination event that occurred in the Middle East five thousand years ago, which has
eventually reverberated around the planet transforming the entire biomass of the
species. This involved a constantly repeated cycle of regeneration, always adhering to
the original plan, embodied in the core identity preserved in the elite, who have
become the Jews, followed by a dispersion phase.
In the detail of this process we find differential modes of change occurring
between individual superorganisms according to their nature and form upon the
initialisation of contact. Thus when the Jews invaded Britain and exterminated the
ruling Druidic elite they could simply insert themselves as the new masters, and
establish the newly formed Jewish slave identity, Christianity, as the source of power
for the new elite who were put in place in exactly the same way the Jews are selecting
the new authorities to run Iraq following their invasion last year. Of course the Iraqis,
as a population, are already slaves of Judaism, so, like the Druidic peoples of ancient
Britain, they are already accustomed to a yoke that fits the Jewish superorganic
physiology. However, when the Jews invaded the American territories, in North
America especially, they found still primitive superorganic forms, just as they did in
Australia, and these had no cultural identity implant that accustomed them to the role
of slave in a highly structured hierarchical exoskeletal being. Hence the Indians were
simple exterminated and a new biomass of already implanted slaves were imported
from Europe, and provided with a new version of the slave implant adapted to the
local territory. Hence Mormonism was fabricated and it is now a major religious
force that is finding its way back to these shores where the effort is being made to
withdraw Britain from European integration to allow the American slave colony to try
and retain some influence in our region. We might note that the importation of
negroes into the Americas was carried out precisely because the Indians were such
useless slaves, and this was really a stop gap until a proper Jewish slave population
could found. As it turns out the blacks are proving to be amongst the most promising
Jewish slaves in the world today, they are at the forefront of a passion for slavery in
America, where their genetic temperament seems to lend them to an intense love of
affiliation in a strong spiritual body. Africa, meanwhile, is experiencing a surge in the
take up of the Christian slave implant. Black Christians are the most passionate
fascists in the Christian slave hierarchy of Judaism, being vehemently against
homosexuals being allowed to become priests and, would you believe, these people
are sending missionaries to Britain to try and bring us back to God! Eh, what about
that then, far out or what? makes you think the whole world is on acid, and if it ain't,
then it obviously should be. I actually agree with the blacks on this point concerning
homosexuality, it does adhere to the creed, and to that extent I think we should respect
their sick attitude, as it demonstrates far and away more integrity, and therefore
honour, than the squirming, sycophantic manoeuvres, of our degenerate slave
priesthood  degenerate relative to the doctrine that makes them who they are,
Christians. No wonder, when you think about it, that from their point of view, the
Africans feel the need to come and preach over here.
The evolutionary battle, always focused upon corporate identity goes on. But
it does involve a process of point origination followed by dispersal, involving
eradication to create uniformity, leading to an overall impression of bursts of energy
followed by a ripple, occurring in a series of broad cycles, which we must expect to
occur more frequently as the evolutionary process releases more of the pent up
potential of mammalian physiology directed at the realisation of a more perfect form
of superorganic being. The reason for this simply has to do with the laws of physics
and the relationship of energy to mass, as the mass increases the dynamics operating
within it create a more dynamic internal environment and this must induce more rapid
change, and that is exactly what we experience living in the modern world. Our
social structures, that is to say our exoskeleton, appears to be, from an individual
perspective, in a state of flux.
I do not know about you, but I think that this scientific account, emanating
directly from the discovery of precisely what human nature is, is totally devastating
for our world view, and must have a massive impact upon our society if it becomes
ascendant. Not in the fallacious and misleading ways in which Pinker says the theists
argue it must have, by undermining the slave implant that makes people obey the laws
imposed by the elite, but in simply revealing what the nature of the elite is, and
thereby jeopardising all law as we know it.

'As the outlines of the narrative of human evolution have emerged, two
particularly intriguing puzzles have emerged with it. Under what selection
pressures did, firstly, the two-legged gait and, secondly, the enlarged brain
become adaptive? The first of these can be rephrased as: Why did ancestral
hominids become bipedal when all other primate species which have come to
the ground have adopted some or other form of quadrupedal locomotion?
Many thinkers on these topics, starting with Darwin, have tended to opt for an
all-purpose explanation which might explain both bipedalism and brain
enlargement, for instance, tool and weapon carrying. However, since specific
evidence for the two evolutionary shifts are separated by at least two million
years, it may be wise to uncouple the searches for explanations.'

This section is perhaps the most telling. What do we say about this? It is
quite appalling. Here, the priest is playing with his evidence in a sickening manner,
like a kitten toying with a mouse. This passage reeks of arrogance and contempt for
knowledge, for science, for humanity. We can treat this paragraph as one integral
question. Within the question the proper mode of reply is given, the extraordinary
and unique features of humanity should be treated as being related to one another, the
high priest of evolutionary theory, Darwin, himself recognised this must be so.
However, evidence has proven that if this is correct then there must be a thread of
continuity running through the evolution of hominids which must extend right down
to the present time. If this is so then we have proven that there is such a thing as
human nature, and all we need do is recognise what it is. Clearly, the answer is to
think of a smart arse way of saying the evidence must be wrong, otherwise the Jewish
mythology in the Bible and the Koran can not be defended, and this is a situation the
scientist-priest is dedicated to ensuring cannot happen. Thus we have the
mythological requirement that the two unique features of humanity be uncoupled.
Uncoupled! Just like that. Who do these arseholes think they are!! The scientists are
worse than the Creationists whom they feign to hate, while in reality they are
colleagues of theirs in the control of knowledge, and therefore in the mastery of
society.
To engage in science, we might actually want to address the questions raised,
they are interesting. Given that the ape animal living in the forest was selected as the
best form to give rise to a mammalian superorganism, why did an upright posture
come to the fore as the primary alteration in form, acting as a foundation for the
further necessary changes, the most outstanding of which, making its presence felt a
good while later, was increasing brain size?
From the outset we know that the vacuum the hominid line was set to balloon
into and fill was the social vacuum. The apes that came out of the woods and made
the ground their home must of been evolving toward an ever more intensely social
form from the word go. At the same time the perverse emphasis upon the survival
value of attributes relative to the physical environment we see in Isaac must be
applied to the course evolution took. Baboons live on the ground in large troops, but
they are grazers, it may well be that an ape adopted the kind of omnivorous diet that
has been observed in some chimpanzee troops and they developed hunting strategies
which led them toward the ground, and more importantly, toward far more intense
social relations.

'For instance, do potential feeding niches really exist that would make
bipedalism adaptive?'

Asks Isaac. Awareness of chimpanzee hunting strategies did not exist when Isaac
wrote this just over twenty years ago, but we are all well aware of this today, plus the
quite sophisticated use of tools for catching termites and cracking hard nuts. These
are exceptionally important observations in terms of providing valid reasons for
speculating on the possible early avenues of evolutionary divergence that first set the
hominid line on its way.
We could speculate all day on the actual first steps and toy with the
significance of the ideas we come up with. But what we know for sure is that human
nature is corporate and it was this nature that created our earliest ancestors. So no
matter what we know that upright posture came into being because it fostered the
complimentary shifts in form that all come together to make an ever more potent
superorganic form. To work how the pattern of evidence fits the logic of the
argument we need to theorise on the kind of evolutionary transformations that would
of fostered the increasingly social animal's development.
What stands out in all my work is the importance of identity. All species must
have identity fixing parameters, but we are talking about a special mode of identity
formation that takes place in the social domain and thereby incorporates the individual
into a social unit. It is clear enough from watching chimpanzees organise a hunting
party where specific roles are adopted to lay a trap for their prey, that these strategists
would benefit enormously from better integration into a social unit. If the prey were
available to fund such a shift, how would it come about in terms of physiological
transformation?
We know that the first indications that our kind is on its way is the appearance
of ape like creatures with an upright stance. What would this stance do for them?
Free their hands, and so we see tools come on the scene, and what are tools, tools are
full blown evidence of superorganic form. So from the day upright stance and tools
appeared our kind was already evolved, these were human beings, but in an early
stage of development, because it is the existence of a true superorganic form, with real
exoskeletal attributes, that defines the human species. Not upright posture, not tool
use, not speech, these are not the indicative attributes of the human species. Having
an exoskeleton, this is the single identifying mark of our kind. Tools are the evidence
of this mark, not just in themselves, but in what they tell us about what the animals
whose bodies these tools formed part of looked like as superorganic creatures living
in established nest sites, home sites at the centre of a fixed territorial range.
With this conception in mind we are more inclined to reach back from what
we know about the earliest bipedal hominids on the ground, into the forest where we
know nothing about their antecedents. What is evident is that the creatures who came
to earth and stood upright must already of evolved into a fully superorganic form of
ape while still living in the forests. These forest dwellers, like the hunting apes of
today, must of evolved an ever more elaborate form of social unit even while they
were still apelike creatures. Having evolved as superorganic forest dwellers, the
limitation on their further superorganic development would of been apparent in a
forest environment for creatures of their size, they were not insects.
Apparently, somewhat to my amazement, I must admit, someone worked out
what form a superorganic type of mammal would have to exist. Scientific method is
amazing, and I wish I was able to do the maths upon which it is based. But what you
do with the results is what really matters.

'Hamilton could be said to have inaugurated the field with his

introduction of the conceptual framework of kin selection, which solved,
among other things, many of Darwin's puzzles about eusociality in
insectsthe way ants, bees, and termites live "selflessly" in large colonies,
most of them sterile servants to a single fertile queen. But Hamilton's theory
didn't solve all the problems, and among Richard Alexander's important
contributions was his characterization of the conditions under which eusocial
mammals might evolvea "prediction" stunningly confirmed by the
subsequent studies of the amazing South African naked mole rats (Sherman,
Jarvis, and Alexander 1991). This was such an astonishing triumph of
adaptationist reasoning that it deserves to be more widely known. As Karl
Sigmund describes it, Hamilton's ideas

led to a most remarkable discovery when, in 1976, the American

biologist R. D. Alexander lectured on sterile castes. It was well known
that these existed for ants, bees, and termites, but not for any kind of
vertebrate. Alexander, in a kind of thought experiment, toyed with the
notion of a mammal able to evolve a sterile caste. It would, like the
termites, need an expandable nest allowing for an ample food supply
and providing shelter from predators. For reasons of size, an
underbark location [like that of the presumed insect ancestors of
termites] was no good. But underground burrows replete with large
tubers would fit the bill perfectly. The climate should be tropical; the
soil (more than a hint of Sherlock Holmes here!) heavy clay. An
ingenious exercise in armchair ecology altogether. But after his
 lecture, Alexander was told that his hypothetical beast did indeed live
in Africa; it was the naked mole rat, a small rodent studied by Jennifer
Jarvis. [Sigmund 1993, p. 117.]

Naked mole rats are surpassingly ugly and strange, a thought

experiment of Mother Nature's to rival any of the fantasies of philosophy.
They are genuinely eusocial. The single queen mole rat is the sole female
breeder, and she keeps the rest of the colony in line by releasing pheromones
that suppress the maturation of the other females' reproductive organs. Naked
mole rats are coprophagousthey regularly eat their own fecesand when the
grotesquely swollen pregnant queen cannot reach her own anus, she begs feces
from her attendants. (Had enough? But there's much, much more, highly
recommended to all whose curiosity exceeds their squeamish-ness.) A bounty
has been learned from the study of naked mole rats, and other nonhuman
species, using the techniques of Darwinian reverse engineeringusing
adaptationism, in other wordsand there is surely more to come. E. O.
Wilson's own important work on social insects (1971) is deservedly world
famous, and there are literally hundreds of other fine animal sociobiologists.
(See, e.g., the classic anthologies, Glutton-Brock and Harvey 1978, Barlow
and Silverberg 1980, King's College Sociobiology Group 1982.)
Unfortunately, they all work under a cloud of suspicion, raised by the
escalation of greedy claims by a few human sociobiologists (through their
megaphones, as Kitcher suggests), which is then echoed by the escalation of
blanket condemnations from their opponents. This really is an unfortunate
fallout, for, as in any other legitimate area of science, some of this work is
great, some is good, some is good but false, and some is badbut none of it is
evil. That serious students of mating systems, courtship displays, territoriality,
and the like in nonhuman species should be tarred with the same brush as the
more flagrant oversteppers in human sociobiology is both a miscarriage of
justice and a serious misrepresentation of science.'

(Darwin's Dangerous Idea : Evolution and the Meanings of Life,

Daniel C. Dennett, Penguin, 1996. Page 483 - 4)

It is really so frustrating to read material like this where the subject I love is
presented with such passion, by people who are such out and out enemies of the
subject, and who have the bare faced gall to make out that they are the defenders of its
integrity just because they are bone fide professionals, while anyone who seeks to take
science to its logical conclusion, even if they too are professionals, by including
humanity in its remit is a blackguard and a menace.
What is tantalizing about these diatribes written by the high priests of
theocratic science, is the frequent mention of these rogue traders in knowledge 
WELL WHERE THE HELL ARE THEY! I can never find them. I would pay good
money for a look at their work. And why do we never get any references to the
library of books these people must surely of written to justify all the uproar the priests
bleat about that is damaging their good work and name?
But, the scientists are clever, and this I admire and adore, no matter what. It is
a bit like looking at the work of Michael Angelo splattered gorgeously all over the
walls of an obscene building such as a house of God. The theocracy was the sole
patron for talented people and so their skill was naturally perverted by being used to
represent the deviant ideas of the Jews about the nature of reality. It is a tragedy for
humanity, but the work is stunning and must be admired in the same way we may
instinctively recoil from some vile insect, like a tarantula, but driven by our
intelligence we must admire its form and the execution of the process that created it.
So it is with the work discussed by Dennett, here. Dennett himself is a most
detestable person in the context of our subject. But that is no reason to ignore the fine
pieces of knowledge he and his kind rob from us to weave their lies about in order to
serve their masters, the Jews. The work he refers to here sounds brilliant and it is
exactly this kind of analysis that we would anticipate in the post Judaic world scientist
would be free to apply to the study of humanity; the very idea of which so appals
Dennett who stains himself to try and ensure we are kept aware of a false barrier
between humans and all other life forms.
So, presumably someone, if the church would allow it, could apply the ideas
of Alexander to the apes that must of lived in the forest, and ask what they would of
needed to do in order to become superorganic beings. Note Alexander is represented
here as focusing upon the evolution of a sterile caste, but this is only to home in on a
prime feature of a superorganic species, occurring in a specific form. This adheres to
the theistic rule that scientists must focus upon forms and not study the nature of none
physical qualities which concern the nature of forms. But the fact is that the question
is the same in terms of demonstrable proof whether you ask what a creature would
have to do to create a sterile caste or what it would have to do to create a superorganic
form, these are two questions leading to the same end, do you want to follow the
circle to the left to find out where it goes, or to the right?

And so, returning to our last point of focus upon the material of Isaac's, we can
see that he is asking the wrong the question when he wonders whether the niches exist
that would make bipedalism a valid move for an ape. The answer is no, because
bipedalism in anthropoids is not a response to niche exploitation in the ordinary sense,
only in the special sense of introverted force of evolutionary pressure where the social
environment becomes the vacant space where potential lies for an animal to evolve
and thus gain in their exploitation of the physical environment by turning the face of a
superorganism upon that outer, normal, environment. Bipedalism was a strategy
empowering the superorganic form which had undergone the preliminary stages of
necessary evolution in the forests, what was required, as indicated by Alexander's
reasoning, was a shift to a domain that would support the establishment of an
expandable nest capable of housing all in one close knit location.
On this basis we could say that the bipedal gait was required because in order
to take their eusocial evolution further hominids had to become ground dwelling, they
were not going to develop the individualistic strategy of the gorillian form which
relies upon brawn for safety on the ground, because their strategy was the
transformation of the individual into an integrated superorganic form so that the social
unit became the organism. If we suppose that hunting was part of the fuel supply
enabling this process to go ahead, and the requirement to evolve a centralised home
nest site was part of the socialisation process wherein an animal evolved a true
exoskeleton then we can see how the shift to ground locomotion and the development
of dextrous hands would be positively linked.
And all this would be able to proceed without any need for an exceptional
increase in brain size, although intelligence would of been central to the process
leading to a social animal with complex creative demands being made upon its ability
to work materials. At this stage the medium of social unity would of been on a par
with the familiar physiological range of identity mediums from the animal kingdom.
Naked skin will of been established, I would of thought, and during the million years
or so between the establishment of bipedalism and substantial encephalization a
superorganic fauna will of spread across the terrain that could support such territorial
creatures s these early hominid superorganisms must of been, and racial differences
will of been important in defining the superorganisms populating the range where
they lived. Competition will of occurred between these creatures for control over the
niche environment they had evolved to exploit, and this will of kept the pressure on
the latent potential of the mammalian physiology to release ever more of it potential
to create a superorganic form. At the core of this process, as ever, was the ability to
increase social unity.
The increase in brain size is loosely associated with intelligence, but as we can
see there are two primary modes of intelligence, social and practical. These two
evolved side by side because as the social integration increased the ability to create
exoskeletal fabric, was ever more important, and a central feature of exoskeletal form
included the ability to exploit the home range which the superorganism possessed as
its territory in opposition to its own kinds competitive need to expand its reach. A
territory is in effect part of the exoskeleton, this is obvious in our world where we
make such a business of setting boundaries and changing landscapes to suit our needs,
and covering the surface of the planet with structures that facilitate our exploitation of
our terrain, but it will of been so right from the day the first superorganism stood
upright and wielded a stone to make a shelter at the hub of a domain from which it
drew its sustenance.
The crucial neurological transformation that took place as the brain grew in
size concerned the adaptation toward ever greater social integration, this is what
enabled an increasing powerful superorganism to evolve that would out compete its
rivals. The single feature that we are concerned with here is language. The increase
in brain size has to represent the coming of language, but not the coming of humans
proper. It is evident there were a number of stages in the evolution of linguistic
ability. This is not surprising when we consider the nature of language, it is rightly
thought to be the hallmark of our species, for it is language that sets us apart, it is in
fact language which brings to fulfilment the unravelling of the potential of
mammalian physiology toward the realisation of a true superorganic form in which
the individual is made discrete at the same time they are made dependant upon the
social body for the uniqueness acquired by the creation of the ability to act with self
centred discretion. It is our ability to reason, courtesy of the language that integrates
us into the superorganism, that gives us our individuality, such as it is. And this is
why, with the increasing power of the superorganism, has come an increasing
expression of individual consciousness.
But, as I say, this transformation toward a fully symbolically empowered
linguistic creature occurred in stages. The animals with the enlarged brains will of
been articulate after a fashion, maybe so articulate that if we could observe them
today we could learn what their communication was and communicate with them. I
say this because while we have examples of complex communication in the animal
world, most famously in the marine mammals, the mode of communication in these
creatures is alien to us, whereas the mode of communication in early humans must of
been linguistic in its form, and as such our kind of baby. When you think of the ways
that stone age peoples communicated, as recorded by anthropologists and travellers,
in the not very distant past we might imagine that these people might of been able to
communicate fluently with the proto-humans of a million years ago. Stone age people
apparently blended their verbal display with all kinds of demonstrative behaviour,
body language, and the whole manner was supposedly very different from the way we
are familiar with in our well ordered and strictly defined articulation of what we have
in our heads.

'It is also hard to make sense of the intricacy of the brain without
supposing that the adaptive advantages that have brought it into existence have
long involved culture of increasing complexity. However, to keep our topic
from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps we should allow for the
possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism, might have been a pre-
adaptive development that was favoured by selection for reasons other than
culture. This point notwithstanding, for the time being I shall treat the brain
and the culture it sustains as likely to have evolved as a single adaptive
complex, that is to say as a co-evolution.'

And, on this subject of brain evolution we get this from our professional
'scientist'. He, once again, states the obvious, that there is a common thread of force
driving the brain's evolution unswervingly in the same direction, for millions of years.
But, once again, having thus stated what is undeniable, he ducks out of it, he makes
the ludicrous assertion that to stick with this simple fact would lead to boring,
predeterministic ideas! The man is too disgusting for words, sickening, vile, insane.
But a highly respected, extremely intelligent man, of the first calibre, in the theocracy.
Nonetheless, despite his reservations, he is prepared to accept that, as the brain is
responsible for culture, he will, reluctantly, we understand, treat both the brain and
culture as if they were somehow related to one another! Well ain't that marvellous. I
suppose if he were making a geographical study of a modern nation, although he
would recognise that cars do not actually make roads, somehow, in some way, it could
be said that roads are a product of motor vehicles, and so, reluctantly, he would try
and explain the presence of roads as being, somehow, related to the use of vehicles. It
is a good job the man is not a geographer, with this kind of incisive application of
intelligence he would probably get an Oscar - or should that be a Nobel, or more
likely a Knob, to stick on the top of his head?

'We are rightly impressed with the biological success that seems to
have followed from the development of the brain through some critical
thresholds, but it must be remembered that enlarged brains require prolonged
infant dependency and high quality nutrition (Sacher & Staffeldt, 1974; Martin
in Lewin, 1982). Both of these are expensive commodities in the economy of
nature. No other lineage has experienced selection producing such an extreme
development. The central puzzle to understanding our origins, therefore,
remains the problem of figuring out under what novel selective circumstances
this trend was initiated, and under what conditions the selection was
sustained.'

It seems extravagant to quote a block of work and then to keep pulling junks
out and repeating the exercise, however I believe it is liable to be helpful in the task I
see before me, of seeking to induct people into a correct, but novel, way of
understanding themselves. Duplicated selections contain important subject matter and
we may regard this practice as effecting an increase of magnification upon the sliver
of intellectual deposit that we already have upon the slide. Homing in upon this
piece, for example, is vital. Isaac makes a crucial point here about the extraordinary
nature of human evolution, we know that we are extraordinary, but how does this
reality pan out when we seek to understand it in scientific terms?
Like this, we see that the brain, as the organ of intelligence, is the nub of the
matter, and we interpret this organ in terms of a cost analysis; it is mighty expensive
in terms of nurturing care, and in terms of nutrional demands. Not surprisingly
therefore this particular evolutionary adaptation is unique to humans. And thus, the
question delivers itself, How did this organ, our brain, come exist? We may
emphasise the points made by Isaac by noting that the brain is an incredibly expensive
bit of kit to run, it is in effect the engine in the vehicle. The fact is that it is not
possible for the brain we humans have to evolve, it is, quite literally impossible, and
science has know this fact for a long time. The reason is that it cannot possibly pay
for itself, it would be like using a second world war Spitfire engine, the Merlin, to
power a Mini Cooper. Aside from the practical arrangements, the fuel bills would not
make any sense, no one would do it, no one does do it. Unfortunately Nature does not
have the advantage of a supreme intelligence guiding what it produces, so it did not
know that putting a brain in a human that consumed two hundred percent of all the
food an individual could possibly find to live on did not make sense, and would
inevitably lead to the starvation of the animal so handsomely endowed. Poor stupid
Nature, in its bewilderment, just blindly went ahead, and by producing an animal that
was guaranteed to starve to death as soon as its evolution was perfected, it created the
most successful animal on the planet today. Wow! How did Nature do that? Maybe
someone should try fitting Minis with Merlins, they may take off, and make the
inspired genius a fortune.
If the Merlin is fitted to a fighter aircraft it works, it makes it possible to fly,
and to do so with speed and agility. It is not that a massive power unit is inherently
worthless, on the contrary, it is a question of what body it is fitted into. And we may
suppose the same applies to the human brain. While one human brain is massively
over endowed with intellectual capacity for the fulfilment of the needs of any
individual animal that only has the task of feeding itself, surviving hazards, and
dealing with the routine of intersocial behaviour, if the this enriched endowment can
be made the basis of a superbrain then we enter a whole new ball game. And
obviously this is exactly what idiot Nature did.
But it is vital for the survival of the Jewish master race that this knowledge
does not become known and so Isaac, being a priest in the Jewish theocracy makes
sure that when he focuses these scientific questions he misdirects our attention away
from the nature of our kind toward the form, in accordance with the dualistic directive
of priestcraft. Under what conditions he asks, whereas he should be asking what
forces was human form subject to that could bring about this result. Conditions set
limitations, forces extend potential, the difference in terminology here concerns
perspective, although we are supposed to be considering dynamics, Isaacs guides us
toward a static sense of physical being that must wrestle to adapt itself to challenges it
meets.
Curiously, in the passage leading up to the piece selected from Dennett, he
actually discusses the validity, or otherwise of seeking knowledge. Here he follows
his fellow priests example, that of Pinker, as quoted above, in making out that there is
no threat from the truth, we must simply have faith. Of course there is indeed no
threat from his mythology of truth, but I think that most people would see a massive
threat in the truth, as revealed by me; not necessarily to themselves, but to society at
large, and especially to the most important elements of society. I shall not trouble you
with a block of Dennett, I was going to, but I think what I have just said can stand as
it is. If you care to, you may search out his words for yourself, they are fairly droll,
and just as you might be able to conjure up yourself in imaginary imitation of this
man's work if you have a few idle months in which to try and reduce your heart beat
to near zero by means of slow breathing and lack of eating and sleep, or whatever , I
simply do not know how to make a brain that stupid, but if your interested you may
be able to work it out before you kill yourself trying, so that, your brain becomes
comatose and incapable of delivering a meaningful thought, bar an impulse to deliver
a sudden burst of energy allowing you to mimic a Dennett, a Pinker, a Gould, a
Dawkins, and all the other famous, brilliant communicators of modern science that
glorify the theocracy's magnificent intellectual institutions.

This list of five ways in which the 'brain-culture' duality may of come about is
facile. It is like talking about the leg-walking system and hypothesising that this
system came about by people walking to the river, walking to the shop, walking to the
hills, and so on. What on earth is it supposed to mean that the brain-culture system
came about due to the making of tools, hunting, gathering, socialising? These things
are culture, damn it! Hunting may be carried out by a lone feline or a pack of
canines, and is not necessarily a social behaviour, but in humans culture is implicit in
hunting. We saw in my earlier speculation about how the initial stages of
superorganic formation could of condensed from the genetic attributes of forest
dwelling apes guided by behavioural strategies such as hunting that is observed in
modern chimpanzees and is so obviously social in its nature requiring that these
animals act as if they were a multi-headed beast, with individuals adopting specialised
roles. If we are saying that hunting in humans is culture, not a behaviour leading to
culture, then clearly we are attributing culture to chimpanzees. However, we can
make some distinction about this, for crucial point is that not all chimps hunt, whereas
we are assuming that all hominid tool makers hunted, if they hunted at all, they may
just of scavenged. But working from the insight given us by chimp behaviour we are
entitled to suspect that it was the acquisition of gorgonic attributes, that is being many
headed, that fed the newly evolved ground dwelling hominid superorganisms. And
today, or until recently, the modern humans living in the jungles of Africa still employ
tactics that involve leaving strategically placed nets and then driving forest animals
toward them by forming a line and making a hullabaloo.
On this basis we can imagine that the gap in the fossil record noted by Isaac
can be accounted for, indeed is accounted for by a natural extension of the narrative I
have provided above, in an attempt to match my idea of human corporate nature to the
points raised by Isaac's presentation of the Jewish idea of human divinity, that shows
humans are simply unique in all of nature, and cannot be accounted for by any
straightforward biological means such as we might apply to any other species.

Fig. 25.5 shows that for the last four million years a useful if still
somewhat patchy fossil record of members of the family Hominidae has been
recovered. We need more, but what we have is a handy start. A similar useful
but patchy series of hominoid fossils has been recovered from the time range
from about eighteen to eight million years ago. In spite of loudly enunciated
early claims to the contrary, a concensus is now emerging that none of these
earlier hominoids can be classified as members of the family Hominidae.
 Between the Miocene and the Pliocene to Pleistocene fossil samples,
there is a four to five million year gap, a period for which we have as yet
virtually no hominoid fossils of any kind. This is the period during which the
biochemical evidence would indicate that hominids, chimps and gorillas
separated. Although we know more than Darwin did about the range of
skeletal organization patterns that existed before divergence, our interpretation
of the divergence itself is still obliged to be fossil free.

(Page 518 - 9)

This gap in the fossil record has been accounted for by the natural means of
supposing that the relevant species lived in unfavourable terrain for fossil
preservation, forest terrain being a fine example of the type where would not expect
fossils to be deposited too readily due to the highly organic nature of the environment
where decay would be rapid and effective to a maximum degree. Such a gap is liable
to induce a variety of misleading ideas into the minds of workers in the field and I
have no accounts handy, not have I read any in recent times to guide me on the matter
of just how these speculations have gone. But we can see that my account lends itself
naturally to the problem in a very subtle way for it not only indicates that a forest
habitat is liable to of been the right location for the transitional phase from ape to
hominid, but that once this phase had been completed and produced a true form of
superorganic ape, it acted on the mechanistic imperatives associated with Alexander's
theorising about the requirements for the evolution of a superorganic form and shifted
of its own accord into the daylight where its bones all of sudden become available to
our searches.
This paints a picture of an already fully evolved humanoid form of creature
coming out of the jungle to unleash the natural potential of its mammalian physiology
directed as unleashing the potential latent in the social environment of mammalian
form. In the earliest remains of the human line that we have thus far obtained then,
we are seeing a highly advanced humanoid form. Thus where we try to make sense of
the sudden appearance of bipedal gait and tool fabrication in terms of the environment
in which it first appears, a natural enough thing to do, we are mislead. The open
terrain, its niche environment has nothing per se to do with the evolution of upright
posture or tool making behaviour, these attributes were already fully formed before
humans set foot on the plains. The shift to the plains represents the first great
transition to a challenging environment that has become a characteristic of our kind, a
move which reveals the sanity of Nature's investment in the lump of meat stuck on
your shoulders that we like to think so much of. A translocation, what is more, such
as Isaac says only occurred, for the first time, after we came along, some 100,000
years ago. As ever, got their heads stuck up their own arses these people; but, for
once, with good reason. Except that, if they would only approach the subject with an
open mind, focused on the necessary destruction of mythology, and thus the age old
basis for order in our society, they could of seen this for themselves long, long ago,
and saved Darwin the trouble of leading us all up the garden path; where he liked to
spend his days at Down House walking round and round in circles, and no doubt came
to the conclusion that this exercise would be good for the rest of us.

Preadaptation
 Just a word about this. When I read a feature of human physiology, which
poses the most difficult challenges for the priests to interpret according to their
nonsensical mode of reasoning, described as posing a problem because it may not be
related to the context we think it is related to by way of its function, and so it may be
an intrusion into a context for which it was preadapted, I wince. This is such an evil
perversion of the beautiful science that these charlatans have taken possession of by
means of power and wealth, via the institutions they are inducted into, that provide the
means to go and scrape the surface of the earth looking for the vital clues that act as a
licence to preach science. Turn up the magnification to max.

'However, to keep our topic from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps
we should allow for the possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism,
might have been a pre-adaptive development that was favoured by selection
for reasons other than culture.'

This is sheer, unadulterated arrogance, they do not know the answer, they do not care,
and so they just offload some vomit spiel that meets the objection, like a thief
explaining why he happens to fit the evidence of a crime by saying there may of been
an earthquake in Japan when he was visiting London and that could of caused the
juxtaposition of the loot and the space under the floorboards in his flat. A thief would
never be so stupid as to say something this ridiculous, knowing the grip of authority
would not take kindly to being treated with contempt. But these priests are an
authority unto themselves, they each stroke one another's ego, playing the same tune
even when they pose as intractable adversaries, they can come out with any garbage
they like, and who is in a position to challenge them? They own the evidence, and
they own the means to speak about it.
I raise the subject now because as we have teased out of Isaac's excellent
description of the pattern revealed by the evidence a probable explanation for that
pattern, by applying a nontheistic model to that evidence, a scientific model in other
words, we have found that we have an example of an evolved feature, unique to
humans, that could create the illusion of preadaptation. We have seen that our tree
dwelling ape evolved in the forest to fill the social vacuum created by the evolution of
mammalian physiology. As this process took shape the resulting superorganic form
was obliged to give up a strictly arboreal lifestyle and to descend to the ground. This
process involved the evolution of bipedal gait as ground-dwelling demands combined
with nest-making demands  that is the demands of creating exoskeletal structures in
which to house the newly evolved superorganic form  to favour a mode of
locomotion dedicated to the ground and allowing the dextrous use of materials.
To our eyes, seeking the sources of our evolution, and finding only the
evidence of bipedal gait existing in the open savannah, it looks as though this posture
evolved for the open savannah, but in fact, while it was perfectly suited to this open
terrain, it had already evolved to completion while the first humanoids were living in
the woods. Thus bipedal stance could be, badly, described as having been preadapted
to the open terrain. But this is a spurious way to describe what must of happened,
according to our rationalisation of the evidence, in keeping with what we know was
the driving force behind all human adaptivity. Bipedal gait was an adaptation to the
social environment, as all adaptation associated with our lineage must be, and having
adapted to this end, the resultant creature was empowered to extend its terrain into
otherwise unavailable niche environments. It is this ability to extend into the
otherwise untenable niches of the earth's biosphere that makes the superorganic form
a viable strategy, and the recognition of which offers us a means of discovering an
answer to the questions Isaac asks when he talks about finding out what
environmental factors made tool use, increasing brain size, or upright stance, a
positive adaptive shift.
One explanation covers all, it is that a superorganic form can survive where a
loose conglomeration of competing individuals, constituting the normal species,
cannot do so well without focusing upon the specialisation of form that leads to a
diversification into a range of species. Logically, it should be clear that while one
adaptive strategy leads to a focus upon a niche, thus adding to the niche, the other
leads to a generalised ability to exploit all niches, which is exactly what characterises
our own kind as we like to think of ourselves, as Isaac says.
There cannot be such a thing as preadaptation. Legs did not evolve in a way
that justifies the description 'preadapted' to open land. They evolved to allow an
arboreal animal to become a terrestrial animal, and the drive to become terrestrial
came from within the latent potential of that animal's basic physiology, which had a
capacity for social integration between individuals that was awaiting realisation. A
hallmark of mammalian physiology is the inherent intelligence of the mammalian
brain.

'Mammals differ from other vertebrate animals in many ways, one of

the most important being their comparatively high degree of intelligence,
which is associated with the structure of their brains. To their intelligence
they owe a great part of their evolutionary success; they are adaptable and,
although they are to a large extent creatures of habit, they can alter their
behaviour patterns to suit new circumstances.'

(British Mammals, L. Harrison Matthews, Collins, 1963. Page 2)

Loosely put, we can see, that one may very well say that human bipedalism was
preadapted to the open savannah, where it came into its own. As reasonable as this
mode of expression seems on the face it, it is thoroughly misleading for the very
reason that it appears so reasonable. It is the job of anyone interested in speaking for
science to see that they do not make such crass use of the superficial, but rather that
they ensure the unbroken threads of causality are properly revealed in the narratives
they give that turn the patterns of evidence into accounts of reality.

'Social Dynamics treats of the development of humanity. This

development is subject to invariable laws. "Each of the successive social
states is the necessary result of the preceding state and indispensable condition
of the following state."'

(Organismic Theories of the State : Nineteenth Century Interpretations

of the State as Organism or as Person, F. W. Coker, AMS Press, 1967, page
119)

Coker is here quoting from Comte. I have just read this today, and it fits in
nicely with the subject discussed in this section. It seems that Comte, the first real
sociologist, who sort to apply a scientific method to the study of humans, here had in
mind the stages of civilisation, such was the limited scope of the vision of the first
sociologists. But it is nice to see that the principle he deduces here is applicable to the
earliest evolutionary transformations of our species, where we may apply its insight to
the evolution of human form, since we have determined that all human form is related
to the social state of the organism. Thus while Comte has in mind patriarchal or
democratic societies, we may with equal justification have in mind bipedal gait of
brain size as successive social states. And, on this basis, we may use the same rule as
Comte, and say that each successive physiological change is a necessary result of the
preceding social change, and the indispensable condition of the next social state. In
our example bipedal gait was the necessary result of increased social cooperation
producing a true superorganic form, and the realisation of bipedal gait was the
indispensable condition of the next social state realised in the translocation of hominid
populations from an arboreal setting to an open savannah terrain. Thus social form is
reduced to physiological form in the earliest stages of hominid evolution, when
hominids were still true animals as we would recognise them to be, if we had
cognizance of them as they were when they were undergoing the transformations that
we are considering at this moment, as discussed in Isaac's piece.
Crucially then, in complete opposition to the establishment, we can say that
upright posture, tool use, and brain size, are not adaptive responses to the physical
environment, they are physiological responses to the impulse to exploit the social
potential of mammalian physiology as it had unfolded in the arboreal line of primates
prior to the divergence of a distinctly hominid line. This fact is perfectly obvious,
since it is encapsulated in the fact that it is not possible to equate the brain size of
individuals to a nutrional pay off. The fact is that none of these features of individual
form are in any direct sense related to a nutrional pay off, although this preconception
is what Isaac constantly tries to force onto the facts, and, in acting in this manner, he
is representative of the whole theocratic establishment which is determined to see the
process of human evolution as a divine inspiration, focused on creating the supreme
elite individual, in the guise of themselves, of course, as defined by themselves
because of the elite position they do most definitely hold in our intellectually perverse
society.

Shit Eating Rats, Piss Drinking Monkeys

'The peculiarities of the early hominid megadont phase presumably

relates to diet, but what this was continues to baffle us. Scanning electron
microscope (SEM) studies of tooth wear by Alan Walker (1981) and others
suggest that non-siliceous plant tissues were being consumed - presumably
fruits (sensu lato) or seeds. But what fruits or seeds? And why such large
teeth? These questions call for studies of floristic communities and the
feeding opportunities they offer as well as scrutiny of fossils.'

This is no place for squeamishness, all we are interested in is reality. I do not

pretend to be able to answer directly the question asked here, in the above exert, but
there is a very interesting attribute of superorganic species' that concerns, not diet
exactly, but rather eating habits, and modern humans are very much included in this
peculiarity.
 It is a characteristic of human behaviour that we consume none nutrional
foodstuffs, for behavioural reasons. In other words we consume social foods, social
food is not to be confused with eating socially. Interestingly, these substances, these
social foods, are sometimes known as the food of the gods, the peyote cactus, being
an extremely potent hallucinogenic, is an example the kind of social food that evokes
such reverence and denomination. We know that the gods, or simply God, in our
culture, are, is, really the superorganism, and that these foods are really feeding the
superorganism's collective body directly, or a special segment, or organ of that body,
not the individuals who actually do the eating. These individuals, by eating these
non-nutritious, social substances, food of the gods, or mind food, are thereby inducted
deeper into their role of creating the superorganism by consuming these psychoactive
foods, foods of the superorganism. It is self evident that we evolved to engage in this
drug taking behaviour as part of our subduction into a superorganic form, but in the
light of our ruminations here, we might ask just when this particular facet of our
species first expressed itself?
The anal fixation of mole rats upon their own waste products clearly forms
part of their species social adaptation leading their becoming a true superorganic
species, their own shit is their divine meal, and so naturally, they share it. We may
imagine that it contains hormones reinforcing corporate identity, no doubt information
exists that would answer this question, but I do not have it and I think we can take it
for granted. In what I have seen described as Edward O. Wilson's favourite ant
species, the Leaf Cutter ant of South, or Central America, these creatures also share a
common foodstuff, a fungi which they grow in gardens in their nest, and which they
share with one another. Once again we may deduce this is their God-food, and it
serves to reinforce their corporate identity in some manner.
Piss drinking monkeys? Well, not quite, a bit of artistic licence here in order
to find a catchy heading, don't want to lose the interest of the little ones do we. The
human species have acted upon their early evolutionary development enabling them
to enter any environment where food is available, and they live in all terrestrial niches
the world has to offer, some of which draw their viability from the sea, and might be
considered semi-marine niches. Humans have not evolved to live in the water,
despite the notions of an aquatic phase muted by some fanciful commentators,
because this would require the evolution of a separate species of human being, and
that evolutionary trend would be in direct opposition to the nature of human beings
that evolved to form a corporate social organism, not a specialised individual form
adapted to a specific niche environment. The aquatic ape theory is alien to human
nature and as such utter nonsense; no wonder it has been so popular, in a minor way,
anything to avoid reality.
While human species identity has remained unchanged, despite the adoption
of the most contrary habitat ranges, human behaviour has likewise conformed to the
same narrowly defined, uniform range. But the various habitats have imposed variety
upon cultural modes expressing these uniform behavioural patterns, in exactly the
same way racial identity has shown an infinite capacity for representation of corporate
identity, while always conforming to the same requirement to be a superficial
expression of territorial location, and an absolute definition of superorganic identity,
but nothing more, not threatening to go deeper by evolving a human form adapted to a
specific niche. Part of that variety within conformity to a general pattern, is also
revealed in the common practice of consuming superorganic foodstuffs, while
accessing a diverse range of local plant materials. Some members of the superorganic
fauna that colonised the more northerly areas of the European landmass made use of
the fly agaric mushroom, the pretty one with the red cap covered in white spots, that
grew in the woodlands covering the territorial domains to which they had become
adapted via a combination of superficial physiological transformations that were
essentially racial, and concerned corporate identity, plus more crucial behavioural and
cultural transformations based on the acquisition of information which induced
changes in the exoskeleton of the superorganism, enabling the creature to occupy
hitherto vacant terrain. Part of these changes in the exoskeleton, enabled by means of
language upon which the evolution of knowledge was based, included the particular
local organism consumed to induce a heightened intensity of superorganic identity,
bringing about a deeper integration of the biomass living within the evolving
exoskeleton as it became adjusted to the terrain it was advancing across. Needless to
say, the consumption of this magic food, connecting individual consciousness with
corporate consciousness, experienced as a state spiritual awareness, was the basis of a
social hierarchy. Thus the superorganic food was literally responsible for the
fabrication of physiological structure within the human organism. This allowed a
priesthood to be founded on the basis of access to the psychotic states induced by this
poisonous toadstool; today it seems to be a feature of priesthoods that they are made
up of naturally psychotic people who have only to be inducted into a religious
mythology to show their true nature, and who need no artificial stimulation to
perform beyond that induced by knowledge of the law ....... but I won't start ranting,
as much as I would like to.
Any road, being poisonous this mushroom made the person who ate it ill, one
consequence was vomiting, not too nice, but somewhat like whacking-up smack,
when people inject heroin they often vomit as a reaction to the drug, so they tell me.
The priestly order were the ones who had the privilege of consuming this raw mind-
food, and the other members of the organism would be included in the process of
heightened identity unification induced by these superorganic foodstuffs by drinking
the urine of the priests. The urine retained enough of the active ingredient of the fly
agaric to induce hypnotic sates, thus allowing people to commune with the spirits,
albeit to a lesser extent no doubt, while not having the more dangerous and unpleasant
side effects experienced by those who ate the thing raw. One might ask whether
risking being poisoned to death, and getting off lightly by nearly vomiting to death,
would not actually be preferable to drinking some half deranged priest's piss, but that
is a matter of personal taste I suppose.
And so, with Isaac's remarks in mind, and our own analysis of the manner in
which apes turned into humanoids, we come back to the question, When did humans
evolve this symbiotic type relationship with special, non-nutrional, foodstuffs? We
have recognised that apes must of undergone a transformation into a fully
superorganic form while still remaining apes, and in order to realise the potential of
their transformation the newly formed apes were obliged to come down from the trees
and take up a permanently terrestrial lifestyle, and this moment is one candidate for a
cusp point at which the shift is made from ape to hominid, all this while still living in
the jungle. Could it be that central to the evolutionary process during the initial stages
bringing about the unification of individuals into one superorganic form, sharing one
mind, was initiated, or facilitated, by some psychoactive plant substances for which
the none superorganic ape species developed an ever greater susceptibility, because
doing so facilitated their evolution toward a superorganic form?
People observing the absolute frenzy involved in the chimpanzee troops,
preceded by the extraordinary care involved in the execution of the hunt during which
there is great calm, followed by the ecstasy of the kill, plus the novel modes of food
sharing associated with this special food stuff, meat, have said it looks as though the
eating of this meat-of-the-chase induces some kind of euphoric state, just like we
would associate with drug consumption. Maybe group hunting was a precursor to
actual drug taking, where behavioural stimulation promoted the evolution of a
physiology which was aroused by intense social behaviour, and then narcotic
stimulants were found to trigger the same responses and so acted as the next baton of
evolutionary advance carrying individual physiology toward an ever more integrated
superorganic form; each baton of sociality increasing the spiral pressure of the
spinning vortex that would draw the human out of the ape. We know that racial
physiology and language are two major batons of evolutionary advance derived
directly from the force of human nature. We may be sure that bipedal walking, tool
making, increased brain size and increased cerebral organization were similar batons
adding to the formation of a living rope of interlaced causal threads that is our human
form. We know we take drugs with a passion, and we know we like violence as if it
were a drug, so we may guess, for the time being, that these two are threads woven
into our being at some early stage of the spinning out of human nature to form the
rope that is our physical being. The spinning vortex of sociality feeds the loom on
which our kind is woven by Nature, the threads are drawn into the physiology of the
individual, dyed in an infinite array of colours, which are woven into the social
matrix; and the cloth is being woven still, see the pattern unfold, look, look ...............
do you see? The loom is language, I am weaving for you now.
But prior to the weft and warp of words weaving knowledge into a pattern
upon which the social fabric is modelled, there comes the spinning of genetics
creating the physical being of living flesh and blood. While the artistry of my
scientific philosophy reveals the image created by language through time, the art of
the scientific practitioner will unpick the thread of human physiology by revealing the
batons strung along that thread in a time sequence, so that the thread of human
physiology, visualised as a string holding a series of distinct societal beads, will
culminate in the linguistic gem which will begins to turn the thread into a cloth. The
one dimensional form of physical organic being will thereby be lifted onto a another
plane, occupying a further dimension of space which we know as the social
dimension, not only possessing forward momentum as it twirls of the spinning wheel
of genetic evolution, now possessing a means of lateral expansion, the organic
material acquires a two dimensional form where threads interlink ever more tightly as
the threads of the biomass proliferate and fan out across all of the space within which
life exists.
So that prior to bipedal walking, we now have drug induced states of social
intensity, which involved the first symbiotic relationships between humanoids and
another species, such as we would more definitely associate with domestic species,
and prior to this food of the gods candidate for increasing superorganic form, we have
hunting behaviour fuelling the evolution of a hyperactive social impulse to work
cooperatively. And we may guess that the ape evolving a hunting strategy turned on
other apes, just as chimpanzees focus upon a kindred form in the monkeys they hunt.
The point about this strategy is that these creatures, having a similar form, are more
nearly matched, and so adapted to the same environmental terrain, where simply the
best equipped to predate becomes the predator, and the other becomes the prey. It
may be this prey predator bifurcation occurred within the ape fauna of the forest of
twenty million years ago, initiating the first moves toward the division of the
anthropoid line which allowed humans to appear. We do need to tease out a subtle
chain of ever increasing social attributes spiralling mammals toward a superorganic
form if we are to make complete sense of our present day constitution.
I confess I feel I am going out on a limb taking this highly speculative
proposal, concerning superorganic foodstuffs, so far. But I like the basic idea of
following up on the human disposition to take drugs in this way, even though there is
the possibility that this habit only came into being during the later phases of our
evolution. In the paragraph re-copied above, we see a reference to exceptional
dentition, and the soft foods it seems to be associated with, maybe they were
masticating something that fed their corporate identity, not their bellies. The beauty
of making psychoactive stimulants the vehicle of the early stages of the shift toward a
more deeply integrated social form of anthropoid, is that this removes any need for
the animal to of evolved any radical physiological adaptations that later came to
characterise our kind, such as upright posture, tool use, exaggerated intellect. So we
are not invoking preadaptation, we are simply finding modes of transition that make
sense each in their own time and space, but also conform to the imperative to evoke a
greater degree of superorganic integration. Thus, as when we make a journey, we
only need make one step at a time but, while each step is complete in itself, all steps
are guided by one directional force, where we want to get to, and thus we get to a very
definite place as the steps accumulate. The evolutionary steps unfolding the potential
of mammalian physiology to fill the social environment created by the coming of
mammalian physiology itself, by creating a mammalian superorganic form, was
directed by what we should call the force of human nature. The force of human
nature has led from the jungles of twenty million years ago to the world of global
terror of today, where still the competition goes on, and one animal preys upon
another of a like kind, in a relentless drive for an ever more complete state of
integration into one superorganic form.
In other words we are putting a psychoactive foodstuff, which means a social
foodstuff, consumed solely for reasons to do with social unity and social structure,
into the role of catalyst in the process of lifting the mammalian animal, in the form of
an ape, over the initially difficult threshold of starting to become a superorganic
being. We can equate the ape fauna of twenty million years ago with an organic
matrix, which constituted a compound subject to the laws of physics, as revealed in
chemical processes. Within this matrix competition between species of apes,
resulting in evolutionary change, acted as the force increasing the equivalent of
pressure and temperature, a force operating within the finite mass of the faunal-
organism which was the total ape fauna. There was one environmental domain left
unexploited until one species of ape evolved an adaptive strategy that allowed it to
evolve in-group cooperative strategies, so defined by their focus on out-group entities.
Thus one ape became a predator of other apes by evolving, amongst other requisite
attributes, an increased sense of identity. Identity, was from the outset at the nub of
the process. In this seething biochemical soup, defined by the living bodies of the
anthropoid fauna, a fauna which was replete with an extraordinary variety of form,
eventually, something, a catalyst, not part of the organism itself, but instrumental in
causing the reaction to go, lifted one species over the threshold which led toward an
easy decent into the vacant terrain of social integration that was crying out to be filled
under these competitive circumstances. Once lifted over this threshold it was an
unceasing, headlong rush to fill this social void with a superorganic form. And this is
precisely what is happening when we engage in the new strategies of suicide
bombing, of all out war upon civilian society that is the hallmark of the newly
ascendant wing of the Zionist movement, Al Qaeda, that is driving the planet's human
biomass ceaselessly toward unification under one master identity, Judaism, as it has
been driven now for several thousand years, since the discovery of complex modes of
creating exoskeletal form managed via language, and linguistic structures in the form
of writing and the laws writing is able to evolve. So humanity glides down the path
toward true integration into the social environment realised by evolving a fully
superorganic form that we now know we have inherited today.
We may relate this supposed vehicle of social unification, superorganic food,
to the superseding vehicles that we know about, racial physiology, and language. We
know race continues to act as a powerful force delivering corporate identity to
individuals, but we also know that language, in the form of highly specialised
mythologically based religions, like Judaism, has taken the place of racial physiology
in the delivery of corporate identity. If we now add the predisposition to take
superorganic foodstuffs, that evolved for exactly the same reason, to that of racial
identity and fully symbolic speech, also evolved to deliver a corporate identity to all
members of the organism, then we can see that drug taking habits fall into a similar
recessive category as racial physiology, where they still have a major impact on our
superorganic form, but one that is presented as particularly malicious in a world
where we are shifting ever more toward one corporate mind based on linguistically
transmitted myth.
As a final word on this subject I would like to point out that the habit of using
foodstuffs to induct individuals into a corporate identity seems to be alive and well,
but it is now based on more ordinary foodstuffs that do appear to constitute items of
nutrition, but which in fact are bad for us, and so ought perhaps to be designated as
anti-nutrional, and as such non-nutrional in the same sense narcotic foodstuffs are,
and thus they might be seen to have the same real nature as foods of the gods, existing
to induce corporate identity, and so to sustain the priesthood that controls their supply
and consumption, as opposed to consuming them themselves, a subtle shift in strategy
arising from the equally devious shift in the form of the magic food substances. We
can see that we can apply the term artificial to narcotic substances as well as we
might to modern processed foods, for neither are oriented toward the natural
physiology of food consumption.
In effect the modern global corporations are self engineered priesthoods,
whose identity is delivered in the form of a brand name, with their own competing
hubs of veneration, we might call them temples, bearing their own distinctive, but
basically identical, logos, be it MacDonald's, or Burger King, or Pizza Hut, or Road
Chef, and so on. Thus giving themselves a corporate identity designed to induce
emotional attachment in individuals, especially the young  capture them early  by
means of priestcraft, the elite have produced ephemeral foods that are all taste and no
substance, perfect to induce emotional attachment, and to be consumed as part of an
image imbibing ceremonial act of consumption, no wonder people get grossly fat; we
call these modern superorganic foods, fast-food. In effect fast-food is the latest form
of food of the gods, it is an artificial product, just as naked mole rat's pooh is an
artificial product. And this mole rat trap crap-cuisine, serves the same function in
their superorganism as junk-food serves in ours; and it looks like its serves the same
function to me from the effect it is having on the individuals enslaved to this new anti-
nutrional foodstuff, big fat bodies, but fat fat, fat bodies. And lets face it folks, lager
is about as close to drinking something that looks like piss as we are ever going to get,
originating in northern districts of Europe too, come to think of it, and there seems to
be no stopping the ever encroaching fad for this disgusting yellow, gassy, chilled
brew; so maybe we are, at heart, piss-drinking monkeys after all.
 To most people alive today, living in the centre of the Western world, as I do,
the notion of equating corporations, of any kind, to a priesthood, and meaning it quite
literally, is liable to appear absurd. It is, however, anything but absurd, it is not only
correct, it is logically inevitable that corporations must be the exact equivalent of the
social body we normally call a priesthood. By developing a fully scientific model of
society based upon a biological conception of society, all aspects of society must be
capable of being reduced to that model, and therefore all attributes of all aspects of
social form must be capable of being attributed to some functional role or structure of
the superorganic physiology that science is obliged to recognise as real once it has a
true perception of human nature. Thus we need to decide what the defining attributes
of a priesthood are, and then see what features of society conform to these priestly
attributes.
A corporation that serves the social needs of the people directly is, in effect,
acting as a farmer of the human biomass. In the total human biomass, we could also
include, as noted by Spencer, the biomass of domestic species, but we can also
include the biomass of the entire planet, since this has been incorporated into our
territorial domains, in all but a few cases, where untouched wilderness remains, for
now. An organisation that manages the human population directly is bound, in our
sophisticated world, to do so by highly developed means. At the heart of these means
will be knowledge about how to carry out this management, or farming role, to
maximum effect from the stand point of the interests of those doing the managing.
The rules that these priests in charge of managing the human biomass will operate in
accordance with, will inevitably be learnt by dealing with the human instinct to act in
obedience to that which we have called human nature. Human nature is corporate,
thus human nature forces humans to form groups. Humans have an instinct to form
groups, they are fulfilled when in a group, and unfulfilled when not in a group. We
might say the human animal is gregarious, but this would be to understate the matter,
humans are far more driven to be sociable than is suggested by the idea of being
gregarious, we are talking about necessary physical association, and life depending
upon it. Alienation is the worst experience any human being can have, which is why
some societies in the past, the Druids for example, as noted by Caesar, used the
rejection of individuals, those refusing to acknowledge priestly authority, from social
intercourse. This practice of the Druidic priesthood is related to the idea of being
outlawed that was continued in these islands for a millennia after the Jews
exterminated the Druidic priests and imposed their new method of social farming that
still rules our world to this day. Being outlawed meant an individual would have no
recourse to the laws of society, they would be an open target for anyone to abuse, in
anyway they could. Humans must be part of a group, that is that.
Some people may want to quibble about the use of the word Jew in this
historical reference to the ethnic cleansing of the Druidic culture. People who have
not the least notion what history is may think that reality is in a name, and thus they
may think the Romans were responsible for the annihilation of the Druidic priesthood
that they drove to a last stand on Anglesey, and then massacred to a man, and women.
And then the Romans, I suppose, just happened to introduce the Jewish slave identity
to Britain, and then disappear from the face of the earth, leaving the Jews proper,
behind to reap the reward some two thousand years later. Well of course history is a
facet of Jewish priestcraft. The Old Testament reeks of historical mythmaking,
which, as pseudo Jews, our Christian priests continue to foist upon us today, as an
account of our organic evolution and growth. Although of late we have actually had a
Jew proper preaching history to us in the form of Schalmer, who has been given a
licence by the BBC to produce an endless amount of Jewish propaganda specially for
the Christian slaves of Judaism who go by the name of Britons, under which, by
virtue of this artificial label Britain, which is a legal construct, a construct of Jewish
legal method, as inherited via the Romans from Sumeria, by whatever convoluted
course, Schalmer can include himself. But can a Jew be British, given their affinity
for Israel? Of course not. But since they are the priesthood, they can do as they damn
well like, and as such a British Jew is, in reality, as British as some poor sod like me
who is only British, and who has no other higher place to call their own, which they
really serve. The best I can hope to do is to serve Schalmer's true home, Israel, via
our artificial home, Britain, that is what all Christian and Moslem states exist to do,
after all.
There is no such thing as history, anymore than there is such a thing as God.
What these priests, who call themselves historians, are doing is identical to that which
the palaeontologists that we discussed above were doing when they sent deeply
religious men off to Africa to look for evidence that would obliterate any possibility
of anyone ever being able to believe in God in the future. These historians are simply
corralling the evidence, and thereby possessing it, thus licensing themselves to cloak
it in whatever outer form they cared to, which naturally was one that conformed to the
demands of the priesthood, as ever. If this academic method did not exist then it
would not be possible for all knowledge of any relevance to humans, always to
conform to the requirements of Judaism, and the preservation of its authority via the
ability to form the largest group of all by means of a common religious identity.
We, as scientists, must look at the same stars the astrologer looks at, the same
fossils the palaeontologists like Isaac look at, and we are forced to track social
changes via the only extant record of those changes available, albeit they are always
written by the Jewish priests who rule our world and write our records; anyone
writing history according to the Jewish method automatically becomes a Jewish
priest, they do not need to be conscious of this, Adolf Hitler was as Jewish as you
could get by this definition, and he was in real terms too. I am the only person I know
of who does not adhere to Jewish method, and I of course am a true atheist, a true
scientist, a truth teller. Use the same evidence we must, but we do not have to fall for
the bullshit that evidence is dressed in, which use the ideas that the human individual
is an end in themselves for whose benefit history, like society, exists. The individual
for whose benefit our society exists is the individuality that is Judaism, and to that
extent Jewish historical method makes sense, because it weaves a story that places
Judaism at the core of all things, as we see when insane ideas like those of the
Mormons of America appear out of the woodwork, talking about the native
Americans as the twelve lost tribes of Israel. What? Insane, that is what. But this is
how the human organism spreads its uniform identity under one God, by endlessly
reinventing Judaism.
We do not need to be fixated upon the names of the people who carried out the
actions reported in the histories we are told are our history just because these are the
histories we are interested in, because we are not interested in events anymore than a
doctor is interested in knowing the ephemeral minutia of a patient's daily routine
when making an examination. We are primarily interested in processes, which we
hope to discern operating through the evidence of events. Thus we do not care who
did what to whom, and when, we only want to know what happened. We do not
distinguish between Americans invading Iraq and killing people, or Al Qaeda
kidnapping people and decapitating them, or planting bombs in public places. We are
interested in the behaviour, not the events, the interaction of the groups, not their
names, other than the usefulness names serve as labels. Hence it is easy for us to see
that these two groups, Al Qaeda and Americans, are both Jewish physiological
structures, and they are working in harmony in a perfectly functional manner to
produce a healthy outcome, superorganic growth of the Jewish organism. You cannot
possibly see this if you are fixated upon the historical mythology emanating from the
workshop of the priesthood, which is precisely why we are programmed with the
theistic language, that is the software programmed into our brains by our process of
acculturation, software that makes us absorb the myths as they are meant to be
absorbed.
However the complex manner in which America came to have its present
identity is supposed to of occurred, the fact that cannot be denied is that it is a
passionately Christian society in which the Jews are a powerful force, and any way
you cut it, while the people who invaded Iraq last year may call themselves
Americans because they live in a territory called America, their identity is pure
Jewish. And therefore it was Jews that invaded the Jewish territory of Iraq last year,
from the perspective of process, not Americans. On this basis we should call the
Iraqis Jews, and indeed, so they are, just as we are, we are all Jews, and so were the
Romans. But, but, the Druids were not Jews. Nor were the Incas. This is why these
two priesthoods were exterminated, but only the priesthoods. Because the Jews
wanted to enslave their populations to their own identity implant, and that is what has
been done, and it is this process we are interested in teasing out. We are not
interested in reaffirming the Jewish priesthood's mythology, on the contrary, we want
to eradicate it so we know what the truth is, and so we possess a true science of
humanity.
A corporate organisation charged with the role of farming the human biomass
will seek to find ways to make as much as possible of the biomass join its group.
Yesterday, 26/06/04, I received an email from the American internet book dealer I use
apologising for debiting my bank account twice, telling me they had corrected the
error, and giving me a token voucher to spend this week. They thanked me for
supporting their organisation. Supporting, this is corporate-speak. The idea of
supporting this organisation never entered my head, I fortunately was just extending
my overdraft limit the day they made the error otherwise it would of cost me a £25
charge from my bank, and I was telling the clerk what a brilliant book dealer this
internet firm were, but I was not supporting them, I was just conversing. But they
want to interpret all behaviour in this corporate manner, it is how they seek to manage
their livestock, you and me. But all these people are doing is applying the lessons that
have been learnt by the art of priestcraft down the ages, in just the same way the
farmer does who looks after his livestock on the farm. So, what we are really saying
here, is that a person who effectively farms human beings, in whatever way, by acting
as a social manager, in whatever capacity, is, not a farmer, but a priest. From this
purely scientific perspective, it is clear that corporate food outlets are priestcraft
organisations, which therefore constitute priesthoods, and their structures, where they
involve gatherings, or delivery of a message of some kind, or the distribution of a
product, like food, do take on the attributes of a church.
Naturally, in our modern world, since we have a religious priesthood, we
would expect it to be involved in the management of people in these agrarian ways,
and this is the role we would especially expect Jews, like Schalmer, to play in
Christian and Moslem societies, since we know that this is the relationship that Jews,
as the master race, evolved to have with the substructure defined by the Jewish slave-
identity implants. And we do indeed find that Jews tend to dominate in these agrarian
type managerial roles in society, being lawyers, actors, managers, politicians, and so
on. Naturally, for this parasitic-cum-symbiotic relationship to exist between these
religious identity defined hierarchical structures within the living biomass resident in
the exoskeleton of the superorganism, the relative balance between the identities must
be maintained and Jews must always remain as a low percentage, but in a relatively
highly privileged position in any society they farm. Unfortunately I am obliged to go
by personal experience, severely limited as it is, to verify these logical deductions
about the social constitution by religious identity. It would be a heinous crime to ask
to know what religious identity people were, in relation to their jobs. And proposing
that this is done in order to find out what the proportion of Jews in the biomass is, and
what roles they have in the hierarchy, would probably get you a prison sentence. So it
would be best if everyone pretends they have not read this paragraph, and I will
pretend I have not written it.
There are, according to Lilienfeld, three spheres of operation in every social
organism, (see page 147 of Coker). The economic, juridical, and political. This
means any overarching priesthood, such as Judaism, must control money, law, and
political action. It must do so via its religious programme of identity implantation
which gives it possession of the biomass, which it then controls by strategic
involvement in the structures the priesthood evolved by way of priestly knowledge for
the purpose of farming society. Corporate enterprise is part of this priestcraft, which
is why we see tobacco companies, fast food outlets, and such like corporate
manipulators of human nature, always operating according to this selfish principle of
maximum profit, minimal responsibility, maximum dishonesty practiced as an art
form acting as a prime strategy of empowerment of the priesthood, and hence
maximal use of manipulative techniques such as advertising, role model association,
seductive presentation. And of course the law facilitates the existence of this, what I
would call criminal fraternity, because these corporate farming operations are the
powerhouse of the priesthood, lawyers and lawmakers being a fundamental part of the
priesthood.
Lying is the very essence of priestcraft, religion is the pure essence of lies.
The Bible and the Koran, these are corporate lies on the grandest scale, creating mass
illusions that embrace the entire biomass. We do not mean to be judgemental when
speak in this manner of social communication directed at abusing human individuals,
although I am using a judgemental term because I hate this lying priestcraft. Even so,
that is no reason why we should not recognise that this manipulative behaviour is
what nature has achieved by perfecting the human corporate form; civilisation
amounts to Nature's perfection of the art of lying. Lying is what gives colour to the
skin of the organism, by colour I mean identity, we acquire these lies, religious
identities, and thus we are incorporated into the being that is controlled by the
priesthood that emits the colour programme. If you think it is barmy to say you hate
something but you are not being judgemental when you describe it in derogatory
terms, then let me ask you if you like cancer, as a disease? no of course you do not,
you hate it if you think about it, but you are not judging it when you speak of it with
venom in your language, unless you are lost in a state of emotional confusion, or
extremely ignorant, or plain stupid. And so, advertising, public relations, spin
doctors, these are the roles occupied by the latter day priest. I met a young lad just
out of college last night, 28/06/04, a friend told me about him, he has just obtained a
job in advertising earning £25,000 a year! Only priests, social mangers that is,
farmers of the human biomass, can earn such sums so readily. He seemed a nice
youth, by the look of him, and he would no doubt be bemused by this account of the
profession he is entering and the equation of himself, a tattooed, modern, freethinking
fella, with figure of a priest. But I am unravelling the pattern in the cloth, and tracing
the thread of priestcraft which leads from the earliest foundations of complex social
form in the Middle East some five millennia ago, right up the present. They did not
have McDonalds beef burger joints poisoning their minds then, and we do not have
golden bulls poisoning ours today, unless we are Hindus, but we have a priestcraft
today, as we did then, because priests and their craft are an inherent part of human
superorganic physiology, it is merely a matter of figuring out how to recognise the
signs, the priests do not know them, only the social scientist may know these things.
Priests do priestcraft, that does not mean that they know what it is that they do; an
advertising wiz kid may be able to relate to the idea of farming the populace, they
know all about human vulnerabilities for sure, but they would not realise that they are
part of a united priesthood that forms a theocracy and culminates in a literally
religious force, Zionism, and the identity which is the heart of it, Judaism.
It is clear that Jews do have a powerful bias toward these kinds of social
management affairs, the porn tycoon whose daughter runs the sexy party outlet Anne
Summer's is a perfect example, and no one likes sexy knickers more than me, so I like
a lot of the things the ever wily Jew seems to be driven to come up with to get rich.
But there it is, they are famous for being in charge of finance and managing money,
you can dismiss this as a nasty stereotype but the Christian slave implant makes the
Jews the controllers of money in Christian society! And we must be able to account
for Judaism in a scientific manner, just as we must be able to account for race in a
scientific manner, or breathing in a scientific manner. I have already frequently noted
how Jewish identity is evolved about the very idea of law as it arose in Sumerian
society five thousand years ago. And we only need look at America to see how the
Jews run politics, just as they did in Britain when Britain was the leading military
wing of Judaic ambition in the nineteenth century, when people like Disraeli  look
at the name  were the leading men of the day, and the thing that burned in the hearts
of the British political elite more then anything was the question of Israel, which the
British were so instrumental in returning to Jewish control. And it is to war that
politics is always reduced, as we can see from Spencer's notions of the centrality of
war in forming and sustaining priesthoods, (See page 132 of Coker). It is clear that,
acknowledging that Christian and Moslem societies are Jewish societies, in another
guise, that Judaism is to war as wet is to water.

On the basis of all these considerations we must think that just as race will not
go away as a factor in our sense of self, so it seems God foods keep hanging on in
there too. What the hell Ratty, whose for another turd-turnover? Cor yummy, yes
please, me, me!

'I can see no way of predicting the human pattern from the primate
patterns without introducing some novel elements into the mix of variables.'

Then, we might ask, why didn't you!

 I am ducking and diving here folks, no planning in my world, I just cannot get
my head round any real kind of plan, no wonder I find this writing a book business so
difficult. But I hope my dynamic presentation will work in its own way without
making me too vulnerable to scurrilous attack.
I had planned on taking the next two essays after Isaac's but as I have
unravelled so much from his piece I decided to go onto selections from Coker, whose
book I have just finished and in the final stages of which I found some excellent
material to copy and react to. However returning Coker to the library today,
29/06/04, I checked out the sale racks and came away with a small pile, amongst
which is a book which I think we can usefully put to use in the elucidation of what has
to be a primary objective of our effort, to reveal the sheer unmitigated blind self-
righteous ignorance of these endless flood of priests who have the free run of the
media in which to dress up their robbed out material and spit stupidity into the very
being of the presentations they make.
The Great Apes : Our Face in Nature's Mirror, by Michael Leach, Blandford,
1996 is not a work of science by a scientists, as we dug into above in Isaac's case.
This is a pretty picture book telling a bedtime story for the slaves to read and go ah!
It bleats about the tragic destruction of the habitat upon which these nearest of
relatives of ours depend but in doing, so while propagating the theocracy's lies about
what human nature is it is a major tool in the ability of those who desperately want to
exterminate all life not of service to humanity, by default, as a product of their Zionist
philosophy of human supremacy vested in Judaism, in the pursuit of theistic power to
go right on doing what they have always done. I am not sure that anything can
change this process, but one thing is for sure, anything short of a total change of
outlook will necessarily continue the pace of corporate expansion of the Jewish
organism to form a blanket across the earth's surface smothering all life that is not
drawn into the living tissue of the organism of Judaism. This result is predictable, left
to nature, and we can do nothing else, but that is the one thing this book does make
plain, we can build nuclear weapons, we fight wars, we can go to the moon, but we
cannot stop ourselves ravaging the biosphere of the planet because that is what human
nature obliges us to do and that is what Judaism evolved to perfect.
Lets take a look at how the foundations of perverted physical anthropology
laid down by the life long dedication to the task of people like Isaac and the Leakey
dynasty, have made it a matter of ease for the misrepresentation of human nature to
continue unabated. Leach opens the fifth chapter Man : the Super Ape, with a nice
discussion of our species classification in which he tells us

MAN:
'
The Super Ape

UNDER THE LINNAEAN system of animal classification, each species is grouped

together with relatives within a family. Animals that are closely related are listed
under the same genus; they are then given a second name which identifies the
individual species. The words used are frequently strange hybrid mixtures of Latin
and Greek, with the names of their discoverers sometimes thrown in for good
measure. The idea is to provide a universally recognizable name which avoids
confusion when scientists of different native tongues get together.
The names are chosen almost whimsically by zoologists rather than linguists
and they usually refer to some aspect of the animal, either physical or behavioural,
that makes it different from other creatures. For example, the polar bear is listed as
Ursus maritimus, which translates as sea bear. When we came to classify humans,
with typical immodesty, we honoured ourselves with the name Homo sapiens - wise
man. As we were the only animal on earth to call ourselves anything at all, it was
concluded that we were the most intelligent. Linnaeus himself wrote: 'I am well
aware of the vast difference between man and ape, when considered from a moral
viewpoint. Man is the only creature whom God has blessed with an immortal soul.'
With a more detached and less emotive view, Desmond Morris reviewed the
original choice of name and suggested that humans should be redesignated as the
'naked ape', which is a name zoologists from another planet may have chosen for us, if
they had been given the task. When it comes to biological classification, the
relationship between the great apes and humans lies in the differences that separate us,
but from a personal point of view I find it is far more interesting and illuminating to
look at the things we all have in common.
In pure evolutionary terms, humans are one of the side branches on the ape
family tree. There are minor anatomical features that differentiate us from the others.
Our arms are shorter and our legs longer in relation to our body size. We walk
upright and lack an opposable digit on our feet. Our canine teeth are smaller and our
bodies are considerably less hairy and muscular. There are other distinctions but
these are mostly hidden. The similarities outweigh the differences by a huge margin.
Many biologists believe that humans are separated from the apes by what is
found in our heads rather than by other parts of our anatomy. For both scientists and
philosophers it is the brain that makes us distinctly human. Physically we are slower
and weaker than the anthropoid apes; we are far less able to defend ourselves against
predators and, without the aid of tools in some form, only a tiny fraction of our
species are now equipped with the skills to comfortably survive in any natural habitat.
The skulls of early man had short nasal clefts, showing that even then our species had
a poor sense of smell. Human teeth are small and puny, unsuitable for either shearing
meat or constantly chewing up leaves and grass. Humans are physically one of the
world's most spectacularly non-specialized animals: we can't run quickly, climb trees
confidently, crack nuts with our jaws, migrate efficiently, kill prey without the aid of
weapons or carry out any of the everyday survival tasks that other species undertake.
East Africa is regarded as the site where man first appeared in anything
resembling his present form. Our ancestors were shorter than we are today and
probably even slower at running. According to the accepted theory of evolution, early
man had few natural advantages in the survival stakes, so he had to develop some
special skills to compete. We know that many forms of early humans appeared and
eventually died out, but the successful subspecies that was to colonize the earth
proved to be the one with the most efficient brain.
We have no way of knowing what triggered the initial blooming of human
brain power, but there are some clues that point the way. Early hominids had short,
stumpy fingers that were incapable of fine manipulation, but they had one huge
advantage and that was a natural upright stance which left their hands free for
collecting food and carrying large objects, while other primates walked on all four
legs. One theory for the appearance of an upright posture is that our ancestors
adopted this unique carriage as a way of keeping cool in the burning tropical heat. All
quadrupeds present their heads, necks, shoulders and back to the sky and absorb a
huge amount of heat when the sun shines. Many take to the shadows and coolness of
tree cover for the hours around noon, just to avoid overheating, but this cuts down
their available feeding time. It is possible that our distant African ancestors first stood
up so that less of their body surface was directly exposed to sunlight. Compared to a
four-footed stance, our upright posture cuts down heat absorption by 60 per cent,
allowing man to venture out when the other early primates were forced to stay in the
shade. This would also explain why we still have hairy heads, as hair insulates
against the heat as well as the cold. In those distant days before sharp stones were
used as tools, hair would have grown throughout the life of humans and the resulting
thick mat would have kept off the worst of the midday sun from their head, neck and
shoulders. Standing upright would also have exposed their bodies to more breeze,
increasing the cooling effect.
A very different idea of the route we took to reach our current status is based
on the possibility that pre-humans went through some sort of aquatic phase in their
evolution. There is a major gap in fossil evidence that spans the time between 7
million and 3 million years ago. This is an unimaginably long period and evolution
must have gone through many twists and turns before ape-like man appeared. Some
scientists think that instead of leaving the forests and taking to more open land, our
ancestors took to the water. This could have been a way of avoiding competition with
the ancestors of the great apes.
The evidence for this hypothesis is too strong to be completely ignored. There
are many aspects of human anatomy that are significantly different from that of the
apes and a water-based evolutionary phase would account for some of them. Few
people really think that we went through a totally aquatic existence such as that of
whales. Most subscribers to the idea believe that our ancestors had a semi-aquatic
lifestyle similar to seals, where hunting took place in the water but breeding and
resting happened on land.
This would certainly help to explain our unique absence of body hair, for thick
ape-like fur would be a hindrance under water. Humans possess a layer of
subcutaneous fat which, in distribution, bears a strong resemblance to whale blubber
but is absent in all other primates. For a species that is reputed to have evolved in the
tropics, humans are appallingly inefficient at dealing with high temperatures. Unlike
other land animals that live in hot environments, we have no way of conserving
moisture, in fact, we waste it in extraordinary quantities. Humans drink and sweat
more than any other animal of our size, our faeces are moist and our urine highly
diluted. We will die very quickly without water, even in conditions that are less than
hot. In common with marine mammals, we weep copious saline tears - a mechanism
that is used to reduce the salt level in a body that is constantly immersed in sea water.
When compared to apes, one of the most distinctive features of a human face
is the strange nose. Why do we have nostrils situated beneath a strange fleshy hood,
while apes have simple flat apertures? The sense of smell in apes and man appears to
be very similar, so there is no real difference in function. It could be that our peculiar
noses once acted as an anti-flooding device which prevented water entering our
breathing system while swimming. It is interesting to remember that all the other
apes, with the exception of bonobos, loathe water and will avoid entering it at all
costs, while humans regard playing in water as a pleasurable experience.
Humans exhibit a classic dive reflex from birth. Put a baby's head into water
and its heart rate immediately slows. This effect reduces the amount of oxygen used
and has been adopted by marine mammals when they want to stay submerged for long
periods. New-born babies also exhibit an astonishing swimming skill, at a time when
they are virtually incapable of any voluntary muscle control beyond crying. Their
eyes remain open under water and they swim not with chaotic splashing but with
rhythmical, balanced actions; they even control the direction of movement. Based on
current knowledge, it is entirely possible that our ancestors did indeed spend some
time as semi-aquatic animals, hunting for fish, crustaceans and other food in the
shallow waters of tropical Africa. The actions of prying and grasping in these
slippery conditions would be one plausible cause for the development of our slender
and highly manipulative hands. Lacking the sharp teeth, beak and talons of other
fishing species, our dextrous fingers would have compensated in the finding and
carrying of food. This could have been the point when arms and legs evolved into
different tools; flat feet would have been ideal fins for propulsion. Unfortunately,
fossil evidence for this idea remains unknown and, even if it were found, anatomy
alone would be unlikely to give us clues about the behaviour of these distant
creatures. Human evolution may have gone through a water phase but at some point
it moved back on to dry land.
For land-based hunters the advantages of the extra height given by a two-
legged posture must soon have become apparent. Elevated heads can peer over long
grass and provide more efficient long-distance sight when searching for either prey or
enemies. Even now many primates will stand on their hindlegs when excited or
frightened. They may be able to maintain the position only for a few seconds but it
gives them an excellent view of their surroundings. Our ancestors would have learned
that hands not needed for walking can be adapted for other skills. The first tools were
used by man around 2 million years ago; they were simple cutting stones, created by
chipping off a few flakes to modify and sharpen a rock that was naturally close to the
right shape.
This tool design did not significantly alter for the next million years, but it had
a profound effect on the long-term success of humans. Until the first stone was
sharpened and used to kill a wild animal, feeding would have been a matter of finding
fruit, shoots and other plant material. This would have been supplemented by birds'
eggs, insects and reptiles that were easy to catch. Red meat would have been a rarity
and probably the result of a lucky find. Tools changed this. Suddenly humans could
kill larger animals and their diet improved dramatically. The image many of us have
of our grunting, low-browed ancestors as rampaging, carnivorous arch-hunters is very
misleading. Remains of meat meals eaten long ago are easy to identify through the
way the bones have been cut. Meat-eating animals such as hyenas and big cats leave
very different marks on a skeleton to those made by a human armed with a stone
knife. Evidence found in caves shows clearly that, even with the aid of weapons,
humans had difficulty bringing down big prey.
Skeletal analysis in Africa tells us that most meals were made up of young
animals or adults with physical disabilities such as arthritis or broken limbs. In other
words, humans were killing animals that were not fast enough to escape. There are
very few signs of meals made up of large healthy adults or powerful species such as
rhino or buffalo that could easily defend themselves. The use of tools for hunting still
made a considerable difference to the welfare of early humans. Their normal diet,
consisting almost entirely of available vegetation, was low in protein and required a
long time to gather. The introduction of animal flesh, even once a week, was a
significant step forward in the history of human nourishment.
Red meat is a concentrated form of protein. Over relatively few generations,
successful hunters and their families would have put on body-weight and become
more muscular - which in turn helped them catch more animals. It also gave them
more 'leisure time'. One good meat meal would have been the equivalent of a whole
day searching for nuts and berries. An improved diet would have resulted in lower
mortality and the population would slowly have started to grow. Inevitably there
would then have been increased competition for food and space, so man started to
increase his range. Most tropical environments are 'user friendly'  the weather is
good and food abundant  which is why the area around the Equator is home to most
of the world's species of wildlife.
As early humans wandered further afield, they would have encountered
conditions that were less hospitable, containing fewer animals and subject to harsher
winters. If anything, this would probably have accelerated the development of their
brain, for our ancestors had to find ways to adapt if they weren't to die out or be
forced to move back to warmer climates, where there would be a hostile reception
from the locals. Humans learned to use animal skins as clothes and to make their
homes in caves in order to protect themselves against the weather. Fire soon became
the ultimate survival tool and a new age began. Obviously much of this is conjecture
and can never be truly proved, but the ideas are widely accepted by most scientists.
Some 50,000 years ago humans were found only in the tropics and warmer belts of
the Old World. Northern Europe was reached just 30,000 years ago, then Siberia
20,000 years ago, the Americas 11,000 years ago and New Zealand just 1,000 years
ago. In 10,000 BC the whole human population of the earth probably totalled less
than 10 million; now there are more than 5,000 million and the figure is rising
alarmingly.
We are adaptable, non-specialized animals with one factor in our favour: a
good brain. Our ancestors survived and passed on their genes because they had the
intelligence and capability to evaluate changing conditions and work out ways of
adapting to them. This took the form of building shelters, making weatherproof
clothes and hunting in organized groups armed with spear throwers, slings and bows.
But, most important of all, man had the power to think in the abstract, consider the
future and its various possibilities and then consciously plan ahead. Life is simple for
species that lead a solitary life. Apart from external factors such as weather and food
supply, their actions are quite random. Communication is almost totally unnecessary
as they have no information to pass on and nothing to address it to. In dealings with
other members of the species, only a few simple signals need to be employed. These
vary between groups but the basics are courtship signals, aggression, submission,
territorial rights, etc.
When animals live in tightly knit groups, the need for communication grows.
In the absence of language, evolution has produced what is called the 'pecking order'.
The majority of group-living animals have developed a hierarchical system where
actions are controlled by a single individual, usually the biggest. This dominant
animal makes many of the everyday decisions and the others comply. Rebellion is
quelled by physical punishment. There are advantages in being a member of a larger
group: each individual is less vulnerable to attack and, in predatory species, a pack
can often hunt more efficiently than a single animal.
There are many signals used within social groups. They come in the form of
individual scent, group scent, body position, facial expressions, tail position, vocal
sounds, etc. But is it language? No two people will agree on what exactly constitutes
language. A wolf is perfectly capable of signalling to another pack member that he
owns a certain piece of meat  so keep away. But the same signal, a growl with
exposed teeth, would also be used to threaten a trespassing bear or a rival male
challenging for breeding rights. This is not true language; rather, it is a simple code
that conveys a limited message.
Some biologists have defined language as the ability to consider a subject that
is not present. A wolf will respond if his meal is being threatened by another, but no
wolf could think about a meal in three weeks' time. Only humans appear to have the
abstract thoughts to consider 'what if?' and 'maybe'. These may seem to be of minor
importance but they do open the doors to questions of much greater consequence.
The fact that we can think about future possibilities and variations gives humans the
luxury of choice and adaptability. But this would have been totally useless unless the
ideas could be passed on to other members of the group, so that all could benefit or
act together to make the plans work. Man is a highly social animal. We appear to
have evolved as such and every clue indicates that we have always lived in family
groups. In order to hunt efficiently, plan for the future and, possibly, compensate for
our lack of physical prowess, humans developed language.
Working out the exact timetable of human physical evolution is difficult
enough due to the scarcity of hard evidence and the numerous ways in which fossils
can be interpreted. Consider the plight of those attempting to work out the history of
language, for here there are no pieces of real evidence. The mechanics of producing
words  and therefore language  are housed in soft tissue that does not fossilize.
We have no real way of looking at early man and assessing the complexity of the
voice box. Brains do not last long after death and leave no fossil record; we can only
measure the inside of skulls and work out the size and shape of the brains that were
once housed within. But this gives no sense of their capabilities and the scant
information can point us totally in the wrong direction. Neanderthal man had an
average brain size that was almost 10 per cent larger than that of a modern human,
although it needs to be said that they were bigger overall, making the size of their
brain proportionately little different from ours. Yet Neanderthal man used crude
stone tools that did not change in design for over 150,000 years; compare this to the
technological changes that have taken place in our own short lifetimes.
Neanderthals showed little sign of adopting abstract behaviour such as
experimenting with art. So how advanced was their language? The truth is that we
really don't know when language was first used. It may be a pointless quest for, like
all other major characteristics, even a basic language would have taken hundreds of
generations to evolve. Early human vocal signals were probably as basic as those of
the wolf. Then nouns would have appeared and gradually the vocabulary would have
expanded. The transition from primitive grunts to modern debates over the creation
of the universe is a quantum leap that should completely defy our imagination. But
still we take it for granted. In the late twentieth century there are a little over 5,000
known languages in the world and an unknown number have disappeared into
oblivion before being recorded.
In common with the other apes, humans use a wide range of facial expressions
to signal emotion. Only we have more muscles and therefore more control over our
faces than any other animal. Fine movements of lips, cheeks and eyebrows in any
permutation are used for signalling. We can broadcast many subtle signals without
uttering a word. Some are universal and appear to be genetically controlled rather
than learned. Smiling is understood in every culture; it appears spontaneously shortly
after birth, even when the baby is blind and has no chance to copy the action from its
parents.
Our modern smile has its origins in the fear-grin that is familiar to anyone who
watches chimpanzees for any length of time. Chimps pull back their lips in an
unnaturally wide 'smile' when faced with extreme danger. If the fear is generated by a
dominant male, the grin is recognized as a sign of absolute submission. It shows that
the subordinate animal is posing no threat. From this beginning it is just a short step
for a grin to become a message of friendship. Modern humans smile for many
reasons. It signals contentment and relaxation, but most of all it conveys to the
viewer that the smiler is not hostile. We smile at strangers to help break the ice,
without realizing that this action dates back to a time in our history when humans had
no verbal language at all, when our main communication was, like that of apes,
carried out with actions.
Smiling can be used in moments of extreme stress as a way of placating the
aggressor. Most children at some time in their lives will be ordered by an adult to
'wipe that stupid grin off your face'. This indicates that the signs are being
misunderstood, for the grin is not showing arrogance or mirth but submission. In the
face of threats from a dominant human, many people use the 'smile' to signal that they
accept their low status and are not challenging authority. Just as chimps do. The
modern conventional smile is simply a logical extension of this, especially to
strangers. It shows that we mean no harm and have only peaceful intentions. Other
gestures are dictated by local convention. A protruding tongue in Europe is a mild
insult, while in the New Zealand Maori society it is used as part of a greetings ritual.
Humans as we would recognize them today have existed in some form for
around 2 million years. But cultures that we can understand are surprisingly recent.
Until long after the end of the last Ice Age, about 50,000 years ago, humans were
hunter-gatherers living in small family groups. Then, slowly and spontaneously at
various places around the globe, man turned into a farmer. The dawn light of the
agricultural revolution fell on humans some 10,000 years ago and it changed us for
ever.
Around that time, we believe, there was a fortunate quirk of nature that was
literally the seed of our farming efficiency. Agricultural wheat, as we now know it,
did not exist then. Its immediate ancestor was just one of many wild grasses that
grew somewhere in Asia Minor. For some reason this seems to have accidentally
crossed with a form of goat grass and, against all the odds, produced a viable fertile
hybrid. This was emmer wheat, and it came with fat, heavy seed heads that were
bigger than anything seen before. This was to be the staple crop of proto-farmers.
Nowadays we constantly experiment with cross-pollination and genetic engineering in
order to increase crop yield, but emmer wheat was the result of a natural event.
At some stage in our history someone must have posed the question, 'What
will happen if I put these seeds in the soil?' It would never have been quite as simple
as that, but before agriculture really started the experimental farmers must have taken
the decision to act today for the benefit of a future time that was beyond their ability
to measure. This was not a programmed reflex action, but a considered, intelligent
gamble. Some animals do appear to make provisions for the future. Squirrels bury
nuts in the autumn and retrieve them in the cold winter months when food is scarce.
But this is an instinctive response to an abundance of food, it is not a planned,
cohesive strategy for survival. Squirrels born just six months earlier have no way of
knowing in autumn that soon the leaves will fall and thick snow will blanket the land.
They bury nuts because instinct tells them to, not their brain. Research shows that
squirrels do not remember where they left the food, they find it through a combination
of sporadic digging and an acute sense of smell. Sometimes they find nuts they
themselves buried, sometimes they find nuts cached by other squirrels, but even more
often the nuts are not found at all. Several animals show this type of behaviour,
particularly rodents, but it does not signify an awareness of the future; rather, it is
simply a deeply rooted response.
Human evolutionary and cultural history is peppered with watersheds that
shaped our future. Relative importance lies in the eye of the beholder, but few would
disagree that the discovery of controlled farming was a true milestone. Along with
fire and language, agriculture was a skill that, once mastered, would change our
existence. For such an earth-shattering discovery, farming took a surprisingly long
time to reach the rest of the world. From its original appearance in the Near East, the
new agricultural skills spread painfully slowly. One well-researched figure estimates
that agriculture moved north and west at the rate of 1,000yd (1km) a year. Not all
environments are suitable for sustained agriculture and the concept completely
bypassed cultures in areas such as deserts which were incapable of being cultivated.
For the first time, humans had a degree of permanence. Instead of moving
regularly to follow migrating animals or escape the weather, they stayed on one site.
Animals were domesticated around the same time. Cattle and sheep were kept for
meat and milk that supplemented the unpredictable harvests that must have been
experienced by farmers who were learning as they went along. Until that point we
were semi-nomads, our worldly goods confined to whatever we could carry. There
was little point in developing an arsenal of weapons and tools if they were not
portable. Agricultural stability meant that buildings could be erected and large tools
made  and kept  to help till the soil. Big pits could be dug where food was kept
cool and stored in preparation for the cold desolation and hunger of winter. The very
nature of man was changing. There is no argument about the intrinsic importance of
agriculture to the success of human beings, but we need to realize that the spin-offs
were not always beneficial. As agriculture permeated and eventually took over our
methods of food collection, humans lost the wisdom built up by their hunter-gatherer
ancestors. It created an absolute reliance on artificial methods and, if things went
wrong, this could be catastrophic.
In a truly wild environment there are natural cycles that drastically reduce
food supplies. Specific diseases of prey animals or food plants and drought can bring
about starvation in any species population. But it is always the specialist feeders that
face the greatest risk, for if their one food supply vanishes they cannot shift their
attention to a different source. Our ancestors survived by eating shoots, grubs and
other organic substances that we no longer see as edible. The possible results of total
reliance can be seen in the Irish Potato Famine of the nineteenth century, when blight
hit the staple crop and virtually wiped it out. Hundreds of thousands died or were
forced to emigrate, because the potato plants did not yield their usual harvest. Their
ancestors must have found plenty to eat in the same habitat, but agriculture had swept
away the early skills and few now had the knowledge to live off the land for any
length of time.
The success of farming brought with it another hidden danger. Instead of
having to find food by digging and scavenging, suddenly it could be grown on the
doorstep through sowing, irrigating and harvesting. So more and more was planted.
Eventually the chosen crop formed most, if not all, of the diet. Despite the fact that
they had to work hard for it, with their wide variety of foods, pre-agricultural humans
had a balanced diet containing vitamins, minerals, roughage and the occasional
concentrated protein. Arable farming, however, was based almost entirely on starch-
based crops such as corn (maize), rice and potatoes. Good as they are, when these
substances completely take over, the diet is nutritionally poorer. Going back to
skeletal analysis, we know that many early hunter-gatherer societies contained a high
number of individuals who were physically bigger, had fewer bone diseases, kept
more of their teeth and often lived longer than people in later societies who relied on a
monoculture farming principle. All because their diet was better. To quote just one
example, late Ice Age men in what is now Greece had an average height of 1.78m (5ft
lOin); 2,000 years after the adoption of agriculture, this had fallen to 1.63m (5ft 4in).
A similar percentage drop also applied to women.
It is ironic that the early man-creatures roaming East Africa would probably
have had a diet similar to today's chimpanzees but, with the triumph of agriculture,
the quality of human nourishment subsequently plummeted. Due entirely to our
intelligence and creativity, for thousands of years the human diet was poorer than that
of the apes, most of whom consume several hundred distinct sorts of food. In the
West today we rely on less than twenty plant species for 95 per cent of our basic non-
meat diet. Whatever the long-term results of farming, the system has one undeniable
advantage: cultivated land always produces more edible material than a wild patch
covering the same area. This means that although the menu may be less than exciting,
more people can eat, and that has always been the one overriding consideration.
Farming marked the first of several revolutions that were to radically influence
every aspect of our existence. The earliest known written language appeared about
5,000 years ago, with a complex pattern of syntax and grammar. The first known
wheel was used about the same period, but even this hugely important invention has
not reached every corner of the world. There are still cultures that have not adopted
this most basic of human gadgets  and see no reason to.
There have been several milestone 'revolutions' since agriculture. Industrial,
electrical and atomic have all had their effect on our lives. Our history spans around 2
million years, yet most technological advances have taken place in the last century.
At first glance this is an unbalanced development, but it should not be that surprising.
Scientists working now are building on research carried out by their predecessors over
centuries; they are plugging into a vast network of accumulated knowledge. Inventors
now do not have to work out a power source before constructing a computer; they
simply plug in and throw a switch, leaving more time for their own specialities. The
basic components of high-tech inventions can be bought off the shelf, instead of being
built from scratch. Technical education for children was a rarity until the early
twentieth century; now most people leave school with at least a rough idea of the
principles that govern science. And, finally, there are more people today working in
science than in the rest of history put together. The reservoir of resources and
knowledge alone explains why there has been a mushroom effect in scientific
development.
We may live in a high-tech society but our automatic actions are still guided
by basic instincts shared by the other anthropoid apes. We are starting to realize that
even humans use body language unconsciously to express emotions. Due to the high
mobility of people, the telephone is now the most important means of instant
communication. It is well worth watching someone talking on the phone as they try
to put over an important point, or, better still, become angry. Arms are waved about,
fingers pointed and faces fold in scowls. To no avail, for the recipient on the other
end of the line can see none of it. This is purely instinctive, just as with the apes. We
use body language without thinking about it. It is estimated that humans use around
3,000 different hand signals as part of their non-vocal communication. Like
languages and dialects, these are different throughout the world and no one culture
uses all of them.
Gestures need to be seen in context to be fully understood. Gorillas often
mate face to face and usually keep close eye-to-eye contact throughout. This helps to
maintain the bond, making the act personal. In any relationship between close
individual humans, unbroken eye contact is also important; it can be seen between
mother and child, lovers and close friends. But without the underlying security of this
relationship, the stare takes on a different meaning. When rival silverback gorillas
meet, they glare at each other. This is a direct challenge, as neither will look away
and accept the dominance of the other. It builds up the tension and frequently results
in more aggressive displays or even violence. Similar scenes take place when a
stranger walks into a bar and stares directly at a local man. If the eye contact is
prolonged and unbroken, the atmosphere thickens. We are not comfortable in this
situation, for no reason other than that it is a threat-relic of our man-ape past. The
feeling of unease is effectively used by people in dominant positions; they frequently
use an unblinking gaze to 'stare down' subordinates, making them more submissive.
This can clearly be seen in boxers, teachers and even parents.
Humans evolved as social animals, so had to learn to live peaceably within a
settlement, and this is not an easy matter. Every group is made up of individuals,
each with their own temperament and needs, yet they have to act cohesively to
survive. One of the ways animals achieve this is by copying the actions of a single
individual or the dominant core. Gorilla groups are guided by the silverback. When
he sleeps, everyone sleeps; when he starts to build a nest, they all do. Overt
compliance is an excellent method of avoiding conflict. Humans are not quite so
straightforward. When subconsciously giving out signals, we often use postural echo
 or, in other words, we copy each other. If two friends sit together talking and one
crosses his legs, it is more than likely that the other will soon do the same. If one
leans forward and rests his hands on his knees, it will not be long before the other
copies the movement. This kind of group behaviour can be seen by any interested
observer yet is rarely noticed by the parties involved. This is exactly what apes do in
the same circumstances in order to pass friendly signals to each other and prevent
friction within the group. Resting chimpanzees spend a great deal of time delicately
combing through the fur of neighbouring animals. Mutual preening of this nature has
little to do with keeping clean; its prime function is to strengthen bonds by
emphasizing group dependency. Humans display exactly the same behaviour all the
time. How often do we see a wife removing a fleck of dust from her husband's coat
before they leave the house. Or a father straighten his young son's tie as he sets off
for school. We all do it automatically, not for cosmetic reasons but for physical
contact and mutual reassurance.
Whenever animals live in structured societies, there is likely to be competition
for food, mates and territory from neighbouring groups of the same species. It is
impossible to generalize about the nature of such rivalry, for there are species, such as
badgers, where individuals freely travel between groups and aggression levels are
low. But in most cases, competition is so fierce that outright war ensues when rival
bands meet. The whole group may join in the battle or it might be only the dominant
males that fight. Humans are not equipped to survive alone. Our ancestors, until
comparatively recently, would have lived in extended family groups made up of less
than a few dozen people. Then almost everyone was related and all members knew
each other well. Occupants of nearby villages may have been known and recognized,
but they would also have been treated with suspicion. Twentieth-century life has
changed this culture to an incredible degree.
Most humans are now city dwellers, surrounded by literally thousands of total
strangers. Psychologists tell us that few people are comfortable with this, so we re-
create small-scale, more comprehensible, close-knit communities by joining golf
clubs or supporting local football teams. Other clubs and teams then become the token
'enemy', to be mocked and defeated whenever possible. Membership of the group is
advertised with scarves, badges and songs, each of which helps maintain the internal
bond between individuals. At a primitive level the superficial interest that adheres the
membership is probably less important than being a member of a manageable,
friendly 'family'. Be they football supporters or a rival quiz team, the opposition are
simply outsiders. This is what prompts the majority of sports-related violence.
Soccer hooligans are lapsing into behaviour that their ancestors would have adopted
when faced with another band of hunter-gatherers. Humans live in a sophisticated
world, but our behaviour has not caught up and is still remarkably close to that of the
fur-clad hunters that once lived in caves. Each of us has a basic desire to be a
member of a small group in order to make sense of social structure and remain an
individual. When ape groups become too large, one or more wander off to start
another  which is how our ancestors would have responded to a similar situation.
Humans cannot cope with the rapid changes that have occurred in our society.
Instead of living in small groups, the majority of humans are now brought up in
tightly packed colonies containing millions of individuals. So we should not be
dumbfounded to find that urban man suffers far more from stress-related problems
than any tribesman living in a small family group in New Guinea or Brazil.
Humans are a phenomenally successful animal. We are the only species in
history that has the power to dictate not only our own fate but also that of other
species that share the earth with us. Many believe now that we are too successful.
Modern medical science has either eliminated or enabled us to control most of the
diseases that once kept our population in check. In the Middle Ages few people died
of old age and those that did were often buried before they reached fifty. An
increasingly high percentage of us can realistically expect to see our eightieth birthday
 everyone is living longer.
Frighteningly lethal hunting methods have wiped out the majority of serious
predators that threatened our survival and agriculturalists are rapidly learning to coax
crops from areas that were once barren scrubland. We have conquered most of the
natural factors that normally restrict the population growth of every other animal. In
any stable environment, the numbers of each resident species is limited by food,
predation, disease and living space. Without these limitations the human population
is doubling approximately every thirty-five years. It is mathematically provable that
the earth cannot sustain this unimaginable growth rate.
The reign of humans on earth has been directly compared to fleas infecting a
dog. This may be insulting but the analogy is accurate. Parasites can exist only on a
host animal that supplies food, warmth and shelter. From a strictly biological
viewpoint, it is in the fleas' interest to expand their population, so they breed. It is
equally in their interest that the dog stays fit and healthy, but occasionally the number
of fleas grows too high and they take too much blood when feeding. The dog then
becomes anaemic and dies from a secondary infection. With the loss of their host, the
fleas also die out, for they have nowhere to live and nothing to eat. If the human
population continues to expand, in 200 years we will have exhausted the reserves of
oil and other resources that keep twentieth-century humans alive and mobile. The air
will have become too polluted to breathe and our waste will contaminate our drinking
water. On top of this many 'wild' habitats will have been turned over to crop culture
and 70 per cent of the world's wildlife will have died out.
At the moment we calculate that there are around 30,000,000 species of
organic life on earth. Realistic estimates indicate that around half of these will
disappear by the year 2100. That is a wholesale extinction at the rate of seventeen
species an hour. Mankind has lost touch with the idea that we are merely part of the
natural world rather than masters of it, even though our brain gives us the ability to
control our surroundings. While humans were confined to tiny isolated populations in
the tropics, our actions were ecologically irrelevant. Now they have a major impact
on the entire globe. We have just two choices in the very near future: we must learn
to consume less and drop our breeding rate or attempt to live with the consequences
of ignoring the problems. Our ultimate nemesis is unlikely to appear in the form of
universal destruction on a biblical scale. Total extinction of such a successful species
is difficult to imagine, although it did happen to the dinosaurs. More probable would
be a new disease that spread rapidly as a result of high population density, lowered
physical strength through a worsening diet and unclean water. There are many
precedents for this scenario. When European rabbits contracted myxomatosis, 98 per
cent of them died within six months. The same mortality is entirely possible in
humans, should a similar virus infect urban areas where thousands of us are packed
into a few square kilometres. The city habitat, with its high population of constantly
moving and mingling people, all living in warm buildings, is a perfect breeding and
transmission medium for a huge number of known diseases.
Unlike bigger animals, disease-creating 'bugs' are constantly mutating, and
because their life cycles are so short, their evolution is rapid. The common cold is a
perfect example. Just as we build up an immunity to one form, it mutates into
something slightly different that cannot be recognized or dispatched by our
antibodies. There is a widespread theory that our final fate doesn't lie in the fall-out
of atomic warfare but in decimation by a virus already known as harmless that, in
some altered form, will break down a critical function of our body system.
This may all sound rather bleak and obviously the future could be very
different, but few biologists would disagree with the hypothesis. Man is now too
successful for his own good we are in danger of engulfing the planet that we need for
survival.

(Pages 88 - 103)

Bite, bite, bite! I want to say something, but I will bite my tongue. Lets try a
straightforward criticism of this narrative, although God knows it does not deserve a
moments consideration, it is not serious, it is not meant to be, it is simply bullshit
propaganda for the priesthood, the theocracy.
Lets ask ourselves in what essential way this ludicrous fairytale differs from
the infallible scientific argument I expound above when dealing with the detail of
human evolution? I have a key, it is as simple as that, my key is the fact that humans
are a superorganic species that evolved from apes to form the world we live in today.
Leach's brain sucking drivel also has a key, it is that which we find in any
mythological work, especially the Bible, man is an animal realised in the individual
person and exists in the name of God. God is not invoked here, but man as a free
person is the key to which this stupid account adheres, and in doing so, although it
purports to be a scientific account based on biology, anthropology and evolutionary
ideas, it nowhere retains a biological and evolutionary theme, it retains a
psychological theme, which is the hallmark of theology, as the focus upon the person
as the end in themselves for which human sociality exists. The corporate being exists
to serve the person according to these charlatans, whereas it is the other way round,
but by inverting this dynamic they get to manage it by saying we are doing what we
want to do, while we are really doing what they want to do and they are working the
human biomass, as I have made plain, like farmers, and to do this they have to have a
distinct identity from the masses, and they do, they are a priesthood and this fine
example of their craft is an indication of how they work their skills as human farmers
of humans.
I could make my way through this garbage and pick up points, it would not be
uninteresting, but I have done it already with Isaac and you can do it for yourself.
Why bother inserting it then? Well I thought I would pick my through it, but now I
cannot be bothered, but it is a fine example of how these people whiter on and on
about stuff they know nothing about and never seem the least bit concerned to address
any real questions arising out of the fact that we are animals and we evolved.
Anyway, I have shown you above how to reason that with the potential of the
social environment that came into being as a void, a vacant potential territory for
evolution to enter, with the coming of the mammalian kingdom, we can account for
the evolution of humanity in the finest detail without any contrivance, without any
recourse to elaborate inconsistent theorising and with periodically declaring how
certain things such as how speech came to exist, can absolutely never be known. The
priests love this don't they, their greatest weapon, to say there are things that can
never be known. These people are the ultimate low life of humanity, the most highly
regarded, adored, and powerful upon whom the entire social structure depends,
because by robbing all evidence from which knowledge can be fabricated they
become the robber barons of the social being, and we become their dupes, or you do
anyway, and I tend to get dragged down the plug hole with you because the flow of
morons is such as no one can resist except by being a priest in order to join the
flotsam drifting to the upper echelons of society. So wake up and pay attention you
lot. Damn it!

Monosyllabilism

Authority - Priest

You may be sick of me going on about this priesthood and that priesthood, it
is monotonous, tedious, tiresome, repetitive and downright wearisome, I guess. You
may want to say 'me think he doth protest too much', and 'when does the priest hunter
become a priest?' Priest is however an appropriate term for anyone who has a
position of authority of any kind in a human social group, and any formal structure of
social effort, of any kind, likewise warrants the word priesthood. I refrained from
buying a book on religion from the library yesterday, 29/06/04, because it was just a
religious treatise for dorks who want to be slaves or priests, but in the opening
chapters some mention was made of criticisms of religion and Durkheim's name
appeared, and then the functionalist approach was refuted by pointing out the
difficulty posed by the question How, if religion was a functional attribute of human
social behaviour, functionalists could accounted for secularisation?
Of course I do not see any process of secularisation. This is such a frequent
ploy used by priests, they set up a false position and then another branch of the
theocracy comes along and knocks it down again, we even saw Isaac declaring this
was common practice within the scientific establishment, a kind of sport, as if it were
a legitimate way of pursuing true knowledge! I see only an organism, like the noted
Greek philosopher Parmenides, who devastated his world with his rationality, I think
only of unity, not duality. And since ours is a unity in which theocracy still rules our
world as much it ever did, I see these secularised structures as mere organs of
theocracy, and the truth of this is revealed in the devolution of the basic principle of
duality, upon which theistic myth is based, to the academic branches set loose from
direct control by the church just a short time ago, places where science is practised so
that, just as we have seen that calling people Romans, Britons, or Americans does not
diminish their Jewish identity, it merely obscures it under layers of exoskeletal
structure, the same applies in relation to the devolution of political power categorised
under a host of new terms.
But what is nice about noting this link between the process of devolution of
authority away from direct theistic control to a substructure of the theocracy created
under a legal framework, which is then given a new name, is that the new categories
cannot be mere words, even though the way we understand them means that that is all
they are in reality, these illusion of independent existence actually has to appear to
have some material form to make it look real. And so we see a direct link between a
need to secure religious authority's continued absolute rule, while allowing the reach
of its authority to be extended to embrace all of society under willingly  by consent
 as they say. This is done by spinning this interdependent social fabric, consisting
of linguistic constructs, and associated structures. Thus just as the message and the
ink on a page are one and the same thing, so the words and the social structures they
denote are one and the same thing, and these social structures are the creation of a
priesthood writing in stone, steel, tarmac, what have you. This is why monumental
architecture evolved as a behavioural expression of human nature. Pyramids were the
writing in the sand that could not be blown away.
So this means that the best way to recognise this ever present theistic influence
it to offer a counter strategy to that of the priests by making sure we counter their
infinitely varied nomenclature with a monosyllabic nomenclature. We must apply the
term for an acknowledged member of the priesthood to all people who carry out the
bidding of the theocracy, whether or not they are themselves aware it. The result is,
in places, an intrusive monosyllabic nomenclature that becomes a little tedious,
perhaps, but which is due to the all revealing idea of evolution which I am applying to
human society for the very first time in human history, in any meaningful manner.
Evolution sucks all into its embrace as it replaces the idea of God, which evolved to
do the same in a supreme act of intellectual perversion.
Looking at the Leach contribution, just imagine what would be the state of
affairs in society if Darwin had not earthed scientific enquiry in the physical being of
human physiology which makes it possible for a flow of this kind of ceaseless drivel
to be presented to the masses as the best that science can say about human beings.
Drivel fills the void in knowledge created by Darwin's false idea of evolution with
self centred fantasy. We will shortly see a little sample of the tide of thinking,
courtesy of Coker, that was focused upon the organic nature of society. Without
Darwin this tide would of become a flood to drown the theocracy. Imagine if a run of
the mill overview of the kind extracted for presentation above, were telling the truth
as I have revealed it, what then, what would the world be like to live in? Completely
different, that is for sure. Do you think this knowledge would be tolerated by our
masters? No chance, if we want the truth we must find it for ourselves.

Identity - Jew

If the resulting monosyllabic nomenclature which leads to every person with

any kind of authority role in society being labelled a 'priest' is bad enough, the same
effect in respect to religious denomination is catastrophic, everyone, from Moses to
Hitler, ends up being called a Jew, pure and simple. This is not tedious, this is not
annoying, this is an evil unlike any evil imaginable, this is a vile crime, that is, it is a
vile crime against our masters. and since our masters are us, it is a crime against the
self, it is a crime against society.
This is not a rigorous presentation of scientific knowledge, it is a philosophical
presentation of scientific themes that we cannot have free access to because of the
theistic society that we live in. Therefore there is not too much finesses in the
presentation and no attempt to ameliorate the damaging consequences of the release
of the truth, I am afraid this kind of consideration is alien to me and I am interested in
sucking up to the human qualities I hate. Reading the work on Gierke the one idea
that we are presented with is as a consequences of society being perceived as an
organism is that of society in possession of personality, which I have stated is
nonsense, it is the application of the personal, the individual, to the collective form.
The word that these thinkers should of been using instead of the theistic-personal term
'personality' is the scientific-functional term 'identity'. since we live in a theocracy
where we are all inducted into a mind via our language programme that directs our
self awareness we only have theistic words to use to think in ordinary ways about life.
Personal denominations which define in and out groups, like Jew and Hindu, conform
to this conceptually isolating requirement. But once you have a scientific conception
of society that has broken free of this constraint so that you can apply scientific
nomenclature to your account then you recognise that society, while it doe snot have a
personality, does have an identity. The identity of our superorganism is Jewish,
therefore we are all Jews, if we are Hitler, we are still Jewish, no one can escape being
Jewish in our society. If you have power then you are a priest, power of any kind,
therefore someone like Hitler is not only Jewish, he is a supreme Jew, just as someone
like Moses was. There is no difference between someone like Hitler or Jesus, or
Mohammed, these individuals are the same functional forms in the superorganic
physiology. Hence we find we have the same requirement forced upon by a true
scientific model of society as we noted above concerning the need to be constantly
aware of the nature of people with authority, we must adopt a monosyllabic
terminology for describing the identity of people, all people are Jews, just as all
people in authority are priests.
Certainly this creates a degree of confusion for us when trying to understand
society because we know for a fact that there are different kind of people living
different kinds of lives and recognise them by their culture which we speak of in
terms of their corporate identity, thus Jew, Christian and so on. Yes these identities
exist, but they are not the identity of the superorganism, as organism, like a species
can only have one identity, any other notion about identity is absurd, as we may see if
we imagine having separate personal names for the different main structures of our
body so that while we may be called Jack or Jill our legs might be Bob of Betty and
our livers Tom or Tracy. Reversing this thought we can see that what the religious
denominations we take to be defining individuality are really defining is not personal,
but structural. So Jew, Christian, Moslem, Hindu, British, Welsh, Indian, and so on,
all these names are describing structural elements of the superorganic physiology of
the Jewish superorganism. The superorganism gets to tally with just one of the
structural elements of its physiology, the master structure, the brain, the core, and that
is what we call Jewish.
 Form - Biology

Later this year we get to vote on devolution, on whether or not we want a

North West Regional Assembly. This not about any meaningful change beyond the
internal structure of society. A new name will be turned from fantasy into reality, but
the name will not represent a new being, something distinct from the Westminster
government we have today. What is this all about, why now?
Westminster government is being relegated to a secondary status in the
transfer of power to a continental authority, the European constitution being agreed
just last week, and we will get to take part in the second referendum of my life time to
seek a mandate to give up the sovereign power of the British state that belongs, in the
final analysis, to the people, not the statesmen that rule us. This principle can be
found in the works of medieval thinkers reviewed by Gierke where much of the effort
engaged in by the lawyer-philosopher-theologians of the middle ages concerned
finding a means of delivering authority to a centralised figure while still making that
figure's authority a grant from another ultimate source. The solution to this
conundrum that we see being played out by the lawyers that rule society today in the
guise of politicians, is that the people, at some singular point in time accept the
authority of the king, parliament, or whatever. This is a one off grant of authority,
such as we see delivered by a referendum, there is no going back and the authority
thus empowered is made autocratic by this action. However, it follows from this
system of social organization that the power granted to the central authority does not
belong to it, so while it may use it in anyway it sees fit, it cannot give it away. And it
is this principle of sovereignty as a grant of the people that is being acknowledged by
Tony Blair when he says he will submit the European constitution to a vote of the
population of the day in order to secure a mandate for the shift of power from Britain
to Europe creating a new centre of authority.
And so, coming back to our original question, why a regional assembly, and
why now, we can see that what is touted as a decentralising process delivering
autonomy to the regions is anything but. This is a macrocosmic development
intended to facilitate government from a more distanced centralised authority based
on the continent. Such a continental authority must find it easier to deal with a series
of enlarged regional entities denominated by a none personal anonym such as 'North
West Region', rather a plethora of highly personal localised names such as Cheshire,
Lancashire, and Cumbria. Although of course, these personal names for districts will
themselves of been artificial constructs once upon a time, imposed by some priestly
authority calling upon the art of law for its inspiration just as the priests continue to do
today. This is the two edged sword of priestcraft, you want to fix the biomass which
you are in charge of upon some artificial identity, be it national, local or religious, or
even racial, not so popular today of course since Hitler gave it a bad name, but when
the time comes to expand your authority the problem is how to move on beyond the
bigotry that was formerly a supreme act of reverence. Given this dynamic it is hardly
surprising that politicians, lawyers and theologians are the supreme liars, charlatans,
tricksters and thieves, of all humanity. How bizarre that the ultimate low life should
be the lords of society; flotsam floats. But that is the way it is because we are not
humans, as distinct from animals, we are animals and nature determines everything
we do.
The change from familial identity structures to bland structural entities is a
visceral organic growth process adjusting the body to the changes taking place in the
territorial occupation which defines the organism. The shift from nation states to
continental confederations is directed by the coming of a unified global authority
under one legal authority. This is the creation of one God, one superorganism. New
connective threads are required to deliver these changes enabling the new command
structures to deliver their commands to the tissues they are in charge of.
The process is biological, not social, directed by nature, not human beings. In
a book about identity Political Identity, the author, W. J. M. Mackenzie, has a chapter
called Powerful Abstractions : Nation, race, religion, class in which he begins his
discussion of religion thus 'The case of religion is not biological but cultural and
semantic.' page 137. We cannot accept this, and so once again we find ourselves
homogenising language by invalidating distinctions we all take for granted, at this rate
we are going to have no language left and we will be reduced to humming at one
another in order to communicate our ideas, this cannot be right. But this result is
appropriate if we assume that language is the information medium creating
superorganic form, as we decode the connection between the language we use and the
form it gave rise to we should indeed find that as we decode the meaning of the word
the structure is vaporised in so far as the meaning of the word is vaporised.
However what is real, and what is not vaporised simply by denying the
meaning of a word is the material representation the words has resulted in that is the
social fabric I have called the exoskeleton. Just because we call politicians priests do
not mean there are no longer politicians, just because we call Christians Jews does not
mean there are no longer Christians, and just because we call cultural forms biological
does not mean those cultural forms cease to exist. What all this decodification does
mean is that we change our understanding of what these things are. Social structures
are physical entities and they act as such in relation to the organism that created them
so that a social terrain exists which is a physical terrain in which the organisms which
acted as its creator are made to act in a highly structured predetermined manner in the
same way that water makes the watercourses that water is then obliged to flow
through.
John Prescott is a senior politician in the present government whose name is
associated with the push for regional government, it is one of his babies and has been
for a long time, we are told. So we might say that regional government is a political
project sought by a dynamic, fat, nasty, brutal, ignorant, forward thinking individual,
contradicting my assertion that it is a biological process driven by organic evolution
like any other organic process. We must appreciate that we are trying to apply
science to humanity and this means thinking on a deep timescale that reduces personal
involvement in any events, whatever they may be, to a blur.

'In the modern labor movement, within the limits of the national
organizations, we see decentralizing as well as centralizing tendencies at work.
The idea of decentralization makes continuous progress, together with a revolt
against the supreme authority of the central executive. But it would be a
serious error to imagine that such centrifugal movements are the outcome of
the democratic tendencies of the masses, or that these are ripe for
independence. Their causation is really of an opposite character. The
decentralization is the work of a compact minority of leaders who, when
forced to subordinate themselves in the central executive of the party as a
whole, prefer to withdraw to their own local spheres of action (minor state,
province, or commune). A group of leaders which finds itself in a minority
has no love for strong national centralization. Being unable to rule the whole
country, it prefers to rule at home, considering it better to reign in hell than
 serve in heaven. Vollmar, for example, who in his own land possesses so
great an influence that he has been called the uncrowned king of Bavaria,
cannot consent to play second fiddle in the German national organization. He
would rather be first in Munich than second in Berlin!'

(Political Parties : a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical

Tendencies of Modern Democracy, by Robert Michels, Collier Books, 1962. Page
198. First published 1911)

Michels is not lending himself directly to my account of human social forces,

but this work is a natural source of ideas for me to draw on given the centrality of a
caste organ of authority in the conception of the human organism as a superorganic
being. Here we have a curious switchback affair of an idea where Michels recognises
that the masses form a body and the elite form a body but ends up by making
individual motives the central force in this whole discussion.
Individual motives exist, whether we use Vollmar or Prescott to give
substance to our claim to be aware of them, but they are of no consequence whatever
because in society there will always be a range of views ready and waiting to
accommodate a new force seeking to assert centralised authority over society. We are
use to thinking of the Spanish conquistadors as having overthrown an empire with a
few men assumed by the amazed inhabitants of the Inca empire to be gods. In fact the
truth is rather more prosaic, the Incas terrorised their satellite cultures as all leading
cultures exploit a group of underlings, and with the arrival of a potential new ally
local tribes were ready and waiting to oblige the Spaniards desire to dethrone the
Incas. No doubt, Isaac, would say the existence of the tribes allied against the Incas
were a proof of preadaptation being a real thing, as these people were adapted to the
arrival of a foreign power who had all sorts of new technology preadapted to the
primitive tribes people who would welcome it.
The same applies in Iraq today, the Americans invade Iraq to remove the man
they use to support, Saddam Hussein, and they are spoilt for choice when looking for
people to become puppet rulers willing to impose European democratic ideas on an
society where democracy is inherently alien, because the Jewish slave implant of
Islam is infused into the identity of the biomass occupying this territory that was
codged up by British imperialists less than one hundred years ago.
Thus it is completely irrelevant who supports what, just as it is completely
irrelevant which particular portion of a swollen river happens to sweep little Johnny
of the bank and end up in his lungs when they sweep him out two day later. Prescott
came into politics via the union route which is why he ended up in the Labour
movement and so there is some especial relevance in the short passage fro Michels
because we can see how Prescott will of formed his personal opinions according to
some notion of drawing power away from central government to empower the
ordinary person, it just so happens that the course of time has resulted in the idea he
has advocated for decades coming into its own, but for reason not in the least bit
associated with any reasons he either gives today or would of thought of decades ago,
but rather for reasons to do with the physiology of the superorganism.
I have been talking of the exoskeleton of the superorganism and speaking of it
as being biological, there is some difficulty here in that we end up, if we follow this
route, speaking of a train, say, as an organic entity, which it is, but only in the sense in
which a coral reed or a snails shell or a termite mound is an organic entity made via
the agency of a life force. Speaking of a machine in the same manner as a living
animal does clash with our sense of reality and we do not want to create a sense of the
absurd. The sense we have of things, however, we must be aware, can force upon us
absurd ideas when we discover the truth, the fact that the earth is spinning at 22,000
miles an hour is about as absurd a thought as it is possible to have, but it is a true
thought.
Accepting that social infrastructures and all that we call artificial is part of the
exoskeleton of the superorganism presents us with a whole new conception of reality
and perhaps there is a better way of describing it then to reduce it to a common term
to that which we apply to living tissue. To this end, and acknowledging the inorganic
nature of exoskeletal material we can think of the exoskeleton as a physical
environment rather a physiological form, we may continue to think of the exoskeleton
as a physiological form when we concerned with the interaction taking place between
the human biomass and the exoskeleton within which it exists. This is like thinking of
a snails shell as a piece of inanimate matter when empty of its living cargo but
otherwise regarding the whole as the animal, and thus organic, when occupied by a
living snail, and this does conform to our natural way of understanding these tricky
questions.
This idea is what leads me to make the comment above concerning the idea of
social structure as a physical environment. I particularly have in mind things like the
infrastructure which causes human behaviour to act as it does, so that the coming of
ocean going ships leads to the discovery of new lands and then their occupation by
Europeans, and the coming of the industrial age leads to the invention of materials
and means of production that lead to aviation and now people fly all around the world
at the drop of a hat. The elements of the social terrain, ships, planes, and so on, are
the valleys cut into the social environment along which the biomass flows irresistibly
causing the physical territories within which these social structures are overlain to be
watered by the superorganism which gives rise to these social forms.
But within the social environment the dynamics of the living tissue is organic,
so that it is not meaningful to speak of religion as being cultural and semantic as
distinct from the racial which is biological. As I have often stated already the nature
of these things is identical, hence the reason Mackenzie ends up discussing them in
one block, the point to be clear about is that language is as biological as anything ever
could be and so, therefore, is its product, and since the identity product we call
religion is not substantial in itself it is purely biological, it is simply the identity
infused into the organism.
Interestingly the first person to pay much attention to the social study of
society from a scientific view, Auguste Comte, did so by invoking the idea of Social
Physics. However a quick perusal of his work reveals a poor conception of the idea
which we find culminating in my insight that society is a physical being. He has the
right intuitive ideas but he is enmeshed in the mind set of his day and he cannot help
but think in terms of politics and ideals. Thus he says:

'The ancients used to suppose Order and Progress to be irreconcilable:

but both are indispensable conditions in a state of modern civilization; and
their combination is at once the grand difficulty and the main resource of
every genuine political system. No real order can be established, and still less
can it last, if it is not fully compatible with progress: and no great progress can
be accomplished if it does not tend to the consolidation of order. Any
conception which is so devoted to one of these needs as to prejudice the other,
is sure of rejection, sooner or later, as mistaking the nature of the political
 problem. Therefore, in positive social science, the chief feature must be the
union of these two conditions, which will be two aspects, constant and
inseparable, of the same principle. Throughout the whole range of science,
thus far, we have seen that the conditions of combination and of progress are
originally identical: and I trust we shall see, after looking into social science in
the same way, that ideas of Order and Progress are in Social Physics, as
rigorously inseparable as the ideas of Organization and Life in Biology; from
whence indeed they are, in a scientific view, evidently derived.'

(The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, translated by Harriet

Martineau, Published by Calvin Blanchard, 1856. Page 401)

Yes, and so with a true conception of society we do indeed learn that the living
organism can be envisaged in terms of political order and progress and this is seen to
be united in the Zionist philosophy of unity under one God, which is brought about by
an endless series of wars of extension into none Judaic territories, or Judaic territories
requiring reorganization, followed by periods of consolidation of identity and
structure. Comte does not appear to grasp just how detached a social scientist must
become from their subject in order to grasp reality, he seems to be advocating a
political plan, and yet in the section preceding this comment his criticism of thinkers n
the subject hitherto consists of a rebuke for their sole concern with practical matters, I
cannot see, from a quick look, quite how Comte thinks he is getting us away from this
parochial view of life.
A social environment is a real physical environment that has its own physics.
The fabrication of social structures weathers this environment and moulds it, resulting
in a social terrain in which the organisms that we call individuals live. Consequently
the individual is constrained by the physical terrain of society to act in a given way,
thus a social environment is deterministic of individual will, meaning there is no such
thing as absolute freewill in a social setting. So the evolution of automobiles, and the
establishment of a society given over to the car, where roads run everywhere, where
town shops close and superstores open in the outskirts of population centres, and
public transport becomes rationalised, all develops a human social environment that is
in no sense whatever amenable to individual choice. We have to have a car, or we are
liable to be seriously hampered in our ability to access the social environment that
evolution has created for us to live in. And yet, bizarrely, as we all know, the
ownership of cars is the pinnacle of choice! How can that be? Because when we
make this observation we are assuming the existence of the infrastructure that makes
the car a necessity and so we do not factor this aspect of the question of individual
choice into the idea that we gain in our ability to make choices by having the freedom
a car gives us. It is clear that the evolution of the car has a natural life cycle and the
dynamic of choice alters through time, emphasised when motoring was new,
minimised as motoring becomes ubiquitous.
This is the kind of model Comte should of been anticipating, and to my mind
if you are going to speak of social physics then I would of thought this is where you
would get to. I will have to find time to take a further look at his work, I bought the
book because of what Coker said about his ideas on the social organism so there must
be something there to draw on for our investigation of the intellectual deposit
pertaining to the idea of Super Being. I have been speaking of the social structure as
organic, not subject to physics, but biology. But the fact is that this exoskeleton has
the qualities of none living matter and as such physics is a fair medium through which
to understand its form and evolution. we should not let the scientists
compartmentalization of areas of reality to obscure the fact that all facets of existence
are interwoven seamlessly and our habit of conceptual organization is a behavioural
imposition upon reality. We can see from this that the universe might naturally shift
through cycles of inorganic, organic and back to organic without any meaningful
break such as we seek to impose when we make the firm distinction between life and
one life. It is no wonder we have such a hard time defining life when it may well be a
figment of our box-like imagination. And we must also bear in mind that all of these
distinction are handed down to us from theists who thrive on this kind of
manipulation of society though linguistic delineation.
A piece of Comte has caught my eye so we might as well have a rock from his
quarry. It is best that I tell you what Positive Philosophy is before we go any further.
Comte should of called his philosophy The Philosophy of Scientific Method, for that is
exactly what it is. And I must say that is exactly what I have striven to create myself,
although by way of practicing the scientific method within the area of interest which I
find so compelling, because this is where there is no knowledge available of a
scientific kind, or rather there is a gaping hole that no one seems to notice. Comte
gets his denomination 'positive' from the fact that science is derived from independent
attributes of reality, as opposed to the antiquated methods of religion which relies
upon products of pure fancy, that happen to be self serving, for its notions of reality.
Thus religious ideas are negative, while scientific ideas are positive, in the same sense
that a person who says they will check the brakes on the car, but they know they are
safe, is negative, compared to person who says they have checked the brakes on the
car and they know they are safe. Will goes with but, have goes with and. But denotes
a discontinuous link in the sequence of actions relevant to a described event, and is as
such presumptuous. And indicates a fixed link between actions relevant to a described
event, and as such and is positively affirmative. The one offers a weak link, the other
a firm link, and hence one is negative, the other is positive. We can see from this idea
that the basic character of scientific knowledge, so reviled by the theist, is that science
embodies a causal connection between action and ideas, and therefore science
develops ideas which may be characterised as deterministic, although of course ideas
determine nothing of themselves, which is precisely why the theists ideas are negative
in respect to the real world they presume to describe, because they are without causal
connections linking a serious of actions leading to an articulated event, beyond those
of their own making that they love to speak of endlessly.

Influence of Biology upon the Positive Spirit

Looking now to the higher functions of this science [Biology]  its

influence upon the positive spirit, as well as method  we have only to try it
by the test proposed before;  its power of destroying theological conceptions
in two ways:  by the rational prevision of phenomena, and by the voluntary
modification of them which it enables Man to exercise. As the phenomena of
any science become more complex, the first power decreases, and the other
increases, so that the one or the other is always present to show,
unquestionably, that the events of the world are not ruled by supernatural will,
but by natural laws. Biological science eminently answers to this test. While
its complexity allows little prevision, at present, in regard to its phenomena, it
supplies us with a full equivalent, in regard to theological conceptions, in the
testimony afforded by the analysis of the conditions of action of living bodies.
The natural opposition of this species of investigation to every kind of
theological and metaphysical conception is particularly remarkable in the case
of intellectual and affective phenomena  the positivism of which is very
recent, and which, with the social phenomena that are derived from them, are
the last battle-ground, in the popular view, between the positive philosophy
and the ancient. In virtue of their complexity, these phenomena are precisely
those which require the most determinate and extensive concurrence of
various conditions, exterior and interior; so that the positive study of them is
eminently fitted to expose the futility of the abstract explanations derived from
the theological or metaphysical philosophy. Hence, we easily understand the
marked aversion which this study is privileged to arouse among different sects
of theologians and metaphysicians. As the labors of anatomists and
physiologists disclose the intimate dependence of moral phenomena on the
organism and its environment, there is something very striking in the vain
efforts of followers of the old philosophies to harmonize with these facts the
illusory play of supernatural influences or psychological entities. Thus has the
development of biological science put the positive philosophy in possession of
the very stronghold of the ancient philosophy. The same effect becomes even
more striking in the other direction, from biological phenomena being, beyond
all others, susceptible of modification from human intervention. We have a
large power of affecting both the organism and its environment, from the very
considerable number of the conditions which concur in their existence: and
our voluntary power of disturbing phenomena, of suspending, and even
destroying them, is so striking as to compel us to reject all idea of a
theological or metaphysical direction. As in the other case, of which indeed it
is a mere extension, this effect is most particularly marked in regard to moral
phenomena, properly so called, which are more susceptible of modification
than any others. The most obstinate psychologist could not well persist in
maintaining the sovereign independence of his intellectual entities, if he would
consider that the mere standing on his head for a moment would put a
complete stop to the course of his own speculations. Much as we may wish
that, in addition to these evidences, we had that of an extensive power of
scientific prevision in biology, such a power is not needed for the conclusions
of popular good sense. This prevision is not always baffled: and its success in
a few marked cases is sufficient to satisfy the general mind that the
phenomena of living bodies are subject, like all others, to invariable natural
laws, which we are prevented from interpreting in all cases only by their
extreme complexity.
But, moreover, positive biology has a special conquest of its own over
the theological and metaphysical systems, by which it has converted an
ancient dogma into a new principle. In chemistry the same thing occurred
when the primitive notion of absolute creation and destruction was converted
into the precise conception of perpetual decomposition and recomposition. In
Astronomy, the same thing occurred when the hypothesis of final causes and
providential rule gave place to the view of the solar system as the necessary
and spontaneous result of the mutual action of the principal masses which
compose it. Biology, in its close connection with astronomy, has completed
this demonstration. Attacking, in its own way, the elementary dogma of final
causes, it has gradually transformed it into the fundamental principle of the
conditions of existence, which it is the particular aptitude of biology to
develop and systemize. It is a great error in anatomists and physiologistsan
error fatal to both science and theologyto endeavor to unite the two views.
Science compels us to conclude that there is no organ without a function, and
no function without an organ. Under the old theological influences, students
are apt to fall into a state of anti-scientific admiration when they find the
conditions and the fulfilment coincidewhen, having observed a function,
anatomical analysis discloses a statical position in the organism which allows
the fulfilment of the function. This irrational and barren admiration is hurtful
to science, by habituating us to suppose that all organic acts are effected as
perfectly as we can imagine, thus repressing the expansion of our biological
speculations, and inducing us to admire complexities which are evidently
injurious: and it is in direct opposition to religious aims, as it assigns human
wisdom as the rule and even the limit of the divine, which, if such a parallel is
to be established, must often appear to be the inferior of the two. Though we
can not imagine radically new organisms, we can, as I showed in my
suggestion about scientific fictions, conceive of organizations which should
differ distinctly from any that are known to us, and which should be
incontestably superior to them in certain determinate respects. The
philosophical principle of the conditions of existence is in fact simply the
direct conception of the necessary harmony of the statical and the dynamical
analyses of the subject proposed. This principle is eminently adapted to the
science of biology, which is continually engaged in establishing a harmony
between the means and the end; and nowhere else, therefore, is seen in such
perfection, that double analysis, statical and dynamical, which is found
everywhere.

(Page 330 - 32)

Where to Begin

It has often been a question whether, in studying each organ and

function in the whole scale, it is best to begin at the one end or the other;to
begin with Man or the simplest known organism. I do not consider this
question so all-important as it is often supposed, as all qualified inquiries
admit the necessity of using the two methods alternately, whichever is taken
first: but I think that a distinction should be made between the study of the
organic and that of the animal life. The functions of the first being chemical,
it is less necessary to begin with Man; and I think there may be a scientific
advantage in studying the vegetable organism first, in which that kind of
functions is the more pure and more marked, and therefore the more easily and
completely studied: but every investigation, anatomical or physiological,
relating to animal life, must be obscure if it began elsewhere than with Man,
who is the only being in which such an order of phenomena is immediately
intelligible. It is evidently the obvious state of Man, more and more degraded,
and not the indecisive state of the sponge, more and more improved, that we
should pursue, through the animal series, when we are analyzing any of the
constituent characters of animality. If we seem to be by this procedure
deserting the ordinary course of passing from the most general and simple
subject to the most particular and complex, it is only to conform the better to
 the philosophical principle which prescribes that very course, and which leads
us from the most known subjects to the least known. In all cases but this, the
usual course is the fittest, in biological studies.
Here we conclude our review of biological science as a whole. The
extent to which I have carried out the survey will allow us to consider its
separate portions very briefly. In doing so, I shall follow the order just laid
down, passing from the simple considerations of pure anatomy to that positive
study of phenomena of the intellect and the affections, as the highest part of
human nature, which will carry us over from biology to Social Physics,the
final object of this work.

(Page 334)

This is actually an amazing piece of writing, perhaps the best fragment of

writing I have ever seen. According to the translator Comte's work appeared in eight
volumes, each eight hundred pages long, she (I assume the name is feminine) has
reduced it to one volume of the same bulk. The reason being that Comte had never
set out to write a book, but rather the material for his work had accumulated over
many years of giving lectures and as a result there was much repetition, and this on
top of a rather pedantic style of expression employed by Comte in an attempt to be
fully understood in a field that was not equipped with a ready made linguistic
vocabulary of its own, unlike that of the ancient way of knowing he refers to here.
Theological vocabulary is infused into society so perniciously that it delivers the mind
we are all programmed to obey by virtue of 'our' very own thoughts, the formulaic
power of this vocabulary being so great that, since Comte's day, it has managed to
dissolve the fruit of scientific method in an acid vocabulary that is so corrosive of true
knowledge, producing a theological jelly that passes for science today.
Actually produced between 1830 and 1842 the original volumes were a
product of the critical period that constituted the birth of the scientific age. For Comte
the application of scientific ideas to life, arising from the work of people like Bouffon,
Linnaeus, and many others, would be as new and revelatory as the scientific ideas
produced by the discovery of the double helix in the world of genetics is to me, as I
was born in 1955, and have grown up in a world that only became aware of genetics
as I passed from childhood into adulthood. What is so special about a time such as
Comte lived in is that ideas are necessarily free flowing as people are finding their
way. We are not talking here about the birth of an idea, such as genetics, but the birth
of a subject, biology, in such a case ideas must first be released before the knowledge
perverts can respond and dissolve their meaning to fit the ancient mould. This initial
phase indicating a freedom of expression is encapsulated in these remarkable
comments from Comte. Imagine anyone saying today that science was in any way,
shape, or form, antagonistic to religion! Its inconceivable, we all 'know' that the
harmony between science and religion is sublime, the Vatican has its museum
dedicated to Galileo and astronomy. We 'know' that without the church science
would not even exist, and we hear all the time that the notion of a war between
science and religion is as antiquated as any idea could possibly be. Yet Comte speaks
of the penetration of scientific method into the arena of life as

'the last battle-ground, in the popular view, between the positive

philosophy and the ancient.'
Today, despite the power of religion being massively increased relative to a few
decades ago, despite the new global religious war in the name of Zionism, under the
guise of Islam, despite the occasional obscure books asking why, flying in the teeth of
the incontrovertible fact of evolution, there is a ceaseless barrage of garbage from the
theists about how unique humans are and how we cannot say what human nature is,
all showing how nothing has changed since Comte's day in terms of the advance of
science in the field of biology in relation to this last battle front, despite all this, we
are being told that there is no conflict, there is no war, between science and religion.
And this is true, the war is over. All this is the sure sign of an outright victory, where
the victor gets to tell the tale. Meanwhile science is not so much long since dead and
buried, it was aborted as a foetus; Darwinism being the prime abortifacient. And
here, in Comte, we get to see the living thing during its gestation, as it was when still
alive and healthy! Of course now it is nothing but a fossil buried under a pile of
sterile intellectual detritus; still delightful to see though, if only we could still read
science today instead of the endless garbage we have been obliged to trudge through
in our exploration of the tragedy of science as we try and deliver something real,
something that will destroy religion outright, exactly as Comte indicated must happen
for science to exist.
Comte, when discussing biology, says 'the positivism of which is very recent'
because considering life in a scientific manner, a positive manner, is so new, and this
fact can be seen emerging from these words that I have spoken of in terms that make
them out to be the most extraordinary words in all the world. Here is being voiced the
fact that just as open land gives way to occupied land in a manner that is absolute, so
religion gives way to science in a manner that is absolute. As science advances,
Comte is telling us, so religion must, of necessity, recede. As I always say, you
cannot be a scientist unless you are an atheist actively seeking to eradicate religion
from society, it is implicit that to Comte, as to me, this was self evident, and he lived
in a world where he saw the reality of the process in action. Long ago he saw a bright
future, I live in a miserable present. The trouble is that this evidence of the decay of
ignorance led him to foresee a scientific age coming into being, where we know
nothing could of been further from the truth as today we descend ever more
precipitously into a dark age of religious ignorance where science is nothing but a
ghostly figment of the priest's pervasive imagination.
What is not recognised here, in Comte's work, is that science and technology
are two different things, and we live in a technological world, that is the product of a
scientific flourish, but most definitely not the realisation of a scientific world. The
nineteenth century scientific dream lived on in the imagination of Comte's compatriot
Jules Verne and our very own dreamer H. G. Wells, but that is all it was, a dream.
Their technological innovations courtesy of the mind's eye, inspired by science, we all
know all about, but the utopian ideas expressed in Men Like Gods, forget it! Men
Like Robots, now if Wells had written that, he would of cracked it, that would of been
prevision for y'u. Of course Brave New World by Huxley does give us this vision of
the hell we live in, but it is only told as a story, as such it is made into a nightmare
that effectively tells us that we do not live like this, yet, no scientist dare reveal the
truth of this tale, that we do live like this now, we evolved to live like this, and we like
it therefore. The creators of the Borg in Star Trek utilise the same priestly trick of
taking a common idea, drawn from reality, and then turning it into a parody of reality,
here making the Borg represent a superorganism in which all individuals answer to
one mind mechanistically, in a very crude and simplistic way. All people who, in any
sense, acknowledge a religious identity, are absolute robots, that is what the religious
programme is, a programme to run a biological machine composed of 'intelligent'
units. Language is the machine code, theology the operating system; and science, just
one piece of software.
I say that no scientist dare speak the truth on this question, but sociologists do
deal with the question raised here in a routine manner. It is a familiar point to
acknowledge that individuals are bound up in an extremely oppressive system of
constraints, but one to which they are adapted in the same way we are adapted to
atmospheric pressure, so that we are amazed to discover that the weight of the air
amounts to fourteen pounds per square inch of our skin's surface area. In the social
context the idea is that while there are a rules of one form or another impinging upon
us at all moments, we are so attuned to them that we simply do not notice them. This
is completely correct, and the best description I have of this situation is to be found in
Invitation to Sociology : A Humanistic Perspective, by Peter L. Berger, first published
in 1963, where chapters four and five, Man in Society and Society in Man deal with
this topic. But all this is merely descriptive, and as such it cannot be deemed
scientific. To be scientific it would have to account for this state of affairs and tell us
why it came about in the sense that Comte speaks of when he says that :

'Science compels us to conclude that there is no organ without a

function, and no function without an organ.'

And so sociology, to be a genuine science in its own right, would have to take on the
mantel of biology that treats the organism in this manner, where any material
observation is seen in purely functional terms. Why are we so attuned to social
regulation? How did this come about, and what does it tell us about being human? In
the end, having made the observation in a perfect manner, Berger simply dismisses it
as of no importance, and then he even goes on to say readers will be wondering why
he bothered to make the observation so carefully if he is only going to dismiss it as
being of no relevance to anything. This is it, sociology is not science, there can be no
better example of so called science being dictated to by religion, this even when the
author is engaged in a work that makes him subject to the condemnation of being an
atheist, something he virulently denies as he declares his deep affection and respect
for knowledge perverts, for the work of religious people in other words. All science
must pay homage to the theocracy, in the sense that all science comes from the
establishment.

Comte even tells us that there is a law concerning the advance of knowledge
that can be derived from the relationship between the waning of theism and the
waxing of real knowledge and used to determine whether or not a branch of enquiry is
a real scientific subject. Biology conforms to this law, one wonders how sociology
might fair today if subjected to this test, certainly I do not regard it as a science in any
sense. If sociology complies with Comte's Law of Scientific Knowledge then the
advance of sociology should have the effect of making religion recede from those
areas sociology touches upon, and it should do it in two ways, by enabling an ever
increasing degree of prevision, and by enabling an ever increasing degree of control
over its subject material.
Sociology fails the test miserably. Not only does it do absolutely nothing to
confront religion, as we have seen when considering Berger, but furthermore, by
pretending to make the challenge it performs the exact opposite function, it acts as a
shield defending religion from deeper criticism or analysis. Sociology delivers no
more power of prevision than a worm might be supposed to possess regarding the
destiny of its species. And it offers not the slightest shred of knowledge that a
practicing professional could utilise, with a sense of absolute certainty, regarding
outcomes pertaining to the management of any aspect of society covered by the
discipline called sociology. The one get out clause the sociologist might seek to claim
for themselves is denied them by Comte's law, for he says that one or the other avenue
of demonstration of validity will be available no matter how complex the problem if
the branch of science is a true and valid branch. A true and valid branch would act in
accord with the scientific method, or the positive method as Comte would have it.
Invariably what we see with sociologists, as with Berger, is that after doing a fine job
of routing out facts, to give them possession of the material, they then make a play of
rendering those facts in a consistent manner, as we saw Isaac do with the materials
relating to physical anthropology, and then, at the last moment, they make a clean
break from the positive connection between action and ideas and just dismiss the
significance of all their hard work, to conclude that all is a mystery and we must look
to the priest for our best ideas on the nature of existence. Thus we must conclude that
while Comte could speak in the affirmative of biology, we must deny the subject of
sociology a place in the pantheon of scientific subjects.
Did sociology predict the Nazis, the world wars, the global society, the
advance of Islam into the West, the re-establishment of Israel and the centrality of this
country in world affairs which we can link to the conflict between cultures which has
given us the new age of global terror, and a world dominated by one superpower?
No, it told us nothing. Because sociology does not do this kind of thing, sociology
chases the lamb's tail as it wags, and that is all it does, making excuses, not offering
explanations and predictions. Because sociology is the product of priestcraft, not
scientific method. Our delineation of human nature as corporate, with its ensuing
consequences, does comply with the scientific method, does offer factual knowledge,
and does allow a devastating degree of prevision which continues the link of the past
we call history toward a future we can call hell. This work is riddled with the future
as we elaborate upon the Jewish superorganism that we are, and how Judaism is
linked with everything we do, and how this means that one day there will be the world
as set out by the Jews so long ago, ruled by one God, their God; God and the
superorganism being one and the same thing. Now why couldn't the sociologists do
this!
Of course it goes without saying that armed with this knowledge we could
pass laws to eradicate all religion from society, and so save humanity from the ever
increasing state of evil into which we are plummeting in obedience to the Jewish
ideology. We must obey Nature's directive to grow and become one, to be a
superorganism, but we do not have to do it in the guise of Zombies driven by a slave
implant. We can take control, as Comte says we should be empowered to do when
science is unleashed upon the world. What is most fascinating about this thought is
that if science allows prevision and control then Judaism is the greatest science ever,
since the idea of one world under one God is an ancient insight into the future, and
amazingly the Jewish identity programme is delivering this result. So the priests who
wrote it must of recognised the significance of the knowledge they were formulating
because within the microcosm of their world at the birth of civilizations, they could
see the dynamics played out in miniature before their eyes. This is truly impressive.
But if men could do this several thousand years ago why can we not do the same thing
today in line with our modern knowledge of the universe and the limits of the planet,
to act as our guide as to how we should best manage our affairs according to the
parameters set by nature? The answer is that the same priesthood that wrote the
programme that has delivered the result is in control, and they are determined to stay
there, and this is why Judaism continues to thrive while science as an idea of
existence is an abortion.
Apart from the snippets of Comte I have selected and commented upon, which
deliver a clear cut expression concerning the nature of the intellectual climate, I must
confess I find making sense of much of what Comte is saying here nigh on
impossible, and I wonder just what the original said; one cannot help but suspect that
our translator has been a little too happy with the hammer and chisel, and too frugal
with the fine polish and finish. But no matter, we can still glean a few fragments of
great significance from this early exponent of science as the be all and end all
knowledge. The last fraction, Where to Begin, I took because it contained a sentence
that caught my attention

'It is evidently the obvious state of Man, more and more degraded, and
not the indecisive state of the sponge, more and more improved, that we
should pursue, through the animal series, when we are analyzing any of the
constituent characters of animality.'

This, plainly, evokes the idea of the evolution of life in a sense that suggests that all
life on the planet is of a piece, exactly as we now know it is. So this idea must of
been perfectly obvious to people at the time when Darwin was growing up, and
realising this kind of thing is something we must seek to do as we try to understand
the challenge the theocracy faced when it sent Darwin off to far distant lands to come
back with a theory of evolution that conformed to theological principles of duality, by
focusing on form, while paying no attention whatever to the nature of any particular
life form. The challenge of science, with the last battle line drawn by the subject of
biology, before which Judaism must stand and face extermination, or destroy its
adversary, was out there. The new knowledge had to be perverted in the usual way,
according to the usual dualistic formula, which splits information from the form it
creates, thus reducing knowledge to the status of a piece of inert matter that could be
manipulated freely by anyone who cared to have shot at it; like carving wood, except
of course blocks of information in the form of knowledge are cut with words, not
chisels.
By focusing only on the physical bodies of species Darwin made the
competition between these material entities and their physical location the sole matter
of interest, and thus his theory took on the lopsided character we know it bears the
hallmark of so much, to this day, where evolutionary progress is said to be driven
purely by a model of chance accumulation of genetic increments of value, and where
any kind of model that embodies the acquisition of potential that is then released is
rejected out of hand, for this latter model would smack resoundingly of the 'unique'
human character of intelligence, planning, and forethought. But we know perfectly
well that all forms come into being in a point place and time frame, from which point
they then disperse. We know this from our own creative actions where we see a new
machine, the locomotive for example, coming into being and within a few years rail
track is all over the place. This is latent potential operating between a physical form
and an environment that, relative to that form, represents a void, a vacuum waiting to
be filled. This latent potential is exactly what was embodied in the newly evolved
terrestrial ape that had bipedal stance and the makings of a superorganic form able to
generate exoskeleton, and thus to manage any environment, it just had to pour from
the woods and into the open, and it did. Thus we completely invert Darwin's
ludicrous, simplistic, and utterly perverse interpretation of evolution, that earned him
a slab of marble in Westminster Abbey; today our notion of Darwin as the enemy of
religion is made a reason to wonder at just how this bloke got to be so honoured  oh
dear me yes, isn't life strange and all and all, isn't life strange. But not half as strange
as the farmers would have you believe.

Leach .........
There was one piece of Leach's account that I did like, the Simple Simon
Says gorilla instinct, which offers another line of evidence about how the early stages
of ape to human evolution might of been driven. On this basis gorillas appear to be a
mini-superorganism, or social form with the latent potential of superorganic form.
This is exactly what we would expect to find in our nearest relatives for we know that
the anthropoid line, of all mammals, has turned out to be the one with the basic form
best suited to become superorganic. It is clear enough what the key factor in the
physiological makeup is in this selective event, the possession of gripping hands. The
reason we can be sure of this is that the one thing that makes a superorganism possible
is the ability of the creature concerned to fabricate exoskeleton, in insects this task is
performed by use of the mouthparts, in primates it was the hands that opened the way
to this adaptation. For Isaac this would invoke the idea that apes were preadapted to
form a superorganism because they had hands long before they ever started making
exoskeleton. To reason like this is an offence against scientific reasoning. The
mammalian form had the latent potential of a social environment implicit in its being
so that some mammal had to evolve to fulfil this role, hands lent themselves to this
and so they were a feature of latent potential awaiting expression, this is not
preadaptation. Preadaptation implies forethought by some supreme being, even
though Isaac only means to say it arises from a broken chain of causality, in order to
make sure that there is no possibility of discerning a thread of causality which would
reveal human nature and destroy belief in God, no establishment scientist wants to do
anything to threaten religion.
The fact that gorillas became terrestrial but represent a line developing
evolution focused on individual physical prowess, leading to a massive ape adapted to
the physical environment, as opposed to the social environment, indicates that early
hominid qualities have been carried down through time, but expressed in relation to
the alternative environmental modes, and we might note that no ape has evolved to
fly, there are no ape bats, or ape equivalents of flying squirrels, and neither has any
ape evolved into a marine creature. Meaning there is no incentive in the ape-hominid
form to shift toward the water, this slot was taken over by a variety of other
mammalian forms. Apes, other than humans, did evolve to become terrestrial, and
social, this was the ape's forte, and this diversion from the rest of the mammalian
lineage has to be traced back to the evolution of limbs offering a fore grip, where the
original mammalian species were four legged affairs. So mammals went from
quadruped-terrestrial to forelimbed-arboreal, and on to bipedal-terrestrial, and in the
process a superorganic thread was spun from the wheel of mammalian physiology.
And chimps, our nearest relatives, seem to represent a middle way between the gorilla
and human mode of adaptation, where they have acquired some of the benefits of
social adaptation, but remained adapted to the physical environment, and they live a
life style that likewise bridges the two distinct zones of arboreal and terrestrial living.
Hominids, made the break, left the trees behind, and took to the wide open spaces.
 Part III

Superorganic Reality

First Phase, The Exoskeleton - An Idea Too Far

It never rains, but it pours!

Not something you can say of this summer, it pours all the time, but
something you can say of the subject matter pertaining to this work. When I began
this book a couple of months ago it was inspired by one simple thing, evidence, I had
found hard evidence of the fact that I was not the first person to realise that human
beings were animals, that they had evolved, and they were therefore a part of nature,
but not in some Biblical sense, in an absolute sense.
That evidence had come to light by pure chance when I found a piece in a
book already on my shelf, about Gierke. This was a major breakthrough since the
revelation that the lawmakers had been obliged, for many centuries, to think of
society as an organism, was exactly what I did expect given the realisation that
language is the information medium extending the programme that makes human
form, from the individual, to the social domain, laws being the actual linguistic-genes,
so to speak, directing the formation of corporate form at the social level. Then,
miraculously, I drop on Ouspensky, also sat innocently upon another shelf. I already
had Spencer, and suddenly I realised I had three distinct voices declaring, in no
uncertain terms, that humans were an organic, as opposed to a self made species, in
their entirety. More than three years ceaseless searching had preceded this purely
chance discovery, and I was delighted. My idea was that if I could prove that it was
not simply an aberration to think of human society as an organic phenomenon then
this was proof of the potential validity of the notion, obviously, an analysis of the
ideas formerly presented, why they disappeared so completely from view, and how
they can be made the basis of a new age of enlightenment in science, is what this
work has to be all about. I set to work
But the revelations just keep pouring in. You will find a record in this work of
the arrival of a book by Durkheim, from America, in which I found the most cursory
reference to Coker as a source of thinkers on the subject of human superorganic
being. Yesterday I sent that book back to the British library after having been treated
to a fist full of authors who must of devoted their lives to their attempts to unravel the
mystery of human society, just as I have done, and who found the new science of
biology the key to their enlightenment, and thus they modelled society on the
physiology of the organism.
Now what? Last night, 29/06/04, being a bit shattered from waking too early
for my usual routine, I was standing around at a loss as dusk fell, too knackered to
even drag my sorry arse to the ale house, when the red spine of a book on a shelf by
my desk, captured my attention. The Concept of Cultural Systems : A Key to
Understanding Tribes and Nations, by Leslie A. White, Columbia University Press,
1975. I lifted it and opened it at a chapter all about the origination of the idea of
society as an organism! I ask you! I could not believe it. More clues, more
revelations, and in this case a very nice addition to the story offering me information
about when the idea peaked, something I had already more or less deduced from what
I had found in Coker, and when the idea drifted from view. Added to which, since
this author was instrumental, as a popular academic-priest, in burying the corpse of
true human science, this book was bound to be a godsend in my efforts to exhume
human science and breath life into the carcase once more by revealing the crime, and
indicating the guilty party. Nice! We will be having some of that, I feel the lifting of
a whole chapter coming on; all in good time.
I guess this is how Raymond Dart felt when he realised he had found the
earliest hominid fossils in some stuffy South African museum collection - if I am
remembering my facts right there, or how Heinrich Schliemann felt when he dropped
upon the hordes of bronze age gold he found buried in the soil of Ancient Greece.
What I have been unearthing during my excavations this year have been so much
more valuable than anything discovered by any archaeologist or palaeontologist, ever,
which is why the academic institutions have devoted themselves so completely to the
eradication of this evidence from view by heaping masses of detritus, like the sample
from Isaac above, sloughed from the festering corpse of academia upon the real layer
of intellectual gold which bubbled up from the cauldron of nineteenth century
freethought. Oh too much passion do I hear you say? Really, and what dominates our
world view of evolution today? Creationism, or such stuff as that from Leach, which
is as different from the gist of creationism as six is different to the sum of two threes,
no difference, Leechism, Creationism, six of one, half a dozen of the other, both
constitute the ultimate obscenity and insult to humanity, one is from the house of
science, the other is from the house of God, mirror images, not of Nature, but of each
other.
This is what dualism makes possible. The fabrication of an illusion reflects
reality in the same way a mirror reflects a face. The reflection in the mirror is not
another something real, real meaning substantial in accord with its appearance, and
neither is mythology something real in accord with what it reflects. God is a
reflection, an illusion, a key figure in a coded pantheon of linguistic creativity
reflecting observed reality, but not something substantial in accord with what it is said
to be; myth is not reality. We can experience God as something real, just as we can
utilise reflections in a mirror as if they were a product of the direct line of sight. But
we cannot kill the man by shooting the reflection, and we cannot know the world by
knowing the reflection. However, the fact that we can experience mythology as real
is the trick foisted upon us in the making of our kind, this is what makes us a perfect
superorganic being, united into a body we do not even know the real nature of, that
we can only see by way of a reflection in our mind's eye. The problem is resisting the
illusion that is our mind, for we have no mind, we are part of a mind. Science, it
seems, when it comes to knowing ourselves, is as much about fighting to be free from
within, as much as it is about struggling to explore that which is without.
Academics have performed this task of deposition upon the corpse of true
insight unconsciously, in obedience to their identity programme written by the
theocracy they serve. So, in making my fruitful diggings possible, their masters have
been defeated by the academics own systems of research which have allowed me, in a
somewhat haphazard manner, to unearth the evidence, and let reason reflect the
golden light of truth once again. Although I must say that if it were not for the
internet and my free access to a veritable sea of books through that most marvellous
American internet bookstore Alibris, I would have nothing, or the next best thing to
nothing, very little. See how I curse the Americas as a slave state of Judaism, and yet
it is the greatest source of freedom at one and the same time, which is because society
is not a man made conspiracy in the grip of some malevolent gang of criminals, it is
an organism which is formed about an organic principle which has woven into it
identity structures which posses the individuals of which the biomass consists. Hence
the systems which empower the prime identity through knowledge control are freely
available to others, as long as you do not have a virtual, or actual police state, in
which information is controlled by a fierce system of observation such as we might
associate with the former Soviet block.
The problem with Soviet control, a most bizarre, and tragic thing to our
personal way of experiencing, is that it involved the setting into place of an extremely
tight structure, in effect making, as far as possible, a concrete exoskeleton. This
behaviour was a product of the shift from one structural mode of priesthood to
another, the intensity of authoritarian pressure, as in the case of the French revolution
which occurred, in the time frame of the corporate organism, just moments before that
in Russia, a difference of a mere dozen decades or so, one heart beat, had to be intense
to let the new priesthood take root. Nothing of any significance about the priesthood
altered one iota, there was just a change of identity, like becoming black instead of
being white. The core identity of the beast remained unchanged, the identity switch
was necessary, in both cases, that of France and Russia, simply to introduce new
superficial organic structures necessary to superorganic growth as nation states
became ever more entwined and leading up to the stage we are just completing now
with the passing of a European constitution.
What the intensification of authority meant was that while the world within the
resulting fortress was rigidly controlled, constricting the natural state of permeability
between the independent organism, as it was perceived to be in the political speak of
the theistic priests, and the outer world. The soviet priesthood ignorantly conceived
itself to be, just as all states tend to do, an independent political entity. This blind
ignorance of the elite comes about because the superorganic physiology is reliant
upon the robotic actions of self obsessed individuals who are incapable of perceiving
the reality that lies beyond their infinitesimally tiny world view  and an exaggerated
degree of isolation is not commensurate with the nature of the human organism,
permeability between superorganic structures is inevitable because they are of one
species. The osmotic boundary between superorganic structures concerns, first and
foremost, the transmission of information, nothing can go where information does not
lead the way. The point being that other states, at best, represented other discrete
organisms in a faunal population, but, given the Jewish nature of Communist Russia,
in common with all other states in Europe, America and Australasia, the real state of
detachment was not even this distinct. Russia's Jewish nature could not be, in any
sense, erased by so fleeting and meaningless an event as the Russian revolution, not
even something as vastly more dramatic as the two world wars, but still relatively
miniscule in relation to the depth of corporate identity, could induce this result; not
even if Hitler had won. It would take something far more profound than such major
historical events as these, which really only represent healthy signs of growth, and I
hope you are looking at that profound something right now, offering a means to a
change of identity.
Russia was not one organism in a faunal population of superorganisms, it was
one structural unit in one superorganic organism, the Jewish superorganism, exactly
as all states are that have any influence emanating from the Jewish identity implant.
Knowledge advanced on the outside, beyond the Russian priesthood's direct control,
and the alternative identity structures beyond the limits of the soviet bunker acted as a
constant threat to the renegade authority of the soviets. In the end the inevitable
happened, the concrete crumbled, and now we just have regular blot on the landscape
of inequality, corruption, and the free flow of information that a human organism
must have to be healthy. So phases of exaggerated calcification can occur in a
superorganic structure defined by identity parameters, an exaggeration of identity that
causes internal structure to be temporarily overemphasised, relative to collateral
organic identity structures, by the incumbent priesthood. Such deleterious behaviours
are perfectly natural, being due to some constitutional imbalance developing in the
bioflux of a the superorganism and affecting the living material substance within the
exoskeleton, whose mass response results in slight adjustments in the fine detail of the
identity constitution of the priesthood, providing a feedback loop between the body
and its controlling organ, and creating, as a direct consequence, superficial changes in
the appearance of the organism's social structure, thus a monarchy becomes a
Communist regime. It follows, logically, from this description of superorganic
dynamics, that a system of control which accommodates the smooth running of the
feedback loop between the biomass and the guiding authority, while in no way
changing the nature of the relationship between the core and its dependant biomass,
must be the most appropriate organic system for a supermassive superorganism to
evolve; and this is precisely what the democratic form of priestcraft represents,
autocratic rule by consent of the people, as we might say, but perhaps should say,
authoritarian rule guided by feedback from the people. To our ephemeral perception
these life processes result in changes of the most major import, but this conception is
merely the myopic vision of an ant-minded ape living in a big world.
Jewish identity is not a fine detail, it is deeply infused into the fabric of the
organism, and most individuals are entirely oblivious of the Jewish aspect of their
identity, because it is imbued into the actual exoskeletal structure of the organism, so
that when people take up offices within that exoskeleton they act as agents of
Judaism, quite unbeknownst to themselves. In order to understand this we should
recognise that as human individuals we too have a bilateral identity composition, an
inner and an outer representation of ourselves. Our racial identity is part of our
identity, both personal and corporate, and within our brains the same identity status
can be noted, we hold within our brains a conception of identity which is both
personal and corporate. In the superorganic organism the same bilateral composition
applies and this is revealed in the inner social fabric of society, in its institutions, and
in the outer form of the identity more closely associated with individual activities,
such as the occupations, cultural behaviour and appearances of people. Jewish
identity is so ancient that Judaism is associated with the deep structures of the
organism predating the Christian fabric raised on top of the Jewish cultural heritage,
and this is how to understand the point I am seeking to put across at this moment.
How else do you imagine Judaism as an identity manages to survive as it
does, and have the unique historical record that it does, and the unique place in life
today, that it does? Human exoskeletal structure is not conducive to a reef, or even a
termite like, rigidity of form. Yes, when we have Star Ship Enterprise like, city sized
interstellar space ships, cruising the great void, we will have such a rigid exoskeletal
structure, but that is a whole different ball game to what the Russians were trying to
do not long ago, and what the North Koreans are seeking to do in a like style today.
The North Koreans must fail, it is in the nature of the beast, it is simply a matter of
time, and maybe a few dozen nuclear weapons strewn about the place, slaughtering a
billion or two people here and there, which will get the historians in a tizwaz for a
century or so. But the Jewish organism will scarcely bother to yawn and turn over in
its sedate transition toward global domination at such a piddling thing, as the fury is
unleashed against it so its being will be fed, and grow stronger, and the world will be
consumed by its dead weight of ignorance.
But the mass of the beast will still leave room for a few of us to pick its brains,
if only for amusements sake.

Working with Smooth Undifferentiated Clay Deposits

In the superorganic world it is not the fabric that counts, in the long run only
identity counts for anything. Judaism is identity boiled down to its essence, or the
closest thing to it that our human world has yet seen. That refinement of human
essence, to this extreme degree, is made real by the production of a body of identity
texts. These texts form, in relation to our sensually perceptive apparatus, a mirror
which reflects an image of social reality. It is our sense of hearing, as a prime
instrument of linguistic communication, that is concerned in this act of sensual
perception. The ears are in effect the mind's eye when it comes to the delivery of
information of identity by means of language, aided, as all senses aid one another, by
our other senses too. But we now know, having discovered the true nature of human
nature, and therefore the nature of racism, which utilises the medium of sight to
deliver corporate identity, that language evolved as it did, into a symbolic form of
communication, primarily in order to deliver identity by means of language, for
symbolic language was the key to the evolution of true superorganic beings, whereby
superorganisms based primarily upon visual cues could be united into complex
organisms constituted about linguistically generated identity components. Which
brings us round in a circle in this paragraph as we come back to the mythological texts
that appeared soon after we opened our discussion of human essence condensed into a
real artifact of human physiology.
Evidently ears, their nature and form, have to be important in this process of
identity transmission, it is just that their passive role makes them fall out of view
when we look at these issues. And a further point we might make even as we
emphasise the role of the ears in the delivery of the message infused into the texts, is
that in devising texts, the way was opened for the eyes to play an increasing role in
supporting the ears in this ever happening dynamic of evolving corporate form, and
the need to deliver identity to all parts. To the likes of Isaac this would come as a
revelation How could the eyes fulfil this role? They must of been preadapted for
writing, wow! Poor sad man. The potential to write has existed since the universe
came into being some fifteen billion years ago, just as the potential for a planet to
form with oceans has always existed, it was just a matter of the form appearing out of
the matrix. If it ain't in there it cannot come out. Nature cannot evolve a capacity to
find things that cannot exist, and humans cannot become the instruments of creating
that which cannot exist. Writing was therefore a niche opportunity latent within the
social terrain created by the evolution of human corporate physiology, awaiting
exploration by a human form incorporating the elaborate hierarchical structure which
is necessary to deliver a true writing system. Just as the savannahs were a terrain of
the earth awaiting exploration by a mammal capable of forming the necessary group
of interdependent individuals with pooled identities linked by a physiology supporting
close physical integration that could exploit the open expanse, naked skin, a deep
sense of unity induced by the intimacy of naked bodies, shared warmth, moist skin
increasing intimacy upon close contact, a divine stickiness  oops, revealing my
delight in perverse intimacies there, the touch of breasts, the kiss  and all that
plonker Leach can think of is to imagine this came about because we were evolving
toward becoming warm blooded fish!
It is unusual to think of the ears in this sense, we are not really aware of their
role in mental imagery in the same way we are in respect to our power to register light
borne information. And considering this lack of awareness of our ears, they being just
holes stuck in the side of our heads that are, in effect, behind our line of sight, is
interesting because of course in all our discussions there is an ever present ambience
of unwittingness pervading our thoughts as we try to comprehend how it can be that
we, as individuals, quite simply do not exist, and that we are simply cells in a vast
organism which does with us exactly what it needs to do, and that is all we do, what
we are required to do.
Ears, think ears, they are a sneaky device in this set up. Ears lend themselves
to the ingress of uninvited information, we cannot close them as we can our eyes.
Forever open, and they are not just focused upon that which is coming straight at us,
they are like a radar with a receptive range that operates through all angles of the
world surrounding us, perfect for purposes of inducing social integrity. And all the
while, they are so there, so incapable of being turned off, that we are completely
oblivious to their presence. So there that we do not, paradoxically, know they are
there at all. In this respect, despite being a sense organ of immense importance, we
are no more aware of our ears than we are of our stomach. Boy, in the context of this
discussion concerning human nature, the great mystery, that is one hell of a thought,
don't you think?
And while we are tuned into this subject we might pause to throw music into
the frame as a precursor to the evolution of highly abstract linguistic communication,
since we can image that before full blown language evolved a mode of
communicating uniform identity via the lugholes may of been an important facet of
corporate identity deliverance; if you can do it via the stomach  fast-food  why not
via the ears. If we think about the sort of noise that delights some people today, a
mind numbing shrill pitch or deep bellow that opera unleashes upon us, or the brain
stunning beat of black gospel demons, it is dead easy to see how small bands of
incipient superorganic beings may of bolstered their social unity while transfixed
about the camp fire, where the eyes would fall into second place in the hierarchy of
senses of perception just as the ears pricked up and let the hypnotic message flood in.
Maybe the use of fire really evolved as a social tool, and not as a means of
keeping warm or of providing defence from wild animals, or even for cooking food.
Perhaps it was the entrancing effect of a burning fire that acted as a device inducing
corporate deliverance into unity. Just imagine the evolution of an animal that can use
fire, this was not a human being, this was a precursor of our kind, it must of seemed a
very strange and magical thing this fire, maybe these pre-humans first developed
divine sensibilities from such contemplation, that later turned to the sun and the
heavens in general when we blossomed. Fire, in this scenario, would of acted via
sight, and having attracted an audience on the basis of trance, opened the way to the
evolution of behaviour emitting harmonising vocals to act via the ears, like wolves
howling, except in humans all would of sort to join the harmony to make one howl to
unite equally, not a lone howl to establish hierarchy. And so the batons of corporate
deliverance shift between the senses as the organism waddles its way into the future.
How I love to sit and stare at a burning fire, wood in the garden, or camp site, coal in
the grate, doesn't everyone like to stare into the flames and dream? And once fire was
on the exoskeleton's menu of tricks, all sorts of additional openings would be
unlocked. Societal, think societal, exactly the opposite of these damned theistic
knowledge pervert priests we keep having to resort to because they have robbed out,
and perverted all the evidence.
I am being a little fanciful, because I just want to introduce the ideas as they
come to me, by doing this I remind myself of exactly what I criticised in Leach's
pathetic account. The difference however is that my ideas are threaded about a core
of reason which is scientific, whereas Leach's, ideas like those of all authorised
scientific preachers, are centred about the idea of human individuality, so that each
advance has to be justified on the basis of human will power and desire. This theistic
dogma is as unscientific as it is possible to be. Nothing I say requires human intent, at
any point, it all just happens naturally. We do not, for example, have cars because we
want cars, there is no human intent involved in the use of the car, we have cars
because the dictates of the priesthood determined, by their programme which forces
them to compete for power, obliges us to have cars. Society is not ruled by consent
(theistic word - personal), society is ruled by feedback (scientific word - functional).
The difference between us is why I never have to say there is something we cannot
know, and may never know, or have no idea about. In contrast to these priests, who,
in dealing with science applied to people, never know anything of any final sort, while
when their senior partners, in the acknowledged theocracy of the church, have
anything to say about people they think they know absolutely everything with
complete certainty.
The linguistically constituted mirror must be fashioned by what we call an
artificial means, but in a process that is of course purely biological, the word artificial
merely meaning organic form that is part of the superorganism created by Nature via
human agency. And thus Nature creates an image distorted by priestcraft to suit the
need to farm the biomass effectively, which is the function that the priesthood evolved
to carry out. The distortions infused into the linguistic image are dictated by the
needs of the organism, thus the texts reflect the nature of the organism and act as the
fluid-genetic medium generating and managing the organism's form. The Bible, as
we Christian implantees know this body of fluid-genetic material, is, by implication, a
refined essence of humanity, one that is long overdue further distillation, but is well
beyond the ability of any still's capacity to refine usefully.

In the pile of eight books I came away from the library with yesterday,
29/06/04, from which you have already been treated to one extensive piece of
mythological priestcraft, I now want to delight you with another item, of exactly the
same nature, being pure priestcraft, but of quite another kind. I splashed out seventy
five pence on Christian Origins : Theology, Rhetoric and Community because I
spotted a chapter entitled Gregory of Nyssa : the force of identity, by John Milbank.
As I found myself weaving an account of modern civilisation's growth in terms of
physiological dynamics, in which I have just drawn out an explication of the nature of
Jewish identity in terms of this scientific examination of human society, where I
conclude with a statement on the force of identity, a force which I am, of course,
always aware is the representation of human nature in our world, and therefore the
very being of God in the Jewish mythological texts, I took a scan at this piece by
Milbank and thought you should have the opportunity to do the same within the body
of this work.
It is a little chewy, so make yourselves a cup of tea, sit down, take a sip, and
read in a relaxed but focused manner. While the pasty verbiage is spotted with jargon
which is more less meaningless to the uninitiated, do not let that distract your
attention, just get the gist of the thing, and then spit it out, take a further swig of warm
comforting tea, and proceed to ingest more of the gooey 'substance'. This is where the
antiquarian of knowledge has to develop a few practical gifts as they exert there
intelligence to extract the information from a whole range of mental deposits.
Sometimes you want to know how a smooth clay compares with another identical
looking item from another locality, and so you suck it and see, the level of grit may
reveal something. Religious treatise are, by their very nature, a kind of linguistic pap,
somewhat like baby's squawking, it seems meaningless, it is definitely irritating, but
you know that it means something to those making the noise, and you just have to
check it out to see if you can work out just what the trouble is with the little mites. So
it is with this sample, have fun, do not let its squeal get on your nerves, and like a
baby's cry, there is something human, primitive, but human, in there to delight the
adult being.

GREGORY OF NYSSA

The force of identity

John Milbank

My excuse, as a systematic theologian, for addressing some issues in historical

theology, is threefold. In the first place I am concerned with the way in which much
recent treatment by systematic theologians of the Cappadocian position on the Trinity
accords ill with the best and especially the most recent scholarship on Gregory of
Nyssa. The implication of this scholarship is that many of the contrasts between
Gregory and Augustine on the matter of the Trinity have been overdrawn, even as
regards the yoking together of trinitarian with psychological concerns, as I shall later
explain. In the second place I am concerned with the relevance of Gregory to
contemporary debates concerning the relation of the philosophical category of being
on the one hand, to the theological category of gift on the other. Thirdly, and most
specifically, I am interested in Gregory's strong advocacy of apatheia, both as
ontological norm and as ethical goal, which contrasts sharply with a tendency in
recent theology either to reject or to qualify apatheia in both respects, in the belief
that it represents a hellenic contamination of the biblical inheritance. In the face of
this assumption I shall suggest that in certain respects Gregory stresses apatheia even
more strongly than his pagan predecessors and near-contemporaries, precisely
because he thinks this is demanded by the deliverancies of revelation and by
categories of gift rather than being. This emphasis in his thought may seem, on the
face of it, to accord ill with those aspects of his teaching which modern Christians
have found congenial, namely his validation (or at least apparent validation) of
relationality, communication and growth, distinct personal existence, emotions of
certain kinds, generation and embodiment: in other words all that we might take to
characterize the life of persons in material space and temporal duration. We take it
that the positive valuation of the latter will be bound to include also a validation of the
worth of the passions, and in this view we are, indeed, at one with much of ancient
philosophy, although it made the correlation for opposite, negative reasons, being
somewhat suspicious of the passions along with time, embodiment and spatial
relation. From the point of view of both ancient and modern philosophy, it might be
thought that Gregory is inconsistent in promoting a positive view of the latter three
categories, and yet maintaining, even augmenting, apatheia.*
However, I shall argue in this chapter that Gregory was not necessarily
inconsistent, once one has grasped that instead of validating the passions he attempted
the different task of redefining activity in such a fashion that it is no longer
straightforwardly connected with notions of self-containment, self-sufficiency and
autocracy normally taken to be the reverse of the passion-governed life. Instead, for
Gregory, it is possible, at every ontological level, to be in the same instance both
receptive and donating, without being in any sense subject to anything else that is not
oneself, or in some way inhibits one's ideal reality. Here to receive is somehow
already the movement of a counter-donation on the part of the will. I shall describe
this conception, which will be further elaborated in due course, as active reception.
For now one should note that if it redefines receptivity as action, it equally redefines
action as receptivity. In my conclusion I shall suggest why the strategy of embracing
active reception might be more radical and more defensible than the modern strategy
of abandoning apatheia. But first of all I will outline this strategy of Gregory's under
four headings: those of reputation, generation, growth and embodiment.
One of the key sites for the tyranny of the passions, according to Gregory, is
that of doxa, or worldly glory, honour, credit or reputation. As with many of his
pagan predecessors, a suspicion of worldly honour goes along with an apparent retreat
from the social and political as such. This sphere encourages us to believe in the
realities of obscurity of birth or illustrious birth, or glory or splendour, or ancient
renown, or present elevation, or power over others as Gregory puts it, whereas such
things have no real hold in Being. They are all rather a matter of human fictional
imputation, and in Against Eunomius Gregory takes a fairly cynical view of human
government: it being the case, he argues, that all humans are fundamentally equal as
created, no human rule over other humans will ever be tolerated for long, and political
history is bound to be a story of rise and fall. In this sphere, prestige is a matter of
reputation and reputation is always bloated, never adequately warranted. Thus
Gregory shares the late antique tendency somewhat to devalue the political as a
sphere of self-realization, in favour of the inner soul, as being more self-sufficient,
less prey to the delusions or vagaries of repute and the degradations of time which
tears from one every possession, whether of material goods or civic honour. He also
augments this shift in so far as he advocates, at least for many, a withdrawal from the
institution of marriage. The latter is viewed as peculiarly subject to the dominance of
the passions, but not especially, and in fact, hardly at all, the sexual passion; much
more as tied to the attempt to extend one's worldly glory beyond the present
generation, to ensure that sons will preserve one's name along with their inherited
possessions. Also with a well-nigh inescapable melancholia: to embrace one's wife is
always to embrace the one you know you will eventually have to mourn, or else will
have to mourn you: therefore it is already an embrace of suffering, and a lure which
engulfs the present in a perpetual reminiscence (Gregory of Nyssa would not have
liked Shadowlands). Marriage contains no remedy for these things within itself,
although it can be used for the good, says Gregory, by those with sufficient gifts. For
the weaker, however (presumably including himself), virginity is the safer course.
Gregory's critique of marriage shows that he not only distrusts present civic
glory, he also wishes to escape from all traces of human reputation left by time.
Hence in On the Christian Mode of Life he exhorts us not to follow fashion, or seek
truth in inherited opinions, but to turn inwards for the contemplation of abiding truth.
This sounds like a thoroughly Cartesian rejection of all inheritance and mere
reception. However, Gregory builds his entire theology not round a defence of the
inner citadel against the buffetings of illusory glory, but rather round a different, and
more abiding doxa, which includes a more positive view of processes of historical
transmission and public visibility. As to the first, one can mention the prologue to On
the Making of Man, where Gregory wonders whether he should just praise his brother
Basil's uncompleted Hexamaeron and not tarnish his reputation by producing an
inferior conclusion, concerning man, since he regards himself as a far lesser thinker.
However, he justifies his enterprise by arguing that he will more reveal Basil's
greatness if he shows that this can engender an equally great work in his disciple. In
other words Basil's identity is no longer complete and bound up in his own works, and
equally a praise of Basil is no longer just something conferred on him extrinsically,
manifesting nothing new of his essential being. On the contrary, Basil's identity
resides in the spirit of his writing, in a certain force which can communicate itself,
and in praising Basil, Gregory is not just passively recording his greatness, but
demonstrating it by actively appropriating it, so revealing its fecundity.
As to the second aspect of doxa, public visibility, one can mention Gregory's
discussion of whether one should reveal one's good deeds in On the Christian Mode
of Life. Here, following the words of Jesus about not displaying one's piety, Gregory
insists that good deeds performed for reputation will cease to be good deeds because
they are being traded for a perishable, worldly good. However, he also has to confront
texts about letting your light shine before men, which suggests that an entirely
invisible good could scarcely be a good at all, since it would do no good, and certainly
could not encourage in the good. Gregory resolves this aporia of virtue and visibility
by requiring that we should give glory to God alone: that is to say, let shine in our
deeds, God's deeds, since all good deeds are given from God. Whereas for the world,
virtuous deeds result in praise, for Gregory virtuous deeds are only, in themselves, the
praise of another, attribution to God as their source, which is at the same time an
offering of the deeds back to God as a return of gratitude. Inversely, in giving us the
grace to become virtuous God is glorifying us, that is to say praising us not for our
virtue, but that we can be virtuous. Virtue for Gregory is a power, dynamis, and a
power that we must will, and yet this power, including our will, entirely begins before
us as the Power of God. And though we receive it, we can only receive it actively
(else it would not be our virtue) to the limit of our participating capacity. Against
Eunomius and his view that the Father's glory is essentially incommunicable Gregory
calls attention to the fact that even human creatures, never mind the Son of God, can
be glorified by the Father, without finite limit (that means for us, endlessly) with his
glory, which is to say his active potential or dynamis. The trinitarian context will
offer a yet more radical twist; not only does God's dynamic praise of us precede and
permit our virtue, this is even the case (though in an altered sense of precede which
involves no temporal priority nor hierarchical supremacy) for the divine Logos who is
fully and essentially God himself, since the Son is the glory and the dynamis, besides
being the wisdom of the Father. And this means that the Father's own virtue consists
in offering a previously unmerited praise to another, just as he essentially persists also
in receiving back this praise.
We are now in a position to contrast Gregory's views of worldly and divine
doxa. The former is empty, and here praise has a secret priority over what is praised.
One would expect a contrast to this to be made in terms of an indication of stable
identity, of what really belongs to things and to human beings. In other words, a
rejection of the rhetorical world of persuasion in favour of the dialectical realm or
vision of abiding realities. Yet Gregory scorns dialectic as much as rhetoric: reality,
as the infinite being of God, cannot be grasped under a category, nor can created
realities be so grasped either, for they mirror this incomprehensibility and are in a
state of constant flux. How, then, can one identify Gregory's discourse, which one
notes is marked by the piling up of persuasive arguments after the fashion of the
second sophistic, and by the celebration of less ornate but thereby all the more
sublime figures of speech which he takes to characterize biblical writing? I suggest as
a kind of doxologic, in which persuasion and encomium is not directed towards the
possession of glory by oneself or another, but rather to the constant transmission of
glory which is all the more one's own in so far as another person can receive it and
repeat its force. As with human glory, surprisingly, so also in the case of divine doxa,
praise has priority over what is praised, yet this is no longer secret, but out in the open
and with a different intent  not to hoard praise but to exchange it, such that praise is
never simply of oneself or of another. Supremely, we know in praising God, in
offering him glory which is his own, and not in seeing God, nor in manipulating men.
This 'doxologic' is followed by Gregory in The Life of Moses, where he
defines virtue as perfection, as the infinitely active, unlimited, entirely dispassionate
life. As such, it cannot be contained, and therefore, unlike Plato and Aristotle,
Gregory offers no logos of virtue. Nor can he offer his own life, nor could anyone, as
an example of virtue, since virtue as infinite cannot be attained. All Gregory can do is
exhort to virtue, and praise a virtue which is never present, but which nonetheless
arrives through praise, since it is an offering of praise. For this reason Gregory can
claim that though we do not know and cannot exemplify virtue, we can still have a
part (mesos) in it, if we proceed from activity to activity, for activity only remains
active if it does not seek to lay hold inwardly upon its activity but continuously
receives more activity from the divine source. In this context a certain reception from
the narrated memory of other human beings also is possible: one may praise Moses
and offer him as a kind of example, since he was the sublime man who pointed
absolutely beyond himself to God, and to the God-Man. In imitating Moses,
therefore, we are imitating a man who is paradoxically imitating  that is to say
following behind the back of  a man who is yet to come: Christ, just as for us also
the full body of Christ is yet to be realized, and we follow in its wake. Nonetheless
Moses plays for us a slightly more positive role: his finished life is itself a mesos, a
part, which has connotations of both role and inheritance (the double sense in English
of a 'lot') just as Gregory insists that Moses played a part in the politeia, a political
life, but a polis now more in time than space. Moses is a more appropriate example
than a present contemporary saint, since his life is over and therefore we are less
tempted simply to copy it but see that it is to be taken further, extended differently
and yet sustained as the same. In other texts Gregory suggests that properly speaking
there is only one human being transmitted from person to person; it follows that
epectasis applies transgenerationally as well as internally, and Gregory does not
exhort us to leave behind the Chaldeans and Egyptians in the sense of leave behind
history, but in the sense of leave behind our passions, which they allegorically stand
for, and pass, not from place and body to spirit, but in every place and every body
from passivity to activity.
My second heading is that of generation. I have already mentioned how
Gregory treats an exchange of glory within the Trinity. The Son is the Father's doxa;
without the Son the Father is without doxa and the glory of both is the Holy Spirit.
Here the Spirit is the bond of glory in exactly the way he is bond of love for
Augustine. This giving of glory within God is dealt with by the Bible in terms of
metaphors of generation, Father to Son. One of the main questions at issue with
Eunomius was how this generation was possible without passion. Eunomius claimed
that all generation necessarily involved passion, and therefore that the Son was
subordinate to the Father, who is in himself utterly uninvolved in any such transitive
activity. To this, Gregory responds that even in the case of human generation,
children do not have a different or a lesser human essence than their parents. Even
though human generation is passionate, it already gives the lie to Eunomius'
assumption that cause and effect will diverge essentially, or that a beginning is a kind
of pre-containing foundation. (So much for the idea that all the Greek Fathers laid
great store on the Father as arche, prior to relationality.) Furthermore, the passionate
aspect of human generation is only an aspect of the post-fall emergency economy;
humans were originally intended to self-propagate in a purely active mode. Such
propagation was restored in the case of the Virgin birth, in which Mary's integrity was
not cancelled but rather re-affirmed by her receiving of the Logos, when her body was
entirely transparent to her active willed assent. This assent involved a speaking of a
word from her mind which Gregory presents as a further example of non-passive
generation even amongst human beings: it is not that the word receives something
from the mind, rather that it is the activity outgoing from the mental source.
Therefore to defend generation without passivity in God, Gregory makes appeal to
certain instances of causality within time to show that such a possibility exists even
when generation involves movement and alteration. And, as Michel Barnes has
shown, he is involved here in defending a certain account of the diversity of kinds of
causality. Gregory accuses Eunomius of assimilating all causality to the model of a
voluntary, artisanal imposition of form on matter. In so far as Eunomius speaks of
dynamis, he thinks of it not as a power that is automatically self-communicating, but
rather like the power of an emperor which can be exercised or not at will. No action or
energeia for Eunomius belongs essentially to a nature but arises only for the occasion
of producing a particular work (ergon) and is precisely adapted to just this one work
and no other; whereas Gregory points out that many causes produce diverse effects in
different receptacles, thus rain always moistens, but quickens myriads of diverse
seeds, fire always heats, but heat hardens some things, melts others. For Eunomius
the Son is an ergon caused by an act of energeia of the Father precisely adapted to
this one work (whereas for Gregory the same causal dynamis of the Father both
generates the Son and creates the cosmos with all its diversity of effects), but the act
of the Father is not in itself the Father, who as strictly the ungenerate does not of his
essence enter even into causation. Here it is worth noting that while Gregory attacks,
on apophatic grounds, Eunomius' identifying of God with an essence for which we
can give a word  ungenerate  there is another sense in which Eunomius' God is
more ineffable than Gregory's in so far as it is totally non-participable. Gregory
defends not just God as incomprehensible ousia, but also God as incomprehensible
dynamis  as inherently giving and effecting (and affecting).
According to Gregory, to grasp divine causality, one must employ analogically
examples of all modes of created causality. The artisanal model applies somewhat to
creation, but here it must be supplemented by, and in the case of trinitarian generation
abandoned for, other causal models. Physical generation is one, the generation of
mental power in the incorporeal word is another, yet equally crucial is the much more
materialist instance of material efflux, or the self-propagation of a material power.
Here the supreme example is fire  fire, like mind, is in ceaseless motion, inherently
contagious  it exists to effect, and it cannot but heat. Again and again Gregory says
that the Father is like this. Barnes has shown how Gregory is here drawing on a key
motif within Platonism itself. From the Hippocratic tradition, Plato took over the
notion of a power physics according to which the cosmos is composed of fundamental
self-propagating elemental qualities usually arranged in pairs of opposites. Unlike the
materialist philosophers, the more human scientists, the doctors, refused to treat the
combination of those elements as merely epiphenomenal in relation to their corporeal
components. This, however, suggested that the philosophy of material elements could
not provide an adequate ontology, and that what arrives later cannot be explained as
an aggregate of the earlier, but only in teleological terms as an arrival from a
transcendent source. Hence in Phaedo (an important source for Gregory) Plato says
that the number 2 is not to be explained as 1 plus 1, but as a participation in the form
of Twoness. However, the spiritual forms themselves are conceived on the model of
power physics. Just as fire heats, so justice makes just and so forth. Despite the
continued dominance of the artisanal model in Plato's account of the relation of ideal
to matter  that is, ideas inform a substratum  the transposed power physics gives
an idea of participation which the Neoplatonists can later develop into the notion of
emanation.
Hence Gregory's insistence on dynamis represents a very Platonic moment in
his thought. And the notion certainly lent itself to thoughts of threeness  for Plato in
the Sophist there is a dynamis to affect and a dynamis to be affected. The
combination of the two is a third reality. However, in that dialogue Plato supposed
that real being must be outside affecting and being affected, including being known,
and if to the contrary it appears that being can somehow be known then true being
must after all embrace both the unchanging and the changing. Without truly solving
the problem of the self-dissolution in Platonism which this suggests, the Neoplatonists
insisted that what is truly and absolutely One does, nonetheless, communicate itself,
just as the sun must pour forth its rays. Yet Gregory, of course, takes one step further:
the source is now in no sense beyond its rays, and there is no way to return to the
source by abandoning the rays as merely a mirrored reflection. The Father, Son and
Spirit are one equal dynamic display of glory.
While at times Gregory treats the Son as especially the power of the Father, at
other times he insists that power is common to all three persons in the way that ousia
is also common. Here his usual mode of argument is from the experience of
salvation. The Son saves, the Spirit saves, but only God can save, so all three persons
display equally the saving dynamis of God. In this case an economic trinitarian
argument is also automatically an immanent one, and one notes that Gregory insists
just as strongly as the West on one essence whose nature cannot possibly be in any
way defined via personal relation, any more than the fact that I am born declares what
I am. However, Barnes's remarkable contribution has been to show that Gregory
(although in this respect paralleled by Latin treatment of virtus) speaks more often of
one dynamis than one ousia? And this term provides something very like a trinitarian
ontology which is in keeping with a doxological discourse, for it mediates between
the ousia register and the prosopon (person) register. What is must affect, and for
Gregory this affecting is identical with the being affected, since there is no receptable
prior to this being affected, and therefore passivity in the usual sense is denied all
ontological purchase. Yet generation remains, without suffering and without interval
 but thereby, as all the more essential.
Gregory, therefore, charts a specifically trinitarian path beyond the self-
dissolution of Platonism, not available to Neoplatonism. Whereas Stoicism construed
the equality in Being of both the unaffecting/unaffected and the affecting/affected in
terms of a priority of the cosmos which rendered Platonic ideas (the
unaffecting/unaffected aspect) mere surface effects (incorporeals) of a material
process in flux, Gregory articulates a paradoxical identity of these two, of
unaffecting/unaffected ousia and affecting/affected dynamis in the transcendent
source itself. This paradox is exemplified in Gregory's boldest move against
Eunomius when he claims that to deny generation in God actually limits God,
precisely because this denial construes God as a beginning (or a foundation).
Beginnings, says Gregory, imply also ends and therefore relational circumscription.
By declaring that there is some sort of causal transition in God, Gregory negates not
only temporal and spatial interval (diastasis) but also an identification of adiastasis
with an absolute beginning or absolute presence to self. God's incomprehensibility is
not, for Gregory, just an epistemological matter, but is rather ontological and means
that God literally does not comprehend himself. Therefore, although he fully knows
himself, this knowing is not on the model of our knowing which is a grasping or
manipulative effecting, the Stoic katalepsis. And nor is it vision, which also grasps.
Instead it is infinite bestowing and bestowing back again. And the same, doxological
account of knowing extends even to the human creation  here also the earlier does
not explain, and katalepsis is only for purposes of pragmatic technological benefit.
There can be no grasp of essences, since the essence of the world is a mirroring of
divine incomprehensibility. The world does not comprehend itself, cannot be known
within itself, but instead, as Gregory repeatedly insists, the logos about the world is
bigger than the world itself because it accounts for it only as derived from a
transcendent elsewhere and therefore as unfathomable even down to its smallest
details. The identity of the world resides in a power from beyond the world that gives
the world itself a power to go beyond what is previously given.
The third heading is growth. The other site for discussion of passion in
Gregory is the soul. However, it is linked with the Trinity. In On the Making of Man
Gregory declares that if the soul is in the image of God and the soul cannot be divided
then this proves that the Trinity cannot be divided. This is Gregory's development of
an earlier argument for the unity of God as creator from the unity of the cosmos and
the unity of the soul; just as the soul can originate man's diverse activities in the
unified body, so God can do many different things in the unified creation. Here,
however, it is a question specifically of the three Aristotelian faculties of the soul:
intellective, sensitive, nutritive. The difficulty is, can the soul be both threefold and
unified, especially as sensitivity and nutrition are involved in passion. But here also,
as with the Trinity, the solution is provided in terms of a kind of active receptivity,
even if this is not so immediately apparent.
Commentators have divided concerning Gregory's account of the soul: for
some he is essentially a Posidonian  all three faculties belong in some way to the
soul, and the passions have a positive educational function. For others, Gregory
insists on an absolute unity of the soul in accord with one strand of Platonism. What
is quite clear is that Gregory, along with most of his immediate forebears, rejected the
account of the soul given in Plato's Republic, according to which it has three parts:
nous, thumos, epithumia  on the usual grounds that this suggested three different
people (the homunculus problem). However, Gregory assimilated the Platonic
division of the soul to the Aristotelian one, and rejected both in the name of a united
and active rational soul. The lower faculties are said to be improperly named souls
and more properly called hormai (impulses). Nonetheless, he persists in a faculties of
soul language and insists that the presence of the rational soul is necessary to animate
these powers  the mind in order to sense, and a kind of unconscious emanation from
the brain to perform all other natural functions, including generation. So how are we
to understand how the one, active soul everywhere animates, even when this appears
to involve passions?
First of all, one needs to realize that psyche for Gregory's inheritance was a
fundamental ontological category. In the cosmology which Gregory shared with
Basil, the universe consisted not of informed matter but of essentially immaterial
qualities  light, heat, motion etc. which have an abstract character and so can
properly be thought to derive from mind (i.e. the mind of God). These elements are
held together in harmonic and oppositional arrangements which often counter
expectation: for example, light falls. Only our mind grasps these patterns (though it
cannot comprehend them) and so knows that they have their origin in mind. The
cosmos is therefore psychically bound together, just as our souls bind our bodies
together. Rather, as much later for Spinoza, it seems that for Gregory body and mind
never touch, yet are absolutely co-extensive. Now the implication of this cosmology is
that Gregory believes he has followed rigorously the logic of creation ex nihilo: first
there is no passive matter preceding creation and waiting to be informed, but second
Gregory sees no need to posit created passive matter either (it is true he speaks
sometimes of the aeons of time and space as containers, but they are not in any sense
a substratum). Thus Gregory has redefined bodies as essentially immaterial and
active, since their entire being flows from the wholly active God. It is in this manner
that Gregory's Christian outlook seems to give passion still less ontological purchase
than for the Stoics or Neoplatonists. In Against Eunomius Gregory says that the break
ups of bodies are not really passions of bodies, but erga, works of nature (again, the
pre-echo of Spinoza is very strong here). One can interpolate that these break ups are
only passive from the perspective of the individual bodies, and that passivity here
contributes nothing (as a substratum would). But only animal bodies would
consciously have this illusory perspective, only they would undergo death as a
passivity. Death, however, is for Gregory a result of the fall, and therefore the
apparent passivity of even individual bodies is essentially unnatural (and here
Gregory is able to transcend the dualism of perspective consequent upon Spinoza's
monistic immanentism).
It is this consideration which helps us to understand how the one rational soul
can be linked with apparently passive impulses. Their passionate character is part of
the fallen economy  punitive, and yet merciful and delaying. For example, the
fallen body can still receive being, by eating food, yet this causes him passively to
experience repletion and later the passive need to eat again. Our fallen bodies now
live for a merciful interval in which we can receive redemptive glory, but still get
used up. However, these passionate aspects of the fallen body are not strictly to be
called passions, according to Gregory in Against Eunomius: real passions involve sin,
in other words the state in which the rational soul is dominated by such impulses  in
which it identifies, for example, with our need to possess and appropriate food in
order to live, and makes accumulation the goal of life (the well-stocked fridge). The
fallen hormai are neutral, and if we confine suffering to a material level this suffering
purges sin by leading it to its result in death. In this way the hormai can be put to
good use: self-preserving anger becomes anger at sin and so serves genuine self-
preservation under grace, and fortitude in pursuing salvation. Desire for things can
generate desire for God, and Gregory can use the word hedones (feelings) in a
perfectly positive active sense. No passion does not mean no feeling. Rowan
Williams rightly emphasizes the way in which the bodily energies of desiring and
self-preservation can in Gregory be used to promote spiritual growth. However, he
notes, with some concern, that Moses does seem to be presented as having left even
such impulses behind. By contrast, I think that this is not inconsistent because the
hormai or bodily passions are only a hinge; they are not to remain and in this respect
Gregory compares them to Paul's faith and hope, which will not remain at the
eschaton. Suffering, passive desire and self-preservation in the face of the enemy will
pass away; since (even if neutral) they are merely the outworking of sin, the
realization that we have been damaged, impaired in our being, which is to say,
precisely, been rendered passive (and again there is an oddly Spinozistic fore-echo).
However, an eros proper to the soul remains, and is never surpassed, just as the self-
directing will, drive and self-preservation in the good also remain.
The former, in particular, is fundamentally receptive and yet it remains, and
has ceased to be regarded by Gregory as a passion. Neither eros nor will are for him
any longer subordinate to reason  like the Platonic baser aspects, or Aristotelian
lower faculties  nor are they parts or even faculties of the soul. They are one with
reason, but reason is somehow also will and also eros. This strange mode of unity is
presented in The Life of Moses and the Commentary on the Song of Songs as a
temporal oscillation. Frequently we pass from what one might dub a Neoplatonic
stage when reason mirrors God to either a sublime drive of the will to a God whom
we realize we cannot exhaust (but only touch) or else a wounding of our tranquil
contemplation of beauty by a sublime desire (as it were beyond the pleasure
principle).
In this oscillation the Spirit leads us to desire the Bridegroom (the Son) and
moves us on to the Father as invisible source. However, it then moves us back in a
circle to Son and to Spirit via the incarnation and the presence of Spirit in the Church.
These persons also are equally in the place of darkness and both equally belong to the
face to face beyond the Pauline mirror, which direct vision means for Gregory,
paradoxically, following the back of (so that full visibility realizes full invisibility).
We follow Christ with the wings of the dove which is equally the Spirit's brooding or
resting over the Church. Via the flying/resting of the Church in the Spirit we are
inducted into the trinitarian exchange of glory. But this movement of soul into God is
also for Gregory a movement inside the soul  not from faculty to faculty, but from
reason as reason into reason as desire and willing, since reasoning is no longer
katalepsis but praise and loving and self-exceeding aspiration. So from this we can
conclude, after the Mosaic example, that like Augustine Gregory can envisage the
soul as modelled on the divine essence, realized through three persons. For he
stresses that the same soul can adopt different characters (prosopeia)  so the soul is
diversified without parts into reason, will and desire, just as earlier we saw many
human individuals can be considered manifestations of one collective person. The
soul is for Gregory relational and diverse, not in the sense of possessing parts or
aspects but as a dynamis moving from relative stasis to relative ecstasis. Although
there is little explicit development of a psychological analogue to the Trinity in
Gregory as compared with Augustine, it is still there. And for this reason one must
(in the wake of Rowan Williams and Lewis Ayres) oppose the received wisdom
which regards the psychological analogy in Augustine as a speculative substitute for a
genuine existential experience of the Trinity in the East. This is a false contrast, for
four further reasons: (1) it was natural at this time to associate ontological categories
for the Trinity with psychological ones; (2) the experiential was by everyone placed in
psychological categories; (3) the relation to God had to be conceived as a relation
repeated within the soul since we do not really relate to God but participate in him, (4)
to experience the economic is to experience the immanent Trinity and if God is
essentially triune and we image God, then the soul must be in some sense triune.
 These considerations, which tend to justify the psychological analogy,
thoroughly accord with the notion of active reception whereby in receiving we
actively become what we receive: the triune God. So, for example, in The
Commentary on the Song of Songs the Bride first receives from the Spirit, then
becomes a spirit, first receives food, then provides a banquet for the Bridegroom.
Gregory stresses that to go on receiving grace we must ourselves give back, and
salvation for him means that (in the Spirit) we also, as receiving the life of all three
divine persons, can glorify Father, Son and Spirit.
My fourth category is embodiment. I have already mentioned that for Gregory
the body is by nature active. In On the Soul and Resurrection he claims that the
resurrection is possible because the soul is essentially the bond (sundrome) between
the disparate elements, and that after their dispersal, which constitutes death, the soul
preserves memory-traces of them, just as they are in some way marked forever by the
bond of that particular soul. Thus reassembly is possible. However, Gregory faces the
question, which period in a body's life will return? His answer here is no age and no
period, since these belong to the revolutions of passion and it is precisely by virtue of
the purgation of passion that the body will return  as active  but nonetheless via
passion, the fully adequate passion of Christ. Here active reception takes the form of
a clear doctrine of communicatio idiomatum. The divine person in Christ is not the
subject of sin, for he only enhypostasizes the human nature by way of an unlimited
communication of his divine attributes, but he can nonetheless be the subject of
tiredness and fear etc. which are the neutral outworkings of sin, and assumed as the
redemptive hinge of fallen human nature (this does not necessarily mean that the
divine person is conscious of these things).
A further relevant consideration regards Gregory's general account of the
relation of God to the creation. Although, he says, the mind cannot comprehend the
incomprehensible, the incomprehensible can incomprehensibly be mirrored in our
mind. For were the incomprehensible to be simply outside the comprehensible, it
would be limited by the comprehensible (or circumscribable) and would therefore no
longer be incomprehensible (here Gregory is alert to what we should today think of as
set paradox; this is an aspect of his superseding of philosophical dialectic). In
keeping with this transgressive thought, Gregory uses strong conjunction of opposites
language with regard to the Incarnation, and also boldly conjectures that our vision of
Christ in the body of Christ or the Church is the vision of incomprehensible Being
realized inside the creaturely domain.
Therefore one may surmise that, for Gregory, although God does not suffer, he
nonetheless cannot be outside neutral, sinless suffering as it occurs in time, else he
would suffer it as outside himself, as it occurs in time (of course he does not suffer the
real suffering that is sin, since this is sheer non-being). Hence, in Christ's passion one
has for Gregory nonetheless the supreme instance of active reception. And just as
God as logos is subject of suffering and this, says Gregory, is the greatest of all
communications of dynamis, as it is power manifest in its opposite, weakness, which
astonishes the heavenly powers with the force of an ontological revelation, so also the
human body of Christ is entirely infused with Godhead, and in time transformed into
an entirely active body  the passion is only a passage.
Here Gregory stresses the collectivity of Christ's body: Christ is the beginning
and we take him as beginning in order to know what we should desire to be. The
world itself, as St John says, will not contain the book of Christ because this dynamis
in the world which is Christ's body is the world beyond the world  the book that the
world exists to become. And the Church as the new creation is precisely the world
become self-exceeding, looking for itself beyond its seeming totality. One can relate
this world turned inside out, exceeding itself, to Gregory's idea in the Commentary on
the Song of Songs that the psychic life can best be conceived in terms of nature turned
against nature. That is to say, instead of simply using the higher senses and especially
sight as figures of the psychic life, Gregory follows the Neoplatonists and Origen in
using all senses as metaphors but intensifying them. The soul is now a distillation of
sense such that one conceives its life as an inebriation that allows one to get more and
more drunk, or as an orgasmic experience in which wanting only comes with
fulfilment and fulfilment does not cancel wanting. In other words an entirely active,
and in no sense passive or lacking desire; but just for that reason all the more erotic.
And the resurrected body will itself correspond to this active psychic norm.
Thus Gregory's mystical quest looks to the vision of God as mirrored in the
always progressing Christ who is shown in the body of Christ which is the Church.
Only by receiving God eucharistically do we see him, and unconstrained activity now
means primarily receive God inside your soul and body, and not primarily enjoy the
vision of God. Here it is notable that the shape of our flight, of the Dove, is only
given collectively and synchronically in the form of the Church. Hence there is an
infinite progress not just temporally forwards  but also spatially outwards, and this
tends to provide a form for the temporal élan. In both cases of diastasis one can make
an assimilation to, yet also draw a contrast with, the thought of Plotinus. For the latter
there is also a kind of epectasis and non-lacking eros, but one can pass beyond that to
a direct communion of the centre of the soul with the centre of the One itself. This is,
indeed, no mere monism, but nevertheless it is through our inner contradiction, our
termination of relational tension, that we are at last alone with the alone. For
Gregory, to the contrary, the distance remains since it persists in God himself.
This same similarity and yet contrast is seen with respect to interpsychic
relations in both thinkers. For Plotinus, the souls in the intellectual realm fully
penetrate each other, so that greater interiority implies simultaneously a greater spatial
ecstasis. In this sense Plotinus was not anti-political, and he speaks of the final choral
dance of the souls around (although he stresses there is no real spatial distance) the
one centre. In the case of Gregory also, the social and synchronic remains in the
eschaton, but because the co-ordination is here less of a pre-established harmony and
more involves a direct distance of relation, it is shown also in the temporal here and
now, in an external monastic social practice, in which for private possession is
substituted an endless handing-on of glory. In this new polis, as in Plato's Republic,
the superior in wisdom rule (else one has non-rule), but beyond Plato superiority is
grasped as something which is only for time, and so for-a-time: it exists to be
communicated to novices, who have the chance to become wise and just in their turn.
And this restriction of subordination to a temporal economy is rigorously applied by
Gregory also to the internal governance of the soul. Here, again, he outstrips Plotinus
in distance from the classical vision: for the Neoplatonist the lower part of the soul is
still an aspect of real being and nothing of real being perishes, whereas for Gregory
there is no ontologically lower part of the soul, destined to remain even in the final
vision. Such things are rather emergency measures, temporary pedagogic devices.
The full significance of this contrast concerns different understandings of
interiority. For the earlier antique thought of Plato and Aristotle, the intrapsychic
space was constituted by the gap between the higher and lower aspect (whether
conceived as part or faculty): it being the case that the lower soul could not touch the
transcendent height above itself without mediation by the higher psychic element,
while the higher soul required an inverse mediation to make contact with material
reality. This conception renders the inwardness of the soul a mediating phenomenon
which is interior to the degree that aspects of the soul are cut off from direct contact
with external reality. Inwardness is also constituted by the hierarchic structure which
it internalizes: mirroring the government of the cosmos, it must as the governance of a
single whole by itself, or self-government, take the form of hierarchic rule, since
within a whole constraint of one element by another must be construed as a permanent
hierarchy, whereas if something is constrained by an external element (the other) this
may be a temporary and reversible hierarchy. However, in the case of Neoplatonism,
inwardness is construed differently, and the usual accounts of this philosophy (and
then the Cappadocians and Augustine) as deepening an existing Socratic turn to
interiority are oversimplified. For Neoplatonism did not work with a metaphor of
form shaping matter, as in the earlier period, which automatically invoked an interior
space between two heterogeneous ontological modalities, and negotiated this
incommensurability in necessarily hierarchical terms. Instead it adopted a metaphor
of falling, reflected, light. What is interior is now the mirrored or speculative, and
hence internal space is no longer that which is fenced off against the outside,
constituted by the necessary mediation of the low by the high and vice versa, but is
rather the direct, unmediated penetration of external light and its ecstatic return back
upon itself. There is still hierarchy of course, of source over mirror, but formally
speaking there is no limit to the receptiveness of the mirror, and nor does the
hierarchy require to be repeated within the space of the mirror; government is now by
the external, transcendent other, and is no longer in principle a matter of self-
government of the cosmos over itself which is microcosmically reflected in the
individual soul composed of heterogeneous and hierarchically ordered aspects. Now
an access to the transcendent is indeed possible by a pure inward turn, precisely
because the inner light is wholly from outside, and abides entirely in its ecstatic return
to the external source. So whereas, for earlier antiquity, interiority was at the expense
of exteriority, the more drastic interiority of later antiquity (often identified by
commentators) was equally a more drastic externalizing of the soul (as they usually
fail to realize).
However, this new logic of light is more perfectly realized by Gregory of
Nyssa than by the Neoplatonists, because he fully abandons any notion of an
ontologically persisting lower part of the soul, or any receptacle other to what is
received, and which is thereby passionate over against the rays of actuality. Now the
mirror truly is nothing but the apparent surface of light itself in its rebound. Thus we
can see that, in Gregory, the perfecting of the late antique notion of an ecstatic and
paradoxical interiority is precisely correlated with a more absolute doctrine of
apatheia.
There are two prime aspects to this. First of all, by linking activity to relation
and transmission Gregory has more completely detached the idea of activity from the
notion of self-sufficiency. Precisely for this reason, pathos thereby loses its
ontological space, since this was situated in a relational dependence deemed
secondary and deficient compared with self-sufficiency (it is true that Gregory still
speaks of a self-determining soul and a sovereign will; here Augustine's account of
will and grace is required to complete the destruction of self-government). Secondly,
pathos is for Gregory destined to vanish, even in the cosmos, as there is no longer
even the faintest vestige of underlying matter. Creation, since it is composed entirely
of activity, is not a passive mirror of the soul caused by the soul's own act of
reflection into which it can narcissistically fall, as for Plotinus. In Gregory's writings,
reflection involves no such inevitable establishment of a separate and lower reflecting
surface apart from those self-rebounding rays of light themselves. Hence as we have
seen, for Gregory not only can the soul be a pure mirror, also it is only thus as an
aspect of the wider mirror which is the Church, the Body of Christ, eschatologically
co-terminous with the redeemed cosmos: 'in her [the Bride] they see more clearly that
which is invisible. It is like men who are unable to look upon the sun, yet can see by
its reflection in the water. So the friends of the Bridegroom see the Sun of Justice by
looking upon the face of the Church as though it were a pure mirror, and thus He can
be seen by His reflection.'
This makes it possible to conclude that whereas earlier antiquity embraced the
civic compromise of action governing passions, and Plotinus the apolitical retreat into
a pure activity of the soul without windows, Gregory discovers the body and society
as a site of pure activity, or of manifestation of the absolute, and even  in
Christological terms  its full and unconcealed presence (the Hegelian echo is
deliberate).
Finally, I think that Gregory was right. When we defend pathos we tend to
make pity and suffering ontologically ultimate. Endless continued pity is an insult to
the pitied, offers them no good gift and pretends to rob them of their own suffering.
Likewise the prospect of endlessly continued suffering tends to make us construe
virtue reactively, and to imagine a restricting response to a preceding evil as the
highest virtue. This dethrones Charity, which presupposes nothing, much less evil,
before its gratuitous giving (or at most the recipients of gifts with and as a primordial
giving, as in the case of the Trinity). In contrast with aspects of later Christianity,
there is little that could be construed as a cult of weakness in Gregory, and he roundly
declares that it is no more praiseworthy to be fearful than to be foolhardy, or to suffer
than to enjoy merely temporary pleasure. This robustly objective sense of sin is
perhaps now more noticeable and appreciable for an intellectual climate informed by
Spinoza and Nietzsche than it was for a certain sickly version of Christian
Hegelianism, exalting pathos and dialectical negativity, which has persisted from the
nineteenth century into the late twentieth.

(Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, Edited by Lewis

Ayres and Gareth Jones, Routledge, 1998. Page 94 - 109)

Well, that was absolute misery. Never let it be said that I am not prepared to
suffer for my art. They say Mein Kampf is turgid stuff to read, well believe me, as
dreary as it is, it is a sheer joy replete with sublime comprehensibility and reason
compared to this kind of demented rambling on the subject of nothing. Absolute, but
not total misery. I did begin to derive some pleasure from this piece as I found some
very fine approximations to the scientific model of experience mirrored in this
mythological account, as when Milbank elaborates on the meaning of interiority.

What to make of it then! I mean, what on earth is going on here? The first
thing a scientist must do upon being confronted with something like this, is to ask
what this animal is doing. We are not here to judge this work, we are not here to be
repulsed, revolted, or even delighted, these feelings we may have in various measure,
but feelings are of no relevance to understanding the subject, which is human nature.
Why would an organism behave in this way, seeking to communicate such
nonsensical ideas, it makes no obvious sense? What does Dr Milbank think he is
doing? He is like the proverbial person in a straightjacket hunched up in an empty
cell padded with white cloth, holding a conversation with a black cat sat in the
opposite corner.

'Therefore one may surmise that, for Gregory, although God does not
suffer, he nonetheless cannot be outside neutral, sinless suffering as it occurs
in time, else he would suffer it as outside himself, as it occurs in time (of
course he does not suffer the real suffering that is sin, since this is sheer non-
being).'

Pardon? Does anyone understand this, could anyone understand this? Is it

possible the author could actually tell us, in intelligible language, what this means.

'A further relevant consideration regards Gregory's general account of

the relation of God to the creation. Although, he says, the mind cannot
comprehend the incomprehensible, the incomprehensible can
incomprehensibly be mirrored in our mind. For were the incomprehensible to
be simply outside the comprehensible, it would be limited by the
comprehensible (or circumscribable) and would therefore no longer be
incomprehensible (here Gregory is alert to what we should today think of as
set paradox; this is an aspect of his superseding of philosophical dialectic).'

The mind cannot comprehend the incomprehensible; Never, you don't say?
Well fancy that, but wait for it, we are about to find out that it can! Or it can,
apparently, if your name is Gregory. Otherwise how come he is telling us about it?
This piece of genius is an aspect of superseding the dialectic. Wow! Is it indeed, well
isn't that a blessing! And what is that when it is at home? I have come across this
word dialectic so much over the years, first in association with Marx. It has always
absolutely confounded me, I even found a simple definition of it once that satisfied
me that I knew what it meant, I know I did; but I'm fucked if I know what it was now,
and I just do not care. What a shit word, if there was ever a shit word, that is it,
dialectic! Just makes me think of diarrhoea, of the brain. I just hit the dictionary
button, you do not want to know what it said, stick with shit, it is the only meaning
you will ever need for this word. Try it, whenever you come across dialectic just
insert shit, and see if it is not universally illuminating. Lets do it now:

this is an aspect of his superseding of philosophical shit.

There you go, worked perfectly, now the whole sentence makes perfect sense, at last.
Philosophy, I swear, these dangerous nutters want locking up. You would not mind if
they were actually talking about something real, something that you wanted to learn
about. But that is not the case, they are spinning yarn from the linguistic loom to
make a cloak of invisible thread fit for a king to wear, or, as they like to have it, fit to
dress up a divine being.
Never mind the king parading in his suit of invisible clothes, these wizards
want to pass off a nonexistent being, wearing as invisible suit of clothes! And they do
too. Language, a marvellous ting it is to be sure.
 Except they don't do they? What is this animal doing? We know. They are
dressing up the superorganism, which most definitely does exist, in a suit of clothes
which they themselves wear. And while these priests of deceit weave themselves a
fine cloak of many colours they spin a monotonous thread of no hue at all to clothe
the rest of us in, and they insist that we wear the uniform they have produced to
enslave us. To effect this act of abuse they spin away. Words that suggest debasing
oneself to authority are unsavoury, so they spin imitations of these brutal phrases, like
sacred gift of belief, and make submission to their nasty divine authority, in this way,
some sort of nice thing to do. They do this because it works, people accept it. Then
they write interminable sheets about their idiotic nonsense, what is a book supposed to
be about that is called On the Soul and Resurrection? There is no such thing as a
soul, and there is most certainly no such thing as resurrection. But here these priests
are spinning their yarn. It is as if someone had heard of mud pies and decided to write
a book about the Culinary Art of Mud Baking, in which they included chapters on the
nutrition of mud, the famous people who only ate mud, and the joys of mud in all its
forms. Forgetting to bother trying mud for themselves, and thereby failing to
appreciate that actually, you cannot eat mud.
As irritating as all this is, we are relieved of our frustration by having
discovered exactly what is going on, why people want to devote their lives to this kind
of effort, and, more to the point, why this art of idiocy is a supreme source of power.
In this piece of priestcraft we see the function of language in all its glory, concerned
with nothing of any substance, it is used simply to weave a pattern of information that
can be transmitted throughout the organism to achieve uniformity of identity, and all
that necessarily goes with it in terms of purpose, in exactly the same way a queen
termite or ant beams a pheromone message to all her dependants, and for exactly the
same reason. Such creatures as ants and humans share a common nature, just as bats
and birds, or whales and fish share a common nature. I am contrasting mammalian
forms with their comparative general forms for the purpose of indicating that if you
want to know the nature of a creature you do not look to its nearest evolutionary
ancestor, as directed by Darwin's perverse theory of evolution, you look to other
creatures with the same functional attributes, evolved to be adapted to the same
physical environment, in this case, ants and humans to the social environment brought
into being by the evolution of their own general physiological form, air for bats and
birds, and water for whales and fish.

'This same similarity and yet contrast is seen with respect to

interpsychic relations in both thinkers. For Plotinus, the souls in the
intellectual realm fully penetrate each other, so that greater interiority implies
simultaneously a greater spatial ecstasis.'

What about that? This is a delightful example of language without meaning,

pure linguistic colour, perfect linguistic transparency. We see the words, we can read
them, but our mind feels no response when it touches them. It is as if you see a door
and reach out to touch it, only to see your hand pass through the pastel coloured hue
with which its panels are painted. Conversely, of course, this linguistic pheromone
does connect with a brain appropriately attuned via a deeply penetrating linguistic
programme, an ideology that imprints an identity upon its neural pathways expressly
to fulfil the purpose of attaching the individual to a corporate being via a linguistic
identity implant. An identity implant that linguistic physiology evolved to deliver in
order to make a superorganic mammalian form a reality. And we might note while
comparing a piece of theosophy with insect pheromones in this manner, as examples
of identity implants, that there are slave maker ants that raid nests and take pupae
back to their own nest where, upon hatching, they absorb the biochemical message of
the host nest and thus as captives their identity absorbing physiology becomes
imprinted with an alien master identity, and so they become slaves from the inside
out. The enslaved ant, just like the enslaved Christian or Muslim, simply has no idea
who they are, a most odd idea, but as real as real can be. The master ants in these
symbiotic relationships have evolved to be incapable of feeding themselves, they must
make slaves of other species in order to live. This pattern of behaviour is mirrored
exactly in human behaviour. Jews, as a people, have evolved to be incapable of
supporting themselves, as we discussed earlier their culture evolved to be a refined
master identity capable of living without a body of its own and of being transferable
from one host superorganism to another. Jews must make slaves of human
superorganisms by implanting them with an alien identity, a variation on their own
identity, and how this works is a central facet of this work. In biological terms this is
a symbiotic process, but in political language, Jewish language, designed to hide or
confuse the true nature of the relationship, this is about slavery of individuals by
individuals, hence I use this familiar terminology freely, but while not losing sight of
the dispassionate reality of the phenomenon we are discussing. As a scientist of
human nature one needs to be fluently bilingual in both theistic and scientific speak.
An individual can only know what a linguistic pulse, like the exert included
above, means if it has been inducted into the aura the emitted pulse conforms to. Just
as you can only know what being black means if you are black, or what being white
means, if you are white, in, that is, a world where racial colour still carries meaning,
as it originally evolved to do, meaning of identity. Aura, in this case, can be thought
of in general terms as culture, in more specific terms as language, and in yet more
specific terms still, as a particular ideology. An individual is bathed in an aura of
identity by these various mediums of corporate identity, so that a black person will
periodically find themselves exposed, in a European country, to negative vibes which
a white person will never experience, and toward which the indigenous Caucasian
will thus remain virtually oblivious, other than in terms of an intellectual appreciation
of the matter which is made possible by the evolution of language, which then goes on
to deliver a 'racial' medium of corporate identity linguistically, which is why language
replaces genes as the expressive medium of corporate form, the outer form of the
animal.
The same discussion may be had concerning a Moslem living in a European
country, except the negative nature of the experience of a black person will be
reversed into a positive experience, because the Moslem is carrying a cultural
implement of identity which evolution has produced to act as a continuum of racial
identity, in the evolutionary progress of the superorganic form. Moslems will
experience a warmth of identity from the fact that they live in enclaves that are highly
differentiated by pseudo racial attributes, such as distinctive places of worship, and
women dressed in extremely alien attire, relative to the host culture. But overall they
will be at home in the Christian culture which has brought them into Europe as part of
the ongoing advance of Zionism toward an occupation of the entire planet in accord
with the dictates of Nature. Thus we see how these identity mediums serve to aid in
the delineation of superorganic physiology by organising the biomass into dynamic
structures. Meanwhile, in conformity to the sociologist's dictum that we are unaware
of that which we are attuned to, each individual is oblivious to their own identity aura,
taking it for granted as long as it is present, while being acutely aware of those pseudo
racial auras of any other kind, if they are expressed overtly, as with Moslems, Jews,
Sikhs, Hindus, Catholics; when they wear their ethnic regalia.
In the supposed ideal society, each person wears their own regalia as a
personal statement, and all are so dispersed as to make a perfect amalgam, where Jew
may be seen with Sikh, and Moslem with Catholic. But that is like imagining that
because there are robins, blackbirds, doves, and starlings in the garden, that the
different species are going to swap partners indifferently, a completely mad idea.
Religious regalia means as much in human organisms as species identity does in any
other animal populations, if it did not, it would mean nothing, and then religious
regalia would not exist.
I selected this last fragment from Milbank and said it was meaningless, then I
read carefully the next paragraph only to find he explains some of the issues here, and
this is the best bit of the piece. Here we see the idea of hierarchy being discussed in
relation to the complex organization unity into one whole entity that thereby requires
a command structure. Everything I am striving to write about is trying to make
people understand that this is what society is. And here we have someone talking
about this idea in a theological treatise on some long dead Christian mythologist.
This indicates that within the Jewish mythology the essence of reality was infused,
and this is exactly what we should expect to find, it is another theoretical point I make
often. I usually make it in the opposite direction when I discuss the basis of
mythology as being dualistic where form is split from nature, or essence, and then
science gets to discuss form, but never nature and religion is therefore free to possess
the discussion of what essence is. And now, because we are actually considering a
religious text, something I rarely do, we see the method displayed directly in what
may be called its positive manner, as it is intended to result in a free hand for theists
to continue to say what reality is in an ultimate sense. And we can therefore
appreciate just why it is that if a true application of scientific ideas is permitted then
religion must be expunged from existence for then science takes over religion's
domain by deciding the meaning of essence. A further point to mention in passing, is
that in reading this mythological account of reality we find ourselves reminded of the
earlier piece we looked at by our esoteric author Ouspensky, who also wrote and
thought in this mystical vein, where language delivers ideas about inner meaning in a
secretive manner.
And what this shows, above all else, is that these knowledge perverts are
seeking power, and obtaining it, by using a linguistic means of controlling knowledge.
They have not the slightest interest in knowledge as knowledge, they only want to
stroke their inflated egos by acquiring power expressed in the most arrogant possible
manner. If this were not the case then they would welcome new insights which
destroy the social structures they are part of. This reveals the central role of
knowledge in the construction of society, and why Knowledge is Power. Not personal
power, but social power, and from this fact personal power can be derived by
association. Were personal power real then a powerful person could express
themselves anyway they choose. This is never possible, Tony Blair cannot just say
anything he likes, no politician can. Politicians appear to be immensely powerful
people, but make one false step, out of keeping with the requirements of the authority
they represent, and they are done for. Think of what happened to Robert Kilroy-Silk,
the famous television presenter, just a couple of months ago, when he said something
which was not grovelling toward Moslems, after years of service to the BBC, he was
dumped like a red hot coal. The power invoked by powerful people is not theirs, that
is why politicians are such vile liars whom we all despise intensely. And knowledge
is a direct product of language, so having woven their web of deceit these priests then
build a material structure, the Church, the universal body of Islam, whatever, and this
constitutes the exoskeleton of the organism we all find ourselves born into.

I was only drawn to go to all the trouble of accurately rendering this particular
piece of theological verbiage because it dropped in my lap, so to speak, the other
week, and the subtitle of this piece, The Force of Identity, is most appealing. We
must bear in mind that in recognising the true nature of human nature identity is
catapulted to the highest order of known phenomena, in respect to our nature. It is for
this reason that, observing our species from the greatest possible degree of
circumspection, so I see the whole being, I end up by using the single agnomen
Jewish to name the globalising superorganism that we are part of. Which leads me to
name all people who call themselves Jewish, Christian or Moslem, as simply Jewish,
for this is, from a scientific, or specifically biological point of view, if you prefer,
exactly what they are.
Thus the force of identity is absolutely critical in the discussion of what
human nature is, indeed this is the exact problem with applying science to humanity,
it allows us to recognise what we are and thus to discern our identity unambiguously,
and this makes science smash into the ancient ways of knowing, as Comte would of
thought of them, in no uncertain terms, like matter meeting anti-matter. Only in this
case I like to think that one of the opposite particles of knowledge could survive,
although, this has not proved to be the case, as we have seen, and it may not be
possible, this, human corporate nature, may be the limit of the human capacity to
know existence, I can write about it, but it cannot be known. Because if it is known
God is dead, religion is obliterated, and what then? And people object to the
scientific encroachment upon the interpretation of human nature on precisely these
grounds. In Mackenzie's Biological Ideas in Politics he gives us a summary of the
kind of objections made against science, and one of them is that applying biology to
society means the death of God. Mackenzie, being a good priest, refutes this. He
uses the dualistic model of comprehension and so thinks of humans as individuals,
and thus makes out that religion is about a personal search for understanding. Which
he says has never been thwarted by knowledge and need never be, which conclusion,
if the premise were true, that religion has no meaning beyond a personal requirement
for a conception of existence, would be true; but no person could possibly even begin
to accept such an idea, unless they were completely and utterly robotised, as this
excellent professor of political science evidently is.
Identity is at the very heart of the problem, not so much because the sheep
who cannot think for themselves need an identity to latch onto, which thereby delivers
a programme of obedience to an authority, that in turn makes society possible. But
rather because the people who fight for supremacy need, as we see so clearly see in
this piece written by Milbank about Gregory, an identity to fix upon in order to direct
their sense of right action, even though all that they think is utter madness in itself.
The masters rely upon the transmission of authority that has gone before them. And
we see at one point that this aspect of 'wisdom' being passed from one generation to
another is mentioned. Theology is not first and foremost about sense, but rather it is,
above all, about identity, so that theology delivers organic continuity at the corporate
level of existence, as it applies to a linguistically empowered superorganic species,
such as humans are. Sense is there, coded into the identity message, this is what we
are seeking to root out and comprehend, in a biological context. This is why identity
is so important to the Jews, their being the core identity in the pantheon of the
hierarchical identity structure. Jews are ferocious about identity, if they were not they
would not have the history of survival against conflict with others, that we all know so
well. And the huge wall they are building right now upon land robbed from a crushed
and brutally abused people, is just the latest display of the supreme arrogance of
Judaism, of which this piece by Milbank reeks, for who but the most supremely
arrogant of people could ever make like an intellectual over such drivel  only a
naked king displaying his fine suit of clothes could get away with such deeply
offensive behaviour. Gregory, as revealed in this piece, is a naked king, a man of
supreme arrogance, vanity, and ignorance; a typical Jew in other words, in the
tradition of Moses, Jesus, Mohammed (whether or not Mohammed preceded
Gregory), and Milbank is just acting as one more carrier in the biological chain of
linguistic information transmission. (Jew includes Christian, as it does Moslem)
Certainly from this last noted point of view, the piece quoted above is deeply
disturbing to a civilised and moral being, such as myself, and to anyone who cares
about the truth and sees humanity's best interests as being served by the truth, and life
as only being worth living when the truth is freely available. Truth, truth in the sense
of a positive foundation to knowledge in the Comtian sense, is synonymous with
morality; no religious person can be moral by definition, therefore. To be religious is
the supreme act of immorality, if we must reduce knowledge to a functional base,
which, I guess, at some stage, cannot be avoided, and which, regretfully, does, finally,
validate my being called a philosopher; since I am, here, making a political ideology,
an ideology of truth based on science, arise from a neutral knowledge base. It cannot
be helped. But I must acknowledge even as I do this, that there is no such thing as
morality, and hence, no such thing as immorality. But there are social forces that
these terms of moral definition refer to, and it is necessary to engage with the struggle
to control these forces if you want to promote science against religion, thus one is
obliged to use the lingo of priests sometimes, in order to do battle with priests.
But since the truth, a Comtian pantheon of truth, is not freely available, and never has
been, and almost certainly will never be, we must ask why we might be so fixated
upon the idea that it should be. Theologians are fixated upon the truth because, like
all professional liars, it is vital that people see what they say as being sacred in its
representation of the truth. But why should someone like myself care? Because I
have grown up in the poisoned world of the priest, where I have learnt that speaking
the truth is a sacred duty, and I absorbed the idea, and liked it, only in me the idea
backfired, I was too daft to see we were not meant to take it seriously. The truth was
only meant to serve a purpose, as long as we were getting what we wanted from what
we said then, like a carpenter getting a good fit between two pieces of wood, we had
the truth in our grasp. The fact is that knowledge does not exist to please our senses.
Knowledge has a strictly functional role to play in the life of humans, and the free
display of absolute truth is not part of that functional role. Language did not evolve in
order that we could know that the earth went about the sun. People like Machiavelli
have set the record straight on that score, and we all know it well enough, but what
about a scientific explanation of knowledge's function. The fact is that knowledge
serves to build structure, and that structure is organic, even though we call it social.
This organic form generated by linguistic information must be imbued with an
identity, because it constitutes a living organism, and that identity cannot be rendered
as truth, for that is like saying that a persons physiological identity is rendered in the
same manner as their physiological form. Which would just mean that naming
something was the same as stating the truth, which it is not, otherwise we could say,
for example, that a leg is true  which is a meaningless thing to say.
 Truth then is not an attribute of things, it is an attribute of language, but truth
in language is derived from its approximation to the things it pretends to be. However
it is not a primary function of language to relay truth. Rather, the primary function of
language is to relay meaning, and meaning is not necessarily true, although, in certain
very rarely encountered circumstances, it can be. The word God is replete with
meaning, but it is in no sense true, quite the opposite in fact. A teenager today may
say a friend is 'cool' because they have done something they admire. Clearly the word
'cool' is replete with meaning, but it is in no sense true, since the true meaning of this
word has nothing to do with the actual meaning in this context. If it was true that
their friend was cool then they would be cold relative to a comfortable condition for a
human being to be in. We do not normally struggle to ensure our words are true, we
usually try to convey meaning, and the meaning we wish to convey is usually
determined by purpose. There will be a logic to the purposeful use of the world cool
to convey admirable, but we will not go into that. Striving to convey truth, in
subservience to meaning, is almost a pathological behaviour, except in relation to a
very narrowly focused band of activities which concern the manipulation of, would
you believe it, material. Thus we find a natural delineation between linguistic usage
and the world, such that language divides dualistically between material form and
social purpose, where truth relates to form in a very precise way, but not at all to
meaning, and meaning relates to purpose, but not at all to form. And from these
linguistic foundations we can be sure the habit of fabricating mythology, that is the art
of priestcraft, evolved. Linguistic expression therefore naturally divides into
expressing form and expressing meaning. Both modes of expression produce their
own modes of knowledge, and thus edifices of knowledge accrue into distinct cultural
forms, one material, one purposeful. Traces of this dualistic expression are found in
the earliest evidence of our kind, so the material culture of stone tools from thirty
thousand years ago displays a high degree of material sophistication using true words
to know the subject, and the cave paintings of the time show a deep sense of purpose
which must of been carried by a sophisticated language of social meaning, just as
Greg's nonsense carries to this today. In the modern age this can be rendered in
Comte's terms as the ancient way of understanding that is mythological, and the
modern which is scientific. Means versus purposes. And it is easy to see how all the
dynamics of social conflict between the two areas, which is so central to the subject of
this work, arise from this basic linguistic division between ways of knowing the
material world, and ways of living in it. It also follows that this dualism has always
been with us, and we must suppose it always will be. We must suppose therefore, that
the vying between the two that is revealed by the historical record, portrays an
information feedback loop between the superorganism and the environment it
occupies. So we should not lose our hair over this conflict situation, we most
certainly should not allow ourselves to be suckered into a world war of a most
insidious kind in the name of religion, and we must learn to come to terms with the
conceptual repercussions of new material knowledge, and the hard lessons of truth
that this new knowledge forces upon our deeply held sense of meaning.
Truth is truth, and meaning is meaning, and ne'er the twain shall meet; and
that is because truth and meaning have their origins in a state of unity which they
themselves divided in two when they evolved from the behaviour of a creature that
had, until that time, been without a consciousness fuelled by the ability to
communicate linguistically, a behaviour which gave rise to truth and meaning as
linguistic representations of experience.
*
 The beauty of examining a piece such as the above is that it is densely packed
with material relevant to our area of concern, human nature. And one of the things
that is so obvious about the centrality of identity in the guise of religion is that it is not
simply a matter of delivering an identity consistently, the content of the ideas
associated with the identity is of maximum importance. And so upon examining the
detail of the mythology which carries a linguistic identity implant, we would expect to
see features that are closely allied to a true scientific appraisal of human nature. And
this is exactly what we find here, thus we see the power of Judaism, expressed in
Gregory as he concerns himself with obscure features of the dogma such as gift as
contrasted with being. Now this means nothing to me, Milbank tells us these
categories are drawn from two major schools of mythological fabrication, theology
and philosophy, both of which are extremely repugnant to me, and neither of which I
have the least desire to get to know in so intimate a sense that I could hope to
understand what is being said here, I would as soon watch a game of football, a TV
soap, an episode of Big Brother, or listen to some music, read some poetry or fiction,
as I would waste my time and brain ache on such mush.
But we are here doing science, studying the behaviour of an animal, of which
this theological exert is a prime example, and so we only need to discern what this
behaviour means from a biological point of view as informed by what we know of the
organism's nature. Why would Gregory, as a unit of superorganic physiology, in
common with Milbank, and a billion others down the ages, of devoted their lives to
such stuff, what are they doing? We cannot make sense of this on a personal level
since the ideas being dealt with here are pure, unadulterated nonsense, so we must
strive to make sense of why these animals behave this way in terms of beneficial
outcomes for the organism their existence sustains. This we can easily do, for it is by
behaving in this idiotic ways, on an individual level, that units are put in touch with
the life form they evolved to be part of. We are teasing out what they doing, we are
acknowledging that telling the truth is not the function of language, and this particular
facet of linguistic behaviour, theological rumination, is especially concerned with the
creation of the identity of the organism. As such it is fair to say, that, rubbish or not,
vile, offensive ignorance, parading itself as master and divine, or not, this subject
matter is, without question, exactly what these theologians and philosophers, from a
scientific point of view, take it to be, it is of the most supreme importance to the
existence of the life form of which they are a part. This theology says who we are,
and whoever is involved in saying this, in delivering the message, is the person with
power. Such persons do not exist as lone individuals and the connection between the
chain of ideas is at the heart of this passage by Milbank, but because of the important
role these units of superorganic physiology play in the very being of the organism
there is a powerful reward for the individual, and it is this that can be seen to justify
the behaviour at the individual level, although it appears that human individuals are
evolved to act as robots that revive a programme that predetermines their behaviour
and this physiology of then individual explains the compliance with the requirements
of the organism as much as anything.
All of which almost seems to place me alongside that wonderful sociologist
Berger, who I so aggressively denounced for going to the trouble of declaring the true
state of affairs only to dismiss it when he finished, without so much as a word of
explanation, that made sense. I have no intention of making that mistake, we can
have our cake and eat it, we can revile theology and philosophy, and make it the
supreme expression of importance. If this duality were not part of experience then
there would not be the conflict between science and religion that there is. What does
this conflict come down to? The propagandists tell us there is no war between
religion and science because the two are quite distinct, since religion is not amenable
to scientific investigation. I read in some bumf from the Open University the other
day that there is no question of seeking to consider religion from a scientific point of
view. Well is that so! Arrogant pigs!! You just cannot get away with this. The trick
is passed off only by suppressing the advancement of science and by perverting
science from its very foundations up, this is the whole point that I have been trying to
express all through this work. It is one or the other, science or religion, and I have
shown how, when we have a true conception of human nature, all the stupid problems
faced by the so-called anthropologists, just melt away, but also, how this causes all
theology to melt away too. And we can easily see why this should be the case when
we look at the kind of drivel these theological philosophers spew about the place. All
the points of close approximation in Gregory's deranged reasoning, to the scientific
ideas we have discovered in the study of humans as animals, show that this whole
charade of Gregory's effort to intuit God's being and mind, so to speak, comes to
nothing, for science can state precisely what God's mind is, because there is no God,
all there is is an organism and its behaviour can be understood as the behaviour of any
organism can be understood, in relation to its form and its context. God's being is the
superorganism, and God's mind is the behavior of that organism. And what these
philosopher theologians are doing when they devote their lives to this kind of
miserable account of God, is seeking after the knowledge that today can be derived
from science, but only by giving up religion. I have no quarrel with the past, I might
admire the theology of the past as the route by which we came to the present, but as
the past hangs around our necks like a concrete block on a hood's victim, I do object.
There can be only one, either a free humanity, or a Jewish master race, I know what I
want, what do you want?
I look at my world today, the country I grew up in as an Englishman,
destroyed. Where I had hope of a free society, free of religious bigotry, I now see
only the misery of oppression ahead. Yesterday, 9/07/04, we saw on television a host
of Moslems, abject slaves of what is surely the most vile of all ideologies on earth,
brimming with vitality and arrogance in our once free land, like brutes who know
their power and strength, truly something humanity should be up in arms against,
wallowing in their sickening adoration for a cleric who was visiting this land to
preach his degenerate creed, the creed of Judaism. But who should we hate when we
see our world being destroyed in this way, should we hate the Moslems who we revile
for their ignorance, violence, and pathetic slavish ways? Or should we hate the
Christians who are the slaves of Judaism, and who have acted according to their slave
implant in bringing this disgusting plague to these islands? Thanks to the Christian
fascists who rule this land a new law is proposed to make inciting religious hatred a
crime. Of course this is intended to do one thing, to silence, by fear, the voice of
English people, people who live in the name of freedom, not slavery, like the slave of
the Jews and their God, followers of the ideology of ignorance. Well silence me you
bastards!
Hate for people is certainly no interest of mine, hate for sick ideologies that
enslave people's minds and bodies, that concerns me. No one asks the Jews to be
Jews, they make their choice, according to their own account, I presume, whatever
branch of the tribe they come from. In truth it is not the fault of the individual, or
even the society of Moslems, that they are cowed by their slave implant, this is the
product of the priesthood who have brought these people here after the war they
launched to destroy the old fabric of Europe, after having used colonialism to wreak
havoc on the rest of the world. Moslems were brought here to do exactly what
Muslims are doing, to make a new society, more integrated, more powerful altogether
superior to any society that has ever existed under the rule of Judaism before. Fine if
you happen to think living in the name of a delusion is a good thing. So we might
wonder, who should we hate, the malaria that kills us, or the mosquito that injects us
with the disease in the act of sucking our blood? It is our Christian master slaves, the
likes of Blunkett and Blair, that have acted as the vector for Islam. But this behaviour
is only natural, any good natural science of humanity could of foretold this result. I
could of foreseen the main planks of twentieth century world history in Comte's day,
if I had been around then, and of realised the true nature of human nature. So, the
answer is, that while we inevitably hate this vile creed, in all its manifestations, and
the vectors that carry it and poison our world, to hate beyond frustration is silly, this is
nature, the human animal being the human animal that nature made it to be. How else
would we have it? Well, somehow I do not think we will get the chance to consider
the matter, and find out how else it might be. We are stuck with these damned theists,
their infernal wars, slavish ignorance, and the world they give rise to of Men Like
Machines. Echoes of Ouspensky, as we get closer to those ants, lost, hear my lone
voice, crying in the wilderness, as our kind descend into ignorance and misery; the
light beckons as the clouds roll in.

But to think of this society as acting by a force of oppression would be an

error, the proposed law is a normal, if tragic sort of social legislation, and yet it is not
needed to inhibit free speech, there is no such thing as free speech, in any meaningful
sense when it comes to what I have to say. I am not constrained by an external force
of oppression, I am constrained by an internal force of dependence. It is not that I
cannot say the tings that I am expressing a desire to say now, it is that there is no one
to hear me. You cannot speak if no one listens, and it is really the total lack of
interest that anyone has in hearing the truth, the absolute love everyone has for
nonsense, this is the force of oppression, it is a natural feature of our kind, an attribute
of a linguistic creature. Because language did no evolve to deliver unadulterated
aimless information, just delivered for information's sake, language evolved to delver
superorganic form, to deliver structure, and that is what it does. For language to
function in this way there has to be a built in constraint on what people say, what
people hear, and this is what is at the heart of this work, the boundary between what
we can say, set by what linguistic structure says we can hear.
The dynamic of linguistic information transfer I am describing is encapsulated
in one of Aesop's fables, about the struggle between the wind and the sun to see who
is the stronger. A man is selected and the wind set to trying to force him to remove
his coat but the harder the wind blows the tighter then man holds on, the sun comes
out and burns, the man takes his coat of. This is the inner force of compliance that
characterises the manner in which social conformity operates. But I have to say I
think it is mighty impressive that nature can produce an animal such as ourselves with
all our intelligence and thirst for knowledge and yet imbued with an absolute
constraint on our desire to know which can be perfectly controlled without any overt
command to do so. The heat of the burning sun, in the social context, comes from the
sheer dependence of everyone upon the system, you want to eat, to mate, to party, to
enjoy honour, lots of social things which must be desired with a passion and worked
for with intense, life long commitment. This absolute dependence is the ceaseless
force of silence imposed on the individual, and it is implicit that as the force of
dependence must come from an inner core, controlling the delivery of rewards, so the
acceptable image of the known must come from the same source and it is carried on
the same message, the message says what to do, work, play, mate, do this, do that, and
at the same time it colours the message, we this, we are that, it is thus.
We are coming up to an interesting time in our species lifecycle, a time I think
we can say is unique in the challenge it posses. The global organism is here, the
limits of growth are set. They may not really bite for another thousand years, nut we
can visualise the time coming when the impulse of human nature to expand to occupy
all territory is blocked by the end of territory. And it is this prospect, as a conceptual
limitation, that is relieved by our advance into space in search of new territory to
occupy. A Channel Four programme called Equinox, first broadcast five years ago on
19 July 1999, was entitled What Shall we do with the Moon? I bought the book of
the series from the library last week and the subtitle to this programme was .........
searching for a future for the human race ........ In other words what we are seeing
here in this need for a conception of our own existence as unbounded is an expression
of our very nature, our corporate nature that evolved in those woods ten million years
ago to make us into a being that would occupy territory, and here are, done and
dusted, we have occupied the whole damn lot! So what is the next job you have for
us Mother Nature?
We only have one programme, it is built into our physical being, we are a
superorganic species, and we grow, like bacteria, until we can grow no more, then we
find a new way to grow, so we can grow, until we can grow no more, and then ......
This is it, this is all of it, and there is nothing we can do about it. If we cannot grow
outwards, then we grow inwards, we fold over upon ourselves, we find new ways to
increase our density, this is what the people of the third world bring to this territory,
an ability to live in absolute squalor and to thrive. A house was raided in Liverpool
last week, today is 10/07/04, in the wake of the Chinese cockle picking tragedy when
23 Chinese died in Morecambe bay while trying to pick cockles in the dark, the locals
had said forty people were living in this house. This practice of packing properties
with ten times the number of people we would expect to occupy a house is something
the Pakistanis were famous for in the seventies. Islam seems to be an identity implant
that serves to compact people more densely even as it inspires them to be positive
about their lives. Islam is the perfect slave identity, and as such it represents an
alternative to going to the moon, and this is why it is so powerful and is destined to be
the main identity in the world of tomorrow.
Whatever you may make of the ideas I am setting out here you can see that
derived from my firm conception of what the human animal is we get to discern
certain fixed realities about the animal and so we can interpret what we see in a
consistent way. Thus we recognise a social theme, growth, and we relate it to cultural
ideas, such as escape into space, and then we relate it to a more earthy phenomenon of
emigration, immigration, and the different qualities of macro identities defining the
main population masses where shifts take place. From this we get a self delivering
image of the future arising out of the theory unbeckoned, this is the prevision Comte's
law of scientific knowledge indicated any scientific mode of reasoning should deliver
to us. Is the image of the future I offer correct, only time will tell, but it would be a
brave person that sought to disagree, who would really say that the shift toward global
migration and the shift toward the dispersal and consolidation of Islam into the West
is, if a mark of the recent past, not a part of the future? Only a liar or a fool would
deny this prospect of our future, but, there are very good reasons for lying because
this description is manna from heaven for the people the theists call fascists.
 In terms of the character of the identities which enable a reconstruction of the
biomass, such as Islam, and in the past Christianity was to the fore in this process and
still has an important role to play in the intensification of the biomass and the
reorganisation of its structure, a most important feature is the sense of future prospect
it delivers to the implantee, and it is therefore of great significance that these identity
programmes deliver a sense of future that even transcends death, as incredible as this
must be to any, at least semi-conscious, half sane, human being. While on the one
hand the planet itself sets a limit on the ability of the superorganism to grow which
forces it to evolve new linguistic programmes to increase structural complexity in the
biomass, this basic feature of physical environment s must of been a factor throughout
the history of human growth since the evolution of an open terrestrial form came
about, we must assume therefore that it was just this factor that drove the evolution of
language toward a form in which it could induce humans to sustain ever more
complex social structures, in the process language became symbolic and a true
superorganic form, our form, evolved.
This discussion of the nature of humans in relation to the physical
environment they evolved to exist within, all terrestrial environments that is, indicates
that just as the prime function of symbolic language is to deliver an expansive
exogenous consciousness facilitating an internal augmentation of structural form
supporting a denser biomass, so by its very nature ideas that tend to set limits on these
conceptions of infinity, such as a recognition of the reality of heavenly bodies in
ancient Greece, or the recognition of human nature in nineteenth century Europe, are
an inherent threat to this essential quality of human consciousness that language
evolved to deliver. And this is as close as I can get to a description why the reaction
we see to the discovery of true knowledge, mounted openly by the priesthood, but
supported intuitively by all, even by scientists, should be the norm feature of our
species relation to the advancement knowledge. Thus I reduce the act of opposition to
the truth to a functional mode of behaviour in the context of the superorganic being
which we are.
However, in the end the truth is something more than an image in the eye of
the beholder. In Mackenzie's book Biological Ideas in Politics I read the other day
his assertion that our searching for the ideas of our origins that has given rise to
Darwinism and anthropology and such like, is a feature of our times, not some
detached intellectual occupation. I agree, this says something about the stage of
growth of our being, our superorganism. This knowledge reflects the limit against
which we find ourselves pressing at this time, therefore the boundary is there, it must
be dealt with. we have just seen that there is more than one way to deal with a
boundary, we can cross it, or we can adjust to the imposition of containment, and
most likely both strategies will work together intermittently. I am saying that while
the mythologies present an infinite consciousness that is functional to the growth of
the superorganism, the true conception of reality that has become known as science,
delivers a fixed boundary, sets a limit. The one induces growth, the other induces
adjustment. The knowledge I am offering is correct, and as such it offers an
alternative strategy to that of the infinite fiction of mythology, accepting it should not
be a cause of depression and decay, it should be a means of reconstruction that takes
into account the extraordinary position we find ourselves in today as find ourselves up
against one of the most cussed physical boundaries we have yet had to face in our
relentless growth induced by the medium of linguistic information delivering a sense
of the infinite, and how to occupy it. The physical boundary will give way, I suppose,
but it is an awesome boundary, and if it gives way it will be a fabulous thing to
behold, and it will take time, maybe five thousand years to make much headway, we
cannot just plough on with the sense of infinity we have courtesy of the infinite myths
of theology if we are facing such time gaps between our present urge to grow and the
next great opportunity to do so. But I pull a figure out a hat when I say that we might
have to think of five thousand years ahead, still that is what time span has been
required between the formulation of Zionism in the middle east and its culmination in
the global organism today, focused on Jerusalem, exactly as predicted by the
mythologists whose very words made it happen.

I do not know whether to laugh or cry when I read this mind numbing stuff
and think that people take this shit seriously. How about this discussion concerning
the act of generation between the God and Jesus where these gits are trying to figure
out how it works! Can you believe it, its as if termites are trying to work out how the
house they are busy consuming timber plank by timber plank is designed and
constructed. Termites cannot reason thus, humans can, but this is what they do with
it.
As scientists we must accept that we find ourselves transported, by birth, into
this alien world, where all is strange and weird. The first scientists of humanity went
out into the world and looked and interpreted. They saw behaviour that was
comparable to our own social forms and thus ritual and magic were denominated
lower orders of religious instinct. Anthropologists had to strain themselves to
comprehend what it was that people were thinking when they practised magic as a
medicine man, and acted as recipient of the magic. We must do the same with this
strange baggage we find before us in this modern sample from our own society. As a
scientist I know that religion is an aspect of our organic being and it has an exact
function in the same way that a jolt of pain or a sense of hunger has an exact function
in the management of the physiology which sustains this system of communication. I
have recognised that the different religious identity structures have structural roles
and that since our society is Jewish by common heritage and therefore all embracing
identity there is a relationship between the family of Jewish identities.
It transpires that the macro structure of the human superorganism is always
triadic, which makes perfect sense. Therefore we can fit the Judaic family into this
scheme most readily and we can understand how those priests who created the
scheme might of been fully aware of what they were doing when the did it, although I
must admit I tend to think of this as being an evolutionary process beyond the grasp of
any group of people in the sense of their actually effecting the rise of such a triad of
inter-related identity structures. But I reserve judgement on this for the time being.
Any way, with this physiological consideration in mind it has always been obvious to
me that the creation of a myth whereby Christ is constructed as being the son of the
father is exactly as it should be in terms of Judaism giving birth to a dependant Jewish
identity linked with all the intimacies and dependencies of a father toward as son, and
vice versa, but nonetheless made distinct in the same sense. And history has
continued to display the continuing character of the filial relationship where we see
Christians vying between tormenting their 'father', the Jews, and then rising up in fury
to set their 'father' on a sacred pedestal.
All wonderful and fascinating stuff, and it works. And then you come upon
this bunkum where these idiots are actually take the notion of Jesus having not only
really existed as a person, but having been a divine being who was the son of the
divine being, and they endeavour to work out just how the substance of this stupid
fairy tale could of worked in reality! In reality, I ask you, for crying out loud. Boy,
are these creatures weird or what? But this is out world, and these people rule it, in
truth it is their world, and we are privileged to live in it. And this is how most people
think about life one way or another, poetically, as a book by Lewis Wolpert indicates
science is a very bizarre way to think, The Unnatural Nature of Science. So, for all
that I express amazement, it is I that am odd, or at least, the odd one out. This study
of the nature of the act of divine generation is not something I would say represents an
degree of coincidence between the theist ideology of Judaism and the knowledge of
science, by coincidence I have in mind a expression of a common idea, differing in
terms of the key source of interpretation. Here though there is a point of contact as
science studies the actual act of religious study and interprets it according to biology
in the same way anthropologists used to observe pre-civilised peoples from outside
their culture and seek to understand it in functional terms.
It is peculiar as well, to see how these people go about apply a form of logic to
their idiotic ideas so that they discuss forms of causality as if they had the least idea
what causality was, or that causality could have any meaning in the none causal world
of their imaginings, or the derived imaginings of the priestly authorities, such as
Moses, who they sort to build upon. We have Eunomius applying what seems like a
sound notion of causal action whereby the artisan imposes form on matter, only to be
countered in his act of madness by another lunatic in the guise of this bloke Gregory
who says that the same cause produces diverse effects because while rain wets all
things not all things wetted by the rain respond in the same way, thus, thus, would you
believe, not all seeds give rise to the same plants!!! Soddin hell, who was this jerk?
Laugh, no, its not funny, cry, cry our bleedin hearts out. And we should because this
goons are the people who build our world, and most tragically of all they rule our
science, Isaac is just such a person, his own gush is no more sane than this Greg
fella's, and with far less excuse, as he blurts on about preadaptation and the setting up
of moronic ideas by a gang of juvenile professors to be knocked down by another
bunch of puerile priests. Laugh? Cry? SCREAMMMMMMMMM!!!!!!!!
The benefit of abusing our minds with this terrible piece of literature is that we
do derive some real examples of the material that Comte must of had in mind when he
chose to call his philosophy of scientific method Positive Philosophy. The use of the
sensual observation that rain acts as the initialiser of germination in seeds, to impute a
causal effect between the rain and the variety of plants germinated is a perfect
example of Negative Philosophy, where ideas are not linked to the causes they assert
deliver the effects observed, in any direct way. Negative philosophy is the ancient
way of the theist, the way that has crushed the new way of positive philosophy.
Leaving us with the arid shell of technology, automatically building the world within
which we must exist as slaves working in factories, driving cars in traffic jams, their
flow ordered by cameras, flying in planes to destinations where we are managed like
cattle in a meadow by tourist farmers, eating in bars where the nutriment is processed
and dished out like feed, drinking liquid that is a chemical solution of mechanised
derivation, expressing sexual impulse through images on a screen; we have no choice,
this is the fruit of negative philosophy, the fruit of the theists God. Negative
philosophy looks at existence and interprets it according to its need to farm society.
Thus the sun went about the earth, because this set the earth upon a pedestal and
allowed an ideology of elitism to be fabricated to make an elite organ of authority
real, exactly as nature intended.
Even science, as powerful as it appears to be, is powerless to defeat this
pernicious force of nature, that simply corrupts all things in order to reduce human
individuals to the status of insects. I hate this, so I declare it is so, the priests resist me
and say I am an imbecile, they say I am destroying freedom. Ha! Destroying
freedom by drawing attention to the state of slavery we live in, that is good. Here I
am, the supreme individualist, forced to fight the world in order to declare the simple
fact that there is no such thing as an individual. There is irony for you, but the secret
is, that by knowing who you really are you are set free, the truth really could set us
free, or so it seems to me. But none of that matters, the simple fact is we are here to
do science and science reveals that we are organisms and so we want an organic
account of who we are, this is what I am giving you and these other distractions we
are forced to occupy our time with are a consequence of the fact that as humans we
are obliged to fight for our right to be free from those who have an interest, either as
masters or slaves, in the status quo because of the religious identity implant. so
freedom comes down to one simple thing, knowing the truth, as best as it is possible
to do. The ancient Greeks were not free, they were slaves, simply because they did
not know that the earth went around the sun when they could of known this, and we
are not free, we are slaves for exactly the same reason, focused on a new object, we
do not know that human nature is corporate, even though we could of known this for a
couple of centuries at least now. We are slaves of Judaism.
The mode of articulation adopted by these theists crushes the mind exposed to
it, naturally, as the sociologists would tell us, if your mind is crushed from birth by
being bound by the language of these people then you would not feel the weight of its
force acting against true understanding, but boy do I feel it. As I read this stuff I find
it impossible to obtain any grasp of what is being said, even allowing for the wilful
development of a jargonised mode of diction intended to create exclusivity, it is
amazing how anyone can say such stuff, and then get the garbage into print! But here
it is, and this is philosophy. Sadly I must admit that I can only be accommodated
within the category of philosophy as knowledge is defined by our theistic language,
thus I must hate that which I am. But it is for precisely because of the likes of this
extract above that I do loath philosophy, for it is such utter shit, as we can see when
we read the above theological exert. But still we can learn from this miserable
intellectual experience, we can learn from any experience, we can learn from getting
too drunk and finding ourselves defenceless in the hands of a gang of delinquent
psychopaths; What do we learn? Get more drunk next time so we don't feel the pain.
Na, only messin, don't get caught, be on our guard, a basic rule of thumb in this mad
world. In this case we learn something far more tragic than getting the shit kicked out
of us on a Saturday night can teach us. We learn the limitless potential of highly
educated, highly motivated, wealthy, powerful gangs of intellectual thugs to twist and
pervert reason to their own demented and downright nasty agenda; own in the sense of
their being inducted into an organ of authority to which they then belong so that its
physiological function is their agenda. These people are like school prefects, police
officers, zealous civil servants, they are dedicated to the cause of authority. There is
an endless supply of these people, just as there is an endless supply of people who like
sport, drama, music, it is a feature of the individual unit that it needs collaborative
activates, and when it comes to being paid to work there can be nothing better for so
many mindless people than being in a position of authority. And it is this zealot
personality that fuels the arrogance of people like Moses, Jesus, Mohammed,
Gregory, Bin Laden, Blair, Bush and this knowledge pervert Milbank. With this kind
of resource, both human and material, what chance does science, as the sole medium
of truth and meaningful knowledge, stand.
 Lets now pick out a few points of coincidence between the concerns of Greg
and that of the scientists of human nature, that we presume to call ourselves, since we
are the only people since Comte's day to do any progressive scientific work on the
study of humans. We must begin by reaffirming the central approximation of the
theme, as Milbank identifies it, although I must say I did not see the least reference to
the notion of a force of identity, and I did not even pick up an intuitive sense of the
idea in this piece, if it had not been offered as a subtitle the notion that something was
being said about identity would not of come within a million miles of my
consciousness.
That was my first impression, upon reading to render accurately, I see early on
that the notion of identity carried forward in a work of literature is discussed in terms
of a force of identity which becomes disembodied from its creator, and can thus be
picked up by another. Indeed, this is the essence of what Gregory is doing as a
theologian, for there is nothing else any theologian can do. The authority of
priestcraft is fabricated by priests, it has no meaning outside the preserved meaning
priests impose upon it by continuing the discussion. If Christianity became extinct
today, as Druidism did two thousand years ago, then it would not be resurrected; just
as it would be impossible for Druidism to be resurrected by anyone, or to freely
evolve again. Whereas if physics became extinct today, if scientific society rose
again, physics definitely would be resurrected in an exactly identical form. The
astronomy of the Incas was identical to the astronomy of the ????????, in so far as
their obsession with celestial bodies took the same form and led to the creation of a
calendar and great mathematical expertise. However, because this knowledge was
evolved to serve an organic function in the elaboration of a superorganic structure the
manner in which the astronomical knowledge was accumulated and organised did not
conform to scientific principles, but rather became embroiled in mythological
principles and thus the two systems were highly differentiated in their forms, but not
in their details, and a scientific form of astronomy must always be directly
interchangeable in all its aspects, in the same sense that a language is always directly
translatable into another language in so far as common attributes of form are being
dealt with. If aliens on another planet have reached a point of comparable
development as ourselves they will not believe in Jesus Christ, but they will be a
superorganism, because it is only by this means that an organism could develop a
comparable intelligence to that which we are favoured with, and it would also be
bound to develop not just physics, but a exactly identical physics to the one we have.
It is for this very reason that scientists sent the gold plaque inscribed as it was with
scientific symbols, on the side of out first extra solar vehicle, because these are
symbols of universal significance that all intelligence must discover if it discovers
knowledge of this universal order. And at some point it is stated that the master
perceives himself as a person who must deliver the slave implant to the initiate so the
slave can become a master inducting new slaves in their turn. Ah, yes, I do believe
I've got it, jolly good.

'There can be no grasp of essences, since the essence of the world is a

mirroring of divine incomprehensibility. The world does not comprehend
itself, cannot be known within itself, but instead, as Gregory repeatedly insists,
the logos about the world is bigger than the world itself because it accounts for
it only as derived from a transcendent elsewhere and therefore as
unfathomable even down to its smallest details.'
 Not that I want to suggest that there is any meaning contained within this
deranged observation, but it just hints at a theme which we find repeated in modern
theological science, such as sociologists teach, and it is also suggestive of the primary
revelation of our scientific discovery of human nature.
Sociologists tell us that it is not possible to extract ourselves from society and
look back upon it from without. This sounds potentially plausible, since it follows
that since we are inevitably a part of society if we do manage to extract ourselves,
apparently, logic tells us that all we can of done is to extend the limits of society by an
amount equal to the degree we have become supposedly external to it. A fine
conundrum for sure. But you know how deviant these damned knowledge perverts
are, and the trick they are relying on for their control of your mind in these
circumstances is a very simple one, it is the control of language as an evolved mode
of seeing existence. As scientists we must step outside the theistic language of the
priest and rest on a 'positive' foundation, not a negative foundation given to us by our
'natural' mode of communication and thought. We must free ourselves from the
prison of our native language. Native in the sense that we were raised with it, but in
no sense native in the true meaning of the word native, for our language is a priestly
creation and it evolved to enslave people's minds. And a damned fine job it does I
must say.
The sociologists expounded dilemma which makes it impossible to do
scientific sociology, is of course fallacious, it relies upon a dualistic model of the
universe which splits form from nature and then, for the purpose of science, deals
only with form, and acts as if nature is beyond comprehension and must be left to the
efforts of the priests to try and interpret. And so, we see at once how this work of
Gregory's fits the bill. It is an attempt to comprehend, a perverse, not sincere attempt,
the mystery of the incomprehensibility of God, and in doing this he admits it is not a
task that can be met. The particular selection above displays the same logic the
sociologists use today to ensure we cannot examine society outside the limits set by
Judaism, it tells us that essence is incomprehensible. When the sociologist says we
cannot step outside the society of which we are a part, they are acting on the
assumption that society is a material thing, they are dismissing essence, or the nature
of society, without a moments consideration, and in effect saying that essence is
incomprehensible. So we must reject this dualism and insist that there is no such
thing as essence as distinct from form, and that while it is self-evidently true that in so
far as society is a material entity we cannot extract ourselves from  which is why I
say we are all Jews, including myself, including Hitler or Bin Laden indeed, for
society is an organism and that organism is Jewish; even a cancer cell that kills a body
is still part of the body it kills. Although of course Bin Laden or Hitler are in no sense
antagonistic to the well being of the Jewish organism, quite the opposite, they are the
essence of its being, they are supreme exponents of Zionism without which the
organism could not grow  the acknowledgement of human nature admits of an
opportunity to step outside these constraints of physical being.
Recognising the kind of logic this exert displays, and how the same logic is
used by the scientific priests in the theocracy's universities today, we can see what it
was that this priest, Greg, was trying to do. He was simply trying to obscure any
possibility of anyone finding a way outside the mental barricade imposed upon them
by their Jewish slave implant. He did this in obedience to his slave implant, he did it
unwittingly therefore, just as a dog urinates on a lamp post in obedience to its social
programming, to mark its territory, but all the while being completely oblivious to
what the act of squirting urine really means.
 Rejecting the dualistic model, accepting that we have access to essence as
much as form in the real world, because we are equipped with a capacity to reason
that evolved to create an elite organ of authority to direct the activity of the
superorganism, we can consider the question of standing beyond the limits of the
society we live within from a holistic perspective. And we readily see that of course
you can be external to the society of which you are a part, it simply depends upon
certain conditions which relate to this subject of essence, or as I would say nature, or
as we might say, information, which can also be understood in terms of knowledge or
even identity. Thus we are asking, ultimately, if we can step outside our identity.
Now on a dualistic model that makes the individual an end in themselves, this act of
being external to the self is obviously not possible. Whereas a monistic model that
recognises that there is only a collective identity, from which the individual derives
their personal identity, then, given that collective identity is really the identity of a
superorganism, and there must be a population of superorganisms, then it stands to
reason that an individual, could, under certain circumstances, stand outside their given
identity, because their are a range of potential personal identities. Indeed, the ability
to do this is the very essence of what science is doing when it examines the society it
exists within. Yet, referring once again to Mackenzie, in his brief treatise on the
subject of biological ideas on the nature of society, he says that science must perforce
be part of the society within which it takes place. Once again we see the priests
blocking off an escape from the mental prison generated by religion. He is wrong,
science may have to exist somewhere, but because of the nature of the human
organism it is possible for an individual to exit from the organism within which it
exists, and then to exist in a sort of no man's land, where, if they can survive, they
may take on the quality of a prophet, a seed of insight, delivering knowledge that can
act as a kernel of regeneration about which a new social being will grow, eventually
to consume the parent which gave birth to the new idea. This, dear Gregory, is divine
regeneration science style.
I am existing very much within the English society within which I was born,
but yet I am, as you can see all too clearly, very much outside it, outside in the sense
of being alienated from its identity. This state of alienation is a cultural, therefore a
biological phenomenon, to do with the coming of the scientific age, thus science is a
space somewhat external to the nature of the organism, and it is this space which I
feel an affinity with, this space I want to squeeze myself into. Science is the
information that can generate a new bud that can break free from the parent, I want to
give that bud form. Darwin gave rise to a new mode of thought derived from science,
as such he mimicked the action of a prophet, a seed giving new birth. But his new
idea, as antagonistic to the old as Comte might ever of liked to see an idea be, did not
give rise to a new organism, on the contrary, it has become very much a part of the
old organism. This is what Darwin was meant to do, to provide a seed true to the old
stock, not a seed at all really, just a new layer of structural organisation. I seek to do
something much more radical, I want to give rise to a new seed, a seed that will
destroy the old stock in an act of regeneration, new growth, a new beginning that will
finally free us of the ancient prison of Judaic identity. My idea is about the future,
about growth, about life, drawn from the old, but necessarily requiring the death of
the old before it can come into its own and grow independently, as it should do.

The difficulty is, can the soul be both threefold and unified
 The superorganism is always threefold and unified, so we might think that in
making this statement we have a theists closest approximation to the true nature of the
superorganism, which they use the code word God to denote. But as we see here they
are not using the theistic code word God, they are using the theistic code word soul.
So what is it that these knowledge perverts are seeking to posses for their own selfish
reasons of greed, vanity, and earthly power? Identity, essentially, I would say of the
top of my head, without giving the matter any thought. The triadic structure is
denoted by an identity triad, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, so we must suppose this
is what these priests of Judaism were seeking to understand. But to understand
intuitively, in accordance with the mythology they had inherited, it is somewhat
amazing that from a host of entirely erroneous ideas so much very real, unseen,
powerful knowledge could be derived. This vindicates the behaviour of these highly
intelligent people who dedicated their lives to these studies in the belief that they were
doing good, and in the knowledge that they were the highest order of human beings in
their society in their own life times. I hate and despise them, just as there kind hated
and despised the primitive savage when they came upon them in their explorations of
the world, so they set about destroying them and converting them to Christian slavery.
But my hatred is not a reflection of their role as given to them by nature, or as
understood by them or their society. It is just the inevitable consequence of my living
in their world whiles not being one of them. The mythology of Judaism, is, self
evidently immensely powerful, and it should draw the maximum degree of admiration
from all who know it, again, as a victim of its blind oppression, I am none too chuffed
with it, but that does not mean I cannot be impressed by Nature's wonders in
generating such a mode of animal behaviour in a ape like creature.
It is highly desirable to try and discern where this power lies and how it came
to exist. and it is at points in such material as this that we can hope to do that. I have
not bothered to find out when Greg was doing his thing, but it may, for all I know of
been before the Prophet gave voice to the Jewish slave implant of Islam, in which
case we can gain some insight into how this third leg of the triumvirate of Judaism
came to be designed by the priests who were responsible for it. I must say I think this
is beyond the ability to do consciously, it had to of been a naturally occurring process.
We can get some idea of how this process may of occurred from an observation of a
modern phenomenon of Judaic recreation following the extermination of the native
populations of North America by the slaves of Judaism who then took up a new
Judaic creed, Mormonism, in order to allow them to settle in as an independent
structural identity element of the newly acquired continent. As a consequence of the
success of this process the Jews proper now rule America, and consequently the
world, with an iron grip, as we all know perfectly well, but only an out and out idiot
would say out load; so say it quietly.
It was inevitable that a new Jewish slave implant would be produced for the
new continent. If Comte had figured out what human nature was, as we have done, he
could easily of predicted this eventuality, although even with the cool-aid of digesting
a ton of lysergic acid diethylamide, washed down with a bath load of cognac, he could
not of managed to get himself so far off his head that he could of come up with the
way in which the new Jewish creed was spun from the yarn of the old. Yet there it
was, a new Biblical chapter was born, complete with an account of the Indians as the
lost tribes of Israel and all sort so of weird gubbins, no matter how weird, it served as
the basis for the extension of the Jewish slave implant, and that was all that was
wanted.
 And so we must think in some such terms of territorial context when we come
to wonder about how the Jews produced the Islamic slave implant. It too must of
been enabled by a state of social flux, and it too must of been informed by a
preadapted, as Isaac would say, state of knowledge, or, as we would say, as scientists,
a latent potential was waiting to fill a social void, exactly as it was in the case of
America in the early nineteenth century once the job of establishing the amorphous
biomass of the continent had reached a critical point where it was ready to receive an
identity programme adapted to its circumstances.
Still we have to ask, if we now live within a world where we have a true
global superorganic being in the form of a Jewish triumvirate split into a hierarchy
consisting of an inner core of Judaism proper, a middling authority structure
denominated Christianity and a final order of authority that will serve as the main
body of the entire planet, in time, and yet a triadic structure is a universal feature of
the superorganism, what was happening before JC was cooked up, and with this job
jobbed, what about the intervening six centuries before Allah was painted into the
story?
To answer this question we need to turn our attention to the evolution of the
Jewish identity implant itself, for this is the nub of the thing. The special attribute of
Judaism is that it can exist as an independent identity devoid of its own body, it is like
a floating brain, a motile authority organ. This refined quality evolved over a long
period in the melting pot of civilisation of the middle east, and the record of precisely
how this process occurred is there in the Jewish historical record, of which they are
very proud. They learnt to render this kind of account in historical terms, as part of
their priestcraft, and we follow this mythological process. But a biological analysis
would easily accommodate the life history of the Jewish organism, as I am indicating
right now. It is obvious that the Jews did not need a body of their own, they drifted
from one location to another, all the while the superorganic fauna of the middle east
was evolving toward an ever more supermassive superorganic form, and the Jews
were always there in the thick of it. When the time came to release a new subidentity
evolved to implant all none Jews with a Jewish identity a most remarkable thing
happened, the erstwhile territorial site of Jewish culture was destroyed by the slaves
of Judaism, the Romans. This, I must say is so perfect an occurrence that I just do not
know how to account for it in sufficiently subtle terms to make it sound biological and
not conspiratorial. However we must think in terms of evolutionary dynamics quite
beyond our ability to grasp at this point in exactly the same way Darwin could
perceive the evolutionary process sufficiently well to say how it happened in detail
because of the consequences he observed, but he had no chance of intuitively working
out the physical basis of the evolutionary process. I simple do not have enough
knowledge of Jewish history or the relationship between the Jews and the other
people in their story to be able to say just how these vital events managed to take
place exactly as they needed to do. I guess the point is however, that if they had no
taken place in this way then like all other tricky questions concerning human
evolution we would not be where we are, discussing what we are today. So there
must be some degree of inevitability about these processes. The question is often
asked whether farming had to of been discovered, or whether it might not of been.
The answer is that it was a latent potential of our species that had to of been
discovered, that is for certain, it was discovered when it was due to the biomass
reaching a certain critical point in an appropriate niche to support the development.
What you must always bear in mind when discussing this aspect of human evolution
where the social dynamic is paramount is the role of the elite in the process, they
guide the direction society shifts in for they acquire knowledge and promote it as it
empowers them, this is a feedback loop acting between the core organ of authority
and the environment. One of the aspects of the history of the first break away
subidentity of Judaism is the close collaboration of the master Jews with the Romans
in their efforts to destroy this alternative authority. In this way a new form of Judaism
was born that unwittingly became a second order of Judaism, since it was spun from
the old, but rejected by the old, and this mode of replication and growth is bound to be
a feature of human superorganic growth. We do not need conscious will to of been
operating here, which is handy, for you can be sure it was not.

_____________________

What, I would like to know, does any of this have to do with the exoskeleton,
which the title of this section promised we were going to discuss?
Beats me, but its good don't you think? Blimey it is that long ago since I
began writing this section that I have not got a clue what I had in mind when I began
it, and I do not know what on earth this piece of theology is doing in here. But I mean
to find out.
Now let me see. I had the foresight to make out a cursory comment in the
contents section when I decided to insert a new section, and there I noted that I was
inspired to create this section by the material provided in Coker's book, which gave
me a few authors who sort to argue that society was a true organism, but all of whom
failed to reach the logical conclusion that society was an exoskeleton, which would of
solved all the problems that thwarted the triumph of biology over mythology in the
nineteenth century, and, come to that, in the twentieth century too. The Milbank stuff
just entered my field of vision as I was beginning, and got sucked in. It could of gone
in anywhere, up to a point, but here is good, it is about the theist's own efforts to
possess the account of human social being, and as such it could be said to be a theist's
description of the human exoskeleton, since we have a discussion of the rendering of
divine being, which is the being of the superorganism, in the form of the church. The
church is a beautiful example of the representation of an exoskeleton, and large
cathedrals are said to have a symbolism of bodily representation applying to the body
of Christ. And quite apart from the intended mythological representation, one of my
earliest thoughts on the idea of an exoskeleton developed about the physiological
function of the great cathedral edifices within a superorganism. Such major works
represented a very real and substantial exoskeletal form located centrally, by virtue of
the wealth and power they represented, within a web of more perishable organic
structures reaching out into the surrounding terrain that was occupied by the newly
evolving structure of the ancient Jewish organism which gave rise to these most
magnificent of all human creations in the pre-scientific era.
Once we have this physiological idea of the cathedral in mind we can very
easily give it an abstract representation in terms of a substantial material form,
existing at the centre of a web of organic action, which extends throughout the
surrounding territory and serves to draw the energy of the territory toward one central
point, the sacred centre. With this model of a human superorganism in place we can
look beyond the cathedrals of a thousand years ago, still standing, to the magnificent
edifices of which Stonehenge is the crowning glory, dating from four thousand years
ago. Having recognised that these structures are functionally physiological structures
that co-ordinate the life processes of the superorganism in such a way that the
available energy of the territory is enabled to flow in a unified fashion we can then
step forward from the cathedral age to the present and see the great stock exchanges
as the evolutionary development of these physiological structures. Stonehenge,
cathedral stock exchange are thus reduced to attributes of exoskeletal physiology
evolving in accord with the burgeoning mass of the biomass and the variety of
exoskeletal structures it has acquired over time.
We might speculate upon the form these structures take. The stone age
cultures, so called, had a tradition of building barrows which had the circular form of
the Stonehenge monument. This was a natural product of a unified superorganic
being that was essentially a localised organism, where all people would of known one
another and not looked to authorities at a distance. The circle would be the natural
form for such a human organism at this stage of evolutionary development to acquire
in spontaneous reaction to it self organising behavioural attributes. The cathedral on
the other hand is wholly different, it should for a knot in a web of authority which
centred upon focal point very far off in a sacred land, Israel, where the Jewish temple
of Jerusalem took the place of the circular mound as focal point of the evolving
organism. In this case the local representation of identity had to be much more
complex and thus we see these magnificent physiological structures evolving in order
to carry the identity of the central edifice imbued into their own material form. This
representation is interpreted as being a personal effort at representation by the
architects, but behind the minimal conscious purpose of the individuals contributing
to the act of regeneration, in the manner of Gregory teaching the novice, is the
biological force of human corporate nature which is the real source of the dynamic
which creates these literally organic structures. Today as the world becomes unified
into a closely integrated organic form the new focal points of energy transfer, the
stock exchanges, take on the form of neural centres in a living piece of tissue handling
no material, as the brain handles no material, but directing the, by means of a massive
flow of information, all the major transfer of material taking place anywhere on the
planet.
Humans did not choose to build ceremonial mounds, humans did not choose to
build henges, humans did not choose to build cathedrals, and humans did not choose
to build stock exchanges. These exoskeletal structures evolved, the theocracy's priests
have devised a broad concept splitting these forms from their derivative nature, hence
we call these organic structures that are created via a process that co-ordinates
individual mass behaviour, cultural. And thus we have the major mode of description
of these phenomena called cultural, and humans decided on the cultural things they do
because they look for solutions to problems that face them, in common with all other
living things. Bullshit. We are made to create these things as part of the evolutionary
process and it should be possible to predict what structures must come in the future to
replace stock exchanges. To do this we must determine what attributes of the
exoskeleton gave rise to the evolution of the stock exchange structures, and so what
changes might take place that would make stock exchanges redundant and usher in a
new mode of energy distribution. I like the idea of having a go at this but it would
necessarily involve me in the sort of semi-real effort to relate social form to biological
form in a manner invoking the behaviour of the nineteenth century thinkers who we
are about to consider that tried to think of the social structure as an organism's body.
Social structure is not like an organism's body, it is an organism's body. We can see
the kind of transition that might cause stock exchanges to become redundant because
we see the money-less age beckoning. But, more important than the means of
exchange is the constitution of the organism. The stock exchange structure came into
being a t a crucial time in the expansion of the continental organic form toward a
global form, just as the cathedrals evolved at a time when the organism was
consolidating its continental stage of growth. So, what will bring an end to stock
exchanges is the change in the actual constitution of the organism. Once the global
organism is united in an unassailable form then the whole structure of private
enterprise becomes, exactly what it appears to most of us to be today,
counterproductive of human welfare, because there is then only one human being, and
there is no longer any need for an aggressive form of energy system. A new mode of
energy distribution must be the result, no more capitalism, the coming of the utopian
reality so many have dreamed of. It will even represent the closet thing to Marx's
supposed utopia. The stock exchanges will be redundant, money will be long go. All
there will be is one world, under Judaism. Some way to go, but it is coming, as sure
as chalk is cheese.
And having found myself guided fortuitously to include a strictly theological
piece in this work, I must say am delighted by this intrusion for it is perfectly in
keeping with the character of the work, which has styled itself upon the notion of
unearthing the intellectual deposits of human kind in a dispassionate attempt to
realise, and give expression to, the true nature of humanity. And if it had not dropped
in my lap, a piece of pertinent theological text should of been something I ought to of
sort to include, just as I have included a piece of esoteric work despite the extreme
antipathy I have for such ways of thinking. However, that said, I included Ouspensky
because he expressly sort to discuss society as an organism, and we can be sure I
would not find a Christian author making out an argument in the name of Christianity
in so blatantly biological a form. Although, that said, there have been some very odd
treatise written in the name of Judaism, and I would not put a Christian work styled
on this basis beyond the realms of possibility. Did I ever tell you about the Victorian
account I have of heaven .......... That will do, lets get on with it, or I'll be dead gone
to hell before this thing gets done.