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Asymmetric Warfare Group "Attack the Network" Counterinsurgency Methodology: Part 3

Asymmetric Warfare Group "Attack the Network" Counterinsurgency Methodology: Part 3

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Published by Impello_Tyrannis
OVERVIEW:
This document continues discussion on effective targeting methods (lethal and non-lethal) at
the Battalion and Brigade level. It continues dialogue on Attacking the Network by further describing
Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability analysis themes and their link to network modeling.
This document also discusses the use of detailed, Observable Indicators to focus Intelligence Surveillance
and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy's vulnerabilities. A modified Intelligence
Synchronization Matrix (ISM) ensures integration and synchronization to the friendly course of action
in a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified
ISM helps the S2 understand the insurgent networks operating in his Area of Interest, focus assets
against the known or suspected Critical Vulnerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander
the information he needs at the Decision Points.
BACKGROUND:
Part I of the Attack the Network Methodology series discussed the significance of understanding
an ideologically motivated insurgent leader's approach to influencing the Center of Gravity
(COG). The major point discussed within the first paper was the need for commanders and staffs at
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and below to understand the significance of targeting Tier II personalities,
or "Intermediaries." Tier III targeting may result in immediate impacts to security, but are typically
not long term gains. Tier II targeting severs the link between the ideologically motivated Tier I
leadership and the Tier III cell members and develops longer term effects. Part II of the Attack the
Network Methodology series focused on personality targeting as one of the keys to attacking an insurgent
network. Units need to analyze the enemy's Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements,
and Critical Vulnerabilities. Analysts then identify HVls and the associated tasks they perform in order
to have a significant impact on the enemy. We need to attack the threat's weaknesses and contain
its strengths. The final discussion focuses attention on "how" to identify the targets we determine
are a higher priority for attack.
We can easily convince ourselves that detailed analysis of threats is not required because
the situation is too fluid. Several published articles focusing on the strategic issues of intelligence
and analysis in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment have argued that we must be adaptive,
that we must completely re-think our analytical processes. In some ways, they are correct; we have
to continually adjust to new threat Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. More importantly, however,
is the reality that analysis in a tactical COIN environment must be extremely detailed. After all, what
is harder to find, a Motorized Rifle Regiment or a High Value Individual (HVI)?
When a commander uses an indirect approach to attacking a threat in his battle space he will
have the intelligence staff, with assistance from other staff elements, identify those areas within the
insurgency network that are most vulnerable. Once those Critical Vulnerabilities are identified, the
intelligence staff should start working diligently to find out who are the threat personalities within the
network. That is a major challenge in the COIN fight. Imagine an S2 coming into theater for the first.
time, taking over a new area and understanding what needs to be done, but not knowing where to
start. In the traditional Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), the S2 would start Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) by defining the battlefield environment, describing battlefield effects,
evaluating the th reat, and determining the threat Courses of Action (COA).1 An intelligence
officer would list out the threat's organization, capabilities, battle formations in a doctrinal template,
and then plot known and suspected positions on a situational template based on reporting and
sound tactical reasoning. He would then determine
OVERVIEW:
This document continues discussion on effective targeting methods (lethal and non-lethal) at
the Battalion and Brigade level. It continues dialogue on Attacking the Network by further describing
Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability analysis themes and their link to network modeling.
This document also discusses the use of detailed, Observable Indicators to focus Intelligence Surveillance
and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy's vulnerabilities. A modified Intelligence
Synchronization Matrix (ISM) ensures integration and synchronization to the friendly course of action
in a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified
ISM helps the S2 understand the insurgent networks operating in his Area of Interest, focus assets
against the known or suspected Critical Vulnerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander
the information he needs at the Decision Points.
BACKGROUND:
Part I of the Attack the Network Methodology series discussed the significance of understanding
an ideologically motivated insurgent leader's approach to influencing the Center of Gravity
(COG). The major point discussed within the first paper was the need for commanders and staffs at
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and below to understand the significance of targeting Tier II personalities,
or "Intermediaries." Tier III targeting may result in immediate impacts to security, but are typically
not long term gains. Tier II targeting severs the link between the ideologically motivated Tier I
leadership and the Tier III cell members and develops longer term effects. Part II of the Attack the
Network Methodology series focused on personality targeting as one of the keys to attacking an insurgent
network. Units need to analyze the enemy's Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements,
and Critical Vulnerabilities. Analysts then identify HVls and the associated tasks they perform in order
to have a significant impact on the enemy. We need to attack the threat's weaknesses and contain
its strengths. The final discussion focuses attention on "how" to identify the targets we determine
are a higher priority for attack.
We can easily convince ourselves that detailed analysis of threats is not required because
the situation is too fluid. Several published articles focusing on the strategic issues of intelligence
and analysis in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment have argued that we must be adaptive,
that we must completely re-think our analytical processes. In some ways, they are correct; we have
to continually adjust to new threat Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. More importantly, however,
is the reality that analysis in a tactical COIN environment must be extremely detailed. After all, what
is harder to find, a Motorized Rifle Regiment or a High Value Individual (HVI)?
When a commander uses an indirect approach to attacking a threat in his battle space he will
have the intelligence staff, with assistance from other staff elements, identify those areas within the
insurgency network that are most vulnerable. Once those Critical Vulnerabilities are identified, the
intelligence staff should start working diligently to find out who are the threat personalities within the
network. That is a major challenge in the COIN fight. Imagine an S2 coming into theater for the first.
time, taking over a new area and understanding what needs to be done, but not knowing where to
start. In the traditional Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), the S2 would start Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) by defining the battlefield environment, describing battlefield effects,
evaluating the th reat, and determining the threat Courses of Action (COA).1 An intelligence
officer would list out the threat's organization, capabilities, battle formations in a doctrinal template,
and then plot known and suspected positions on a situational template based on reporting and
sound tactical reasoning. He would then determine

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Published by: Impello_Tyrannis on Oct 14, 2010
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OVERVIEW:
UNCLASSIFIED
//FOR
OFFICIAL
USE
ONLY
APRIL
2009
ATTACK
THE
NETWORK
METHODOLOGY: PART 3NETWORK MODELING AND ISR SYNCHRONIZATION
ASYMMETRIC
WARFARE
GROUP
1
Thisdocument continuesdiscussionon effective targetingmethods(lethal
and
non-lethal) atthe Battalion and Brigadelevel.
It
continues dialogue
on
Attacking the Network
by
further describing Center of Gravity and CriticalVulnerabilityanalysis themes and theirlink to networkmodeling. This document also discusses the use of detailed, ObservableIndicatorsto focusIntelligenceSur veillance and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy's vulnerabilities. A modified IntelligenceSynchronization Matrix (ISM) ensuresintegration
and
synchronization
to
thefriendly course
of
action
in
a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal
and
situational templates
and
a modified
ISM
helps the S2 understand the insurgentnetworksoperating
in
his Area ofInterest,focus assetsagainst the known
or
suspected Critical Vulnerabilities,
and
synchronizeISRto givethecommander the information he needs at the DecisionPoints.
BACKGROUND:
Part I
of
the Attack theNetwo
rk
Methodology seriesdiscussedthe significance of understanding an ideologically motivated insurgent leader's approachtoinfluencing the Center of Gravity (COG).The major point discussed within the first paper wastheneed for commanders
and
staffs atBrigadeCombat Team (BCT)
and
belowtounderstand the significance oftargetingTier
II
personalities, or"Intermediaries."Tier
III
targeting may result
in
immediate impactstosecurity, but are typically notlongterm gains.Tier
II
targetingsevers the link between the ideologically motivatedTier I leadershipandthe Tier
III
cell members and develops longer term effects. Part
II
of the AttacktheNetworkMethodology series focused
on
personality targetingasoneof the keystoattacking
an
insurgent network. Units need to analyze the enemy's Critical Capabilities, CriticalRequirements,
and
Critical Vulnerabilities. Analysts thenidentify HVls
and
the associated tasks they perform
in
order to have a significantimpacton the enemy. We need to attack the threat's weaknesses and contain its strengths. Thefinaldiscussion focuses attention
on
"how"toidentify the targets
we
determine are a higher priority for attack.We can easily convince ourselves that detailed analysis of threats
is
not required becausethe situation
is
too fluid. Several published articlesfocusingon the strategicissuesof intelligence
and
analysis
in
the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment have argued that we must be adaptive,that we must completely re-think our analytical processes.
In
some ways, they are correct; we haveto continually adjust to new threat Tactics,Techniques
and
Procedures. More importantly, however,
is
therealitythat analysis
in
a tactical COIN environment must be extremely detailed. After all, what
is
harder to find, a Motorized Rifle Regiment or a High ValueIndividual(HVI)?When a commander uses
an
indirect approach to attacking a threat
in
his battle space he willhave the intelligence staff, with assistancefromother staff elements,identify thoseareas within the insurgencynetwork thatare most vulnerable.Once those Critical Vulnerabilities areidentified, the
Modifying doctrinally sound processes for application
in
a
COIN
environment canwork to successfully target and destroy enemy networks.
1
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
OFFICIAL
USE
ONLY
 
UNCLASS
I
FIED
/ /FOR OF
FICIAL
U
SE ONLY
2
intelligence staff should start working
di
ligentlyto find outwho arethe threatpersona
li
ties within t
he
networ
k.
Th
atis amajor cha
ll
engein the
COI
Nfight.Imagine
an
S2 co
ming intotheater f
or
the fi
rs
t.
time, taking over a new area and understanding whatneeds to be done, but not knowing where to start. In the traditionalMilitary Decision Maki
ng
Process (MDMP),the
S2
would startIntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield (IPB) by defini
ng
the battlefield environmen
t,
describing battlefield ef-fects,evaluating the threat,and determ
in
i
ng
the threat Courses of Acti
on
(COA).1 An intelligenceofficerwould
li
stoutthe threat's or
ga
nization,capabilities, battle formations ina doct
ri
naltemplate, andthen plot knowna
nd
suspectedpositions
on
a situationaltemplatebased on reportinga
nd
sound tacti
ca
l reasoni
ng
. He wou
ld
th
en
determi
ne
possible COAs based
on
t
he
threat's COG, ob- jective/intent, and capab
il
ities and vul
ne
rabi
li
ties. Why should thatbe
an
ydifferent
in
a COIN envi-ronment?
Using doctrinaland situational templates, as well as a modified Intelligence Synchro-nization Matrix (ISM) the S2 can better understand the insurgent networks operatingin his Area of Interest, focus ISR assets against the known or suspected Critical
VUl-
nerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander the information he needs
at
the Decision Points.
NETWORK
MODELS
The process starts by identifying the Criti
ca
lCapabilities, Critical Requirements,
and
CriticalVulnerabilities of the threat within the battle space (the second paperin this series covers this topic
in
detail). Once the Critical Capability or Threat Network
in
the area
is
identified
we
must considerall of the actions that take place for the network to
be
successful.Forexampl
e,
if the Critical Capa-bility
is
to provide
log
istics then there are several Critical Requirements that must
be
identifi
ed
.Wecanu
se
a simple wire
di
agram to describe the link between ea
ch
of the CriticalRequirements; this
is
a
ty
pe of doctrinal template.
In
the following exampl
e,
a commander wants to neutra
li
zet
he
threat's
ab
il
ityto detonateIm- provised Explosi
ve
Devices
(I
EDs)
in
his battle space. The staff
knoWs
the components are comingfrom a nearby country.They also know that caches are oftenused and the components must
be
brought to a centralized locati
on
for
an
expert to make the bomb.The
in
telli
ge
nce staffbegins
wo
rkby describing each of the Critical Requirements associated withthe threat opera
ti
on. They canwargame the threat's actions from the pointof detonation,
and
work backwards
in
time,
or
they
can
start with the
in
itial action.
In
the example,the staff chose
to
start from the beginni
ng.
Eachof theCritical Requirements was labeled with a "lette
r".
The staff determinedt
he
fo
ll
owing Critical Requi
re
-ments had to occur for there to be a successful detonation: smugglel
ED
materials across aninte
r-
national border,distribute materials, cache materials,assemble materialsinto aneffective lED, con- ductreconnaissance, emplace lED,and detonatelED.Other requirements were added as the staff began to understand the tasks associated with the insurgent movement of lethalaid and bomb- making (seeFigure
1).
2
UN
CLASSIFI
ED
/ /
FO
RO
FFICIAL
US
E
ON
LY
 
UNC
LA
SSIF
I
ED
j
jFOR
OFF
I
CIA
L
US
EONLY
3
NetworkMode
li
ng
in
a COINfi
gh
t
=
Do
ctr
in
al
T
emp
l
at
i
ng
St
ep
1:
Desc
ri
be
t
he
Net
work
EF
Fi
gure
1.
A.
lEDComponents are completely
or
partially constructed at a factory
or
warehouse
in
anothercountry.B.Materials aretransportedto
an
officialinternational bordercrossing point OR.
..
C.Materials are transported acrossthe porousbo
rd
er r
eg
ion usi
ng
as
mu
ggling
rou
t
e.
D.Materials pass the scrutiny ofa
bo
rder
po
li
ce
office
r.E.
Materials possibly undergo
add
itionalscrutiny
in
a secondary sear
ch
area atthe
bo
rder
po
i
nt.
F.Materials are moved
to
a distribution point.
G.
Materials are trans-loaded onto smaller, more maneuverable vehicles and moved to cache points/safe houses or directly to a bomb maker.H.Materials are cached for future use.
I.
Materials are drawnfrom a cache point
and
moved to
an
assembly point for use against Coa-lition Forces.
J.
Insurgents conduct surveillance of the probable lED emplacement point.
K.
lED is emplaced.L. Trigger man moves into position.M.lED detonated.N.Trigger man leaves the scene, conducts Battle Damage Assessment, andreports information to his commande
r.
This
wi
ll
likely also include turni
ng
over video recordings to be used
as
part of a media message
and
for Battle Damage Assessment.
3
UNCLASSIF
IEDjjFOR OFFICIAL
USE
ON
LY

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