CHAPTER

Tnn Inne oFCop

In 1963 a small book was published by an Anglican bishop, a book that

causeda religiousstorm both in Great Britain and America.' InHonest to God
Bishop John Robinson dared to suggestthat the idea of God that has been
dorninant in western civilization for centuries is irrelevant to the needs of
modern men and women. The survival of religion in the West, Robinson
argued, requires that this traditional picture of God be discarded in favor
of a profoundly different conception of God, a conception Robinson pro-
fessed to perceive emerging in the work of twentieth-century religious
thinkers such as Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann.
Robinson correctly predicted the reaction to his thesis,pointing out that
it was bound to be resistedas a betrayal of what the Bible says.Not only
would the vast majority of Church people oppose his view, but those who
rejectedbelief in God would resentthe suggestionthat the idea of God was
already dead or at least dytrg. In letters to the editor of the London Times,
in articlesin scholarlyjournals, and in pulpits on two continents,Robinson
was attacked as an atheist in bishop's garments, and only infrequently
defended as a prophet of a new revolution taking place within the Judeo-
Christian religioustradition. A look at someof Robinson'sideaswill help us
in our effort to sort out different ideas of God and to focus on that idea of
God which will be the center of our attention throughout most of this book.
Before the emergenceof the behef that the whole world is under the
sovereign control of a single being, people often believed in a plurality of
divine beings or gods, a religious position called polytheism. In ancient
Greece and Rome, for example,the various gods had control over different
aspectsof life, so that one naturallyworshipped severalgods-a god of war,
a goddessof love, and so forth. Sometirnes,however,one might believethat
there are a number of godsbut worship only one of them, the god of one's
own tribe, a religiousposition called henotheisrn.In the Old Testament,for
example,there are frequent referencesto the godsof other tribes, although

4
 T H E I D E AO F C O D 5

the allegianceof the Hebrews is to their own god, Jahweh. Slowly, however,
there emerged the belief that one's own god was the creator of heavenand
earth, the god not only of one's own tribe but of all people, a religiousview
called nutnotheisut.
According to Robinson, monotheism, the belief in only one divine
being, has passeclthrough a profound changa,a changehe describeswith
"up "out "up
the help of the expressions there" and there." The god there"
is a being located in spaceabove us, presumably at some definite distance
from the earth, in a region known as the heavens.Associatedwith this idea
of God is a certain primitive picture in which the universeconsistsof three
regions,the heavensabove,the earth beneath, and the region of darkness
under the earth. According to this picture, the earth is frequently invaded
by beings from the other two realms-God and his angelsfrom the heavens,
Satan and his dernons frorn the region beneath the earth-who war with
one another for control over the souls trnd destiny of those who inhabit the
"up
earthly realm. This idea of God as a powerful being located there" at
sorrredefinite place in spacewas slowly abandoned,Robinson claims.We
norv erplnin to our chilclrenthat heavenis not in fact over their heads,that
"the
God is not literally somer,vhereup in the sly. In place of God as old
rnanin the sk7,"there has emergeda rnuch more sophisticatedidea of God,
"out
trn iclea Robinson refers to as the God there."
"up "out
The funclamentalchange from the God there" to the God
there" is the change from thinking of God as located at some spatial dis-
tance from the earth to thinking of God as separatefrom and independent
of the world. According to this idea, God has no location in some spot or
region of physicerlspace.He is a purely spiritual being, a supremely good,
all-porverful,all-knowing, personal being who has created the world, but
is not a part of it. He is separatefrom the world, not subject to its laws,
judgesit, anclguidesit to its final purpose.This rather majesticidea of God
u,asslorvh'clevelopedover the centuriesby great western theologianssuch
asAugustine,Boethius,BonAventure,Avicenna,Anselm, Maimonides,and
Aquinas.It has been the clominantidea of God in western civilization.If we
"rrp "the
label the Gocl there" as old man in the s$," we can label the God
"out "the
there" as God of the traditional theologians."And it is the God of
the tr:rditionaltheologiansthat Robinsonbelieveshas become irrelevant to
the neeclsof rnoclernpeople.Whether Robinsonis right or wrong-and it is
r.ery doubtful that he is right-it is undeniablv true that when most of us
u,ho are the cultural heirs of western civilization think of God, the being
rve tl-rink of is in rxany important respects like the God of the traditional
theologians.It will be helpful, therefore, in clarifio"g our own thoughts
trbout Cloclto explore rnore thoroughly the conception of God that emerged
in the thinking of the great theologians.
 C H A P T E R1

THnArrnIgurEsoF Gon

We have already noted that according to many major theologians,God is

conceived of as a suprernelygood being, separatefrom and independent
of the r,vorld,all-powerful, all-knowing, and the creator of the universe.
Two other fetrturesthat were ascribedto God by the great theologiansare
self-existenceand eternity. The clominant idea of God in western civiliza-
tion, then, is the idea of a suprernelygood being, creator of but separate
from trnclinclependentof the world, all-powerful (omnipotent),all-knowing
(omniscient), eternal, and self-existent.Of course, this list of the rnajor
elernentsin this idea of God will be illuminating to us only insofar as the
elernentsthemselvesare understood.What is it for a being to be omnip-
otent? How are we to understandthe idea of self-existence? In what way is
God thought to be separatefrom and independent of the world? What is
rneant u'hen it is said that God, and God alone, is eternal? Only to the
extent that we can answer these and similar questionsdo we comprehend
the central iclea of God to emerge within western civilization. Before
turning to a study of the question of the existenceof God, therefore, it is
irnportant to enrich our grasp of this idea of God by tryng to answersome
of tl-resebasic rpestions.

andPerfectCoodness
Omnipotence
ln his great work, the Summo Theologica,St. Thomas Aquinas, who lived in
the thirteenth century, undertakes to explain what it is for God to be
ornnipotent.After pointing out that for God to be omnipotent is for God to
be eible to do all things that are possible, Aquinas carefully explains that
tlrere are two different kinds of possibihty, relatiae posstbillty and absolute
1tos,sibiliry,anclinquires as to which kind of possiblliqzis meant when it is
said that God's omnipotenceis the abihty to do all things that are possible.
Sornethingis a relative possibilitywhen it lies within the power of somebeing
or beingsto do. trlpng by natural means,for example,is possiblerelativeto
birds but not relative to mere humans. Somethingis an absolutepossibility,
however,if it is not a contradiction in terms. Defeating a chessmaster in a
garneof chessis somethingthat is very hard to do, but it is not a contradiction
in terms; indeecl,it occasionallyhas been done. But defeatinga chessmaster
irr ir garneof chess after he has checkmatedyour king is not just something
thilt is very hard to do; it cannot be done at all, for it is a contradiction in
terrns. Becoming armarried bachelor, making one and the same thing both
rouncl and squtrreat the sarnetime, and defeatingsomeoneat chessafter he
has checkrntrtedvour hng are not possible in the absolute sense;they are
actir,'itiesrvhich, irnplicitly or explicitly, involve a contradiction in terms.
 TI{E II]EA OF C]OD

Having explainedthe two different kinds of possibihty,Aquinas points

out that it must be absolutepossibiliq,which is rneant when God's omnipo-
tence is explainedtrsthe abilityto do all things that are possible.Forif we
rneant relative possibility, our explanationwould say no rrlore than that
"God meansthat he can do all things thtrt are in his power to
is or-r-rnipotent"
do. Ancl while it is certainly tme that God can clo all things that are in his
"God
power to do, it explains nothing. is ornnipotent," then, means that
God can clo whatever does not involve a contradiction in terrns. Does this
mean that there are sorne things God cannot clo? In one senseit clearly
does mean this. God cannot make one anclthe samething both round ancl
square at the salne time and he cannot defeat me at a galne of chessafter
I have checkmateclhis klng. Of course, God could alwayscheckrnatemy
klng before I am in a position to checkrnatehis. But if he should-for
whatever reason-engage rne in a game of chessanclallow it to happen that
I checkrnatehis klng. then he cannof win that game of chess.He could
annihilate me and the chessboarcl, but he could not win that garneof chess.
So there are many things that God, despite being ornnipotent, cannot do.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that God's power
is sornehor,v lirnited, that there are things he cannot clo which, if only his
power were greater,he could do. For power, arsAquinzrspoints out, extends
only to whzrteveris possible.And there is nothing that is possibleto be done
thai God's po\ /er is inaclequateto accomplish.Thus Aquinas conclucles,
"Wh:rtever
iniplies contradiction does not come within the scopeof divine
omnipotence,becauseit cannot have the aspectof possibility. Hence it is
more appropriilte_tosay that sucl'rthings cernnotbe done, than that God
cannot do thern."'
But trren't there solne things rvhich, unlike rnaking a round square,are
not contrzrclictoryand yet such that Gocl cannot do thernP Cornmitting
suicide or sorne evil cleed are not cclntrtrdictory.Many theologians,how-
ever, have cleniedthat God can destroy himself or clo rvhat is evil. For the
doing of such things is inconsistentwith God's nuture-his eternity and
perf'ect gooclness.It rnight he objecteclthat God's perfections imply only
th:rt he r,villnot clestroyhirnself or clo evil, not that he cannot-he has the
power to clo evil, but becausehe is supremely gcloclit is a power he will
never erercise.What this objection overlooks,however,is that to attribute tct
Goclthe porverto cloevil is to attribute to him tlre power to ceaseto have an
attribute (perfect gooclness)which is part of his very essenceor nature.
Being per{'ectlygoocl is as much a part of Gocl's nature as having tl-rree
anglesis pilrt of the nature of a.tritrngle. Gocl coulcl no rnore ceaseto be
perfectlv gooclthan tr triangle could ceaseto huve three zrngles.In view of
this difficulty, it is perlrapsnecessaryto amend Aquinas'explanationof what
it rneansfor God to be ornnipotent. Insteaclof saying simplv that rvhnt it
8 ( ] f { . \ P T E Ri

rnerlns is {or hir-n to have 1ls porver to ckr anvt}ring tl-rat is art albsohrtepos-
sibilitr', u'e shutll suy that it rneans that God cun do anrrthing thett is trn
absolrrte possibilitv rurcl not incon,si,stentrcitlt am1 of his bu,sic attributes.
Since cloing evil is inconsistent u,ith being perfectll' gootl, ancl since being
per{bctlv goocl is a ba.sic trttributer of Gocl, the fact that C}oclcttnnot clo evil
u,ill not conflict u.itli tlre fact that he is orr-rnipotent.
The iclea that Clocl's omnipotence cloes rtot inchrcle the power to do
sornething inconsistent r,vith anv of his biisic irttributes ciln help us solve
n'hat has been callecl the parador of the stone. Accortling to this pararclox,
either God has the power to creirte ir stone so hetlv-vthat he czttrnrttlift it, or
Gocl cloes not htn'eil',ot power. If he ckres hal'e the porver to create such a
stone, then there is something fkrcl cunnot clo: lift ther stone he cttn crettte.
Or-r the other lrancl. if God cannot crt:ate srrch it storte, then thetre is also
sornething lie citnnot clo: create a storte so heary he cannot lift it. In either
case therc is sornething Gocl cau'nrotclo. Thererfrrre, God is nrtt omnipotent.
Tl-re s<rlrrtionto this puzzle is to see that c:rt:nting o ,stoneso lrcout1thrrt
Gorl connot lift if is cloing sornething inconsistent'rvith one of God's essential
ru.ttribrrtes-the tittriltrrte of oninipotence. For if there exists it stone scl
hean' thirt (]ocl lacks the porver to lift it, then Gocl is not omnipotent.
Theiefore, if ()ocl lias the pnrt"t to create such rt stone, he hits the porver to
bring it about that he lacks an attributer (ontnipotence) that is essential to
lrinr. So, the. proper solutirtn to the pvzzk: is to srwthilt Gocl canuot cretrte
such tr stone an\/ lTrore than he can clo rin evil cleecl.This cloes not tnean, of'
corlrse, thzlt thi:re is sonre stonc in the infinite series o{'strtnes weighing
1.000 pouncls, 2,000 pottncls, :1,000pottncls, 4,000 pouncls, and so on, that
()ocl cunnot create. In thc ctise of an evil clcetl, Gocl ciutnot perforrn that
dee.clr,tecausehis perf'ect goochressis essentiitl to hint. In tl-rectrseof a stone
so herun, that Gocl cannot lift it, Gocl cirnrrot crezrtesuch a stone ltecause his
onrnipotence is esserrtiulto hirn.
\\/e'r'r- seen that (locl's ornnipoteuce is not to be unclerstoocl as
"porvL.r"
inclucling the to ltring about logicallv irnpossible states of uf'fairs or
to perfbrrn uctiorrs inconsiste:nt rvith his essential attriltutes. What about
changing thi: pilst? Clearly, Cloclcuulcl htrverprerventeclRicharcl Nixon {rorn
being ri presidc:nt o{- ther Unitecl States. But can Gocl noto clo so? Nixon's
never having been presiclent is not a logically irtrpossiblerstate of a{lhirs; rror
cloes ltrir-rging it about appc'ar to be inconsistent u,ith Gocl's gooclness, or
rul.of his other essential uttributes. Brrt it cloesseerl-lthtit it is not rtou in the
pc\\,er o{'iun'lteing, inchrcling un onrnipotent bering,to bring altout Nixon's
nevc.r hrn'irrg been prcsiclent. So, arlthough u,'e have refinecl our uncler-
stantling of the notion of oninipotence itncl corle to see that Clocl'sornnipo-
tence isn't the power to bring allout absolutely artvthing r.vhatever, we
ciuurot clirin-r to hiu'c prov'iclccl a {irll erxplication of't}re iclea that Gocl is
 T H E I I ] E AO F C ] O D 9

ornnipotent.For, aswe've just seen,certain past happeningscalnot now be

changed even by an omnipotent being. And there rnay be other statesof
affairs that an ornnipotent, divine being cannot bring about.
The idea that God rnust be perfectly good is connectedto the view that
God is a being who deservesunconditional gratitude, praise, and worship.
For if a being were to fall short of perfect goodness,it would not be worthy
of unreserved praise and worship. So, God is not just a good being, his
goodnessis un.surpassable. Moreover, God doesn't simply happen ,o.lr:
perfectly good; it i.shis nature to be that way. God logically corrld not fail
lo b" perfectly good. It was for this reason that we observed above that
God does not have the power to do evil. For to attribute such a por,verto
God is to attribute to him the power to cease to be the being that he
necessarilyis.
Are lve sapng that God is perfectly good by definition? Yes.But we are
also noting tlrat the definition of God as perfectlv good is connectedto, if
not grounded in, the religious requirement that God be an object of
.tt "otrditional praise and worship. And we are making an additional point.
For lve also have said thrrt the being uhct i,sGod cannot ceaseto be per-
fectlv good. A bachelor is unmarried by definition. But soilteonewho is a
bacfielor cAn ceaseto be unrnarried. Of course, when this happens (our
bachelor marries), he no longer is a bachelor. Unlike our bachelor, horv-
ever,the being who is God cannot give up being God. So,we are not simpll'
saying that God is by definition perf.ectly good. We are also saying lhal a
being rvho is Gocl cannot ever be anything other than God. The bachelor
next cloor can ceaseto be a bachelor. But the being who is God cannot
ceaseto be God. We can put it this way. Being a bachelor is not part of the
nature or essenceof a being rvho is rt bachelor. So, although by definition
sorneonecannot be a bachelor without being unrnarried, that person can
ceaseto be unmarried becausehe can ceaseto be a bachelor. But being
Gocl is part of'the nature or essenceof the being who is God. So, sincethe
being r,vhois God cannot ceaseto be God, that being cannot ceasetcl be
perf'ectlvgoocl.
But what is it to be perf-ectlygood? Since Gocl is unsurpassablygood,
he has all the f'euturesthat unsurpassablegoodnessimplies. Among theseis
irbsolutenrcrol gooclnes,s. Morzrlgoodnessis tt vital part, but not the rvhole
of goodness.For there is nonmoral goodnessas well. Thus we distinguish
tr,vostaternentsthat might be rnade on the occasionof someone'sdeath:
"He "He
led a good li{'e." hacla good life." The first staternentconcernshis
moral gnoilt "rr, the latter centers chiefly on nonrnornl goodnesssuch as
happiness,good fbrtune, etc. God's perfect goodnessinvolvesboth moral
eooilrl"rr or"rdnnr-trnoralgoodness.Of chief interest here is his absolute
i,'rotalgooclness(perfectjustice.benevolence,etc.). For Gocl'srnortrlgoodness
lo C I I A P T E R1

haslong been thought to be in sorneway the sourceor standardof what it is

for hurnan life to be moral. Furthernlore, by virtue of his essentialmoral
perfection, sornejudgments can be made about the world he has created.
We may be certain, for example,that God woulcl not create il morally bad
world. It might even be true that by virtue of his moral perfection Gocl
would be led to create the morerllybest world he can. These :rre irnportant
topics. We will pursue the seconclof these topics (what sort of world Gocl
rvould create)when we later considerthe problern of evil. It r,villbe helpftrl
here to consider briefly the connection between Clocl'srnoral perf'ection
and morality in hurnan life.
God has been held to be the source or standard of our rnoral cluties,
both negative duties (for exarnple,the duty not to take innocent hurnan
life) and positive duties (for exarnple,the duty to help others in need).
Cotnmonly, religiouspeople believe that theseduties are sornehowgroundecl
in divine corllnandrnents. A believer in Judaisrnrnay view the ten corn-
manclmentstrsfundarnentalmoral rules that cletermineat leasttr gooclpart
of what one is rnorally obligateclto clo (positive duties) or refrain frorn cloing
(negativeduties). Clearly, given his absolute rnoral perf'ection,what tlod
corrlrrlandsus to do must be whtrt is rnorally right fbr us to clo.But are these
things rnorally right becauseGod comrrAndsthem? That is, doesthe moral
rightnessof thesethings sirnplyconsistin the fact that Goclhascornnra.ncled
therl.r?Or does God corlrnilnd these things to be done becausethey are
rightP If lve saythe second,that God cornrnandsthem to be dor-rebecause
he seesthat they are rnorally right, we seernto irnply thtrt rnorality has an
existenceapart from God's will or cornmands.But if we say the first, that
whut rnakesthings right is God's willing or courrrlunclingthern, we seernto
inrply that there woulcl be no riglit or wrong if there were no divine being to
issue such colulnands.While neither answer is without its prolllerns, tlre
dourinant answerin religious thinking concerning God a.nclmorality is thtrt
rvhat God commandsis rnorally right indepenclentof his cornrnaudi.Gocl's
colrntanding us to perform certarinactions does not rnake those ilctions
rnorerlh'right; they rl.rernora.llyright indepenclentof his commilnds and he
cornrnanclsthern becausehe sees that they are rrlorally right. Horv then
doesour rnoral life clependon God? Well, even though rnoralityitself need
not depend on God, perhaps our knou;ledgeof r-noralityis clependent(or at
leastaided) by God's conlrnands.Perhapsit is the teachingsof religion that
lea.dhurnan beings to view certa.inuctions trs rnorallv riqht and others a.s
n'rorullywrong. Also, the prtrcticeof rnoralityrnavbe aicleclby belief in God.
For although trn irnportant peut of the rnoral life is to do one's duty out of'
respectfor duty itself, it would be too rnuch to expect of ordin:lry hurnans
that they u,ottld relentlesslypursue the life of duty even though there
\\/ere no grounds for nssociil.tingrnorality with r,vell-beingancl herppiness.
w
:il
l ,,,

T I I EI D E AO F G O D ll

Belief in God rnay aid the moral life by providing a reason for thinking that
the connection between leading a good life and having a good life is not
simply accidental. Still, what of the difficulty that certain things are morally
right apart from the fact that God commands us to do them? Consider
God'sbelief that 2 +2=4. Is it tme that 2 +2=4 becauseGod believesit?
O r d o e sG o d b e l i e v e t h a t 2+ 2 = 4 b e c a u s e i t i st m e t h a t 2 + 2 = 4 ? I f w e s a y
the latter, as it seems we should, we irnply that certain mathematical
staternentsare true independent of God's believing them. So, we already
seemcommitted to the view that the way sornethings are is not ultimately a
matter of God's will or comrnands.Perhaps the basic truths of morality
have the sarnesort of status as the basic truths of rnathernatics.

Self-Existence
The idea that God is a self-existentbeing was developedand explainedby
St. Anselm in the eleventh century. By various arguments Anselm had
satisfiedhirnself that among those beings thtrt exist there is one that is
suprernelygrezrtanclgood-nothing that existsor ever did existis its ecpal.
Of anything that exists,however, Ansehn was equally persuaded that we
curnaskof it, what accountsfbr or explainsthe fact that it existsPIf we come
upon ertable, fbr example,we can ask what accounts for the fact that it
exists.And we rnight answerour question,at leastpartially, by learning that
a carpentertook somewood and rnadeit. So too, {or a tree, a mountain, or a
lake, we ciln ask the question, what explainsthe fact that it exists?In an
effort to learn more about the supremely great and good being, Ansehn
asksit of this being. What is it that accountsfbr the farctthat the supremely
great and good being exists?
Before tryrg to answer the question, Anselm observesthat there are
only three ca.sesto consider: either sornething'sexistenceis explained by
artother,explaineclbq nothing, or its existenceis explainedbq it,self.Clearly,
the existenceof the table is accountedfor by sornethingelse(the calpenter).
Sotoo for the existenceof a tree. a mountain. or a lake. Earchof thern exists
becauseof other things. Indeecl,the familiar things in our lives all seem to
be explainedby other things. But evenrvhen we don't know what, if anything,
explainsthe fact that a certain thing erists, it's clear that the answer must
be one of the three Anselm proposes.The fact that a certain thing existsis
explainedeither by refbrence to something else, by nothing, or by itself.
There simply ure no other explanationsto consider. What then of the
existenceof the suprernelygreat and good being ? Is its existencedue to
another,to nothir-rg,or to itself ? Unlike the table, the tree, the rnountain,or
the lake, the suprenielygreat and gooclbeing cannot have its existencedue
to another,Ansehn reasons,frrr then it rvould be depenclentfor its existence
L2 C I I A P T E RI

on tl-ratother thing and, consecpently,would not be the supreme being.

Whatever is supremeover all other things cannotbe (or havebeen) dependent
for its existence on any of them. The existence of the supreme being,
therefore, must be explainedeither by nothing or by itself.
For somethingto have its existenceexplainedby nothing is for it to exist
and yet for there to be no explanation whatever of the fact that it exists
rtrther than not. Could there be something of this 5sft-sernething whose
existence is simply an unintelligble brute fact, having no explanation what-
"It
ever? Anselrn's answer, whether correct or not, is perfectly clear: is
utterly inconceivablethat what is something should exist through nothing."3
Unfortunatelv, Anselm gives us no explanation as to why we cannot conceive
of sornethingwhose existenceis an unintelligible brute fact. Presumably,
he thought the point so obvious as not to require explanation.In any case,
we must carefully note the principle Anselm is here expressing,for it \^/ill
figure later in one of the major arguments for God's existence.Anselm's
basic ccrnviction is that whateoer exists must haae an explanation of its
existence-there must be somethingthat accountsfor the fact that it exists
rather than not, and that something must be either something else or the
thing itself. To denv this is to view the existenceof somethingas irrational,
absurd,utterly unintelligible. And this, thinks Anselm, can no more be true
of the suprernebeing than it can be true of a tree or mountain. The exis-
tence of the supreme being, therefore, cannot be explained by nothing.
There rernains,then, only the third case.Anselm draws the conclusionthat
the supreme being's existenceis due fo itself.
Of course, it is one thing to conclude that the explanation of the
suprerne being's existenceis to be found within the nature of that very
being, and quite another thing to understandwhat it is within the supreme
being's nature that accountsfor the existenceof that being. Anselm does
not profess to understand u;hot it is within the divine nature that accounts
fbr Gocl's existence.Nor does he understand just hou a being's nature
n-rightprovide the explanation of that being's existence.All that he pro-
fessesto be sure of is that the existenceof the supreme being is due to the
suprernebeing itself. He doesnot mean, of course,that the supremebeing
brought itself into existence.For it would then haveto existbefore it existed
in order to bring itself into existence,and clearlythat is impossible.Moreover,
aswe noted earlier, eternity is one of God's characteristics,so he clearly did
not come into existenceat a certain tirne.
Ansehn cloes,however, offer an analog,,in an effort to help our under-
standingof this very difficult idea. Using our own example,his point can be
expressedas follows: Suppose on a cold night we come upon a blazing
carnpfire.We note that a rock a few feet frorn the campfire is warm. If we
erskrvhat explains this fact about the rock (that it is warm), it would be
 THE II)EA0F (;OI) l3

absurd to suggestthrrt the erplanation is to be found within the rock itself,

that there is something about the nature of the rock that makes it wann.
The fire trnclthe nearnessof the rock to the fire explain the rock's warmth.
Supposelve then note that the fire is alsowarm. Whut etccountsfor the f'act
that the fire is warrn? Here it does not seern absurd to suggestthat the
exp)ttnationlies within tlre fire itself. It is the nature clf :r fire to be wzrrmjtrst
asit is the nature of n triilngle to hilve three angles.To avoid confusionhere
we rnust keep clearly in mind that it is the fact of the fire's warmth we are
tryng to explain,anclnot the fact of the fire's existence.The fact of the fire's
existenceis not due to the fire but to the carmperwho built the fire. The fact
that the existing fire is witrlrl, however, is a {irct about the fire that is ac-
counted for by the nature of the fire, by what it is to be a fire. We havehere,
then, an exan-lpleof a {hct trbouta thing (the fire's warmth) that is accountecl
for not bv sornethingelse but by the nature of the thing itself (the fire).
Ansehn'shope is that if we once seethat a certain fact ubout a thing rnaybe
explainednot by something elsebut by that thing's nature, the idea of self-
existencervill seernlessstrangeto us. Whether this is so or not, it should be
clear both r,vhatis rneant by ,self-exi,stence and why the traditional theolo-
giansf'elt it to be a basic feature of the divine being. For sornethingto be a
ielf-existent being is for it to have the explantrtionof its existencewithin
its orvn narture.Since no thing can exist whose existenceis unintelliglble,
lacking trny explanation(Ansehn'sbasic principle), ancl since the supreme
being r,vouldr-rotbe suprerneif its existencewere clueto somethingelse,the
conclusionis inevitable that God (the suprernebeing) has the explantrtion
of his eristencelvithin his orvn nttture.

e) andEternity
Separation,Independenc
We htive been exploring tl-renotions of ontniTlotence, petfect goodnes,s, ancl
,self-exi,stence our grasp of
in a,ne{'fortto er-rlarge the dorninant idea of God
to erlerge in western civilizaltion.Sorneof the other elements in th:isiclett
of Cloclrvill be explored in la.ter chapters. To cornplete this beginning
explorittion,however, it rvill be instnrctive to consider the ttotion that God
is,separote.from rtnd inclependentof the uorld. and the conceptionof Clodas
ar etcnrrtllteing.
We have notecl the ernergenceof monotheisrnout of henotl-reisruand
polvtheisrn.Monotheisrnis thc dorninanttraclitionin Juclaisrn,Christianity,
rurd Islanr.Another rriew of God has persistedsince ancient times, nnd still
flourishes,particnlarly in the rnajor religions of the East, Buclclhismancl
Flindtrisrn,rt vie\\, calleclpanthei,srn.According to pantheism, everything
that existshas an inncr nature that is one anclthe sarnein trll things,anclthat
inner rrature is Clocl.Later, rvhen we examine the experiencesof sor-neof
t4 ( ] I I . \ P T F , RI

the great rttvstics, rve shall consider pantheisln nrore {irllv. The funclamenta.l
iclea irr nronotheisni thnt Clocl is seporutc front the r,vorlcl constitutes rr
rejection of pantheisrn. Accorcling to thc Jucleo-Christian trncl Islarnic con-
ceptiorr of'Gorl, the rvorlcl is entirc'I1' rlistinct from Gocl; everrything in it
corrlcl be entirelv annihilatecl rvithorrt the slightest change in the reality of
the clivine being. There are. o1'colrrse, things in the r"uild more like God
than other things. Since hurnirn lleings are lir.irrg uncl rational, thev are rlore
like Gocl than :rre stones uncl trees. Brrt beinglikc Gorl anrlbeing God are
enorl"nouslv cli{ferent. The rvorkl is not the clivine. ancl the notion that Ckrcl
is separate frorn the rvorlcl is rneant to enrphusizerther fundan-rental differ-
ence betrveen the rea.litr,'of Gocl ancl thc reralitl, of the u'orld.
T l r a t ( i o t l i s i n r l c p t ' n < l t ' r rotl ' t l r c r v o r l r l r l r " , , l r ,t l r i r tl r t ' i s n o t g o v e r n e cbl y
tunv of the ph-vsical ltru,s accorcling to u,hich the universe operates. But it
lrleilns rnrrch llrore than this. It a.lsome,ans that God is not subject to the
Inu's of spiice ancl tirne. Accorcling to the lirrv of'space, ncl object crln exist rr.t
trvo cliff'erent placersat one ancl ther sarnertirner.Of corrrse, tr pnrt of'an object
can erist at one plzrcein space rvhjle turother prrrt o{'it (if it is a large object)
can erist trt a difT'erent place. The Llrv cloesn't rleny this. Wh:rt it clenies is
thilt the u4role of an object can erist at hvo cliff'erent places in space at
the sarne tirne. Nou, if this larv appliecl to (]ocl, either Clocl rvoulcl be at
sorre place in space at a certuin time uncl nclt at clther places at that tirne
or he uorrlcl be evenu,4rere in space nt once, brrt onlv a purt of him in ea.ch
part of spacc'. Neitherr of therse alternatives wirs acceptable to the great
theologians of therpust. On the first altel'native, rvhile Gocl rnight be present
in Boston at tr.certuin rnor-ncnt, he corrkhr't, at that nronlent, be present
in N€'\\, York. Ancl, on the secorrcl alternutir.e, rrltliorrgh Gocl coulcl be
both in Roston zrnclin Nerv York artthe srlrne tirne, it u'oulcl be one part of
Gocl in Neru,York ancl :r clifTerent part in Roston. C)n the trachtional icle:r of
Clcrcl.not onlv must Clod be at everv plzrce at the silrlre tirne, the tohole
o.f God rnrrst be at each rlistinct place ut the srlrnertin-rcr.The rvhole of God
is in Boston ancl in Ner,v York ut oner ancl thc salne tillre-indeecl, trt every
tinre. But such a r.ierv conflicts u'ith the lar,vof space. Ar-rclso the iclea of Gocl
thrit c'nrergecl in uresterrr civilization is the iclea of ir suprerne being who
is inclepenrlc'nt of the larvs of niitrrre unrl transcencls c'verrthe basic law of
spilc'c.
The iclca that ()ocl is not subject to ther linv of time is, as rve shall see,
closelv relaterl to one meiuring <.tfe|.cntifrT.Acconling to the lar,vof space,
nothing cir,rrerist as il u4role in tr.wrcli{hrent placc'sat the sarne tirle. Accrxcling
to the lau' of tin're, nothirrg can e'rist as a x'hole in hvo clifferent times at
tlte siule tinre. Trl rrnrlerstanrl the lau, o1'tirne. u,e neecl onlv consicler the
errrn'rple o{'a n-uuru'ho e-'xistc,'cl l'esterclil, exists toclav, ancl will exist tomorrow.
The u4role n'ran erists at etich of these clif.fux'nt tinlcs. That is. it is not that
 THE II)EA OF (;OD 15

only his arm, sav,existedyesterday,his head existstoday, and his legs will
exist tomorrrlrv. But even though the whole man exists at each of these
tlrree times, the rvhole temporal ltfn of the man cloesnot exist at each of
these times. The temporal part of his life that was yesterdaydoes not exist
todtu'; at best he can share in it only by rernemberingit. And the ternporal
part of his lif.e that will be tomorrow does not exist today; at best he can
slrarein it only by anticipating it. Although the u;holenlon existsat earchof
these three times, his u;holn lrfu exists ertnone of thern. His li{.e,then, is
dividecl up into many temporal parts and at any particula.rtin-reonly one of
these temporal parts is present to him. Thus a person'slife exemplifiesthe
larv of time. For accorcling to that lar,vthe indiviclual temporal parts of a
person'slife cannot all be present to hirn at once. For reasonswe neeclnot
pursue here, the great medieval theologiansrvere reluctant to view God's
lif'eas split up into ternporalparts, and so took the viervthat God transcends
the lar,vof tirne zrswell as the law of space.Even though it is scarcelyintelli-
"the
gible,they took the vier,v,as Anselm expressesit, that suprelne Nature
existsin place ancltirne in some such w&/, that it is not prevented frorn so
existing,lo,rltnr'reously,as a whole, in clifhrent placesor tir't't"r."nAccording
to this idea, the rvhole beginninglessand endless life of God is present
to hirn at each moment of time, and the whole of Gocl is simultaneously
present at every place in space.
Eternal hits two clistinctmeanings.To be eternal in one senseis to have
endlessten-rporalexistence,without beginning and without end; it is to htrve
infinite cluration in both temporal directions. Nor,vthere is nothing in this
rneaning of eternol that conflicts with the law of tirne. The law of tirne
rvoulclimplv only that anything that is temporally infinite has an infinity of
temporal prlrts rnakingup its life such that at no time doesit have more than
one of theseternporalparts present to it; the other ternporalparts would be
either in its perstor in its firture. Accordingto the secondrneaningof eternol,
hower,,er,an eternal being does not hirve its life broken up into temporzrl
parts,fbr it is not subjectto the law of time. So,accordingto this rneaningof
eternal, a being hilving infinite duration in each temporal direction and
subjectto the law of time would not be eterrr:rl.As the Roman scholarBoethius
(,r.r. 480-524) noted:

\\'haterrer is subject to the condition of time, even that r,vhich-as Aristrttle

conceived the r.vorlcl to be-has no beginning and r,vill hatve no encl in a lifct
coextensive rvitli the infinitl' o{'time, is such that it canuot riglttly be thorrght
eternal. For it ckresnot cornprehend and include the rvhole of itrfinite lif'e all
at once, since it cloes not ermbrace the future r,vhich is vet to cotre. Tliere-
fore. onlv thtit u4rich con-rprehencls and possesses the r.vliole plenitucle o{'
encllesslif'e together, from u'hjch no future thing nor any past tliing is absent,
can justlv be callecl eternul."
t6 (]I]APTER1

Boethius,Ansehn,Aquinas, anclother traditional theologiansinterpreted

the eternity of God in the secondof-the two sensesjust distinguishecl.They
held that God is outsicleof time, not subject to its funclarnentallaw. Other
theologians,however, took the view that God is eternal in the fir515sn5s-
that he has infinite duration in both temporul clirections.The eighteenth-
century English theologian SarnuelClarke, for exarnple,rejecteclthe idea
that a being rnight transcendtime asa senseless icleal,ancltook the view th:rt
to be eternul is sirnply to be eaerlasting,existingin time but having neither
beginning nor end. When we later study the problern of divine foreknowledge
rrnd hrrrnanfreedoln, we shall reconsider these two sensesof eternitryancl
note their implications for the doctrine of divine foreknowledge.For the
rnornent, however, it is sufficient to recognize that eternitv is a central
elernent in the traditional idea of God and that it has bereninterpreted in
tr,voclistinct lvays.
We ha.vebeen exploring some of the basic fea.turesrnakingup the iclea
of God tha.thave been central in the western religioustraclition.According
to this idea, Gocl is a supremely good being, creator of but separate{rorn
and independent of the world, ornnipotent, ornniscient,eternal, and self-
eristent. In the course of exploring this itletr of God, we have ulso notecl
various other conceptionsof the divine associatedwith polytheisrn,heno-
theisur,rnonotheism,and piintheisn-r. The idea of'Goclthat will be of centrill
importance in this book, horvever,is the icleuelaborateclby the tradition:rl
rvesterntheologians.It is the major idea of Goclin the three great religions
of'westerncivilization:Judaisrn,Christianity,trnd Islanr.Up to this point rve
"the
have used Robir-rson's expression God out there" and the expression
"the
Gocl of the traditional theologians"to refer to this idea of Gocl.Frorn
tlris point on, horvever, we sharllcall this view of G<lclthe tlrci,sflciclea of
Gocl.To be a theist, then, is to believe in the existenceof a suprernelvgoocl
being, creator of but sepzrratefrorn and independent of the world, omni-
potent, rtrnniscient,eternal (ln eritherof our tu'o senses),a.nclself-existent.
An athei,sfis anvone rvho believes that the theistic God cloersnot exist,
rvherettsa\ agnostic is sorneonewho has consicleretlthe theistic ide:r of
Gocl but believes neither in the eristence nor in the nonexistenceof the
theistic Clod.
\\'e htrvejust useclthe terrns theist, nthei,st,antl a.gnosticirt n restricterl
or nrlrrow sense.In the broaclersense,a theist is sorneonewho berlievesin
the existenceof a divine being or beir-rgs,even if his idea of'the clivine is
quite clifferent frorn the idea of Gocl we ha.vebeen clescribing.Sirnilarly,
in the brotrder senseof the terr-n,an atheist is sor-neone who re,jectsbelief
in e','eryfirnn of cleity, not just ther God of the traclitional theologians.
To avoiclconfusion, it is importunt to keep in n-rinclbotlr the narrow und
the ltroarclersensesof these tenls. In tlre narrow serlse.the Protesttrnt
 T I I EI D E AO F G O D L7

theologianTillich is an atheist,for he rejected belief in what we have called

the theistic God. But in the broader sensehe is a theist sincehe believedin
a divine reality, albeit clifferent frorn the theistic God. For the most part I
shall rrsethe terrns theisnt, athei,strt,and agnctsticismin the narrow sense.
Thus when we consiclerthe question of what grounds there are fbr theism,
rve .shallbe concemed with whether there are rational grounds for the
existence of the theistic Gocl (the God of the traditional theologians).
And r,vhenwe ask, for example, whether the facts about evil in the world
support the truth of atheism,we shall be askingwhether the existenceof
evil provides rational grounds for the conclusionthat the theistic God does
not exist.
Having clarified the idea of the theistic God, we can now considersome
of these larger questions.And we shtrllbegin with the question of whether
belief in his existencectrn be rationally iustified.

:
ToprcsFoRRnvtnw
I

!j
1. Briefly define the conceptspolqthei,srn,henothei,srn,ttnd nwnotheism.
i

fi 2. Explain how Gocl can be ornnipotent trnd yet not have it in his power
to clo evil.
3. What is rneant by u self-existentbeing, ancl {br what reasonsdoes
Ansehn think that God is a self-existentbeing?
4. Statethe luw of spaceand the law of time, and indicate the connection
betrveen the law of tirne and what is meant by the eternity of God.
5. Describe the theistic iclea of Gocl anclrvhat is meant by theism,
otheism, anclogrtosticisnt.

ToprcsFoRFunrunnSrupv

l Horv would you clefine the term Godi' If your clefinition of God is
clifferent frorn the theistic idea of'God, explain the di{l.erencesand
give reasonsrvhy your icleaof God rnight be a better one.
2 . What reasonsr,vouldyou give to show that God exists,as you've
clefinedCod I What reasonsnight someonegive for rejecting either
vour clefinition o{ God or vour clairn thnt God (as definetl by you)
actuallv exists'PHow rvoulclyou respor-rcl?