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The global spread of democracy and the changing nature of the international
system in the post-Cold War era have been attributed to many factors. Among these,
and probably one of the most important, is the emergence of international organizations
in a global system that has become increasingly interconnected because of the process of
globalization. Although the term was originally coined to refer to economic processes,
“globalization” now encompasses a broader scope. It permeates the social, cultural, and
political spheres. Of course, globalization in itself is not an active entity. The manner in
which it surpasses national boundaries to seep through practically all spheres of life is
naturally done through active agents.
One principal agent (and as I’ve said, probably one of the most important) in
which “interconnection” happens are international organizations (IOs), basically
referring to organizations that are not state-based, and whose goals are, similarly, not
confined to any particular nation-state. International organizations are sub-grouped
into international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). The basic difference between the two is that the former is
independent of any government, while the latter, though still not based on any single
government, is composed of governments.
From the materials I have studied, the literature on International Organizations is
largely concentrated, forgive the pun, on basically four main issues, which this paper
intends to assess and synthesize. Three of these issues are concerned with the impact of
IOs in general: global governance, global democracy, and norm-construction. The last
issue is concerned with the problem of global accountability.
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The informal mechanism in which norm-construction takes place involves the
media, and shaping the public opinion of citizens. This will be discussed more
extensively in the third part of this paper.
When it comes to international monitoring, IOs take a “watchdog” role to the
states. Blitt (2004) points out four ways in which IOs, particularly those advocating
human rights, fulfill this role: (1) information gathering, evaluation and dissemination
(documentation and education), (2) monitoring and advocacy (enforcement), (3)
development of human rights norms (empowerment), and (4) legal and humanitarian
assistance (democratization and development). Concretely, Blitt points out that these
are usually done by carefully documenting alleged abuses, clearly demonstrating state
accountability for those abuses under international law, and developing a mechanism
for effectively exposing documented abuse nationally and internationally.
Amnesty International, for example, is an IO advocating the release of all
“prisoners of conscience”, that is, “people imprisoned because of their race, ethnicity,
sex, economic status, religion, or national origin, or for peacefully expressing their
political belief” (Microsoft Encarta 2009). The group achieves its goals through
interviews with the victims of human rights abuses, letter-writing campaigns, news
conferences, and fundraising events. These means, though seemingly trivial compared
with state capacity, serve to rally public support in pressuring government officials to
recognize their cause.
Another organization, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontiéres)
forwards its cause through more concrete means, by providing medical aid to more
than 80 countries. The organization recruits health professionals to volunteer for a few
months or a year, and it is through these volunteers’ testimonies that the organization
speaks to the public against human rights violations.
Few can deny the global spread of democracy in the twentieth century. Russett
and Oneal (2003) argue that this, along with the emergence of international
organizations, and the economic interdependence that exists among states, have
contributed to the absence of inter-state wars in recent times. To further this established
relationship between “peace” and “democracy, economic interdependence and
international organizations” there are also scholars who argue that the proliferation of
the democratic ideal, in the first place, is also the result of the emergence of
international organizations.
There are two main ways in which IOs influence democratization. One way is
through structural incentives. Pevehouse (2002) argues that the rise of democracy as a
global phenomenon cannot be a solely domestic process (i.e. “inside-out”), but rather,
was made possible because of the structural setup in international organizations that
usually encourages the practice of democratic principles among countries. Pevehouse
refers to this as democracy from the “outside-in”. The author, in this case, is referring
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specifically to membership of states to intergovernmental institutions. However, the
author also concedes that a definite causal link between IOs and democracy is yet to be
established.
Pevehouse also points out that membership of a non-democratic country to an
IGO composed of democratic countries (such as the United Nations) puts political
pressure on that particular country to democratize. IGOs can do this by applying
diplomatic pressure or by “de-legitimizing” a non-democratic regime. Also,
membership in an IGO entails conforming to agreed conventions. An example of this is
the United Nations (UN). Many of its conventions are conducive to, if not promoting,
democracy. However, given the anarchic nature of the international system, a non-
democratic member of UN always has the option not to sign to these conventions, or to
sign and not implement them in domestic law.
The other way in which IOs have helped in the “globalization of democracy” is
by lobbying mass support for democratic principles through information dissemination.
This is usually associated more with INGOs than IGOs. Though incapable of using
concrete political or economic pressure to nation-states, they engage in direct appeal.
INGOs are capable of shaping norms and building ideas, specifically through the
utilization of media, even to the extent of establishing “a hegemony of ideas” and
shaping a specific “global public opinion” on particular issues, if one would use the
Constructivist approach towards analyzing this. Amnesty International, for example,
promotes human rights by conducting and publishing newsletters on researches and
reports of human rights violations. Another example is Reporters Without Borders
(Reporters Sans Frontiéres), which seeks to promote press freedom and condemn the
political harassment of journalists by reporting the treatment of the media in states all
over the world.
Another important issue discussed in the literature on IOs is their role in creating
international norms. Since the formal mechanisms in which norms are created were
already discussed in the first section, this part of the paper seeks to explain the informal
mechanisms used by IOs in creating norms. This is usually associated with INGOs,
particularly with “international advocacy networks” defined by Keck and Sikkink
(1998) as organizations built on shared values and principles and who engage in
voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal exchange of information and services. In the same
way, Khagram (2002) argues that the primary goal of transnational advocacy is to
create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms. Pubantz (2005) argues
the role of international organizations, particularly the UN, in constructing reason. He
demonstrates this by pointing out that prior to 1945, human rights was not something
recognized and protected. It was only when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
came out that human rights became “embedded” as an unquestionable norm in
international law.
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Through a process called “socialization”, these scholars argue that international
advocacy networks are able to influence a state’s perception of its “national interest”.
One may easily recognize this assertion as the core of Constructivism in International
Relations theory. This line of thought, while conceding to the traditional perception of
states as self-interested entities, actually advances it by saying that state self-interest can
be “constructed”.
However, the informal construction of norms banks on states only indirectly. It
bases itself largely on influencing public opinion and the perceptions of normal citizens
through symbols that appeal to human sentiments, and by framing issues at a more
personal level. It is by constructing society, and citizens’ notions of “right” and
“wrong”, that these informal norms actually “trickle up”, please pardon the term, to the
level of the state.
Everett Rogers (2003), though not referring specifically to international
organizations alone, analyzes the emergence of advocacy groups, and the diffusion of
ideas. According to him, innovations are usually perceived as uncertain, and even risky.
This pushes a person who adheres to a particular innovation to seek others like himself,
and group together to spread their ideas. Rogers also explains how this process has
become faster and more advanced because of the advent of the Internet in the nineties.
An opposing perspective comes from scholars such as Sidney Tarrow (2005), who
does not give quite as much credit to IOs in norm-creation. Unlike the previously
mentioned authors, Tarrow argues that these organizations are actually only means for
states to forward their interest, and to extend the scope of their influence.
In this perspective, IOs are not independent actors trying to influence independent
states through norm-construction. They are acting based on the values that were
already embedded to them, because of the context in which they belong. In this sense,
the author argues that there can be no sharp delineation between the international and
the local. The “international” cannot possibly exist, free of nation-states.
The logic in this argument is that the values these IOs advocate did not originate in
the international arena itself. These are already existing values that originate from a
particular nation-state. In fact, INGOs themselves are already a product of the norms
created within a particular state or society.
To demonstrate the friction that exists between these two perspectives, one
interesting norm to look at is environmental protection. In the first perspective (hereby
dubbed “the socialization perspective”), its emergence as a global concern can be
attributed to a handful of organizations who value the environment, and who have
utilized media and public opinion to the extent that environmental protection has been
established “in the hearts and minds” of most people (please pardon the drama) as
something good.
The other perspective, however, would argue that these values already exist within
a particular state, and that the influence exercised by IOs in advocating the values that
they do, is actually just the extension of the influence exercised by the state from which
they originate. In Left lingo, one would call this “modern imperialism”.
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Of course, these scholars may be both right and wrong. Though it is true that
INGOs themselves are products of the values shaped in the society they originated
from, one cannot deny the implicit effects of their utilization of symbols and public
opinion in shaping social norms. Second, it is very important to take into account the
fact that members of INGOs actually come from different states. The fact that they share
the same values despite the difference in context is enough to discredit the “modern
imperialism” argument.
Moreover, this debate assumes that values are necessarily man-made, as though
there were no universal and inherent sense of “right” and “wrong” in important issues
such as life, for example. Both theories ignore the possibility that INGOs, far from
having a hidden, norm-shaping agenda, are merely agents advocating universal values
that truly have a global consensus. But of course, the non-/universality of values is
another debate altogether.
Another issue when it comes to IOs is their accountability. In principle, they act
in the international arena independent from other states. The main problem is the lack
of a higher authority to demand from them. This is even more problematic recently
because the number of IOs has escalated considerably, and they are being given
consultative status in the UN. International tribunals are also becoming more
dependent on IOs for information. An example is the role of IOs in providing
information for the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic.
One may argue that IOs are even more effective than states in carrying out their
agenda, since their non-state status frees them from diplomatic constraints. Moreover,
their activities (research, data gathering, monitoring and advocacy, health aid) do not
usually require prior certification, and there is no mechanism of delineating them from
other third parties pursuing the same activities.
What is problematic, however, is that their methodology is often haphazard, and
their conclusions, hasty. These organizations often rely on unauthorized statements by
victims, whose identities are not even usually revealed.
One example of a “haphazard methodology” is the 2002 report by a Palestinian
NGO (which was immediately reported by international media and other international
NGOs) on a “massacre” that happened in the Jenin refugee camp, which turned out to
be a confrontation of armed combatants.
Other problematic cases involve INGOs not following the standards they have
set for themselves. One example is when Amnesty International sent two West German
members to investigate West Germany, despite its core principle that members should
not investigate in their home country.
There are also cases when the behavior of an INGO is inconsistent with its
original purpose. For example, B’Tselem, an Israeli organization, is often involved in
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negotiations with terrorist groups, even though its main thrust is in educating the
public and policy-makers on human rights.
If these IOs are all for the promotion of “the good”, all is well. On the other hand,
what happens when these IOs cause damages? Can states, or even individuals, sue
them? This is problematic, because the only actors International Law recognizes are
states. This issue is being tackled in more recent literature by several scholars, such as
Michael Szporluk (2009), Kerstin Martens (2003), and Blitt (2004).
There is a consensus among scholars that there is a problem when it comes to the
accountability of INGOs. Some, like Martens, point out that this problem arises from
their non-status in International Law, in the first place. After all, how can you hold
accountable an entity that is not even recognized fully as an actor in international law?
Others scholars, however, such as Szporluk and Blitt, propose alternative solutions to
this problem.
None of the scholars I have encountered in my study argue for tight constraints
on INGOs, since checking mechanisms that bind them to the state in any way might
render their purpose (and their very nature as non-governmental organizations, in fact)
fruitless. This dilemma has pushed scholars to prefer mechanisms that allow for self-
government.
Szporluk argues for a self-checking mechanism among INGOs; that they must be
accountable to the community in which they are serving. According to him, they must
adhere to, and respect, local processes, instead of imposing their own.
Blitt, on the other hand, while still arguing within a self-government perspective,
proposes the creation of an independent body of IOs, composed of representatives from
different IOs. This body is expected to come up with a mechanism that ensures
transparency among IOs through incentives. The author suggests annual reports on the
performance of IOs, and even awards for whatever good they might have done.
These authors make a good point in suggesting self-checking mechanisms.
Indeed, once these IOs become “beholden” to any government, they would probably
become ineffective. However, I do not think it would hurt either if external checks are
imposed, as long as the standards are clear (and therefore not prone to abuse) and
minimal (such as transparency in research methodology, for example). It is possible, for
example, to create an external international body that ensures these standards are
followed.
The relationship between INGOs and states is extremely similar to that of the
media and the state. The media also fulfills a similar role; that is, it proves information
to the public, and serves as a watchdog to the state. In the case of the media, however,
we know that there are existing minimal constraints (such as laws against libel) that
allow for accountability on their part. Without these constraints, there is, indeed, a great
possibility for media to abuse its freedom. The minimal constraints that exist make it
possible for media to act more responsibly (relative to the previous scenario) while still
maintaining their role as a watchdog. In a similar way, having external checks on
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INGOs may actually work better, rather than allowing them to put internal checks on
themselves.
Conclusion:
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Bibliography: