y

S O S

 UNCLASSiFl!

REPORT

OF

C O K B I H i D

A.1 R B 0 R H E - T R 0 0 P C A R R I E

M A N E U V E R

24 T O 29 S E P T E M B E R 1944

' % DEC 1944

, WDGS"

B. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

#'
 IE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER

Camp Mac kail, Jforth Carolina

I - Summary

II » Preparation

the Project

Purpose

The problem

Maneuver rrea

Maneuver Staff organization

participating units

Control of Area

The Plan

Glider evacuation

medical

Visitors* pureau

umpires

priefings

III - Execution

•neception

pathfinder Mission

Parachute Mission

Glider Landing Mission

Air Transport Landings

Medical Evacuation

Air Cargo pesupply

IV - Appendices

A' - Orders, Memorandums and Instructions issued by

Maneuver Headquarters.

v - General staff sections

C - Special Staff Sections

weather

vcignal and Communications

Qua r te rmas t e r

Surgeon

public Relations officer

provost Marshal

Engineering ard maintenance

Transportation

T) - I Tactical rir division

E - 13th Airborne revision

p - 60th Troop Carrier wing

G - 1st Provisionsl Troop Carrier Group

fci
c
F - Umpires
O H

Chief Ground Umpire

Chief ^ir Umpire w F

Chief medical umpire

I - photographs

j - Maps

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp M a c k a l l , N o r t h C a r o l i n a

REPORT OF
COMBINED A3RBORME-IROQP CARRIER MANEUVER
SEPTEMBER 24- - 2 9 , 1 9 4 4
Summary of Maneuver

GENERAL

1« A combined Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver was conducted in the

North Carolina maneuver area in the general v i c i n i t y of Camp Mackall,
North Carolina during the period of 24 September 1944- t o 29 September 1944-j
inclus ive a

PURPOSE

2^. a* Training of Airborne and Troop Carrier Staffs in planning,

supervising and conducting Airborne operations.

b o Training of Airborne and Troop Carrier units in air movement,

rapid assembly and attack by combined arms during both day and night.

SCOPE

3# a. Duration of five days.

b# Employment of at least two departure air bases.

c. Objective area to be reached by circuitous route of approxi­

mately 100 miles,

d. Landing'and assembly of units to be made at night to the

maximum extent practicable.

e. No contact to be made with friendly ground forces prior to

f• After the Division has been closed in the objective a r e a ,

resupply and evacuation by a i r and/or a i r landings u n t i l D/4.

TROOPS

A.
BLUE RED TASK FORCE
13th AB Div. 151st AB~Tank Co Staffs of AB, TCC. XXII Corps
60th TC Wing 89th Div Ren Troop 4105 QM Co (Truck;
Units I TAD 841st A/iA L/H Bn 4107 QM Co (Truck)
130th Evac Kosp 161st AB Sngr Bn 3978 QM Co (Truck)
85th Sig Opns Co
Prov MP Co
511 Med Coll Co
512 Med Coll Co

DESCRIPTION
5. a . A j o i n t staff composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the XSII Corpi;
the Airborne Center, and the I Troop .Carrier Command was organi
i n i t i a t e preparation for maneuver. This staff
arrangements, prepared the t a c t i c a l situa^ioErand issued i n s t r u c t i o n s t c
the participating units for the conduct of the maneuver. 3h addition, it

functioned as a higher headquarters during the actual maneuver.

b. The timing of operations was based on 25 September 194-4- as

D-day, H-hour being 0600 EWT.

c. The night movement of the 13th Airborne Division to its land­

ing area under blackout conditions was accomplished by two groups, the 34-9th

and 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Groups of the 60th Troop Carrier Wing. A

normal Troop Carrier Wing consists of four groups, each group consisting of

four squadrons containing 16 powered aircraft, with a total of 256 powered

aircraft in the Wing. These two Troop Carrier Groups were the only ones

available in the United States for this maneuver. The 1st Provisional Troop

Carrier Group had only three squadrons assigned. Accordingly, a Provisional

squadron was formed and assigned to this group. Each squadron of each group

v;as reinforced by seven additional powered aircraft and crevjs obtained from

Combat Crew Training Schools and Troop Carrier units in operational train­
ing. This resulted in the Wing having 18J+ powered aircraft, and crews

r.ssigned.

d. The 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group operating from Lumber-

tea and the 349th Group operating from Laur:.nburg*Maxton, with a total of

j.69 aircraft, transported paratroopers over a circuitous 100-mile courge to

\,hree parachute dropping zones and jumped their loads at five-minute inter­
vals on each PDZ beginning at 2030, D-l, 24- September. There was a complete

overcast at the time of the drop, with a 4.000-foot ceiling, and very re­
stricted visibility due to haze and smoke, affording a very dark night.

h'lo to the weather conditions in the blacked out area, many aircraft and

olements became lost and were not able to locate their respective targets.

This resulted in paratroopers being dropped in widely dispersed areas. Fol­

lowing the parachute serials, 20 CG-4u's were flown in double tow to land in

the same PDZ used by the paratroopers, carrying jeeps as prime movers for -i

ths guns of the parachute field artillery. All of these gliders arrived on

ttne and landed in the proper glider landing zone in spite of the limited

visibility. The maneuver would have been postponed for 24- hours to obtain

better weather conditions except for the fact the combined opinion of all

the weather officers in this region unfortunately was that poorer weather

conditions would prevail for the next several days. Actually the follow­
ing days turned out to be perfect.

e. The two groups were scheduled to bring 218 CG-4A gliders in

double tow, and four CG-13 gliders in single tow to seven glider landing

zones in the period first light to dawn. This would have resulted in more

than fifty percent of the Division being brought in during the hours of

darkness. However, due to unfavorable weathor conditions, the departure

of the gliders was delayed for two hours, and the gliders landed at 084$ •

All but four gliders landed in their respective zones, on time, and all were

within 4-4- minutes. This was considered a very successful mission.

f . The first tactical objective of the Division was the capture

•A the Camp Mackall Air Field. This was accomplished at 1200, 25 Septem­
ber, at which time the Division notified the Wing that the airport would

e available for air landings within one hour. Air landings were begun at

v-'rat time and the Division plus an evacuation hospital requiring 60 air­
»:vaft sorties closed with all its personnel by 2010, D-day, 25 September,

.JJ less than 24- hours. The entire Division was then developed for co­
\ iinated action. Resupply consisting of 4-70 tons followed immediately,

: id continued to 04.00 in the morning of 26 September, D/l, when suspended

<T. account of vjeather. Resupply for four days was resumed at daylight and

. ompleted by 1100, 26 September, /

g. On 27 September, D/2, an isolated battalion was supplied by

ir, using six aircraft, one of which was equipped, w i ^ h ^ §cMV(^fP ^J.t

installation for discharging the containers out of the door. This

proved very satisfactory. All bundles ncro dropped from the aircraft

as door loads by parachute at a low altitude, and all hit the target.

h. Units of the I Tactical iiir Division, Third Air Force,

participated in the maneuvers to provide escort, air coverage, pre-

planned, on-call and smoke laying missions.

i. Personnel transported in parachute drops, glider landings,

and air landings totalled 7130.

j. Equipment and supplies air transported totalled 134-3 tons.

k» Ten B-17 aircraft were provided for air landing purposes,

and each carried U5 airborne troops with full field equipment on every

trip.

1. The casualties during the maneuvers were 13 fatalities,

and 21 injuries requiring hospitalization for fractures, etc. (none

serious), Twelve of the casualties were caused by the crash of a C-47

aircraft as a result of colliding with field artillery bundles dropped

from the pararacks of a three-ship formation that crossed in front and

just above the formation containing this airplane. The thirteenth

casualty was caused by the malfunctioning of a paratrooper's chute, as

a result of this Darutrcoper putting on his gas mask over his parachute

harness and thereby preventing the chute from opening completely.

m. Separate reports covering all phases of the maneuver, to­

gether with recommendations and conclusions, are attached as annexes to

this reporta

CONCLUSIONS

6, The summarising conclusions ares

a. An Airborne Division can be air transported during hours of

darkness and can be landed in a predetermined tactical area only if the

light from a quarter moon or better is available, unless better navi­

gational aid can be provided.

b. That the wide dispersion of the parachutists1 drop was the

result of a combination of weather, lack of sufficient marking on the

ground to identify fields selected as targets, and the addition of ad­

ditional crews as a military necessity that could not be trained as a

unit.

C That the Division if landed in a predetermined tactical

area can be assembled and developed for coordinated offensive or defensive

action.

H. J. TERRELL, JR. ^v W. D. OLD J, T. DAEBEY

Major General, U. S. A, Brigadier General, U. S. A. Colonel, Thfat/fc '

Commanding, XXII Corps Ccmmanding, I Troop Carrier Commanding, Airbo. w

Command Center

 " •• PREPARATION

THE PROJECT

The developments of warfare in Purope and the

Pacific area had shown the decisive tactical value of

airborne-troop carrier forces. To further the perfec­

tion of training of airborne-troop carrier units for over

seas operation, the i7Tar "Department ordered the Commanding

aenerals of the Army Ground Forces and Army ^ir Forces to

hold a combiner maneuver of airborne-troop carrier forces

Accordingly, a joint maneuver was held by the 60th Troop

Carrier wing and 13th airborne division, at Camp *fackall,

North Carolina during September 1944, in compliance with

letters sent from Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces

and Army Air Forces, to the Commanding Generals of their

respective units.

PURPOSE

The objectives of the maneuver were two-fold* (1)

The training of airborne and troop carrier staffs in

planning, supervising, anri conducting airborne opera­

tions; and (2) The training of airborne an* troop car­
rier units in air movement, r^pici assembly, and attack

by combined arms, both clay and night.

The plans of the 13th Airborne "Division were to

emphasize the following in attaining their objectives*

1. Far Department Memorandum /WDGCT(1 July 19442/.

2. Letters, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to

Commanding General, I Troop Carrier command, 14 Aug­

ust 1944; and Commanding General, Army Ground Forces

to Commanding General, XXII Corps, August 1944.

3. Maneuver" Memorandum No. 1, Airborne-Troop Carrier

Maneuver Headquarters, Camp Mackall, North Carolina,

7 September 1944.

- 1 .

 ]_• Loading plans were to be flexible, so maximum

capacity of all tugs and gliders could be utilized.

2. units were to be transported by motor to loca­

tions, so air departure would be from more than one

field.

3. Troops were to be assembled immediately after

landing, day and night, and attack Fas to be made by

combined arms.

4. The organization was to maintain itself, in the

field, with rations, supplies, and equip?nent which could

be transported by available troop carrier units after

the division had been closed.

5. Close coordination and cooperation of staff

activities, with Troop Carrier, were to be maintained

at all times.

Troop Carrier units were to emphasize the following

in attaining their objectives;

1. Squadron and/or group formations were to be

used for single and/or double tow with maximum practic­

able loads in airplanes and gliders.

2. Poth day an'? night operations were to be used,

with departures from more than one airfield.

3. objective areas were to bo located and para­

chutists droppec1 and gliders landed therein, by day and

night, through the use of the navigrtional aids avail­

able in B combat theater.

4. Close coordination and cooperation of staff

activities, with Airborne Division, .-.herald be maintained

at r? 11 times. 4

THE PROBLEM

An -'.irbo ;-Ti:--tj"jcp carrier task ir. :<:•: r?..s to attack

uii j-1 i'AT~. sorr: ^ .V^J. secure Camp M a r

k a U n r p o r t , and

prevent movement of pod forces through bhu Hoffman area

v
until rc"_i.cvod y .friendly Blue forooc.,5

"'he ;sci;,j •_•:..! conditions govcrnlnr ":"i bz'La'.-xcn oi'

tho r-\r.i3-\\cz :i\.."c loins are outlined :H'.-.o^;

ri1
lc b.e ?:ir;r.cuver was to last a rr'\riuiuri of five days.

£r II "LerL.t two departure baso.c: wo^o to be used.

3. objocbivo areas were to bo r c a ^ o o "by circuitous

route of 100 miles.

4. Letter f.GF to CG, XXII Corps, 23 / ug 4 4 , subj; "nirec­

tive for Joint Training of the 13th /irborne Pdvision

5. Field Order Fo. 1, AB/TC 'fen, Fq, Camp Mackall, N.C«,

: 8 Scot 4 4 .

- 2 ­
 4. Landings and assembly of units were to "bo con­
duct od at night to the maximum extent practic­
able.

5. Fo contact was to be made with friendly groun_d

forces prior.to T)/4.

6. pesupply slid evacuation by air and/or air land­

ings until n/4 after the division has "been

closed in the ob1active area.®

MANEUVER AREA

The territory chosen for the operation was bounded .

on the east and south by TJ.S, Highway Ko. 1, between

Cameron and Rockinghari, and by that part of Gamp Mackall

military Reservation south of TJ,S» Highway $0. it The

western boundary approxinates a line running through the

towns of pockinghara, Ellerbo, and Biscoe; and the

northern boundary a lino through. "P-isc'oe, Carthage, and

Cameron. The soil in the region consists of white sand

in the south, grading into red clay in the northern

section on an approximate east-west line running through

piscoe, Pinehurst, and Fort Bragg, Numerous small

streams flow in a south to southeasterly direction through

densely wooded swamp areas, making passage difficult,

However, there are sections of the forest area with sparse

vegetation affording little cover. The remainder of the

area is composed of cultivated land planted to corn, cot­

ton, tobacco, and orchards.

Several fields are available for parachute and glider

landings in the vicinity of Camp Mackall to enable an

adequate force to be landed for purposes of capturing the

designated objective.

6. Ltr, Cnr, A OF, to CO, XXII Corps, 23 fug 44, subj;

T)irective for Joint Training of the 13th Airborne

"Hivision.

7. intelligence Annex Fo. 1 to Field order Fo. 1, A B / T

7f
En. T-Tq, Csimp rackall, F.H., 12 Sept 44.

- 3 ­
 Three railroads furnish transportation for heavy

traffic in a north-south direction, with two of the linos

intersecting at Aberdeen. In addition, three hard-sur­

faced U.S. highways cross the crea in a north-south direc­
tion. Several secondary sand and clay roads, five to ten

miles apart, and numerous.* wood an^ farm roads, interlace

the area. The red clay roads of the northern sector,

however, make the use of mechanized equipment extremely

hazardous In vet weather.

MANEUVER STAFF ORGANIZATION

The staff organization for the maneuver was differ­

ent from that sot up for previous airborne-troop carrier

operations. A joint planning staff VG.S composed of

General staff and' Special Staff representatives from.XXII

Corps, Airborne Center, and Troop Carrier Command. Major

General Henry Terrell, Jr. of XXII Corps, was chosen

Ground director with Colonel j. T. m l b e y as Airborne

director, and prigadler General ^rT. "n. old as "Director for

l-.lv. Colonel Williams was appointed Assistant director

around, with Colonel M . /\. Quinto as Assistant Airborne

director, and Colonel F. A. Nichols an assistant director

fci A I;-- ilia cc:«bi..dod staff was designs 'A,(! as The Task

Force and had the function of setting up the missions for

the lower echelons of command.

The Goth T^oop Carrier ^Ting end 13th A5rbo_°nG

pii/io:.or v/ore given the responsible I~v of Mvciklng out the

detaile:? plans 'r'or accomplishing tro 0.&signed missions.

Intelligence Annex Fo. 1 to Fid order vo _ 1, A

*f?.n. Hq, Camp Mackall, F.C., 12 Sopt 44,

- 4 ­
Field orders and maneuver orders were issued "by ^Ting

and Division for executing their missions.

PARTICIPATING UFITS

T^c units participating in the maneuver were se­

lected on the basis of level of training and availability.

The forces engaged were divider1 into three general

groups; the Blue forces (attacking"); the. Pod forces

(defending); end the Task Force. The function of this

latter group v?as to present the general tactical situa­

tion and act as a higher headquarters during the maneuver.

The BLUE FORCES consisted of the following:

60th Troop Carrier wing . .

v.ring Headquarters

349th Troop Carrier Group (reinforced)

1st provisional Troop Carrier Group (Reinforced)..

1st Air Cargo Resupply

detachment, 4-engine cargo craft (10, p-17's of

89th Eomba rd mon t G ro up)

1st Tactical Air "Division

372nd Fighter Group (represented by 50, p-40 f s)

1st Tactical Ren Sq (represented by 10, A - 2 0 ' S )

69th Tactical Pen ?q(represented by 2, P - 4 0 ' S )

1st Tactical Control Gp (represented.by 2 Advance

Hontrol Teams)

3973th ouarterr.ir.stor Truck Company

4105th Quartermaster Truck Company

4107th Quartermaster Truck Company

130th ^vacuption Hospital

13th Airborne Division

The KUP FORCES included the following;

161st A / P T?ngr (Atend; ^et, 464th Parachute

151st Airborne Tr;nk Company

841st AAA A W p n

pen Troop, £5 9 th infantry Division

9. During previous maneuvers., Field and Maneuver orders

from Ipask Force contained detailed information for

carrying out assigned missions. It was thought

dosirablo to test the lower units on their ability to

develop and execute detailed plans.

- 5 ­
 THE TkSll FORCE consisted of:

Staffs of ABC, ITCC, m i Corps

I Motion Picture Unit

"The Liajor units in this operation were the 60th

Troop Carrier V/Ing and i t s coriponent groups, the 13th

Airborne Division, and the XXII Corps.

The 60th TrooT) Carrier Yfing was activated on 18

June 1943 with headquarters a t 3edalia Amy Air Field,

T
7arrensburg, Ilissouri. Lt Col August A. Adair, the

current Assistant Chief of Staff, A-l, was named acting

co inlander •

On 31 August 1943 Colonel Jerone 3 . JlcCauley took

control of the V/ing. This l a t t e r officer had recent ly­

re turned from the Ilediterranean theater where he and his

organization had taken a proiiinent part in the campaigns

in North Africa and in S i c i l y .

Under the guidance of Colonel HcCauley and his •>

staff 'che './ing completed i t s training in the f a l l of

1943. Subsequently, in December 1943 and. January 1944,

the "V:Lit-;: participated In various Lieneuvejs, arxng which'

were two combined Troop Carrier-Airborne operations •

In the l a t t e r part of ifcrch, Colonel T-icCauley v/as

transferied to Sedalia Army Air Fie.Id where he became the

Base Jom-ander, while Colonel Yc A, tli;+-s} ?:*on:erl3r Base

CoLiiianding Officer of Lo.urinburg-ISiiXoon,' be cane the

Cciinander of the Ving.

T
In April 1944 the 7ing v/as drastica]ly reduced in

strength (fron 175 enlisted nen and 50 officers to 50

enlisted .:ien and ,35 officers) and be cane a supervisory

body with coii"Grol over Pope ]?ield, Laurinburg-llaxton,

and Lawson Field.

- 6 ­
 From the tine of its inception the T7ing has super­

vised, at various" intervals, the training of seven Troop

Carrier Groups now serving in theaters outside the

United States.

The 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group evolved from

a reorganization of the 44-5r&. Troop Carrier Group, The

latter unit was activated in September 1943 at Sedalia

Array Air Field, 7arrensburg, Missouri, with only two

squadrons. Ua.jor 3L:ier F. 2strunse becane the Group Cora-

Ljarider.

In Fobruar2r 1944 the 445rd Group was redesignated

the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group. A month later

the unit was assigned to the 60th Wing and was raoved to

Camp liackall, ITorth Carolina. The personnel of the

Headquarters Squadron v/as assigned to the 801st AAF B. U. and

placed on D3 at I£ic?-:all to supervise the training of

several kinds of units such as Troo-n Carrier Squadrons,

Troop Carrier Squadrons (Oonnandc), and Airdrome Squad­

rons .

In I.£.y 1944, raj or Hay (at that tine Captain)

succeeded liajor Sstrunse as Commanding Officer.

At the present tine the Group has under its control

the 316th Troop Carrier Squadron, the 317th and 318th

'Troop Carrier Squadrons (Comoando), the 34<3nd and 343rd

Airdrone Squadrons, and the 1st Air Cargo Hesupply Squad­

ron, 'ihese squadrons are considered fully trained to

acco-.iplish" their various missions.

The 349th Troop Carrier Group was activated at

Sedalia A m y Air Field, 'ferrensburg, Ilissouri on 1 Novem­

ber 1943. Its original personnel was drawn from the

443rd Troop Carrier Group, which also furnished the

549thfs temporary comeander., Major E. F. Estriimse, On

18 November 1943, Lt Col Leonard J. Barrow, who had

recently returned to the United States from duty with

Troop Carrier units involved in the invasion of Sicily

and Italy, became tlio. Group Coraar.nd.er.

On 7 Ilarch 1944, the ITCC transferred jurisdiction

of the 549th Group from the 61st 7ing to that of the

60th 7ing. This change in oontroi also entailed move­

ment to Pope Field, Fort 3ra£&, North Carolina.

Since its arrival at Pope Field, the group has- taken

part in several operations, inducting: .

1, Coribinod Troop Carrier-Airborne maneuver in

collaboration v;ith the 1st Air Force.

£• Combined Troop Carrier-Airborne maneuver with

the 15th airborne Division in Tennessee.

3. Several over-water tasks, one of which involved

the ATC in a run from I Hani to the Canal Zone.

4 . l£iny l o c a l maneuvers.

At the present tine, the group is considered, fully

trained to carry out its mission.

ITu difficulties 7/oro experienced in a;;3irg tiie

Maneuver area for military purposes, since rights already

had boon obtained for auch activity n;i oariy as 1941,

To Lr.-^o the yiaulr-.ted baotle co-iditions as nearly

li]re the actual <\r poysiblo, blaci^cuu conditions v/ere

to ho oiiforcod over an area large enough to permit an

approx:L.jJiito 50-mile, north-ncutli run--in over drop c>nd

landing zones. Agreement v/as reached at a conference

on 7 September 1944, with Interne1.! Sccurit3r, Carolina

Light and Power, Seaboard Airline Railroad, and North

Carolina State Highway patrol representatives concern­

ing (1) blackout; (2) power cut-off; (3) highway

control; and (4) railroad traffic control.

The blackout was planned for the night of D-l,

from 2100 until daylight. In general the blackout area

covered Ilont-gonorj7", Richmond, Iloore, and parts of Hoke

and Scotland counties. The State Highway Patrol agreed

to block road entrances to the blackout area fron all

but essential local and emergency traffic. Actual

power line cut-offs were to be for the area of Southern

Pines, Aberdeen, Hoffman, Ullerbo, and 7estend. Rail

traffic was to bo slowed to approximately -20 miles per

10

hour in the blackout area during the night of D-l«

Safet3r end mechanical perfection of the operation

was established as the first consideration in conduct- ­

ing the maneuver. Ho activit3~ was to interfere with

the safe arrival of the parachute, glider, and airborne

troops on the exact assigned ground spot. Hov/ever,

additional problems - some onl;/ on "oajer - were to be

injected in the planning phase in order that the par­

ticipating personnel might consider the actions

necessary to overcome such conditions in actual v/arfare

10. Homo of Conference, A3/TC- man Hrlq, Caop Ijackall,

H. C , 8 Sept 44.

 The general plan called for transporting an air­

borne division over a circuitous route of approximately

100 niles to a tactical area. After the capture and

securing of Camp I2r.clcc.il .airfield by the division, re­

inforcements, re supply, and evacuation was to be done

hy air. In the initial movement, approximately one-

third of the division v/as to "bo moved in each of three

methods, namely; parachute drop, glider landing, and

air transport landing. Parachute' drops -were to bo raade

in three zones. Glider landings were to follow the

parachute drops by approximately twelve hours. Two of

the parachute drop zones were to be used in the glider

ope-ratiGiis, with approximately 200 gliders being landed

in one of then. ^11 air transport landings of ::ien and

materiel YIQTO to be made on the Cci/ap llf.cl:all airfield

after the capture of the airport.

Tighter cover was to be furnished for the various

phases of the maneuver by the 1st Tactical _J_r Division.

Protection was to be provided for parachute, glider, and

air transport activity for an airea approximately 80 miles

w;_o.a a:.c. 10'.: riles de:n-;j covering tlu ';err-_J:ery from

Hai-tsvillc, Charloi.te, Salisbury, Durhcr., "kO.asboro, and

rioronco. In addition, tactical reconnaissance was to be

active tnrougnou^ one maneuver perioa.­

^ecer)ticn wac to be errpioyed in ti\e maneuver, One

dummy parachute d.;:c]j behind a smoPio screen, previous to

any troop parachute drops, was to be used for the pur­

pose of drawing mobile forces of the airport defense to

the east just before landings weru made to the west.

11. Ht.ii. Homo .,£L, A3/TC IJan. Hdc[, Camp liackall, U. C ,

7 3ept 44.

12. See .ijinex -fa IT-'JD to 10 ^ 1 , llr.n Hdq, i^ppendix A.

- 10 ­
 .ui isolated battalion of the 13th Airborne Division,

' guarding a dam, was to be provisioned completely by aerial

resupply, during the period of D/2 and D/4.

Additional phases of the maneuver included testing

the tactical usefulness of various kinds of equipment,

CG-I3A type gliders were to be flown for the first time in

a tactical situation. Tactically equipped 3-17's (Flying

Fortresses) were to be employed as troop transports for

the first time in an airborne-troop carrier maneuver.. In

addition, litter-equipped CG-4A gliders were to be used

in the glider operation, so that tactical snatch-pickup

of litter patients could be made.

An Evacuation Hospital was to be moved completely by

air. Difficulties T«vere expected in loading and unloading

the equipment3 since a unit of this kind had never been

transported in this manner. Hov^ever, medical service pro­

vided by an evacuation hospital in the battle area was

considered of enough value to warrant the experiment.

GLIDER EVACUATION

Plans were laid for evacuation of gliders, so re­

trieving would interfere less with the tactical situation

than in previous maneuvers. Large numbers of administra­

tive personnel, with their retrieving equipment, had

interfered with the tactical ground activity during the

last maneuver. However, there was no desire to let

gliders remain unprotected for an extended period of

time. Pilots of the gliders could be used for securing

and protection of the craft, but they were not available

- 11 ­
for that purpose. (Experience in various theaters of war

had proven the tactical value of the employment of glider

pilots with airborne troops immediately after landing.

Therefore, they were to fight with-the ground troops as

an added phase of training for overseas duty.)

60th Troop Carrier Y/ing was given the responsibility

for the protection and evacuation of all gliders and the

return of same to the proper stations. Administrative

evacuation of gliders was not to begin from Zone Ho, 1

before 1000 hours on D^day, and evacuation from Zone 3>!o.

3 was not to begin until 1200 on D/l. Sufficient guards

'were to be provided to insure safeguarding of gliders and

accessories landed in glider zones during the maneuver.

Gliders lost enroute were to be guarded by Provost mar­

shal3 llaneuver Headquarters, as soon as location was

given by 60th Troop Carrier Y/ing. The detailed plans

issued by V/ing for protection and evacuation provided in­

13

structions on all phases of the problem,

iJSICAL

The irane liver surgeon was to provide and coordinate

higher•echelon medical service for bcth administrative

and tactical casualties during the maneuver. The lower

echelons of command were to work out detailed plans for

tne medical care of personnel in the •aniv.s. (.idiiinis­

trative casualties are those actual injuries and illnes­

ses which demand emergency evacuation and hospitalization.

Tactical casualties are those casualties tagged by the

umpires3 and minor injuries.)

13. IIan.I.Lenio..';3, AB/TC Hdq, 11 Sept 44^ Iian.IIerjo#9?AB/TC

Hdq$ See IIan.lLemo^2960th TCW, for details of ^Adrninis­

trative Control and Evacuation of Gliders.1'

14. Man. Hemo #3, AB/TC Hdq, 15 Sept 44.

- 12 ­
 The organic medical units of the 13th Airborne

Division were to furnish medical service to Blue Forces3

according to regular 30? 5 with the exception that they

would establish a clearing station as soon as the air­

heads were secured. Such facilities were to be set up

within one-half mile of the airhead for providing medi­

cal service for all airhead personnel in addition to that

of the Blue Force9 until relieved by 130th Evacuation

Hospital. The Evacuation Hospital was to clear patients

from tlio division ana deliver thorn to 60th Troop Carrier

•.'/ing for evacuation by air. 130th Evacuation Hospital

and 60th Troop Carrier V/ing were jointly responsible for

loading patients in the plane.

Organic medical units of the Red Forces were to

function according to regular bOj?0 In the absence of

organic medical support5 casualties were to be evacuated

by the nearest medical installation through ground

16

umpires.

60th Troop Carrier v/ing was responsible for medical

service to all units at the departure bases, from H-12

to departure. Additional medical service was to be pro­

vided for personnel while planes were in flight. Units

of the medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron were

attached to 60th Troop Carrier Wing to function accord­

ing to their own SOP.

A central control station was to be established at

Maneuver Headquarters to coordinate the activities of the

15. I Ian. Ilemo #3, A3/TC Hdq, 15 Sept 44

16. Ibid

17. Ibid

- 13 ­
administrative medical installations. A complete com­
munication net was established for the purpose of keep-^

ing maneuver headquarters informed of administrative

casualties in any part of the maneuver area.

VISITORS BURSMJ

In order to accommodate the various observers and

visitors, an Observers Bureau was established in a wing

of the Airborne Center School, with Kajor Graham T.

Stevens, ITCC, in control. It was incumbent upon this

office to provide for quarters and mess for the umpires9

press9 and observers, and to furnish transportation to

the Maneuver Area for the press and observers. For

billeting purposes, the Bureau operated nine buildings

for quarters and one for messing. On the night of D-l

and on the morning of D-day, the bureau provided an es­

cort to the visitors' convoy which consisted of seven

staff cars, thirty-five jeeps, and two personnel carriers

bearing the press. One hundred forty observers and twenty-

nine- correspondents registered at the bureau during the

initial phase of the maneuver.

-i-p

In this mansuvor the Public Relations Office was

separated from the Observers Bureau. The chief func­

tions of the former ware to arrange for adequate pub­
licity for the maneuver, to insure proper orientation

for the press and other visitors, to edit all news re­
leases so that classifiod material would not be sent

forth, and to provide the visitors with the opportunity

to witness as much of the operation as possible. Iiajor

- 14 ­
 :;
Vincent P. /ilbur, ITCC, was charged with the responsi­

bility of overseeing this section.

On September 23, members of the press were briefed

thoroughly for one and a half hours by Colonel ITichols,

Colonel Balbey, Lt Colonel Valsii, Iiajor Kvi&era, Kajor

V/ilbur, and Ilajor Parker (V/D Representative) as the speak­

ers. The plan of the maneuver, the functions of each

major unit, the medical preparations, and the necessary

security precautions were forcefully brought.to the

attention of the listeners. In the afternoon of the 23rd,

the press was taken to Ilaxton Army Air Base to observe

the preparations for the maneuver.

On 24 September the correspondents were briefed

again, this time by Lt Colonel S o T., Uoore, who had spent

more than two and a half years in the C3I theater as an

officer in the Troop Carrier units stationed there. In

his discussion Colonel Moore stressed the role of the

Troop Carrier Command in modern warfare. Thus, by the

time the maneuver had begun, the correspondents were con­

versant with the various phases of the project.

The observers, including military representatives

of several allied nations, were briefed on the afternoon

of D-l,

The Public Relations Officer prepared a detailed

itinerary which provided the observers with ample oppor­

tunity to witness all phases of the operation. The

Public Relations Office also distributed a brochure

describing, as far as security measures would

18. See Observers Schedule, Appendix C.

- 15 ­
permit, the organization, the training, the weapons,

and the accomplishments of the Airborne and Troop

19

Carrier Commands•

ULFIR3S

In order to provide a means of evaluating the

activities of the units involved In the maneuver, two

sets of umpires wero procured, - one for air and one

for ground.

The duty of the air umpires was to observe and

evaluate such points as the briefing of pilots, the

type and quality of formations flown, the approach to

and departure from the drop zones.

After several preliminary conferences, on D-l,

the umpires ucro briefed throroughly and given detailed

instructions concerning their responsibility, the type

of information desired, and the moans of obtaining it.

Ten umpires were assigned to judgo the performance

of the power planes while 20 were assigned to gliders.

The power plane umpires wore detailed in the following

manner' three to each of tho Troop Carrier Groups - to

observe the take-offs and to fly with the serials; two

to each of tho landing areas; two to the SOth Troop

Carrier "7ing, one of khich was a Plight Surgeon. Colonel

EcCauloy, the chief air umpire, covered the landing

areas, Tho glidor umpires rrere assignee1 as follows:

two to each take-off field; two to each of tho landing

fields. raj or Bayne was tho chiof glider umpire while

Captain Smith was tho chief glider umpire in CfLZ !To. 3.

19. Titlo: "8one Pacts About the Airborne Center and

the First Trccp Carrier Command•!? Appendix C.

- 16 ­
The glider umpires prepared mimeographed questionnaires

to bo completed by the glider pilots upon the fulfillment

of their missions. The questions involved data on

intcrcon.riunico.tion, take-off, tovj, altitude, element

interval, tun; run to landing field, and landing pattern.

The cbr;orvations of the two groups of air umpires

is contained in the reports of the glider umpires and

of the chief air umpire.

The principal duties of the ground umpires were to

evaluate and permit or deny ta ,,cal progress of the

units involved. Decisions ore based upon the strength,

position, and f iropowc. of the opposing units.

The chief ground ur.piro, 1'aior John F. Trudo, re­

ported to Lancuver Headquarters on 19 September and his

principal subordinate;:; registered on 20 September.

In order to Insure the competence of the umpires,

a school was conducted by the chief umpire In accordance

with FII 105-5 and with rules formulated by The Infantry

School, Port Banning, Georgia, On the last day of

Instruction a series of comprehensive written tests was *

given tc ascertain the degree to which the lessons had

been absorbed.

Each commissioned umpire was responsible for tho

proper Instruction of his enlisted aides,

A map ancl control officer was stationed in Uaneuvcr

Headquarters charged with the responsibility of keeping

the maneuver rituatlcn map abreast of the actual move­

ments ,

There v/ere several groups of umpires; one for tho

Blue units, one for the Red, one for artillery, and one

for medical activities, Tho chief umpire functioned,

- 17 ­
for tuc nest part, -rith-tlic Blue troops. The chief

Red urrp5.ro net only acted In that capacity, but also

we J the Rod Commander, His unit commanders also

•'.crvod as umpires.

To facilitate tho receipt of reports from, the field

and to provide for adequate contact between the umpires,

tho signal corps erected an elaborate phono and radio

net, v/ith. Taneuvcr Headquarters as tho central agency.

Information uas alec relayed by messenger. The tele­

phone net proved, to bo tho most effective of those means

of c ommuni ca t i en •

A total of 100 corrissicned officers and 217 en­

listed non, exclusive of those for anti-aircraft

artillery and for nodical activities, served as ground

umpires during tho Initial phase of the maneuver.

The planning phase of the maneuvers drew to a close

with a briefing of the various units participating in

tho maneuver. All pilots -Tore given a final briefing

on tho various phases of their mission. Standard operat­

ing procedure was to bo followed In all paratroop drop

and glider landing serials. In addition, the following

specific instructions r;:6ro given particularly for the

maneuver.

1. As many passes ucro to be made over PDZ as

were necessary to drop complete load, except In cases

of refusals,

2. In event of single engine failure, the pilot

v/as to leave the formation Immediately and jump para­

troops at his ovrn discretion. All troops v/oro to be

Juapocl before pilot attempted single engine landing,

provided sufficient altitude had been maintained,

- 18 ­
 3. All crow ohicfs v/cre tc v/oar parachutes and

maintain position at ro::r dcor of plane, listening on

interphone fcr any emergency chanre in jump orders from

pilot.

4. Cabin lights T/cre not to bo used in static

hoch-up or inspection of sane. <:

5. Green fuzzocn at ?DZfs were to bo placed in T

f on at ion.

Glider pilots received an additional briefing on

the ground phase of the i/aneuver, siiice they were to

become a part of the yrcuiid fighting units as soon as

landing was made. Ihoy were ^iven a description of the

£Oi:orai and specific objective, tc be attained during

the nauuuvur by the ground forces . ^hc Comr andinr;

General of the 13th Airborne Divioicn rave a brief talk

before the briefing bo.-'an, trhich nade the pilots feel

tho'; wore a ir:.or..ber of the tear,. Glider pilots v/ere

assigned and t'^en repo3?ted to the airborne officer under

vihciv. they vjculd T/cr1;' after landing their gliders.

Rendezvous points -ore indicated and each pilot hnew in

advance his responsibilities and duties as a combat mem­

ber of the ground forces.

The training and instruction of the personnel par­

ticipating in tho maneuver had finally cono to an end.

Only the execution of the operation could indicate how

;7oil prepared tho various members of the units were to

20

meet tho problems 77.1th which the^ would be confronted."

20. A-:'., l\""/2 and 0-^2 hepcrt for I.c.ncuvcr, Appendix B.

- 19 ­
 All phases of the a t t a c k bv" the Airborne-Troop

Carrier task force vrcrc keyed for the purpose of seiz­

ing and securing Car.p l a c k i l l a i r p o r t , and for prevent­

ing the rover; ent of "led Forces through the Hoffman area

u n t i l r e l i e v e d by f r i e n d l y blue F o r c e s .

The v'oct i.,!1 "fas v.-x t the kii-61 thai; i s r e s t desir­

able for Airborne-Troop Carrier a c t i v i t i e s , since

v
r^oonliy.ht '!is :u-lcr;-":L u t ^ n t . Broken clouds to overr­
v
oast covered th.e sky a t d-,000 to 5,000 f e e t , ;ith visi­

b i l i t y of five to seven m i l e s . There was a surface

v-ind "h.r, t ..:.-. rilv.s p-r heur before d e p a r t u r e , decreas­

i;.v; to s i x r i l \LJ by ~hhO

' C hours, F3 ^inds a l o f t , up be

o,000 f e e t , v-rcrc ayprexiiaately sixteen r i l e s p^r hour.

v
Sluice vcAt'ror prc h i c t i c i s i n d i c a t e d no ...lr-provopont /ith-

DECFPTlOiy

The f i r s t neve in bo.'"inniny, the a c t u a l e::-.,cut:--cn

r
of th^ •-ai'ior.vor "as a-, a c t of d e c e p t i o n . Dunma.cs were

dro.vod by parachute be"-...'-nd a screen of snioko in an

effort to dr•-••;/ eh>.> ..,,e; y fcrcos iro;;> defense of the air­

port. The su.oko screen la-diiy A-20s crossed i;he Initial

point e x a c t l y ±'. t^.e a ppciiited ei.:e (D~l, 1713 hours) and

.luj.-J.' J.

1. I'aneu'^r .h. adquart^rs \-as to decide vr.\ct!ior ^cather

v/culcl p e r n i t t!ie r:an.juver to bey;;n a t the scheduled

tir.e'. If l e a t h e r did i n t e r f e r e -.rifc.h the yaratrocp

d e p a r t u r e , then t'.:>.e nancav..r -vc\ild be postponed 2d

.heurn. her/over, if r-cather developed to prevent

the "lidor ta]ro-off a f t e r parachute drop v-as ccr>

p l e t e d , tho-ii delay v.rcv.ld bo by hourly i n t e r v a l s

u n t i l -lid..rs co-Id d e p a r t .

n:•.•.;/ v i s i b i l i t y of tbo parachute £ r c p , o;iccpt for c.

r;ap bo-tv/con the tv:c elcudc cf crake."

T'oe C—»7s cr.rc in c^ur the Gcut!'^ cud of tbo s; oi:c

screen a t fbo apijoi.ii^cl tir.x (D-l, 1715 hours ) to drop

cluru'.-iv..s by parachute bc'rLnc. the v-c.ll of siooho. Several

ruee -.Tcr,; i•-•; do cvu:r thu duep :3;;..o by the trrc participat­

ing planes t c 3irau.la.te a ear^-a; i c r c o ,

Various -nlnds of :on ^ic*r t i eon 1 a i d s v/orc available

for 'rb.d Lv V'c pianos into t'10 d.i?op :.nd l e n d In." z o n e s .

Personnel, f-urebr. ,;.nd ricboccfi eeuipieoi.t, ^vith ni;fficicnt

quantities cf ;;reon fi-zo-^i Y'ere d e l i v e r e d ':•;.• parcicbuto

t o t.1 .c varfoarj sonon ('..e c v c n i r i " of D - l . Cue "olc.no

eorr;'.in-- t:;.o GT"? ".•-!• ..eripr'^r.t " • r r i v . d over t'\e IP r.t

v
.i...v.' . 1 •' '- • '— . I t/ U » .• V.' •-!••.' I., w v_' . . .. .s. • . *~> ~> --L - ^ i 1 . - . ^ - i <-< W W i. ^.y L> J. . >. - 1 O

(J--..-.L o ^-J. J . .J. •,.-.- ^ '. [;i.^'--^vj u O i;..iv. fA o kJ J , t_-j J-^ U J . j ,; A fj • . u L ..\.i l . o o J . f - ­

t'-\o p].cno c i r c l e d t' .e f i e l d end r-..\r:,L.~lc3. i:' e I c c a t i c n

of f'.'.e oeetd.find:..r oe_uip;e^nt • Tee e^viipreont ~ve.e dropped

i..' !./".•.-. proper l o c a t i o n and -rae eet up in tin e i;o eve

d e n c f J.en fe t'...,; f l r r t :;eri<als of t'".e pnrac'iute dro:^,'"'

.. .f Lnu, e, I I3.jJ.Cf

.e.t o

s:,rhaie ef air,>lan.,s b^arin--,- parachi;.te troops. Four

s ...•:? i-.v I s , couponed o-.' lo-l- plane::;, c a r r i e d 19C1 r-.oi'i, and

110,5b7 pounds cf <;cauip'"-..nt and ou jpli-.,e to che irop

zcnuG, arrivin. • over the ccsie*a aute.jd areas accordin ; to

.^ • j . . iU »ji ..O ;• ..; v./ J A . . J ; . ! U V/W/ O c. o j .J. ^^ b^j'vx —o -^ X oo ..i. 1 u ui

lach cf pros ear -.j • it:'.in t'ao t"u..hs of t'.v... second yrcap
a t t1 .-., pv"ap_.r tirec. J]ir"ht pla-:,,s -.-fe-ro us..d in oper­
a.tf:.ni, four r e l e a s .ui'" Si'-c-:e at the sar e t i n e .
3, At l e a s t tax- s,h:;s of t'ro equipment are a1 i s patched to each
pia.ce so as to i-irjuro one a v a i l a b l e for o p e r a t i o n .

•-. on d e t a i l s cf serials.
schedule. As a result cf t.hi. combination of scvoial

factors, i.ncludliv;* a oy plotoly darkened sky, para­

troojs V'Ore dispersed ever a lai'ye area around all

The 5I5tb Parachute Infantry Re -ir.c-nt, Division

Divisional Artillery ueadquarters, l-5Gi;h Field Artillery

i _K . O U... X -'.--•- J. , {j ^ l .i . j_J •->- x . *~ — . _j~-» -L ^J.O k^ i. O , ;. k._- ,.., £j {^i - XL*. i O U . J. .>; - X

P l a t o o n Tvcre d r o p p e d by p a i ^ . c h u t e . Difficulty '.as e::­

perionc>jd i n a s o e r b l i n ; se:-'v_ of t h e u - . i t s L.S .:. r e s u l t

CX G. '..'.j .'.L'.-O 0. J. Sp^. 1'S .1 i Ox ll'.ii.-. i n S •

A battalion :f lufu.;.ti:y v/ae to be dropped in each

cf the P.OZc • 'Vhe battalion vhic'i dropped in Zone -;;'•!

put ab'C.-t ;;!." percent cf th.e perscnrrel in fie drop zcuc,

rent available ••ithin one and one-ha If hours. The- bat­

talicn dropped in FDh \'2 vjas scattered in such fanner

that the jattalicn corr;Wilder did net r.ya\n control of

'...ore than 20 percent cf hie ecru and prior tc 1000 D-day,

Individuals and snail ;-roups cf thin battalion had pro­

arranyed missions cf road ;:^lcch-s and recennaissanco,

w:."ich added tc the difficult:;' cf re-aini,,; control of

t'..e unit. Several parachutists landed outside PDZ ye

T
but vcro "irett" v/cll rass-^c i.n t':n. areas vherc t';oT

Detailed report of drepphn-^ is included in Consoli­

dated 1 iss5.cn AopcrtSj ebO,, 1st Provisional Troop

Carrier proup for laneuver, 2-1- Goptenbcr te 27

September 19'bi^ G0±.'i rT1. 0. 'jiri^ Fcpe Field, port

'"••>•><• •••.-— '' "* op, r; .-,|-^..-•'••..^,- p ~\ O " '• o r«'^ i > f1 <\ -i r> TTr--n^r>- I c

• -^ -- - ,^. y •• • • ^ • > <•-•<-'' u ^ Jr l>..'! ./ k_-l J. «.. ^ ^ _; O..--L -^ i ii. J-I U L : J j . 1 L. o

.lepcrt, a.id A-e Report, ba.ieu^er IToadruartors, Carp

a plane v/as seen tc turn on its longitudinal axis

and crash tc the ground. Investigation shev/od tbat

eiyht airbc^rne r^n ancl four air corps y:en -vore In

the plane.

*. ?: ­
The artillery parachute battalion was able to assemble

and regain control of nine of the twelve Howitzers

within five and one-half hours.

Additional administrative equipment was brought

in by glider at 2110 D-l. The twenty gliders used for

this purpose landed in Zone #3, although five did not

land in Field "A" as planned. All equipment landed was

immediately available for use in giving additional

mobility to the forces landed by parachute,

personnel brought in "oy parachute were to secure

the glider landing zones and airport. The battalion

landing in PDZ $1 moved into a position southwest of

the airport for that purpose. The battalion landing

in sene #3 moved down just cast of Zone -!f2, in position

for the attack. Both battalions made contact with the

enemy at approximately 1100 hours on D-day, Five

artillery positions guarding the airport were captured

by 1200 hours and the airport was declared captured cat

that time,

GLIDER LAHDIUG I.IISSIOIT

During the period of attack en the airport by the

parachute trcops, glider landings wjrc made in GLZ's #1

i.^d #Z for reinforcement of the attacking units.

7, "General Critiauo at end of First Phase of 1,'ancuvor",

School Building, Cp Uackall, N.C., 0900, 29 Scp 44,

Lt. Gel. TValsh. fs presentation,

8, See A-3 report and Air Umpire reports for details of

parachute and glider serial activity.

9, The battalion which landed in zone #2 rather than

that landed in zone -lf-3 was to attack the airport

from the west. I-Iowovcr, because of the scattered

nature of the parachute drop and the missions for

protecting road blocks, the battalion from zone -#2

was unable to carry out its mission as planned.

Weather was of such urvtu.ro that glider take-off was

delayed for two hours, but tho first serial arrived

ovor the GLZ at 0848 D-day in accordance with the

revised schedule •• Tv/o hundred and eighteen gliders

carrying 1104 airborne personnel and 384,013 pounds

of equipment and supplies were landed in GLZ's i'-1 and

10

#3 almost without incident. All gliders landed in

ALZ's and no damage war; done to equipment. Only 11

gliders were rendered non-flyablc, with an additional

12 being slightly damaged.

Two battalions of artillery,.an infantry battalion ­

less a cor*pony, a cci.ipc.ny of engineers, and elements of

Division and Division Artillery Headquarters, and 16

glider loads of additional artillery and ammunition

were brought in by glider.

The four CG-13A gliders employed in the glider

drop gave satisfactory results on take-off, in flight,

during landing and in the snatch-pick-up operations.

Thus, the first simulated tactical use of this type

glider proved a success.

Gliders were dispersed in an oven pattern over

most all areas in occh landing zone. The frequency of

landings, one every 20 seconds, prevented movement about

the field for a short period of time. However, assembly

and control of troops and equipment were gained very

quicklv as a result of the comDact nature of the land­

10, All glider serials wore double tow. The glider

clement could not have boon moved to the GLZ?s

within the proscribed time through employment of

single tow. Tour gliders were released in tow

after leaving -departure bases*

ings, allowing the clement of surprise to be fully

exploited. ~ The removal of gliders from GLZ's was

not to interfere with the tactical activity of the

maneuver. Operations in some theaters of war have

been such that gliders have been retrieved by tactical

snatch-pickup. Glider pickup of wounded would bo one

means cf removal of casualties if an air landing field

were not available. Therefore, plans wore laid for

the removal cf several gliders by this method during

the maneuver. However, there was only one glider re­

trieved by tactical snatch-pickup, A litter equipped

CG-4A glider was snatched during the morning of D-day

with geed success. All other gliders were retrieved

administratively by pickup method from GLZ #1, with the

excepticn cf five damaged gliders. The CG-13A gliders,

likewise, were removed by the pickup method. The five

non-flyablc CG-4A gliders were dismantled and returned

to the departure base by truck. All gliders (200)

landed in GLZ #3 were pulled to Camp iXwCka.lu. over the

glider tow read. That road was constructed with an

especially wide right-of-way, so gliders could bo ro­

tr? cvnci without dismantling. Gliders were not removed

adrJnisLratJvely from either GLZ until the situation

would permit personnel to be taken into the area with­

12 .

out interfering with ihc tactical problem.

11. General critique at end of First Phase of Laneuver,

School Building, Gamp I'ackall, H.C., 0900, 29 Sop 44-,

12. A-3, A -4 and Engineering and 1'aintenancc Reports

for Airborne Troop Carrier "maneuver, 24 September

to 30 September 1944• Some interference was ex­

perienced on D / 3 with gliders being removed from

Zone -//3. Future areas should bo chosen so glider

evacuation and action in the tactical area do not

conflict.

- 6 ­
 Troops brought In by glider were not usod In tho

attack on tho airport. Their function was to help secure

tho airport and to prevent the movement of red forces

through the Hoffman Area.

AIR TRANSPORT LAHDIIIGS

Units moved In by parachute and glider took positions

of strategic importance for purpose of securing the air­

port for subsequent air transport landing of troops. Engi­

neers began repairing the airport immediately after seizure

and had completed the task within one hour. Little damage

had boon done to the airport because of the method of bomb­

ardment used and hast v/ith which the enemy withdrew.

Air landings began, at 1540 D-day on Gamp Kackall,

with tho arrival of 10 B-17Ts carrying 450 airborne

personnel which Included the airhead control party.

Seventy-two C-47fs transported the 130th Evacuation

Hospital. A total c± 265 C-47's wore usod In tho air

transport landing phase carrying 2,230 personnel and.

665,837 pounds of freight. All tactical personnel and

their fighting equipment had been landed at the airport .

by 2010 on D-day. It was then announced officially that

the division was closed and that it had been completed

13

In less than twenty-four hours.

One full glider infantry regiment and the remainder

of another, v/as air transported to Gamp Tackall and took

up initial defensive positions just west of the airport.

13. A-3 and Consolidated mission Reports, 349th, 1st

Provisional Troop Carrier Group for maneuver,

24 September 1944 to 27 September 1944, 60th

Troop Carrier TTing, Pope Field, Port Bragg, IT• G•

— 7 —

Lato In the afternoon of D-day, tho division was given

the responsibility of protecting or defending a dan in

the vicinity of Lcdbotter. An Infantry battalion and

a battery of field artillery were sent to accomplish

14

tho mission.

KEDICAL EVACUATION

Hcdical plans had boon laid so any emergency could

bo handled in an expeditious manner. Actual casualties

were handled administratively. Twenty-five airborne

casualties wore admitted to 1'axton Army Air Base Station

Hospital during the period H-18 to departure. Seventy-

six cases wore associated with tho parachute jump, and

ten were Injured in the plane prior to jump and returned

with the plane to departure bases. An additional six

casualties occurred during the ground- actI on-;, phase.-.."Thir­

teen deaths occurred during the parachute jumping phase,

twelve of which were tho result of a plane crash. The

Maneuver Surgeons agreed that only 21 casualties of those

admitted to the hospital would have been so considered in

a theater of operations•

plans had been laid for evacuation of tactical

casualties for purposes of giving personnel of the 13th

Airborne Division some practice in handling various

kinds of wounded individuals. Umpires tagged simulated

wounded cases but few were processed through the medical

~16

Installations•

14, -Goaoral Critique at End'of First Phase of Maneuver,

School Building, Camp Kackall, ZT.C, 0900, 29 Sop 44,

15, Report of T'anouvor Surgeons, appendix C.

16, Report of Maneuver Surgeons, appendix C.

 Morale of personnel participating in the initial

phase of the maneuver was extremely low as a result

of unfounded and erroneous rur.ors regarding oncrmous

death tells from- parachute drop. Untrue runors were

circulated from personnel in a manner which would no

doubt give the enemy great satisfaction in a theater

of operation, Guch activity would do much to inpair

17

the physical and mental efficiency of all personnel*

r, • j-r-i n \ ? r n T?~? "AilT; v T V

Since the division was to bo Isolated from D to D /

4, a plan was devised for resupply by air. This phase

began Immediately after the conploticn of the air trans- :

port landing of troops. Two-hundred seventy-four C-47

plane loads cf supplies totaling 1,189,794 pounds, and

nineteen B-17fs carrying 125, 'rOC pounds of freight were

z 18

landed at Gamp Tackall airport by H O C Hours D / !•

Enough supplies had boon flown In by that time to pro­

19

vision tao troops for the first phase of the Maneuver.

An additional serial cf six C-47fs was flown for

the rcsupply of the Isolated battalion located at Lodbettcr.

One hundred and twenty packages totaling 26,800 pounds

were dropped at 1103 D / 2, by parachute. Some packages

were damaged as a result of insufficient distance, from

point cf drop to ground, for chute to open and retard the

rate of fall. The packages wore distributed on the ground

In a good pattern, permitting easy and quick recovery of

17. Report cf Llanouvor Gurgoons, Appendix G.

18. Consolidated risslon Reports, 349th, 1st provisional

Troop Carrier Groups fcr Maneuver, 24 Sop to 27 Sop

•JT'-C ,

19. See Report of Maneuver Air Forces Quartermaster for

details cf Air Cargo Rcsupply Squadron activities,

• Appendix C.

- 9 ­
 20

supplies by the recGiving unit.

The 13th Airborne Division was brought in by Troop

Carrier forces and landed by parachute, glider and air

transport. Capture of the airport v/as accomplished by

1200 hours on D-day, before rlidor-borne infantry could

be brought into play. Sufficient aerial.rcsupply pro­

visioned the troops during the period of D to D / 4.

Aerial reconnaissance and fighter protection was furnish­

ed the ground and air forces during ail phases of the

nancuvcr. The Blue Forces ^oro able to move enough units

north and v.-cst frer.; the landing areas, by a series of

positions, to drive the cncr.iy forces out of range of the

airport. The 13th Airborne Division took up defensive

positions in that area en D / 3. They v:orc passed through

at 0800 the following morning and v/orc ordered back to a

reasscrbly area just east cf Tarston. That rove brought

the Airborne-Troop Carrier phase of the I'ancuvor to a

s u c c o s s f u 1 c on c 1 u s i o n .

20, Report of l.'aneuver A-3, Appendix B.

- 10 ­
 APPENDIX

Orders, Memoranda and Instructions

issued by Maneuver Headquarters

AB-TC MANEUVER AREA

SMPT-IS44
 3 S

•.* s
3
3 8

I
? i-

I? si
"5

.* £

ii

F I

 ^AIRBORNE .TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

TENTATIVE 11 September 1944

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

STAFF OFFICERS STAFF SECTION TEL QUARTERS ADDRESS

NO.

| NICHOLS, E .S., COL, IGD Asst Director (Air) 532 ABC 72

Q,UINTO, M J U , COL, GSC Asst Director (AB) 532 ABC BCQ, 72

ALOE, R.C., COL, GSC Asst Director (Ground) 532 ABC BCQ, 72

CALDWELL, C.C., LT COL, AGD G-1 (AB) 24

ABC BCQ, 72

McGINNIS, L.E., MAJ, Inf G-1 (Ground) 535 ABC BOQ, 72

MOORE, S.T., LT COL, AC A-2 (Air) 546 ABC BOQ 72

LUDSMAN, R.F., MAO", CAC G-2 (AB) 546 ABC BOQ, 72

A.CTENBERG, I., CAPT, Inf G-2 (Ground) 546 ABC BOQ, 72

THOMAS, A.D MAJ, AC A-3 (Air) 521 ABC BOQ 72

WALSH, L,A.JR., LT COL, GSC 38

Southern Pines, NC

G-3 (AB) 6902

CEAILLE, J.L., MAJ,» inf G-3 (Ground) 521 ABC BOQ, 72

FRENCH, J., MAJ, AC Asst A-3 (Air) 521 ABC BOQ, 72

MILAU, E.C., CAPT, AC Asst A-3 (Air)

521 ABC BCQ, 72

Glider officer
RACHAL, D,W., MAJ, Inf Asst G-3 (AB) 521
Red s p r i n g s , NC
WALLACE, J.A., MAJ, GSC Asst G-3 (AB) 521 -207

ROW, A.W., CAPT, Inf Asst G-3 (AB) 521 ABC BCQ, 72

McGINNIS, L.E., MAJ, Inf Asst G-3 (Ground) 521 ABC BCQ 72

MEEBMA, W.H •» CAPT, AC A-4 (Air)• 43 ABC BOQ, 72

Pinehurst, NC

ROCKEFELLER ..J.S..LT COL,GSC G-4 (AB) 48

3311

GA33AWAY, M .B., MAJ, inf G-4 (Ground) 48 ABC BOO, 72

Pinehurst, NC

DISTSNHOFER s H.J., MAJ, AGD Adjutant General 534

4223
HSLCHER, M>,MAJ, AC Signal Officer (Air) 533 ABC BOQ 72
BRANDT, M.M., LT COL, SC signal Officer (AB) 533 p i n e h u r s t , NC

DIUGUID, J.W., MAJ, SC Signal officer (Ground) 533 ABC BOGi 72

pinohurst , NC

HUNEYCUTT, R .£., LT COL, GSC Field Artillery 0 (&B}1 23

2302

KVIDERA, G.J ., MAJ, AC Surgeon (iir) 535 ABC B0^ 72

Southern pines,NC

BRUQ3R, U»xL , U&Jy vMC:. , - Surgeon (AB) 14

LUPEMM, EoF*, MAJ* ... Antiaircraft 0 (&B) 544 ABC BOQ, 72

Southern rinesjKC

CHRISTIANSEN U£ GC Engineer 0 (A3) 17

7303

S3A2PB, J.». , LIAJ. AC Air Engr 0 544 ABC BOQ 72

^ 1 ­
 Telephone Directory (Cont'd)

STAFF OFFICERS STAFF SECTION TEL QUARTERS" ADDRESS

EQ.

hARRlS, J.E..MAJ, qjvIC quartermaster 0 (Air) 43

Pinehurst, N G

ROCIGJlffgLLSR, J.3.,LT QQL,GSC Quartermaster o (AB) 48 '33II

GAoSAWAY, M f B.,MAJ, INF 'Quartermaster 0 (Gad) 48 ^.BC BOQ, 72

G H E T T O , J. j . , ls^t LT, CFiP Provost Marshall(Gnd) 544 ABC B O ; 72

MV.ITIN, DREW A., CATT : INF Kq Comdt (AB) 56 ABC BO > 72

WLJBUR/V. P., }U,J, AC ' PRO (Air)

( STEVENS, G., M;.J, AC Observers Bureau (Air)

CHRISTIANSEN,R.T.LT COL,CE Observers Bureau (AB) Southern pines,NC

Air Support 0 521

Motor Transport 0 53®

Ordnance Officer 4^

Message Center ,

Chief Umpire .538

Sgt Major .534

Charge of Quarters -53k

Direct Line to pope Field f..T-.. (POWDER)

Direct Line to Laurinburg............... (BUGLE)

Direct Line to Lumberton # (APPLE)

Direct Line to Camp Mackall. (DUK3)

 AIRBORiNE-TRGCP CARRI1CH- MA&EWER HEADQUARTERS.

Camp Mackail. Forth Carolina

8 September 1944

MEMORANDUM OF COHERENCE;

Conference reference maneuvers (1) black-out 1 (2) power

cut off; (3) highway control; and (4) railroad traffic control.

Conference held 7 September 19445 and the following were

represented3 Internal Security representative, Colonel Prit­

chard. Fort Bragg 5 Post Engineer, Camp Mackall, Lt. Colonel

Goulds Carolina Light and Power Company representative,.Mr.

I.-celderoy$ Seaboard Airline Railroad representative, tar.

Brotzraan; State Highway Patrol representative. Patrolman

Keykendallj Post Provost Marshal, Captain Ritchie and assist­

ant; and the undersigned.

Maneuver requirements on the above subjects were discussed

and the following agreements reached.

For the night of 24-25 September 1944, from 2100 until day­
light, black-out in the following countiess Montgomery, Rich­
mond, Moore, and parts of Hoke and. Scotland. In general, the.

black-out area will permit a 30-mile north-south run in over ­

i! if
D Field. Highway 15 from Fayetteville to Laurinburg was

excluded. Laurinburg was included within black-out area, south

of east-west line5 and Blewett Falls Lake and Marston excluded.

State Highway Patrol agreed to block roads at entrances to

black-out area from all but essential local and emergency traf­
fic*

Actual power line cut-offs to include the area bounded by

Pines, Aberdeen, Hoffman," Ellerbe, and West End. It

was agreed to furnish marked aerial photos to the Carolina Light

and Power Company through Post Engineer when actual drop areas

have been determined. Mr. Mcelderoy agreed to place all desired

warning signal lights on 100 foot high line tower, running east

and west through Derby, at points to be selected by this head­

quarters. He stated a requirement for batteries similar to

arrangements of last maneuver. Post Engineer assures he can

comply.

Mr. Brotzman was requested to slow all traffic on Seaboard

Airline between Southern Pines and Marston during the hours of

darknesson the night of 24-25 September. He stated however

that there was a 4600 volt ground signal control line on 20 to

30 foot masts paralleling the railroad. This section was not

cut off during the last maneuver, and if it was cut, would pre­
vent all ground signal and thus stop all traffic. Recommend

same arrangement as prescribed for previous maneuver, whereby

this circuit was not cut, be followed. He further agreed to

- 1 ­
station section crews along this route to cover points of poor

visibility and stated that if we .would advise him our intended

drop zones in the vicinity of the railroad bed, he would see

that these points were adequately covered, provided the govern­

ment would defray the costs of hiring extra crews. No commit­
ment has been made on this point as yet, although such arrange­
ments were concluded on past maneuvers. He stated from experi­
ence of last maneuver that if at all possible, the use of rail­
road fuzGos for indicating drop zones was to be avoided. These

fuzees are tho only moans whereby traffic can be controlled by

section crews in the event of accident. He stated that on

previous maneuver they had been requested not to use fuzees at ™

the last moment, and no satisfactory solution for traffic con­

trol was reached. Recommeno that railroad fuzees should not be

used to mark, drop zones.

Ir. Brotsman also advised that the iTorf oik-Southern Line

controls the section running north-south in the vicinity of

Lanesa and Ellerbe, that this line runs three trains weekly, and

that li'c J.'S. Cox in Raleigh could be contacted for coordination,

I will do this. He further advised that the Aberdeen-Rockfish

Railroad controls the traffic on line paralleling Highway 211

leading into Aberdeen from the east, and that the superintendent,

iir. Forrest Lockey in Aberdeen, can be contacted for the control

of this traffic which runs no night train other than troop trains.

I will check this. He further advised that the following persons

could be reached for emergency change or cancellation.; - by day,

superintendent of the Seaboard Airline in Hamlet, Lr. J. L. Cook

(Telephone 532), and by night, chief dispatcher in Hamlet (Tele­

phone 212), He further agreed, if this is desirable, to authorize

crossing of glider retrieving road and Seaboard Airline for

personnel anc individual vehicles provided guard is stationed to

control traffic. 1 ilitary Police will be so advised. When

approaching this crossing, all trains will sound the usue^l signal.

(This is necessary cue to legal procedures agreed upon between

Post authorities and Seaboard Airline Railroad.)

Colonel Pritchard has made initial representation to super­

intendent Seaboard Airline, superintendent, Carolina Light and

Power Company? superintendent3 State High-ay Patrol, and Governor,

state of Forth Carolina, for cooperation of the O.C.D. All con­

cerned incicated willingness to cooperate.

L. A. T;ALSH, Jr.

Lt« Co1», GoSoC.

G-3.

- 2 ­
 HEADQUARTERS AIRBORNE CENTER

ARM5T GROUND FORCES

Camp Kackall, North Carolina

354.2 - C-WDT 26 September 1944

SUBJECT: Use of Carolina Maneuver Area

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters 12th Detachment, Special

Troops, Second Army, Port Jackson, South Carolina,

!• In conformance with Femorandum No. 2, dated 12 February

1943, Headquarters XII Corps, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, appli­

cation is made for use of the following portion of the Carolina

raneuver Area for the conduct of an Airborne Maneuver during the

period 20 September to 7 October 1944, inclusive?

Horth Boundary :• A line through Bisco_q, Carthage, Cameron,

llorth Carolina,

East and South Boundaries: .Highway Ho 1, and that part

of Kackall Reservation exten­

ding South of Highway Ho 1.

West Boundary: Highway No 220, from Rockingham to Biscoe.

2. a. Type of exercise: Airborne maneuver including air

movement and ground maneuver phases,

b. Period of use: 20 September to 7 October 1944, in­

clusive •

c, Routes to and from area: Airborne units will move to.

the area from nearby bases by military aircraft and gliders. Oppo­
sing forces will move from Camp rackall Reservation by the most di­
rect route to their assigned locations. Fovement to and from area

will be b3^ motor, foot, and military aircraft,

3. A blackout is scheduled for the night of 24 - 25 September

during the period of the initial air landings. This is being coor­
dinated with all interested agencies, in the event that weather is

unsuitable for flying the night of the 24th and 25th, the blackout

will be extended the night of 25 - 26 September.

For the Commanding Officer:

Colonel, G.S.O

Chief of Staff

cc: Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver Headquarters

353(Airborne)(7 Aug 44) QiTGGT-51 . 23 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive for Joint Training of the 13th Airborne

Division.

TO : Commanding Generals,

XXII Corps,

Airborne Center.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2, letter this head­

quarters, 320.2/102 (A/3)(0)(22 Feb 44) GNGCT, to Commanding

General, Airborne Command, dated 22 Februar3^ 1944, subject:

^Reorganization of the Airborne Command.:?

2. The 13th Airborne Division will receive its joint

airborne-troo-o carrier training in the general area of Camp

Mackall, Fort Bragg, and Laurinburg-I'laxton Army Air Base

during the period 24 September - 7 October. This training

will consist of two phases, movement of the division by air

and a ground maneuver. The air movement of the division will

be the opening phase. Ground maneuver will begin upon land­

ing in the objective area.

3. The XXII Corps will be responsible for the ground

iraneuver training of the 13th Airborne Division and the Air­

borne Center will be responsible for the airborne training

(joint training of airborne and troop carrier units).

4. In the joint training of the 13th Airborne Division,

the Airborne Center, Army Ground Forces, and the Troop Carrier

.Command, Army Air Forces, will conduct the air movement of

the division. Direct correspondence on this subject is author­

ized. By mutual agreement between the Army Ground Forces and

Army Air Forces, the Com.anding Officer, Airborne Center will

direct the airboino phase of the maneuver assisted by the

Troop Carrier Command. The Commanding General, XXII Corps

.will direct the ground maneuver phase.

5. Umpires, enemy troops, and all other details concern­

ing ground activities will be the responsibility of the XXII

Corps. A mini]IUoi of personnel will be used to conduct the

ground phase of the maneuver,

6. The preparation of the maneuver exercise is the joint

responsibilitsr qf the XXII Corps and the Airborne Center. The

Airborne Center will assure the tactical soundness of the air­

borne operation.

7. The joint airborne-troop carrier phase of the 13th

Airborne Division maneuver will be conducted under the condi­

tions covered in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11, below.

- 1­
353 (Airborne! (7 Aug 44) G-ITGCT-31 - Letter ACS1 to COs, XXII, and

Airborne Center, dated 25 Aug A4. Subj: i?Dir for Joint Tng of

the 13th AB Div-f.

8, Divisional training period.

a. liinimun period - 1 -week.

t., Troops - 1 troo-D carrier wing headquarters

1 troop carrier group with gliders

Z troop carrier squadrons with gliders

1 combat cargo group

*'"*• 10 tactical type bombardment airplanes

1 airborne division

c. Objectives -
Trooy Carriers Operation as a wing under condi­
tions as outlined in paragraph
10 below.

Airborne: Loading, landing, assembly, and

entry into combat as a division,

moving in the minirium number of

lifts practicable over a cir­

cuitous route, (See paragraph

11 below).

9, The 13th Airborne Division will emphasize:

a. Flexibility in loading plans. The maximum, load

capacity of all tugs and gliders will be utilized.

b. Motor movement to air fields; air departure from

separate fields.

c. Rapid assembly after landing, day and night, and

attack by combined arris.

d. liaintaining themselves in the field with only the

rations, supplies and equipment that can be transported by

troop carrier units after tho division has been closed in the

objective area.

e. Staff operation and coordination v/ith troop

carrier staffs.

10, Troop carrier units vail emphasize:

a. Squadron and/or group formations, employing single

and/or double tow of gliders and maximum practicable loads in

both airplanes and gliders.

b. "Day and night operations with departure from

separate air fields.

- 2 ­
353(Airborno)(7 Aug 44) GNGCT-31 -Letter AGF to CGs, XXII

Corps, and Airborne Cantor, dated 23 Aug ^-Subject: vtDir for

Jnt'Tng of the 13th A3 IDiv*.

c. locating objective areas, by day and night,

with only those navigational aids that can be expected in a

combat theater; and in dropoing parachutists and/or landing

gliders therein.

d. Staff operation and coordination with airborne

staffs.

11. Before troop carrier units and thu 13th Airborne

Division are considered capable of performing their primary

mission in a combat theater, the 13th Airborne Division and

the complementing troop carrier units must satisfactorily

engage in a joint maneuver of the following scope:

a. Duration - a minimum of 5 days.

b. Employ at least 2 departure air bases.

c. Objective area to be reached by circuitous route
of approximately 100 miles.

d. Landings •'-.no. assembly of units to be made at

night to the ^r.ximun extent practicable.

e. Ho contact to bo i£ido v.-ith friendly ground forces

prior to D plus 4.

f• After tho division has b^cn closed in the objec­

tive area, resupply and evacuation by air and/or air landings

until D plus 4*

3y command of Lieutenant General Lear:

R. .A. I'ZDREDITH

Lt. Col., A. G. D.

Asst. Ground A d j . Gen.

- 3­
 AITQCRNS

izaTl, "Ior"Sn u a r

8 September1944

FIELD ORDER)
N O . , . , . . .e l )

IJaos: 1/20.000 - Troy,_32, 23, 24, 28, 29,30, 34,35,36 Sanford

19, 2o, 26, 31, Z>2 sheets.

1/62,500 - Troy, Candor, Vass, -Xaclcson Springs, Southern

Pines, moo^ingham,, Laurinburg sheets.

1/500,000 - Charlotte sheet.

1. a_. See Situation I:ap and Intelligence .Anne:: No. 1.

b,. BV'E forces v? 11 continue the attach on D-D~.y. See

Laneuver Siu^atior1. JTO - 1 i'B.OJS) and Overlay attached thereto (liui­

euver 1?Aif)<. Tie PTJE .11th. 7.-jvision is expected to relieve airborne

units in thevicinity oiJ ROT?!AIT on D plus 4*

2. _n airt'-?;nG-:f-l?oot% oarrier te.sk force will attach en D-i

day, seize and secure CAT.,.? IA0ICALL Airport, and prevent movement

of BED Forces through t-ie EGJ'FIIAN Area until relieved by friendly

BLU3 forces.

3. a. The 13th Airncrne Division, \d.ththe 130th liedical

Evacuation Hospital (attached forairmovement) will move by suc­

cessive air lifts f-:cr«. L.;,UKI:TBUKG-!A:CT0::1 i:.rmy Air Base, LUJ. 1T3ZRT0IT

and POPE Field, J.ht/L :i.:;:.ti8lly at H-9^hours D-l day, in thearea

•pV'TnrpT T' T\T "t / TT-p ' ' r*T~ ' " 7 - --a- >-;-' •-Y- •-, o 1-1 ri -~io o T> v> o ^ 7r ' n ' T H T" T T •' -S -v-,-p4 ,--.Tr"I - P c -^»
Jb.L'_' ij J. J*u.'s -•u^U.d" .• i...u!..:.,... i.L , i.d J u u l e and odOUid w-Ji i-i;J,v_'.^a.Ajjj ^ , . 1 - i J.'C;_LCI 1J P
subsequent air la-? ir.r.^j, and prevent movement of HSD troops through

ECFFluAN and viciniGy. 13th 3 Div attachid Z:ZiJ."S. Corps o;: lending.

b. Hie 60th Troop Carrier 7ing v/ill transport the 13th

Airborne division axi-I attachments by successive air lifts fron i

departure ba^es listed in paragraph 3 a_ above, landing the initial

elements at or about n.-?i hours. TJpen' completion °f ^- 8 lothAir­

borne Division movement, the 60th /ing will transport suppliesand

equipment as directed by this he:/"^uarters»

c_e The 13Cth Evacuation Hospital (attached to the 13th

airborne Division forairixve.uient) ivill support the 15th airborne
'•1 vision, reverts to A; Ccros on
Tactical Group^ Inird Tt-ctica
0o::iro Division
l l execute p p aii.os:.o ns p r i D-l day (3ee ^ i r Support
Aiiridjr i nne:; Wu» 2) and p r i o r i t y three luisbions o.n oall from the
j.-Ah airborne Division af^er i n i t i a l landings at E-Sf- hours.
x. (1) i)--Day - 25 September 1944,

E-£cur - 0600"'.

(2) Hadio silence mill be imposed except forPath­

finder Communication until initial landing os:

13th Airborne Division*

(3) Reconnaissance prior to D-Day v/ill be that

United oy use oi Doncer ana fign"Ger a

(4) Complete plans,- to include Field Ordersand

J'bvement Tables, v^ill be nucgi^fc^!«#^o this

headquarters prior Jto^T^Geptienber 4944.

 M A N E U V E R

Field Order No. 1, 8 Sep 44 ^

4. See Administrative I

5, a_. See Signal Annex. (Anii^x NO,, 4 ) .

b, Command Posts:

XXII Corps He Bee, SC

{Aotua 1,1-fcneuve r Hq)

13th Airl:orne Division - '.aurinburg-Ivi.zton
1;;
In Forvie.wl Area o be reported
T
60th Trcop Carrier 7ing - i&urinburg-Mixton
Composite Tactical Gp (Ihird T..D) - To be reported
130 uh 3-ux.<i a t ion Hospr.to.". -lo be reportad thru
13 A/B Division

Colonel

!
Ir.ol 7­ 3j ^ d
lllOl , Signal

DISITvlB ? , C-

 AIRBORItfE-TROOP CARRIER LL;\NSUV£R HEADQUARTERS

Camp M a c k a i l , North C a r o l i n a

20 September 1944
CHANGS HO. 1
TO F . 0 . If 1
So much of paragraph 3 a_9 Field Order Ho. 1 3 dated 8 Sept­
ember 1944 as pertains to POPE FIELD is revoked.

DALBSY

OFFICIAL

^/ALSH THOMAS

G-3 A-3

DISTRIBUTION; A, C, 0, E , F } G

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

12 Se
ANNEX #1
P t e m b e r

TO

IELD ORDER #1 INTELLIGENCE

Maps: 1/20,000 - Troy, 22, 23, 24 , 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 3&

Sanford 19, 25, 26, 31, 32 sheets.

1/62,500 - Troy, Candor, Vass, Jackson Springs, Southern pines,

Rockingham, Laurinburg sheets.

1/500,000- Charlotte sheet (1944 edition).

1. SUMMARY OF E N M Y SITUATION.

a. Map (1/500,000 CHARLOTTE sheet 1944 edition) and overlay.

b# Flak overlay - to be issued later.

c. Local Conditions - The projected area of operations is bounded on

the east and south by US HIGHWAY #1 CAMSRON to ROCKINGHAM and by that part of

CAMP MACKALL MILITARY RESERVATION S of US HIGHWAY #1, on the west by the line

ROCKINGHAM-ELLERBE-BISCOE and on the north by the line BISCOE-CARTHAGE-CAMERON.

This area is a coastal plain composed of white sandy soil in the

south grading into red soil in the northern section on an approximate E-F line

BISC0E-PINEHUR3T-F0RT BRAGG. Numerous small streams flowing generally southward

or south eastward intersectJbhe area. These streams flow through densely wooded

swamp areas that make passage ^ifficlirt»~"Ab6\it"fifty per cent of the'area is

covered with thick to dense second growth pine and oak, although there are some

areas where vegetation is sparse and little cover is to be found. The remainder

of the area is composed of farms whose principal crops are corn, cotton, tobacco

and peaches- Where peach orchards are found, the trees grow to a maximum height

of twelve feet and present a serious obstacle to parachute landing.

The population density in rural areas is estimated at twenty-five

persons £>er square mile. The principal towns in the area and their populations

ABERDEEN 1,500
CARTHAGE 1,000
HOFMAN 500
PINEBLUFF 250
PINEHURST 1,600
ROCKINGHAM - ^ 3.000
SOUTHERN PINES 2,500
VASS 600
'TEST END 6qo
LSDBETTER 500
The natives within the area are friendly and will welcome invasion

by BLUE FORCES. Considerable help .as guides may be expected of the natives•

"* US HIGHWAY §1 and the SEABOARD AIRLINE RAILROAD traverse the area

a NE - SW line, RAIEIGH-SANFQRD-ABERDEEN-RQCKINGHAM and are roughly parallel tc

other. NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY #211 and ABERD5SN and ROCKFISH RAILROAD

cross the area on a NW - SE line, CANDOR -ABSRDEEN-RAEFOKD^auS al30 run roughly

parallel to each other.— $h-& ^ ^ ^ | £ / 4 Y - ^ ^ ^ $ r & e E S the area on the west from

BISCOE to ROCKINGHAM. NORTH CAROLINA STATS HJGH/TAY #27 crosses the northern

sector of the area in an E-1T direction 25 miles north of ABERDEEN. The portion

of the area lying between this highway and ABERDEEN is especially heavily wooded

and difficult of passage. The area in general is grided by a few secondary sand

Annex #1 to F*Q»#1

roads five to ten ntileUtifrart with small additional wood and farm roads. In the

northern sector the red clay roads will be passable with difficulty for mechan­
ized forces in wet weather, while th e sand roads of the middle and southern

sectors are considered passable for mechanized forces in all weather but are

^reacherous because of soft shoulders and ditches.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Determine strength, composition, disposition, tactics, identifica­

tion enemy air units that can hinder movement at departure airdromes and enroute.

Special attention will be given to capabilities of enemy night fighter units.

b. Report location, size, character, activity enemy defensive works

vicinity Camp Mackall and Hoffman.

c. Report location, caliber, intensity of fire, of all antiaircraft

installations encountered along proposed flight path. .

d. Report movement reserves from Raleigh to S and SW»

e. Report any movement Armored Force now located 100 miles NW RALEIGH.

" 3. WEATHER CONDITIONS.

a. Long range forecasts (including sunlight and moonlight charts)

weekly by this headquarters beginning 11 September Zjj;.

b. Daily forecasts by 6oth TC Wing - to this headquarters by 1200

daily.

4* MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.'

a. Aerial reconnaissance and photography, pilot and air crew inter­

rogation, Prisoner of War interrogation, friendly agents.

54 MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND THE

SUPPLY OF MAPS,

a. prisoners of War of field grade and higher and staff officers only

and captured'documents will be evacuated to rear echelon.by air until relieved.

bi Maps, distribution: Request by property issue slip to G-2, this

headquarters•

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

a. Active measures will be taken to deny natives access to troop con­

centration areas at departure bases.

7. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. Periodic reports will be rendered as of 0001 each day by Head­

quarters 6oth TC Wing and 13th AB Div to this headquarters by 0600 until D plus 2,

b. Effective with report due at 0600 D plus 2, 13th AB Div 7/ill render

reports to Hq XXII Corps. (Published with concurrence of XXII Corps). Plq 60th

TC Wing will continue to submit reports to this headquarters.

OFFICIAL:

Uis^ M00RE
Sti

'^UDEMAN
A-2 AB-2

2 Incls: F * «P­
incl §1 - Map 1/500,000 CHaRL0TT*f*3HEET (I944 edition)

incl #2 - Situation Overlay

 "oolfifr

oo
\050

1400

^384

V-.
' . . > •

QH,

HHHHHH

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRI3R M

Camp Mackall, N^rth Carolina

fl 13 September

TO FI3LD CRDSR #1 WEATHER FORECAST

1. A long range vreather forecast for the period 12-20 September foliov.;,:

Tuesday, 12 September

LOT; ceilings v;ith good visibility. Moderate temperatures. Not much

chance of rain*

Wednesday, 13 5eptember

Continued lo'"r ceilings rdth reduced visibility until rpid^morning r-rith

ceiling lifting to lfOO' to 3OOO1 in the afternoon, possible light interrnittant

dri2^zle for early portion of pe riod and light intermittent showers for latter

fcpart of period.

Thursday, ll\. September

Clear to partly cloudy v:ith -good "visibility*." Lo*." ceiling-and increac si

winds occuring to?/ards end of period.

Friday, If) September

Continued lov/ ceilings and high Finds with continous moderate to heavy

rain causing lov: visibility during last half of period.

Saturday, 16 September

Continued lo^ ceilings but improved visibility becoming cls&r 'oy latter

half of period.

Sunday, 17 September

,/

Clear with good visibility throughout entire period, somewhat cooler.

Monday, 13 September

Partly cloudy but good ceiling and visibility. Moderate temperature

Tuesday, 19 September

Continued partly, cloudy rith 'good visibility. Sorje'rr.'-.t varrner in

latter half of Deriod.

. - ! - • •
.11

Wednesday, 20 September 111!1 .^«^\l ^ LiM „ A

Cloudy with good"visibility, probable rain toward end of period.

2. Sunlight and Moonlight table:

35° N. LATITUDE - 79° T7. LONGITUDE

EASTERN ~i TIME
BETEMEER BEGINNING SUNRISE SUN32T ENDING
1944 CIVIL CIVIL
TWILIGHT TWILIGHT
12 O63I O656 1928 1954 0222
13 0632 0657 1926 1952 0316 1735

14 Oo^ ° 0658 1925 1951 0411 1813

15 0633 O658 1923 1949 0507 1847

16 O659 1922 1948 06 02 1918

17 O635 0700 1921 1947 0.657

18 O636 0701 1919 1945 0751 2016

19 O636 0701 1918 1944 O846

20 O637 0702 1916 1942 0941 2115

21 0638 0703 1915 1941 1037

22 0639 0704 1913 1939 1134
23 O639 0704 1912 1938 1232 2302

24 0640 0705 1911 1937 1331 2358

25 O64I 0706 1909 1934 1423 Does not 3©

26 0641 0706 1908 1933 1524 0041

27 0707 1906 1931 1616 0140

28 0643 0708 1905 1930 17Q5 0245

29 0644 0709 1903 1928 1749

30 0645 0710 1902 183 0 0506

DALB3Y

OFFICIAL:

LUDMM
A-2 s
AB-2

DISTPJEUTION: A, C, D, E, F, G

- 2 ­
 r

AIHB0RNE-TB001 GiJiBlSR MAl^SUVEB ^

Camp Mackall, North C a r o l i n a

SUPPL2LI3NT #2 14 September
TC ^NtTSX #1
TO J'I3LD ORDER #1 FLAK OVERLAY

Intelligence reports from all sources indicate RED antiaircraft inntf

lations as shown on attached overlay.

DALBSY

OFFICIAL:

\ f r s-' f

MOORE LUDSLIAN

A-2 AE-2

1 incl:

Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: A, C, D, E, F, G

. •

I
 TROOP CiJffiI-£R I&1TEOTTER HE4

Gamp Ifeokall, North Carolina

SUPH3IOTT # 3) 15 September 1944

TO AI^IEX NO. 1)
TO F.O. #1 )

DEFENSIVE INSTAXIATIONS

Further i n t o l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s from a l l sources

i n d i c a t e RED defensive i n s t a l l a t i o n s as shown on
attached o v e r l a y s .

TERRELL

OFFICIAL:

.' ',
IXOR

A-2 AB-2

2 Inclosures:
I n c l No. 1- Overlay, Camp H i c k a l l Airport

I n o l No. Z- Aberdeen

if
DISTRIBUTION: and
m

•,\ cia?
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

SUFFICIENT #5 19 September 1944

TO AIMX //I
WEATHER FORECAST
TO 3JZII) ORDER # 1
19-27 September f olio: ••:
1. A long range

Tuesday, 19 September

Low ceilings with fair visibility changing to good ceilings and visi­
bility in last.half of period. No rain expected.

Wednesday, 20 September

Good ceiling and visibility with poor ceiling and visibility after

400. Visibility improving by 0800 and ceilings improving by 1000. No rain

expected.

Thursday, 21 September

Clear until Oij.00 with low visibility thereafter until 0800» Ceiling;;.

continued good* scattered clouds beginning 1200 with intermittent showers

probable after 1500 - clearing by 19C0,

Friday, 22 September

Good ceilings and fair visibility w£th visibility improving to un­

restricted after 0800* scattered clouds beginning 1100 with scattered showers

probable after 1500, clearing by 1900.

Saturday, 23 September

Low ceilings and fair visibilities with ceiling clearing after 100".

partly cloudy during remainder of period v.lth scattered sho-:ers probable durir^

^afternoon. Clearing by end of period.

Sunday, 24 September

Clearing during entire period except for fair visibility between 0400

and 0800.

T.londay, 25 September

Continued clear with scattered to broken clouds at 10,000 feet in

afternoon and rest of period. No ra.in expected.

 ipt
Tuesday, 26 September
l
*4

Scattered to broken high clouds during entire period. Good visibili­

ties. No rain expected•

Wednesday, 27 September

Ceiling lovrerin^by 0300 with fair visibility ^clearing after 1000,

Scattered clouds and widely scattered showers in afternoon dissipating by 19-C

2. Sunlight and Moonlight- table:

3S° N. LATITUDE - 790 77. LONGITUDE EASTERN WAR TIME

SEPTEMBER BEGINNING SUNRISE SUNSET ENDING M00NRISE M00NSET FliASS

1944 CIVIL CIVIL OF
TWILIGHT TWILIGHT MOCN

19 0636 0701 1918 1944 0846 2045

20 0637 0702 1916. 1942 0941 2115
21 0638 0703 1915 1941 10^7 2147
22 0639 0704 1913 1939 1134 2232
23 0639 0704 1912 1938 1232 2302
24 0640 0705 1911 1937 1331 2358
25 0641 0706 1909 1934 1428 Does not set ID ls>b
26 0641 0706 1908 1933 1524 0041
27 0642 0707 1906 1931 1616 0140 €
23 0643 0708 1905 1930 1705 0245
29 0644 • 0709 1903 1923 1749 0355 0
30 0645 0710 1902 1927 I830 0506 0 '

DAI3EY

OFFICIAL:

M00RE vUDEMAN

A-2 AB-2

DISTRIBUTION: A, B , C. D, E , F , G

2 ­
 /

• .

3:

i trc

•
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp F a c k a l l , N o r t h C a r o l i n a

>SUPPLEI-.:ENT #7 20 September 1944

TO ANNEX #1

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

TO FIELD ORDER #1

1. No additional information RED defensive installations

vicinity KACEALL AIRPORT.

2. March Group (CT) last reported bivouac vicinity APEX, re­

ported moving S on US HIGHWAY #1 two miles N SANFCRD 0600.

3. Passwords and countersigns for the period.of the maneuver

will be published In Signal Operating'Instructions on D-3#

4. Situation 11th Infantry Division front remains static,

f 5, No nev/ identifications.

6. No increase over normal traffic in area of proposed oper­

ation.

D A L B S Y

OFFICIAL:

*L

A-: A'B-2

DISTRIBUTION; A, C, D, E, F, G

 1153

1340

50 AA
i
14
5 AA
•'•\ OhA

- 50

4 0 AA .. ....

(
n

5epto<ab«» 1944

•«x #3­ v© FC

i «. SAiN'FCPD 3 1 a b t f U ,

.­ , H.©rici. R a
i*:. area. ev&ca&ttdQ

:XC«pt
•

RD
observed in

1335

5* 3'jfi Annex 2 t© PO •

« All
kACKALL

OFFICIALi

LudeouLB
A-2
 .

• '

•• 1

ill all

 AIRBORNE - TROOP C/-RRIBR LaJTUEVER HSADQU/itTURS

Canip t i a e k a l l , North C a r o l i n a

geptember 1944

ANIIEX NO. 4 )
TO s
F . 0 . NO.l )

SIGNAL

MAPS: 1:20,000, TROY 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 , zk, Z$, 3&$ SAHFQRD 1 9 ,

2 5 , 2 6 , 3 1 , 32,

1:62,500, TROY, CANDOR, VASS, JACKSON SPRINGS, SOUTHERN

iTfiS, ROCKIiJOHAIi, LAURIiJBURG s h e e t s .

1:500,000 CHARLOTTE sheet.

1. a. Information on enemy signal communication will be distri­

buted to those concerned as it becomes available. Enemy is capable

of:

(1) Jamming.

(2) S e n d i n g - f a l & e m e s s a g e s i- -•* -•'•• - :-: ­

(3-) Intercepting our traffic,

(4) RDF our stationsV '

(5) Tracking by radar. - :

v(6) Cryptanalysis of our codes and ciphers,

bV "Signal security measures to be taken:

(1) While at-departure'bases.

(a) liak'e ma'ximurn use of wire fa'cilitie^, courier

me'sserigers, and postal facilities. Secret

. and Confidential, matters to be properly safe­

''.:•>. 'guarded 'in transmission and authenticated.

(b) Airborne, unit nets will maintain radio silence .of

"existing installations,

(c) Existing radio stations to maintain a certain

. traffic control load for Troop Carrier units.

augmented by dummy traffic as a balance so

that enemy intercept -will be unaware of accel­

eration in operations approaching D-Day,

(2) Bnroute:

(a) Existing radio stations in departure areas

continue normal traffic load.

(b) Radio silence enforced on all other radios of

forces involved in the operation until initial

landings on,D-Day. Radio silence%iay be broken

in event of disaster and requirement to divert

airborne serials. Pathfinder communication

facilities may break radio silence in accordance

M i t h

- ' - < prearranged plans. _ ^ - — . . « •

 (3) Landed «F SSJSt « B•«**

(a)
1. Enforce transmission security:

aa. prescribed procedure,

bb. Cryptographic security.

cc. Strict radio discipline.

2. Locate transmitters l/8 to l/4 mile from

~~ CP's and other important installations,

( b ) "Viire.-t ;..•••

1« Captured wire lines will be completely

~" isolated, from outside connections before .

using.

2, Constant sur-vjsil.lance of wire system against

~" tapping. Exercise>great care in telephone

. conversations to avoid disclosing secret or

confidential information. .

2, Signal Plan*

a, .Commercial wire facilities, telephone and teletype will* tie

available in departure zone at 0800, D - 14, as follows:

(1) 3 - Telephone circuits, Airborne-Troop Carrier Manuever

Headquarters to IJAXTOi'I Army Air Base.

2 - Teletype circuits, Airborne-Troop Carrier llanuever

, Headquarters to'IjAXTON Army Base* •

1 * Telephone circuit,^Airborne-Troop Carrier" Kanuever

' • headquarters to POPE Field,

(Uote:' Telephone and teletype facilities will be

extended to 1st Provisional Group based at

"i-ACKALL Airfield from Itanuever Headquarters.)

(2) 2 -. Telepiione: circuits:, I /J'lTOlT"to"

2 - Teletype c i r c u i t G , IiAXTOIJ to POPE., -.-,. ,

(3) 2 - Telephone c i r c u i t s . . JAXT01I to LU1 3ERT01r Army Air

B a s e , • • • ' • •

2 - Teletype- c i r c u i t s , LliOCTOH t o LU11BERT01J Array-Air

. B a s e , ; ' ' ' • / " ' ' ". ' •, • ... • : . . - . •

b. Wire f a c i l i t i e s of paragraph"2-a w i l l be supplemented

by radio.

c,^ Message centers w i l l be established aria operated a t I'JLCTALL,

Ji'JCTOlI, POPE, and rJJi2UlTCiJ., 0"00, D - 14. in' departure; urea.
Message center of the 16th ^/i^borne Division in acstLnution zone
to open on landing* • . , .

d. Scheduled messe^rer service by Liason a i r c r a f t to be

established .^betT/eon i'JrCKII)Lm i;7XT0N, L0t;B£irTO.T and ^gPE twice d a i l y ,
0900 and "1330, beginning D - 14 'from yAClUi^L. Other ss^cauul m
service betv/een 1TA T
 Radio: -u it y; «iii* w w * 3

(1) Two nets, Command Net ITos. 1 and 2, established

between Airborne-Troop Carrier Lanuever Headquarters

(lu^CKALL), /lirborne-Troop Carrier Headquarters (liAXTON),

and 13th Airborne Division, when landed (llACKALL) !

D-day. These nets to be known as the Task Force Nets,

and will be A-l (CW) emission. Tactical traffic

normally assigned to Command Hot Ho, 1, and a&jninist­

rative and intelligence traffic assigned to'Command

Ho. 2

(2) Immediately upon comm-.ncement of operations all

serials in flight will maintain listening watch in

Task Force Cornr.and Net No. 1 on lias on set SCR-287,

and be prepareu to act on prearranged signals received

by this channel.

(3) V,K.F, radio channels will be used for airdrome

control and inter-plane communication.

(4) Single call sign procedure will be used.

(5) Second Army Authentication System used throughout.

(6) Common cipher key lists for converter M-209 will be

used throughout,

f, Visual: See SOI.

g, Pyrotechnic: See SOI»

h* Snoke: See SOI.

i. Signal Lamps: See SOI,

j, Pigoons will be supplied and delivered by this headquarters

based on requirements submitted, A mobile loft will be settled at

KAXT01I for communications from 13th Airborne Division in destination

zone to Airborne-Troop Carri r Headquarters and birds from fixed

loft at KACKALL will be supplied for communications to Kanuever

Headquarters and XXIX Corps Headquarters,

3, a, Airborne-Troop Carrier Lanuever Headquarters will effect

the installation, operation anu maintenance of above-mentioned

signal systems in departure areas,

b. Provisional Signal Company, 60th "wing, will establish

airdrome control stations for Troop Currier units in forward areas

once air-landing strip is secured,

c; One Air Support liason officer is attached to Airborne-

Troop Carrier Lanuever Headquarters, D - 14,

df Two Air Support parties with equipment are attached t*

13th, juirbwne Division Headquarters on D - 1.

4, a. Signal Dumps*

Rear Echelon - HAXTON

Forward Echelon - JjAC

b. Maintenance:

(1) Every radio ^ e V operated^ %^fjr^'5u\teries will

land with new batter50& installo^^n%l.nitial allow-

S
"^% 9fcfc^ter.ie» ^ DO tested prior

to x a A * Jrf • tar, .dates; ^ iMXtterfes1 cheeked. Ha " Time

A be

 • -(2) Re-equipping of,limits v/ho lost Signal equipment

or had Signal equipment excessively damaged will

be expedited by 13th Airborne Division maintaining

a replacement pool of complete sets of Signal

equipment.

c. Captured enemy equi uient or facilities;

(1) Radio stations v/ill be taken over or disposed of

according to Division orders.

5. Curro-nt Index of Airborne-Troop Carrier tlanuever SOI governs

DALBEY
1­ I n c l : Commercial Wire Hot.

O F F I C I A L :

G-3

n
DISTRIET'TIO": A., t> Dy E, F , G.
CO&:ERCIAL WBIE FACILITIES FOR AB-TC HANEUVBR

 Hq,
Camp I'ackall, N.C.
da 0 !i1 to Accompany F 0 •# 1 9 September 1944 - 1500

liaps; Same as F 0 if1

a. Rationss

(1) Supply X3oints°­

(a) xiochange until concentration at departure bases

Army Supply Point tfl- 3ragg - For all units lo­

(b) cated at Pop ;r Bragg until departure - opens

day of arrival in area. For rear echelon until,

release. (See Annex if1)

Army Supply Point # 2 - 1/iaxtGn - For all units

located at Ifexton and Lumberton until departure.

Opens day of .. jrival in area. For rear echelon

until release. (See Annex -j 2)

(c) -airheads for aerial rasupply subsequent to land­

ing - Camp Kackall Airport & i)Zs as requested

by 13th Airborne Division on and after D plus 1.

(2) Schedule of distributions

Ration cycle; Breakfast, Dinner, Supper

Time of issue; Army Supply Points ­

13th* A3 Div - 0800 - 1700

Other Units - 0800 » 1700

All1 head - .^s requested by 13th A3 i^iv

(3) Plan of Supplys

if
(a) Field rations A'' at Army Supply Points 1, 2.

l{
(b) Field rations Oj'[ and /'K1', at airheads by aerial

rasupply,

(c) Tv^/o (2) field rations HC^-PH-Jil ^ a one (1)

field rat ion O;I per individual will be carried

by 13th /.i-'oorne lav ision and attachments upon

landing. To be dravjn from present supply

points.

(d) Aerial resupply will be accomplished by 60th

TC T."ing on and after Z,plus 1. Schedule to be

announced later.

(e) Ration strength for units drawing on :.rmy

Supply Points 1 3 2, will be submitted to this

Headquarters .icily at 08005 beg inning four

(4) days prior to day of arrival in vicinity

of each departure base, indicating strength

at each .,\rmy Supply Point.

b. Ammunitions

(1) Supply points;

(a) i7o

Adm 0 # 1 cont'd.

(b) tf&r cferial r a supply subsequent to

Sig - Cr'^ Hackall Airport and~DZs as
requested by 13th AB Div, on and a f t e r D plus X.
(2) Credits for 13th A3_Biv and attached units for

period D plus 1 to D plus 4 9 five (5) units of

fire (all classes) on call from this headquarters.

Units to submit "-"3quests for minimum two (2) units

of fire, small arms 5 and four (4) units of fire

artillery3 during operations.

(3) 13th AB Div and attachments will land with suffi­

cient ammunition to meet all requirements until

re supply by thi.1" Headquarters begins on D plus 1.

(4) Aerial resupply '"ill be accompli shad by 60th TC ­

Wing on a.nd aft . D plus 1. schedule to be

announced later.

c
» Gasoline and Oil;

(1) Supply Points;

(a) Fc change until concentration at departure

bases.

(b) Motor veli-v-.-es;

Army Supply Point # 3 - Bragg - For all units

located at Bragg until departure - For rear

echelon unroll release. Opens day of arrival

in area. (' se Annex 7¥ 1)

Army Supply Point # 4 - Maxtdn - For all units

located at Maxton and Lumberton until depar­

ture - For rear echelon until release. Opens

day of arrival in area. (See Annex :n: 2)

Airheads for aerial resupply subsequent to

landing - C:,mp Itickall Airport and D£s as

requested by 13th AB Div on and after D plus

1.

(c) Aircraft s

Army Supply Point # 5 - Bragg - For all air­

craft located thereat - Opens day of arrival

at base.

Army Supply Point # 6 - Maxton - For all air­

craft located at Iaxton and Lumber ton - Opens

day of arrival c-X base-.

(2) Full tank plus an additional five (5) gals of gas­

oline will be ccrried by each motor vehicle upon

landing.

(3) Aerial resupply will be accomplished by 60th TC

Wing on and after D plus 1.

(4) Estimated requirements for gasoline and oil for

period day of arriva.1 at departure base to D

plus 4 for each Army Supply Point and Airhead to

be submitted to this Headquarters by 18 September

1944.

• 2 ­

L *

,am 0'}1 oont'd. **

s, II; - No change*

(1) No change for1J*F & Service Units,

(2) No change until D plus 1 for other ground units•

(5) Airhead for aerial re supply - Camp Eaclcall Air-':

port and DZs s.3 requested by 15th ^B Div on and

after D plus 1* . ;

(4) serial resupply will be accomplished by 60th TC

!7ing on and after D plus .1,

(1) V/ater obtained locally,

(S) All-water in landing area is non-potable until

treated. Halazone tablets will be obtained thru

normal supply channels.

g. 13 th A 3 Div will submit requirements for aerial re sup­

ply, for Div and attachments, indicating quantity and:

place and time of delivery of all classes for period

D plus 1 to D plus •;: by 18 September 1944.

2. EVACUATION;

a. No change until 1200 D - 1.

b. 60th TG Wing will provide emergency medical service

for units of 13th AB Div at departure base from 1200

D - 1 to takeoff.

c. Casualties:
(1) Ifedical clearing station v/ill be established by

13th .'3 Div at Camp Backall Airport immediately

after airhead is secure for evacuation of casual­

ties by air.

(2) Medical service for all activity at the airhead

will be furnished X)y the 13th AB Div, until ar­

rival of 130th Evacuation Hospital.

(3) 60th TC V/ing v/ill evacuate casualties from

airport to I&xton *iA3,

^» Burials: By units.

e. Salvage and captured materials v/ill be evacuated b3-r

13th -J3 Div to Camp Bickall Airport, All returning

aircraft otherwise empty will be utilized for evacua­

tion of salvage and captured materials to I&ccton.

f. P. W. enclosure will be established by 13th A 3 Div

at Camp Itickall airport and evacuated ~by 60th TCT.7ing

in returning aircraft to Pope.

g. Priority of air e ^ . ^ ^ i j ^ ^ fftFWJdfnSfc. casualties

(2) P.V/.# ( l i A M ? d p i i | $ l

 I it

0 y 1 cont'd.

3. TRAFFIC:

a
* Circulation:

(1) I.SR: liaxton - "timberton its $ 74 (See .Jinex •} 3)

Between /ouac area and supply points to

be select-id by 13th ^3 Div and reported to

this Headquarters.

(2) Routes for m o v "mt to departure airfields.

(See *j3jaex ;J- 3)

(3) Provost Jkrshall, this Hq, will mark all.routes

and supply installation as necessary in rear _.

areas•

(4) ^s directed oj 13th ^B Div in landing area.

(5) Traffic priorities: (1) Troop movements

(2) Supplies,

b. Restrictions:

(1) Blackout light after 2100 D - 1.

c. Control Stations (See Annex ,)- 3 ) .

d. Construction and loaintenance of roads.

(l) Rear area - no change.

(c2) landing area - ?y 13th ;*3 Div until relieved.

e. Units will '.control •'.. jiffic at 'supply points and

departure bases.

4. SERVICE TROOPS ;JTD

a. Bivouacs: (See ^jonexes 1, 2 and 2A)

b. 441st .'j.ir Corps Resupply Squadron will concentrate,

package and load supplies for aerial delivery by 60th TC Wing.

5. PERSONNEL

a. Straggler line and collection points as directed by

13th airborne Div.

b. I.nil; loth ^3 Div -'delivery by air as requested.

Other units - no change.

c. Available bivouac areas in vicinity of departure

airfields. (See xjinexes 1 & £)Y

d. Strength Report - Submitted this Headquarters daily

1200 - effective D -; 1.

« •*- —v «tit^

Adm 0 •!,- 1 cont'd.

e. Repla cements: \\ 7 \

(.".) Airborne ttnitc - none until veDijrad.

(2) Troop Carrier Units - as needed through ^ir

Force Channels.

(3) Other units - no change.

f. Rear echelon personnel v/ill not accompany combat

elements and will r-omain in departure area until released.

g. Casurifj.es evacuated lay air during the airborne

phase v/ill be attached to the rear echelon pending future

disposition by th i~. Zc a d quart ers .

a. Headquarters of all rear echelons will be reported

to this Headquarters by 1200 D - 1.

b. G-4 periodic rc^ci-j to be submitted to this Head­

quarters as of 0001 by 0600 daily, beginning D - 2. abbreviated

report indicating status of supply, evacuation, and flyable

aircraft v/ill be sent by radio or teletype to be followed by

complete written report.­

c. G-5 periodic report to be submitted to 2III Corps

Headquarters (Maneuver) as of 0001 by 0600 daily, beginning D - If

d. Fraternization with civilians, unlawful seizure of

property and abuse of individuals in occupied territory, is for­

bidden. Unit commanders will instruct all men in proper behavior,

field sanitationj and that proper distinction be made between *

measure of military necessity and deliberate misconduct.

IXX3EY

OFFICIAL

ROCKEFELLER dASSA'/AT / !IBDEIIx^'v

IFCL03UR3S:

Incl No. 1 - Annex ,"• 1 (To T?G issued later)

Incl No. 2 - Annex '} 2 (To :.o issued later)

Incl No. 3 - Annex',} 21* (To be issued later)

Incl No. 4 - Annex $ 3 (To be issued later)

 ANNEX NO. 2 TO ACCOMPANY A 0 NO. 1.

SPECIAL MAP OF LAT'RINBURG-MAXTON AAB WHICH INDICATES

1­ BIVOUAC AREA " £ " . •
2. WATER DP.
3. CLASS I DP # 2 .
4. CLASS I I I DP # 6 . LAURINBURG.NO. 14 t". ,. i
s ',/,••
 POFE FIELD

WO. 3 TO ACCOMPANY A 0 >:Oc

MACKALL

MA? • 3t r a t e g i c Map., 4 / 5CO, COQ, Char l o 1 1 e Shee-1

2! T R A F F I C

a. ' MOVEMENTS — BlacVout lights niter /.iuu

'(irA°- Mackall-Pore Field.

(2) B — Mackall-r.axt on Air be? 9,

(3) C - Moc\-Gll-Lumberton Airoas9.

• • t r l U h l i l fjb

[1; TrooT) movements.

(2) Supplies,

i. MISCELLANEOUS, ,.

a . T r a f f i c Her ~ I ^ a c k a l l .
c . M a x t o n and Lumber t o n A i r b a s e s shovm in c o r r e c t e d Dositior.s.

"125O
1 2CC
 AIRBORUE-TRCO

;J;,PPLS J -3I:T >;O I )

TO ADV. 0 ;:!'O 1 )
TO ? 0 I-:C 1 )

(a) Tho ISC'th "-/a'-v.-.a-L-lov- ; .tr.l ,

'•> :vi-dA..:ir. , w i l l o s t a b l i a j i iltn i:.-^fa; l a L I O I ; >•' '..to. :*­

AIr : :ovr..o P i . v i s i o n ; i t v/. : .ll ' J.ell.\'\• •;:• o a t l c n t s ;v

E ^ c u ' v J . c , t o thu S"'t'i u^"1 \!±Lirm

v :•;;
 M

AIRBOHI-IE-TROOF CAEHIE2 K^SlWM^M^^^^^ |^ '

Camp'l.ackall, North Carolina

7 September 19hh<

iIAN3UV3R IELIORAIIDUM)

iiumm i)

1, Announcement of Maneuver. In compliance with letter, Army

Ground Foree s, Sub3ect: ''Directive for Joint Training o:C 13th Airborne

Division", dated 23 August 19kk; a combined XXII-Corps, Airborne, Troop

Carrier maneuver will be conducted in the Camp llackall, North Carolina

Area during th.e period 2k September to 7 October 19UU, inclusive.

2. Purpose of Maneuver.

a* Training of airborne and troop carrier staffs in planning,

supervising, and conducting airborne operations,

b. Training'of airborne and troop carrier units in air move­

ment, rapid assembly,. anc! attach by combined arris, both day a:id night.

3* Scope. The maneuver of the 13th Airborne Division, Tilth at­

tachments, for a period of two v;e^ :s in two phases:

a. First phase to constitute ti~e air movement, landing, and

initial ground action.

b. Second phase to consist of strictly ground maneuver.

IN General Conditions - First Phase, ("&-]. to J>-< Ttorrs*

a. Departure Eases: At least tv.-o (2) departure bases v;ill be

used. Three (3) departure bases are available.

b. Route: The objective area vn.ll be reached by a circuitous

route of at least one hundred (100) miles.

c. Night Operations: Landings and assembly of'units will.be

made at night to the maximum extent practicable.

d. Reinforcement, Supply, and Evacuation: For the first phase,

by air only.

5. Troops. • • • '"

a. 13th Airborne Division.

 _ it ^0 j^ jt

b. 60th Troop Carrier Wing, consisting of:

(1)' 60th Troop Carrier Headquarters.

(2) 60th Wing provisional Signal Company.

(3) 3ii9th Troop Carrier Group (Reinforced).

(h) ,1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group (Reinforced).

(5)" UUlst Air Corps Resupply Squadron.

c. 130th Evacua'tion Hospital (attached to 13th Airborne Division,

1st -Phase only.).

d. . 3978th Quartermaster Truck Company.

e. iilO5th Quartermaster Truck Company.

f. l|.107th Quartermaster Truck Company.

g. l5lst Airborne Tank Company.

h. 5U2d Parachute Infantry Battalion.

i. l+61;th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion.

j« 555th Parachute Infantry Company.

k. 89th Division Reconnaissance Troop ,

1. 8iilst AAA k/Vi B a t t a l i o n .

m. 85th Signal Operations Battalion (Reinforced).

n. Provisional Military Police Company.

o.' 5llth Medical Collecting Company,

p. 5l2th Uedical Collecting Company.

q. Headquarters Company, Airborne Center.

r. I6lst Airborne Engineer Battalion.

6. Supply,

a. Resupply of the 13th Airborne Division by agencies of the '*

XXII Corps during the period of D to D plus 5« l^lst Air Corps Ptesupply

Squadron is available to the XXII Corps for use in connection vrith aerial

resupply of maneuver units.

 b. 'Supply of the-RED forces units vd.ll be as directed by this

headquarters.

C«' Class V resupply will be accomplished vrith live ansaunition.

Containers will not be opened, 13th Airborne Division will be responsible

for collection ancl return of live ammunition • at. the termination of the

maneuver*. '

d. Fost installations will not be used unless-designated by

this headquarters as Supply Points during the period 2k Septeniber-6 Octo­

ber 19kh inclusive*

7. Evacuation,

a* Troop Carrier Conmand vri.ll evacuate assessed casulaties for

the first phase, • •

b. Actual casualties will be evacuated by direction of Maneuver

Headquarters. - • • • •.

8, Higher Headquarters* The . j-ineuver Directors, acting as a higher

headquarters (RED and BLUE}, vd.ll give the necessary conr.ian:l decisions*

9* Umpiring. Umpiring in accordance with HI I!o. lO£-5>­

10. Haps. • • .

a. Strategic M-ap l/5'00,000, Charlotte Sheet.

b. Photographic Aerial Llosaic, l/62,5>O05 llaneuver Area (k s h e e t s ) .

' C .Photographic Aerial Mosaic, 1/20,000, Maneuver Area (30 sheets)

d. Photographic Aerial T.'.osaic, l/l~>,000, llaneuver /irea (8 s h e e t s ) ;

1 1 . S i t u a t i o n . I n i t i a l maneuver t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n (RED and DLUS) _,

vri.ll be prepared and issued by the Maneuver Hearlq_uarters. ' •

12. Secrecy. Documents v/hich sh^'ld be c l a s s i f i e d v^ill be marled

"IIAl'EUVER SECRET", "IIAIIEUVER C01IFI ...TIAL11, or "L^EUVER RESTRICTED".
These documents w i l l remain c l a s s i f i e d u n t i l the termination of the
iiianeuver only. Cor^ianders (RED or BLUE) vri.ll take measures to prevent
the disclosure of maneuver information (RED or BLUE) to the opposing
forces.

13* Observers. V i s i t o r s 1 Bureau w i l l be estab3.ished i n Building

T-1820 opposite 'the Airborne Center School. This bureauvd.il furnish
housing and acAninistration for observers and

' lkf Allovrable Aircraft.-Loads CT..L1 i i e i e t A . W k i

a. The following a i r c a basis

for planning air
C-hl AC

(1) Double tow wither:"' racks 3,000 3 ,7^0

(2) Single tow with pararacks 3,000 3 ,750
(3) Single tow without racks 5,ooo 3 ,750
(h) Parachute formation with pararacks 5,ooo
(5) parachute formation without racks 5,ooo
(6) Air landings with pararacks 5,000 (plus whatever

• load put in rack%)

(7) Air landing without pararacks 5,000 U

b. Glider Co-Filots. All gliders will fly in the maneuver with­

out co-pilots5 leaving the co-pilot's seat available for use by glider

transported units of the division.

' c. Ropes for lashing. Each aircraft will be equipped by 60th

Troop Carrier Vang with proper ropes per lashing load. Requirements to

be made known-to ACLO with 13th Airborne Division. Headquarters Airborne

Center will provide ropes for lashing glider loads..

d. Glider Noses and Tails. Using units of the 13th Airborne

Division vrf.ll lower-noses and tails of gliders upon exit therefrom after

landing on tactical fields during tile maneuver.

15• Conduct of Ground Phases of Maneuver. To be announced by.sepa­

rate memorandum.

16. Maneuver Staff. To be announced by separate memorandum*

•^ • Critique. At the conclusion of the maneuver, a critique will be

held. Time and' place of critique will be announced.

By command of Major General TERRELL:

Ilajor/ A. G. 1).

•OFFIC:[AL: S\ T/ Adjutant General

.*!•• J / DIETENIIOFETI
Ma ;}£#•, A. G. D.
i t General

DISTRIBUTIONi

iff ii
5

and "E'1
 fARLOTTE 7

. .

*!

~
• •

-
 Camp Hacks"". ..orth Carolina

7 September

-2)

1. Maneuver Connanc and Staff v;ill function as a Corps -Headquarters.

The Cov^aiioin^ Officer,, Airborne G v tor, s?si~ted "^y the Cori^.ir/'inr; General,

1 Troop Carrier Com:7ian-!? .'ill direct A'':i.e nir v'.iasa :f the i-anusuver. The

ConrnandinQ; General, XXII Corps, vjil! direct the ^rovnd control of the

maneuver, successively c.c airborne units 7 a:.i-:\

2, The staff to direct hho :w••c?uve:r%is announced as follorrs:

Troop Carrier Airborne Ground

a. Asst,

Directors: Col Uichols Col Quinto G-1 JUJ.1 Corps

b* G-l: Col Bond Lt Col Caldvrell Ilaj '.hcGinnis

c. G-2: Lt Col Koore Haj Luc'eraan Capt Achtenberg

d. G-3: Haj Thomo Lt Col YJalsh Ila^ Chaille

Asst G-3: liaj rronch Ilaj Rachal llaj HcGinnis

Capt !.;ilan i.;aj 'Vallace
Capt Rov:
e. Qtrh' Ilaj Ilcdema Lt Col Rockefeller l.Iaj Gassaway

g. Sig: ilaj Ilelch r Lt Col Prandt Kaj Duijuid

h. FA: • Lt Col Kunevcutt

i. Surg: J'aJ J'videra Ilaj Brucer To be announced

' j . AA: « Ilaj 3/ucenan Ilaj ITilson.

!c» Engr.; Lt Col Christiansen

Air Engr 0: Maj..Sharp.... .~. -^— rr —

- 1 ­
 Troop Carrier Airborne . Ground

1 . QLi: llaj Harris L t C o l Rockefeller M a j Gassaway

in* Prov Marshal: • ,_^ Ifa Veretto

n. H q Comdt: Capt Martin

b. PRO: Maj Wilbur To be announced

p. Obs.Bureau: Llaj Stevens Lt Col Christiansen To be announced
q« Air Support
Officer: To be announced . •.. •

r« Motor Tranpp

Officer: To be announced

By command of Eajor GeneraJ. Ti;;ERbLL: •

t . ' / „ • DIETS! JHOFSR

UaflSEr, A. G. D.
OFFICIAL: Adjutant General

H,/J. DI3TENH0FER

Major, A, G. D,

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"D" and "E»

2 ­
 »: ..: I *

AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER H2ADQXJ;.RT2K3

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

11 September 1944

MANEUVER MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 3)

1, Available Assigned .Aircraft:

C-47fs

10 4-Engine Transports (B-17's)

2-70 . CG-4A Gliders

4 CG-1.3A Gliders

2. Additional Aircraft Available if Obtainable:

38 CG-4A Gliders

3» Twenty (20) gliders are available to the 13th Airborne Division to

provide transportation and/or prime mov.rs for the parachute units. These

gliders to land in the tactical glider landing area not later than K-9 hours.

4« It will be the responsibility of the 13th Airborne Division to secure

glider landing areas.

5» The resupply ©f an actual or theoretically isolated battalion some

time after the Division has closed will be accomplished by parachute and/or

free drop.

6. plans will be provided for the evacuati on of glider pilots at any

time deemed desirable by higher headquarters. The 13th Airborne Division will

issue the necessary orders and instructors for the use of glider pilots from

the time they land snd automatically ^o-./i under the command of the ground com­
mander until evacuation can be accomplished.

7« The Ten (10) B-17!s and all aircraft not in glider serials will be

available for air landing missions as sc^n as the TTing has been notified that

Mackall /.irpcrt has been captured and is available for air landings.

8. The 60th Troop Carrier T17ing snd 13th Airborne Division may assume

Mackall Airport has been made suitable for r.ir landing missions within one (1)

hrur after capture.

9» It is desired the division be closed in 24 hours.

10. Three (3) departure air fields are available - - pope, Maxton, and

Lumberton.

11. The Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier r:ing will be responsible

for the evacuation of all gliders from the Glider Landing Areas and the return

of same to their proper stations. _ ,_. „t, ,.

 f •: - a. provislons^if]: be' made to evacuate gliders from fields ether than

"Dfl %i?eld by agjsiajr pick-up as so«n as the tactical situation will permit.

b. No administrative personnel will be involved in these pick-ups.

Ground stations will be transported by air.

c. The administrative evacuation of gliders will begin at 1200 on D

plus 1 Day. N© administrative evacuation personnel or equipment* will entex the

tactical area prier t<? 1200 on D plus 1 Day except those crews necessary to re­
trieve glider tew r^pes.

d. Camp Mackall Airfield will be open to flyaway glider operations at

0800 D plus 2 Days,

e. T®w rope retrieving crews will not enter tactical area prior .to 6

hours after glider landing,

f. in the event that high winds are forecast sufficiemt administrative

crews will be dispatched to secure gliders in glider landing areas.

By command of Major General TERRELL:

H. J. DISTSNHOFSR,

Major, L»G.D.,

Adjutant General.

OFFICIAL:

A/
(

K./7. DIETENIiOFSR, /

-:n

Ma.j^r, i-i»G«D»»

Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: « A" , " C» , »D», "E"

- 2 —

 AIRBORNE TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

13 September

MANEUVER MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 4)

CONDUCT OF GROUND OPERATION

1. a. The maneuver area is bounded by the following:

(1) A line Biscoe - Carthage - Cameron on the north.

(2) U.S» Highway #1, and that part of the Mackall reservation

south of Highway #1 on the east and south.

(3) U.S Highway #220, £rom Rockingham to Biscoe on the west.

b. Maps:

1/500,000 - Strategic Map, Charlotte Sheet

1/62,500 - Candor, Vass, Jackson springs, southern pines,

Hamlet, Laurinburg sheets

1/20,000 - Troy 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34. 35^ 3&

Sanford 19, 25, 26, 31, 32

Rockinghamjlj., 5» 6

Laurinburg - 3r; 2 sheets

1/15,000 - 8 sheets

2. Umpires

a. The maneuver will be conducted in accordance with principles

set forth in FM 105*-5­

b. umpire schools will b© conducted prior to the maneuver by units

furnishing umpires.

c. umpires listed below will be furnished by the following units:

NO. RANK DUTY

13th Airborne Division 1 Major Asst to Chief umpire

1 Major Bn umpire

21 Lts Company Umpires.

89th Division 1 Field Officer Chief umpire

4 Captains Bn umpires

3
Lts Asst Bn umpires

6th special Troops Majors Bn Umpires

464th parachute FA Bn 1 Field Officer Arty Supervisor

3
Capts Arty Bn Umpires

1 Capt Arty Liaison 0

6 Lts Arty Fire Markers

4
Lts Tank platoon Umpires

27 Lts prcht platoon umpires

1 Lt Asst Blue Bn Umpire

1
Lt FW Officer

4
Lts Director Hq, Asst G-l~2-3-4

 M*A K E u V

* ' 4 ... Lts.,^, » v Ren Troop Umpires

28 -^ *> NCOs Red Forces
^, ©> V8D EM Red Forces
39 NCOs Blue Forces
67 EM Blue Forces
l6lst Airborne Engr Bn All Red Forces
6 NCOs Demolition Handlers
d. All field officers listed above will report to Maneuver Hqs

1300 18 September 1944.

e. All officers (except those listed for duty with red forces) will

be assembled for orientation by the chief Umpire 20 September 1944» time and

place to be announced.

f. All officers listed above will be assembled 22 September 1944i

time and place to be announced.

g. All non-commissioned officers and enlisted men listed under

duty with Red Forces will report as directed by commanding Officer, l6lst

AB Sngr Bn.

h. All non-commissioned officers and enlisted men listed under

duty with Blue Forces will be assembled for instruction under the direction

of the Chief Umpire, time and place to be announced.

i. uniform: Coveralls without arms, white helmet bands, steel

helmets.

j. umpires will be prepared to remain in the field for the period

of the maneuver (24 September - 7 October, 1944)»

k. umpires will be issued rations or messed, according to the

situation, with units to which they are assigned, provisions will be

made for quarters and mess for officers, not assigned to units .stationed

at Camp Mackall, prior to the start of the maneuver.

1. Tv'O (2) C or K rations will be issued to each umpire prior to

24 September 19^-4 by this headquarters.

m. umpires will join their units as they land. Landing opera­

tions will not begin prior to .2030, c.\. September 1944*

n. Transportation for umpires to the assigned landing areas will

be furnished by this headquarters uncljr the control of the Chief umpire.

o. Medical tags will be issued to unit umpires with instructions

for their use.

3. Troop Representation (Red)

a. Red forces aro assumed to be German.

b. Armored, Reconnaisance ard antiaircraft troops will be actual.

c. infantry units will be represented by skeleton units as follows:

1 Yellow flag - 1 anti-tank gun and squad.

1 Red or Blue flag and 6 men - 1 platoon.

1 Red or Blue flag and 2 men - 1 squad.

1 81 mortar tube and 2 men - 1 mortar platoon.

1 Light machine gun (marked "Heavy" )-l Heavy machine gun platoon,

1 Light machine gun - 1 weapons platoon (2 IMGs, 3-6Omm mortars),

\A aJ& £.%>&$V'ER«

 A N

d. personnel more thanToo yards from control flags will be actual.

8. Red force will maneuver as a tactical unit, time and space

factors, zones and sectors will be approximately thtt of actual units,

although represented by skeleton forces as designated in 3 c above.

Zj.. Normal ground supply will be resumed on orders from this headquarters.

Expenditures of all classes of supplies will be normal unless otherwise

ordered by unit umpires.

5» Only organic transportation not already brought in by air will be

released to 13th Airborne Division when passed through by friendly ground

troops•

6. Blank ammunition will be used within limits of supply by both red

and blue forces.

7- Prisoners of ^ar and Captured Equipment

a* prisoners will not be captured by the Blue forces unless released

by Red umpires.

b. Prisoners will be picked' up by this headquarters, from both Red

and Blue forces, time and place to be designated by Red and Blue Headquarters,

and will be returned to appropriate headquarters, as replacements, through

normal channels, except as otherwise directed.

c. personnel captured from D-l to D+5 who are not to be evacuated

by air, will immediately be turned over to umpire control. (See intelligence

annex)

d. Vehicles and equipment will not be captured by blue forces,

except under the direction of unit umpires.

e. Telephone cables and open wire lines will be interrupted on

Corps order only. Any unit discovering such facilities will notify the

nearest communications unit which will tap these circuits to determine value

as source of enemy information. use or interruption will then be by Corps

order.

f. Telephone central offices will be taken over by communication

troops only.

8. Casualties.

a. Casualties will be played as designated by unit umpires, each

casualty will be tagged with type of injury. Litter, evacuation, and walking

wounded cases will be so marked on the tag.

b. All "casualties" will be returned to their organizations with

the least practicable delay following completion of treatment. Transporta­

tion under XXII Corps control will be provided at Maxton to shuttle air-

evacuated casualties to Division forward CP as directed by this headquarters.

c. Casualty administration at Maxton is the responsibility of the

13th AB Division.

9. The list below :. •> off ."limits during this maneuver.

a. Fields under y;i::vation.

b. private and pu:.u.'.o property marked «OFF LIMITS".
*c. All buildingso
*d. Towns, except i1: ~T movement through as a unit.

•• _/••••-• not apply to Military

10. The 13th AirfagjjraAHJptJlfllf is responsible for traffic control at

departure bases and routes thereto, until the rear echelon is moved to the

landing areas, uhen it then"is responsible for traffic control during all

movement of the division, or any part, thereafter.

11.. Blackout will be observed by all participating troops, except on

U. S» Highway #1 and #220. Night movement on hard surfaced roads ""ill be

limited to vehicles only.

12. physical contact betreen members of opposing forces r;ill not

be permitted.

By command of Major General TERRELL:

H. J. DI^T

Major, A. G. D.,

Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:

it./ J . D1ETENKOFSR / /

./I.^jor, A. G. D . ,

/ / A d j u t a n t Genera

DISTRIBUTION: "A", " B" , " C" , " C" , " S» and " G"

89th Division (2 copies)

6th Special Troops (2 copies)

K i. N S TJ V S R
 MAN

AIHBCRHE-TROOP>pp^RRISR IOTEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mac k a i l 3" F o r t h C a r o l i n a

RiNEUVER 1M1MOR.^DUM) " • 15 S e p t e m b e r 1944,

NUMBER £ ) ., .' -:
ADIOTISTRATIVE MEDICAL SERVICE TO

UNITS P,iRTj:CpATIHG IN EJ£BUVER

!• Mission; To jDtf&y.ide .medical service for administrative

casualties during the ~AirUo^tie-Troop Carrier Maneuver.

2. Definitions; - ' "V.:'..

a. Administrative Casualties; actual injuries and ill­

nesses which demand emergency-evacuation and hospitalization for

all classes of personnel. Tactical, observer, press, etc.

b. Tactical casualties? all simulated casualties which

are tagged by the umpires. In addition, minor cuts, bruises, and

.
sprains, etc., may be'."handled as tactical casualties, when in the

*
opinion of the unit medical officer it will not result in undue-

suffering.

c. The decision that an actual casualty is. to be evacuat­

ed administratively is to be made by the unit medical or dental

officer, if available. If not available, any medical officer may

make the decision. , ..*•.• .

d. The simulated casualties tagged ,6y the umpires are* to

be divided into two groups. • _. ", . ..-.

(1) -Litter cases, all of which are to be evacuated'

by air| tags are to be marked with.-rtEl! (littler,

case). . .

(2) Ambulatory, all of which are to be treated as

walking wounded and may be returned to combat

after treatment. . .

3. Estimate of Casualtiess •-.-•,"

i .. • ' ,,'.-'"

a. Administrative„ within Blue Force - 60 parachutists,

30 glider men, 10 air-landed forces; -non-tactical personnel - 20$

Red Forces - 165 Air Corps personnel - 5.

b. Tactical. Blue Force for evacuation - 250

Blue Force ^'ambulatory -.450- (not to be

.." .jeva.cua.ted)

:• V ) . , C o '

4. Medical Installations and Operationst

a
»' Blue Force.

(1) 13th Airborne Division organic medical units are^­

t o f unc tion accord ing t o the ir own S. 0. P.9 w ithT-

the exception that they have been directed in •-.

I the Field Order to establish a clearing station

"
immediately following the securing of the aa&£ldea£.

This clearing station is to be established within

one-half mile of the airhead and is to projvi^e

medical servid'e for all personnel_until relieved

s by the 130th Evacuation Hos

( •

•, v - v - - , * » s ! i?
(Maneuver Memo
(2) Upon landing,, the 130th Evacuation Hospital
is to establish i t s location within one-half
mile, of the airhead, relieve the 13th Air- •
borne Division of i t s medical responsibility
for airhead-personnel. I t is to be set up
t.o t r e a t patients evacuated from the Division
and i t is to deliver them to the 60th TC V/ing
....-'v^ ' ' ^ o r evacuation by a i r . The loading of pa­
t i e n t s in the plane is a joint responsibil­
---"...­ . -ity of the 130th Evacuation Hospital and the
60th TC V/ing.

£>• Red Force. Organic medical units of the Red Force

are to function according to their own S.O.P, In the absence
of organic medical support, casualties are -to ;^e (evacuated by
the nearest me^loal: installation through grouiid-iinpires.

... c. -Eff.ogp. Carr ier Command. *

• ••--"Cfct"-TK^arture Field I n s t a l l a t i o n s . - At eaoh-of
the departure fields the 60th TC Wing surgeon
-• \ --• •-:•:,;-••'-j^tpQ;* i n s t a l l ambulances and adequate medical
personnel. The TC V/ing medical installations
established at departure fields have been or­
dered to serve a l l participant troops from
; -^ • H-12 to departure. Departure- field evacu­
ation is to be to the nearest military hos­
pital. •, . r: • r. ,. -. ;
(T> (2)', Plane.- Each plane .is to. be equipped with five
(5) k i t s , f i r s t aid, aeronautic, and is to be
vU0. •. ready for installation of six (6) l i t t e r s ,
«' ; : ; • Radio operators-and crew chiefs are to be/
qualified in installation of the l i t t e r s , Each
':J.:T". • glider i s to contain three (3) k i t s , f i r s t
'A,VT- • • aid, aeronautic. Division personnel isvtoV be
--:.-• inf or me d of the e qu ipme nt av a i lab le in the
I T T, / ••• p l a n e s , ;• - - •••• ' r . •
(3) A crash truck and at l e a s t one unit of f i r e
_:.-;•. -. • fighting equipment i s to be available at each
Vf. •;'?,- r ; v departure field and at the airhead. ..
• -.; • ...•./••* -r (4) Sufficient radio equipment on assigned fr.e­
:, • quencies is to be made available to the Wing
.•':• £ . surgeon for assignment to roving ambulance?
groups on the line of f l i g h t .
- ,y (5) Air Evacuation Personnel - Provisional flights
• •, • . ,-"• • : . Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron are
'.., to be attached to the 60th V/ing and are. to-
function according to their own S.O.F, A
~,-r:s"ry . liaison officer from the Medical Air Evacu­
ation Transport Squadron is to be stationed
• . at the -airhead.- .Radio operators and crew
' • " , '.;• chiefs are to assist in loading of .casualties
at the air head, aided by the clearing statioi
personnel of the 13th Airborne Division and
130th Air Evacuation Hospital. Unloading at
the evacuation field, or f i e l d s , is to be done
•• • • **':.'•• with the assistance of the squadron dispen­
yrv • sary personnel. Tactical casualties are to
be released to the rear echelon.
d• Administrative Evacuation-. . •
(1) On night of W?JEj

M A K EUVER
 M A

(Maneuver Memo 5 )
(a) Departure Field - Organic medical units

are to serve their own personnel to H-12,

at which time they are released from res­

ponsibility until they are landed by the

TCr'-wing, TC squadron dispensaries are to

serve all jDersonnel from H-12 to "departure.

(b) On route of flight the Wing is5 to furnish

roving ambulances and crash trucks adequa­

tely staffed and equipped. The roving

ambulances are to have radio communic3.tion

• with planes and departure bases. The am­

bulances are tobe stationed on the pro­
posed route of flight toward the airhead.

Pilots are to be instructed in proper dis­

tress and emergency-procedure, The Wing

instructions topilots,-is; attached as

Inclosure #1 • The> Diyisipn Surgeon • should

make identical instructions available to

all participating personnel assigned or

attached to the Division,

(c) Airhead

1 1st Provisional TC Group is to have

~" adequate ambulances on the. line at

Mackall throughput the air landing

phase- of;.the,operation. Evacuation

is- to ie- to ther Station Hospital3

:Camp Mackair, - - "' L T.-;~TO -..-• .

Fields

1 Glider Field * At 1 least one*(l)

medical officer? three (3) enlisted

aid men, and one (1) ambulance is to

be placed at each glider landing' •­

area one (1) hour prior to' landings.

The ambulances are t©-be .equipped

with litters, blankets and crash

splint sets. The medical officers

are to be provided with 1/4 ton

trucks.

2 Jump Fields - At least one (1)

medical officer, three (3) enlisted

men, and two (2) ambulances equipped

with litters, blankets and Army splint

sets are to *be placed on the fields

one (1) hour prior to/landing. The

medical officers are to be provided

with 1/4 ton trucks, v.>­

(e) Lakes in the landing drop areas are to be

patroled. -r ,-. -i-­

(f) Hospitalization

X : At departure fields and alo.mg route

"" '.-• of flight, administrative? casualties
are to be evacuated ^o the neares"t
hospital. WherjgutMpTlasible, military
hospitala T^^yfe

M A N E

(Maneuver Tie mo 5

£ At the landing fields administrative^

... casualties are, to. be evacuated to the

Station Hospital, Camp Mackail.

3^ All available hospitals are to be ad­

vised of the time of the maneuver and

estimated casualties-by:'D«5 by the man­

euver surgeons.

£ Military hospitals-'and-locations. •

Stat ion Hos'pital, Laur inburg-Maxton

Army Air1 Base. '' :

4­

Stat ion'Hospital, Camp Mac ka11•

Stat ion--Hospital, Fort Bragg.
Central Control Station. . • •
1^ A central control station •;is .to be-
established at Maneuver Jlejadquarters •
to coordinate the activities^of- the ;; .
administrative medical installations.­
This control station £&• .-to be- in coil- .,
tact vjith the following organizations s
State Highway police, by phone.
Al^ Medical Umpires, by radio,
^ - All'military
r
hospitals 9 by emergency
phone. service. .'* •­
All Tactacal Umpires 9" by radio on /••-•
:
Chief :Umpire Network." _ . -;
All Departure Bases thru; Camp Mac k a i l .
Airplanes ? by Air Corps'radio equip­
ment. •••;•-. . ^
2_. The control station is to be staffed
by at least one (1) Medical Depart­
ment officer, and is-to be',.supplied.
through t h i s headquarters with de­
tailed maps of the•maneuver a r e a a n ^ ;
route of f l i g h t . Before being re-r
leased, from duty, a l l adminis.tra.tive.­
Medical Department of fie ers. are., to .­
report to the control station to com­
pile a consolidated report of cas.UaJ-­
ti
ties. ' V " A-y-

Phone Numbers,

Army Emergency •"'(?&'& tfei^kall •LTJ-:

Maneuver Headqiart^k; tec k a l i

B^ckall Hospital (Arab) - 501. '

Maxton. Station;•Eosjfi'tai ;(Jimb) ­

Pope :"'old- (Dispensary5°H. 27130.

Admit£ii^-.,.a?±!^co t Station'Hospital

^ 1 "
Moore Goneral Hospital (Civilian)
4 "'
(2) During the Maneuver following'Landings

fc
" ""^jBKwwf*^^

 M A N

(Mane uv e r Mo me 5 ),

Normal evacuation of administrative casual­

ties throughout the problem are to be to

the Station Hospital, Camp Mackail. The

Medical installations on the landing fields

(glider and parachute) are to be released

after the completion of all landings by

maneuver director,

(3) (a) Throughout the maneuver, visitors and

GHQ, personnel are to receive medical

service at the 542nd Parachute Infan­

try Battalion Medical Detachment, at

the dispensary opposite Theater # 4 . ,

Out-patient service is always avail­

able at the Station Hospital, Camp

Mackail.

(b) All field ambulances in the maneuver

area are to be under administrative

control inasmuch as participating

units are to use only the 1/4-ton

trucks fitted with litter brackets.

5» Sanitary Inspections.
a. Administratives

(1) All Troop Carrier-, Airborne, and XXII Corps

installations are to be inspected by the

Maneuver Sanitary Corps Officer.

b. Tactical;

(1) Tactical installations by unit medical of­

f i c e r s . The Maneuver Sanitary Officer is
to report on efficiency of field sanita­
tion by participating units.

(2) All water has been declared non-potable.

6» Resupply

All resupply of medical items arc to be by air thru

organization channels. There is to be no normal equipment ex­
changed between ground and air units.

By command of Major Ga^era! Ti?K?vj'iJjL2

A* a

OFFICIAL;/

'H./tf. DIETENHOFER /

A . G . D . •/

Ad/jutant General /

DISTRIBUTION: A, ,C, D, E, F, G.

- 5

 AIRBORNE TROOP CABRIKR MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackail, North Carolina

MDMCBaNDUM) 15 September 19
E17B/1GER . 6)
AMMUNITION
1. Basic Load,
The initial requirement of the 13th AB Div landed

pursuant to paragraph 1, b, (3) of Adm 0 # 1 will consist of:

a.
Blank small arms ammunition carried by individuals.

Blank ammunition of all types as requested by 13th

AB Div up to limits made available by XXII Corps•

m 3 loaded containersr balance•

i
2. Resupply; i

a. Blank ammunition of all types as requested hj 13 th

AB Div up to limits made available by XXII Corps.

b. Live ammunition for balance.

3. Supply Points.

a. Blank ammunition for initial requirement will be

drawn by 13th AB Div from post magazine at Br ogg

or Mackail as directed by XXII Corps.

b. Sand loaded containers for initial requirement will

be drawn by 13th A3 Div from dumps of such ammuni­

tion now located at Mackall and Maxton,

4. Return of Containers.

a. Until all sand loaded containers have been returned

to airhead by 13th AB Div all ammunition drawn at

airhead will be by exchange of sand loaded contain­

ers for containers filled with live

b» All band loaded containers will be returned to ISt'i

A3 D:Lv to existing dump at Mackall on conpletion of

maneuver.

-» 1 —

v v

Maneuver Memo #6 (Corrt!&)

c. All live jranjq^tjion w i l l be returned by 13th AB

Div to po%$' hMhzlnes at Mackall or Bragg on com­
pletion of .^neuver as directed by XXII Corps.
5. Red Forces.
Blank ammunition required will be drawn by usir^ unit,''

from post magazines"at Bragg or Mickall as directed by

XXII Corps.

6, A l l anraunition r e q u e s t s w i l l l i s t code ? typo^ and rounds*

By command of Major General TERRELL:

H. J . DISTEEKOSSIL'.
Ma j or , A. G. D • ,
A d j u t a n t General«.
OFFICIAL: X

H. / / DIETSMIOFER, \ /

Ma^Qr? A. G. D . .

Adjutant General. /

DISTEISUTICN and

- 2 ­
 M 1

AIRBOR1:2 TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Hackall, North Carolina

UMTTRS HEADQUARTERS

Camp Hackall, i\. C.

18 September I9V4

IIAN3UV3R MSM

NUMBER 7 )

UMPIRE SIGNAL IICTBUCTIONS

The following signal instructions for umpire communications

are effective iirjnediately.

By command of Colonel DALBSY:

E. J . Di^TiS-TEOiTL
Major, A. G-. D,,
Adjutant General

OFFICIAL;

Major, A. G. D.f

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: « A" and « G«

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 AIRBCRNE-TROQF CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

19 September 19

MANEUVER MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 8)

DAMAGE CLAIMS

All damages caused to crops, . livestock, or real estate vd.ll be reporte

promptly to the Claims Officer, this headquarters. All persons desiring to

present claims for damages will be requested to do so in v/riting to the Clai

Officer, this headquarters.

By order of Colonel BAL3EY:

TT T "P\ *T"T"!rTl—^TTTA1'1"*''''
ti» J. JJijii-iiMriUi'jji
Major, A. G- D-•

Adjutant General

OFFICIAL: ,

-;7 / ' /{'Si/? /• - •'•"

5
H . ^./DISTENHOFER," '"'"').

M a j o / , A. G. D . f /

Adjutant G e n e r a l , /

LISTRIB'OTION: A, C, D, E, F , G
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER
Camp Mackail, ITprth C a r o l i n a

i/AHSUVSR MEMORVJtoUM) 19 S e p t e m b e r 1944

R e « o o o e . e o « e . 9 )

1, The following a i r c r a f t load v ; i l l be used as a b a s i s

planning a i r movements and w i l l not be exceeded;
C-47 A/C CG-18A G l i ' s
a. Single tow without r a c k s s 0 6,000

2. 60th Troop Carrier V/ing will be relieved of Airborne Com­

mitments five (5)days prior to maneuver.

3. In the event non-availability of parts precludes all air­

craft being equipped in accordance with Par 2, ITCC LlemorancLum To,

60-169 dated 15 July 1944, an Aldis Lamp or C-3 A Blinker Light

will be added to aircraft equipment for emergency release warnir^;--;.,

4. 60th Troop Carrier V/ing will submit a detailed statistics 1

report covering the air phase of the maneuver to this headquarter

This report will include an evaluation of the suitability of ecu:.;- •

•
ment.

5. 60th Troop Carrier I'/ing will provide sufficient guards

to insure safeguarding gliders and accessories landed in glider

landing zone curing maneuver. Location of gliders lost from tow

enroute to glider landing zone will be reported to Provost Mart-he.; .

XXII Corps, Maneuver Headquarters, Camp i lac kail, 17C, extension544,

who will be responsible for posting guards.

6. The 60th Troop Carrier Wing will take necessary action t .,

provide adequate notification of glider and airplane forced land­

ings along all routes and assure that the proper authorities are

notified regarding protection and retrieving such aircraft. Contro!

will be such that all aircraft can be properly accounted for with­
in two (2)hours after completion of each serial mission.

7. The 60th Troop Carrier wing v ? m report the location,

condition, casualties if known, and aircraft serial of all air­

craft down outside prescribed landing zone to Chief Air.Umpire,

Maneuver Headquarters, extension521.

8. The administrative evacuation of gliders from "S" Fi

will not begin prior to 1000 D-Day.

- 1 ­

MA'FEUVSE

ijtJK >.-<*^
 M A N E U V E R

(Maneuver Memo #9 ? contd)

By command of Major General TERRELLs

H. J . DIETEIHIOFER
Major, A. G. D . ,
Adjutant General,

OFFICIAL
" 3\if
'iK./ft/ blSTSlTHOFERj /

' l ^ o r j A. G. D. ? /

Adjutant General, /

DISTRIBUTIONS A 5 C, D 9 E 5 F , G.

- 2 ­

M A H E U V S R
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRI2R MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

MANEUVER MEMORANDUM) 21 September 1944

NUMBER 10)

CLOSING OF RANGES, C M P MACKALL, NC

1» By agreement rdth the Post Commander, there viill be no firing on

ranges at Camp Mackall for the periods indicated below to permit maneuver

use:

a. All ranges Test of Highway #1 on 21 September 194^-»

b. All ranges both east and '.vest of Highway #1, 22 September

through 5 October 1944*

By order of Colonel DALB3Y;

K, J . DIETIiNHOFSR,
Major, A.G.D.•
Adjutant G e n e r a l ,

OFFICIAL: ^[

H./T. BIETENHCFER,

Adjutant General. /

DISTRIBUTION: "A", n c" , " D" , "2", "P',"G".

 AIHBGRHE-TROOP CARRIER LAHEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp rackall, Horth Carolina

22 September 1944

1:AHSUVER I.:EEORAKDUlO

1TUKBER...........11)

!• Aircraft courier messenger service will be established

22 September 1944,

2. Overlays, maps, pouches and mail to be delivered will

be sent to operations office at POPS, I.AXTCN, and LUk'BSRTOiT at

least fifteen (15) minutes before scheduled arrival time. Par­

cels to and from I/JLCKALL will be delivered to I'aneuver Headquar­
ters Message Center for disposition,

3. The below schedule will apply when POPS FIELD is

included In itinerary;

LEAVE I. ACEALL 0900

ARRIVE LAXTGil 0915

LEAVE LAXTCN • .0935

ARRIVE LU1 BSRTOII .0955

LEAVE LUI.IBSRTGH 1015

ARRIVE POPE 1040

LEAVE POPE 1105

LEAVE LACKALL 1330

ARRIVE LAXT01T 1345

L3AVE LAXTCN .1405

ARRIVE LUFBERTOH. ..•..••...•...;i425

LEAVE LULBERTOII ....•••. . .1445

ARRIVE POPS 1510

LEAVE POPE .1530

ARRIVE KACKALL. ..# . ,1550

4# Y/hen courier service to POPS FIELD Is no longer

required the following schedule will be maintained;

LEAVE LACKALL 0900

ARRIVE LAXTON 0915

LEAVE LAXTCI-T 0935

ARRIVE LUKBSRTOW .0955

LEAVE LUrBERTClI .1015

ARRIVE I.ACiiALL .1040

LEAVE LACKALL. . . „ ,# . 1330

ARRIVE I.AXTGI? . 1345

LEAVE LAXTGN 1405

ARRIVE LTJLBERTCN 1425

LEAVE LUI.CBERTC1T 1445

ARRIVE r.AilCALL 1510

By command of Kajor General TERRELL':

II. J. DISTEPTiOFER

I.'.a j or, A • G. D.

Adjutant General

OFFICIALS

YiS J/ DIETSiUOFER

Laior, A. G. D.

Ad-nutant Genera 1

• o q r n - j — " T T r p T p TT • • ' A if tJ —
- * »? •']*)!' »'T?M ilr.iil ''D-*'
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER 1ANEUVER HSADq,U,:-RTERS
Camp Mac k a i l s North C a r o l i n a

8 September 1944

MANEUVER SITUATION NO. 1 (BLUE

1 . RED F o r c e s a r e d i s p o s e d f o r defense a s shown on t h e

a t t a c h e d o v e r l a y , marked "Haneuver "A".
2 . BLUE F o r c e s renew a t t a c k on D-Day a t H-Kour ( 0 6 0 0 ) .
e c t i o n CHEru^-HAlXET-HOFFL/AN. 13 t h Airborne D i v i s i o n i s a t t a c h e d "
t o XXII Corps upon l a n d i n g t o as:- 1st i n t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h . The
11th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n (BLUE) advancing along t h e HAliLET^ICFFIi^N
roads w i l l relieve the 13th Airborne Division in the vicinity of
HOFFIMT by D plus 4 days,
3. a. The 13th Airborne Division (BLUE) transported by suc­
cessive air l i f t s will seize and secure the CAilP LiACEALL Airport
and prevent the movement of RED through HOFFIviAN. I n i t i a l landings
at K minus' 9-4.
bi. The SOth Ving (TCG) (BLUE) operating from Airbases
IiiXTONj LUlIBERTOr, and POPE ( a l l airbases assumed to be 100 miles
southwest of actual locations) v.'ill transport the 13th Airborne
Division to the MACKALL-HOFFIAN Area by successive air l i f t s .
4. Resupply and evacuation of the 13th Airborne Division
during the period D to D plus 4 days between airbases and the
Division Area by the 60th v/ing. Supplies to and evacuation from
airbases by XJCII Corps.
5. Troops shown in the situation are both actual and imagin­
ary.
a. The following actual units (BLUE) will participate in
the maneuver t .
13th Airborne Division
60th Troop Carrier "ving
60th Wing provisional Signal Company
349th Troop Carrier Group (Reinforced)
1st Provisicn.:..^ Troop Carrier Group (Reinforced)
441st Air Corps Resupply Squadron
Detachment 4 Engine Cargo Aircraft
Units of Third TAD - to be announced later
3978th Quartermaster Truck Company
4105th Quartermaster Truck Company
4107th Quartermaster Truck Company
130th Evacuation Hospital
b. All other troops (BLII3) named in this situation are
imaginary.
6. Based on situation (BLUE) stated above? orders w i l l be
issued by lianeuver Headquarters.

II A M . U 1 S K­
— . —» ^>t «t_» _ * ^ _ _ _
 " Vis.. '**.,.

M A 1-1 H ­

Maneuver S i t u a t i o n Ho. 1 (3LUS) (Continued)

By order of Colonel DALBSY:

H. J . BISTili-TKCFER
i i a j o r 9 A. G. D.
Adjutant General
OFFICIAL

K.' v". DlSTJillHCFSR

I la.j or 9 A • G. D•
Adjutant General
W 1 Incl:
Situation Overlay
DISTRIBUTIG C9 D 3 S , F &G

- 2 ­
.••1 A IT £ U V S R ­
 ti £ .. i E V

/ /

su I « M : V i>cpt

DALBEY

Colonel

G - 3

 AIRBGR1IE-TR0GP CARRIER K^HEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp !:ackall, North Carolina

13 September 1944

LTJ.L s -L. -Oj-jOli /'

1. Taps i

1/500,000 - Charlotte Sheet

1/62,500 - Ca nd or, yas s, Jac k 3on S prIng s,

Southern Pines, Hamlet, Laurlnburg Sheets

b• Se que nce 0verlay (1st Pha s e)

Sequence Overlay ^2d phase)

2, The mission of the 11th Division (Imaginary) iss

"Seize and secure crossings of the Pee ^Iver, continue the attack

to the northeast, relieving the n-""oL Airborne Division at Hoffman

on D plus 4."

3, The 100th Division (Imaginary) v/Ill crosc the Pee Dee

River, at crossings secured by the 11th Division, on order,

4, Sequence of events of imaginary and real forces (1st

phase ) °

a, D Day - 11th Division's Initial crossings are

unsuccessful,

(1) liessage to 13th Airborne Division - 1400 D Day:

"Initial crossings of 11th Division unsuccess­

ful, operations continuing''. (Drop or air

D Dav 1500 - !frove one (1) battalion to vici

nity of I^D^TTER (1128.4 - 1331.2) prevent

destruction of dam until relieved. Aerial

resupply will be made available en callfr.

b, D plus 1

(1) 11 th Divislc-, establishes bridge head across

the Pee Dee River.

(2) Battalion at Ledbetter Is isolated and infor

med by urnpir r« :hat ammunition, rations and

water supplies are. running low.. This batta­

lion should request resupply by air.

c, D plus 2

(1) 0700 - Division is attacked from North by

Red combat team. Rod combat team drives to

within artillery range of'airport and goes

into, a defensive position.

(2) 11th Division stopped along linos Rockingham

Hamlet Road,

(3) 1200 - 100th Division being committed in

vicinity oCPORDEL. Kiss ion - cut off and

AMLET

destroy reds at HAM

(4) 1800 - Battalion at LEDBETTER relieved of

mission.

- 1 ­
AD Tr Carr LInvr Iiq,Cp I'ackali, 1T.C.,
Dirs Grd S i t Blue, 13 Scp 44

d. D plus 3
(1) Division will be directed to drive combat

team out of artillery range of rackall

airport if rvf£icicnt action has not been

taken by the division prior to this time.

(2) 1300 - Reds at HALLET have been cut off.

Topping up operations now in process, 13th

Airborne Division will bo passed through

tomorrow morning.

(3) 2 300 - Reds break contact and withdraw to a

non-tactical assembly area for the break bet'

ween the fi:..\:.t and second phase.

D plus 4

(1) 13th Airborne Division is passed through

0800 and ordered into rear assembly area.

(2) 0900 - Overlay type order for movement.

(3) Announcement of time of critique to accom­

pany order.

D plus 5

Critique in rear assembly area. Time and place

to be announced.

EI'aD OF 1ST PHASE

5. Sequence of events of r...^l and imaginary forces (2d

phase).

a. See sequence overlay 2d phase.

b. October 1st ­

(1) 1400 - Overlay type order: Mission move to

vicinity CR (1138.5 - 1341.6) protect the

northY/cst flank of the, corps from Drowning

Greek to Lo^better• One AB Tank Company

attached.

(2) 0700 - Division starts movement.

c. October 2d ­
(1) Division closes in area.

(2) 1200 - Division takes steps to repel Red Bn

attempting to move in from west.

d. October 3d ­

(1) 1200 - Division given overlay type order to

move to vicinity"of Derby (113518 - 1351,4)

same mission - warning of possible use'of

division to envelop the Red west flank.

(2) 0700 - Division starts movement.

 J Vji i JJ U .1 J. v~. ^ V l ~- Vw V v^/ X . L f— 7 L' ( ;>J w Wj_ Li. U X • _t _L O O J . ^.- l i

/3ST 211) (ll-iO.O 13::2.C;. Attack 0700, 5 October, ^oi^rally

along Yx\*rj 73. Capture EAST700D r e vent Rcclc, moving frcrr.
Raleigh from relnf ore In.;:: r.nlts nov; at P
team froin 100th Division :;I11 be on thj , e •."•—.;. C.L a !"'•

)ber bt 0700 ­ Attack by .Division.

1000 ­ Objective taken. Oeorrv
zatlon critiouo of :"j.en.

i-JL • ^l/L/l-Ul! ? U.-.;. OJ. -L b.Luue .

V v v i i^ r
in case oi .q O/ \ 7^ r\ o "I- -r\ r "p. ,^ r."! r • "O t" — "I *^ '1 -"-^ T .'^ ° '" 1^ 4 ij <L

vrlll be laovod back one U...L, "I I ; FT;'"'P.

the criolcue da--.

Lore than a 24 hour posi;pone!".ent a-Il

oi' t'le maneuver, anc- action shev/n In nation u:i.i.i DO con­
donsed accordln-'l".

con-and of

general

C1VICIAL

• /

A&. TUu?.iiu L-onerai

A "T\ : "I
 \ZOO

,35O

\ooDtV
IBH ^-. D
J3

>OLftTEO > l

"-D+4
CX.D+ 5(^E5T 13

Di-1
\oo
D

S
7£00P

5£QUEA/C£T Y P/VASE 1
/3 44
\ C \A4

MAO

• •
 AIRBORFE-TROOP CARRIER MkUEUVER HEABQUARTER;

Camp IJackall5 North. Carolina

13 September 1944

MANEUVER SITUATION NO. 1 (SSD)

1» Red Force will simulate German forces throughout all

phases of the maneuver and designations will conform to actual

German units,

2. Red troops will be both actual (in part skeletonized)

and imag inary•

3» Red Troop List (Actual)

161st Airborne Engineer Battalion

Atchds Det 464th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion

841st AAA AW Battalion (Sem)

Reconnaissance Troop, 89th Infantry Division

151st Airborne Tank Company

* 4. Red Order of Battle (Imaginary, except as stated herein)

a. Grounds

XXXIV Armeekorps (Infantry Corps)

384th Infanteriedivision

376th Infanteriedivision

212th Infanteriedivision

316th Grenadierregiment (Infantry Regiment)

(represented by the 161st Airborne Engineer

Battalion)

320th Grenadierregiment

423d Grenadierregiment

212th Artillerieregiment (One battalion repre­

sented bv liaison officer and fire markers)

212th Schnelle Abteilung (llobile Battalion) (One

company represented by the reconnaissance

troop9 89th Infantry Division)

841st Leichte Flakabteilung (Light Anti-Aircraft

Battalion) (Represented by the 841st AA Av/ Bat-

k talion)

151st Panzer Abteilung (Tank Battalion) (One comp­

any represented by the 151st Airborne Tank Company)

221st Landesschutzenbataillon (Local Defense Bat­

talion) (Represented by 161st Airborne Engineer

Battalion)

b # Air;

26th Jagdgesciiwader (Single Engine Fighter Group)

11th Nahaufklarungsgruppen (short range reconn&is­
s anc e squadr on)

5. Red Forces are disposed i n i t i a l l y as shown on attached

overlay* Red XXXIV Corps has a defensive mission.

p 6. No formal orders w i l l be issued to Red Force during the

' play of the maneuver. Red actions w i l l be controlled by the Red
Force Commander (Commanding Officer of the 161st Airborne Engin­
eer Battalion) so as to conform t o the Directors Situation (RED)

M A N E U V E R

Maneuver Situation No. 1 (RED) (Continued)

(to be published later), and subject to umpire decisions and later

directives which may be issued by this headquarters.

* ' By command of Major General TERRELL:

H. J . DIST31TE0F3R
He.jor9 A. G. D«
Adjutant General
OFFICIAL;

v
1./J7. DISTENHOFiCR

Adjutant General / /

1 Incl:

Red Situation Overlay

JJISTRIBUTIONJ A, D, P, G.

10 additioneul copies to G-3 3 Ground

- 2
MANEUVER
 OO

oo

IO5O

- II

X 2e! Loc^u

Ah/

C
376
 AIRBORNE *TROO
Camp MackaliT *rih. Ca/tfli|af
DIRECTORS ) 13 September 1944

Ground

SITUATION RED)

1. First phase.

a. initial situation is as shown in overlay to Maneuver Memorandum 1

(Red).

b. Sequence «f Events:

D-5 3l6th March Combat Gruup (CT) consisting »f:

3l6th Grenadierre^' tit (l6lst AB Engr Bn)

1st Bn 212th Artillxeifegiment

1st Kompanie 151st Panzer Abteilung (151st A3 Tk Co)

moves to concealed bivouac vicinity VASS.

D-l 841st Leichte Flakab:,3ilung (841st AAA AW Bn) and

221st Landesschutzenbataillon (l6lstAB Sngr Bn)

defend Mackall Air Base against Blue attack.

D 212th schnelle Abteilung (Ren Tr, 89th inf Div)

assigned mission of determining strength and disposition,

Blue Forces vicinity Mackall Air Base.

D+l 316th M^rch Combat Group moves hy motors F from

- VASS, circling so as to enter Blue defended area

from N» Movement from VAS3 just prior to dark on

D-l will be picked up by 81*le Rcr: Avn.

D+2 212th Schnelle Abteilung exerts pressure against Blue

defended area from SE in a cliviroionary effort shortly

before daylight. ;.t dawn 3:6th OT drives into Blue

defended area from N and att^rrts to establish a defen­

sive position ^itbin light e.st..11: r.n^e of airfield.

D+3 3l6th CT defends in position u-it-.il de.rk or until forced

to withdraw, 212th Schnelle ^teilung continues to

harass Blue from S and SE­

1ST PliASE TERMINATES -uND RED FORCES \7ILL BREAK CONTACT*AT W D + 3

2. Second phase.

a- initial situation: 212th infanteriedi'fision has moved from RALEIGH

and has been committed, opposing Blue 11th-and lOOtl; infantry Divisions. 316th

Grenadierregiment 'is the division reserve•.

I.I A N E U V £ I

 b. sequence of Events:

1 Oct 212th schnelle Abteilung hits Blue Advance party in

bivouac area vicinity CR (1138._5-1341-6)» then ~ith­

drav:s but maintains contact rcith Blue v.T flank, locates

gaps in flank security and reports strength disposition

and movements of Blue Division.

2 OCt '212th Schnelle Abteilung continues mission. 1st Bn

Grenadierregiment attacks from w f attempts to pierce Blue

flank security and seize Mackall Air Base.•

3 Oct 212th Schnelle Ab+ ilung continues same mission.

h Oct 212th lnfanteried:"vision is forced back to vicinity PINE­

KURST. 3l6th CT 3ves to Division Reserve vicinity

EASTWOOD. 212th ^chnelle Abteilung establishes counter­

reconnaisance screen along Righv/ay 211 from NICKS CREE£

to LITTLE RIVER. . ;

212th Schnelle Abteilung reinforced by «ne battalicn,

3l6th CT delays Blue advance to the E, falling back

on prepared: defensive position to "17 of SASTY'OOD, T/here

organized defense is iriade by entire CT. .­

Pli'JSE ENDS 5 OCT V/HEI7 R2D FORCE L DRIVSL-I E OF HIGHWAY 15.

By command of Major General TERRELL:

H. Z. DISTSNI1OESR

Major, A. G. D.,

Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:

X J . DI3TENK0FSR

v&yzift A . G . D . ,

Acl?Utant G e n e r a l

10 add'l copies - G-3 Ground•

i ^ A N E U ^
 AIRBORNE TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

8 September 1944

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER. 1) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

1. The following procedure will govern the handling of all correspondence

for this headquarters*

a. All incoming and outgoing mail will be received and dispatched by

message center.

b. staff Sections will prepare correspondence for the signature of t'ne

Adjutant General.

c. Correspondence will be prepared on colored paper appropriate to its

use as follows :

(1) Red Paper will be used for matters pertaining to Red Forces.

(2) Blue paper will be used for matters pertaining to Blue Forces.

(3) White paper will be used for neutrals and information which

is applicable to both Re3. and Blue Forces,

d. Correspondence will be prepared in compliance ^;itn AH 340-15 insofar

as is practicable. All correspondence will be prepare^ with a headquarters file

cwpy nn yellow paper. The headquarters file copy will contain typist and dic­
tator's initials. File copies should be initialed by the officer originating

the correspondence before they are submitted for signature.

e. The following identifying sTrrnbols are assigned to Staff Sections

as indicated. These symbols will be shown on all copies for the corresx-'ondence

following subject numbers,

ABTCDR. . Director

ABTCDP* ,..., Deputy Director

ABTCDA . Asst Directors

ABTCAS ..........-..*... .Administrative Asst

ABTCAA..... ...,.,* A-l

ABTCGA i... c c,., .... .G-l

• ABTCGB..a....... c,.,,fG-2

ABTCAB...» •. .A-2

ABTCGC...„................. G-3

ABTCAC, o oo ........... A-3

ABTCGDo o .,.,. ,G-4

ABTCAP.t» A-4

ABTCAG. •••»•••••..- 9 Adjutant General

ABTCCO. ,„ o .Headquarters Commandant

ABTCOD .Ordnance

ABTCSI , , Signal

ABTCCW ,Chemical Warfare

ABTCFA ot . .Field Artillery

ABTCSG..., ,...f Surgeon

ABTCOJVI. f .quartermaster

ABTCSN .Engineer

ABTCPM ,.,.,.,...,..,.. .provost M&rshal

ABTCVB 11...• Visitors Bureau

ABTCPR ,,Public Relations

- 1 ­
Staff Memorandum No. 1, 8 Sep 44 contd.

f. All correspondence will be dated by the Staff Sections and routed

to Message Center after signature, Messar/'; Center 'Till process the communication

and return file copies tr> AG Section.

2. All communications relating to troops in the maneuver will be classi­

fied "Maneuver Restricted" unless conditions indicate a necessity for classifi­
cation of secret or confidential.

3» All personal mail will be addressed to:

Maneuver Headquarters,
Airborne Center,
Camp Mackall, N»C.

!}.• Werk orders to be performed by the Reproduction Center, Airborne Corri'-

cand, will be submitted to the Adjutant General for approval,

5« The Engineer Officer will be responsible for the storage of all maps.

All requests for maps will be made to the G-2 --A-2 Section for approval.

6, Officers reporting to Maneuver Headquarters for duty will sign the

Officers Register in the AG Office; observers and guides at Visitors Bureau.

All incoming umpire officers will report to the Chief Umpire. Other officers

will report to the Adjutant General«

7. All officers will sign out with Chief Clerk when they will be out of

office for more than three (3) hours.

8<> Medical service for visitors or officers and enlisted men on temporary

duty will be available at the 542d Prcht Inf Dispensary. No change in medical

service for personnel permanently statione"1 at Camp Mackall, N - C

9» General and Special Staff Sections will maintain a current report cf

activities of their sections to be available to Maneuver Director on call, and

on completion of maneuver will submit a complete report to the Maneuver Director.

An outline of the activities of each section for the day will be submitted to

G-l by 120S daily covering the previous day.

10, Security Measures*

a. Chiefs of Sections will insure that security measures are taken

to prevent mishandling of classified materials'. Attention is invited to AR

380-5­
b, The fallowing measures will apply, in the handling of classified

correspondence:

(1) The file clerk in the Adjutant General's record section is

responsible for the registering of classified documents.

Classified correspondence to be dispatched will be referred

• to the Adjutant General for registration and dispatch,

(2) Staff Sections desiring classified correspondence on file

in the Adjutant General's record section will sign classi­

fied record sheets and will be properly charged with the

security of the document,

(3) Incoming classified correspondence will be referred to the

Adjutant General for registration and dispatch to the Section

to which it pertains.

- 2 ­
Staff Memorandum No. 1, 8 Sep 44 contd.

(4) All classified documents will be returned to the Adjutant

General's reocrd section prior to 1700 hours. These documents will be locked

in a vault for safety ever night. If documents cannot be returned by 17C0

hours, they will be given to the Duty Officer on duty in the Adjutant General's

office who will place them in the vault.

(5) The senior non-commissioned officer in each section is

charged with the responsibility of disposing of all T~aste

paper in the Section prior to 1645 hours daily, and will re­
port to the Sergeant Major that it has been accomplished.

By order of the Commanding Officer:

H.. J. DIETENHOFER,

Major, Adjutant General's Department

Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:

tJ, 'J. DIE^ENKOFSR, /

Major, Adjutant General's/Department

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: " A"

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER EJMQJJARTSRS

Camp M&ckall, North Carolina

STAFF MEMORANDUM) 22 September 1944

NUMBER 4 )

TWENTY-FOUR HOUR DUTY

1» Effective 0900, 24 September 1944i all sections, this Headqu&rt;••.-;

will function on a tv;enty-four (24) hour basis. This schedule v/ill remo.v

in effect until further notice.

2. staff sections v:ill maintain sufficient personnel on duty at all

tines to execute the normal duties of the Section.

By command of Major General TERRELL:

II. J. DIETENKOFER,

Major, A«GoD»r

Adjutant General.

// 7
rU t . DIETELTIIOFERf
<L ±x
/- 'J •"- * ' * * * /
Adjutant General. L /

DISTRIBUTION: »i.«

 AIRBQRHE-TROOP CARRIER FAISUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp F a c k a l l , I T orth C a r o l i n a
23 September 1944

STAFF FEHORALDUL )

TJUFBER 5)

1. An historical report will be compiled of the SepterVr-'

1941 Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

a. Each General and Special Staff Section will submit

a final report of its activities in the maneuver* The report

will set forth the problems encountered; and an evaluation of

the activities carried on, pointing out weaknesses, and suggesting

improvements for future operations. Faps, charts, and tables

may be used to Illustrate reports,

b. Chief Ground Umpire, Chief Air Umpire, Chief

I'edical Umpire, and Umpires of Red and Blue forces will submit

final reports,

c. Red Forces will report on their various activiti•••:*>

in the maneuvert

d. The 1st Tactical Air Division will submit a rep^^

of its activities in the maneuver,

2, Final drafts of reports will be submitted to Faneuvor

Director, Camp lackall, not later than D plus 6,

By command of rajor General TERRELL:

I-I. J. DISTEiTlICFER

Fajor, A, G* D.

Ad jutant Genera 1

OFFICIAL:

If. J . /DIETSNilOFER

Major^ A. G. D.

Ad.Wtant General

ir
DISTRIBUTION: A"

 COPY

(Destroy all others)

AIREDRNiii-TROOP CARRIijE I ANJUVIK HEADQUARTERS

Camp l-.ackall, North C a r o l i n a

STAFF k^OR.-luMIL) 27 September 1944

NUI.,JB.cPu 6)

1. Critiqusn will be conducted as follows in Airborne Center School

Building:

a. a i r Sta.fr Critique ­ 281000

b. \ in;_: Critique (Air Stcii'f, ,;irr Staff, Group Commanders) ­

281430.

c. Cohtbined Staff Gritiqus (XiwII Corps, Airborne Center, Troop

Carrier Comnand, 60th Troop Carrier win- , and 13th Airborne Division t o
include Battalion Commanders and separate Unit Coiiinv-inders) - 290900.

By command of Major General T-iiRRiuLL:

S»/ J . DIsbT ^ .i- iOFH t

ixzajor, n. G. D.
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION: "A"
CC: CO, 60th TC -/in"­
13th A/B Div
 • " I 'f
i

• < •

., - ^

' " '

 APPENDIX

General Staff Section Reports

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER liANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp M a c k a l l , North C a r o l i n a

29 September 1944

SUBJECT: Combined A-2, A/B-2, G-2 Report on Combined Airborne—Troop C a r r i e r

Maneuver, 24 - 30 September 1 9 4 4 . '.

TO: D i r e c t o r , Airborne-Troop C a r r i e r Maneuver,

Camp Mackall, North C a r o l i n a .

1 . The I n t e l l i g e n c e ; S e c t i o n of Maneuver Headquarters c o n s i s t e d of r e p r e s ­

e n t a t i v e s of t h e Airborne C e n t e r , I Troop C a r r i e r Command and Headquarters XXII
Corps. D e c i s i o n was made by t h e .airborne and Troop C a r r i e r Command r e p r e s e n ­
tatives that, for purposes of training, all Intelligence functions pertaining
to the tactical aspects of the maneuver be the joint responsibility of G-2 of
the division and *i~2 of th~ Ving. Headquarters Intelligence functioned chiefly
to provide mental ^yr.astics for these sections as situations were developed an­
alarous to conditions of warfare,. The necessary continuous coordination of the
staff sections of Division and \i±n^ left much to be desired but a major reason
for this lack was tho necessity of both organizations to fulfill other training
programs -o.p bo the eve of tno airborne movement. Aside from thus absence of
ideal coordination, both Division and V/in^ Intelligence sections functioned
efficiently ard their respective reports are an annex to -ohis reports ./

2 , The three intelligence representatives of Maneuver Headquarters worked

in closes!; c oo.r cli ca'V" on liroiu the establishment of maneuver headquarters on 7
.':; optember- " ?4^ T.O C~.OS^ The intelligence annex to Field Order #j^ overlay of
v
.;x3 ii7.ltj.alj, LrA pori.olic changes in the enemy ; round situation wore prepared
:'..: j - i n t laij.y conferon:. ,.s:. They are an annex to this report.

3n The Historical Section of A-2, Troop Carrier Command, was made res—
ponrib?.o for r..he oomr.O.ete report of this maneuver, Additionally„ an AAF Combat
araera Un\t wa;; as:-:;!.^;r_ea to make both a photographic h i s t o r i c a l record of the
•:• K U
n ami ng films and s t r i p s desired by both Airborne Center

4, A Counter J.-rtollj_p-enoe section of A-2, J_ Troop Carrier Command, was

acsipned tc WC.TK diroccly with the 60th Win£ inteii.i/<-enwe echelons for train—
'.i-[ i:i t h i s phase a i t or coordination with the 13th A/B Division C.I.C, Section.
r
!.V-j rooort of t h i s section i s in annex.

5- Puoljc Relations Officers handled numerous niomSor^ of the Press.

•}C-o-j.:~J_ :-7 a^p^ots wore- coordinated with the Headquarter? intel'Lu- inca s e c t i o n .
M
:h; !..n:'<ollip;on.ce section Vn-fed the Pross.

6, Particjlai* comoonriation i s made of the joxn"0 brief in-;; oi Glider Pilots

]-y the 1'5-h A/B d i v i s i o n and 60th lJ±n[% General ChapLian pers^nclly upened the
triv/riap" vr..th a ehoi^t taj.k wnich made the f l i d e r ^x.lor.s fool, fio.t. they were
iiionibers of the team, n thorough knowledge of the bi-oad and sp^cii'ic objectives
of the maneuver ;;as r;ivon to the p i l o t s , making bhom fool important cc^s i n the
machinei'T., P i l o t s wero then assir.ned by sections bo serve with p a r t i c u l a r u n i t s
oi the d i v i s i o n after ia;ri?.ng. Rendezvous points fac reporting v/ore pin-pointed
and each p i l o t knew i n L-lysnco his r e s p o n s i b i l i i TOS am du^aes as a combat
number of some ur_xi of t^ir ground forces. Thi.s phaso of oho briefing r e p r e ­
sents a model of compreshensive i n s t r u c t i o n of p l i d e r piiocs as t o the part
they w i l l play as ground combatants.

7. Maps used were:

1/500,000 Charlotte

1/62,500

1/20,000 Photo kap

These wore o f f i c i a l ,

- 1 ­
 Unofficial maps used wore:

1/30,000 Photo Map

:
1/15,000 Photo Map .. • • • . - . ' .

Control over i s s u e of a l l naps was vested i n the G—2 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,

XXII Corps. Supply was adequate.
Template references were prepared by G-2, Airborne Center.

8. An AAF Photographic Unit a i r c r a f t was assigned t o 60th Win*7 c h i e f l y

t o provide photo aids t o n a v i g a t i o n . ; I t a l s o served both t h e Wing and D i v i s i o n
for the taking of a e r i a l photos for i n t e l l i g e n c e s t u d i e s . This s e r v i c e proved
invaluable.

9 . I t was proposed t o e r e c t on a c l e a r e d area of the Mackail range a

v a r i e t y of obstacles such as would be used i n s t a t i c defense a g a i n s t g l i d e r
l a n d i n g s . The purpose of t h i s plan was.to t r a i n Photo I n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s t o
recognize such o b s t a c l e s i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Beccu.se f i r i n g was i n progress up
t o the beginning of the maneuver t h i s could not be done.

10. Because of c o n f l i c t i n t i n e of other b r i e f i n g s with b r i e f i n g the P r e s s ,

Headquarters I n t e l l i g e n c e was not r e p r e s e n t e d a t other b r i e f i n g s of a i r and
r^und f o r c e s . By r e p o r t i t would appear t h a t a i r b r i e f i n g s attempted t o give
too much information t o p i l o t s , and was r e p e t i t i o u s , making the b r i e f i n g o v e r ­
i e t a i l e d and t e d i o u s .

uocommend a t i ons

1, That an exchange of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s between Wing and D i v i s i o n does

not produce the maximum c o o r d i n a t i o n e s s e n t i a l to successful o p e r a t i o n s . It
i s believed Wing and D i v i s i o n I n t e l l i g e n c e sections should e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t
war room a t the s t a r t of operations ( a l s o a v a i l a b l e t o G-3, A-3) ^nd t h a t the
sections should work i n c l o s e s t cooperation continuously, u n t i l the completion
of the a i r phase.

2 . That the b r i e f i n g of s l i d e r p i l o t s as was done i n t h i s maneuver be

adopted as S.O.P.

3 . That a photographic a i r c r a f t , or u n i t , be assigned for j o i n t use of

Wing and D i v i s i o n under d i r e c t c o n t r o l of t h e s e u n i t s i n a l l planning s t a g e s
of Airborne Operations,,

4 , That i n future maneuvers, s t a t i c defenses a g a i n s t paratroop and g l i d e r

landings be a c t u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n areas not to be used i n the Maneuver for
t h e 'purpose of t r a i n i n g photo i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s i n r e c o g n i t i o n of such
hazards.

I . ACflTEMBISRG, R. F . LUDE2«AN S . T. MOORE,

Capt., Inf., iviajor, CUC, L t . C o l . , ^C
G-2 (Ground) V B - 2 (,&)• , A-2 ( A i r )

- 2 ­
 Canp l a c k a l l , XTorth Carolina ' *

;
ABTCAC ' • • ' . . . • • • . 30 Gepteriber 1944

SUBJECT: A-3 Report on Airborne-Troop Carrier Kaneuver

Conducted During 24-29 3ept"eaber 194<t, I n c l u s i v e .
TO • V Director,
Airborne-Troop Carrier Jr.neuver Headquarters,
Cazio l a c t a l l , :;Torth Carolina.

-L • v.7U_i.t. :• - i J . y - - J - ' « • . - • • . • " - . ,.

' a. The-coi-blued Airborne-Troop Carrier Ikneuver

24-29 Oe^te.iber 1944 v;d3 ordered upon authority of \*rr J t ­
partjaent l^s^iorandun .{'7DQQT 555 - 1 July.• 44..- to- CO"1LX/IC1:/,I;_
General, Ariay Air.::7oroej and ^rr^ Ground Iforco,^ datod 7 -jAGU3t
1944 and l e t t e r , Headouartera ^ . r ^ - - i r . '•Poros-b c-.atsd 14 .ji^ust
1944'to Cojikn ncl ing .General^ I Troop Carrier Coji.^nd, s u b l e t :
••Joint Trc.ininc of _d.rborne and Troo-? Carrier I T nit^ r 0

b. lj:.iicjuvor *oiior—luui^. ITo# 3., s e t t j . n ^ lortl^ c o i i c i ­

t i o n s under T^;Iiicli r^^uvei T :U- t o be conductor':, \-e^j issued '
D7 ix'.neuver Koad, uc.rtcr.^ ? 0^-j.p i-*- c c a l l , ITortli G'r.rolii.c, on
7 ^epte. :ber 1^4^-. Coiidition.a spociiied" i.'.cluo/.c. u^e c l " t
l e a s t t\/o (2) de-iartur3 *^^^^> ':- circuitov.a route of a t .least
one hundred (100)^:ileG bo^8|tjectivo i rec., o ^3ration,'.: t o be
conducted j a t ni:_>r& uc th^ _:~::1: r». «:;tv,"iu )r".ctic."jlc, . ndr e ­
,-- i'it, air?*3l3", :.RC.evacuation b^;r.ii only.
. .• • o» ,?ie-ld Order To.._l was issued by l^r.onvcr Head­
quarters on 8 Geptenber 1944~.i).C. sot forth 't.'ie general sit­
uation' and G^ecific m.jsiori.

d. Tic Id Order "~o. 9, 60th Troop. Carrier " Inc ^^s

l.oSCLo'C -L .' j J 1 uo. iOGi _L>4b'.-i: •

. •. . . e.- -.?ield Order Ho.; 49, 349th Trop-o ';:r r i ^ r Irou-n

"'Q3 .issued; 21 .je-otevil^er 1944.
f. - 7iGld Order'To. 4, 1st Provision 1 Troop Carrier
^roun '"tfP.s issued 23 ^eTbenber 1944.
g. . / i e l d Ordar I-To • 2, 13th Airbcrn: Division urs
issued 20 3epterl>or' 1544,
• * •

2. i^THTirTJSRb: • •'; , / ' J : -; • /../

.?our Pathiindor aerials were flown on B-l, t h ^

planes in two serials by the 549tn Troop Carrier Crroup and

two planes in'two -serials' by the 1st Provi.sidnc.l Troop Carrier.

Group. The aerial:., dropped Airborne. r>athfinder ten.i^. v:ith _ •

lights and radio aids on the I.?, and DZs. • A.11 arrived at

their objective^ within one ainute cf the scheduled ti.v.ie,

cxitod loads end returned to base.

3. D-l:

a. ;:issions started as ^iannad at 1839.on B-l, 24

-iber 1944 Y/ith an overcast at about 4,000 foot and

visibility due to 3ix>'k:e and haze beinf encountered near

', 1T. C.

b. .'Jerial ./5, 29 C-47'S' flown by the 1st Provisional

Group, took off fron iaurinburg-Ir.xton Arny Air Base on tire,

., •• - 1 ­
dropped the 1st Patt?.lion of the 515th infantry pegiment and

the 222nd "-epical Platoon generally south an-i southwest of

PDZ 1. Plane .-^20 "gave s green light prematurely ani • follow­

ing planes followed this action with the result that five

plane loa^s were dropped several minutes north of PDZ 1.

spacing-of elements was poor. Formation good, within elements.

Last plane returned to.departure airdrome at 2110.

c. Ferial ^ 6 , 49 0-47»s flown'by the 1st Provisional

Group, tcok off from Lumberton on time, transporting the 458th

Field artillery Battalion to be dropoed on PDZ 3 F and p. The

lead eli,mcnt failed to correct for a strong northeast wind and

flow a parabolic course to the radar beacon aoproaching from

northwest instead of from north. .Tump signals wore given too

early and troops wore drooped from two miles northwest of PDZ

to PDZ, mostly into dense woods- causing numerous injuries to

personnel. The last section of this serial followed the same

procedure on aoproach and dropped troops too close to down

wind side of field. mhose troops wore dispersed to the south

and west of the TW.. Tn this portion of the serial one plane

crashed and burner! on field 3 F at 2045. This serial brought

back 94 refusals srd/or equipment failures. Formation of this

serial was rrggeel with several planes out of position. All

elements did not turn out lights. Last plane returned to

departure airdrome Ft H£-55.

d. Serial -'••7. 7A r-47»s flown by 349th nroup, trans­

porting 2nd Fattalion, 515th Parachute Tnfantry ?n^ company

T t n

0 , 129th Airborne '^ngincor pattalion departed LauriiiKirg­

T
-faxton AAP for "°"n7 2, Or. final ODprosch the formation did

considerable ,°-ing snd uwo shi s broke formation. The last

diamond made a curving approach and troops ^erc not jumped. p

second approach --'as made and at that tim.e other planes were

over D7 at a lower aiI '.tudo. 3rd diamond then climbed to

approximately 2,500 foot indicated, remained in vicinity until

D7 was cleared of ai"-::::-af t, then made two more passes at PDZ

2 dropping last of troops on fourth pass at 2105. Troops in

plane .-#37 of third diamond >.'cro jumped on. Field 3 F. Last

plane arrived at departure airdrome at 2130.

c. Ferial ^'8, 96 0-47's flown by the 349th Group,

departed from laurirburg-vaxton transporting 3rd battalion,

515th Parachute xnfentry, T-Tq r.nd wq co, 515th parachute infan­

^rtillor'r pq enA ^iv Fq (-) to be dropped on

ard "n. Formation arrived over PD7 on time. Formation

ra>,god end troops drifted south and west of V)y,, landing in

heavy woois rnd s^-an.ps. poveral planes dropped late and in­
dividual planes an" small elements circled and made second

parses causing much confusion in the air and on the ground.

T?st p].x,no arrived at --icpsrturc airdrome at 2156.

f. serial ^'9, 10 0-47 is an^f 20 0^-4.A alidors

flown by the 349th croup -^psrtM. from jaur ?nhurg-T^axton trans­

porting vehicles of 515th. ^ar?chute infantry, 3r^ Platoon,

222r6 **i dical coriDEny, 513th fir-borne signal Co-ioany nn^ 458th

Parachute Fiel^ Artillery pattalion. Gliders to be landed in

GLZ 3 A. Take off n:ado in 5 minutes. Arrive^ over CLZ on

time but spacing between tugs w^s too great and run was wide,

in spite of this all gliders landed safely in area. 15 in GLZ

3 p, 4 in 3 p ani 1 in 5 n. Last tug arrived at departure air­

drome at 2214.

4.. D-DAY;

a. Serial #10, 49 c-47's and 98 CG-4j\ Gliders flown

b3.r 349th Group, departed Laurinburg-^axton two hours after

schedule due to weather, transporting 676th Glider Field

Artillery Pattalion, revision Fq (-) and pattalion (-) 326th

- 2 ­
Glider infantry. "Destination 0L7 3 A through p. Take off

completed in 28 minutes. Interval "between elements was too

great and last elem.cnts vere slightly high and wide. one

glider pilot cut loose O R take off claiming right wing heavy.

One glider pilot cut loose on tow claiming glider stalled out.

vo ma, j o r damage to g 1 id ors .

b. Serial ^11, 41 n-47's a^d 82 O G - 4 A n-lidcrs flown

by the 1st Provisional Group,, departed Lumberton two hours

after schedule H U e to weather, transporting 677th Glider piol-i

Artillor:r pattalion, Oompany E'^n, 129th Airborne ^ngincer

battalion and •nf.vision Artillery, destination G-I.7 3 F °nd p.

Take off completed in 52 minutes. This formation over ran

proceeding serial ?t rendezvous sn" flew a parallel course to

I.?. Formation V T S ragged and became scoaratc^. Altitude and

interval at GL7 vas high an"1 ^idc. one glider release accidental.

One glider wing io^n on take off an"1 glider pilot cut l o s e .

T~o damage to gli-crs or injury to personnel.

c. serial *<12, 4 0-47's an^. 4 CG-13 sliders flown,

by 349th Group departed l/'urlnburg-^xton 2 hours after schedule

due to weather, transporting 3rd Platoon, (-) 222nd ^odical

Company, destination GLZ ^1» Take off completed in 1-1/2

minutes. An excellent mission in all respects.

d. Serial -''13, 19 0-47's and 38 CTG-4A Gliders flown

by 349th Group departed Laurinburg-wsxton two hours after

schedule due to weather, transporting Pattery "n", 153rd Air­

borne A A pattalion, Patterv "Ftf, 153rd Airborne r A Pattallon,

platoon (-), 222nul uc^ic°l Ooipany. destination r-TJ?. -^1. Take

off completed in 10 minutes. Interval between tugs was too

great but pattern was excellent.

e. Peri^ls ^10 through ^(13 had a total of 4 acci­

dental releases imnMirtely pfter- t°ke off an^/or enroute.

All other gliders lardud in proper landing zones. patterns

were excellent and landings were good. vo 1niur5.es to person­

nel or damage to Airborne CQV° oment. A total of 23 gliders

were damaged, 11 of which sustained suff5.cient r3rim?ge to

make them non-f1yab1e.

f. Ferial :'-'-14, 10 P - 1 7 ' S of 89th Pombrrdment ^Ting

and 4 0-47's of 349th Group departed i.a.urirburg-T/rnxton on

schedule transporting airhead control party and initial air

land ing serial. n es tina t i on A T.7 4 (~:T? cka 11 A Ird romo ). A ir­
drome captured at 1200, "n-T)ay. 1st plane landed 1310; others

landed at 90 seoord intervals. Total time on ground 31

minutes.

g. Serial #15, 72 C-47's, 36 from 349th Group and

36 from 1st provisional Group departed Laurinturg-^'axton and

Lumber-ton on schedule transporting 130th evacuation pospital

(-), ^P ^latoon, and CC-th Glider infantry (-) air landings

lihd t 20 &oec>r;d Intervals. unloading lagM^d slightly.

h. Peri-Is 16 through 23, 144 G-47's ^erc composed of

air landing missions consisting oT 9 plane formations from the

349th an/-"l 1st Provisional nroups departing Lrur^nburg-^cixton and

Lumberton simultareously, departing on r continuous shuttle

transDorting remaining elements of the d:'vision to AI/7 4.

Average take off interval for all 8 serials was 16 seconds.

Average lending interval wrs 26 seconds. Serials ouerated with­

out Incident,

i. Serial .-^24, 190 c-47's, w^s a contiguous shuttle

of single aircraft flown by both grouus from respective depart­

ure airports transporting division resuoply starting at 1926.

All loading was accomolishe^ in a very satisfactory mariner

but unloading lagged on several occasions. This fact, combiried

- 3 ­
with two .incidents of aircraft trouble at TTackall (one flat

tiro blocking taxi runway S3 and one gear failure which block­
ed runway for approximately 45 minutes) resulted in a complete

saturation of the airdrome and necessitated the curtailment

of dispatching of aircraft from Lumberton and l..aurinburg-Max­

ton for a period, of 40 minutes. Remainder of shuttle was com­
pleted without incident, Resupply completed 1100 r>/l.

j. Ferial .-#26, 1 0-47 flown by 349th Group from

laurinburg-Maxton made a tactical pick-up of a on—4A glider

from aj_r? 1 loaded with litter patients, Pick-uD was accomp­

lished successfully on first pass, however tug arrived 10

minutes early ?n^ ^uc to l°ck of ground coordination pick-up

station was prepared late, necessitating the circling of the

tug in the area for a period of approximately 30 minutes.

5. r>/2;

Ferial #25, 6 c-47's flown by 349th Group, from

I.aurinburg-^xton dropped supplies by parachute to an isolat­

ed Pattalicn ?t 1103 on T > /2. Pattern of Jrop was excellent

?nd orly criticism offered ^as tb^-t some passes •'"ere made at

too low an altitude giving parachutes insufficient time to

slow momentum of bundles dropped with resultant damage to

equipment pecks.

6. CUr GILSIGiS. :

a. ''aneuvor plans issued by the operations sections

of the directorate staff showed good coordination.

b. coordination through liaison officers an^ personal

contacts between section chiefs of the 60th Troop Carrier wing

and loth airborne m.y.,_.r; 1 on was aecomplsihed.

c. T\he Field order of the 60th wing was issued in

sufficient time ard adhered to with minor charges.

d. c-roup pi old orders were issued on the dste re­

quired on proper forms and conforming to higher echelon field

orders.

e. Pcthfin^er personnel were dropped, shortly prior

to the mission fully -lopcrdent upon their operation.

f. The mothoH emr> 1 oyed for ron^ezvous ?nd assembly

of double glider to'" scorirls proved so. tisf sctory. Time fact­
ors involving teke off, time cut, time back, three turns to

allow close up, plus the tirru- allotted for the normal mal­
functions of equi iront ",-oro accurately figured lorior to take

off. A S an ad^ed safetv factor to prevent the large forma­

tion from sev-ring the chain due to improper take off inter­
vals, the serial lerder was briefed to fly over the departure

airfield just prior to going on course, where he would receive

a "proceed" or "held in rrea" signal.

go I Troop carrier command SOP's were adhered to in

all instances.

h. Close and. zone cover was afforded Troop carrier

formations during numerous missions in all phases of this man­

euver,

i. It is believ' d that the poor approach formations

in paratroop serials were due to the influx of new crews upon

trained squadron teams, lock of visibility, 4000 foot over­

cast (causing darkness) and air discipline.

- 4 ­
 j. CPX flights arc unnecessary for short distance

operations.

k. A satisfactory dependable homing directional

beacon of at least 35 to 50 mile range is needed.

1. Traffic control at the airhead was satisfactory

due to the 60th wing designating a commander familiar with

this type of operation, preorganization of a control team,

and the transporting of this team during the initial air

landing phase,

m« concentration of aircraft occurred about 2345

D-day due to employment of too many aircraft for airhead

facilities.

n. Conveyor belt installation In C-47 aircraft for

door dropping proved satisfactory to mission requirement.

o. Thcit pilots demonstrated a r:Igh state of pro­

ficiency In the.handling and knowledge of aircraft.

p. That Troop carrier pilots ani slider pilots

briefing to airborne troops prior to take-off be specifically

outlined.

q. The C ^ - 4 A glider is a suitable tactical glider

and may bo used with a great degree of success in small un­

prepared fields.

r. pour c^-13 gliders loaded with 6000 lbs Day

loads vere successfully flown in this maneuver. This type

glider may be used successfully In tactical daylight opera­

tions, however consideration must be giver to select suitable

fields. The field selected should be 1500 feet or longer,

Tjnder no circumstances should this glider be landed In strange

fields at night because of Me"h ].?nding speed and long ground

roll.

s. Two methods of glider hook-up vere employed in

this operation. One, the conventional side feed book-up by

which a 75.4 second average take-off Interval was accomplish­

ed. The second method was a type of static hook-up, that is,

all gliders and tugs were parked In positlor for take-off

with ropes and intercommunication attached prior to take-off

time. A 33 second average take-off interval was accomplished

by thi° s method.

t. The high percentage of effectives In the glider

operation may bo attributed to the proficiency of the glider

pilots and the result of daylight operation,

/u. Tactical evacuation of gliders is feasible and

serious consideration should be given to th:' s type of opera­

tion during unit training,

v. individual power pilot technique in glider pick­

up was poor-. This was demonstrated during administrative

evacuation,

w. Present external type communication tow rope is

unsatisfactory and should not be considered over 50% effective.

x. Glider pilots were sufficiently traired to execute

assigned missions after landing and their conduct as ground

soldiers was satisfactory.

- 5 ­
 7. RECO^m'^ATIor0 •

a. That a complete study "bo ma^e pnd a SOP publish­

ed covering all briefings necessary for all Troop carrier and

airborne phases of operations.

b. That a decision be made with regards to which

staff section an air cargo resupply squadron is responsible

to during Airborne Troop carrier operations. .

c. Tvuring initial air landing operations at an air­

head Troop carrier aircraft should have, in addition to the

regular 4 man crew, two men trained to assist In or to off

load the aircraft. *

d. Parachute drops with dummy loads be made in

greater numbers behind smoke screens to confuse defending

units.

e. tactic?1 air force units should be employed in

Troop Carrier maneuvers on a sufficient scale to allow numerous

rendezvous and escort missions to be accomplished.

f. That means be devised by which serial leaders can

successfully navigate at right at low altitudes, that contin­

uous experimentstior with r^'sr br, con^ucte^ as to Troop

Carrier requirements, tbst p. requirement be- mo^e for s satis­

factory directional light beam that can be carried by prth­
finder personnel.

g. Thr\t future Troop Carrier Airborne maneuvers of

the division scale dohote the practice peculiar to this area

of spot dropoing or selecting 9 target which due to Its

angular shape r;oces::itatbS an exact corridor of approach.

This plr.ces an ad - itional requirement on the serial leader

during the run In i'ro;n the I. P. to DZ whereas were the pilots

only required to hit an area "nz identified by c. radar beacon,

observe an area clear of obstacles below then drop, a more

favorable dropping result could be expected.

h. perious consideration should be given to modify­

ing all bases used by Troop Carrier for a static tyoe hook-up,

both in future maneuvers and actual operations.

I. That the practice of night glider landing should

be considered an operational emergency and restricted to such

equipment necessary in the initial phase of an oooration.

j. T'Tost effective glider operations can be accomp­

r
lished b; take off and flight to GL7 under cover of darkness

with glider landings schedule-"1 to begin at davn, Recommend

that th?s tyoe operation be considered normal operating pro­

cedure.

k. A soaclng slo^ should be une^ as a visual aid in

taking up slack In tow rope on take off.

.1. Th°t deceleration chutes be retained as part of

glider equipment.

m. jt is recomnerded that glider pilots accompany

their airborne loads after landing and proceed with the air­
borne troops until the ground situation becomes stabilized

or the airborne units roach their assembly area. At this

time the glider pilots should be conducted to the senior air­

borne command post but rot higher than a regimental command

post, upon arrival at the command post glider pilots should

be organized into provisional units for possible employment as

- 6 ­
infantry. Although Airborne commanders will be in charge

of glider pilots after landing, unusually hazardous and

extremely tiring missions or such duties that woul^ dis­

perse them to such extent as to prohibit rapi^ assembly

for evacuation should not be assigned except in extreme

emergency.

n. missions requiring separate assembly should

not be assigned to glider Dilots prior to landing.

o. Schedules should be so arranged as to allow

all glider pilots to supervise the actual loading of

gliders.

p. Air-borne commanders should be contacted prior

to operations to ascertain exact nature of individual equip­

ment that Airborne troops will rear end carry in ordeiv that

glider pilots may b3 likewise equipped.

/ s / A. ^. Thomas

A. D. THOMAS

Major, Air Corps

- 7 ­
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mack-all, North C a r o l i n a

28 September 1944

SUBJECT: A-4 Report on-Combined Airborne-Troop C a r r i e r Maneuver, 24 - 30

September 1 9 4 4 .

TO : Maneuver Directors, Airborne-Troop Carrier ;/-aneuver Headquarters,

Camp liackall, North Carolina.

1. Preparation.

The i n i t i a l plannin of the maneuvers included a determination of facil­

i t i e s , personnel, supplies and equipment that would be available as well as r e ­
quired for this maneuver. The following resume includes the important phases
of the supply functions:
a
« Supply points and bivouac areas.

Adequate supply points and bivouac areas were determined by actual

inspection at Laurinburg-uaxton AAB, Lumberton, and Fort Bragg, and designated
in the Annex #1 of AB-TC Field Order j£L.

b. Aircraft Spare Parts and Accessories.

The amount of aircraft spare parts, accessories and organizational

equipment necessary to maintain 200 aircraft and 242 • liders which were required
for maneuvers was determined by contact with each organization involved. A
special arrangement was made with Air Technical Services, Uri r ht Field, Dayton,
Ohio, to secure a small supply of c r i t i c a l items, normally only supplied to air­
craft grounded for parts, so that no aircraft would be grounded just prior to
D-day. This was successful to that extent that 197 aircraft and 242 gliders were
flyable on D-day.

c. Vehicles.

Vehicles required for ground umpires, observers, ground maneuver

staff, were supplied by the Airborne Center Headquarters and XXII Corps. The

following vehicles were provided through AAF channels:

8 - l/4 ton 4x4 trucks - - --- Air Umpires

2 - 3/4 ton 4x4 weapons carriers - - - - - Air Umpires

5 - 1/4 ton 4x4 trucks - --- _ _ Lotion Picture Unit Det

2 - l/4 ton trailers Lotion Picture Unit Det

2 - 2 l/2 ton 6x6 trucks Lotion Picture Unit Det

1 - 3/4 ton 4x4 weapons carrier - I TAD

1 - lifht sedan _ _ _ _ TC Laneuver Director

1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 A-4 & Aircraft Engr

2 - 1/4 ton 4x4 A-3

1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 — lay dies

d. Aerial Resupply.
Complete report concerning these activities outlined in Incl. #1 to
this report. This was made a special project for which kajor J . E. Harris, Air
Quartermaster, was responsible in addition to his other duties.
e
» Aircraft Gasoline.

The requirements for gasoline was not known until D-6, therefore
a l l gasoline supply points were advised to keep storage f a c i l i t i e s filled to
capacity. The requirements were then figured on the following basis from in­
formation received from A-3 of tho 60th Troop Carrier IVing.
159 sorties of Paratroopers
121 sorties of Dual Tow Gliders
420 sorties of Air Landings (Troops)
400 sorties of Air Landings (Resupply)
1100 Total Sorties

- 1 ­
 Each aircraft was completely serviced with 800 gallons of 100-octane
prior to departure from home station. 60,000 gallons of 91-octane was made
available for refueling at departure bases, namely Laurinburg-Maxton AAB and
Lumberton. This made a t o t a l of 160,000 gallons of 100-octane and 120,000 gal­
lons of 91-octane required and available on D-2. A t o t a l of 160,000 gallons of
100-octane and 67,000 gallons of 91-octane ware used to transport by a i r 7130
personnel and
901 tons of eorabat equipment
430 tons of rosupply, air landed
12 tons of parachute resupply
1343 tons, Total
i

Fuel servicing units of each organization accompanied the units

to their departure bases, thereby providing adequate servicing facilities.

£• aircraft and Glider Maintenance.

Outlined in detailed report (Incl. #2) by Major J. W. Sharpe, Air

Engineering Officer,

2. Operations.

All operations wore completed insofar as supplies were concerned and

sufficient supplies.were available to accomplish the mission of the AB-TC

lianeuver.

3. Conclusions.

a. advance planning plus experience from previous maneuvers are the

two main factors that made this maneuver successful from a supply standpoint.

b. Recommend that the aerial resupply phase be under the jurisdiction

of the «.-4 and G-4 u n t i l aircraft are ready to depart.

c. Recommend that a l l rope required for lashing and loading ramps for
gliders be provided by the Airborne Division. The .airborne personnel are trained
in the use of this equipment and should bo part of their equipment.

/ s / William H. Mcdcma
A / WILLIE H. MEDEMA
Capt., a i r Corps,

- 2 ­
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

29 September 1944

SUEJECT: G-4 Report on combined £irborne~Troop Carrier

Maneuvers, 24 - 30 September 1944.

TO: "nirector, airborne-fro op Harrier Maneuver,

Camp• Mackall, North Carolina.

1, personnel - TTnits

a. The following personnel were assigned to or

employed by this section exclusive of the A*-4 section?

One it Col - - - - - - - /i/p 4

One Major - - - - - - - Q^4

One Major - - - - - - - Pesupply officer

One 2 d L t - - - - - - - Motor officer

One 2d &t - - - - - - ,. Asst Motor officer

One cwo - - - - - - - - Ammunition officer

One EM - - - - - - - - - Ammunition Clerk

One F M - - - • - - - • • • dispatcher

b. The following units were under the control of

this section exclusive of the /\-4 section?

555th parachute infantry Company

3978th Quartermaster Truck Company

4105th ruartermastor Truck Company

4107th (Quartermaster Truck Company

Casual detachment - drivers, Mechanics

2. equipment.

a. The following equipment was obtained prior to

or during the maneuver;

(1) vehicles

20 truck? l/4 ton for Maneuver readquarters

45 trucks l/4 ton for observers Headquarters

30 trucks l/4 ton for umpires

5 trucks l/4 ton for military ^olice

4 trucks 3/4 ton for Military Police

26 trucks 3/4 ton for n-2 teams

20 trucks 2-| ton (or substitutes) for aug­

mentation of Quartermaster Truck Companies.

vehicles were obtained from the Fort Fragg

tactical pool on authorization of Army Ground

Forces,•through Headquarters, Fourth service

Command, unsuccessful attempts were ma-e to

obtain a ruartermaster car company and 20

dedans through the same channels. Last min­

ute improvisation was used to borrow 12

sedans from 60th Troop carrier ™Ting, 5 pedans

from peadquarters airborne Center, and miscel­

laneous vehicles from the commanding officer,

Camp Mackall and units stationed at Mackall.

b. 1200 cans, 5 gallon, inflammable liquid, were ob­

tained from YXTT Corps, Headquarters detachment, i?ort Pragg,

c. signal equipment required for umpires and Maneuver

headquarters was obtained from 85th °ignal Pattalion and local

units by the Maneuver signal Officer,

- 1 ­
 d. Post, camp, and station equipment required for

Maneuver Headquarters was drawn from the ^ost.

3. Supplies.

a. 55,000 C or K rations were requested through

This request was forwarded to Charlotte Quartermaster

Office of the Quartermaster General. The /\ir Quartermaster was

directed to ship in rations from Spokane, Washington and pair-

field, Ohio. j\s these rations did not arrive in time, the re­
quired rations were borrowed by Post from stations within the

service Command, to be returned on receipt of those from Air

Quartermaster,

200,000 palazone tablets were obtained through

Troop carrier Quartermaster from Troop carrier bases at Maxton

and Pope.

6,500 gallons of gasoline for resupply was ob­

tained through-Troop Carrier Quartermaster from waxton.

b. live ammunition was obtained from the Mackall

magazine from amounts on hand for YYT7 ^orps and headquarters

/firborne tenter.

?and loaded simulated containers were obtained

from stocks un^er control of -Airborne renter.

c. Signal batteries an^ wire were obtained through

supply channels coordinated by the Maneuver °ignal officer

d. local purchase items were obtained through the use

of Special Field Fxercise Funds allotted to Headquarters Air­

borne Center.

e. ^ost, camp and station supplies required for

Maneuver Headquarters were drawn from the Post.

4. Arrangements.

a. ^ivouac areas at Fort pragg, Maxton, and lumberton

were obtained from station commanders.

b. permission was obtained to use permanent Class I,

III, and ^'ater supply Points at the above stations.

c. Maneuver righted areas were confirmed with, the

Fourth service•Command pents and Claims Board, Fort Jackson,

South Carolina, and representatives of the poard were present

during operations.

5. operations.

a. The section assembled all required equipment and

supplies at vaoksll. Prpgg, and Maxton. Py reason of the lack

of advance notice many r.ong distance telephone calls were re­

quired and much materiel h^d to be specially trucked or flown

to be available in time.

b. Tlp.e 555bh Parachute infantry company and. the three

Quartermaster Truck companies were placed under the control of

the pesupply officer whe picked, up the resupply material wher­

ever located, hauled it to Maxton or Lumberton in equal amount,

anc! turned, it over to the 1st Air Cargo pesupply Squadron at

those points.

c. The pesupply Officer and units listed in paragraph

5 above, moved to Maxton after all resupply was accumulated at

that point and Lumberton and assisted in the loading of material

from the dumps of the 1st Air Cargo pesupply squadron into

trucks. personnel of the squadron off-loaded the trucks into

planes and accomplished whatever special packaging and rigging

was required.

- . 2 • - .

 d. in coordination with interested General and Special

Staff sections, Administrative Order ^1 to accoTripany Field

Order ^1 was published together with the annexes to the Admin­

istrative order.

e. Under the control of the wotor Officer, a dispatch­

ing system was established providing transportation require­
ments, keeping a continuous record of the status of all vehicles,

and accomplishing necessary maintenance.

f. Continuing coordination was accomplished with divi­

sion G-4, Maneuver Headquarters f-4, Troop Carrier Quarter­
master and the 1st Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, to make certain

all supply needs of the "division were provided. The operation

of the pesupply Squadron was under the ^Ting A-3 rather than A - 4

and resulted In the Maneuver Headquarters fA-4 and wing A-4 being

largely eliminated from the resupply operations.

g. pesupply was airlanded as follows;

Class I - - 26,000 rations type C - 65 tons

Class TJ- - lTone

Clsss H I - 1,200 5 gallon gas cans, 6,000

gallons - 25 tons

Class IV- - Pignsl "rire and batteries - 30 tons

°ignsl Parts end ppsros - 2 tons

engineer - 3,000 mines AT - 11 tons

Engineer - miscellaneous - 5 tons

Class V - - Tive ammunition in original containers

- 345 tons

Totsl - 483 tons

h. pesupply required by an isolated battalion was de­

livered by parachute using 6 C-47 sircrs.ft dropping 125 con­
tainers.

i. Traffic control - Provost Marshal report.

6. Recommendations.

a. That a maneuver of such scope be planned suffic­

iently in advance to allow all classes of supply to be shipped

in to the departure bases by rail in the normal manner.

b. That the availability of aircraft and the flight

thereof be under the direction of the A-3 sections of the par­

ticipating Air Corps echelons and that the accumulation of

supplies and all handling thereof by the Air Cargo pesupply

°quad.ron be under the direction of the A-4 sections to provide

continuity of supply responsibility and supply flow.

c. That the fir Cargo pesupply Squadron be charged

with the responsibility of accumulation of resupply from the

permanent supply installations designated by higher headquarters

rather than merely the receiDt of resupply at the temporary

dumps established by the squadron. T"Then necessary the squad­

ron must be augmented by additional transportation and labor

but the augmentation must be under squadron control to avoid

divided authority which may result in an interruption or gap

in the flow of supply an^ a wastage of equipment an^ manpower

in the handling of supply.

/ s / Max B. asssaway / s / j. c.'Rockefeller

/t/ M X B. GAS SAW AY, J.• S. ROCKEFELLER,
Major, infantry, I.t. Colonel, G.S.C.,
G-4 (Ground) A/p -4 ( A irb orne )

- 3 ­
Special Staff Section Reports

o u-

Signal and Communications

Quartermaster
a.

Surgeon

Public Relations Office

Visitors' Bureau

Provost Marshal

Enpineerirv7 and k'.;.xv: -nance

 AIRBORNS-TRCO?^ CARRIER lAHIlUTSR HEADQUARTERS

Camp Hackall,. North Carolina

26 September 1944

SUBJECT: RGDort of 7eather Section.

TO : Ivfeneuver Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Ikneuver

Headquarters, Camp I&cka11, North Carolina.

1. At the request of the ikneuver Director for a v/eather

officer for the headquarters of the Airborne-Troop Carrier

L&neuvers, 13ajor John E . Butler, Staff 7eather Officer HITCC,

proceeded to Camp I&cl:all, INT. C , on 21 September 1944 as per

'Temporary Duty Orders HITCC dated 18 Sep 44 (Incl # 1 ) .

2. Memorandum from A-3 Section, Lkneuver Headquarters to

Fajor Butler, dated 22 Sep 44 (Incl # 2) outlines schedule of

forecasts to be furnished", area forecast is to cover, distri­

bution of forecasts, and what items of v/eather that are to be

forecast.

3. 1% was decided that to obtain best results, each fore­

cast issued would be coordinated with the v/eather stations at

Pope Field, L-M, and Camp J.nckall, and that the forecast agreed

upon would be published and distributed to all concerned.

Regular distribution of forecasts in addition to that mentioned

in Inclosure #2 included 60th TC 7ing, all staff weather

officers of Troor> farrier organizations and the 372nd Fighter

Group.

4. All weather forecasters at the weather stations men­

tioned in paragraph 3 above were contacted and the information

in Inclosuro # 2 was passed on. The missions to be flown were

discussed so that each forecaster concerned would be familiar

with the problems involved,

5. "fritton forecasts issued from 1000 37 23 September

1944 to 1000 27 26 September 1944 are included as inclosure # 3.

6. Special long range forecasts were requested and receiv­

ed from the 7eather Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, OC&R

for the maneuver area on 30 August 1944, 14 September 1944 and

23 September 1944 (Inclosure # 4 ) .

7. Sun and Lloon Tables (Inclosure•'} 5) v/ere distributed

in advance of the maneuver period to all concerned.

8. In view of the forecast for broken clouds during the

period of the paratroop and glider missions On the night of

24 September 1944, thus, there being a possibility of the moon

being obscured, the llancuvor Director - on the afternoon of

the 24th - inquired as to the adviseability of postponing the

maneuver for twenty-four hours. This issue was advised against,

due to the very great possibility of bad v/eather moving in the

next, night that might possibl3r delay the maneuver for several

days. The forecast of the v/eather for the night mission of

24 Sep tomb or, as shown by inclosure ?J-3 was as follows:

Broken clouds at 5000 foot; visibilit3r - 7 miles;

surface wind - NE 14 I.IPH, decreasing to 8 IiPH by

2200 E7« Winds aloft up to 3000 feet, SMS 20 IIEH.

Actual weather conditions at the time over the drop

- 1 ­
Report of '/oathcr Section 26 Sop 44 (cont'd)

zone: A totally dark night with overcast at 4000 to

5000 foot,. Visibility restricted by haze and smoke.

Surface wind NNE, 10 IIPH, decreasing to 6 MPH by 2300

m. -rttnds aloft up to 3000. feet NE 16 1-1EH.

9. The forecast issued at 2200 EW, 24 September 1944 for

the period of the glider mission on the LIDrning of 25 September

1944 as shown by Inolosuro -;J-3 was as follows:

Overcast at 3000 feet occasionally broken, lowering

to 2000 feet by 0600 HT.7. Stratus overcast will

form at 800 feet by 0400 E7/, becoming broken at 1000

f e et by 1000 E7/. Vis ib i li t y 6 miles , de creasi ng to

4 miles by 0400 E7/ and improving to 7 miles by 1000

E17. Surface wind - NE 10 I3?H, decreasing to 5 KPH

by 0600 EV7. 7/inds aloft up to 3000 feet NE 15 IIPH.

This is essentially the sa.au as the 7/eather Bureau at 7/ashington

and Atlanta was forecasting for this area. T7hen the decision

was made to fly a weather ship over the area between 0300 E and

0400 E on the morning of 25 September 1944, the A-3 Officer was

advised that it was entirely possible to have good ceilings and

visibility at that time and have the low stratus form between

that time and the time set for glider take-off or any time up

until sunrise. Thus, if the gliders took off on schedule there

was a good possibility of low stratus clouds forming while they

were enrouto to the GIZ. However, if the take-off time was de­
layed until sunrise, this would be averted. Actual weather

conditions during the glider mission follows:

Broken clouds to overcast at 3500 to 5000 feet.

Visibility 5 to 7 miles. Surface wind HNS 3 to 6

MPH, 7inds aloft up to.3000 feet S3ME 12 IIPH.

10. Forecast for the Air landings and resupply missions

was as follows:

Broken clouds at 6000 feet, lower scattered clouds

to broken clouds at 2500 feet dissipating by 1900 E.

Visibility unrestricted, decreasing to 6 miles by

2300 E and to 4 miles by 0700 E, with 3 miles in

local patches of ground fog, 2 miles in dust, vicin­

ity Camp Ha oka 11 Airfield. Surface wind NE 4 i/IPH,

be coiling EGS by 2300 E and calm by 2400 E. 7/inds

aloft up to 3000 feet NE 10 xIPH. Actual conditions:

Broken clouds to overcast at 5000 feet, becoming

scattered clouds at 3000 to 5000 feet at 1600 E and

clear at 1800 E. Visibility 8 miles decreasing to

4 miles at 0230 E and 3 miles at 0330 E. Surface

wind NN7 to NNE to 4 HFH becoming calm to 2 liPH at

2100 E. 7/inds aloft up to 3000 foot NE 5 MPH becom­

ing ESE 8 at 2400 E and T/SV/ 7 MPH at 0600 E.

/ s / John II. Butler

/ T / JOHN H. BUTLER

Major, Air Corps,

Staff Veather Officer,

INCL03URES:

Incl $ 1 - Temporary Duty Orders.

Incl ff 2 - Memorandum - Schedule of Forecast to be issued.

Incl # 3 - Forecast.

Incl ff 4 - Long Range Forecast.

Incl // 5 - Sun and Ho on Tables.

— 2 —

 Army A i r F o r c e s
HEADQUARTERS I TROOP CARRIER COIvikAM)
Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana

TCCAG-0 18 September 1944

Subjact: Temporary Duty Orders

To : MAJ JOHN H. BUTLER, 0464344, AC

800th AAF Base Unit

1. I t i s directed t h a t you proceed by mil acft or r a i l o/a 19 S e p t ­

ember 1944, fr Stout Fid, Indianapolis, Indiana, t o Camp MacKrll, Hoffman,
NC, for purpose of assuming duties of maneuver weather officer, and from 22
September 1944 u n t i l closing d a t e , to p a r t i c i p a t e i n maneuvers. Upon comp­
l e t i o n of such temp dy r e t t o your proper s t a .

2. Auth i s granted to make such variations i n t h i s i t i n e r a r y and t o

proceed to such add places as may be necessary for the performance of t h i s mis­
sion.

3 . The provisions of Cir 260, WD, 1944, w i l l be complied with. No

per diem w i l l be atzd during'maneuver period. TDN, 501-32 P 432-02 212/50425.
AuLn: AAF Ltr 35-10, 4 May 1944.

By command of Brigadier General OID:

FRANK E. KINNEY,
1st Lieutenant, AGD,
Asst. Adjutant General.

I n c l . #1
 iBORwiV-TRCCr C,RRISR juAl^UViSR HnkDQUARTERS
Camp i*&ci:all, North Carolina

22 September 1944

M TO: lii&jor B u t l e r , D i r e c t o r a t e S t a f f ^ s a t h e r Officer.

From: foajor Thomas, A-3 Section, Maneuver Hq.

1. Weather forecasts are requested on the follovtinf dates and times:

-• t

Date • Time
23 September 1944 1000
" 1500
" 1900 (Special Report
if requested)
24 Sept ember
it
1944 1000
1500
it
18C0
II
2200
25 Sept ember 1944 0200
n 0600
tt
1000
tt
1400
tt
1800
tt
2200
2. These reports will have baen deducted throu h the f a c i l i t i e s and met­
ooroli-dcal reports from iviaxton Army Air Base, Pope Field and Camp Mackall
w e ather s tations.
3. Reports will cover the general area bordered by the following cities

a,
b. Sanford
cf Troy
d. Rockin^ham
e. Me Coll
f. Fairmont

4. All reports will include a detailed 12 hour forecast and forecasts

up to 2200, 25 September 1944.

5. Distributions

a. Air Director
b. Airborne Director
c. Ground Director
d. A-3
e. Airborne G-3
f. XXII G-3

6. Forecasts to include;

a. Sky conditions
b. Geilin;­
c. Visibility'
d. Surface winds
ef Winds aloft up to 3,000 feet.

A. D. THOkAS

Major, Air Corps

Incl #2 A-3

 M A

AIRBORNE-TROOP 'CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Gamp Hackail, North Carolina

23 September 1944

WEATHER FORECAST

1000EW to 2200 EW 23 September 1944

SKY CONDITIONS - High scattered clouds. Lower scattered clouds

at 5000 feet by 1400 EW dissipating by 2000 EW.

VISIBILITY - Unrestricted.

SURFACE WINDS - Northeast 12 KPH.

WINDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 feet - Northeast IS HPH.

FURTHER OUTLOOK

SUNDAY - High scattered to high broken clouds. Lower scattered

cumulus clouds at 4000 feet in afternoon dissipating by

sunset. Visibility unrestricted except 3 miles in ground

fog early morning. Surface wind east 12 KPH.

I.XNDAY - High scattered to high broken clouds with stratus over­

cast forming at 800 feot by 0400EW becoming broken at

1000 feet by 11003W and 3000 feet by L200EW. Lower clouds

dissipating by su-.iset. Visibility 3 miles in fog increa­

sing to 7 miles by 1100EW. Surface winds easterly 12 KPII,

/s/ John H. Butler

/T/ JOHN H. BUTLER
15ajor, Air Corps
Staff Weather Officer
n
DISTRIBUTION: A ; ? ,!?Gif.
KA N3 U V3 R
 Weather forecast received from'svachinfton on 30 Aufust 1944 for the
maneuver area for the period 15 September to 30 September 1944:

Mostly ^ood flyinr weather i s expected throughout the period except for
showers with low to intermediate ceilinrs about the 16th and apain from the
20th thrown the 23rd.

/ a / H . H. BiiSSETT
/ t / H. H. B^SSiiiTT
Co-Ion e l , ' Air Corps
Chief, Weather Division
Office, Asst Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments &
Requirements

Incl #4
 M A N E U V E R

AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER KAKEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackail, North Carolina

23 September 1944

WEATHER FORECAST

19003V/ 23 September 1944 to 0700EW 24 September 1944

SKY CONDITIONS - High Scattered clouds,

VISIBILITY - Unrestricted beccning 3 miles in fog by 0500EW.

SURFACE './Il-IDS - Eastnortheast 6 EPH.

7/I1IDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 FEET - Eastnortheast 20 I.TH.

FURTHER OUTLOOK

0700-235937/ SUHDAY - High scattered to broken clouds. Lower scat­

tered cumulus forming at 4000 feet by 13003W

becoming occasionally broken clouds, dissipating

by 1900317• Visibility 3 miles in fog becoming

6 miles or better by 1000EVJ. Surface winds

eastsourfcheast 4 l.'PH increasing to 10 KPH by

1200E7.

0000-2359EV/ IXNDAY - High scattered to high broken clouds with

stratus overcast forming at 800 feet by 04003V:

becoming broken at 1000 feet by 1100EW and 2500

feet by 1300EVJ. Lower clouds dissipating after

sunset. Occasional light rain showers during

afternoon. Visibility 3 miles in fog improving

to 7 miles by 1100EW. Surface winds southeast

5 I.-PH increasing to 15 FPII by 12OOEV7.

/ s / John H. Butler
/ T / JOHIT II. BUTLER
liajor, Air Corps
Staff l e a t h e r Officer
!f sl
DISTRIBUTION: A , "G",
MANEUVER
 M A N E U V E R

A ~)~P "MTi' — ' " ' n O C " ^ C ^ •'' P T •pl 1 UV3R HEADQUARTERS
th Carolina

23 September 1944

V7EATHER FORECAST

15001:77 September 23, 1944 to O3OOE77 September 24, 1944

SKY GC1TDITICITS - Zigh scattered clouds. Lower scattered clouds

at 15000 feet dissipating by sundown,

VISIBILITY - 7 miles,

SURFACE ,/I7:DS - East northeast 10 J7PH.

7/1HDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 FEET - Eastnortheast 18 ITE.

SUNDAY - High scattered clouds. Lower scattered clouds dissipating

by sundown. Visibility 4 miles In early morning ground

fog becoming unrestricted by 1000F/7, Surface winds East

4 fpll incrcx^Ing to 15 IPH by 12OOEV7,

I.OliDAY - High scattered to high broken clouds vrith stratus over­

cast forming at 007- foot by 0400E"/ becoming broken at

1000 foot jy 1100E7/ and 3000 foot by 1200E7/. Lower clcuc-3

dissipating by sunset. Visibllty 3 miles In fog improving

to 7 miles by lluOg.7. Surface winds East 5 L'PH increasing

to 15 1TII b--; 1200777.

/s/ John II, Butler

/ T / JOIIIT H. BUTLER
17a j or, Air Corps
Staff 'leather Officer
ISTRIBTJTICli
1.1 A 1: JJ I V i'!) -i

FROM HQ AAF WEA DIVN N5HN DC

TO CO 6OTH TROOP CARRIER wIN POPE FIELD FT BRAGG NC

REURAD DTD 13 SiSFTiMER FORidDtfST FOR FOPE FIELD FT BRAGG MAXTON NC AND V I C ­
INITY FOR 2 4 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 27 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWS

SEPT 24 AND 25 CLEAR TO SCATTluRnD CLOUDS N I T H VISIBILITY SIX MILES OR

GR^ATKR. SURFACE VJIND NORTHi/EST TEN TO FIFTEEN MILES PER HOUR BOTH DAY AND
NIGHT. '

26 BROKEN CLOUDS ABOVE TEN THOUSAND FEET ^JITH LCWER SCATTERED

CLOUDS AT FOUR TO SIX THOUSAND FEET DURING DAY. SURFACE WIIJDS NORTH TO
NGRTHEaST FIVE TO TEN i^ILES PER HOUR. OVERCAST ABOVE TEN THOUSAND FEET DUR­
ING NIGHT MTH SURFACE VJNDS NORTHEAST THREE TO SIX kILES PER HOUR.

SEPTEMBER 27 I-OiGH OVERCAST WITH BROKEN CLOUDS AT FOUR TO SIX THOUSAND FEET,
SURFACE MNDS NORTHEASTERLY FIVE TO TEN KLLES PER HOUR DAY AND NIGHT

B AS SETT
142O33Z
Forecast received from Washington at 1630 &} 23 September 1944

TONIGHT - clear. Visibility 6 miles or more.

SUNDAY - scattered clouds with v i s i b i l i t y 6 miles or more becoming high

broken clouds to hi<-,h overcast, scattered clouds at 4000 to 6000 f e e t .
Ceiling gradually lowering, to 4000 to 6000 feet by ni^ht with light rain
and v i s i b i l i t y decreasing to 4 to 5 miles.

• MOIDAY AH) MONDAY MIGHT - overcast at 4000 to 6000 feet with intermittent
l i - h t r a i n . Visibility 4 to 5 miles (The Washington Forecaster stated that
this is a very optimistic forecast that i t was quite possible to have low
stratus clouds down to 800 feet by 0400 i&tf Monday morning continuing u n t i l
near noon),

TUESDAY AM) TUJ33DAY NIGHT - scattered clouds at 4000 to 6000 feet. Visi­
b i l i t y 6 miles or more.

/S/JOHN H. BUTL3R
' t / JOHN H. BUTLER
Major, Air Corps
Staff Weather Officer
 FAFTnTnnr.p^^^^^^T?* 7 ••*' * "! ?«* fe

AIRBORNE-TROOP CKR^ITH rAITCUV'.R HEADQUARTERS

Camp F a c k a l l , N o r t h C a r o l i n a ­

24 September 1944

1000E:/ TO 2200K7 24 SEPTEI-'HER 1944

S11T COl'DITIOrS - Broken clouds to overcast at 6000 feet lower

scattered to broken clouds at 2500 feet. Occasional

light rain after 1300E";r.

VISIBILITY - 7 miles decreasing to 3 miles in rain.

SURFACE 7/HH) - BASTFORTEEAST 15 ITE.

7INDS .ALOFT UP TO 3000 FEET - 70 degrees 20 ITH at 1000 feet

becoming 95 degrees 25 TTH at 3000 feet.

2200EW 24. SEr'iTCITCR TO 23OOS-/7 25 SEPT5I13ER 1944

SKY COFDITIONS - Broken clouds to overcast at 6000 feet lower

scattered to broken clouds at 2500 feet becoming

overcast at 800 feet by 0300EW and 1500 feet by

123OE'tf lowering again to 1000 feet by 2000EW.

Occasional driszle or light rain until 1000EW.

VISIBILITY - 5 miles decreasing to 3 miles by 0300EW improv­

ing to 6 railes by IIOOS'Y.

SURFACE 'CTFDS - East 2 ITT-I increasing to 12 ITE by 1100S7

decreasing to 3 I,TH by 2000E"'f.

/ s / John E. Butler,

/t/ JOHN H. BUTLER,

Fa j or, Ai r Corps,

Staff Weather Officer

tf Tf
DISTRI3UTI0F: A

' «bc .
 AIRBORNE-TROO1" CARRIER LIAMEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Kackall, North Carolina

24 September 1944*

WEATHER FORECAST

1800EW 24 SEPTEMBER TO 0600EW 25 SEPTSi^BSR 1944

SIT CCIDITIONS - Broken clouds at 5000 feet becoming scattered

clouds by 23OOEW and overcast at 800 feet by 0400EW.

VISIBILITY - 7 miles decreasing to 4 miles by 0400EW.

SURFACE WIND - Northeast 14 ITH'decreasing to 8 NPH by 2200EW.

WINDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 FEICT - Eastnortheast 20 MFH.

i
0600EW to 2400EW 25 SEPTET "HER 1944

SIT CONDITIONS - Overcast at 800 feet becoming broken clouds

.at 1000 feet 'by 1000EV and 1500 feet by 1130EW.

VISIBILITY - 4 miles improving to 7 miles by 1000ET7.

SURFAC2 "/IND3 - Northeast 8 KPH increasing to 10 NPH by

1100Ev7.

WINDS ALCTT UP TO 3000 FEET - East IS LTE.

/s/ Pchi: H. Butler

/ t/ ,OH:v II. BUTLER,

Nrox", Air Corps,

f-? Weather Officer,

ft TT

DISTRIBUTION: A , »G".

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER NANEUVNR HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

24 September 1944

WEATHER FORECAST

2200SW 24 SSPTENBER TO 1000EW 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

SKY CONDITIONS - Overcast at 3000f occasionally broken,

lowering to 2000 f by 0600EW. Stratus over­

cast will form at 800f by 0400EW becoming
broken at 1000 f by 1000SW.

VISIBILITY - 6 niles decreasing to 4 niles by 0400ii;*V

and improving to 7 miles by lOOOE'.T.

SURFACE "7IFD - Northeast at 10 1TH decreasing to 5 LTH by

0600E7.
WINDS ALOFT U? TO 3000 • - Northeast at 15 1*TH.

lOOOS'V.to 2400SW 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

SKI CONDITIONS - Broken stratus at 1000/ will dissipate by

1130SW with broken alotcu at 8000 f . Few

scattered cu at 5000T by 1300EW and dis­

sipating by sunset.

VISIBILITY - Greater than 6 miles for period.

SURFACE WIND - Sastrxortheast at 5 iTH increasing to 12

NPH by 1100EW and decreasing to 6 by 2300EW,

WINDS ALOFT UP TO 3000f - East at 18 ITH.

/ s / John K. Butler

/t/ JOHN E. BUTLER,

Major, Air Corps,

Staff T7eather Officer.

?T ?
DISTRIBUTION: "A", G \

 MLKSUVE

AIRBORNE-TROOP O.',

CampliBokMj

25 September 1944

WSaTHSR FORECAST

14OOEY/ to 2400E7I 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

OILY CONDITIONS - Broken clouds at 6000 feet; lower scattered to

brolzen clouds at 2500 feet dissipating by 190037,

VISIBILITY - Unrestricted decreasing to 6 miles by 2300E7*

3URFACS V/IND - Northeast 4 MPE becoming eastsoutheast by 2300E17.

T
.miD3 AIJOFT UP TO 3000 IEET - Northeast 10 iffiH.

0000SW to 1200K/ 26 SEPTEI.33EH 1944

3KT C0ND1TI0FS - Broken clouds at 6000 feet,

VISIBILITY - 6 miles decreasing to 4 miles o^r 04001?// improving to

7 miles by 0900EI/V

xxGE 7/T:TD - Eastsoutheast 4 IIPH becoming southeast 8 I.£PH by

'7ETDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 T3ET - N o r t h e a s t 10 tfEE b e c o m i n s s o u t h e a s t

10 !M: by 10001T./,

/s/JOIIN H. BUTISR

/t/JOIIF H. BUTLER

I.feLJor, .air Corps

Staff V/eather Officer

;f
DISTRIBUTION:
A<% WGT?

 AIRB0PJST3-TR00P CARRIER 1OTEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp l&clcall, North Carolina

25 September 1944

1;
/EATEER FORECAST

O60OE17 to leOOWJ 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

•MVI COITDITICFS - Clouds at 3000 feet variable between scattered

and overcast with occasional patches of drizzle

becoming scattered clouds at 5000 feet by 13002T.T

(however there is still a possibility of an

overcast at 700 feet forming near daybreak)

VISI3ILI.iT - 6 miles lowering to 3 miles by 0700©/ and improving

to 6 miles by 1000 El"/ and unrestricted after 1200EVJ,

SURFACE T/HTD - Northnortheast 5 I£PH increasing gradually to 12

I.3PH by i

•:/HTDS ALOFT UJ? TO 3000 FEET - N o r t h e a s t 18 MPH.

1800EV/ to 2400EV/ 25 3EPTELBER 1944

SIO" CONDITIONS - S c a t t e r e d clouds w i l l d i s s i p a t e by 2000EV/.

VISIBILITY - G r e a t e r than 6 m i l e s .

JUEIJACE 7/HTD - N o r t h e a s t 12 IIPH decreasing to 8 MFH by end of

period,
Tr
IND3 A10FT UP TO 3000 FEET - East 18 IIPH.

/s/JOHN H. BUTI^R
A/JOHN H. BUTLER
I&jor, Air Corps
S t a f f Weather Officer
DISTRIBUTION: ;f
A;f, *•'&>
 25 September 1944

WEATHER FORECAST

0200X7 to '1400 X7 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

SKY CONDITIONS - Clouds at 5000 feet varying from scattered to

overcast and gradually clearing over entire area

by 0300X7 beconing overcast at"700 feet by 0400

377 which will break and rise to 1000 feet by

0900X7 and dissipating by 1130X7.

VISIBILITY - 6 miles decreasing to 3 miles near 0700X7 improving

to 5 miles by O9OOX7 a:id to 8 miles by 1200X7.

3URUACE WINDS - Northeast 8 ICPH increasing to 12 KPH by 1000X7.

'rIND3 ALOT^T UP TO 3000 TEST - East 20 IIPH.

1400X7 to 340027 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

SKY CONDITIONS - Scattered clouds at 5000 feet becoming clear

by 2000X7.

VISIBILITY - 8 :ailes decreasing to 6 miles by end of period.

SURFACE 7IND - Eastnortheast 12 IIPH decreasing to 10 MFH by end

of period.

WINDS ALOET UP TO 3000 FJLiiT - E a s t 18 IIPH.

/a/JOHN H. BUTLER

/t/JOHN E . BUTLER.

L^ajor, Air Corps

Staff Weather Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

 If $*§£ ™(
:
\ •

AIRBOKS-TROOP CARRIiiR JlONIi^VSR KeiADQ^JARTERS

Camp M a c k a l l , N o r t h C a r o l i n a

25 September 1944

FORECAST

2000SVi 25 September To O8OOS3T 26 September 1944.

SKI CONDITION: Clear

VISIBILITY: 7 miles lowering to 4 by 0700S'..: and to 3 i n l o c a l patches

of ground, fog. ( V i s i b i l i t y a t Camp Mackall occasionally
2 miles i n dust caused by heavy a i r c r a f t t r a f f i c ) .
SURFACE vVIIfflS: Northeast a t 4 becoming calm near midnight.

illlTDS ALOFT lit' TO 3000 FSET: Northeast a t 4 IEH' becoming South-southeast

a t 8 M£'H by end of p e r i o d .

C800S* 26 September to 2C003A 25 September 1944

&KY CONDITIONS: Clear with s c a t t e r e d to broken clouds a t 4000 feet after

llOGlir/*, beginning to d i s s i p a t e by end of p e r i o d .

VISIBILITY: 4 miles improving to u n r e s t r i c t e d a f t e r 0930B.-J.

SURFACE, OTD: Southeast a t 4 MPE i n c r e a s i n g to 10 MFH by 110BW.

ALOFT Up TO 3000 FiHT; South-southeast a t 8 WE i n c r e a s i n g to

12 MPH a f t e r 12002.W.

/s/ John H. Butler

JOHN H. BUTLER,

Major, Air Corps,

DISTREBTION: tf
Aw , W
G"' Staff 'Weather Officer,

MAN3UV

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MM2UVER HEADQUARTERS

Gamp Mackall, North C a r o l i n a

26 September 1944

FORECAST

1000SW 26 September 1944 To 2200EW 26 September 1944.

SKY CONDITION: High broken with lower scattered to broken clouds at 2500'

forming by 1300EW and dissipating by 1900SW.

VISIBILITY: 4 m i l e s due to haze and smoke improving t o 6 m i l e s by 1200SW.

SURFACE WIND: Southeast a t 3 m i l e s p e r hour i n c r e a s i n g to 6 MEH by 13003W

and d e c r e a s i n g t o 3 Mill by end of p e r i o d .

WINDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 f FEET: South a t 10 MEH a t 1000 f e e t and s h i f t i n g t o

west a t 10 MPH a t 2000 and 3000 f e e t .

2200EE8f 26 September 1944 To 1000BW 27 September 1944.

SKY CONDITION: High s c a t t e r e d t o broken becoming high o v e r c a s t by end of d

period. "^

VISIBILITY: G r e a t e r than 6 m i l e s d e c r e a s i n g to 3 miles by 0600EW i n smcko

and ground fog, i n c r e a s i n g t o 4 m i l e s by end of p e r i o d .

SURFACE WIND: S o u t h e a s t a t 3 MHi d e c r e a s i n g to calm by m i d n i g h t .

WINDS ALOFT UP TO 3000 ISET: Southwest a t 15 MPH.

/s/ John Hc B u t l e r ,
JOHN Ho BUTLER, •
Major, A i r Corps,
S t a f f Weather O f f i c e r .

DISTRIBUTION. "A" , "Gw .

i
 — MAXTON—MACKALL — LUMBERTON— KNOLLWOOO AREAS

• N. LATITUDE — 79 # W. LONGITUDE EASTERN WAR TIME

•ana* a mam*Q BNDINO BNI)IN<i F.NDTf!-";

A S T K M M - mwnon Qftt CIVIL NAUTICAL ASTRONOMi
1944 MIL ' wnnr 90RSBT TrflUWT TW1LKHT ICAL UOOVRJSE V'XWFT
P'A'E
CF
TWILJfVT
nation
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0534
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06*
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06*?
WO
1942
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2035

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?100
1916

1959
0506

0620 \j •'•••»•

0555 0100 Ottf 0690 mo 2006 2032 2058 2039 0 7 3 •»

0
4 0535 0100 Ott5 0650 1939 2005 2031 2057 2.117 <X4S
0
5 0536 0601 0626 0651 1938 200U 2030 2056 ?1«U» 095^
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6 0537 0602 0627 0652 1936 ?002 2028 2054 2233 1104
0
7
8
053*
0538
0603
0603
0628
0628
0653
0653
1935
193?
2001

1959
2027

2025
2053

P051
2312

2355
1211

1316
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9 0539 0604 0629 0654 193? 1958 PO24 2TK0 — 1417

10 0540 O6O5 O630 0655 1931 1<>57 X»23 2049 00/, 1 1S15 1
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2047 0129 1607
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« 0541 0606 0631 O656 1926 1954 0222 16%

L l3 0542 0607 0632 0657 1926 1952 .1018 ?0i4 0316 1735 f
• l4 0543 0608 0633 O658 19 ?5 1951 ?017 2043 0411 1813
i
l5 0543 0608 0633 0658 1923 1949 2015 2041 0507 1847 f
1 16 054V, 0609 0634 0659 1922 1948 2014 2040 0602 1918 i
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05/47 061? 0637 070? 1016 1942 ?oo8 2034 0941 2115

21 ov 4 ft 0613 0638 0703 101? 1941 ­ 2007 2033 1037 2147 §

22 o%o o*n - O6?9 0704 1913 1939 ron«; 2031 . 1134 za?
23 0549 0614 0639 070/* 191? 193ft 12^2 2302. 0
24 O55O 0615 O640 0705 1911 1937 rooj : n29 i?n 23^8
€)
25 0S51 0616 0641 0706 1909 1934 1959 20 24 1428 — ©'••••'
26 0^51 06U 0706 lOOfl 193 1 l<Htf 1-023 1524 0041 t)
1 27 061? 0642 0707 1906 1931 1956 JX121 1616 ouo 0
# 28 0618 O643 0708 1905 19^0 lQ^ 4 . 2020 . 1705 0245 0
29 0?«-4 0*19 0644 0?09 1<JO? 19* 1953 .VIA 1749 035s o-
30 O555 0620 0645 0710 l°>o.: 1Q;>7 19 r ^ .X>17 1830 OfO6
0
 arp racbali, ITorth Carolina

30 SoptcmbGr 1944

31™;J3GT: Report on Con::- uiilcatlons for AB-TG ranouvor for 13th

Airborpe Division - Airborne Phase.

TC : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier 1'aneuver, Gamp

Factual Data ;

1. On 23 August 1941, GG, AGF, directed a maneuver be held

24th September to" 7th October 1944 for Joint Training of 13th

Airborne Division.

2. Effective immediately a Laneuvcr staff was formed on a

Task Force basis, including Airborne, Air, and Ground Force re­
presentatives, and staff planning ye-an.

3. A Signal Section vr-as forr.:cd consisting of:

A •! -^1 • ~-n v-. -, _ T J- :"l r l !.' n l ff^-r^r^ T' T> T> ti :••-, r! +" Q "1 (T P A T T» —

i i i i iJol iiu — XJ V • L-e x • i U.L1 O i U J. • ...,X o^-KJ. o , O-L^£, O^ i-iXX ""

borne Center.

Air - fnjcr Lori Helchcr, A » C , I Troop Carrier

Ground - ra lor. Jehu II. Diuguid, SIg C , XXII Corps.

4. The Signal Staff functioned on a cooperative basis with

Lt. Col. Brandt actin-; as coordinator overall for signal and com­
munications natters, "responsibilities of the Signal Staff were then

divi'-ioa according to Airborne, Air, and Ground functions. How­

ever, in case of Airborne and Ground officers the responsibili­
ties v/crc complicated because of divided responsibilities be­
tween Airborne Center and XXII Corps in relation to the training

of the 13th Airborne Division, i.e., Airborne Center having Air­

borne training responsibilities only, and XXII Corps having Sup­
ply and Administration responsibilities together with Ground

training of the division. The final allocation of these responsi­

bilities were as fellows;

a. Airborne Signal Officer;

(1) Communication planning, supervision, and ex­

ecution of necessary action concerning require­
ments to accomplish cemmuniction between Task

Force Headquarters, AB-TC Headquarters at de­

parture fields and satellite departure fields,

XXII Corps •Headquarters, and the 13th Airborne

DIvis icn which la:ided In the des 11naticn zone.

(2) preparation of Joint Signal Operation Instruc­

tions for lanouver.

(3) Coordination of Airborne, Air, and Ground Sig­

nal matters,

b• Air Comn-unictlcn Officer :

(1) Communications planning, supervision, instal­

lation, and operation of communication facili­
ties In connection with requirements for I

Troop Carrier Command units involved In the air

transport, parachute drop, glider landing, air

landing, rosupply, and evacuation for the 13th

- 1 ­
Report on Communications fcr AB-TC Faneuvcr for 13th Airborne

Division - Airborne phase (ccnt'd)

Airborne Division, Installation and operation

of teletype equipment and message center at

1,'ancuver Headquarters.

c. Ground Signal Officer:

(1) Task Force communication plans for XXII Corps

in Task Force command nets.

(2) XXII Corps Signal plans for ground phase of

maneuver including Corps SOI.

(3) Umpire communication requirements including

supplies.

(4) Initial supply and rosupply requirements for

13th Airborne Division in maneuver.

5. After the Task Force Signal Section was formed in order

to obtain a meeting of minds, a conference was called which was

attended by all interested Signal and Communications personnel,

principally the Task Force Signal Staff; 60th TO Wing Communi­

cations Staff; 13th AB Division Signal Officer; XXII Corps I\'.an­
cuvcr Signal Officer and 1st Tactical Air Command by proxy in

that the Task Force Communications Officer fcr Air expressed re­
commendations for these requirements. The net result of this con­
ference and subsequent conferences wore that differences were

ironed out and a Joint Signal Operation Instructions was evolved.

6. Although requests were made for a full T« 0. and E.

strength Signal Operation Company and Signal Construction Light

'Company, together Yrith other equipment essential to the operation

of a Task Force type communication system., which personnel and

equipment according to doctrine are to be furnished bj GIIQ or

Theater, there was furnished to the Air Communication Officer

only sixty (60) miscellaneous specialists fcr operating purposes

and no extra equipment. This meant the burden of making up

shortages in personnel and equipment fell on the 60th Troop Car­

rier 7ing, the 349th and the 1st provisional Troop Carrier Groups,

This added burden en the 60th Troop Carrier V/ing and Groups was

later doubled by a command decision to base the Groups at POPE

and LAOEALL FIELDS and operate out 1.AXT0E and LUT.BERTG::. There­
fore, signal equipment which had been counted on to move with the

Groups to the fields from which they would operate,.had to be

divided leaving part at their bases and talcing the balance to the

departure fields. Because of this, airplanes were priority flown

to Atlanta for signal equipment; also wire had to bo borrowed

from 85th Signal Operation Battalion.

7. Fortunately for the condition which existed per the above

paragraph, the 85th Signal Operation Battalion with equipment was

made available for the umpire communication system and corps in­
stallations* Due to the excellent spirit of cooperation within

Task Force Signal Officers Section, resources and equipment were

pooled and critical situations were alleviated. Air Corps radio

equipment for 1'anouvor Headquarters stations were installed and

operated by personnel from 85th Signal Operation Battalion and

in turn some of their equipment was used at AB-TC Headquarters

(l.AXTOr) and operated by Air Corps personnel.

<->• Task Force Communication System;

T
a. 7ire ;

(1) In addition to army communications systems, com­

mercial wire facilities were leased for the Air­
- P. ­
Report on Communications for AB^TC I'aneuvcr for 13th.Airborne

Division - Airborne phase (ccnt'd)

borno phase of the maneuvers. The initial fac­

ilities contracted for wore:

3 - Pull period telephone trunk lines from AB­

TC Headquarters at CAI'.P KACKALL to AB-TC

Headquarters at LAXTOIT AIR BASE.

2 - Full period teletype trunk linos, MACKALL

to r.AXTuI:.

1 - Pull period telephone trunk lino, LACKALL

to GOth TC rJing Headquarters, FORT BRAGG.

2 - Pull period telephone trunk lines, AB-TG

Headquarters (LAXTOU) to 349th TC Group at

POPE FIELD.

2 - Full period teletype trunk lines, KAXTCN

to POPS FIELD.

2 - Full period telephone trunk linos, AB-TC

Headquarters (HAXTGH) to 1st provisional

TC Group for Operations out of LI;1.B3RT0N.

2 - Full period teletype; trunk lines, KAXTCN

CO J-JUI -:..'iii.L t'X '\J i: •

(2) Later, 21 September 1944, when it was known 1st

Composite Tactical Group v/as to be based at

POPS FIELD, one (1) more full period talking

circuit was emergency leased between AB-TG

maneuver Headquarters I.-ACiCALL and FORT BRAGG,

which was in turn extended to -the 349th TC

Group switchboard. This last r.inutc arrival

did not pcrr--.it as good telephone service to the

Tactical Air Officer as would have been avail­

able If their base was known at the"tine of the

original planning.

(3) Since 1st provisional TO Group was based at

mAOHALL two (2) teletypewriters and linos wore

extended fror AB-TG l.'.aneuver Headquarters to

take care of that unit.

c. Radio;

(1) Task Force radio not consisted of two nets, a

Ccnmand Hot Ho. 1 for all tactical traffic and

Coniiand H,,t r o . 2 for G-2 Intelligence and Ad­

ministrative traffic. Stations in the net were:

2 - S0R-c99's (or equivalent) at AB-TG Haneuvcr

Headquarters (Task Force), 1.A0KALL.

2 - S0R-390ts (or equivalent) at AB-TC Head­

quarters, I AXTOH departure field.

2 - SCR-490's jeep rcunted flown In by glider

for 13th Airborne Division Headquarters In

destination zone.

(XXII Gorps was wired In by telephone and

teletype to Fanouvcr Headquarters and being

physically located In Faneuvcr Headquarters

building, radio was not used.)

(2) Task Force Headquarters was HGS station in both

nets.

Report On Communications for AB-TC Bneuvor for 13th Airborne

Division - Airborne Phase (cent'a)

(3) 1st TAG had two (2) Air Command Parties with

radio equipment• One AC? was attached to 13th

Airborne Division and the other stayed with

Task Force (Fancuver) Headquarters.

(4) Radio silence was imposed on the Troop Carrier

Aircraft and 13th Airborne Division in the air

movement until initial landing. It is inter­

esting to note that emergencies arose necessi­
tating the serials in flight to break radio si­
lence ;

(a) Take-off accident in which a C-47 broke

silouc
to indicate landing en another

silence
field.

(b) C-47 which became lost and asked for homing

information.

(c) Reports of crash.

(5) Pathfinder personnel scheduled to jump in one

hour prior to main forces were in some cases

delayed. The IP pathfinder take-off was said

to be fifteen minutes late and in the jump the

men were scattered so that it took about twenty

minutes to organize and they were just about

able to turn the equipment on ten minutes be­

fore arrival of first serial.

d. Fes son'-;or t

(1) Fessender service to departure airfields was by

liaison airplane and was well used. Two

scheduled runs per day were normal and on sev­

eral occasions additional special flights were

rr.de. This vras supplemented by motor messenger

or special occasion and in event of bad weather.

(2) In addition to tactical messenger service Fan­

cuvor Headquarters delivered a mail pouch from

13th Airborne Division Headquarters (FACKALL)

to the division in bivouac at F.AXTOII. Seme

confusion ensued from this in that the Division

called on the ".7ing message centers to do some

sorting and distribution for the Division.

This was refused in that it is not a message

center function, nor were they equipped to do

so.

(3) pigeons wore supplied to the 13th A / B Division

frcr. Task Force and Corps Headquarters. One

hundred and ton birds wore supplied. Eleven

tactical no ssages wore flown back to Task Force

and thirty-seven tactical ressages flown to

Corps. !To pigeons were lost doing cemmunica­

ticn work. Throe wore killed and two Injured

injured in parachuting.

9. Fancuvor Headquarters Organization:

ranouvor headquarters had superimposed en it the

tactical XXII Corps headquarters which was confusing to

message center ©Deration and to seme extent Task Force

Report on Communications for AB-TC ranouvop for 13th Airborne

Division - Airborne phase (cont!d)

Staff and Corps Staff, particularly the Ground Task

Force Staff in that they served in dual capacites i.e.,

Task Force Ground Staff during first phase and XXII

Corps Staff in later stages of airborne phase. It be­

came necessary to sot up a separate XXII Corps message

center adjacent to Task Force message center to straight

en this out.

10. AD-TC 1,'aneuver Headquarters (LAXTOIv):

Organization at this headquarters was not in ac­

cordance with doctrine, which states that AB and TC

staffs shall operate jointly and in same areas, prefer­

ably same offices. The 13th Airborne Division Head­
quarors and 60th TC Wing Headquarters operated fairly

close together although in separate buildings. The

Group staff and Combat Team staffs were however on op­

posite sides cf the airfields so that close liaison

could not be effected.

11. Communications:

a. in general, communications for this maneuver was

excellent and in consideration cf miscellaneous

type cf operating personnel- thrown together to op­

erate the system, much, credit for holding delays In

transmission of messages and violation of procedure

to a minimum was due to energetic action of super­

vising personnel.

b. Ulthin the loth Airborne Division communication was

observed to be excellent. Staff appreciation, on

all levels, of the capabilities cf the system was

only fair and staff preparation of messages in do-

tails, together with effecting security concerning

the same could have been improved. It was observed

that initiation cf verbal or written requisitions fo

fresh batteries cr other signal supplies by lower

units, companies end battalions, was net prompt al­

though tho Division signal company had brought''in

seventeen tons of signal supplies,

c. Closing cut of Task Force nets was not prompt in

that Division roar echelon at rAXTCTT did not noti­

fy tho Maneuver Headquarters when they had dis­
placed and Task Force did not confirm promptly to

Force Signal Officer in order to release and close

Task Force communication facilities. 1-Iets could

have boon closed 0500 D+4 instead of 1 3 ^ D+4.

12. For further detailed Information concerning signal

plans for this maneuver refer to tho following:

a. Paragraph 5 cf Field Order -//I.

b. Signal Annex i'-l to F. 0. #1.

c
A3-TC I aucuvor Signal Operation Instructions.

d. Separate reports by 60th TC Wing and 13th Airborne

Division Signal Officers.

o. Umpire signal report.

- 5 ­
Report en Communications for AB-TC I'aneuvcr for 13th Airborne

Division - Airborne phase (ccnt'd)

f. Ground Signal Officers reports on supplies required,

13. A statistical report, inclosure two, gives details on

personnel, messages handled, and equipment for the Task

Force Headquarters.

•*-'* • Conclusions •

a. Task Force communications in this maneuver were ex­

cellent considering all factors involved.

b. Task Force Headquarters radio station should remain

rTet Control Station in that emergencies may arise

in serials in flight which require breaking radio

silence•

c. Scattered drop of parachute elements prevented op­

eration personnel fro;;, raking an early location of

ccnminicaticns equipment and thus delayed getting

in Task Force Command net by two hours. This was

also true for battalions where some communications

bundles could not be located until daylight thus pre­

venting Bn.nots getting in operation until daylight.

d. During the air movement, there was a period when

responsibilities cf command were divided between

Task Force and XXII Corps Commanders in relation

to 13th Airborne Division causing confusion in cor­

rect renting of traffic. This was further compli­
cated with XXII Corps Headquarters being superim­
posed on Task Force Headquarters.

15. Recommendations:

a. It is recommended:

(1) That an overall Force Signal Officer be appointed

who is free to coordinate the operation cf Sig­

nal Section and make decisions for the same.

(2) That at least sixty days prior planning time be

allowed in which signal matters ray bo coordin­

ated and requisitions for supplies, be initiated.

(3) That a Lanouver Signal Property Officer be add­

ed to account for Signal Supplies.

(4) That a Signal Umpires Section be added to um­

pire s igiia 1 activities.

(5) That sufficient signal troops and equipment bo

attached to Task Force Headquarters in accord­

ance with doctrine so as to relievo the Wing(s)

involved in moving the Airborne Division of

responsibilities of departure area communi­

cations for the Task Force and AB-TC Headquar­
ters and satellite fields.

(S) That closely coordinated Joint Signal Operation

Instructions as was used for this maneuver bo

favorably considered in future operations.

(7) That a clean cut transfer cf command control

responsibility be established between Task Force

Commander and combat zone control (in this case

- 6 ­
Report on Communications, for AB-TC Maneuver- for 13th Airborne

Divis ion - Airborne PhasQ (cont *d)

a Corps) Commander preferably-at that time

when the Airborno Division has completed its

air movement and closed, instead of piece-meal

parts of the division coming under Corps con­

trol as they land.

(8) That elements of the Signal Company- form a

complete Advance Division Command pest signal

team, and go in with the first Regimental Com­

bat Teams for early control and organization

purposes.

(9) That in maneuvers administrative motor messen­

ger service for telegrams and nail be intern­
ally arranged for by the Division Adjutant be­
tween the Division bivouac area in camp and

departure fields and in forward area when

landed.

(10) That ';7ing fixed direction finding facilities

stand by sc as to give bearings to aircraft

who become lost in the maneuver, and the

SCR-274 Ccr.in-.and set be reserved for-this pur-

P O S G •

Lt. Col. LULFCRD I-... DRAiiDT,

Signal Corps, Airborne Sig C

I'ajor 1.3RL BELCHER, AC

Air Communication Officer

raj or JCIilT II. DIUGUID,

CM ^ n^
o J- ,;_\ • \J <-> •

3 inols Ground Signal Officor.

incl #1 SCI
incl Statistical •P +-.
incl M?, -r,igeon RG

- 7 ­
 SISIIAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

Authentication
1-1 AB-TC Maneuver Hq
Cajnp Mac kail, IT C
15 September 1944

Effective EWT 23 Sep 44

The following Signal Operating Instructions are issued for

use by units participating in Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuvers.

All items are effective on the date and at the time shown. When

ohanges to these instructions are issued by this headquarters, the

SOI item that has been superseded -.,111 be withdrawn and destroyed

by burning.

DALBSY

OFFICIAL: A

V 1 \\

G-3

DISTRIBUTION: (s)

Item 1-1 Page 1

£;
; X

 MANEUVER-j

SIG-IUL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

Index t o S. o. i .

2 - 1

AB-TC M a n e u v e r Hq
Camp M a c k a l l , N C
15 September 1944
Effective 0001 SW1
T23 Sep 44

SERIAL EFFECTIVE DATE

ITEM NO. TITLE NUMBER CURRENT ISSUEj

GENERAL

1
Authentication 1
23 Sept 1944
2
Index 1
23 Sept 1944
3
General Instructions 1
23 S e p t 1944
4
Distribution nSn for S.O.I, 1
23 Sept 1944

CODES AND CIPHERS

5
Cipher Keys f o r M-209 1
23 Sept 1944

6
Map Template Code 1
23 Ser;t 1944

7
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Panel Code 1
23 Sept 1944

8
P r e - a r r a n g e d Message Code 1
23 Sept 1944

9
B r e v i t y code 1
23 Sept 1944

10
P y r o t e c h n i c Code 1
23 Sept 1944

11
Smoke Marking P a t t e r n Code 1
23 Sept- 1944

12
Message A u t h e n t i c a t o r Code 1
23 Sept 1944

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

13
Radio Frequency and Call Assignments 1
23 Sept 1944

14
Pathffnder 1
To be issued.

WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

15
Telephone and Teletype D i r e c t o r y 23 Sept 1944

MISCELLi£O0US

16
"Visual, Sound, and Warning S i g n a l s 1
23 Sept 1944

17
Vehicle I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Code. 1
23 Sept 1944

DilBSY:

OPFICIAL:
• (

TOSH,

DISTRIBUTION: (S)

2-1

Page 1 of

1 page.

 Si

£#

IIETOJCTIOIB
3-1
AB-TC Ila ^
Camp Ifctckall, II.C.
15 Sepbcnbcp l$l)k
Sfft^tive $ ^ ETfT 23 September 19kh

1, ' GE1ERAL: f
"' a. Local tirje zone "Q" TTLH be used. \

t . Pre-plan and t/ritb out subject natter to be tr&nsnittod in t e l e ­

pfconb and radiophone clear conversation so that eneny* derives l i t t l e iiiforn­
:
a t i o n . . . ' • •••'•:•;•'• ' ..:'. •'. .. •• ;• ~ ' '•

i ' - . j •
c. Authentication by I&ny Authentication S^sten Ho. 2 r a i l bo used*.
2. CRIPTOCfiAPfHC SECUTJTI; ' •. ' '

a. IThen capture i s . ii-mincnt,' codes rriHl be destroyed and the ex­

ternal and internal indicators of the converter 11-209 vrill be neutralized be­
fore destruction. \ . •
' x b., If copies; of codes or ciphers become l o s t , captured or conpro­
raised,'innaediate report Tdll be nade to the next higher headquarters*.
" c.. in &!}$•. ponnrunicaticn, proper, names of persons, torms, atrcatis,
and localities, m i l HOT be use(J. Offi-eial Designations m i l be used to
idofntifjr individuals* Pro-arranged Hess^o. Code, or Tlap Cordinato Codes v i l l
"be used to identify l o c a l i t i e s , etc. "
3. RADIO CO:I0
a. Powert . Amount of pov/er used, held,to 'a'minimum for r e l i a b l e
N y
communication. . ',. • '

b. Security: ' , . ^ ~ . • •

(1) Relieving units ifi)& - U & G over thecall signs or names

and frequencies of relieved ur4.tc» ' . • >•

(2) Tactical frequencies- are COIIPIDBIITI/Xand direct mention

(
of these frequencies trill not,be r^ade in'the clear. Tfhcn

discussing in theclear, make reference to currentSOI

, •' .' Item Code group forthat frequency. •'

• ' < \ ' . . . . • • . - . ' ; ,

c. Durir.g radio^ gilpnep under tactical conditions, IDS stations

act as "interceptlt /stations on their onr 2-hd nearby frequondies copying

all transmissions heard. (Co'pips to go to G / A - 2 and 'S~2 sections •)

d. .Special Ai\3T Frcquohcies^; FolloT-dng radio frequencies have

been assigned to h*iF forthe special purposes noted:

$00 KG International M s tress Frequency. Normally should

bo used at sea. .

3-X .

M.A U-S'tr-V.lS.'jl
•Mv J mm f$m M W •*•» «v^ mmn -m*p
 H A H E 2 V E R - .. "L- 5 T R I C T E "B

£36 KC Emergency Honiiig« Uniycrsal "honing" frequencies * '

17U2 <KC to bo used rritn 3CR--19i or SCR-183 t r a n s m i t t e r s or
s i n i l a r oquipncnt, i n cases of emergency Trherc radio
ranges or standard honing agencies arc not a v a i l a b l e .
These frequencies nay likoTti.se be used r/ith radio 1 '
conpass SCIW26£ and radio s o t SCR-287 or similar
e<£uipnent for honing between planes and" t r a i n i n g of
' crews i n the geiidrcl p r a c t i c e of honing*. Use of
those frequencies i s subject to causing'no i n t e r f e r ­
ence to other services•

3000 KC Conbined Scene og Action contact or coordinating

frequency !AJf (voice) enission-. This frequency'" i s
to be employed only as an dnergency o r . l a s t r e s o r t
f frequency for intercommunication a t scene of action
•' Tjhere i t has been ::r:ocsiblo to arraiige a coordinated
: • intercommunication ;::>lan of a c t i o n . This frequency
• i s not to be used for any required cormunications
for ivhich an operational plan has been established
. ­ .-., o-xcept T'hero oquipjapiit l i m i t a t i o n s pernit' no a l t e r - ­
• ; n a t i v e . In order t o prevent i n t e r f e r e n c e , no other
/ frequency trLth 10 kilocycles of this-channel *,dll
be used by the iirr.^/ Air Forces 3 nor r d l l t h i s f r e -
quency be used for other purposes/
3105 KG National Calling nrf. ^forking frequency. For use by
a l l classes' of'cJ.reJa£^# Hay be used by Amy c d r ­
craft not equipped to t r a n s n i t on ulj.95 Kilocycles,
. o r rrhen the use of .'ill-?!? Kilocycles i s impracticable.
.-••...- (Reference; - AAF Ptegulation :Jo.- \00-k).

he2Z0 KC Amy AiiTTayg S t a t i o n s . Calling and TiorldLng f r e ­

quency to a i r c r a f t . Use r o c t r i c t c d . n o r n a l l y to A3
• • (voice) enission only. (References; AAF Regulation
. Ho, 100-h,)
Uh9$ KC Universal teiy Aircraft- c a l l i n g frequency. Far-use
;
- i n c a l l i n g a i r i>o ground. Ifot to be used for i n t e r -
plane o r t a c t i c a l corjiunieaiion. Restricted n o m a l ­
x l y to A3 (voice) 01:11ssion. (Reference: AAI? Regula­
tion No. 100~Iu)

KC. /oriy Air^yaft ,rAlr.vr.f> q * lion-tactical calling" and

TTorlcing 'frequency -bo 'airiTays- ground s t a t i o n s *
Restricted nori-ially -oo -X (CTT) erassion. (Reference
•''••• AAF Regulation I-o. L00-Iu )
6210 KC n a t i o n a l .Calling "and forking rrcquonc^. For use
: . by a l l claGses of a i r c r a f t . I lay be used by
Aircraft not equipped t o t r a n s n i t on hh9$ Ici
- or Trhen the uso^of kh9$ kilocycles ic'inpracticablo.
• - ; (Reference: iW Regulation IIo. 1004;,) •

8200 KC Calling and 'Tforleing Frequency. For co::munication to

or fron aircraft to /jrny'AirrTays Stations. Intended
for use only Trhc^'o coraunication coxiditions najr r e ­
q u i r e t h e enploynent of a higher frequency than Ij.ij.95
or liS95 kilocycles for satisfactory air-ground cor.>­
nunication. Restricted to Al "(CTJ) ojiicj
, . (Reference: AAF Regulation lib. 100-U.)

":- .; .^ ' Pago 2 of

C.'. ' •' •xl

 I l A H E U Y E R - i

KC Universal Airways Stations or Aircraft. Calling

and Tiorking frequency for corxrunications to Army

Airrcay* Intended ":>,:r use only Tjhere communication

conditions nay require the use of a higher frequency

than kk9$ or k$9$ ldJLocycles for satisfactory'' 'air»­

ground communication. Restricted to Al (C1T) emission,

km TEIEPHOIE COIIIUTJICATIOIJ:

a. /JJL available virc equipment T-i.ll bo installed and put in

use as soon as the situation permits.

b. Official Designations and Directory nanos Tri.ll be used,

rather than proper names of individuals or organizations,

c. Messages "id.ll be r/ritten out to reduce load on lines and

preserve "security".

d. Alvrays "ring off" after ucing a field telephone, so the cir­

cuit nay be released.

e. In using cornercial tclopl"o:.,o and telegraph facilities, ad­

here to routines proscribed by such companion or tlxc c embodied' in special

ins true tio ns.

f. U13DER 110 dRCUI-BTiUlCSS TiTLL COIIEHCIAL OR UI-IPKE CIRCUITS BE

CUT OR JiiERFERED TOTl III AI3Y ~JXI.

$, LESS AGE CEIITER?

a; llescago Centers at command " osts, -where their operation is

prescribed, idll operate continuously,7".

b. lies sage Centers '.Till not be used to perform clerical or steno­

graphic "Tork for the units they serve.

c. Ileosage Centers of Troop Carrier Command in departure area

Td.ll service Airborne Units in their area, (This irould normally be handled

by GB3 troops for both Airborne and Troop Carrier.)

DAHSI

G-3
DISTHIBUTJ01T: " 5 "

3-1
pagc 3 of
A IT E u v E R - • • B H B H B H B F
_ _ ^ pages
 ...„

OPERA?IO|'TIHSTRTJ0TiaiS
n
Distribution Sw AB~TC Maneuver. J|q
Camp Mackall, K C
15 September 1944

EWT 23 Sep 44

UNIT flo» of Copies

AB-TC Maneuver Hq • ' ' 15

AB-TC Maneuvers Signal' Office 20

XXII Corps 10

13th Airborne D i v i s i o n IP
• 1 1 t h Infantry D i v i s i o n • 5
*100th Infantry D i v i s i o n . * 5
60th Troop Carrier Wing 10

3rd TAD
\ Total 70 copies
* Imaginary*
"K-:,
DAliBKY

OFFICIAL: •

ISH •

DISTRIBUTION* (S)

M A U E U

 la it ii ill

AB-TC llanouver Kq,

Camp l l a c k a l l , K.G?
15 September 19UU?
Effective 0001 EflT

•DRUM LIIG OK LETTERS LISTED ^ELCH DEIiM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BELOf

= BAR P03ITI01I SET PIUS TC) TFERI.U....1 • BAR POSITION:"SET PUTS TO THE RIGHT.'\

ALL OTHERS TOTJL1E ALL OTHERS TO' LEFT^

1 2 3 U 5 6 1 2 3 U 5 6 •"

1 o-5 A A A A 1 1-0 A A A

2 B B B — — — "• 2 3-0 — — — B B —

3 . 0^ - — — c C - 3 3-0 _ C _ C - —

u5 o-5 D
E
—
E
D
E
D —
—
—
—
U
5
o-U —
—
D
E
D
E —
D
E
D

.. 0-5 o-U
6 0-5 F — — F F 6 U-6 F F F F —

7 0-5 -* - G — — G 7 U-6 G — G G —

8 o-5 H — — -, 8 0-6 — TT

a II — — H

9 o-5 I I I I — I 9 0-6 — T
_ I — _

10 5-6 - — J J J J 10 0-6 — — J — _

11 $-6 — — •*. K K 11 0-6 K — I'i — K

12 5-6 L L L . L 12 0-6 — L L L L

13 0-6 T" — — — — 13 0-6 _ i.l 11 _ i'i

1U 0-6 N — — IT 0-6 II N _ _

15 0-6 - 0. 0 — — — 15 0-6 0 _ _ 0

16 0-6 - — P P P — 16 2-0 P — P P P

17 3-6 Q Q Q Q — 17 2-0 Q Q — Q Q

18 3-6 - R R — 18 2-0 R R R R

19 U-6 — S — — 19 2-0 S S S _

20 3-U T T T 20 2-0 T •

21 3-U - — — — 21 2-0 u — — V

22 3-0 V V V 22 2-0 _ V

23 3-0 w
X - 23 2-5 — V

2U 3-0 -
— 2U 0-5 X Y

25 2-0
- z
25 0-5 Y Z

26 1-0
z
26 0-5 —

27 1-0 27
o-5

26-LETTER CHEOS: 26-LETTER CHECK

AQTPO PBFTZ VKOXI RQOZK LSA:JU H TKUIIZ LZDSH TIEHZ JCOTV FOZNF G '
(EncIphermenT of "A" 26 t i m e s w i t (Encipherment of "A11 2'6 times"' 1 A r ith
key wheels a l i g n e d on AAAAAA.,) key wheels a l i e n e d on ilaMAA.)

KEY LIST INDICATOR: LB KEY LIST INDICATOR: CA

HOTS: In event of postponement 3X.&ay remains day of
actual i n i t i a l drop. Subsequent days
puted therefrom. J. •?*•.

MAN E | V E R ­

Item 5 - 1 Jr-age 1
of 8 pages
 MANEUVER
SIGNAL OPERATIC'

Cipher Key Lists for Culvert or y-269

AB-tC Maneuver He»
Camp Liackall, N C
15 September 19UU.

e 0 0 0 1 Ev*T
-
V Ua

BRUI: LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BEL01T DRUM LUG OK LETTERS LISTED I

PAR POSITION SET PI1JS TO TI IE R]:GHT. BAR POSITION SET PIN S TO TJIE ItlGHf,'
ALL OTHERS TO mii'lJi
i TIT<
LEFT. ALL, OTHERS TO TI .EFT.

I 2 3 k 5 6 1 2 3 k 5
I 1-0 A _ A A 1 o-U A A A .^
2 3-0 - B B — — 2 U-5 B — - D -r

3 3-0 - — ~ C c 3 o-5 C — C C —

a 3-0 - —
—
— D k o-5 ~ — D — _

i 5 3-0 E _ „
5 o-5 E E E E
6 o-u — F F — 6 o-5 _ — F —

7 U-5 G G — G G G 7 o-5 G G G —
8 o-5 H H - H 8 o-5 K K TT
— K
9 o-5 I »- ~ — I 9 3-$ - — I I 1
10 o-5 — J J J — o 10 3-5 J J — — —
11 o-5 K K K K — K 11 3-6 — T/T
K K —
x\
X2 o-5 — L L L L L 12 2-3 L L L — —
33 o-5 M — _ _ M 13 2-3 M M ~ T.-T —
Ik o-5 AT
N N — lU 2-0 N ^ N _ — —
15 o-5 0 0 — — 0 15 2-0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 o-5 p P P P - P X6 2-0 — P P p p
17 o-5 — — Q Q 17 2-0 Q — Q - •
— Q
2-5 R R R — 18 2-0 — R —
is
19 2-0 — —
•R
—
S S S s 19 •2-0 — S S
£o 2-0 T T - 20 2-0 — T —
?l 2-0 - — U u 21 2-0 U U u
22 2-0 — —• V 22 2-0 — V —
23 2-6 w X — 23 1-2 _ — —
y?4 2-6 X Y 2k 1-0 —
^25 0-6 Y — 25
£6 0-6 —
1-0
z
26 1-0 z
R7 0-6 27 0-6

26-LETTER CHECK: 26-LETTER CHECK:

2UJXM JFQXK PRGQH PGBM ^OJEJ N QQGvTK LRLKK OGJKB ZLftZB YRZAK R
Xti-nclpherment of "A" 26 t i m e s w i t h (Emcipherment of "A" 26 t i m e s w i t h
key vrheels a l i g n e d on AAAi\M«) key wheels a l i g n e d on AAAA.M.)

KEY LIST II}E)ICATOR: DSf KEY LIST I11DICAT0R: AO

MANEUVER-!

Item 5 -1 Page Z
of 8
 M A N E U V E P , ­

SIGNAL OPIiicATION IN

Cipher Key Lists for Convertor 11-209

No? AB-TC Maneuver Hq.
Camp Mackail, N C
15 September 19l;i|.

Eff ective 0001 EOT

DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BSLCIT DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED I3EL0if
BAR " POSITION SET PINS TO' TIiE R JLCTj.xl • BAR POSITION SET Pi;: '.S TC3 THE RIGHT.,.:
ALL, OTHERS TO T' S LEFT. ALL OTI-3:EP.S TO TI IS I

1 2 3 u 5 6 1 2 3 h 5
0-5 _ _ A .. A A 1 2-0 _ A _ A
0-5 B — — B — — 2 2-0 B B B B _
3 0-5 C c C - - 3 2-0 C C C C — — • •

.it 0-5 - - - D D D It 2-0 D D D D D

0-5 E E - E — 5 2-0 E — E E
a o-U F F/ - F F F 6 2-0 F — — — F F
7 3-0 G - G — - 7 2-0 _ G G —
0 3-6 H H H TT
H 8 2-U H _ H _
0-6 - - — I —
9 2-it I I I I I
10 0-6 - J - J 10 O-I4 _ J _ _
0-6 — _ — K K 11 o-U K K K K _
0-6 — - — — ~ 12 O-li L >. L L L Ml *

J-3 0-6 - M — 1.1 — 13 U-5 _ _ _ it;

3J4 0-6 N — N N — - lit _ N _ _
0-6 - - 0 0 0 15 1-5 0 0 _
16 0-6 - P P — — — 16 p P _ _ _ P
17 0-6 Q Q Q - Q Q 17 1-6 Q Q Q —
18 2-0 R R - R - 18 1-0 R R R
i9 2-0 — — S S S 19 1-0 _ _ S S
20 2-0 T - - T 20 1-0 T T _
^1 2-0 U U - 21 1-0 U U u
22 2-0 — V - 22 1-0 V _
£3 2-0 - X X 23 1-0 ~
2-0 - - 2lt 1-0 _ Y
25 1-2 Y • -
25 1-0 Y Z
26 1-0 Z 26 1-0
£7 1-0* 27 3-0

26-LETTER CHECK: 26-LETTER CHECK:

BRIIJL! KSX1.S OSTOL RI1K0C EJCTS B NZKJK IQXIY PrvuQ: £1112 OUSIA N
(Encipher merit of "A" 26 t i m e s (EnciphermenT of " s 'A i r ^ times wit
key wheels a l i g n e d on AAAAAA.) key wheels aligned on AAAAAA.) ;
KEY LIST II'DIGATOR: ER KEY LIST INDICATOR: VU

I! A N E U V E R -

Page 3
of 8 pages
 M A N E U V E R

SIGNAL OPERATIOI

Cipher Key

A^-TC Maneuver Hq,

lamp llackallj I-T C

15 September 19hk

D+4 D+5

DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BELG'7 DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BELOVf
BAR POSITION SET PINS TO TIIE RIGHT. BAR POSITION SET PINS TO TIE RIGHT. :'
: ALL OTHERS TO TIIE LEFT. ALL 0THK1S TO THE LEFT,

r1 6
1 2 h 5 1 3 h
1 o-5 _ A _ _ 1 3-U A —
:
2 o-5 •p — B B 3-U — B
3 o-5 _ C
—
c C C c
2
3 3-h — —
IS

c ­ C
h o-5 — D — — D U o-U D - D ­
5 o-5 — - — E 5 o-U —
6 o-5 F F F F - F 6 o-U F F F F
r\
7 o-5 G G G — G G 7 - G
8 o-5 - H — H H — 8 o-U - H T-T - II II ­
9 o-5 I I — T
- — 9 0-4 I — I I —
10 o-5 — J J — J d 10 1-0 J T
u
— — J
11 5-6 — _ — — 11 1-0 K jr
i\ K K
12 o-6 L L — L L 12 1-0 ­
13 0-6 li M — — 13 1-0 LI - H - ­
Hi 0-6 — N — N — 1U 1-6 _
15 0-6 _ 0 0 0 0 15 1-6 — - - 0
16 0-6 _ _ _ — _ 0-6 — — P p
-
_
16 -
17 0-6 — — — Q Q 17 0-6 "Q Q Q - Q

16 U-6 R — R _ R 18 0-6 — - R

o-U S s _ 0-6 — S -
19 S S
_
19 s
20 o-U T T _ 20 0-6 T T — —

21 o-i* - — — — 21 0-6 U U U u

22 2-U V V V 22 0-6 — V V

—x _

23 2-0 V
23 0-6
2U 2-0 — _ CL\ 0-6

25 1-0 —
0-5
26 1-0
z 25
2-0
Y

—
26
27 3-0 2-0
27

26-LETTER CHECK:
HLSI1N OIEAS RRUIUl LQSKN GRUPO K pCXIK ILEVO KP:::OJ GATRP i:iIOL
(Ericiphermerit of "A" 26 t i m e s TfLVa ^Encipher meat of "ii: 26 times
key vmeels a l i g n e d on ) key wheels aligned on

KEY LIST INDICATOR: KN

Page U
of 8 pages
 HAOU

SIGNAL OP

Cipher Key Lists .£<5T Convertor M-209

No. 1- ' - AB-TC llaneuver Hq«

Camp I.Iackall, N. C.
15 September 19UU*

Effective El'JT

B4.6

DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BELOvT DRUM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BLL(J1

BAR POSITION SET PINS TO TEE RIGHT. BAR POSITION SET PINS TO THE RIGHT.

ALL OTHERS TO THE LEFT. ALL OTHERS TO THE LEfl.

1 3 U 5 5
2-0 - - - — A ii. 1 1-0 - A A J
2^0 B B B — B — 2 3-0 B ­ ­ 1
2-0 — — C c — 3 ' 2-3 fi c, r,
u 2-0 D D D D — U 2-0
i 2-0 E - — - — E 5 ?-6
6 2-0 F — — — 171
F 6 0-6 i1 F
2-0 G n 0-6
G G G G 7 G
7 2-0 H — — — — 8 0-6
8 2-0 — - — I I — 9 0-5
10 2-0 J J J J J J 10 0-5
.11 2-1; K K — K — — 11 0-^ If ­ ­.
o-U - - L - — 12 o-5 L. L — — L
12 0-6 - —
11 — M L! 13 o-5 M —
13 1-6 N — — N N — 0-^ _ N _ N
15 1-6 — 0 0 — — 0 15 O-U 0 0 - 0 - 0
16 1-0 - P — — P — 16 •o-U F •p p _ P
1-0 — n, _ _ r.
17 Q Q Q 17 o-h 0
18 1-0 R R — - — 18 o-U R -
1-3 - S S — S 19 o-U -
19
3-0 - - - T 23
s ­ s s
20 o-U - T
3-0 - U - - 21 o-U u U
a u
3-0 V — V 22 b-U V
22 3-0 ¥ - V
23 o-U
23
w
3-0 - Y 2U o-U X
25 3-0 - - 25 o-U
26 3-0 - 26 o-U
27 0-5 27 o-U

26-LETTER CHECK: 26-LETTER CISXK:

MYSSP piJIT ZHZLR IDSHN QABON L JC1JDL YI'TAP ICOUSJ LTGSV DJGTL II
(Encipherment cu "A" 26 times i/ith (Encipherment of ""A'11' 26 t i n e s \;±th
key Trheels aligned on AAAAAA.) key wheels aligned on AAAUU1.)
KEY LIST Ii'iDIC.TOR: TM KEY' Lie JP

II A 11 E U V S R

Ito-i 5-1
h: c 5

 M A N E U V E R ­

SIGI'AL 0P3RA.

Cipher Key L i s t •ertor 1.1-209

• • No. AB-TC Llaneiiver Kq,
Camp l i a c k a l l , N C
15 September 19hh
Effective EfT

D+8 D+9

UHUH LUG ON LETTERS LISTED 31 DRUli LUG ON LETTERS LISTED

1
B4R POSITION SET PI!'TS T 0 TillI RIG! IT. BJIR POSITION P BIS T 0 TPIE RIGHT.
ALL, OTI•IERS TO 1?iJE LI3 T . ALL OTr IER3 TO T:hE LEFT.

1 2 3 <4 5 6 1 2 3 h 5 6

i 0-6 A A A A A
Jii. 1 1-0 A A A A A
2 0-6 B B _ B B 2 1-3 B B — —
3. 0-6 - - C c 3 3-0 - - C - ­
^• jU 0-6 D D - D — D U 3-0 D - - D D ­
0-6 — — E — — — 5 3-0 — E E — - E
0-6 F F F F F F 6 3-0 - F F - F ­
n
7 0-6 — — G — G 7 3-0 G - U •J G ­
TT
8 0-6 - H — a — — 8 3-0 - H II T-T H ­
9 0-6 — I I — T
I 9 3-0 — — I I - ­
0-6 — — — J J 10 3-0 — J J' — J J
xo
ii 3-6 — K K
—

— — 11 2-0 K - - K - K
$2 3-0 L L - — - 12 2-0 L - - - - L
- 2-0 f- - - - ­
V 3-0 - M H M H 13 i.i

Xk 3-0 • - N N — N lU 2-0 - N N • ­

15 3-0 0 — - - 0 15 2-0 — 0 - 0 0 0
16 3-0 P P — P — — 16 2-0 P ~ - p ' - —
3-5 — — - — — 17 2-0 — Q — — Q Q
is o-5 R — R — 18 0-6 R R R •D
R
S — S — s 19 0-6 — S — — —
19
20 — _ — T 20 0-6 — T T
o-5

Sil o-5 u - — 21 0-6 u — ­

22 u-5 V — 22 0-6 — V

1 O-ii
o-U
—
—
—
—
— 23
2k
$-6
o~5
—
X —
—

25 1-0 Y — 25 o-5 — z
26 1-0 — 26 o-5
27 2-0 27 o-k
z

26-LETTER CHECK: 26-LETTER CHEC

IGSJQ IZIQE XFQQH TAZKO LROHD LI XFNDT GRGNZ QRRDN U1TTVJ GLFQQ K
(Encipher merit of "A" 2b t i m e s w i t h (Encipherment of "A" 6 times with
key wheels a l i g n e d on AAAAAA.) key wheels aligned on AAAAAA.)

KEY LIST INDICATOR: PH KEY LIST IIJDICATOR: KS

MANEUVER

Page 6
of 8 pages
 M

Cipher Key Lists for Gonvertor M-309

No, 1 AB-TC I/Ir.neuver Hq»

Camp Uackall, N. 0.

15 September 19UU.

Effective 0001 K'JT

D+ll

PRIM LUG ON LETTERS LISTED BELOw DRUK Oil LETTJFui.3 LIS TED BSLOVj
BAR POSITION SET PINS TO TIIE RIGHT. BAR SET PIH ri rpr) T:iill i i,JIGKT.
ALL OTHERS TO THE LEFT. ALL OTII T ""•'T'Ti
TIL- XJj_.i"' 1 *

1 2 3 u 5 6 1 Z 3 6

4. 1-0 A A .A A A 1 0-5 A A — A
i 3-0 B B B - o-5 - B - TO
B
3-0 C C c Q - C - C -•
3 c em
3 o-5 -

2-0 D D — •

- D U o-5 D - - - - - :
i6 2-0
2-6
- E -
E
—
-
-
5 o-5 - - - - s - I
F F - —
6 o-5 - F F - F "
1 0-6 - - G - G -
7 o-5
n
U - - - -H -
0-6 — — TJ
3 o-5 H H T.T
-
I I — — — I 9 - - - - I T
X
10 0-5 J J - J — J 10 1-5 - - J J - J
ii 0-5 - - K K - - 11 1-5 - E K —
la 0-5 - — L - - L 12 1­- L — L - T
—
13 o-5 - - T.T
1.1 •f­
13 i-6 - — I.I — M
iU o-5 II - — ii — T.T
1)4 1-0 N - —
15 o-U - - 0 0 - 0 15 1-0 0 — - - - 0
o-U P - - — P — 16 1-0 - - P P P P
17 o-U - - - - - Q 17 l-U Q Q Q - *7 Q
o-U R - R R R 18 i-Ii - - T>
it
19 o-U S _ _ S 19 o-U S s - - s
20 o-U T T T 20 Q-U - T — T
2L o-U U U 21 o-U
^2 o-U V V V 22 U-6 _ V V
o-U 23 U-6
^U o-U X ­ 2k 0-6
25 o-U Y Z 2t 3-o z
26 o-U 26 3-0
^7 27 2-0

26-LETTER CHECK: CIIEGK:

IC31DN FNYIT XAFQJ KIZQT MJXC F SIRPR VFAEL AQPAN Qv:^V Fi'JlJFZ U
(Encipherment of "A" 26 t i m e s w i t h (Encipherment of HA" 26 t i n e s v d t h
key -/heels a l i e n e d on liMvilJx.) key wheels a l i e n e d on Ai'L'JJwfi.)

ISY LIST I1IDIGAT0R: ME ICEY LIST INDICATOR: I,©

M A N E U V E R -

Item 5-1 Page 7

of 8 nages
 MANUEVE.H.-

SIGNAI/ OPERATION INS1

Cipner 'ley t * H--2O9

A P -TO Ilaniiever Uq.

Camp L i a c k a l l I : . C .
1^ S e p t e m b e r 19UU.

Effective 00

D+12

DRU11 LUG - r LLTT.RS LIST.;!) JTELO"."/ IX1UI. LUG on LETTE:,;. LIFTED B::LO.T
3AR POSITION SET P I N S TO T I E IlIGIIT. BAR POSITION SET PINS TO THE RIGHT.­
:
" ALL OTIL.R;, TO T::L, L . J - T . ALL OTIElto TO TIL LEFT,

1 2 3 5 6 1 2 3 5 6
3-0 _ _ _ A A 1 0-6 A A — A fi. ­
1-3 B - B - B - 2 vo - B - - B
1-0 n _ _ „ n 3 2-3 - - Q C - C
1-0 - D D D h 2-0 - D D D D D
1-0 2-0 i? Ts1
- E - - E - 5
i-5 - F - F - F 6 2-0
n
o-5 U G - G - - 7 2-0
o~$ TT
K H II 11 - 8 2-0
0-6 I I _ _ - T
9 2-0
w 0-l|. o - J J - - 10 2-0
u o-k - K K - K 11 2-0 — K K
Ji2 L L L L - 12 2-0 - L L L

t-i

O-Ii XJ

13 o-U M - M H - T- T
13 1-2 J.I 11 - - -
1*1* o-U - - N — IT IT lh 1-0 N _ _ T.T

15 0 0 - 0 0 - 1< 1-0 — — o 0 0 -
£6
o-U P - - - P - 16 1-0 F - p -
O-I;
X -
1*7 Q Q - i^ - 17 1-0 _ Q Q - - Q
0-/!. - - - - R 18 1-0 R n - - -
O-U s S - - - —
—
19 i-U S s S
o-U - T T 20 o-U
0-1; - U U U 21 O-li _ _ U
2 2-0 V - — 22 o-k V V -
>3 2-0 IT X X 23 •o-k
2-0 X Y 2k h-5 Y
2-0 _ Z 25 o-5 Y Z
2-0 26 o-5
-7 2-0 27 o-5

26-LETTER CrEXK;
fSVII IuSYL G...TLL VII!^H STINTD M LVtr/O BIDPV L.1KGU IJ-flgO QLOZI A
'(Encipherraent of "A" 26 times'•'.d (Enciphermcnt of i;Au 26 Lines "
' key ".Thesis a l i e n e d on AA*JJ\A*) key vrheels "aligned on AAA.AA4.)
TTP
KEY LI^T IITDICTOI^ RL

DAL33Y:

OFFICIAL:

U V E R Page 8
of 8 pages
Item 5 - 1
 a n e u v e rr .aq
Tarap M a c k a l l , If C
15 September 1944

MAP g ^ COPS

Map: 1:20,000 Photomap CiMP MAGKALIi, 17. C. and V i c i n i t y . Sheets:

TBDY: 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 34, 3 5 , 36.
SAcTOHD: 1 9 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 3 1 , 3 2 .
BOCKIUGHiM: 4 , 5 , 6 .
>* 1, 2 . . '
gSY TO *>.- 1:20,000 MAP SH33TS

0 J
# 22 #23 # 24 # 19

9 33 JT X L !
TROY # 28 # 29 # 30 # 25 # 25 ;
& H n M IT
#34 $ 35 # 35 # 31 # 32

P R S
# 4 # 5 # 5 # 1 # 2

(1) The numbered sheets have "been given a key l e t t e r , i . e . , A, 3 , Ct etc,

(2) 3ach sheet has Tseen assigned five "oairs of coordinate reference points
and five pairs of map template Eo -an numbered points. These sets of
pairs are numbered from one (l) t© five (5) in conjunction with key
l e t t e r s , i . e . , Ml, M2, Ms e t c .
13) In use, the two template Bornan numeral points are matched up with the
two map sheet coordinate points. The f i r s t map point i s called the
reference point and the f i r s t template Roman numeral i s called the origin
point, these are matched up f i r s t , then the template i s oriented so that
the second template Roman numeral (Extension Humeral) coincides with the
second map reference point (Extension Point).
(4) Once oriented, locations on the map are encoded "by simply reading directly
fr©m the map template, naming the lettered square and the number ©f the
pin-hole in that square nearest to the location. (Pin-holes are numbered
from one (l) to one hundred (lOO) reading from bottom ur> and left to
right.) ^
(5) jidd the S.O.I key in front of this reading and the encoding i s then
plete.
EXAMPLE: -w Headquarters of Airborne Center in Camp Mackall is

shown on SuOTQED Sheet ^0. 31. This location would

"oe encoded as follows:

Step (l) Jind Map Template Code for S^ITFOHD N o . 31

Sheet, then choose, from the five sets of coordinate
©ne set with a reference point near enough to Hq
ABQ SO that when oriented the template will cover
the lecation. In this example the M2 key pairs will
do t h i s .
Step (2) Using M2 key pairs orient template and read
the location. I t will "be found that Hq A3C i s in Q,
square and the nearest ^in-hole is number 46.
Step (3) The complete encoding is M2 $46.
'Coordinates)
IS S
 M A N S U O

REFERENCE
EXTENSION
KEY
POINT
^ 1'IUMERA.L

Sheet 1/20,000
A 1 (1130-1355)
(1127-1355) VI V
A 2 (1127-1356)
(1130-1353) II VI
A 3 (1130-1360)
(1127-1362) VII V
Ali (1129-1356)
(1131-1359) VIII VI
A5 (1131-1361)
(1129-1358) V III
TROY #23 Sheet 1/20,000
B 1 (1136-1356)
(1136-1359) III
B 2 (U3li-1356)
(1136-1356) VI IX
B 3 (1136-1357)
(1139-1355) III V
B ii (1136-1356)
(1139-1356) IX VIII
B5 (1139-1360)
(U36-1360) II T

TROY #21;. Sheet 1/20,000

C 1 (111)7-1355) IX v±
C 2 (llUi-1356)
(llli7-136O; VIII I
C 3 (UliU-1362)
(II47-1360) V III
G Ij. (11^-1359)
(IH18-I356) DC V
c5 (111*8-1358)
VI II
TROY #28 S.:.et 1/20,000
D 1 (U3O-13U5)
(113O-13U7) VI IX
D2 (1127-13U5)
(1130-1350) II IX
D3 (1130-1350)
(1127-1352) VII V
Dh (1131-13U9) II IV
(1129-135D VII VII]

TROY #29 Sheet 1/20,000

E 1 (II36-I3I16)
(1136-13U9) II III
£ 2 (II36-13U8)
(1136-13SL) IX VIII
E 3 (1139-13^5)
(U36-13U7) V III
E Ij. (1139-131^6)
(II36-1350) II v _Lx
E5 (1136-1350)
(1136-1352) in'
TROY #3CSr..^t 2/20,000
? 1 17
F 2 (U]i7-13U6)
(11U7-135O) III
F 3 (11U1+-1352)
(UI47-I35O) VII
F 1; -r
F 5 (lllili-1331) VII VIII

TROI #3li- Sheet 1/20,000

G 1 '1128-1326)
(1128-1339) TT
111
G 2 r1126-1338)
(1123-1338) VI DC
(1131-1337)
(112 8-133 •?) VIII T"?r
G Ij. (1131-1336^.
(1131-131'/) VIII
G5 (1128-131*0)
(1131-13U2)

TROY #35 Sheet 1/20,000

K 1 (1136-1337)
(1139-1337) • II
K 2 (1136-1336)
(1139-13^0)
K 3 (1136-13U0)
(U39-13i-<0) VIII
i"i .'.1 (1138-1339)
(HiiO-1339)
ii 5 (1138-1338)

MA N E
Page 2
o£ [i pages,
 KB!

TROt f;«36 Sheet 1/20,000

I 1 VIII IV
I 2 ) XI 1
I 3 (11U7-1337)
(HUi-1335)
II VI
IU II
1.5 (111^7-1336)
IX

(05JU7-13U6)

SANPQRD; #19 Sheet 1/20,000

J i O1S5-13S7")
(1152-1355)
I V X. H
J 2 (U55-1356)
(1155-1360)
III IX
J 3 (1152-1360)
VIII VII
J k .(115U-1356)
(1156-1359)
VI VIII
j 5 (U56-13S8)
(H5H-1358)
VI
SANFQRD#25
1/20,000
K 1 (1151-13U6) (U53.-13U6) V VIII
K2 (.1153*1351) ) II IV .
K 3 (1153-13U7) (1156-031*5) 7
in V
(1156-1350) (1156-13U8)­
(1153-1352) (1153-1350) • vi IX
I?^ #26 Sheet 1/20,000
LI (U631-13U5) (116G-I3ii5) VI •V
L2 (II63-I3I46) (1160-1350) .VJI II
L3 ((1163-1350) ,(1160-1352) \ III V
Lit IV
L5 -13U8)' HII IV
#31 Sheet a/20,00Q
K 1 (1152-1335) (U55-1337) v ., ;
H2 (115^-1336) VIII
H3 (U55-13UO) (1155-13U2) in •VI
E.J*. (115U-1339) (115U-1336). VIII
M-5 S l (1x56-1336) IX VI
- • II'.:';
1/20,000
(116U-1335) (1161^335-) vi. V
.N 2 (U6?>I336) •I VIII
II. 3 (H63-I3UO) in V
(XI63-1336) (1163-1339) vi Jj
(1163-1338) VI.
ROCiaKGHAM &1 Sheet 1/20,000
P I
(1126-1326) (1123-1326) V. VIII
P 2
(1128-1323) ­ (1128-1331)
( I
? 3
(1128-1327) (1131-1327) VIII

••Pit
(1131-1326) (UV, -1330)

(1128-1332) (r-o-w-1332)
V
ii .#5 Sheet' l/20,000
Q I

Q £
(1139-1326)
(1136^1336)
 ,-'• '

tSAJ-f #6 Sheet 1/20,000

> vm IV

R 2
(11U3-1326) V

(111^-132?)
VI
VII

R 3

Rk (-UU7-1326) XI
VII

R '(11UKL332) IV

1AURBTBURG #1 Sheet 1/20,000

S 1 (1152-132$) 7­ T

s. 2/ (X15W33Q) VII
T

s (U52-.133O) VIII
'TV
st
( 5 ^ ) 'VI
z*' (1157-1329)

c cr I I I
'1
(1157^13315
UUHIHBUHO #2 Sheet 1/20,000
JF 1
(1160-1326). (1162-1326) V
II

!2 (1162-1331) ' (11 '--1328)

VI

(1161-1325) (•jJL6U-»1327r) in:

It
? It (1161-1328) T
IV

(1161-1332)
nu v l

G-3

 MA N E U V

SIGNAL OPEHiU1 T^IJ INSTRUCTIONS

Identification Panel
Code AB-TC Llaneuver Kq
.Jfcrap Ilaclcall, N C
•*>»* ' 13 September 19hh
Effective EF/T

PANEL

AE-TC Maneuvers Hq«

XXII Corps Kq,

-x-llth .Infantry Division

* 3,00th Infantry Division ....... 004

• 13th Airborne Division Command Po b • 781

13th Airborne Division Rear Echelo* 782

13th Airborne Division Artiilerv. • • •. 7^3

l;58th Parachute FA Battalion, 78I4

676th Glider FA Battalion. 785

677th Glider FA Battalion 786

88th Glider Infantry Regiment 787

1st Battalion, 88th Glider Infantry Regiment, 788

2nd Battalion, 88th Glider Infantry Regiment 789

326th Glider Infantry Regiment.« 790

1st Battalion, 326th Glider Infantry Regiment , 791

2nd Battalion, 326th Glider Infantry Regiment 792

f>ljth Parachute Infantry Regiment 793

1st Battalion, 5>15>th Parachute Infantry Regiment 79U

2nd .Battalion, £!5>th Parachute Infantry Regiment......... 795

3rd Battalion, 5'l5th Parachute Infantry Regiment.. 796

lf?3:rd Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion. 797

[{.09th Airborne Quartermaster Company. • • ­.. • 798

5l3th Airborne Signal Company 799

130th Evacuation Hospital,....,

• IMAGINARY.

M A N E U V E R -

Item 7-1 Page'1

of 2 paees

 M A N E U V E R ­

SIGNAL 0F3R

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

1
7- Camp Mackall, IIC

^ 19hh

•:-••

Effective EWT

NOTE: Paragraph 3~c Vfar Department Circular No, 176, dated

5 May 19hh, subject: "Co-^bined Panel System", author­

ized t&e Indicator 3 (Ro..ian Numeral three) be used

alagve flash index to indicate map coordinates. For

Identification Panel Code instead of Roman Numeral

Three no indicator Yiill be displayed above flash index.

This conforms to paragraph 3-*b reference circular.

DALBEIJ

OFFICIAL:

TfALSH,

DISTRIBUTION: (S)

M A N E U V E R ^

y
Q 2

\£~2 pages

 M A N E U V E

SIGNAL OPERATION INST

Pre-Arranged Message

8-1
AB-TG Maneuvers Kq,

Camp Mackall, K»C»

15 September, UU

Effective 0001 EWT 23Sep

y . . . _ J .

. . MESSAGE
BREVITY C'T1E
#PANEL CODE

FOR PHONE
GROUP
SIGNAL LA2.CP

j'i i • I. i n

1. Target of opportunity in

direction indicated.
"Game Called"
63
PKQ

2, Require small arms ammuni­

tion (Figure group tode­
• note caliber)
"Foul Ball"
RIM

3* Bo not land or drop here.

"Play Ball"
2
ma

ii. Require mortar ammunition

(Fir-ure group to denote

caliber).
"Batter Up"
k2
PNA

k.5. Require anti-tank ammuni­

r tion (Figure group tode­
note caliber).
"Batter is out"
U3
PIIF

6. Land (or Drop) at alter­

•• " nate field.
"Man on First'*-'
70
pinr

7. OK to land hev&*
"Shutout"
0
PUD

'8. I have no other means of

communication•
"Runner is Out"
PUT

v9. Require artillery ammuni­

tion (Figure group tode­
note caliber).
"Double"
uu

X0* Require food.

"Forced Cut"
3
PMS

11. OK to drop here.

"Base on Balls"
9
&m

12. Require water.

"Infield:.%r"
h
PHE

13• Have gained objective

"Triple"
8
PNU

llu Am moving hqt (place)

(&ap Coordinate Code)

"Single"
09
HJG

' lf?» Require medical supplies

'"Strikeout"
6
PEE

16. Our troops at (place)'

- (Map Coordinate Code).

"Ho hits-No Runs"
is
PHZ

17• Return to departure

field.
"Home Run"
72
RJR

18. Require reinforcements

"Flied out"
111
PIJK

19. Require gasoline and

• lubricants.
"Balk"
PHL

20. Enerny at (place)

(Map Coordinate Code)

"Caught off Base"
?Wi

21.

"Double Play"
PKW

22. Report my position

k to headquarters.
"Grounded Out"
65
FUG

W : __ J .'.:. ..t ! - _ • • • ., 1 ,1

NOTE: a-Fanel signals vrtll be in accord with combined panel system GCBP8

%& Radio or signal lamp will use "POP" as code group indicator

• \ .

1 !
Otpip T'" "" AT » * 11 /if\\ V

"KilAJjon^
Q-3 MA N E U V E R
Pare 1 of
1 Sheet
 MAN E i i f i
SIGKAL OETOvTiON INSTRUCTIONS

Brevit;. Code

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp llackall, N C

15 September ISkh

Effective $001 L7IT 23 Sep 14;

1. The Brevity Code is issued for use by the originator

of a message as a method of keeping secure, for a limited

time only, the information contained in the message. The main

purpose of the code is brevity -.'or speed in transmission*

2. To employ the code, select coordinates representing

the desired word by reading right and up. The prefix "EC"

(Brevity Code) is used as thcTfirst group in any message em—

plojdjig this code. For eczample, at H+l hour, if "re desire to

send the following; message "EneEfr" resistance right flank", the

encoded text wald be: "BC LU IP IX Sp.««

3.. If transmitted by radiotelephone, the phonetic alpha­

bet must be used.

4, This code to run far 1st 72 hours and then repeat

the cycle. Cycle "begins on H hour, T) day.

OFFICIAL;

i
MLSH,
G-3

DISTRIBUTION: (S)

I t s m >-I of
page!?

•L. X •- .. ...
 MANEUVER

SIGIAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS . : • * * :

Llaneuver Hq
i.i o
September

|H
H Accomplish
AC Automatic Clearinn
Departure Feet Gun

(ed)

^ MM AAdjacent
< Avoid Colimn Deplane Field Half

Advance (ed) Azimuth

AA He Combat Fighter Halftrack

(s)
J Ac!vise Barrage Command Designate j Fire (d) Have

(er)(inr-:) (ion)
Z After Commit Destroy First Heac

(ed) (ed)
C Aid Battery ComjTunicate Direction Five
Headquarters

(ies) (ions)

ri
F Air battalion Company i5 con- Flank(s)
Heavy

(s) (ies) tinue (s) (ed)(ing)

(ed)(inr)

VAirplane(s) .Being Compass Dis emb ark F l i nht HeId

Concen- Displace
trate(ed) (d)(ing)
(ing)(ion)
Contact, Distribute

(ed)(ing) (ion)

Contami­
nate (d)

F Alternate

D Altitude Coordinates Four

J_Houi1 (s)

Y Anun-j.ra.tion Counter- Foi".7ai-d

I Iio-ritxer

attack

N Antiair- Cover(inr) Friendly

idantifv

craft

E Antitank
Immediately

S Approximate Camouflare m::> la cement G-l(S-l)

I In

Cross (inr;) G-2(S-2)

Incomplete

(ed)

Casualties

Q Armored
Information

R Arrive(d) Defend(ed) |Equipment

K Artillery

0 Assemble(ed) Class

(in£)(y) (ified)

Land (ed)(ing)

G Attack(ad) Demolitions Guard j Large

(ed)(ing)

34<fll top 36

ret>eat the cycle

MA N 3
Page 2 of
 M A N E U V E

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

Brevity Code AB-TC !!aneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, N C

15 September ±9hh

Effective
23 Sep kh

mj Leader
Nine
Permission
Reinforce
Six
Troops

(d)(ments)

M Left
Normal
Personnel
Remain(ing)
Sketch
Truck(s)

A Light
North
Phase
Replace
Slope
TITO

(ments)

J Line (5)
Nat
Photograph
Report
Smoke
Unit

(s)

Z Litter
Number
Pilot(s)
Request
Sniper(s)
Unknown

G Locate(d)
Objective
Platoon(c)
Reserve(s)
South
Use(d)(ing)

(ions)

P Loss
Observe(d)
Point
Resistance
Speed
Vehicle(s)

(r)(ation)

V Low(er)
Obstacle
ponton
Return
Squad(s)
Vicinity

LB Machine Gun
Occupy
Position(s)
Ridge
Squadron
Vfater

It (3)
(ied)
( B )

T liap
Of
Post
Rifle
Start(ed)

(ing)
(eel) (ing)

X Mark
Officer
Prepare
Right
Station(ed)
Weapon(s)

F Medical ­ Oil
Primary
River
Straffing
Weather

D Meet
On
Prisoner(s)
Road
Stream(s)
YiTest

Y Men
One
Protect(ed)
Runway
Supply
"jiiere

(ing)
(ies)

N Messenger
Operation
Provide
ocout^s)
Support
win

00
(ed)(inC)

i E Mile (s)
Order(s)(ed)
Pursuit
Second
Take(n)
Wind

S Mine (s)
Organize
Radio
Secondary
Tank (s)
Wire

(d)(ing)

W Mission
Our
Rain
Secure(d)
Team (s)
Withdrawing)

! U MM#
Outpost
Rail
Sand
Third
Woods

Q Mortar(s)
Over
Range
Seven
Three
Wounded

J/g^ Hotoriz ed
Overlay
Reach(ed)
Set
To-Tov;ard
Yards

^ f Move(d)(ing)
Parachute
Ready
Shelled
Train (s)
You(r)

(ments)
(ists)

j K Near(ing)
Park
Rear
Shuttle
Transport
Zero

(s)

0 Need(ed)
Patrol(s)
Reconnaiss­ Signal
Transpor­ Zone (s)

ance
tation

L NevT
Penetrate
Reconnoiter
Silence(d)
Trap
- - - - -
(d)(inc)

•G Night
Permanent
Regirfient(s)
Situation
Trench(es)

V
Z
I
F
T

1201 to 2400J
S
G
T
D
rl

2401, t«3600 K
0.
R
M
Y
B

.'jffitl 1jo4800 V
M
D
C
G

^ K i to 600$ 1
L
.0
U
X
V

E
Y
1 S

'S00
the cycle;

3 pages.

 M A N E U V E R

SIGNAL OPERATIC!;;

Ityroteclinic Code AB-TC Maneuver Hq

1 0 - 1 Camp l l a c k a l l , N C
15> September 19Ui­
Effective gltftfl SWT 23 Sep
lm
PLANE TO GROUND

Signal Meaning

a. Yellow Sinrle Star, iMi (Very) Challenge "are youfriendly?1';

or, "I am friendly"; or, "under­

stood "•

b. Yellow Double Star, 1^2 (Very) "Display Panels",

o. Red Single Star, KU3 (Very) "Enemy tanks approaching, I

will circle and fly in their

direction"•

d. Green Double Star, 1.139 (Very) "Enemy foot troops approaching,

I will circle and JTly in their

direction,"

e» Green Single Star, MLj.5 (Very) "Mark front lines."

2, GROUND TO GROUIID or

GROUND TO AIR.

Signal Meaning

a. White Star parachute, 10.7Ai Challenge "are you friendly?";

or "I an friendly"j or "under­

stood".

b. White Star Cluster, M13 "Fire barrage".

c. Green Star Parachute, Hl> "Lift Artillery fire"; or

"Cease Bombing"•

d. Green Star Cluster, M20 "Objective taken"; or "OK to

land here"; or "OK to drop

(equipment) here *',

e. Amber Star Cluster, M22A1 "Fire pre-arranr-ed .Cires accord-

inn: to schedule",

f. Amber Star Parachute, 112341 "Need reinforcements"; or

"Need Air Support".

g. Red Star Cluster, l£ "Eneny tanl-cs approachinp:".

DALBET:

OFFICIAL: if '
Mt.
WALSH, "

O-3

DISTRIBUTION: ( S )

M A N E U V E R

IterJ
*4*- ;-i'Sheet
 MANEUVER

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTR

Smoke Marking Patterns AB-TC Maneuver Hq
1 1 - 1 • Camp l l a c k a l l , II G
15 September 19UU

Effective tftftfl EvilT 23 Sep

General:

1» The following Smoke llarkiiv patterns and their code letters have

"been "used practically in a theater of operations and vrill be used for this

maneuver•

2» An Army Ground Forces unit will request an Army Air Forces

mission "which may involve offensive action against a target or for re—

supply, fresh reserves, etc., but in either case the location must be narked

so as to insure positive identification.

3« The Army Air Forces support?'ng unit upon acceptance of the

mission is responsibile for the £r\.'.'.->./ing information:

a. Number of aircraft to be used and type.

b. Pattern and coding and color (s) to employ for the

marking fires or smoke pots.

c. Estimated time of arrival (ETA).

d. Speed.

e. Air to ground communications.

f. • Immediate information as to any changes in plan

prior to take off,

h* The Army Ground Forces unit in turn is responsible for;

a. Placing of artillery or mortar smoke fires or em­

placement of smoke potr or fires per designated pattern.

b. Observers placed to report approach of aircraft and

time of crossing reference points.

c. Igniting munitions*

d. Report results of mission.

5>» Patterns and code:

a. Side Harking: Remarks

Azimuth and area, must be given.

Artillery or mortar smoke im-

Code- 3U pact is on each flank of

linear target.

Impact is on terminal ends.

Azimuth and area nust b e riven,

IAHBUVER
Ybei
• « • * • • >

 M A N E U V

^•ASHfC Maneuver Hq

September 19hk

c. Reference Harking: Remarks

Impact area specified, then

distance, bearing and direction.

Code :il

d. "Center Marking:

Impact area in center. Incli­

nation, length and radius

Code CM
given to air cmpport.

e. Outline Marking:
Impact at three (3) or

four (U) outline points.

Code Oil

£m Edge Marking:

Impact on one side, widtl

and length is raven.

Code EH

« Standard Drop Strip

The munitions arc fired when

carpo planes come in sight,

Co J 3DS (about*fifteen (15) miles)

y ^73

DALPEI

OFFICIAL?

l^ALSK,
G-3
DISTRIBUTION: (S)

MANE, H E R
 MANEUVER

•N IMS'gfSl(py>
SIGNAL OPERATION -A** I t
Message Authentiiaior Code

(Army Authenticr^bioi&J^giigm^Ie**'?^

Test Element and Authenticator Charts

12-1 AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall^ N C

15 September 19UU

Effective 0001 EWT 23 Sep UU

1. General Instructions.

a* Outgoing liessages: Message center chief will place authenti­

cation group on message. In transmitting by radio the authenticates double

letter is placed before the W. Jtun^le:' kW T iiFC 031800QGG VF

b. Incoming Messages: Message center chief will check all in­

coming messages and 'stamp or write "Authenticated" on the message. If

authenticator does not check, he will request a check, :IQ" signals m i l be

used in radio and telegraph or teletype circuit,

QIA - Chaclc your authentication of message,

QJA - Authentication of my last transmission (or message) is - (1,

Correct, 2, Incorrect. Correct authenticator is •)

3LA - Authenticate your last message (or message )»

c» Station Authentication: (1) The calling station selects two

' (2) letters at random for the challenge and inserts them

after call: itfflP TiiFC J£ K

In reply IiFC, from C K r t "A", if time were 0609 the auth­

enticator would be CO, Reply: UFC CC LF K ("IF" is return

challenge) *""*

(2) In voice, after contact, challenge by picking at random

any two (2) letters, for instance EF (these are knotm as

test elements) and challenge thus: "Authenticate BAKER FOX:!.

From Chart "A", if time were 0200, called party authenticator

would be £4 Ke would answer and challenge thus; "ZEBRA <—

Authenticate ICENG TTLTJIAIF.

Calling party ivoulc1 then answer "VICTOR".

d. Authenticating Messages: (1) Challenge characters or teste3_e­

ments for messages ar1 not picked at random. The SOI will

direct v/hat two'characters from the text of the message are

to be used, i»e», !r2d character' of first text group and hXh

character of second text group.11 Examples:

(a) . (Encoded text) W CCBDO FOICHA GxTpH QBCDT CCBDO

i! u

FOKRA Bf, .:YD are then challenge letters. The first

.ten characters are divided in two groups and pertain

to code system .zji6 indicators. "GiUipKP1 then is first

group of the text, """

(b) (Clear text) W STAFF I.IEETING 1000 TOPi:! BT, "TT" are

then the challeii^e" letters',

(2) (a) If a ntiiv-ber happens to bu one of the characters, it is

converted to a 1-itter as follows:

1 2 3 h > S 7
A B 0 D E F G
{03 AJQ hh a JC JiUG DP)
MANEUVER­
 II A N E U V Z 2

(b) If text is a single letter, that letter would be doub­

led and used for the challenge,

(c) If a character per SOI is* not in the text, use last

character of test.

Mechanics of Using the Charts: TIMS - Time used will be local time zone.

Always note the time of transmission. If a message,, use time signed

(time of origin). If this is missing, use time filed, and if this is

missing, use time of first transmission. Example: I4.NP T uFC JO K,

Time of Origin 0600m

Step 1. Find the time 0600 in Time Period column on Left side of chart.

Step 2. Along Time period line,^ enter chart to right and find first

letter of challenge.J»

Step 3» Under ROY: Index, find second letter of challenge 0,

Step i|.# From this 2d letter, or.tor chart to right until an intersection

is made with the colvu^ir in which first letter was found (Step

2). This is IIey Letter, in this case V,

Step 5» ilote thic Key Letter at the intersection and find it i:i the

noz-mal alphabet row at bottom of chart.

Step 6. From this Key Letter in top row proceed down until an inter­
section is made with the row in which the time of origin appears

on the right side under T H E column.

Ste:o ?• The lotter C at tlas intersection is the authenticator.

Page 2

of h pages

 M A N E U V E R

SIGKAL OPERATIC,

Message Authenticator Oode

(Army Authentication System No 2)

Test Element and Authentication Charts

12-1

AB-TC Maneuver Ilq

Camp Hackall. U C

15 September 19hh

Effective $01 EOT 23 Sep hh

CHART "A"
AUTHENTICATION TABLE
TIHE RtfT
PERIOD INBIDC TTr.itG
•y
A B C D E F G XI J a L 1:1 11 0
T EQ R 3T TD U V Z
J Yr Iv V F X S —\ I1
T. T
TJ
A C R
T AQ P GK -;;•Q Jj V
~"i

IT T
Q 0001-0030
0500-0559 B
p
II E 0 P 7 V II s I Z h P 0 L u B R T G
Y - - (1
0031-0100
N B A U 11 J V
L P R 0 rn V[ c zE V
D I v 0101-0130
TT

Q 1.

D P G U "J*. 3 D J Y ];, X I z K Q T •D 11 ".," c V R 0 F I-I II A 0131-0200

rr
fi60$~06$9 T.T
D V w F "R 0} C TT I R 7- Z T Q s X i\ Y A 1
E
T~
V'
0 N G L Ti , 0201-0230
F 'i'i S Q ix R J •77
Pv
• • * K F Y p . 'T u z i\ 0 D T E P H L 0231-0300
0700-0759 B E T A Y 3 B G C:
T
p li K F u Q 0 V R TT j .i T
T
0301-0330
H E TT C J 1.1 G }l /)
J P Y S F H j\.V" Q 0 Z R L B V a. 0331-0h00
0800-0859 I F 0 K0 G J Z VJ .'-J
V
R 1) U E T,Ti'i
Y I'I A i.! 0 i-j S J. T 0U01-0U30
\f
J li V L 7 LI p vr E Q T"
U " • . / • T,T
T z G R R D X 0
F I 0 0 A 0U31-0500
ir T M Q D jn V 17 X I
0900-0959 V
S ~[ N A U 0 i-l H F 7
F V 0501-0530
7, T U J-,. N I: T J ';7 13 V F G 0 ri Q F( ^v A L I) Z 0531-0600^
11 7
C •y r
p f.T J
0 R •p
ry
111

0-
s
T
_U
TT
V X E D A i'i. Q TT ] ; 5 X' 0601-0630
rn _ X •v" 1
1
1000-1059 TT
i'-J V-S I Yf TJ
Q V 0 P IT T Tj-
T"
N D
p
u '" T;
HI
z 0631-0700
1.100-1159 0 N R F J z K Bp 0 A Y L E •.7 G I: U Q 30701-0730
i. X

p S Q F 0 i: R ? PI Tj - Z B C J V G A I P r L D 0731-0800
Q c A L TTB X •\j Q II 0 J V F U P y w S D I N T U
p 0601-0330
E D 0 Iv X -­
0001-0059 R J c R !.• Z T? 30831-0900
-•] T TT
•p H C J. Li. 17 0 u T
0100-0159 F Q A G Z T I! J 0 • p
L c E •i X s T; l.i M TT xi T Y 0901-0930
•r
T P T? £ S X L G J T "T
G D 0 l'-i R B I
l]
Z
:\
V j . 0931-1000
m
^200-0259 U E F Z Q
s
T
x r.Gr p 1."' j

-• r
• * •

L D U J V7 A T
T/I 11 V TJ 1001-1030
Y V E T"> Q A T
R G T J Y N i\ p 5 H TJ- c F 0 O L 1031-1100
j~ ,P Q C 1101-1130
.-1
0300-0359 17 K p- <J L
"V
B J c z li V S I 0 TJ T.T
ty
Z IN) E r\ B I T Q J F L
0J400-0Li.5S'
X
Y
\i
s
Y P 7r &
V R
L S
P TT
6 Li u c 1131-1200 7 R
Q c A
TT
i_
" T
V I Vi
N ii. j u D T»
XJ

Z L VR X.
s IC •ill F V j' Q HD 0 T• U A
H.T
J. J
c X B J I X' T
TT if
A' B C D E F V.TIT T A
i a N c P Q R T I z

1. For authenticating station to 13 t . ition (^>r) Ex-inple 1­

person to person s elect at random''1 l e t - : Time ­
ters and use time of transiiru 3s: . 0 1 ) CAutl
h a l l en - J 0
V-jntica tor ­ c
2 . For jn
essage<authentica on use 1 s t and
) Exampl e TT'P 2:
5th characters 0 : I s group in ni(-- w »:age ) UI-IF BT CO EDO ]
text and time {signed ( time Of (origin TTi C3BD0 FOKRA E' . L50200Q ::
(If no time of origin, use time filed, :

BF is Challenge. Authenticator ZZ

if this is missing, use time of trans­

mission.) ) SxanrpILe 3 ­
!|!$ T UFC 0 BT KILL 210 CAfTURSH

J. 2 3 6 7 3 0
BT 150800Q I, ~

Challenge HC) (since no 5th letter

H
in HILL5 must use last text letter

D ) . Authenticator 3D

"E

pages

 II A N E U V E R ­
SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

Message Autheriticg1»H TJbde

(Army Autheni^a^p-n^ysterm No
Test S

AB-TC Jlaneviver Kq
Camp Maclcall, M C
15 September UU
Effective 0001 S7T 23 Sep kh
J
P T
••/
B"
iiUTI-IEI-ITICATION 'T1 ABLI

TliJE ROW

PERIOD INDEX Tllffi

A c It G T 1 'J II
I)
t0 'BU N D6 P Q ft S T y V'ft1 x* 'I
A NC i £' RT s X F T L H U I-! G J. 1201-1230
B Hj C 0 V D S I Q Z E T'J" p N G II A KYR T L F Xu 1231-1300
l600-*-l659 C Y j -r;r Q H N X u B F Z II q L 0 R D T V E Kp A I p c 1301-1330
rn
1700-1759 D F Y ill U 11 Q D w L 0 Z 1 B K •K J P A 1331-H00
cXGS
••.; ­

V
E J o T Q K X c n 0 G li E L N F A Id P R •• ­

V I lli01-ll(.30
1800-1G'59 F E N T Y c g 11 i i D L P X I
V',' R A T ' V Q U 0 F G •n
.u z J I'i 31-1500
G Q B y N U T vr L C II
V T ID R S Y F Z i":. F 0 G JT XI I ii V 1501-1530
}l F P L V i'i S Q m II U G H (> •D J R I Vf A B u E Y
1531-1600
z
k 1900-19$9 I ft F II D P c L1 rr "R. l'I I V R Z U X J H T A 0 E Q 1601-1630
w
J G IT u F S 0 I'iu T E J K DRP C Q I x tr :II V 7 A u 1631-1700
K A Q 11 X r> T? J V 0 '7 II
•Ll.
YU tr
B S L T P Li CT- "0
T
Z NF 1701-1730
2000-2059 L Q P B Y c 'T R II S T.T
Z I u G T.f L X J E A D V 0 H F 1731-1300
2100-2159 T J Q G V 0 C A X I B rr S ?.r D p -,.' 18^)1-1330
p I, Y
u z •D

IT x: F V D T" T X R L T Tf jr r Y B A E S Z U j 'i
•r,
0 Ii". G 1831-1900
v
2200-2259 0 A J U D z T I.I n Q L S A N 0 F C E < I G F ii V
T.T
1901-1930
r; 7 c C N L Q o p, G E I A f.j
V P D Y T F R 1931-20Q0
I.. T-
T
p f.T 5 "B G i. A TT N
U l\
x
Q J R i\ U X V Z P K JLJ D T>
4.
0 fi J.\. 2001-2030
K R fj 0 P T G A Z
T
2300-21.^ R V 8 Q E 0 M \J D V L X TsT
G u 1 V F 2031-2100
S X R X II D F T~ A z J S T r? uJ Y
c V p 11 "G E Q F Fj 2101-2130
,1200-2159 T E V F £• P K u L N 'if A u V 0 G T..T s R Y A C j. Q I 2131-2200
1300-1359 U. X Z Y S T I) p I ! ' i !
Xj T? o A Q G K c J N i\ V R B D 2201-2230
?T
V I V 0 IT N F T A Q Q
D T;
X
T
G J R E U •'v. H G Z •n 2231-2300
lij.00-lli.59 17 F itT» T z T3 P II y 8 D •• r
i',i I-1 L Y 4\A u i- Q U > i T 2301-2330­
X X K TT V U m B A R e
V.i
0 i'
zD cV
TT
IS U
T
F L y 0 S n. I 2331-21*00
Y V F / i . T J s c U I'i /j l.! TT
L T S G P ; j K r>
il.
•p T .T
iI 0 Q
! T* -r r;
1500-1559 Z S G L B p 0 Q R A 1 ! U X V
• p
J li! D T Y

Q TT
O I)
£ F IT t M 6 R s X
.ii
(J X '•J .i

T"\." T T J T 7 V •/
DAL3EI

OFFICIAL:

17ALSK

G-3

3ISTRI3UTI0H: »SM

Pa^e k
of 4 pages.
 MANEUVER , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

SIGNAL OPER/ITIOK INSTRUCTIONS

Radio Frequencies and Call Assignments

Item 13-1 AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackallj N C

15 September 19hk

!
Effective0001 EWT 23 Sep- hh

NET STATION
..CALL.. SIGIJ CALL SIGN FREQUENCY CODE
UNIT A. . B. A. B. DAY NIGHT I'JO. .
TASK FORCE

COMAI© 1TET #L (CW)

AB-TC Maneuver Hq ' :lGBU 1BD3 1AA7 CQ56 (1A)

AB-TC Hq (Maxton) P95l EK78 h09$ (13)

(13th AB Div. rr) 2066 (ic)

(60th TC llg Hq) 3800 (2A)

(2B)

13th AB Div He 1CD7 C317 2395 . (20)

(in DZ) '

' Note; Troop Carrier Serials in £!:« lit will be assigned code names and

call signs associated wl-!;o. their departure fields and their vserial

number in the Air Movement plan.

Field Voice CW

^ Prep." Prefix

MAXTON " BUGLE BB

LUMBERTON APPLE _ AA

POPE pom:it PP

MACKALL DUKE DD

Example: S e r i a l No. U t a k i n g off from liaxton would b e :

(1) Voice: "BUGLE FOUR"
(2) CW: "

• T A S K FORCE
^emmp ism? #2 (cw)
AB**TC Kan^uver Hq 2AJ7 AZ95 2IJ2 AL77 3180 (3A)
U175 (3B)
AB-TC Hq (Maxton) QK77 2220 (3C)
(13th AB Div rr)
(60th TC Wg Hq) 3830 (U)
(to)
13th AB Div Hq 2XS2 AH85 2UU6 (Uc)
(in DZ)

XXII CORPS
COMMA!© NET (CW) A. B.
XXII Corps Hq OS22 ZN96 W/a5 SD18 3735 (15A)
fc 13th AB Div Hq 1CD7 CB17 U965 (15B)
-x-llth Inf Div Hq
*-100th Inf Div Hq

•^Imaginary•
M ANEUVER­
Item 1 3 - 1 Page 1 of
11
 1
MANEUVER

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCT

Radio F r e q u e n

AB-TC Ilaneuver Hq.

Canp IJackall, II. C.
15 Septenbcr 19hh

Effective EWT 23 Septeriber 19hh

NET STATION
CALL SIGN CALL SIGN FREQUENCY CODE
UNIT A. B, B. A. B. No,

6 0 t h TC VJING
POINT-TO-POII.IT I JET (CW)

60th TG TTg Hq (Mart on) QP95 K781|. P951 EK78 (5A)

Pope 9GP2 KK79 6655 (SB)

Lumberton 9CP1 7QI0

* Mackall 71C-3 7PKU

V.K.F. AIRDROME CONTROL

NET (VOICE)
CliMJNEL C (6A)
llaxton BUGLE (XTAL B$9)
(1U2.92 me)
Pope PCMDER

Lumberton APPLE

l l a c k a l l DUKE

Aircraft use last three numerals of plane for call.

V.H.F. INTERPLANE

COM.IUNICATION N£T (VOICE) CHANNEL D (7A)

3l;9th TC Group (XTAL #357)

( 1 3 5 . 3 6 me)

1 s t P r o v , TC Group CHAKNEL D (7B)

(XTAL #325)
(131.9U me)

V.H.F« FIGHTER SUPPORT

L i a i s o n Channel (Voice) CHANNEL B (8A)
(XTAL #333)
(131;.28 me)

AMBULANCE IIET' (CVf & VOICE)

60th TC Vling Hq JWP92 2816 (9k)

Ambulance Squad #1 AK76 5897,5 (9B)

(Gnd t o Gnd)
Ambulance Squad #2 KP91

Ambulance Squad #3 JK76 CHANNEL C (9C)

Ambulance Squad #k 7IK3 (XTAL #359)

(1U2.92 me)
(Air - £n£Lj

THIRD' T.A.D. NETS

ilCVC Page 2
w of 11 pages
 •MANEUVER­

SIGNAL OPERATEW jNSTRUi

13-1
AB-TC Maneuver I-Iq
Camp K a c k a l l , K C
15 September 19Wi­

Effective EWT 23 Sep I4I4.

UNIT NET STATION

CALL SIGN CALL SIGN FREQUENCY CODE
A. B. A. B.

13th AB DIV COLID NET (CW)

CG 13th AB Div (Per, Call) JF9Q,1 95T6 • 3koh 990

Div Comd Post 1CD7 C317
Div Rr Ech -oo5 Y8G5
Div Arty
5E12 1IZ18
T.'O7r7
88th Gli Inf Regt
••- l - ' 1 87^2
326th Gli Inf Regt
5l5th Prcht Inf Regt 9ZU5 JSL9
129th AB Engr Bn Y186 B3A7
153d AB AA Bn 8XU9 926k
GG may enter any net at

DIV AGL-VJARNING NET (CW)

P9R9 A3l:li. 5760

Div Comd P o s t U755
Plane .uVFl 2D58
Div Arty 1DC2 T5U9
83th Gli Inf Regt J2Q5 C1G5
326th Gli Inf Regt 1C71 UQ31
5l5th Prcht Inf Regt Cl;X3 6U15
153d AB AA Bn M1Z2 U8V3

DIV ARTY F/D-NET (QW)

,; PGH9 B7YU 14.650
Div Arty —.—- $690
U58th Prcht FA Bn 51G1 V7?2
6 7 6 t h G l i FA Bn F6U6 5Z96
6 7 7 t h G l i FA Bn 63N2 M35

DIV ARTY AIR-GROUND NET (C¥)

E2P7 71T27 h60
Div Ar%- 5625
U53th P r c h t FA Bn D2E6 O5T9
6 7 6 t h G l i FA Bn S105
6 7 7 t h .Gli FA Bn H3V2 N802

M A N E U V E R

Item 13

 Radio Frequencies and Call Signs

13-1
AB-TC Maneuver Kq
Gamp Mackall, NC
15 September 1944
Effective 0001 EwT 23 Sep 44

UNIT NET CALL CALL FREQ CODE NO

DIV ARTY CONTROL k AA KIND A. 38,6 (10A)
AT EARNING NET (VOICE) B. 32.8 (10B)
Div Arty Comdr
Div Arty Exec 0 KINGFISH
Ln Plane No, 1 KINGFISH
Ln Plane No # 2 KINGFISH
Bn ComdJ*J 458th Prcht FA Bn KINGFISH
Exec 0,458th Prcht FA Bn KINGFISH
Bn Comdr, 676th Gli FA Bn KINGFISH
Exec 0, 676th Gli FA Bn KL\TGFISH
Bn Comdr, 677th Gli FA Bn KINGFISH
Exec 0, 677th Gli FA Bn KINGFISH

458TH PRCHT FA BN NETS

"A" BTRY FIRE- (VOICE) KINDLE A. 32 .8 (ICB;
DIRECTION NET B. 36 .8 (HA)
Bn Comdr KINGFISH 4
Exec 0 KINGFISH 5
Fire Direction Base Set
Btry Comdr KAPOK 1
Exec 0 KAPOK 2
Fwd ^bsr KAPOK 3
Ln 0 KAPOK 4
Spare KAPOK 5
"B" BTRY FIRE- (VOICE) KHAKI A, 28.0 (12A)
DIRECTION NET B. 32.8 (10B)
Bn Comdr KINGFISH
(Exec 0 KIIIGFISH
Fire Direction Base Set
Btry Comdr KALSOIilNE 1
Exec 0 KALSQJOLNE 2
Fwcl Obsr KALSOMINE 3
Spare KALSOl-ilNE 4

M A N E

Page 4

of 11 pages

 M A N E U V

SIGNAL OPERATIOF! INSTRUCTIONS

Radio Frequencies and Call Signs

13-1 *

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, NC

15 September 1944

Effective 0001 EWT 23 Sep 44

UNIT (458TH FA cont'd) NET CALL STATION CALL FR3Q CODE

A
"C" BTRY FIRE­ KEYNOTE A. 36.8 (11A)
DIRECTION NET (VOICE) B. 32.8 (10B)
Bn Comdr KINGFISH 4
Exec 0 KINGFISH
Fire Direction Base Set —,-
Btry Comdr •"LNEL 1
Exec 0 KERNEL 2
Fwd Obsr KERNEL
3
Ln 0 KERNEL
4
Spare KERNEL
5-

"D" BTRY FIRE- ' KNIT A. 38,6 (10A)

DIRECTION NET (VOICE) B. 32.8 (10B)

Bn Comdr KINGFISH
4
Exec 0 KINGFISH

Btry Comdr

AT Plat No. 1 KIMONO

X

AT Plat No. 2 KIMONO 2

AT Plat No. 3 KIMONO

3
AA Plat No. 1 KB:ONO
4
AAPlat No. 2 KIMONO
5
AA Plat No. 3 KI'XJNO
6
676TH GL1 FA BN NETS „ • •

"A" BTRYFIRE" KINGTOD A. 29.2 • (13A)

DIRECTION NET (VOICE) B. 34.2 (13B)

Bn Comdr KINGFISH
6
Exec 0 KIITGFISH
7
Fire Direction Base Set

Btry Comdr KEYSTONE

1
Exep 0, KEYSTONE
2
Fwd Obsr KKISTO^E
3
Ln 0 KEYSTONE
4

U A N E U V Z

page

of 11 pages

 M A N E U V E R

SIGNAL OPERA'S

Radio Fre

13-1

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Gamp Mackall, MC

15 September 1944

Effective 0001 EWT 23 Sep 44

UNIT (676TK FA cont»d) NET CALL STATION CALL s

FRECt
CODE

"B" BTRY FIRE- KNUCKLE A. 34.2 (13B)

DIRECTION NET (VOICE) B. 29.2 (13A)

Bn Comdr KINGFISH 6

Exec 0 KINGFISH
7

Fire Direction Base Set

Btry (jomdr
KODAK
1
Exec 0
KODAK
2
| Fwd Obsr
KODAK
3
r Ln 0
KODAK
L

677TH GLI FA BN NETS

"A" BTRY FIRE- KINGBOLT

A. 35.6 (14A)
DIRECTION NET (VOICE)
B, 30.6 (14B)
Bn Comdr
KINGFISH
8
Exec 0
KINGFISH
9
Fire Direction Base Set

Bn Comdr
KANSAS
1
Exec 0
KANSAS
2
Fwd Obsr KANSAS 3
Ln 0 KANSAS 4

"B" BTRY FIRE­ KEEP A. 30.6 (I4B)

DIRECTION NET (VOICE)
B. 35.6 (14A)
Bn Comdr
KINGFISH 8
Exec 0
KINGFISH 9
Fire Direction base Set

Btry Comdr
KITCHEN 1
M Exec 0
KITCHEN 2
Fwd Obsr
KITCHEN 3
Ln 0
KITCHEN 4

M A N E U

Page 6

of li pages

 MAN EfJWf.

SIGNAL

Radio Frequencies and ^

13-1

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, NC

15 September 1944

Effective 0001 ff/T 23 Sep 44

UNIT NET CALL .STATION CALLS EREQ CHANNEL CODE

OICE CTJ VOICE CW UP,

515TH PRCH?]INF KEGT NETS

REGTL CO1B) NET NK 86J2 M. 4440 (16A)

N. 5570 (16*)

A. 26 (16C)

B. 37 (16D)

Regtl Hq
1st Bn INDEX 1 (E4B1)

2d Bn INDEX 2 (T937)

3d Bn II'JJJx^L
3
(sn3)

1ST BN COMD NET INTERN 33 (17A)

18
(17B)

Bn Hq

Co. "An

Co. "B"
INPUT 2

Co.' "C"
INPUT
3
Spare
4
Spare
5
Spare INPUT
6

1ST BN CO NETS INVENT

Hq Co
I14PURE 3885 (18A)
Co. "An
INNOCEt•JT 4280 (18B)
Co. »B»
ETORT 4930 (18C)
Co.!'C11
ICICLE 5397.5 (18D)

2d BN COMD MET
ISLAND A. 19 (19A)
B. (19B)
Bn- Hq

Co. »D»

Co. "E"
ICEBERG 2
Co. "F"
ic'^^m3
Spare

Spare
ICEBERG 4
Spare
ICEBERG 5
ICEBERG 6

M A N E U V

Page 7

of 11 pages

 M A N E U V E R

13-1

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, NC

15 September 1944

Effective 0001 EMT 23 Sep 44

UNIT (515TH INF contM) NET CALL STATION CALLS FRSQ CHANNEL CODE
VOICE CW VOICE NO.
•2ND BN CO NETS ISSUE
Hq Co IVORY 4035 (20A)
Co. »D" Xh CijNSE 4397.5 (20B)
Co. "E» IRONSIDE 5205 (2oc;
Co. "F» INFORMAL 5437.5 (20D)
3d BN COHD NET INFECT A. 40 (21A)
B. 38 (21B)
Bn Hq. .
m Co. »G" IGLOO 1
Co. »H" IGI CO 2
Co. "I" IGLOO 3
Spare IGLOO 4
Spare IGLOO 5
Spare IGLOO 6
3d BN CO NETS ICE
Hq Co IUDIGO 4080 (22A)
Co. "GM IODINE 4840­ (22B)
Co. "H" INFANT 5327.5 (22C)
Co. "I" I I " iiVAL 5500 (22D)
88TH GLI INF RSGT NETS
REGTL CGfcaD NET NAG 12F6 0. 4915' (23A)
P. 5405 (23B)
A. 23 (23C)
B. 31 (23D)
Regtl .Kq
( 1st Bn NAl-fflSAKE 1 W5M6
2d Bn NAMESAKE 2 Cold

REGTL INTEL & RECON NET NAKED A. 5 (24A)

B. 14 (24B;
Regtl Hq
Patrol No, 1 NECKTIE 1
Patrol No, 2 N3CKTIE 2
Patrol No. 3 NECKTIE 3
REGTL AT NET NARROW A. 8 (25A)
B. 35 (25B)
Regtl Hq
AT Plat No, 1 NANCY
AT Plat No. 2
Spare NANCY

Page
I

of 11 pagej

 M A N E U V E R
* ^ fc

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRl

Radio Frequencies and Ca:

13-1

AB-TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, NC

15 September 1944

affective 0001 Et'/T 23 Sep 44

UNIT
NET CALL STATION
CHANNEL CODE

X88TH INF C o n t ' d ) VOICE CW VOICE

NO.

1ST BN COI4D NET NAVAL

A. 36 T26A)

B. 25 (26B)

Bn Hq

Co, "A"
NEGATIVE 1

Co. "B"
NEGATIVE 2

Co. »C"
NEGATIVE 3

1ST BN CO NETS
NECK

Hq Co
NECTAR
(ISA)

1 C o . "A"
i'EIGHBOR
4280 (IBB)

Go. "B"
.:ERVY
4930 (ISC)

Co. "C"
NEST
5397.5 USD)

2d mf COM!). NET NEGRO

A, 27 (27A)

B. 17 (27B)

Bn Hq.

Co, , » E "
NEEDLE 1
Co, , " F "
NEEDLE 2
Co.
NJ3DLE 3
2 d BIvI CO M
ETS NICE

Hq Co
NET..DRK 4035 (20A)
Go. "E"
NEUTRAL 4397.5 (20B)
Co "F"
NICOTINE 5205 (2GC)
Co. "G"
1:ICKEL 5437.5 (20D)

326TH GLI INF REGT NETS

REGTL COMD NET

KING (17B4)
Q. 4310 (28A)
R. 5390 (283)
A. 32 (28C)
R e g t l Hq
B. 24 (28D)
1 s t Bn
KAISER 1 (A8T9)
2d Bn
KAIS1SR 2 (57N3)
REGTL EECON 13ET A. 1 (29A)
B. 15 (29B)
R e g t l Hq
P a t r o l No . 1 KANGAROO 1

P a t r o l No . 2 r.I!GAROO 2

P a t r o l No . 3 LANGAROO 3

 INSTRUCTIONS

Radio Frequencies juid Call Signs

13-1
AB-TC Maneuver Hq
Camp Mackail, NC
15 September 1944

Effective 0001 EV/T 23 3ep 44

2SEL. (326th Inf cont'd) NET CALL .ION CALL FRSQ CHANNEL CODE

NO."

REGTL AT NET KILL A. 12 155A)

Regtl Hq B. 39 (30B)

AT Plat No. 1 KAYAK 1

AT Plat No. 2 KAYAK 2

Spare KAYAK 3

1ST BN COMD NET KINK A, 16 (31A)

B. 34 (31B)

» Bn Hq

Co. "A"

Co. "B"
Co. "C"
KATYDID
KATYDID
1

KATYDID 3

1ST BN CO NETS KITE

Hq Co ICENNEL 3885 (ISA)

Co. "A" KNIFE 4280 (1GB<)

Co. "B" KIDNEY 4930 (I8C)

Co. »C" KINKY 5397.5

USD)

2d BN CQMD NET KEEN A* 28 (32A)

B. 21 (32B)

Bn Hq

Co. "E"
I
Co. »F'r KNAPSACK
2

Co. »G"
3

2d BN CO NETS KEG

Hq Co KILLJOY 4035 (20A)

KITTY 4397 .5 (20B)

Co. KNOCKER 5205 (20C)

Co. KINGBIRD 5437 .5 (20D)

129TH AB ENGR BN NET NATURE 22 (33A)

Bn Hq B! 29 (33B)

Co.- "A" NOTION . 1

Co. "B" NOTION 2

Co. "C"
NOT:

Page 10

of 11 pages

 II A NE | f

SIGNAL o:

Radio Frequencies "lid Call Signs

13-1
IS^HC Ilanciiver Hq.
Carp l l a c k a l l , N . C .
1$ September ±9hh

Effective 0001 EITT 23 September ±9hh

UNIT • NET CALL STATION CALL FREQ CODE NO.

153d AB AA BN

BIT COID NET NO, 1 NSRYS 37.1

Bn Hq
Btry "A** NATIONAL 1
Btry »B " NATIONAL 2
Btry "C" NATIONAL 3

BN COID NET NO. 2 II4DEHT 28.3 (35A)

Bn Hq
Btry "D" IMAGE 1
Btry "E"
Btry itpn UIAGE 3

B t r y "A" HIPPIE °h .9 (36A)

B t r y "B"
B t r y »C»
NEURITIS
NOIECNAL
Sils (36B)
(36C)
31.7
IIUIBER 30.3 (36D)
NURSE 29.9 (36E)
Btr-r NUTI/EG 23.7 (36F)

FREQUENCY COMION TO ALL SETS 27.5 (37A)

DALBEY

OFFICIAL?
VJALSH
G-3

DISTRIBUTION ( s )

II A N E U V E of

\
 M A I I U V

Signal Ope rat 5** lift FFuct ions AB^TC Maneuver Hq

Telephone Directory Camp Mackall, & G
15-1 10 September 1944
Effective 0001 EWT 10 September 1944

TBL3PHOKE SWITCHING 05ITTBALS

^TO IT LOCATION SWITCHING C3ITTRAL

AB-TC Maneuver Hq. HACK ALL DUK31

AB^TC MAXTON BUfflLS)
349th TC Group POPS ( B a S e ) fcOWDSB
349th TC Group MAXTON ( O p e r a t i o n ) BULLDOG
1 s t Pfov, T.C. Group MACIIALL ( 3 a s e ) DUKE
1 s t 'Pfov. T.C. 'Group LUM3J3HT0N ( O p e r a t i o n ) APPL3
Det.••4-Bngine Cargo A/C MAXTON 3TJGL3

4 4 1 s t A i r Corps Resupply MAXTON BUGLE

Composit T a c t i c a l Group, MAXTON BUGL33

T h i r d TAD.

TELEPHONE NUMBJKS

CAMP MACKALL (Switchboard Name - Duke)

A3-.TC Maneuver H e a d q u a r t e r s

Director , DHKE 21 DUKE 2b

Deputy Director ... DUKE> 21 Ordnance. ••
...•••*•
DUKE k6
Asst." Director..
DUKE- 532
Surgeon.••..••••••••••••
DUKE
Admin,' Assistant
• DUKE £34
Antiaircraft•••••••.•••.
DUICE Skh
G/A-l...
DUKE
Engineer (Air-Ground)...
DUKE 9ah
G / A - 2 . . . . . .
DUKE
Quartermaster...........
DUKE he
G/A-3..
DUKE
provost Marshal•••••••••
DUKE $kh
G-3 (AB)...... •
DUKE 38
];Iotor Transportation.• •.
DUICE 530
Asst. G/A-3 HJKE 521 Air Transportation......
DUIS 521
Kq Commandant «•. •
DUKE
r
56
AG
DUKE 53U
Kefssage C enter..........
DUKE )30
Signal (Air-Ground)
DUKE £33
XXII Corps Ln. 0.•••..;.
DUKE 521
(Airborne)
• .DUKE 33
Tactical Air 0 •.
DUKE 521
Chief Umpire
DUKE 538

MACKALL Airfield

Operations.
DUKE' 26O

13th Airborne Division

Commanding General...
JDUKE 356 G-3... «
DUKE 35"/

Chief of Staff
DUKE 355 G-U
DUKE k39

•1IAXT0N ARiiY AIR BASE (Smtciiboard Name - Bugle)

Commanding Officer........... BUGLE o

Engineer .••«•
BUGLE 15

Executive,
BUGLE
5
Statistical Officer.•.••
BUGLE

Adjutant
BUGLE
Radar Officer...••••...•
BUGLE 10

ATI.•-••.•..:•.•;-•-.-....*.'••....
BUGLE 1
Message Center..........
BUGLE 11

A-2 ....'...•.....,
BUGLE
2
Pigeon Loft•••••••••••••
BUGLE 26

BUGLE
3
Ordnance.•••••••••••••••
35

,.......•...'........•
BUGLE
Weather Officer.........
BUGLE 17

Communications Officer....... BUGLE

k
Army Sup Pt #2 ' CRations)*
BUGLE 353

C .W.0. • *.. BUGLE

23
Army Sup *Pt #i;(C:as T-Ofl')'
BUGLE 352

Surgeon. '.',.. BUGLE

8
Army Sup Pt #6[(&£ '^pj.*
'BUGLE 19

60th Wg Frov Sig Co.....'.V..'. BUGLE 21

Det U-E'rig Cargo" "A/C'» •'• .*.*
BUGLE h00

11 A N E U V

Page 1

of li pages

Commanding General.. BUGLE 306 Ordnance BUGLE 325

Asst Commanding"General....* BUGLE 3jfe Quartermaster .« BUGLE 32.S'

Chief of Staff..... BUGI£ 306 Surgeon.••••••••••••••••••• BUGLE 325

Commanding"General,Div Arty. BUGLE 322 Message Center BUGLE 311

(4) BUGLE 301 Loading Point Officer....... BUGLE 351

BUGLE 302 Ammunition Dump.•»••••••••• BUGLE 35U

G-3. BUGLE 303 Bivouac Area #1............. BUGLE 323

G-Iw ......*...... BUGLE 30U Bivouac Area #2............ BUGLE 32U

AG....... ... BUGLE 307 Army Sup Ft #2 (Rations)... BUGLE 353

Signal Officer. BUGLE 310 Army Sup Pt #U (Gas cVOil). BUGLS 352

Engineer Officer.••.....•••• BUGLE 310 3978th QM Truck Co......... BUGLE U01

Chemical Ylarfare Officer.... BUGLE 310 Ul05th QM Truck Co......... BUGLE U02

Hq Commandant............... BUGLE 32? Iil07bh QM Truck Co BUGLE h03

Provost Uarshal »• BUGLE 327 130th Evacuation Hospital.. BUGLE h0k

LUHBERTON ARMY AIR BASE ' POPE FIELD, FORT BRAGG

(Switchboard Name - Apple) . (Switchboard Hame '- Powder)

Army Sup Pt #2 (Rations).... BUGLE 353 Army Sup Pt #L (Rations)... POWDER 51

Army Sup Pt {fk (Gas & Oil).. BUGLE 352 Army Sup Ft #3 (Gas & Oil). POHDER $2

trmy Sup Pt #6' (AC Sup)

ivouac (A/B)
BUGLE 19
APPLE 306
Army Sup Pt #5 (AC Sup).... POWDER 3'3

Bivouac (A/B) PO17DER $k

Subordinate Airborne-Troop Carrier Units

Airborne Forces

tlaxtou Lumbertori

CT

Switchboard. BULLDOG APPLE POTDEh

Airborne Liaison................. BULLDOG 301 APPLE 301 POl'JDER 3 0 1

Commahding1 Officer BULLDOG 306 APPLE 306 POIIDER 306

S-2......... BULLDOG 302 APPLE 302 PG^DER 302

3-3.i..».. BULLDOG 303 APPLE 303 POilDER 303

S-iu.. .*..... BULLDOG 30U APPLE 30k POvJDER 301i

Message Center.;..;..........'.... BULLDOG 11 APPLE 11 11

Troop Carrier Groups

i Mackall T
'n .ton Lumberton

1st Prov Gp 3h9th Gp 1st Prov Gp

Switchboard DUKE BULLDOG APPLE POYIDER

Commanding Officer....... DUKE BULLDOG 6 APPLE 6 PO11DER 6

S-l............. DUKE 60 BULLDOG 1 APPLE 1 PONDER 1

S-2............. DUKE 1*21 BULLDOG 2 APPLE 2

POHDER 2

DUKE 69 BULLDOG 3 APPLE 3 POTHER 3

s-i;!!!!!!!*!!"//. •*•«..
DUKE 61 BULLDOG h APPLE h

Communications'Officer;.. DUKE 77 BULLDOG 10 APPLE 10 FG7DER 1 0

Message Center... DUKE 77 BULLDOG 11 APPLE 11 PCHDER 1 1

Engineer Officer DUKE 71 BULLDOG 15 APFLE 15 PONDER 1 5

Troop Carrier Squadrons of 1st Prov Gp

Based at Camp MACKALL

316th Sq 3l7th/3l+2d 3l8th/3U3d Sq

Switchboard....,.., DISPLAY DUKBilR

Commanding Officer. U6 56 -66 36 26

hi 57 67
37 27

S-2 U2 (Diamond)
32 22

(Diamond) (Diamond)
(33 ) ( .— )

Page 2
15-1 of It pageb
 Troop Carrier Sq

Based at Camo

316th Sq

hk (Diamond) 6k (Diamond) 2k
( 5k ) ( 3k )
Communication Officer*...... (Diamond)
(Diamond) (Diamond) (Diamond) (Diamond)
igineer Offie er............ (Diamond)
{ $10 ) { 510 ) ( 310 ) ( 210 )
(Diamond) — (Diamond) (Diamond)
(• U5 j
) ( 315 ) ( 215 )
O p e r a t i n g from LUIiBSRTON

3l6th Sq 3 I 7 t h / 3 k 2 d Sq 3 l 8 t h / 3 k 3 d Sq

Switchboard. ACADEMY ACROBAT AMTELOPE

Commanding" O f f i c e r . . . . . . . . . . ACADEMY 6 ACROBAT 6 AHTELOPE 6
S-3, S-2-.... ACADEMY 3 ACROBAT 3 AtfTELOPE 3

Troop C a r r i e r Squadrons of 3k9th TO Group

Based a t POPE FIELD

311th-Sq 312th Sq 313th Sq 31kth Sq

.tchboard........ PACKARD Pi\DDOCK PASSPORT

ling Officer PACKARD 6 PADDOCK 6 PALACE 6 PASSPORT 6

S-l. PACKARD 1 Pi\DDOCK 1 PALACE 1 PASSPORT 1
S-2..*......... PACKARD 2 PADDOCK 2 PALACE 2 PASSPORT 2
S-3. PACKARD 3 PADDOCK 3 P/U \-r\V ^ PASSPORT 3
S-k . PAC KARD k PADDOCK P A T "' f TT> ) i

h PASSPORT k
Communications officer...... PACKARD 10 PADDOCK 10 PALACE10 PASSPORT 10
PASSPORT 15

Engineer Officer • PACKARD 1$ FADDOCK 15 PALACE 15

Operating fi'om UAXTOK

31i|th Sq

311th Sq 312th 313th Sq

BEAVER

Switchboard BAGPIPE BAuBOO BARLEY BEAVER 6

Commanding" Officer BAGPIPE 6 BAMBOO 6 BARLEY 6

BEAVER 3

S-3, S-2 BAGPIPE

Telephone 3
Service BA253OO 3 BARLEY
to Subordinate 3
Units

Airborne
1. Telephone connections to such regimental subordinate units

avs battalion combat teams TO.11 be available by joint use of 1st Pro­
visional Troop Carrier Squadron and 3k9th Group switchboards.

2. To contact equivalent Airborne commanders and staff offi­

cers as are listed for Troop Carrier squadrons, use the same tele­
phone numbers*

of k page*5

 STATION CALL

LOCATION CODE MAI-IE SIGN

AB-TC Maneuver H q . . . MACIIALL DUKE DIR

13th .AB Division Ln...» MACKALL DUKE DBA

1st Prov TC Group (Base) MACKALL DUKE DTC

13th AB Division Hq HAXTO1J BUGLE BAB

60th TC Wing Hq. MAXTM* BUGLE WIG

3U9th TC Group. IIAXTON ^ BUGLE BGP

3U9th TC Group (Base) POPE PONDER PAC

Airborne In POPE PONDER PCT

1st Prov TC Group LJ}1BEET0N APPLE APV

Airborne Ln L Tr ;/^rON APPLE ADI

SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR HAXTOH BUGLE BOP

CONFERENCE NEP

The following stations are in a teletype conference net;

LOCATION CODE NAME CALL SIGN

lilAXTON BUGLE BCQ

MACKALL DUKE DHQ

LUMBERTON APPLE ALL

POPE • POWDER &M.

COLLECTIVE (NET) CALL SIGN — QST .

General Teletypewriter derating Instructions

1. Combined Teletypewriter procedure per FI.I 2J4.-8 will'be used.

2. Not more than five messages should be sent at one time.

3. To call switchboard operator, make a two-second break with break \zey of

' TT. • '

!+• Operator answers with call sign of switchboard.

5« Calling station then types call sign of station wanted.

60 Operator makes connection, starts motor of called printer and sends bell

signal to attract/attention of called station.

7. Called station answers by typing own call sign.

8. Calling station proceeds with message per FM 2U-8.

9. Called station may break in on sending station by operating spacing bar

of teletypevjriter several times, (Caution: Do not use the break key for

this as it will call the switchboard operator in on the circuit.)

To end transmission, calling station operator will make a two (2) second

break with-break key. Operator will, monitor on line, seeing no traffic

he vri.ll press motor stop and disconnect the call.

\ I ( DALBEY

OFFICIAL; \LJfulA ....^t^^f\

DISTRIBUTION: (3) M

of h pages

 M A N E U V E R ­

SIGNAL OPERATION

Visual, Sound and WarninfrSignals

15-1 AB-TC Maneuver Hq
Camp 1/iackall, II C
1$ September 1?UU

Effective 0001 E3T 23 Sep hh

- Smoke Signals

GROUND TO AIR;

Signa-1; Meaning;

Orange Isolated, emergency supplies

needed.

Violet . Objective taken.

Rod Enemy resistance or target.

Yellow I am friendly.(Mark front lines)

Green • Use 1st bomb release line.

(or primal target).

II - Aircraft Signals

Signal; -Moaning;

Aircraft rocks wings* Display unit identification

panels. t

Short climb and dive. Understood.

Short climb and dive, ..' • ".

executed twice. Friendly plane.

Short climb and. dive

executed three times. Not understood.

Fishtail flying toward enemy. Enemy mechanized units

approaching from, this direction.

Ill - Seund Signals

Signals by horn, Yrhistie, siren, klaxon. Individuals call out natur?

of impending danger and indicate its direction.

Signals; . Meaning;

One short. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attention

One long . . . « • • • • » Cease firing

One short — One long . . . . . . . . Report to G-3(S~3) for

orders.

Two long . . . . , . . . • • • . . . Prepare to displace GF

Three short • • • • • • • • • • • • Enemy air or Paratroops

Three long . . . . . . . . . . . . . Enerny mechanized troops

Four long . • • • • • . . All Clear

Percussion sounds by striking metal against metal rapidly and con­

tinuously, using triangles, iron rails, empty cartridge cases, .etc.,

indicate GAS ALARM.

II A II E U V E _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ —
Item 1 6 - 1 Page 1 of
2 pages.,
M ?! •*'! * * '
 M A II E U V E

SIGNAL OP
Visual, Somcjy^fH/Tarning Si finals
Item 16-1 AB-TC Maneuver Kq

Camp Mackall, IT <2

15 September UU

Effective SWT 23 Sep hh

Air WaAirigs

RADIO (CW) RADIOPHONE (VOICE)

Warnings on (C1T) will be preceded Give "Flash" twice, number of

by a series of "Urgents"(0,0,0,) planes and direction of approach.

Any detailed information of air-

AIE* craft will follow warning.

A77N . . .
AWW ' ' (ex#) "Flash Flash three planes
MIS west. Three planes west",
"Enemy fighters flying low."

Tank Warnings

TWE* Give "Flash" tvd.ce, number of

tanks and call word of likely

TW unit to which attack is directed.

Detailed information to follows

warning.

(ex.) "Flash, Flash, six tanks

Tiger Six tanks Tl^er". "Six

enemy medium tanks approaching

in column on-River .Road two miles

north of Tiger".

3as Warning

GWE-* Give "Flash" twice, gas warning

and. call word of unit •oncer attack.

Details to follows warning,

(ex.) "Flash, Flash (tear) Oat

Warning Tripod Gas Warning Tripod",

"Tear gas from airplanes (mortars)

(arty)".

---(The last letter of each group indicates direction of attack.)

The "All Clear" signal -rill be - tven V C f o r CW) or "All Clear" re­
peated twice followed by type of v:,. ...jig cleared, which is followed by

another "AC" or "All Clear"*

(ex.) AC, AC, AWE, AC, or " A H Clear, Air Warning East, All Clear".

DALBEI:

OFFICIAL:!?-. •*

DISTRIBUTION; (S)

 "Vehicle Identification Code

AB-.TC Maneuver Hq

Camp Mackall, F C

15 September 1944

Effective 0001 -5WT 23 Sep 44

1. JPor identifying the leading and last vehicles in a column, white strip

will "be displayed on the hood of the vehicle.

*2. lor odd days of the month the single strip patterns will "be used.

even days of the month the double strip ~.• i,terns will "be used.

ODD EVEN

7777777/7
W////A
7/7/777771,

3. When using patterns one (l), three(3), and five (5) display yellow

strip of

4. V/hen using patterns two (2), and four (4), and six (6) display white

and red strips of panels AP-,50-A as follows!

a. Pattern two (2) red strip on right side top looking forward,

white on left side.

b,, Pattern four (4) red strip forward, white strip in rear.

c. Pattern six (6) red strip on top of white strip.

(*) Six different patterns are given above. Start with number 1

for 33rd of September, and repeat every six days.

DAL3SY:

WALSH,

DISTRIBUTION: <S)

&££ 2

age

1 page.

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Gamp Mackall, N. C.

-These Spaces for Message Center Only

Time Filed Msg Cen No. How Sent TT

MESSAGE (Submit to Message

Center in Duplicate)

N0._ DATE 21; September

TO CG 13th AB DIV

COs 60th TC VJ'G, 3k9th TC Gp, 1st PRQV GP,

C O M TACT GP

MANEuVEE-CONFIDENTIAL-SIGNAL OPERATION

KSTRUCTIONS. EITHER AP-5O-A YELLOW PANELS

OR YELLOW SJ.5OICE OR BOTH AUTHORIZED TO MARK

FRONT LINES.

1000

Official Designation of Sender Time Signed

Authorized to be on teletype II. M. Brandt

sent in clear Signature of Officer

1.1. lu. BRANDT, Lt CoFsC

Signature and Grade of Writer

.These Spaces for Message Center Only ., , .

Time Filed llsg Cen No, Ko'vT Sent TT

aiU'
(Submit to Message

Center in Duplicate)

NO. h DATE 2U September

TO CG 13th AB DIV

COs 60th TC 7;G5 3U?th TC GP, 1st PROV TC GP,

COliP TACT GP

MANEUVER - SECRjJT SOI ITEM 12-1 OCCASION MAY

ARISE FOR SENDER TO INITIATE DIRECT AUTHENTICA­

TION (EX: NCS TO..STA OBSERVING RAD SILENCE) IF

SO CHALLENGE LETTERS AND AUTHEN COMBINED AS h

LETTER GP IN CALL UP EXP 2 PAGE 3 VJOULDBE 1|NP

1 L+l:\j U j-P/jc-Y-'

Dir AB-TC Man Ilq

j

Official Designation of Sender

Authorized to be M M Brandt
} Time Signed

sent in clear—TT Signature of Officer

j

M. H. BRANDT, Lt Col SC

Signature and Grade of Writer

Page 1 of 2 Pages

 -These Spaces for Message Center Only-

Time Filed i
j How Sent TT

j ?.Tsg C e n N o .

MESSAGE (Submit to Message

Center in Duplicate)

NO. 5 DATE
2k September

TO CG 13th AB DIV

COs 60th TC WG73u9th TC GP, 1st PROV GP,

COMP TACT GP

MANEUVER - SECRHT SOI ITEM 13-1 PAGE 2A 1st

COMP TACT GP VHP NET ADD 1ST TAC RON SQ (.4-20)

STA CALL SVEREAOI FREQ A. CODE NO

Dir A8-TC Man Hq

Official Designation of Sender Time Signed

Authorized to be M M Brandt

sent in clear—TT Signature of Officer

M. M. BRArlljT, Lt Col SC

Signature and Grade of Writer

Page 2 of 2 Pages
 AEffiORrE-TROOP CARRIER MA1EUVER HEADQUARTERS
Ganp Mackall, IJorth C a r o l i n a

20 September 19hh
Change No. 1)
to S.O.I. )

So much of twenty-six (26) l e t t e r check, pago 8 of Cipher Key' L i s t s ,

Item 5-1 of Signal Operation Sis true t i o n s , dated 1$ Soptenibcr 19hk> i s
anondod to road as folloiTc:

LVTVO BHOHY UMU E-HE0 QLOZI A

DKLBKI

OFFICIAL: : p f \ \

G~3

1I (S)
 g A IT E U V

AIRBO!tlE-TROOP CAtaiSR IIulETJVSR- liZIi

Canp IiaclcaXl, ITorth C a r o l i n a

22 Septc:±>cr ±9hh
Change Ho. 2)

to 5.0.1. )

1. For identifying XA~'kon, k x k9 truckc, Volucle Identification

Code patterns will be displayed on tlie hood of the vehicle,

2. Paragraph One (1) of Iton 17-1 is rcccinded and instead a col­

tu:m of vehicles m i l display the pattern of the day on loading and last

vehicle of the colurin. Additional vehicles so narked nay be interspersed.

in the coluxm as required.

DALBSY

OFFICI/OL: i *; -x

G-3

DISTTIIBUTIOK:
 Pyrotechnic end Sffldke Code

Maneuver Hg.
Camp Mackall, N C
19 September 1944

Effective SV8? 23 September

1 # -a. Each tug and each glider will carry:

Two (2) each M^.ll red star flares.
Two (2) each M-16 "blinker green star flares.

b. In addition each glider will carry:

Two (2) each red fuzes.

(2) each green fuseof.

Red Star Aircraft in distress,

injured personnel.
Red 3\xzee to distress location.
Blinker Green Flare Aircraft down safely, no
medical aid necessary.
Green $0 aid required.
a* When a glider is accidently released the ce-pilot of the follow­
ing tug will report the fact lay radio, Using prearranged message
codet - X%m\".'Som 8~1, this 5.0..I.'

"b. After the glider is down the M-ll Red Jlara- will be fired if
medical aid i s required and the Red 3Tuzee will "be l i t to guide
the rescue party.

c. If the glider lands safely (©.titside the maneuver area) the pilot
will fire an M-16 Green Blinker Hare which will indicate that
no medical aid is required. A Green Puzee will also lie l i t to
further Minify that no aid i s needed.

d. No Pyrotechnics will be fired in the Glider landing zone, except

those used by Pathfinder teams*
Di&BEY:

. l r \
OFFICIAL: I

DISTHI3IPTI0H (S>

a A 1 1 2 1 1

 M A O U O

Signal Operation Instructions

Radio Frequencies and C a l l Signs

13-1 AB-TC Maneuver Hq>
Cairro M a ckall, H" C
23 Set>temher 1944
Effective 2VT S3 Sep 1944

1. Reference to S.O.I, Item 13-1 nage 2 Third T.A.D. nets the

following information is issued concerning those nets:

(a) T h i r d T.A.D. has Ijeen changed t o 1 s t T.A.D.

("b) F r e q u e n c i e s and c a l l names a r e :

STATION CODS
CALL

1 s t TAD Net (Maneuver Kqs ^ MACKALL)

TAD Radic S t a t i o n ( H a n e u v e r Hq S ) (38)

ACT (Advance Control Team w/Hq

13'ch A3 D i v i s i o n ) DOCTOR

*(?or this maneuver only a few representatives with 2 radio

stations will "be present. A tactical Control Center is

assumed to control and relay traffic "between ACT and TAD

Radio Station)

1st Composite Tactical Group

•*• n t ^ r - p l p n e and Air-Ground.

408th F i g h t e r Squadron MCKINL3Y CHAHHBL C #E'/l

Alternate B
409th lighter Squadron HAHDI1TG CHAU3ISL D #303
124O3 me

2. V ^ . F . F i g h t e r Suppcrt, Liaison Channel (Voice) Channel 3 Code

(8A) i s rescinded herewith.

DAL33Y:

05TICSR:

DISTRIBUTION (s)
MANS
Item 1 3 - Page 2a of
11 pages.

«J 1
 M A i, JJ U v j.j i t

IGiy^ OF;jy,AT?:OIT JlISxTtUCTIOIB

FassTiords and R e p l i e s

18-1

AB-TC Uaneuver Hq.

Canp Ijackall, Il.C,
22 Septerser l?!^

Exf ective 1800 51TT 2li Sep hk

1. Folloiririg identification "w'ord.s are prescribed for identification

betiToen a l l units« (Riblialiecl Tri'bli concurrence IDCII Corps.)

2. Reproduction of thio iten in iihcle or in part is not authorized.

DiDGeizUiation of identification '.rovd.3 xnJJ. be oral.
nv '••
ISFLZ
"TIALT1' CCERllX l3jZi0 2^ Sep - 0600 26 Sep
a^rsns LOUSY 0601 26 SQ-D - 0600 27 Sep
"T ^ ! ! CKD3R 0601 27 Sep - 1200 29 Sep
"IIALT" HE TIT 1201 2? Sep ~ 1800 1 Oct
'ITT ALT" AI3STJI.IT GUARDHOUSE 1801 1 Oct ~ 1800 2 Oct
i!" IALT" ami . 1801 2 Oct - 1200 U Oct
I IT IALT" TliLLOTT IIIFS 1201 k Oct - 1600 6 Oct

OFFICIAL:

DISKIBUTIOITs

ItGill 1 8 - 1

II A II Z 11 V I
 A /sU V Ei\ HQ .
r 0 TO

POWOL'/{(P0P£)
•••<Gf>.

:
Bwcm
/%* My'

$TAT/OA/ ft

OfFlee
 TELEPHOHS TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

Corrected to 221200 Sept 1944

60th TC Wg.
TiiSK PORCH
13 AIH GHD
txx.

c o 349 th Gp.
i
SIR

(
r i
UKP
(Base)

153d Ak B n
129th Sngr B n
713th Crd Co
222d Med C o (-)
MP P l a t

515th Gli

88th

336th Gli I n f H g
676th Gli 3U 3 n
CG Divarty
513th 5ig Co

3d ?Ifvt? 222d Med Co 458th Pcht

409th QA'I CO 677th Gli
130th

DISTRIBUTIOH (3) Lt. Col. Sig C,

Signal Officer,
 AB-TC MANEUVER; HEADQUARTERS

Camp MackaH, N. C.

30 September 19UU.

MESSAGE CENTER TRAFFIC

Total from 0001Q to 2,U00Q

IN OUT

Teletype 85 99

Radio 19

Pigeon kQ 0

Messenger 12 8

Total 16k 122

Grand Total 286

Radio Communication Notes:

2k September 19hk

2001 (8 pm) Contact TriLth maneuver headquarters at Maxton established

and has remained continuous since then,

2315 (11:15 pm) Contact established with 13th Airborne Division at DZ and

has remained continuous since that time.

29 September l$kk Closed Task Force Nets at

Telephone Traffic Note:

^ No figures available on Telephone Traffic as telephone switchboard ser­

vice Maneuver Headquarters was handled by the Camp Hackall Administrative

Telephone System.

Personnel used for Task Force Headquarters Communication consisted of

the folio-wing:

I4ESSAGB CENTER

-''-$- Message Center Clerks (667)

5 - Teletype Operators (237)

1 - Teletype Mechanics (239)

3 - Cryptographers (805)

1 - Clerk Typist {kO$)

-x-x 3 - Messengers (590)

fc *- 1 Message Center clerk supplied by 8£th Sig Bn.

r -JHt 1 Messenger supplied by Airborne Center.

Radio Section

-"- 12 - Radio Operators (756-766)

2 - Radio Mechanics (15k)

* 6 Radio Operators (766) supplied by 85th Sig Bn,

INCLOSURE N0« 2 - 1 ­
 Signal. Office

1 - Wire Chief (261)

1 - Clerk Typist (l;O5)

'•* 1 - Communication Off. (0200)

-x- Used as Message Center'ahd "Radio Officer.

Equipment used at Task Force Headquarters for 'communication purposes

were:

2 - Typewriters, MC 88

2 - Teletype Machines, EE 97

U ~ Telephones, EE 8

2 - Converters, M-209

1 - Stamp, Number

1 - Stamp, Time, MC-181

1 mi. - Yifire, 1/7110

-x- 2 - Pistols, Automatic, .k$ cal.

-x-x- 1 - Jeep, Radio

-''- Borrowed from 1st Prov Group

-x~x- Borrowed from XXII Corps Motor Pool.

Radio Station

2 - Radio Sets, SCR-188

* 2 - Power Units, PE-75

-x-x- 2 - Tents, Pyramidal

-x- Used for stand-by purposes. Borrowed from

35th Sig Bn #

-x-x- Siipp^.ied from Comdt Hq Co, Airborne C e n t e r ,

Camp i l a c k a l l , N« C.
 828th SIGNAL PIGEON DETACHMENT

AIRBORNE CENTER

Camp Mackall, North Carolina*

30 September 19hh*

SUBJECT: Report of Pigeons used in Air-Phase of 13th AB Division Maneuvers.

TO: Signal Officer, Airborne Center, Camp Mackall, N. C.

1. The following shows the distribution of Pigeons stationed at Maxton

Arrny Air Base representing 13th Division Rear Echelon.

UNIT BIRDS NUMBER ROUTINE NO AVERAGE

SUPPLIED TACT MSG RELEASES MSG TIME

5l3th Sig Co 16 10 6 0 1 hr.

gljth Prcht Inf Regt 8 0 7 1 killed 1 hr. 15"

88th Glider Inf Regt k 0 h 0 1 hr. 5"
Division Artillery k 1 3 0 1 hr. 8"

TOTALS 32 11 20

2» The following shows the distribution of Pigeons stationed at Camp

Mackall and representing XXII Corps.

513th Sig Co 32 21 111 h 17"

2 killed
326th Gli Inf,Ledbetter 16 11 k 2 injured Uo»
83th Glider Inf k 0 h 0 25"
Maxton Msg Cen 26 5 21 0 30"
TOTALS 78 37 U3

3, No Pigeons were lost doing communication work during the maneuvers.

Three pigeons were killed and two badly injured. One was killed by the 5l5th

Prcht. Inf.. Regt. during the night jump. The bird was in a canvas vest strapped

on the chest of the Communication man. Two others were killed when a parachute

Tailed to open while resupplying the 2nd Bn., 326th Glider Infantry Regiment ,••

isolated at Ledbetter Dam,

lu .All messages received were delivered to the proper message centers and

a signed Local Delivery List received for each message.

HENRY F. TOLD

1st Lt., Sig C.

Detachment Commander

INCLOSURE NO. 3 mm 1 —.
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER i:AN3UVSR HEADQUARTERS

Camp Eackall, North Carolina

•ABTCQI-.: . 29 September 1944

SIJBJECT: Air Quartermaster Report on Faneuver A c t i v i t i e s ,

TO : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver; Camp

Fa c k a 1 1 , Nor th Carolina.

1« The Air Quartermaster engaged in activities relative to

Class I, I I , and III supplies at Laurinburg-Kaxtpn Army Air Base, i

a Class III station under the jurisdiction of the I Troop Carrier

Command and observed particularly the resupply activities directed

by the 60th Troop Carrier '71 ng and accomplished by the 1st Air

Cargo Resupply Squadron.

2 , Supply activities at Army Supply Point # 2 , Laurinburg­

T'axton Army Air B a s e ,

(a) Personnel:

1. personnel available to the Quartermaster to

accomplish receipt, storage and issue of all

classes of supply to regular base units and

units engaged in the maneuver was as follows:

Enlisted Civilian
a. Administrative 1 ' 3
b. Class I 11 10
c. Class II 6 19
d. Class i n 0 14
2, Ten Individuals of the normal complement of

enlisted personnel were furnished from D-2 un­

til D+3 day to supplement with ether AAP per­
sonnel from I.'axton the 1st Air Cargo Resupply

Squadron,

(b) Operations•

1. Class I

a. Based upon strength estimates furnished by

G-4 of the division and A-4 of the *7ing,

components for a Class A field ration were

obtained for consumption on D-l and D day

for the "/ing and division units and on D+6

for division units. An additional Class A

field ration was held In reserve to be Issued

at 1600, 24 September for consumption on 25

September in the event that the division was

not lifted on H hour of D da}-, 24 September,

b. Type C, E, and D rations for consumption by

the division after D day were furnished by

division Quartermaster through Arry Supply

Point jj'l, A portion of the type C rations

used by the division were delivered through

Arr-y Supply point #2. C rations for Air

Corps units were furnished upon estimates

furnished through the 60th Wing.

2. Class II

a. All supplies In storage were made available

to units of the division and the wing upon

requisition,

- 1 ­
Air Quartermaster Report on Faneuver Activities (cont'd)

3. Class III

a. Three gasoline stations were made available

for issue of gasoline and lubricants on a

24 hour basis from D-2 to D+5.

b, Road map of Laurinburg-Eaxton Army Air

Field was made available and direction

signs posted to locate all supply points,

(c) Issues D-2 through D+5,

1.. Glass I Division Wing

a. Class A Fiold Rations 28,000 1525

b. Typo C Field Rations 9,000' 3428

c. Ice, lbs 28,500 1500

d. Halazone, tablets, each 100,000

2, post psir-g and station equipment as authorized

by T/A 20 was issued to division and w ing to

completely equip 42 forty-man barracks and 4

throe hundred-man mess halls. Administrative

equipment for the division and wing was Issued

Including Ci desks, 403 chairs, 21 tables, 15

tables, (camp folding), 8 typewriters and 10

paulins.

3. Class III

a,
Gasoline (Premium Grade) 34,000 gallons.

b. Lubricants 990 gallons.

(d) Observations:

The flow of Quartermaster supplies of all classes

to using units was very satisfactory. This was

accomplished because of the very excellent cooper­

ation, coordination and accurate estimate of re­
quirements b"; the G—4 and A-4 Faneuver Headquarters,

Division G-4 and Quartermaster, wing A-4 and

Quartermaster Supply Officers at Laurlnburg-raxton

Air I3aso,

JCS3PII S . HARRIS
r a j o r , QTC
A i r Qua.r t e rma s t e r

- 9. ­
 AIRBORiiE-TROOP CARRIER 1.A13UVSR HEADQUARTERS

Camp Fackall, lTorth Carolina

ADTCQJ" 29 September 1944

SUBJECT: Observation of r'aneuvcr Operation of 1st Air Cargo

Resuppiy Squadron.
TO : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier I'aneuver, Camp
1'ackall, ITorth Carolina.

1. The 1st Air Cargo Resuppiy Squadron was activated to

provide the necessary organization to receive, package and load :

supplies required to be delivered by air transport to Army Ground

Forces•

a. The organization and equipment of this unit are

given in columns AA, 3D, CA and CG of T/O and E

1-470, 23 lay 1944. The total authorized strength

is 10 officers and 219 enlisted men. All officers

are to be transportation officers, qualified to

handle cargo, with a specification serial number

0612.

b. The purpose of this unit as stated in T/O and E

1-470 is to receive, package and tftcre all classes

of supplies arriving at designated concentration

points for delivery tc final destination by air

transport; distribute and move supplies tc airplane

take-eff points; load airplanes and in exceptional

cases, assist in unloading air cargo from airplanes

in flight.

c. It is anticipated that tc accomplish certain missions,

additional transportation and labor would be re­

quired. Such additions of personnel and equipment

to be furnished b" the commander ordering the aerial

resuppiy.

d. Reference is made to Itr Hq AAP, 22 !:ay 1944, sub­

ject Supply by Air, file APACT-4. The following is

quoted from that Itr:

!f
lst Air Cargo Resuppiy Squadron will be activated

on or about 1 Juno 1944, under jurisdiction of the

Air Service Command for manning, organizing ana

completion of basic training. Upon completion of

basic training, .and when the unit is capable of ex­

ercising its own administrative functions, it will

be transferred to the jurisdiction of I Troop Car­

rier Command which command it is anticipated may

need the assistance of the Airborne Command jln the

air cargo training of this unit.1'

2, Training.

a. M F training Standard 40-19, 3 m y 1944 was pub­

lished as a guide. The training objective is des­
cribed la the, samo terraa as expressed in the remarks

column T/O and. E 1-470 which is given in par. 1b

above•

b. The unit was moved to Lawscn Field, Port Banning,

Georgia and passed to the jurisdiction of the I

Troop Carrier Command on S August 1944.

- 1 ­
Observation of Maneuver Operation of 1st Air'Cargo. Resupply

Squadron (cont'd)

c. On 2 September the unit moved to Camp I.'ackall, Hoff­

man, N. C. to continue training and enrfa^e in com­
bined Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuvers.

3, Combined Airborne-Troop Carrier Operations.

a. The 1st Air Cargo Resupply Squadron was under the

jurisdiction of the 60th Troop Carrier 7/ing. All

matters pertaining to resupply and transportation

• of supplies to be under the jurisdiction of the Wing

A-3. T his plan uas adopted because it v/as felt

that all resupply v/as primarily operational and not

a su ;ply function.

b. The following units were provided to furnish either

additional labor or transportation.

(1) 106 EF of 555 parachute Infantry Company from

Ilq, Airborne Center.

(2) 160 EF of 810th AAF Base Unit, Laurinburg-

Faxtcn Army Air Base.

(3) -3978 Quartermaster Truck Company from Hq,

Airborne Center.

(4) 4-105 and 4-107 Quartermaster Truck Company,

XXII Corps.

c. Personnel of the 1st Air Cargo Resupply Squadron

augmented by personnel listed in par. b, 1 and 2

above received all supplies at concentration points

at Lumber ton and Laurinburg-!.:axton Army Air Base as

delivered by XXII Corps to be air landed or parachute

dropped to the 13th Airborne Division.

d. The total weight of all classes of supplies de­

livered to the concentration points to be air landed

or parachuted for resupply of the 13th Airborne Div­

ision approximated 900,000 pounds.

c. Approximately 24,000 pounds of supplies were rigged

for parachute droo to be rcadv immediately upon call

from the 13th Airborne Division.

f. Upon receipt of information from the 50th V/ing that

5,000 1b. payloads would bo air landed in transport­

ing division supplies from the departure bases to

the advanced airhead, standard loads were set up.

One standard load was arranged en ea.ch motor vehicle

in the supply dump. Vehicles wore dispatched to the

flight line where they were again dispatched to

parked airplanes with a crew to load and lash the

supplies in the airplane. The personnel furnished

made possible the establishment of sufficient teams

supplementing the teams of the 1st Air Cargo Re­

supply Squadron to adequatelj7- load and lash airplanes,

£> A report circulated at Laurinburg-Kaxton Army Air

Base that no additional supply missions would be

flown after 1900 D+l day. Based upon this information

sere portion of the personnel operating with the 1st

Air Cargo Rosupply Squadron was dismissed. Oper­

ations actually were not stopped and the absence of

this personnel did retard the completion of the sup­

plv missions.

- 2 ­
Observation of Faneuver Operation of 1st Air Cargo Resupply

Squadron (cont'd)

h. The first C-47 type airplanes for air landed supply

took off at approximately 2200 on D+l day. All air

landed resupply was completed by 1100 D*2 day.

4. Conclusions.

a. The Air Cargo Resupply Squadron fills a very nec­

essary requirement for trained personnel to handle

supplies for air landing and parachute drop.

b. Considering the very short time that the 1st Air

Cargo Resupply Squadron has been in existence, it is

felt that operations involving supply to the divi­

sion v/ere carried out in a very commendable manner*

5• Rec ommenda t i on s•

a. It is believed desirable to differentiate between

supply, parachute landed, to isolated units and sup­

ply, air landed at an advance airhead to maintain

a division rather than to refer both types of op­

erations as resupply missions. While only a matter .

of degree exists in distinguishing between para­

chute landed supply to a small isolated unit and

air landing of a division supply requirements, per­

sonnel equipment and supply problems are many times

greater.

b. Training directives should be rewritten to give

forceful expression of air landing requirements of

an Airborne division. The vorv greatest importance

must be given to the ability to furnish the daily

supply requirements since the ability of the Air­

borne Division to accomplish the mission and hold

objectives until relieved depend entirely upon this

air supply.

c. Responsibilities of air cargo rosupply squadrons

should clearly indicate that "receiving and storing"

means only, the receipt and storage in concentration

areas established by the squadron. All transporta­

tion from Corps or Army Supply Points must be fur­
nished by the agency furnishing the supplies.

d. So much of the statement of the purpose .of the unit

as given in T/O and E 1-470 indicating that only in

exceptional cases personnel will assist in unloading

air cargo from airplanes in flight should be changed

to assist in unloading air cargo from airplanes in

flight vLion such cargo is free dropped or parachute

dropped.

e. Activities of air cargo resupply squadrons should

not be directed through Wing A-3, but through A-4

section. Division requirements are expressed by div

ision G-4 in terms commonly understood by supply per­

sonnel. The number of planes required, the time and

place for departure can readily be furnished by A-3.

The primary mission is one of supply and a proper

A-4 function.

Observation of 1,'aneuver Operation of 1st Air Cargo Resupply

Squadron (coiit'd)

f• Supply of a division by air is a complex operation.

Directives and orders must pass only through pre­

scribed channels to prevent action based upon rumor

that will unfavorably effect operations.

/s/Joseph E. Harris

Fa.jor, QFC
xA.ir Ouartormastor
 AIRBORFE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp Mackall, North Carolina

ABTCSG 28 September 1944

SUBJECT? Report of Maneuver Surgeons

TO • Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

Camp Mackall, Forth Carolina.

1. Administrative Medical Installations.

a. ground Forces - The "Plan for Medical evacuation"

of actual casualties was carried out. Twenty-eight medical

department officers, thirty-six ambulances, and four radio

jeeps were utilized in this plan. All Medical Department per­

sonnel were acquainted with the maneuver area by a personally

conducted tour of the drop zones and routes of evacuation.

A medical central control wes established at maneuver head­

quarters manned by one Medical Department officer, four ambu­
lances, nine enlisted men. Medical officers on the drop zones

and landing fields were placed as shown on the "Plan of Medical

Evacuation" (inclosure ^ 1 ) . In .addition to those listed on

inclosure *"1, two additional medical officers were placed op­

posite the ^'3 position, ar^ one additional medical officer was

placed opposite the ./-4 position on r> pield. Also, an additional

officer was placed on E an^ p Fields. observers and umpires were

afforded medical service at the 542d "nispensary. Casualties from

the parachute drop zones vere hospitalized at ?Tackall station

Hospital. The surgeon at Mackall station pospital was notified

as to "n-Day and p-pour and the estimated number of casualties

to expect.

b. Troop carrier command.

(1) Departure pases - "Dispensaries were estab­

11 shed on the line at Max ton AAP and l,um­
berton. These Troop Carrier installations

administered medical aid to all airborne

personnel from p-18 to Embarkation thereby

relieving the airborne surgeons of this

responsibility. Casualties from the depart­

ure bases were hospitalized at Laurinburg-

Maxton Station Hospital.

(2) Porte of Flight - Two roving ambulance

groups wore stationed along the route «f

flight. "Fach group consisted of four am­

bulances, two medical officers, eight en­
listed men, an."1 one ra^io truck. These

groups vere In constant contact with the

wing purgeon.

(3) Airhead - The landing strip was covered by

two Troop Carrier squadron surpeors, three

ambulances, and nine Medical Department

enlisted men during the air landing phase.

2. Simulated Casualties. it was planned that 250 tags

would be distributed each d ay of the maneuver by the battalion

and company umpires. Fifty of these tags were to be marked "E '-­
Litter case." The non-litter case casualties were to be treat­
ed in the division medical units and returned to combat. The

fifty litter case casualties per day were to be evacuated to

the 130th Evacuation Hospital and transported to TTaxton by air.

Tagging by the umpires lagged on ^--nay during the

ccn.fu.slor of organization. Farly on r> plus 1, the full number

T 1 ­
of tags were beirg distributed. Thirty-five hours after the

parachute landing, only three casualties were available for

evacuation by air. evacuation by air was not accomplished,

in view of the small number of litter patients brought into

the evacuation hospital, "Hue to previous commitments which

required an early departure of air evacuation personnel, and

the insignificant number of casualties available for air

evacuation, the provisional air evacuation flight was released.

The plan of evacuation of the commanding officer of

the "Tedical company was well prepare- an"1 execute-7, "'ithin

one-haIf hour after landing, he bad contacted his outlying

platoons and... had informed them of his location. A check on

all battalion aid stations was made hourly. It was determin­

ed that the ta^ge^ casualties were not being received by the

battalion aid stations.

3. actual Casualties.

a. actual casualties evacuated administratively,

(1) casualties prior to take-off - F-18 to em­

barkation, 24 September 1944 - admitted to

Maxton Army Air Pasc station Hospital;

Air Corps - Fore

Airborne

1 - rectal bleeding

1 - otltis cxterna

1 - brass fragment in thigh

1 - dislocation of shoulder

1 - back injury, ol-, symptomatic

1 - mi 1- myo s i ti s

2 - obs ervat i on a open^ i c i ti s

3 - me'3 ios 1 observation

5 - acute gonorrhoea

1 - chlorine gas casualty

1 - dermatitis

1 - burs itIs

1 - 2d degree burns on hand

4 - upier respiratory infection

1 - headache

(2) casualties associated with parachute jump ­

24 September 1944;

7 - minor cuts, lacerations, bruises

2 - concur sion, mild

1 - contusion, nock

1 - contusion, abdomen

4 - contusion, leg

4 - contusion, back

3 - contusion, shoulder

1 - hematorna, neck

16 - sprain, knee

9 - sprain, ankle

5 - sprain, back

1 - sDrain, shoulder

6 - possible fracture, ankle)

4 - possible frac'ture, leg )

1 - possible fracture, arm ) of these only

4 - possible fracture, back) seven have been

2 - possible fracture, ribs) conformed as

2 - possible fracture, foot) fractures,

1 - possible fracture, pelvis)

1 - dislocation, shoulder

TOTAL - 75*

- 2 ­
 (3) casualties among, parachutists who returned

with planes following jump*

2 - mild concussions

1 - back injury

2 - upper respiratory infection

1 - observation aopendicitis

1 - gastro enteritis

1 - hysteria, epileptiforrn seizure

1 - otalgia

1 - headache

(4) casualties incurred during the ground action

of the maneuver following the landings and

admitted to station FosDital, ramp Mackall­

1 - contusion, chest (run over by jeep in

bivouac while sleeping)

1 - asthma

1 - upper respiratory infection

1 - hes^ache

1 - dental patient

1 - psychoneurosis conversion hysteria

(5) Summary of casualties:

"Deaths venereal Mild severe critical TOTAL

1200 n-1 to Em­

barkation 0 5 37 0 0 42

Parachute Landings 1 0 54 21 0 76

Plane crash 12 0 0 0 0 12

Glider 0 0 0 0 0 0

Air-landing 0 0 0 0 0 0

Ground Action dur­

ing first two 0 0 5 1 0 6
days of maneuver

TOTAL 13 5 96 22 0 136

Of all patients admitted to the hospital it is the

opinion of the maneuver surgeons that only 21 required immed­

iate hospital care, on the basis of approximate figures, and

not counting the plane crash, less than one oercent of para­
chutists were hospital type casualties following the parachute

jump.

As of 1700, 27 September 1944, forty-seven (47) men

are reported missing from the "Division.

4. Sanitation - sanitation as practiced by the partici­

pating organizations was mediocre. it was observed that,

although personnel were acquainted with the fundamentals of

sanitary installations, they were not familiar with proper

maintenance of these installations, water discipline was very

poor in the pre-maneuver bivouac period, in that water supplies

were arbitrarily considered satisfactory for consumption. r>ur­

ing the active maneuver period water discipline was, on the

whole, good. However, examination of water in individual can­

teens indicated an insufficient chlorine residual in the water.

The insufficient chlorine residual in individual canteens was

due the fact that the men were not informed that water in the

maneuver area had a high chlorine demand. For detailed san­

itary report, see Annex No. 1,

- 3 ­
 5, comments.

a#
Feeding of Air crew Personnel - Air Crew personnel

in the first serial from Lumberton had not eaten for a period

of twenty hours. it was reported that no food was available

at Lumberton• It was learned that adequate rations were avail­

able at lumberton, but due to improper distribution, many air

crew members were deprived of rations,

b. Morale - The morale of all personnel participat­

ing in the airlanded pha^.e was extremely low, due to the un­
founded and erroneous rumors regarding enormous death tolls.

Pumors were circulated by pilots, airborne officers, and

umpires, as well as enlisted men. At one point during the air-

landed phase, the surgeons were requested by Dilots to call off

the maneuvers because "the deaths were mounting hourly." one

pilot stated that the maneuvers were "a complete flop." Pumors

such as these do much to impair the physical and mental effici­

ency of all personnel.

c. personal Hygiene - it was observed by medical

officers that some personnel were extremely unclean, both

bodily and•in attire, prior to take-off. One of the subjects

in the basic training is personal hygiene, during which troops

are instructed in the fact that the possibilities of serious

infection are markedly enhanced by uncleanliness prior to and

during combat. The uncleanliness of personnel would seem to

indicate a deficiency in training in basic medical subjects.

d. instructions on Emergency and Distress signals ­

in spite of specific orders contained In Medical Annex 110, 1

to Administrative order No. 1, 60th TC"T, and in maneuver Memo,

]\TO. 5, maneuver Headquarters, A P / T C , that participants would

be instructed in emergency procedures regarding forced landings,

participating Airborne officers and enlistee1 men, for the most

part were Ignorant of all distress signals.

personal interrogation of twenty parachutists and

glider-borne infantrymen in various units, revealed that these

men received no instruction regarding emergency and distress

signals for forced landings by either ™7ing or Division person­

nel, one glider-borne infantryman, who was the only passenger

on a cargo glider, stated that the glider pilot handed him a

sheet of instructions, but no instructions were given as to

the location of flares or fuzees. Fortunately there was no

need for emergency or distress signals, but had there been, the

lack of knowledge on the part of the ground troops may have

resulted in prolonged suffering or needless loss of life.

e. Tagging of Casualties - The lack of simulated

casualties processed by the me^icel installations was not due

to faulty planning by the division medical personnel, nor was

it due to improper tagging by the umpires, it seems apparent

that the subjects who were tagged by the umpires were not

cooperating in the play of medical evacuation during the man­

euvers.

6, Recommendations

a. The commanding officer of the Medical company

was able to maintain contact with his units only at the ex­
pense of using his personnel as couriers. Since the medical

company is already inadequately staffed, it is apparent that

the medical company should be furnished with sufficient signal

equipment to maintain constant communication.

b. It is recommended that a more careful check be

kept at departure "bases of rations In order that there will

be .an equitable distribution of available foodstuffs.

- 4 ­
 e. The problem of person? 1 hygiene must be further

stressed in the training program. it is aopsront that addi­

tional sanitary training in the form of r>ractic?l aoplicati on

is necessary.

d. instructions on emergency en- distress measures

should be a direct responsibility of the pilot. crew members

should be made to realize their responsibility to their pass­

engers .

e. It is recommended that in order to have an ade­

quate processing of tactical casualties there be assigned at

least four medical umpires (ground) per division.

f. Greater emphasis should be placed on night vision

training In all piloting personnel.

/ s / ncorge j. Trvidcra / s / marshal V»

/ t / GEORGE J. XVIDBRA
/t/ - A R F H ^ L H. ERUCER

T T
' ajor, ?'T.C.

^ancuvcr ?urgcon, T.C

'•'ancuvcr Surgeon, A.B

- 5 ­
 PLAN 01
A IRBORNE^
3nfiA7r&orne Division
Point A 60th Troop Carrier wing
MINSK
ADMINISTRATION UNITS ONLY

" FIELD
PAR . . I U T E LANDINGS
Time No, of Planes
193* •••• 2
.AmDulance c Med.Off.

"X —Medical Radio

0 —Reserve Ambulance

•F" FIELD
PARACHUTE LANDINGS
Time No.of Planes

" E * FIELD
PARACHUTE LANDINGS
Time No. of PJanes
1932 . . . . 1

'ۥ* FIELD
38 Gliders (0716)
4 Gliders (0700)

ALL MED. OFF. -ND AMBULANCES.

:
WILL. BE IN -LACE ri
AND BY O63J
 AIRBOR,:E-TRCO? CARRIER RAoEUVSR HEADQUARTERS

Camp r/ackall, Horth Carolina

ABTCSG 29 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Faneuver Surgeons, Annex Ko. 1 (Sanitary)

TO : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Lancuver, Camp

Fackall, North Carolina.

1. .Sanitary Inspections were conducted throughout the man­

euver period in order to determine the decree of sanitary pro­
ficiency of the participating units. Inspections were made only

of units living under field conditions.

2. prior to take-off.

a. Results of these inspections which, were mado during

the bivouac period prior to take-off are summarized

In Table Ho. 1, page 4. In each case Inspection

was made of personal hygiene, camp site, drainage,

water discipline, chlorine resldaul in water, mess

sanitation, fly control, garbage disposal, human

waste disposal, and police. Recapitulation of un­

satisfactory sanitary practices shows that of the

nineteen (19) organizations inspected, the following

number of discrepancies were noted:

Ho. of organizations

r
7ater discipline 13

Chlorine residual 14

less sanitation 10

Fly control • 16

Garbage disposal 10

Human waste disposal 10

Police 6

b. It Is noted that the rest prevalent violation of

sanitary- standards occurred In the field of 'fly con­

trol. Only three (5) organizations, namely the

1 ^ 'v,^ A A-> A A p-.-- r'-m OOp-nrl A /"O T >••'! Pn ^ nrl fSp

130th Evacuation Hospital, provided adequate fly

control measures-. Such r.oasuros were especially

necessary during this period in view of the fact

that nA:f rations were served to practically all per­

sonnel. In addition to fly control, unsatisfactory

moss sanitation was observed in ten (10) of the

nineteen (19) participating organizations.

c. Water supply was unsatisfactory. At Lumberton Army

Air Base the viator supply which was chosen contained

high amounts of hydrogen sulfldc and iron, which

constitued a high chlorine demand. No cognizance

was taken of 1 ancuvor Ii'cmcrandum 2;o. 5, Par*. 5,

which stated that all water was declared non-potable

As a result only five (5) participating units chlor­

inated water during this .bivouac period. Only four

(4) of the units supplied their men with water con­

taining the required 1.0 rrF chlorine residual.

— j. *•

Report of Maneuver Surgeons, Annex Ho. 1 (Sanitary) (cont'd)

d. A niatomacoous earth filter for field water purifi­

and Haliaco and Tie m a n inc.) whlc'i had previously

undergone controlled testing, was used throuyhcut

tho maneuver period to supply all water requirements

varied frcm 130 to 270 i;:on. This constituted the

• c' °i -••> o + • P -^ - "! - 1 J

r ••• <n -h •*"' /-i-o - ^ v - - -l o /--- " i 1
"• -° T ~ i » " - '•'< -•- '."? - / ~ i - " ! + - c-i I-T - -v> -~, ^ |
:
.1- la. b l 1 XvJi'J L/ jS b L Oi u.ilu O^uiPiiiO--!. u • .lUOulLo W-v ± -J ^ |

very favorable and indicate that this equipment was

hiyhly applicable to field use.

•pi • o T-N.,--. e •" "| r\ -p --r--- n -f- ,- o rr,"^ f ' 1 T"; o o +• ' o -f-1 •-> r> -!-• rs :••> »- Tlr. "T I I f)1 ("* 'C
l
'w . [y'iJ^.Oo.j.J. U.L ...-i-.o b o o '.,<-» o L I J - - I U - « . b -_>... J. v ; L- b - . a. , * ^'.^.ui \ i U y '...^.
1 rn
L.ie u.--.i"i^s aio . moL prac cicc proper yaroa o ciicpos-ax.^

and ton (10) cf the units did not practice human

waste disposal,

i. It was noted that in almost all cases sanitary fail­

ures could be attributed to lack cf proper maln­

sonncl were acquainted 'rlth the fundamentals cf san­

itation, but did not have a sufficiently rounded

knowledge cf sanitary principles to enable thorn to

r,» The Division Artillery ana th^., 130th Evacuation Hos­

-,~, -? -!- .— *] v-' —. •" -•- -J- :- "! •••; - •-"] v - i T r> '-"i "i *' • '-\"\ ,—r< r' *^ "'" -1 4- f . y s - • o "••" r > ! . I n i i . ' - ! Q 4- -. o v-i
o' j . •,-•->- i - i.'-— J . - - . u - L . u j . ^./ ^.l i . . . l.i.*_/ - J . . J. J - . . J . U i o '»- ----. ..L ! _ " - * • ! O L". • A -A / . •- • i- J. a O 0 . .i.^—L 4.
r- -.-'1 ^ - ^ -r^ • - V% • ^ - * > ..... -:-5 '"\'"i "":'• i " 1 /"T> -1 •.>/""» -•- •! '.•"•f- O ' V ) rv"" ; " 1 1 C O ~l~ "1 O " ' ^

*_*._..t. , O i LJ^.^'^/ O k,.. , U 1 :Jt.-.i. b ,J_ w X .;c... b X -..'. L/x ,^<-^ •..L^-J —^ u i . L'-*O .

Dur "' n
r- he actl-o maneuvering starting on D-Day, in­
4-

spi, on s wcrc brief; and, duo to the fluid nature

K; b
.!- !„
euvcr, not all units ^oro contacted. In­
spections during this p.rlod were limited to obsor­
vatlcne oi' water discipline, chlorine residual,

police, and care of latrines. Results of .these in­

spections are summarized in Table Ho. 2, paye 4«

b. It was noted that four (4) of the eleven (11) units

Inspected did not practice proper v/athor discipline.

In many instances directions were net yy.ven to men

concerning do •-•TOG of c'HLcrl nation necessary. V/herc

instructions were yaiven chlorine desayoa were arbi­

trarily chosen, without regard to the possible

chlorine demand of water usud. Host of the water In

f'lis maneuver arja has a 'al-h chlorine demand. As

a result, although halasone tablets wore almost In­

variably used according to directiciiS of unit corn­
ra;u;dcrs, six (G) of tho units l.,,sp.wotud were drink­
ing water containing fron, G to 0,1 \'W oblor:i..ne

residual. It is believed that this condition is, to

some extent, Inherent to the presently prescribed

muthods of Individual canteen sterilization In tho

field. However, this fcuwit can bo r;roatly overcome

by training men net merely to add certain fixed

amounts of halazone tablets tc their water, but

rather to use seme crude method, ruoh as taste, to

determine adequacy of chlorine dceayo, and to cope m

with varyiuy field ccnditlcne.

c» Tho laajoi'Ity of units showed evidence of satisfac­

tory pclicinw. The majority of units maintaining

latrines had in operation satisfactory straddle trcn­

— 2 —

Report of Maneuver Surgeons, Annex No. 1 (Sanitary) (cont'd)

4. Summary.

a. Organizations participating In this maneuver evi­

denced Incomplete sanitary training; especially In

tlio field cf fly control, and water purification and

discipline•

b. A dlatomacccus earth filter developed by Hq., AAP

and Ilq. ITOC v/a's field tested with encouraging re-

suits.

5 • lieCGII"Ondations •

a. further training In field sanitation, with emphasis

on practical appllcatory exercises under varying

field ccndltlcns.

(1) Training cf all officer personnel to enable

them to assui.'.o responsibility for and supcr­

"isien cf sanltatlcn in their respective units.

b. Further training in fly control.

c. Further training In vjator discipline and vator puri­

fication,

d. Investigation l)^; higher echelons Into possibilities

cf other rcans of Individual no.tor sterilization

vr'.iicb. would Insure adequate sterilization under all

field conditions.

— o ^

 TABIE 1

SUMARI OF SANITATION PRIOR TO T-iKE-QFF

Re si dual -PI

Selection o

Human Waste

Sanitation

Camp Site

Personal

Idsposal

Chlorine

Drainage

Disposal

•H

Control

Garbage

Hygiene

rH

Police

PH
U -H

Mess

CD O
Commanding

Fly

- P CQ

.zation Officer
515th Prcht Inf Col Linsey
1st Bn Lt Col Dcdds 3 S S u 0.1 U u S S S
2nd Bn Lt Col Hendrickson S S s s 0.2 u u u s S
3rd Bn Lt Col VJiekley S O s u 0 u u u s s
326th Gli Inf Col Poindoxtcr
s 8 s s u s u

CO CO
03 03

1st Bn Lt Col Frcmer 1.0

2nd Bn kaj Spotswocd s s
s 1.0 u
u u u

; thGli. Inf Col Roth

c u u u s

CO CO
1st Bn Lt Col Mrr.zek S 3 <^> 0.1 S

2nd Bn Mai Ockenshauzer S s s u 0

u u u
s

:;.±v & Brip- Gen Llolitor E s s u 0.0 E u s E E

I'.53rd A/B Aii Bn Lt Col Hale S o s s 1.0 E s s U U

458th A/B F^i Bn Lai Oliver s S s u 0 U TT

\J u U u
6,76th G l i FA Bn Lt Col Kohen TJ S s u 0 S u u E s
677th G l i F* Bn Lt Col Lon:; u S s u 0 S u s U s
;
.,2a th ,i/3 En^r En Lt C o l .6i.'.vthv.-rv. i.c)k U S s u 0 U u u U s
'/1'ith Qrd Co Capt Hi^h U u s u 0 U u u u u
-;1 !th A/B Sif-. Co Capt Puckott s s a 3 0.2 S u u u u
v - n d iv/B Med Co Maj Hoivoll s u s u 0.9 s s s u u
QM Co Capt Wurzbaca s s s u 0.2 s u s E s
3R Sq Laj Hayes u u u u 0 u u u u u
:.^Oth Evac Hosp Lt Col Caliison s s s 1.0 s s s o s
ivo. of organizations below standard 5 3 1 13 14 10 16 10 10 6

Le q-end:
E ­ Excellent
S ­ Satisfactory
U ­ Unsatisfactory
 SUMMARY OF SANITATION DURING ACTIVE MANEUVERS

Water Chlorine
Discipline Residual^PFM Police Latrines

515th Prcht Inf

2nd Bn S 0 S U
3rd Bn U 0 S None

326th Gli Inf

1st Bn 3 1.0 u S

88th Gli Inf

1st Bn S 1.0 u U
2nd Bn 3 1.5 u u
458th Prcht FA Bn U 0 - ­
676th Gli FA Bn U 0 u None

677th Gli FA Bn s 0 - -•

129th ii/B Ensr B

^ u 0.1 s S

222nd A/B Med Co s 1,0 s s

130th Evac Hosp s 1.0 s s
No. of organizations

below standard 4 4

E - Excellent

3 - Satisfactory

U - Uns&tisfactorj*"

For the maneuver surgeons

/ s / Eugene H, Trubnick

/t/ ii)UGEME H. TRUBNICK,

Captt „ S ani tary C orps,

kanouver Sanitary Officer,

-5 ­
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CAHRI1& MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp M a c k a l l , North C a r o l i n a

&BTCW 27 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report of A c t i v i t i e s of Observers Bureau

TO: . D i r e c t o r of Combined Airborne-Troop C a r r i e r Maneuvers,

from September 2 4 - 2 9 , Camp Mackall, North C a r o l i n a .
1 . The Observers Bureau f o r t h e combined Airborne-Troop C a r r i e r man­
e u v e r s , 24 t o 25 September i n c l u s i v e was i n c h a r g e of L t . C o l . R. T . C h r i s t i a n s q ;
(Airborne C e n t e r ) and Major Graham T . S t e v e n s ( A i r ) .

2 . A meeting was h e l d on t h e 16 of September a t which g e n e r a l p l a n s were

l a i d f o r t h e opening of t h e Observers Bureau. P r e s e n t a t t h e meeting were t h e
following:

Col. M.A. Quinto

% Lt. Col. J . S. Rockefeller
Lt. Col. R. T. Christiansen
Major G. T. Stevens
Capt. J, W. IvIcLaren, 542d Prcht Inf Bn

At this meeting the buildings to be used for the Observers Bureau and
the housing and messing of observers were selected as follows:

Bldg. T-2620 for Bureau Headquarters

Bldgs. 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813-for Umpire Quarters.
Bldgs. 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824 and 1825 for Observers 'Quarters.
Bldg. 1809 to be used as a consolidated mess for both observers
and umpires.

3» The 542d Parachute Infantry Battalion was assigned the task of oper­
ating the mess and the securing the bedding and supplies for the. functioning of
the entire bureau,

4. Personnel from the 542d Parachute Infantry Battalion were assigned to

man the above installations as follows:

5 Officers
41 Enlisted Men
Captain McLaren was in charge of the d e t a i l .
2d Lt A. E. Green was i n charge of the mess.
1st Lt J . L. Striegel, 2d Lt G. A. Bilque and 1st
Lt E. A. Ritchie were detailed Duty Officers in
charge of the area and Visitors Bureaus Office.

S/Sg£ C. Ward, S/Sgt T. Boltinghousc, S/Sgt J . West were assigned as

Non-Commissioned Officers in charge of the registration office at Observers
Bureau. Cpl Teese was assigned as vehicle dispatcher. Room Orderlies and run­
ners were maintained at Bureau Headquarters for the purpose of contacting Offi­
cer Observers.

5. The Observers Bureau was officially opened 21 September 1944. 23

Umpires and 8 Observers checked in as of midnight 20 September. The Cfosarvers-
Umpires Mess was officially opened for dinner on Friday 22 September. Bedding
was installed to take care of 245 v i s i t o r s .

6. 1st Lt. J . J. Veretti, Provost Marshal, XXII Corps, provided military

escort for both the dry run and the actual convoys. Also arrangements were
made with the State Highway Patrol for furnishing escorts for the convoys t o
and from the maneuver area and the Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base, A dry run
of the convoys was made on Friday morning 22 September using 20 jeeps to "D"
Field and JIE" Field, thence to Maxbon Army Air Base. Arrangements were made
with the base commander for an emergency breakfast should the takeoff scheduled
for 5:20 be delayed.
- 1 ­
 7. Many observers arrived and chucked.in Saturday, 23 September and
by Saturday evening at 1500, approximately 130 observers, umpires and c o r r e s ­
pondents were on hand. By Sunday evening, 24 September, 45 umpires, 140 obser­
vers and 29 press correspondents had r e g i s t e r e d making a t o t a l of 214 people
served by the observers bureau.

8. A detailed s i t u a t i o n map of the maneuvers' was kept by Major Bertram

I . Nash, Airborne Center, i n the lounge of the observers bureau.
9. The convo}?- t o observe the Parachute Jump (See I n c l . I ) , l e f t observers
headquarters a t 1930 Sunday, 24 September consisting of 7 staff cars carrying
general o f f i c e r s , 11 staff cars and 35 j e e p s anc * 2 personnel cars carrying
press and observers. The convoy operated on schedule without i n c i d e n t .

10. On Sunday, 24 September a t 1630 the observers and press were briefed
i n Classroom nA" a t Observers.Bureau. The a c t i v i t i e s of Sunday, 24 September
Here terminated by observing Glider Landings on Field "3A" at 2110.
11. All general officers a r r i v i n g were met by an officer representative
of the observers bureau and assigned private quarters and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .

12. Breakfast was served at 0300 Monday 25 September. Convoy departure

•;.t 0330 for Maxton i n accordance with t e n t a t i v e schedule issued for observers.
vx.3ee I n c l . 1 ) . Due t o weather conditions, there v;as a two hour delay a t Max-
ton during which period a second breakfast was served at the Officers T Mess a t
OoOO. Glider takeoffs were observed from 0640 t o 0720 a t which time the convoy
departed for "D" Field t o observe Glider Landings. Glider landings wore ob­
served at "Du Field from 0343 t o 0950. The convoy departed for "R"'Field where
the Glider pickups were observed at 1100, The convoy returned t o observers
bureau at 1130. Lunch was served at observers mess at 1200. The convoy d e ­
parted for Mackali n i r Field at 1330 where a i r landings were observed through­
out the afternoon.
13. The f i r s t group of observers s t a r t e d checking out a t about 1600
Monday, 25 September.

14. The newspaper coverage of the maneuvers was l e f t up t o the Public

Relations Office which prepared d a i l y r e l e a s e s for the p r e s s . These s t o r i e s
received wide d i s t r i b u t i o n throughout the country,
15. The following publications and press services were represented as
follows:
Air-News Magazine Aviation News Magazine
Air Transportation Newark Evening News
I n t e r n a t i o n a l News P l a t t , Forbs, I n c .
Air-Ade Washington Evening Star
Office of War Information Trcms-Radio Press
Southern Flight I n d u s t r i a l Aviation
Air-Tech Army & Navy Journal
Standard News Scripps-Howard News
Christian Science Monitor Charlotte Observer
Skyways Magazine Saturday Evening Post

Officers in charge of Public Relations section of the Observers Bureau

were Major Vincent P. iuilber, assisted by 1st Lt Robert A. Kvidera represen­
t i n g the I Troop Carrier Command and 1 s t Lt G. A. Both of the Camp Mackali
Public Relations Officer, representing the Airborne Division. . '

16. The operation of the Observers mess was suspended as of supper, 26

September. The Observers Bureau was o f f i c i a l l y closed as of l600, 27 Septem­

ber. ' •

17. Quarters for Umpires remaining on duty are t o be maintained as neces­

sary u n t i l the conclusion of ground maneuvers.

/ s / Graham T. Stevens ROY T. CHRISTIANSEN,

/ t / GRAHAM T. SM/3NS, Lt. Colonel, CE,
Major, Air Corps, Observers Bureau (Airborne)
Observers Bureau (Air)
1 Incl.

Incl #1 - Tentative schedule for observers.

 C O R R E C T E D C : GF Y

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE ' '

FOR OBSERVERS

AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER

Time

Sunday?
24 September

1500 Observers arrive, register at ABC School Bldg,

Receive quarters and assignments.

1600 ­
1630
Briefing of Observers (ABC School Room)

1630 ­
1700
Briefing of Fress (ABC School Room)

1730
Supper (Camp Mackail Observers Mess)

1930
Departure forifDu Field

(2030
Observe parachute landings (90 plane loads)

(Fields 3 D , E, F)

2055
Iiove to Field 3 A.

nno
Observe glider landings (20 gliders with artillery

transportation).

_Sept ember

Breakfast Fo, 1 (Camp Mac k a i l Observers Mess)

De partur e f or Maxt on

Arrive Ivfexton
Observe departure of g l i d e r s from Liaxton (98
glid3rs in double tow)

Depacture for "D11 Field, Camp Mac kail

0648 Observe Glider Landings - "D" Field (180 gliders
in double tow)
 C O R R E C T 'ED GfiPY
Monday, 25 September (contd) ' ­
0830 Observe glider snatch.

0900 Breakfast I\To. 2, Camp Mac kail Observers Mess

1000 (Approx) Observe initial air landings9 Camp Mackall. Air
landings throughout the day.

Other Events

1, Observe Resupply by air of isolated battalion

(D/2)

2, Observe Resupply Cargo bquadron in operation

at Maxton.

3, 30CII Corps takes over ground action of Air­

borne units on landing.

H. J. BIETSNHOFER

or9 A. G. D.

adjutant General

•iKaj (ji. ? ..io br o JJ » / /

• %-,.l u t a n t G e ner a l / /
^ 1/
 AIRBORPE-TRCOP CARRIER ? AH3UV2R HEADQUARTERS

Camp Fackall, North Carolina

27 September 1944

Subject: Public Relations Activity Report.

To! Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Faneuver Headquarters,

Camp Fackall, Forth Carolina,

j- •
The combined Airborne-Troop Carrier Faneuvers were

attendee! by a total of 26 representatives of the press, 22 of

whom represented national magazines, wire services and radio

cutlets. There- were four representatives of the local Forth

Carolina press also present,

2, The press party arrived by special airplane <£rom New

York and Washington on the afternoon of 22 September, The plane

was met by a special convoy which transported the group to the

Observers Bureau, Faneuver Headquarters, where arrangements were

made for their billeting and mess, A barracks was assigned to

the male members of the party and four women representatives

were housed at ohe Station Hospital.

5. press activities commenced on the morning of 23 Septem­

ber when following briefings by Colonel Flchols of Troop Carrier

Command and Colonel Dalbey of Airborne Center, the party under

the supervision of individual public Relations Officers toured

various Installations at Camp Fackall and worked on articles of

their own designation. Several members of the party evidenced

an interest in the Parachute packing Shed and an inspection tour

of these facilities was made. Other members of the group reques­

ted opportunity to photograph and examine the C-02 Fock-up.

After conference with the War Department Review Officer, Kajor

Parker, this request was granted,

4, On the afternoon of the 23d, the entire party was trans­

ported by jeep convoy to Faxton Army Air Base, At this instal­
lation short talks were made by the Commanding Officer and the

Operations Officer for the purpose of Indoctrinating the visitors

with certain useful background material on the glider training

program and other aspects of the work at Faxton which had an

Important bearing on the maneuvers which they were to witness.

Landings and takeoffs, of the C-G- 4A were also observed at this

time and an inspection made of the C-G-' 13 and British Plorsa

Glider.

5, The Press returned to Camp Fackall at 5 P.F. and fol­

lowing supper an informal party was held at the Command Officers

Club.

6, On the morning of 25 September no activities were for­

mally scheduled but several members of the press utilized the

time to discuss specific aspects of Troop Carrier and Airborne

activities with Individual officers, A final briefing of the

maneuvers was hold at 4 P.F. conducted by Colonel Foore, A-2 of

the maneuvers. The press party joined the official observers

convoy at 7:30 p.I*, and remained with that convoy until it v/as

disbanded on the morning of the 26th.

7, The first story on the maneuvers appeared in the mor­

ning papers of 25 September and was written by correspondents

prior to their departure for observation zones the afternoon of

the 24th, This release date had been arbitrarily set up by the

Bureau of Public Relations in Washington. It is believed that

a release date to morning papers of Tuesday, 26 September, would

have been somewhat better since It would have given the corres­
pondents an opportunity to write their primary release after

viewing the Paradrop rather than beforehand. This detail however,

did not cause any noteworthy loss in the total linage given to

the maneuvers•

- 1 ­
Public Relations Activity Report (Cc-Wd1)

8, The first novs af the fatal airplane crash on the

night of 24 September --as confirmed 07 Colonel Nichols and

Colonel Dalbcy and rcl.jc.rc agreed upon by 2 A.F. that night.

This acei.de at -as arwiouccxci 1:o the press at Z A.T.I, the corning

of the 25th. Correspondents Immediately filed bulletins to their

respective newspapers and press associations which were handled

by the base Western Union office immediately. All available de­

tails of the crash with the exception of the names of victims

uoro released in accordance with War Department regulations.

Following positive identification of the twelve victims and noti­

flection of next of kin, naic.es of the dead were released by tel­
egraph to all major press associations on the night of 28 Sep­
tember ,

9. ' It Is desired to point out that although coverage of

this maneuver mas by a relatively large group of correspondents

the immediate "spot11 nous: circulation represented mas consider­

ably exceeded by pctccblal national circulation which can be

expected within the next month through the medium of the several

aviation magazines whoso representatives attended.

10. All elccracee of copy wee by yajor Parker, the special

representative of the War Depart]went Bureau of Public Relations

and by the undersigned, who acted with his authority and In his

name. Articles which vn 11 be written In the future relative to

various aspects of these maneuvers not covered In spot stories

will be submitted directl" bo the War Department for clearance

In accordance - ith written agreements to that effect signed by

all correspondents who attended and copies of which arc on file

w.th the bureau of bublic Relations.

11. It In cca-eldcmc'") trial: the maneuvers were highly suc~cec;w

ful from a bubble Relation;: standpoint and that the provisions

under YweLch the bu'cble bclab2.or.1s Office -as allowed to operate

•.-/oro extremely ixtehllgext a m farsighted, particularly in that

they allowed a caleb" rcmcow and. release of all Information per­

taining to the mar•.•_•;•.7ore acid D.ado no attempt to confuse or 'V/hl-i.e

washff such minor1 ni-.ortccr-Ic";s In technique as were observed.

This policy can always be expected to produce a much bettor long

term relationship bctwocn the Army :ml the public than any other,

12. It Is derirod to present hero a word of gratitude to

bVie officers cf the Airborne Center for their kindness In allow­

ing the press facilities cf the Airborne Club. It is believed

thai several excellent nLories to be written by representatives

arc the direct outgrowth cf informal convcrsatiojis with Indivi­

dual officcre there on the uichts of the 25d and 24th.

12. '-lousing cccd rmem facilities were adequate and transpor­

tation excellent. For the benefit of the Public Relations staffs

of future ra;.euvcrs It is suggested that the physical equipment

of the bublic Relations emctlen and the technical facilities

available for filing of copy by telegraph bo augmented. Specifi­

cally, it is felt that arrangeronts should be made in the future

to wire all copy from the Post "[entern Union. Cff Ice rather than

from the Western Union Cffj.ce In 3cu.th.ern bines, which involves

use cf a courier and. cc^,.ciclcrcblo lose cf time. Typewriters were

not available to cor res-pond J nts during their visit and all at­
tempts to obtain them were fi1 tile. It Is understood that those

machines are a hard item to cab but it is felt that they should

be made available In greater numbers for any future coverage of

this nature which may arise.

Public Relations Activity Report (ContJd)

14, The Public Relations section at maneuver headquarters

rras comprised of five commissioned officers. This personnel was

adequate for the handling of the press party and for conducting

such individual groups as were organized to observe special acti­

vities. It is recommended that in the future this staff be aug­
mented by at least two full-time enlisted men who by absorption

of detail work could clear the commissioned personnel for future

personal contacts with individual members of the press party.

/ £ / Vincent r. "Yilbcr

llajor, Air Corps

Command Public Relations Officer

Troop Carrier Command

 JJBBpHNE TROOP QARRX2R I ^

Camp I&ckall., Nb^tk Carolina

liiBeuver Report of Provost Marshal, 29 September 19M

5. Ilaneuver Director* Combined Airborne Troop C a r r i e r

l&nauver # Camp I&ckall, H*: ۥ

following is a report of activities "of !Provost I&rshal,

Troop Carrier Maneuver.
Composition :ptsil^nexvvev ffrpyis i ona 1 Mi 11 tary,i;fojLice ^Company,
&u Ihree cjoiisiissioned officers;
( 1 | '1st lieutenant (Provost ,I^rsJial).
(2) iLst Lieutenant (Coiapany Coinaander).
<3} 1st lieutenant (Traffic Control Officer)
b. Sixty four (64) Noncommissioned officers.
c« Forty four {44} Privates•
Transportatioajassi^necL^ to Proyisional 15JitarjL Police Company
Five (5) 1/4 Ton Trucks,

Four (4) 3/4 Ton C ond.R Cars.

Four {4} Solo lfetorcycj.es.

Four (4) 2-1/2 Ton Trucks.

Traffic Control:
a. Rear Areas:
(1) Routes for 13th Air bo rne-^Di vision s e r i a l s leaving
Camp J&clcall for departure bases were designated.
(2) 3uppl3r dumps were laarked, i n d i c a t i n g c l a s s of supply
a t those p o i n t s . Traffic c o n t r o l a t supply p o i n t s
was handled by 13th Airborne Division r e a r echelon
personnel.
b* Departure Bases;
Control of t r a f f i c a t departure bases was coordinated
with Provost Ixirshal, 15th Airborne Division, Provost
liUv s h a l l , I lax ton A i r b a s e .
c. landing Areas:
(1) C i v i l i a n t r a f f i c was rerouted around the a c t u a l landing
and jump area by t h e North Carolina £ t a t e Highway P a t ­
r o l , Township Police Departments, and 1'Janeuver M i l i t a r y
Police* 4ri.ll roads leading i n t o the g l i d e r landing
•zones and parachute jump a r e a s were blocked by maneu­
ver 1 Military
(2) Field telephone comamiication was maintained hy
Ilaneuver Military police at Hoffman, N. C», and at
Addor, IT. C , to Hilftary K>liceman a t the i n t e r ­
section of Seaboard Airline Railroad and Glider
Road to warn him at approaching t r a i n s , so that
tracks could be cleared of g l i d e r s .

- 1 ­
 (3) I&neuver Military Police assisted the Military

Police of the 13th Airborne Division in controlling

traffic in the vicinit^r of Ifeckall Airbase.

(4) 13th Airborne Division traffic frora rear areas to

Division assembly area was controlled by, I&neuver

Military Police.

d
- Local Towns:

(1) Traffic control posts were established at al.l

hazardous intersections in the vicinity of Pine­

hurst, Aberdeen, Southern Pines, Hoffman and

Camp Mackall, N. 0.

(2) Military Police patrols were maintained at Rocking-

ham and Ledbetter, N. C , to control nnneuver person­

nel in these towns.

4
•
Aircraft Crash Detail:

Military Policemen were assigned to some units, with orders

to guard dana&ed aircraft. A reserve of Military Police Aircraft

guards, and emergency transportation was kept in readiness at

Iriiieuver Headquarters, Airborne Center,

5" Prisoners of T/ar and Casualties;

A collecting point for Prisoners of T7ar and Casualties was

established at l&xton Airbase. Prisoners of T7ar and Casualties

upon being evacuated by the 13th Airborne Division and 60th Troop

Carrier Wing, were returned to the respective organizations by the

Maneuver Military Police.

6. Obs ervery s Bureau:

a- Military Police escorted all organized observer convoys.

b. Controlled observers and civilians at the various obser­

vation posts during the actual glider landings and parachute jumps

7. Blackout;

a. Close cooperation and liaison with State Police and Offil

cf Civilian Defense was imintained. throughout the periods of

preliminary planning and during the actual period of blackout.

b. Nine (9) road blocks on main highways were manned by

North Carolina State Highway Police, and Maneuver Military

Police, preventing the flow of civilian traffic into operations

area. These road blocks were established at?

(1) Eastwood, IT. C , Highway # 15.

(2) West End, N. C , Highway •;- £11*

(3) Laurinburg, N. C , Highway § 15 and 501.

(4) Raeford, N. C , Highway. •;/ 211,

(5) Lake view, N. C , Highway § 1.

(6) function of Highv^ays ^ 1 and ^ 77 above Hamlet N. C«

(7) Junction of rlighv\rays 'u 73 and '} 731 at Mt Gilead N.C

(8) Highway # 220 North of Rockingham.

(9) Highway 7/ 220 South of Biscoe.

• 2 ­
8, Miscellaneous Activities: Located and returned to proper

organizations, items of lost government property.

9. Recommendations;

That a trained Military Police Company be furnished. The

inany preparations that must be made prior to maneuvers do not

allow sufficient time to properly train other personnel as

Military Policemen.

JOSEPH J. YERSTTO

1st Lto, C. M. P.,

Provost Marshal.

- 3

 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIE MNxOJVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp k a c k a l l , North C a r o l i n a '

28 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report of A i r c r a f t - E n g i n e e r i n g S e c t i o n .

TO: Maneuver D i r e c t o r ,
Camp Mackail,
North C a r o l i n a .

1 . Preparation:

A. Airplanes - In order to provide 134 C-47 type aircraft for the

operation, the 349th Troop Carrier Group was reinforced from
a normal strength of 64 aircraft to 100 and the 1st Provis­
ional Group, consisting of 3 squadrons, from a normal strength
of 43 to 99 aircraft. The required additional maintenance
personnel were procured from other Troop Carrier bases and
were available in the maneuver area on 5 September 1944. The
maintenance efficiency of the heavily reinforced groups was
exceptional, in view of the fact that 100$ of the assigned
C-47 type aircraft i:ore flyablo on D-l day and subsequent.
No special equipment installations wore required on the a i r ­
planes, with the exception of approximately 80 astro-dome
emergency release lights, which was accomplished prior to
D-l day in food order.

B. Gliders - Duo to th-, retarded flow of glider to the area

from the Glider Rehabilitation Program (Project DOM 4007) i t
was necessary to rely on local repair f a c i l i t i e s for the
majority o£ gliders for the operation. Due to the fact that
the two groups installed their own accessories such as decol­
oration chutes, crash-noses, otc, the airplane shops at
Laurinburg-Iia^toii and pope Fields were able to turn out
sufficient glicUrc together with the 40 returned from the
factories to fulfill the requirements of 4 CG-13fs and 238
GG-4A!s with adequate spares. All g3.iders participating i n
the operation wore equipped with the following:

1. Corey Crash Nose.

2. Interphone Communication System.

3. Deceleration parachutes.

4. Landing lights.

C. General - On 13 September 1944, 175 C-47 type aircraft and

. 296 gliders wore evacuated from the maneuver area in view of

a Hurricane alert. Although disrupting preparations for the

maneuver for 48 hours, the evacuation was accomplished in a

very orderly manner. The only flaw in the movement was the

temporary loss of 4 gliders due to premature releases.

2. Operation:

A. Airplane - The required number of C-47A aircraft properly

equipped wore available for the mission. One aircraft was
destroyed during the i n i t i a l paratroop drop.

B, Glider - Tiu: required number of CG-13 and CG-4A gliders,

properly equipped, were available for the mission. Of the
23£ gliders which actually landed in trie GLZ's, only 6% wore
not left in a flyablo condition. It i s the opinion of the
undersigned that this extremely low a t t r i t i o n rate can be
attributed to the following:

- 1 ­
 1* Use of the Corey Crash NOG a.
2, Daylight Glider landing.
3. Glider pilot proficiency.

Tactical evacuation of one CG-4A glider ( l i t t e r equipped)

wa3 successfully made from #1 Field with a Model 80 oquiuDod
C-47A.
3, Administrative - The administrative evacuation of gliders was
well planned and executed by the 60th Troop Carrier Winr.
The 196 gliders which landed in Field No, 3 were a l l
transported by dolly to Hack a l l Airport via the "Glider Road",
whore 10 were disarmorbled and returned to maintenance shops
and the balance flown to their respective bases. Due to the
inaccessibility of No. 1 Field, 37 of the 42 ; lidor5 landing,
including the 4 CG-13's were evacuated by means of the liodcl
SO pick-up. The balance of 5 non-flyable r-lidors woro d i s ­
assembled and evacuated by truck,. Evacuation from both fields
was completed during tho afternoon of D/3.Day.

4. Conclusion and R-conupendations - Due to th- extrer-oly low -lider

a t t r i t i o n experienced on this operation the following recom­
mendations are made;

1. That a l l fliders used tactically be equipped with

the "Corey Crush Nose11 or equal.

2, That serious consideration bv iven GO dawn or

daylight ;-'lid-r landing operation.

The najority of ;.lider l^ndin-.c were mado in daylight, which

may have rediaced the required use of deceleration chutes.
However the low nuuiber of chutes used raises a definite
question iv.,.ardin_; the operational justification for the cost
of the ecjuipcient and installation time required.

/ s / J . VJ. Sharpe
/ t / u. I-.1. sHriKj^ii
Lajor, Air Corps,
Aireraft En-dneor •

- 2 ­
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS
Camp Fackall, North Carolina

2/ October 1944
SUBJSCT: Report of I.'otor Transportation Officer.

TO : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

Camp Fackall, North Carolina.

1. It was necessary to plan the transportation needs that

the rotor Transportation Officer would be called upon to furnish.

In order to get a comprehensive view of all the possible needs of

transportation, it was first necessary to estimate the number of

observers and visitors expected - so that the proper allocation

of vehicles could be made. Also, estimates were received from

the Provost I.'arshal and 85th Signal Operations Battalion for the

number of vehicles needed in addition to those already on hand as

a part of their T/E equipment of the 85th Signal Operations Bat­

talion, to fulfill the umpire transportation problem, with allow­
ances made for replacements in the event of any mechanical fail­
ures of a serious nature.

2. Three QT Truck Companies were made available to fulfill

the trucking requirements. They were the 3978th, 4105th and

4107th Qj; Truck Companies,

3. Allocation of vehicles were made as follows:

\b - -v; ton trucks to the Visitors Bureau.

16 - Sedans to the Visitors Bureau.

20 - |- ton trucks to the 1'aneuver Headquarters.

38 - -& ton trucks to the 85th Signal Operations Battalion.

5 - | ton trucks to the Provost I.'arshal.

4 - 3/4 ton C & R Cars to the provost I'arshal.

17 - l|f ton PC Carriers to Red Forces.

The above allocation for vehicles was- made on the fol­

lowing basis ;

3 observers per vehicle for the Observers Bureau ­

2 officers per vehicle for the Maneuver Headquarters.

The Red Forces were issued the 17 - ij ten Personnel

Carriers so that the efficiency in mobility could be maintained,

since the Reds required a fast and efficient striking force.

4. No Car Company was available for the Maneuver Period,

but a total of 16 Sedans wore obtained frcr Pope, Faxton and

rackall for the peak period of three days for the Observer Pool.

Just prior to D Day serveral requests were placed for additional

transportation and it was uecessary to obtain 14-- J ton trailers

for the Umpires and Field Artillery Fire marking teams, sj^nce

Weapons Carriers were not available.

5. A dispatching system was set up, whereby the 20 vehicles

for Maneuver Headquarters wore under control of a dispatcher at

the Maneuver Headquarters. All of the vehicles for the Observers

Bureau were dispatched from the headquarters of the Bureau, and

It was a very satisfactory method.

A Fanning Board for the truck companies was kept since

many trucking details were required, and the entire bulk of

supplies for the division had to be transported to the departure

points at Lumbertcu. and Faxtcn. In throe days 470 tens of supplies

were trucked to the departure points. Transportation was also

— 1 —

Report of Fotor Transportation Officer (ccnt'd)

furnished by the- three truck companies in entirety, to rrGve-the

13th Airborne Division to the departure areas over a two day

period. At the close of the first phase, one trucking company

v/as used tc transport the live ammunition from Kackall Airport

to the post I. agazino.

6. The 555th parachute Infantry Battalion furnished the man­

power for all of the loading and unloading of supplies at all

points.

55 drivers and 10 mechanics vere procured from Fort Bragg

XXII Corps units to fill the drivers and mechanics needs for the

first phase after which they were returned tc Fort Bragg.

7. The replacements of parts on vehicles were few. Only

two unit replacements of second echelon wore made, with on re­

placement of third echelon nature. Two accidents occurred, in­
volving a single J ten in each :,casa*,'• Damage was...-.light in both

cases .

The assignment of drivers tc vehicles was the factor

which aided in keeping the mechanical failures to an absolute min­

imum. At the close of the first phase, 46 vehicles were processed

and returned to Fort Bragg. This was done at this time, since

manpower was available and used to the best advantage.

8. Recommendations: That regular drivers be obtained for

all vehicles for the entire period and one mechanic bo obtained

for each 15 vehicles for the same period. This would reduce the

processing period so that the vehicles could be returned to the

Ordna nee pool in a comparatively short time after the close of

the I' a no uv or period.

/s /R O bc r t J. 7/7 sock i

//OBxi.KT J. V/YS03KI

2nd Lt., F. A .

rotor Transportation Officer

- 2 ­
 APPENDIX

I Tactical Air Division Report

 A I B 3 0 H N E - T B Q 0 F CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

~~ Caoip Mackall, ITorth Carolina
28 September 1944

SUBJECT, A-3 5 I TAD Report on Air Landing Phase Airborne-

Troop Carrier Maneuvers.
TO •D i r e c t o r s Combined A i r b o r n e - T r o o p C a r r i e r Maneuver
H e a d q u a r t e r s 3 Camp l l a c k a l l , l\ T orth C a r o l i n a .
!

1. GiibiERAL.

A. The I TAD was given the assigned area HARTSVTLLE,

CHARLOTTE5 SALISBURY5 DURHALI, G G L J S B G R G , and FLGRK7CE. This

area is approximately 80 miles wide and 100 miles deep. The II

and III TAD»s were assigned the area to the east and west re­
spectively of the I TAD^.

B. The I TAD has under its control one Fighter

Group (less 1 Sq) under command of Lt. Col. Sam V/.T7estbrook9

one light Bomb Gp (less 2 Sq's), one Tactical Reconnaissance

Sq (less 3 flights), and two advance control teams.

C. Softening up preparations were begun D-22 using

medium, light and fighter bombers supported by fighters to

bomb and strafe enemy airdromes, supply dumps, troop concentra­

tion and railroad centers in assigned areas, principally at

CHARLOTTE, SALISBURY, WH^TON-SALIM.,, GR^FSBORC, DURHAM, CASS­

BORO and RALEIGH. As the battle progresses these operations

will continue in an attempt to maintain air superiority and to

isolate the battle field.

2. SPECIAL.

A. D-l Day.

(1). At 1913 a flight of A-20!s equipped with

racks_for smoke tanks laid a smoke screen 3 miles long, along

,jHa;i:JUTG CL-LJEL from US HWY #± to.US HVJY #15. Course 133° Mag.

The object of this mission was to providG a screen for dummy

parachutists dropped at 1915 in this area.

3. D-Day Missions.

(l). 0845, a preplanned mission using 2 squad­

rons of 15 planes each to rendezvous five miles NlHv of GJjZ #3

at 1500' with C-47's towing two gliders per plane. Rendezvous

was made, planes and gliders had fighter cover during landing

phase of gliders. .

(2). 0945, Ren mission 1 P-40 photographed GLZ

#3, GLZ #1 and I-Sackall AA3 to check dispersal of gliders and

to check Camp kACIvALL for a prearranged signal of a green star

flare to be fired if kACKALL had been captured by Blue Forces.

If flare was seen it was to be reported by radio from Ren pilot

to Maneuver Directors and to POPE FIELD. The green flare was

not seen by the Ren pilot so the flight over l.^CK^LL was repeat­
ed every 15 minutes until 12;30.

!
(3). 1350, one flight (8 P-40Ts) rendezvoused

with 36 C-47 s over ST PAUL and provided top cover during re­
supply of troops at LIACKALL.

(4). 1415,, one flight (8 P-40fs) rendezvoused

with 36 C-47's over CAi uOR and proveded top cover during re­
supply of troops at UACI\ALL# '

(5). Beginning at 1230 and ending 1800 a patrol

was maintained at 1500f altitude from JACKSON SPRiMGS to RAEFORD

for the purpose of providing fighter cover for the C-47's re­
supplying troops at LIACKALL.

 (6), ISOO, Photo Acn mission I P-40 to photo­

graph g l i d e r s Dl #1 and ,;/3 to get dispersal of g l i d e r s , equip­
ment and a c t i v i t y iii araa.
C. D plus 1 Missions.
(1). 08005 12 P~40 ! s Bomb and Strafe troops
and armored vehicles concentration at 0S3Qh£!j2. P i l o t s r e p o r t ­
ed no a c t i v i t y in area.
(2). 0815, 2~pM6 ! s Ren mission from Camp
lAXIULL south to CAJ^DEH west to FLuRtiKCS north to Camp LACKALL.
Report a l l movement on roads.
(3). 08305 4 F~40's Ren mission from Camp
IACK..LL to oJAL 79°52'~34°58 t west to UAuuioBQLtO, LiOj>iROiC9 .CHAR
C
LOTTiii, Gamp IACKALL5 O
to POx'iii. Report a l l movement of troops
or vehicles on roads.
(4). 0900, 12 P-40 f s Bomb andt Strafe t troop and
armored vheicles concentration at Vi*5& 79°16 -35°15 . F i l o t s
report only a c t i v i t y C-47's landing I.^CAALL5 one L-5 5 miles
I' LiiCKALL flying east a t about 300 f t . ­
(5). 09305 Fighter Sv^eeu and Ren mission from
Camp W.CKALL m to Reservoir 30°07!f~35°25 f & along PSE DS3
River to SOCItCTY• hlJJL 79°50'~34°31 iiE to Camp 1-^CLALL. Strafe
and Bomb any enemy movement observed. P i l o t s report no
activity.
(6). 1000, 12 P-40 1 s Bomb and Strafe troop and'
armored vehicle concentratj.on a t BS.. lEIToViLL^ 79°40 ' ~34°06 f .
P i l o t s report one re con vehicle on I-Iwy destroyed.

!
(7). I 1O3O3 4 P«40 ! s Ren mission
f
from BESHiSTT-
SVILL^ 79 4p "34°CS ? CbBObiKi 79°46'-34°47 9 Camp ImCKi^LL,
ABJi:LD.^V 79 50 l -35°08 1 9 V/.SS 79°16 ! -35 1 5 ' 5 KL'UIKLINVILLS
79 u 43 ! ~35 u 44 t . P i l o t s report JLOO C*47fs on kuCkiJLiJb, a c t i v i t y
around g l i d e r s in GiDZ rr3. I-lo -btner a c t i v i t y noted.
(8). 1100. f4 P-40's Ren xaission from !
Campr
I^CKALL to PIlAiiuRoT .79°29
f
-35°13' 5 AEDTEID 79°33 -35°14* ,
J;'-CKi>Oi! Sn-iU'/GS
r
7S°37
f
-35°13 f , TttOY 79°52 f -35°25 ' , to CART­
HAGE 79 21 -35°20 3 to Camp i-/ACI>ALL. Strong enemy forces
reported in t h i s araa. P i l o t s report no a c t i v i t y .
D. Total time from 0700 9/25/44 to 1200 9/26/44.
. FLYIiIG TILE
Fighters 5 40 39 s 30
Ren 8 20 27; 30
Patrol 4 38 49^20
Escort 4 54 65 s 20
A~20 (Light Bomb) 1 9 18? 00
TOTAL 23 " 161 ' 199 ;40

S. Communications, From Airborne-1.Maneuver H e a d ­

q u a r t e r s I TAD had FA c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e advance c o n t r o l team
l o c a t e d v;ith t h e I S t i i A i r b o r n e ,Comiiiand_Post and v ; i r e c o n t a c t
vvith t h e 372nd. F i g h t e r Group a t POPE FIELD, HG. F o r t h e e m e r ­
gency standby VHF contact v/as possible with the fighters either
from PCPE FIELD or lAwCTCA FIELD toners. Thr'oughout the maneu­
vers a l l communications v/ere good
F. RecomL-iendations. In future problems9 time must
be provided to enable IViB Staff and Ilaneuver Directors Staff
to j o i n t l y plan operations.

./JOE K.
L t . C o l . 9 A i r Corps 9
A - 3 , I TAD.
A. CanD ! AGICA.LL Airdrome taken on D Day by P-40 Pilots Ren plane

B. DZ# o (A,B,CfD,S,P) seen In distance taken by P-40 Photo Ren

on D Day.

 >Lr /cnro
**r f5~/O
1 *7 Mr-/~" ••- WOW

:
~" • *»­

11
Tl

||IM J
' • •

•**

/
it •:--,, *-' V, \ >i

u
C. Arf F i e l d of DZ#

n
B r i F i e l d of DZ# :i
E. «»Blf , "G"
"G", F i e l d of DZ# 3

F. "Ci? F i e l d of D
 i

of D1^
 f th
n-llders In the far side of the
e f

J. DZ# 1

 APPENDIX

13th Airborne Division

 -L.. yvr w'

To -,o Q-j'jC.TCizo rcpor

 Appendix

60th Troop Carrier wing _popo'rt

Orders, Memoranda and instructions

Report of preparation phase

Letter of Transmittal

General staff Sections

Special Staff sections

Statistical Report

CD

 OOltP. S C T 2 D COPY
FIELD CKDER)
NO. 9)

Maps: 1/20,000 - Troy 22r B3, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34 1 35, 36; Sanford 19, 25,

26, 31, 32 Sheets.

l/62r500 - Troy, Candor, Vess, Jackson springs, Southern Pines,

Ro*kingham, ieurinburg Sheets..

i • • • . , ' •

1/80,000 * Mackall - West 2nd.

1/500,000 - Situation Map (Situation 2000, 24 Sept 1944).

Sectional Aeronautical Chart, dtd 6 April 1944, Charlotte.

1/15,000 - Aerial Mosaics Maokall-West 2nd Maneuver Area, dtd

14 June 1944r.

l/SOPO - Glider Maneuver Area 14 June 44.

1. a# See Intelligence Annex 1.

b» (l) Friendly Ground Situationt

(a.) See Situation Overlay A of -"irtelllgence Annex tto. 1*

(bf) Blue Forces will continue the attacks on D Day. Blue

11th Inf Div is expected to relieve A/B units in

vicinity of •HGETOAN o n D / 4.

(c,) Blue forces with the 11th Inf Div, will start push

northeastward in the direction of HGFBCAU on CEfflRAW-

HAMUST-HJFB/ttK ROAD to relieve 13th k/h IHv in the

vicinity of HCFSMAN by D / 4. 11th Inf Div will be

\ strengthened in this pu'sL by the 100th Inf Div, which

is held in reserve.

(2) Friendly Air Situation:

(a.) The conrposite tactical group, 3d TAD, will execute

softeni \g~up attacks prior to D Day. This Gp will also

be available for priority "3* missions on call from 13th

A/B Div after initial landings at ft-9§ hrs.

(b.) 3d TAD will furnish fighter cover for initial air

landing serials* *

(c.) The B-17's will be available for use by TC in air-landing

serials on D and D / days,

(d.) Aerial reconnaissance and photography will be furnished

by unit of 311th Photo Vg atchd. to 60th TC Wg.

2« The 60th TC % will move the 13th A/B Dii. from adrms shown on Move­
ment Tables (Annex $B) by successive aii lifts via a/c and glrs to

PD2*s and GIZ's in the MAC^J£-tra^ Area*,

.Landings to commence at H-9-J- hrs..

3. a. The 349th TC Gp operates Sorials r s shown on Movement Table, Annex

#2 and Re-Supply-Serials on call from TaskJB^c^irfto^fcjider throu^i

CO, 60th TC ,Vg (See Route Ovgc\py 4149^ f 1 and. all a%r landing

serials)*

l: . -^ m •*

ft* *• ^ * ^

 £2 US IS. I

\0. #9 60th Td %4cont*d)

Ser fa and 2s ffcop Pathfinders as indicated in Instructions
to Pathfinders, Annex #4,
Ser. jj7 and 8: l%$r Parachutists in PDZ #2 and 3 in a fbrm~

atlon'ifee of Tees, 2500 feet interval between squadrons

(See Navigational Aids Overlay)»

Ser #9: Sirs in this serial land in GLZ #5A as indicated in

GLZ Overlap #1, Glider Annex No. 3.

Ser ftp: Glrs. in this serial land in GLZ #3A, B, C & D as in­
dicated in G^2 Overlay #1, Glider Annex #3,

<5) g,er $121 Glrs in this serial la; ^ in GLZ #1 as indicated in

GLZ Overlay #2, Glider Annex jfc,.

(6) Ser fag; Glrs in this serial land in GLZ #1 as indicated in

GLZ Overlay #2, Glider Annex #3,

(?) Ser f 14 ,(8-17*8.)*- An e.ir Ian .ing serial to be flown in a Sq

formation. Parking and unloading will be as per Parking

diagram for CAMP MAC3&LL AEtsPCRT. (To be issued later) •

(&) Ser #15? Aa air landing serirl to be flowi in Gp formation

Vee of Tees. Rendezvous with fighter escort will be made.

(9) Serffilftthru 23? Air landing serials to be flown in e series

of continuous formation fits to ALZ #4, (Upon completion of

serial #23, airlandings will be flown in a series of continuous

single plar*e fits).

Ser if24? Resupply serial to be flown in a series of continuous

single plane fits.

Ser #251 Supply dropping mission,

Ser #26? A tactical pick-up of Medical Evacuation glider

in GLZ ft.

b. The 1st Prov TC;lp operates serials as shown on Movement Table,

•§ Annex #2, and i-e-supply serials on call from Task Force Commander

thru CO, 60th TC % (See Houte Overplay 1st Prov D-l; Route

Overlay 1st Prov D-Day; Route Overlay 1st Prov B/l; and all

Air Landing Serials)•

(l) Ser' #3 and 4: A/C will arop Pathfinders as indicated in

'•Instructions to Pathfinders11, Annex #4»

Ser ?f5? Drop parachutists ir. H>Z #1 in a formation

of Vees, 2500 feet interve" between squadrons. (See

Navigational Aids C-7erlay)'.

Ser fet Drop bundles and racks in PDZ 3B; personnel in

C & D .

(4) Ser #11: Girs in this serial land in GLZ #5 E and f, as

indicated in GLZ Overlay #1, Glider Annex #3.

5
( ) Ser #15? An air landing serial to be flown in Gp formation

of Vee$. Rendezvous with fighter escort will be made.

(6) Ser ^ 6 , thru 83: Air landing serials to be flown in a series

of continuous fits to ALZ #4. (Upon completion of aerial

#g3, airlajidings will be flown in a series of continuous

single plane fits) • ' ; ^ -*..•«?» "•*•

Ser #^4{ Resupply serial t<a fetflown in a series of

1 l a n e

P |

 •-. ' U s

£££5.

F. 0. #9 60th «J *% (eoat'M)

Co Prov Sig Co, 60th TC Wg (Soe Annex #6, Sig).

x. (1) A/B fingr Avn Bn will, upon liidingj immediately prepare

CAMP MACIOIX IJKmam far Lirlanding operations and will

maintain the adrm for air landing until raid,

(2) After capture of CLAMP W>VK&:, AERDRCMB an officer designated

by CO, 60th TC *7g, will essume command of adrm* ,

(3) Fit altitudes* All serials cruise at 200 ft above terrain.

800 ft above terrain for all night paratroop serials and

> C$r13 serials. 400.f•& above terrain for all other night

operations*

(4) Olr release altitudes? .400 ft above terrain.

(5) Parachute jumps* 800 ft above terrain.

{&) Returning air landing serials* 800 ft above terrain* ^

(7) Radio silence: Radio silence will be maintained except

Pathfinder communications until initial landing of 13tl

A/B Div end except in cases of extreme omerg.

(8) Fuel Reqmts:. See Annex'#8#

(9) Max gross weights and payloadst ^ee Annex #8.

(10) Gir release warning lights:- Interphone and astral dome light

signals will be given when five (5) miles fr the landing

area and not the inlv fl-f, and again approximately one (l)

mi fr the landing area and lot the indv fid.

(11) Loading and unloading} By A/B units concerned, until movement

of div is complete; thereafter by 1st Air Cargo Re-supply

' Sq, supplemented by Serv Units furnished by Task Force

Commander. A/C crews wil"\ not assist in loading a/c but

pit will check and satisfy himself that, a/c is flyable.

Loads will not be changed unless pit decides a/c is unflyable.

A/C crews will assist in unloading a/c at airhead where

speed is essential. ,

(12) Parking diagrams: Parking diagrams for home bases will be •

furnished this Hq and A/B unit being transported on or

before 22 Sept. Parking diagram of C/ldP MACKAl! AIRPCRT

(To be issued later).

(13) Prchts will be worn by air crew members on all serials other

than glr and air landing serials,

(14) D Day: 25 September 1944.

H Hour: 0600

4. See Administrative Order (Annexes).

5. a. See Signal Annex #6.

b, (l) Ground: 60th TO % , L-l! UJB,

349th TC Gp, L-M /^B

1st Prov T C <o, r

(2) Airf Fit leader in leading -;c of each ser*

By order of Colonel PITTS i f 1 5 ^ * '

•• 0. #9 60th TC Wg (cont^)

Colonel, Air Corps

Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

MELVIN C

Major» Air Corps

A-3. '

1 - Intelligence (With Overlays & Mission Rpts)

2 A Air Movoment Table,

3 - Glider.

4 - Instructions to Pathfinders.

5 - Administrative Order #1.

6 - Signel.

7 - letter of Instructions.

8 - Maneuver Maximutos. •

DISTRIBUTION t A/B • T/C Maneuver Hqs 55

1st Prov TC Gp — 5

349th TO-Gp 5

60th TC Wg ' 10

13th A/B t>iv ™ - — > * - » — 5

HEADQUARTERS 60TH TROOP CARRIER Wbft? ** *•* *

SUPPLEMENT #1 TO F. 0. #9 (CORRECTED COPY) 21 September 1944

. . • • . • • ^

1. Paragraph 3. x. (3) shall be deleted and the following

substituted therefor:

3» x« (3) All serials, both day and night, shall

cruise at 400 ft above terrain except CG~13 &&& night paratroop

"erials which will cruise at 800 ft above terrain*

By order of Colonel PITTS:

E W HAMPTON

Executive*

OFFICIAL:

M C LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Hq 35

1st Prov T C Gp ~ * -™ 5

349th T C Gp — 5

60th T C Wg — 10

13th A/B Div 5

 M A N E U V B

- - **n,, 60th T# C. Wing,

> ^ IrM AAB, MAXTON,'

NORTH CAROLINA,

24 September 1944.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO F. 0. NO. 9.

1. Par. lb (2) (b) is amended by the following:

(b) (l) Two squadrons P-40's (32 ships) will Rendezvous with

Troop Carrier at 0645 E57T, D Day near GLZ #3 and will

furnish cover for Glider Landings and will patrol area

from I. P. (HEMP) to HOFFMAN at an altitude of 1500*.

(2) One (l) reconnaissance ship will arrive over HACKALL

AIRFIELD at 0800 B/T, D Day and remain in area until

signal received that field is clear for air landing

serials. Signal will be green flare.

(3)a,0ne (l) flight P-40's, close escort, will rendezvous

| . with Troop Carrier at ST. PAUL 1500' at H plus 50 min­

w utes*

H - tijne is time of take-off of first C-47 at LUMBEH­

TON.

b.One (l) flight P-401s close escort rendezvous with

Troop Carrier at CANDOR 1500' at H plus 55 minutes.

H - time is time of take-off of first C-47 at MAXTON.

(4) Fighter will be stationed at POPE FIELD,

HAMPTON,

Executive,

OFFICIAL:

JACOBS,

A-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Hq 35

1st Prov TC Gp 5

349th TC Gp 5

- 60th TC Ug • 10

13th A/B Div 5

 •AWNEX.NO. 1 TO F0 NO

INTELLIGENCE /

Hq.j 60th T. C. Wing,

POPE FIELD, FORT BRAGG,

NORTH CAROLINA,

0800 EWT, 17 Sept. 44.

Maps: TROY 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36

SANFORD 19, 25, 26, 31, 32 sheets. Scale 1:20,000,

TROY, CANDOR, VAS6, JACKSON SPRINGS, SOUTHS^ PINES, ROCKINGHAM,

. LAURINBURG sheets. Scale 1:62,500

Sectional Aeronautical Chart, CHARLOTTE (R-8), 6 April 44, Scale

1:500,000. CHARLOTTE sheet, Scale 1:500,000.

Situation Overlay A' to CHARLOTTE sheet, Scale 1:500,000.

1. StMiARY OF ENElvIY SITUATION:

a. Disposition as shown on Situation Overlay A, Annex 1A, to FO No. 9.

b. Present battleline runs from PEE DEE approximately 12 miles east of

FLORENCE thence north along PEE DEE RIVER to NORWOOD and then turns

west. Enemy forces are on the east bank of the PEE DEE RIVER.

c. Red Infantry Divisions identified as the 376th and 384th Divisions

are located in the vicinity east of BENNETTSVILLE.and southwest of

HAMLET respectively.

d. One infantry company and one AA battalion are located at MACKALL

with one infantry division held in reserve at RALEIGH.

e. One armored division (red) has been reported 100 miles northwest of

RALEIGH in the vicinity of DANVILLE, VIRGINIA.

f» For flak areas see AA Overlay Annex lb to FO 9«

g. 1. Enemy air strength is dispersed over a wide area, but is not for­
midable. A squadron of enemy fighter bombers is located at RALEIGH

(35° 44' 33" N - 78° 39' 00" W) and at SALISBURY (35° 36' N - 80°

W ) .

2, One other fighter Bomber unit has been located at a field north

of CHAPEL HILL (35° 56' N - 79° 04' W ) .

3. It is estimated that enemy aircraft as stated are ail within

effective range of our A/C during entire flights in enemy territory.

h. Enemy held airfields in good condition are located at:

CHARLOTTE 35° 14 1 N - 80° 56.1 W

CONCORD 35° 23' N - 80° 01• W

WADESBORO 35° 02' N - 80° 04' W

MACKALL 35° 02' N - 79° 29* tf

RALEIGH 35° 44' N - 78° 39f W

i. Local Conditions - The projected area of operations is bounded on

the east and south by US HIGtfv/AY #1 CAMERON to ROCKINGHAM and by

that part of CAMP MACKALL MILITARY RESERVATION south of US HIGHWAY

#1, on the west by the line RQCKINGHA£i-*ELLERBE-BISCOE and on the

north by the line BISCOE-CARTKAGE-CAIJERON.

This area is a coastal plain composed of white sandy soil in the

sough grading into red,soil in the northern section on an approxi­

mate E-W line BISCOE-PINEHURST-FORT BRAGG. Numerous small streams

flowing generally southward or south eastward intersect the area*

These streams flow through densely wooded swamp areas that make pas­
sage difficult, About fifty per cent of the area is covered with

thick to dense second growth pine and oak, although there are some

areas where vegetation is sparse and little cover is to be found.

The remainder of the area is composed of farms whose principal

crops are corn, cotton, tobacco and peaches. Where peach orchards

are found, the trees grow to a maximum height of twelve

present a serious obstacle to parachute landing* «*fc **

The population density in nasal. "TaFeSS is estimated at twenty

five persons per sc^uare mile. Th4 principle towns in the area ai

 their populations are:

ABERDEEN 1,500^

CARTHAGE 1,000

HOFFMAN 500

PINE BLUFF 250

EOCKINGHAM 3,000

SOUTHERN PINES 2,500

VASS 600"

\fl3ST END 600

LEDBSTTER 500

The natives within the area are friendly and will welcome in­
vasion by BLUE FORCES* Considerable help as guides may be expected

, of the natives.

US HIGHWAY #1 and the SEABOARD AIRLINE RAILROAD traverse the

area on a NE - SW line, RALEIGH-SANFQRD-ABERDEEN-^ROCKINGHAM, and are

roughly parallel to each other, NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY # 2 U

and ABERDEEN and ROCKFISH RAILROAD cross the area on a NW - SE line,

CANDOR-ABERDEEN-RAEFORD, and also run roughly parallel to each other,

N-S US; HIGHWAY #220 borders the area on the west from BISCOE TO ROCK­
INGHAM. NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGH.JAY #27 crosses the northern sec­
tor of the area in an E-W direction 25 miles north of ABERDEEN. The

portion of the area lying between this highway and ABERDEEN is es­
pecially heavily wooded and difficult of passage. The area in gen­
eral is grided by a few secondary sand roads five to ten miles apart

with small additional wood and, farm roads. In the.northern sector

the red clay roads will be passable with difficulty for mechanized

forces in wet weather, while the sand roads of the middle and southern

sectors are considered passable for mechanized forces in all weather,

but are treacherous because of soft shoulders and ditches.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

a. 'Will EAC attack our airdromes prior to or during the air movement:

If so, when, where and in what force:

b. Will EAC attack our A/C during air movement or while at objective?

If so, when, where and in what force?

c. tftiat is present strength, composition, disposition, tactics and

identification of enemy air units within range of our airdromes and

flight courses?

d. Will enemy AA and other ground installations or ground forces inter­

fere with our air movement or with our landings, unloading and

take offs at the objective? If so when, where and in what manner?

•. \tfhat are present and probable new locations, size, caliber, intensity

of fire of enemy AA installations?

f. What is the location, size, character and activity of enemy units

in vicinity of CAMP MACKALL and HOFFMAN?

3. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION:

a. Instructions to subordinate units:

(1) Group S-2's will establish procedures to assure the adequate

briefing of all pilots and flight crews, including briefing on

the subject of collection of enemy information ivhile enroute.

Grgup and Squadron S-2's will brief on such subjects as their

respective group and squadron commanders may direct.

(2) All pilots and air crews vfill be interrogated upon completion

of a serial. The places and manner of such interrogations will

be prescribed by respective Group S-2's except thsrt all such

interrogations will occur as soon after the return of a crew

as is practicable, that intelligence officers only will con­

duct such interrogations and that information concerning the

enemy will be fully elicited.

(3) Aerial reconnaissance and photography, Prisoner of Warr inter­

rogation and friendly agents.

b. Request to higher, neighboring and co-operating units,

- 2 ­
 (1) Request composite tactical!

AB-TC Maneuver Headquarters"furnish information available as

a result of recent combat missions and by reconnaissance

flights, pertaining to enemy order of battle, enemy A/C

warning service and enemy reconnaissance activity in areas

of departure airdromes.

4. WEATHER CONDITIONS: •

a. Weather forecasts will be furnished daily throughout period of mis-*

sion by Wing, .

5. SUPPLY OF MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND OTHER l&TSRIALS: ­

a. The following maps and photographs will be supplied by Wing to

Groups indicated for use and distribution to their respective

Squadrons.

(1) Strategic Maps, C of E, Charlotte 1:500,000

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 10

349th T.-C. Gp - 10

(2) Photp Mosaic, Mackall^Weaft end Area 1:15,000 ($ sheets)

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5 sets

349th T. C. Gp - 5 sets

(3) Photo Mosaic, Mackall-Weat End Area 1:80,000

1st Prov. T. C.Gp - 125

349th T. C. Gp - 125

(4) Blow-ups Maneuver Area Nos. 1, 2 & 3, 1:6,000

1st Prov. T. C. Gp'- 15 each

349th T. C. Gp - 15 each

(5) Night Maps, Fields Nos. 1, 2 & 3, 1:20,000

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 125 each

349th T. C. Gp - 125 each

(6) Situation Map as of 12 September 44, Charlotte sheet 1:500,000

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5

349th T. C. Gp - 5

(7) Photographs Departure Airports-

L-M AAB: 1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5, 9x9; 5, 24x20

349;th T. C. Gp - 5, 24x2O, 5, 9x9

Lumberton: 1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5, 9x9; 5, 24x20

349th T. C. Gp - 5, 24x20; 5, 9x9

Pope Field: 1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5, 9x9; 5, 24x20

349th T, C. Gp - 5, 24x20; 5, 9x9

(8) Photographs, Airfields , Camp Mackall

1st Prov T. C. Gp - 5, 9x9

5, 24x20

349th T. C. Gp - 5, 9x9

(9) Photo Mosaics, C of E, Troy 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36

* Sanford 19, 25, 26, 31 & 32 sheets, 1:20,

000

1st Prov. T. G, Gp - 5 each

349th T. C. Gp - 5 each

(10) Photo Mosaics, C of E Troy, Candor, Vass/ Jackson Springs, Sou­

thern Pines, Rockingham, Laurinlpurg sheets, 1:62,500

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5 each

349th T. C. Gp * 5 each

(11) Flak Overlay, Charlotte Sheet, 1;500,000

1st Prov, T. C. Gp - 5 each

349th T. C. Gp - 5 each

(12) Oblique Photographs of each GLZ

1st Prov. T. C. Gp - 5 each

: 349th T. C. Gp - 5 each

6.,, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

a. Group S-2's will establish definite procedures to assur.^J^Jj; pilots

and air crews do not carry on their petsoas a*iy "effects whicmmay i­
 dentify their own

b. Group S-2!s will assure that all pilots are properly and fully

briefed upon the following:

(1) Destruction of documents, equipment and material in event capture

appears imminent.

(2) Conduct to evade capture and effect return if forced down in

enemy territory.

(3) Conduct in event of capture by enemy including escape pro*­

!

cedure.
(4) Safeguarding classified documents, equipment and material.

(5) Active measures to deny natives access to departure bases.

c. Radio silence in accordance with Annex No. 6, {Signal Annex to FO No. 9»

7. PRISONERS OF v/AR, CAPTURED DOCtali'NTS AND EQUIPMENT

a. Enemy air crews forced down end taken prisoners will be thoroughly

searched for weapons and documents and brought to 10 for inter­

rogation and examination.

b. Guards should be posted about enemy planes crashed or forced down

inside dur lines to protect equipment for technical intelligence

investigations.

c Proper measures should be taken to safeguard prisoners for inter­

rogation,

8 . INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Periodic reports will be rendered by Group S-2's as of 0800 and

2000 each day to reach 60th T. C. Wing Headquarters by 0900 and 2100

respectively each day, beginning at 2100 EWT D-l.

b» Mission reports will be prepared by Squadron S-2ls and will be sub­

mitted to Group S^2fs within two hours of the completion of a

specific-mission. Group S*-2's will consolidate Squadron mission

reports and transmit consolidated mission reports to Wing Head­

quarters, Attention A-2, as soon as possible, by the most expeditious

means available. Mission report form of Annex No. 1 to F0 No, 9

will be used for such Squadron and Group mission reports.

c. Information obtained upon interrogation of pilots and flight crsws

which justifies classification of "Flash News" will be transmitted

immediately to Wing A-2 by or through the proper Group S-*2 by the

quickest means available. /

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON,
Executive,
OFFICIAL;

JOHNSON,

A-2.

~ 4*

 '

Received by:

Person Calling - ftame: Rank

Official Position: ' Headquarters \

• . ­

Callings-from where? Radio Telephone

Clear or Faint

Original Source- df,. Jnforation,

EVALUATION ; ;; •/ ^ 's V. Located at:^

True: • ;,/'•'-»'-'^ ' v ' •" Seen by;'..

Probable: '".-; *• . *

, Possible: • • •

Improbable: .„•- :

Undet 6rmined: •. ^ J •
r

MESSAGE:

1, What?-.

2« Vfliere?^

3.

. 4« Direction o£ movement: Speedy

5» Conditions of.observationr

INTERPRETATION:

'AUTHENTICATION by S~2

A-2

' D I S S M O T A T I O N • . - . • . • • • , • v . " , . • . .
(List on form abbreviations of all to whom the FLASH U

is likely to be sent)

* • i • * , • • • • . * .

Higher HQ -, . .; '; - . _s . \

A d j a c e n t H Q .' • ' . • • • ^ , , . ' . ' ,,, ,' . ." • '" .

Ovm H Q• . 1 ' ' ..'•,'

Lower HQ

••'•M ":.•• * ; • > ' - , . »

r^lt ' . 1
PK£3-BON*ftX MISSION

1 . To:

2 , Date;
« Mission:.. (Report f ^{fr^h^acoo^^

J ' " • ii '' i ; /"

V . - • : • • ' ; , ' ; • / • > - •

^ ^ ^ < v ^ : - . v . A ... .:. \ • . :

^ v ^ - - ^ - . ^ " - - - . - . . • • • • • ' • - . - .. - . . • • • ' . • I ' ' •

ir-ifcOi^-i:-'--;-- ' '• • • • • . • • • • . • • ' •

:
••-• • - v W ^ ^ : ^ f V * • " • • • • ' ' • ; • • "':-;f: =
: t
• • ' •• • • " ' • ' " i " ' %

»>^--.".:' s
i.: ,,: - , > , , . I,,,...,, •,

4. Air Contact?' i^tji Enemy Aircraft;

A

a* s,Wttf. and type of planes,

/ ' ' • . •
l.
•>
- . . . • •

N
• ' r • • • r

*.' Own losses ;(No. and Of planes or gliders)":

. 1H I , . •/ ' > 'f ,

Additional Information ( i f of immediate in^ortance t o futiire operations)

a.; Weather eacounteredf" '•

b. Miscellaneous1 additional information: • ( • • ' •

- • ' • - . • • " , K \ • • • • •

- . • • • " * - •

> / . •

i " .
; • • : . • . • ' • • • . '

(SIGNATURE)

M A N E U
 M i 2I S 1 1 S

MISSION

From

Date

Squadron :

Formation Leader Mission

l.oad (Type, NO. AB Personnel & lbs of equipment)

Tim$ of Takeoff ,,'| '"

Rcaite to Objective and

Escort (Number & Type) objective reached

./

Time ^t Objective
PDZ, GLZ or other Objective

encountered (Type^ Tactics)

SAC seen, not encountered

Casualties to Personnel

'Conduct and Air Discipline o£ A./B Personnel

Eefusals

Damage to own A / C <--iii<

Failure of Equipment

AA, .SL, BB and other installations, circumstiances

Enemy Activity observed(rail, convoy or other troop movements: where, what, when

and speed) , ,

leather

Route back and altitude

Time Down Photos (Taken

General Remarks

<n • • •> • . > -..I... .111.111

Time of Report

M i I £ SI11
 MANEUVER

FIB
its.CAS*A
>JT•

oo

V
•>

13 oo

376

SITUATION OVERLAY
ACTUAL DEPAKTURE FLDS. MAP­
ASSUMED TO BE SCALE-- 1/600,000
MILES TO PREPARED BY: 60th W;>o A*2
DATE: IS Serf. 44 ^

LINE
-BLUE LINE

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

*; •' I

o
RALEUaU

HEMP

O
o
SEVM0U12

 MANEUVER

3 4 9 ™ & I*T PROV. GROUPS

GLIDER LANDING

ROUTE OVERLAY

35° 50

78° 30'

F/VV E T T ElVIU l_ E.

CAMP MACKALL
(AUK)

LUMBELRTON
AUK-2

34° 30'

80° 30'

CHARLOTTE
SECTIONAL AERO CHART
SCALE: 1:500 000
PREPARED BY 60™ T C WING

MANEUVER A - 2 SECTION, 15, SEPT. 4 4

34.9th T . C . GROUP—
t»+. PROV. T.C. GROUP­
—
 MANE­
RESUPPLY

OVERLAY

3?° 30'

78*30'

CANDOR

80*30'

CHARLOTTE

SECTIpNAL AERO CHART

S C A L E : i:500^600
PREPARED B>f 4>O+* T.C. WING
12 SEPT AA

MANEUVER T . C . OCTOVJP
| » * pROV. T . C . Q R O U P • «•»•»•»«»•»«»
HIGH TENSION WIRES
ALL, HEADINGS ARC MAG. HEADINGS
T T ~
 MANEUVER­

AA OVERLAY RALEIGH

SALISBURY

ixso

moo

CONCORD STAR
ROCKY RJDGE
*40

CHARLOTTE N ORWOOD
40

490 SAO ABERDEEN

* 40
AMP MACKALL
PINKSTON
WADESBORO

MAP: CHARLOTTE STRATEGIC

SCALE^ I/50QQ00 j
*4O
PREPARED BY: 60TH |.T. C.
WING A-2 j
uoo DATE­ 17 SEPT 4 4

MANEUVER
 MANEUVER

D-l
349TH & IST PROV. GROUPS
PARADROP

ROUTE OVERLAY

35 30

78*30'

CAMP MACKAUL
(AUX)

LUMBERTON
AU%-2

34 30

80 CHARLOTTE
SECTIONAL AERO. CHART
SCALE: 1:500,000
PREPARED BY 60™- T.C. WING,
MANEUVER A - 2 SECTION, 15, SEPT. 4 4 '
 •""S3

i \ ;
V:; -r * ,

MANEUVER

D- DAY
349™-& I ST PROV. GROUPS
GLIDER LANDING '•<• 5

ROUTE OVERLAY

35°30

HEMP
\.P
78° 30

FAYETTELV1LUE.

LUM8ERTON

34°30

80°30'

CHARLOTTE
SECTIONAL AERO. CHART
SCALE". 1:500,000
PREPARED BY 60™ T C WING

MANEU mmmm
A 2 T . CSECTION,
. GDOOP
|"ST p p o v ,
^ S E P T . 4 4

T.C.
 Hq., 60th T. C. Wing,

POPE F.I'XD, FORT BRAGG,

NORTH CAROLINA,­
21 September 1944 •

SUPFLEtiENT NO. 1 )

ANNEX.NO. 1)
TO
FO NO. 9)

INTKLL3 AffMEX

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1

Location and of GLZrl & FDZ-1

Location:

a. 35° 02' NL - 79° 34' m.,

b. 4.7 miles West of CAMP MACKALL.

c. 3.2 miles North of MARSTON.

d % 1.5 miles Northwesterly from the Northeasterly^Southwesterly

curve in S.A.L. RR,

Approximate Elevation Above Sea Level;

450 feet*

Shape of Field;

u
Arrow Head", pointed Northwesterly, Approximate azimuth of field,

315°.

Size:

Northeasterly leg of Arrow, 0.80 miles (1408 yards) long by 0,22

miles (387 yards) wide (at Southerly end of NE arrow leg).

Southwesterly leg of Arrow 0<70 miles (1232 yards) long.by 0.25

miles (440 yards) wide (at Southerly end of SW arrow leg)*

See GLZ-1 Overlay,

Terrain:

Flat with no high features, pine timber from 3" to 12" in diameter

and from 10* to 50f tall surround the area.

Soil:

White sand.

Cultivation:

None; crops have been removed.

Ranger Zones:

Small timbered area just off center of arrow area. See Blow-up of

Location & Description of PDZ-2

Locatipn: «
a. 35° 03V NL - 79° 31 J -WU
b. 2\ miles Westerly from CA14P ij&CKALL.
c. 1.6 miles from Southerly end of GLZ~3 on approximate
6
d. Between the grayel surfaced road (between GLZ-3 andl.CiilP
and the S,A.L« RR at a point near where the E^y\and West^ portion
of the gravel road turns toward the Nort)
Mosaic MACKAWi-WBST END
Approximate Elevation Above Sea Level:

400 feet.

Shape of Field:

Curved on North & South sides.. General shape is rectangular,.

Size:

Length East 4 West 0*90 miles (l£84 yards) by width North & South

0,50 miles (880 yards)..

Terrain: '

^iat wijth no high features* Pine timber from 3" to 12" in <S.ame1ter

and from 10* to 50 ! tall surround this area except on South side.

Soil:

White sand.

Cultivation: .

None; crops have been removed.

Danger Zones;

See Blow-up of PDZ-2..

Note:

High line along S.A.L* BR 0,60 miles (1056 yards) south of this drop­
ping area. Also note scattered trees in Northerly half of area and

middle portion of area.

Location & pescriptjon of PDZ-3 &

Location:

a. 35° 05* til - 79° 32' WL.

b. ki miles Northwesterly from CAMP HACKALL.

c. 2.6 miles Easterly from South end of DiEBI STRJCP#

d. 4*8 miles Southwesterly from PINE BLUFF.

Approximate Elevation Above Sea Level:

400 feet. x'

Shape of Field:

Rectangular with a projection Westerly near the Northerly 1/3 end

and a projection Easterly from the Southerly end. Approximate .azi­

muth of field, 344°.

Size:

a* 2j miles (4400 yards) from Northerly to Southerly end and an av*­

erage of 0.30 miles (528 yards) from Easterly side to Westerly-

side.

b« The projection Westerly near the North 1/3 end is 0.40 miles

(704 yards) from the Easterly side to the Westerly side and 0.20

miles (352 yards) from the Northerly side to the Southerly side.

c# The projection Easterly from the Southern end is 0.60 miles

(1056 yards) from Westerly end to Easterly eiid and 0*45 miles

(792 yards) from Northerly side to Southerly side.

Terrain:

Flat with no high features. Pine timber from 3" to 12" in diameter

and from 10* to 50* tall surround the area.

§82& ' ­
sand.

Cultivation:

None; crops have been removed.

M A N E U V

 H AN

Danger Zones: %M^

A low gently sloped area* $22 yaro? North and South by 211 yard© East

and West, the lowest depth being from 61 to* *0<l>below the surrounding

ground, located near th* 1/3 Northerly, eft^ wftfre -the Westerly projec­
tion connects with the main fi&&» See GLZ Overlay Field No*3*

location k Description of IPathfinfor Fia^d

Note;

of HEMP will be I.P.

Location:

a # 35° 26' NL - 79° 3&'-WW

b» 3j miles, plus or minus, Westerly from

Approximate Elevation Above

50 f

of Ffold;

Rectangular with projecting f i O 4 *

Size:

a. Main field, 1837 feei (612 jr«4»)

wide. The long way of the f i « W ii

b. Projection field on North aide of

yards) North & South by 5% feet ( £ &

c # Projection field on South side of main

yards) North and South by 334 feet ( U l

Terrain:

Fairly flat, Field has a slight slope from the North to tb» tewth.
There are no high 'features. Pine forest of he«vy *fyOAmQ&mA&
this Pathfinder Field, trees are from 3" to 12* in 4Mflfttar tad from
10* to 50* t a l l . ' Y
Soil:
sand.
Cultivation:

None; crops have been removed.

Danger Zones:

Three small farm buildings in center of field* T*ortt*$ «tf trees

tend North and South in the center of the West half df the i l d

See photo of field.

H/OiPTON,

OFFICIAL:

/JACOBS,

A-2.

7 Incls:

Incl 1 • Overlay, D-l (Glider).

Incl 2 • Overlay, 1>-1 (Paradrop).

Incl 3 - Overlay, D-Day (Glider).

Incl 4 - Overlay, AA (Aberdeen), 1:20,000

Incl 5 - Parking Diagram, AV Hccjkall *

Incl 6 - Pairing Diagram B, llackall

Incl 7 - Parking Diagram C, kackall % % » ^ 4

•MANEUVER

1Kb)

1352

SANPOCD725 ttZ(°- N-CAROtlNA

LOCAL. FLACK. OVERLAY
SCALE 1: ZO.OOO
PQEPACELD BY fcO^W»NG, A i * SECT
l«? SEPT. 4 4 . \

MANEUVER

-~ "s * • > . •
 MANEUVER

D-l
.549™ GROUP
GLIDER LANDING

ROUTE OVERLAY

35° 50

34° 30'

80° 30'

CHARLOTTE
SECTIONAi AERO CHART
SCALE: i: JDOOOO
PREPARED!Bf 6 0 T H T C WJNQ
MANEUVE A - 2 SECTION, 15, SEPT, 4-4
 MAN&UVBTR

O-DAY
349TH. & iST.pRov. GROUPS

GLIDER LANDING

ROUTE OVERLAY

35°30

HEMP
IP
78° 30

FAVETTE.VSLLE.

LUMBERTON

34° 30

80°30'

i CHARLOTTE
] SECTIONAL A6RO. CHART
f ICALE: 1:500,000T
I PREPARED BY 6O * T C WING
* 3k 2 SECTION; f5, SEPT. 4 4
T.C, <St3l OUtPmm mtmmm'mm mm « • • • » « . .

%*rr
 MANE- ?•* »

D-l
349TH & IST PROV. GROUPS
PARADROP

ROUTE OVERLAY

o '
35 30

78*30'

FAYETTE VMl_l_ei

LAUREL

HtLL

LUMBERTON
AUTt-Z

0 I

34 30

80' CHARLOTTE
SECTIONAL AERO. CHART
S C A L E : i:500,000
PREPARED BY 6 0 T H - T . C . W I N G
MANEUVER A-2 SECTION, 15, SEPT. 4 4
T.c.
C.
 H

PAHKTNS

a/c fit— 349th——

z
MH other fits—«-/•/
Shuttle

1* &UL pianos land and T/0 on Runway

a* 1st Provisional T C Group a 36 aircraft flight trill park on
outside of runway
b* 349th T C Group - 36 aircraft flight frill park on outside of
runway //3»
2i i^ll. formations(nino ships)fron 1st t'rofisional and 349th T 0
Groups T7ill land on #34 and park on outside of runway jfe* &£tcr unloading
taxi on runway #11 taking off on runway #34*
3« All ships on shuttle run vrill land on #34 and park on the outside
of #3« Taxi on #11 and take-off on #34*
4» Formation of ton B-17fs i;ill land and take-off on'runway selected
by flight loader* Those aircraft will park on metal strip,, parallel to run­
>ray §3* ^
5* All planes will 0 Qcliiub
I
to 5°° f ton milo^fran airdrarao# i d l traffic
J i l l be to the left at 5 * Pianos o^/talce-off will, not c l i mb higher than
200 1 'until ten miles out. -. #
6O All planes will, contact control tower on approach t<5 field for land­
ing instructions and before take-off. .' r

MLMEUVBR
 AIR UNIOTG PABKIlfc PUN
AHIY AIR BASE

PARKING AREA (SOD) WIND EIB

PARKING AREA. (SOD)

36 a/c
36 Q/C f l t - l s t Prov*
All. other flights (Medical)

Shuttle Run—/

Operations

1» A l l . landings and t a k e - o f f s on runway

a* 1 s t Provisional T C Group - 36 a i r c r a f t f l i g h t w i l l park on out­

aido of runnay
c
b . 349th Troop a r r i c r Group - 36 a i r c r a f t f l i g h t -gill park on out­
side of runway #3*

•2* A l l formations (nine ships) each f r e e 1 s t Provi s i o n a l and 349 t h T C

Groups w i l l land on #11. and park on outsido of runway # 3 , After unloading t
take-off on #11 #

3«. A l l ships on s h u t t l e run w i l l lend on #11 and park on outside pf

#3* Take-off on #11% ;

4» Formation of t e n B-17 ! s w i l l land and take-off on runway selected

by f l i g h t loader* These a i r c r a f t w i l l park on metal s t r i p * p a r a l l e l t o run­
way # 3 ,

5». All-planes will climb to 5 0 0 ' ten mile? frcm airdrome. All. traffic
will, bo to the left at 5OO'» Pianos on takeoff will not climb higher than
200 * until ten miles out*

6» All planes will_contact control tower on approach to field for

landing instructions
 /OR PUN
BASE

*' ABOVE 15 M«P,H,

(SGD)
l e t Erovt 36 a/e
f i t (Mod)

Operations

PARKING AREA (SOD)

36 a/c f i t - 349t
. All other f l i g h t

Shuttle Runs———

, 1* All. laid ings and take-off on runway #3.

T
a« 1st Provisional C Group - 36 aircraft f l i g h t will, park oia
outsida of runway #3^-,
b» Tho 349th T C Group - 36 aircraft flight w i l l park on the S
aido of runway ^11»
2* All formations (nine ships) each from 1st Provisional and 3
I C Groups will land on #3 park on outside of runway #11« After unloading
tako-off on #3* .
3§ All. ships on diuttlo run will land on #3 park on outsido of run­
way #11* Take-off on #3 #
4* Formation of ton B^17fs will land and talc-off on runway selected
by flight loador* Those aircraft w i l l park on metal s t r i p , parallel to run­
way #3»
5 # All planojs.-i7iil dirab to 500 1 ten miles from airdrome* All traffic
w i l l bo to the toft at 500*. " Plarcs on tako-off will not climb higher than
200f u n t i l ten miles out, ­
6 t All pianos wi 11 apntact control Hold for
landing i nstructions a n d bef o A I k 3 | ^
 HEAWJARTiiES

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIE V/ING

• ABMY. AIR FORCES _ ^ *

:
<-.?•
.» *
p|:«"
tept ember 1944.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN)

NUMBiiR . 1)

Mapgj1/20,000, Troy 36, Sanford 31.

1. Aerial reconnaissance indicates emplacements as followsj

Coordinates Description
'v . , (1149.2.- 1337.8) 40 AA
(1149.0-1337.5) 40 AA
(1148.2 ­ 1337.6) 40 AA
(1148.1-1337.4) 50 Cal AA firing Easterly
. (1149.0 ­ 1336.6) — 40 AA
(1149,1 - 1336.4) ~~—— 50 Cal AA,Firing Easterly
(1149.9 - 1336,8) 40 AA
. (1149.9 - 1336,6) 1 < 50 Cal' AA,Firing Easterly
(1050.3 ­ 1336.3) 40 AA
(1050.3 •»• 1336.1) >—.-— 50 Cal AA,Firing Easterly
2. Rail and Road Junction V/ADiiSBORO captured 17 September 1944 by the 11th

Jn£Sb£ty'im^ivisioui:: No change in present line of contact along pee Dee River.

No additional identification obtained.

3. Enemy column estimated one (1) March Group (CT) from Infantry Division

RALEIGH closed in bivouac vicinity APEX 0800, 17 September 1944*

4» No photographs available at this time of HOFFMAN.

5. Agents confirm presence Fighter Bombers in Sq strength SALISBURY,

CARRBORO, .RALEIGH, No information present date if these Sq capable night

employment* No identification.

6. Armored unit 100 mi. N/ RALEIGH estimated one Panzer Regiment.

HAMPTON,

Executive,

OFFICIAL:

A-2.

DISTRIBUTION: A/B - T/C Maneuver Hqs 35

1st Prov T C Group — - — - 5

349th T C Group — — « — 5

13th A/B Division .,5

60th T C Wing 10

IviANEUVSR
 0

: C. Wing,

, FORT BRAGG,

NORTH CAROLINA,.

21'September 1944.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN)

NUMBER 2)

Maps: 1/20,000, TROI 36, SANFORB 31,

1, Aerial reconnaissance indicates additional emplacements and

changes as follows:

Coordinates Description

(1148.1 - 1337.7) —• — 50 Cal AA, Firing N. Westerly

(1148.2 - 1337.5) 40 AA

(1149.4 - 1338.7) •— 40 AA

(1149.3 -* 1338,5) - - — — — 50 Cal AA, Firing s. Westerly

(1149.1 - 1338.2) 40 AA

(1149.0 - 1338*1) 50 Cal AA, Firing S. Westerly

(1149.3 - 1337.7) — — 40 AA

(1149.0 - 1337.4) ~ — 40 AA

(1149.0 - 1336.6) — — Unidentified AA

(1150.6 - 1338.3) —• •-- 50 Cal AA, Firing N. Westerly

(1150.2 - 1338,2) — — 40 AA

(1150.7 - 1338.2) ~ — 40 AA

(1150.2 ~ 1337.8) — *v 50 Cal AA, Firing Northerly

(1150.2 - 1337.6) —- -~f 40 AA

(1149.9 - 1336.8) —•* Unidentified AA

(1150.1 ~ 1336.3) — •— 50 Cal AA, Firing NW

(1150.2 - 1336.2) —- -- 40 AA

2. 11th Infantry Division front stabilized and static on previously

reported positions.

3. Ground defense troops vicinity MACKALL AIRPORT increased to esti­

mated Bn. No organized ground defensive works observed*

4. No reported use of chemicals, except smoke by RED. Agents re­

port large stores chemical supplies available to RED on short notice.

5. Aerial reconnaissance CT bivouad vicinity APEX, negative 0800,

6. No activity Pz Regt. previously reported 100 miles NW RALEIGH,

7. No large troop movements HOFPMAN-MACKALL AIRPORT area* Routine

supply movements only.

0, No additional information RED defensive installations vicinity

MACKAIX AIKPORT,

9.' March Group (CT) last reported bivouac vicinity APEX reported

moving S of US HIGH3Y ^1 two Miles H SJOTORD 0600.

10, Passwords and countersigns for the period of the maneuver will

be published in Signal Operating Instructions on D-3.

JACOBS f

MAHJU.TI.8
 Hq, 60th T C Wing,

'L-M M B

MAXTON, N.C.,

24 Sept 1944,

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN)

NUMBER 4)

MAPS: Photomap, 1:20,000 - TROY 36, SANFORD 31,

1, -XXII Corps reconnaissance responsibility extends to line of US HIGH­

WAX #421 (Incl) in Corps Z action,

2, Bivouac March Group (CT) vicinity VASS bcmbei and strafed 1900, 22 Sept

by 10 A*-20 type aircraft. One large fire started. Detailed results

. not observed due to smoke and darkness.

3, RED forces in contact along PEE DEE RIVER: 376 Inf Div on right, 3#4

Inf Div on left. In 376'Inf Div Sector the 765th Grenadier Regiment

is on the right and the 766th Grenadier Regiment is on the left. Re­
serve Regiment believe located BENNETTSVILLE. In 384th Inf Div Sector,

the 534th Grenadier Regiment is on the left and the 535th Grenadier

Regiment is on the right. Reserve Regiment believed located ROCKINGHAM.

BLUE 11th Bid Div has identified 534, 535, 766 Grenadier Regiments on

its front.

4«. Friendly agents report on chemical supplies available. RED forces,

indicates innumberable locations. No effort being made to destroy these

stores pending first use by RED.

5. Latest installations MACKALL AIRPORT shown.­

6. Traffic zone operations remains normal.

7. This is last supplement before operation. Late in formation by message.

HAMPTON. .

Executive,

OFFICIAL! •

JACOBS

A-2. .

 MANEUVER

f I "^i jjf ;^ • ^

NTELLIGENCE
5ULLETIN, NO.4

40 AA

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 SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER OTC

22 September 1944.

SUPPLEMENT #1 TO ANNEX §2 F, 0. #9 60th TC Vg.

1. So much of Annex #2 to Field Order #9, 60th Troop Carrier *

Wing, as concerns serials #6 and B} under the column marked H DEST U ,

shall £e deleted.

2. The following shall be added to Annex #2, serials #6 and 8

respectively, under the column marked "BEST11:

Ser, #6 DEST: E k F

Ser* #£ DEST: C & D

By order of Colonel PITTS:

E. W. HAMPTON

Executive.

OFFICIAL:

M. C. LEWIS

A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Hq - — 3 5

349th TC Gp — r— 5
1st Prov TC Gp 5
60th TC Wg 10
13th A/B Div 5
 ANNEX NO. 3 TO P1SXD ORD!

GLIDER

;
Hq., 60th Troop Carrier Wing

Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina,

OBOO EWT, 17 September 1944.

1. GENERAL

a
» Departure Bases. All gliders will arrive at their departure bases na

later than D-2.

b
- Extra Ground Crews. 810th AAFBU will furnish all of its available

ground crews to 349th T, C. Gp. These ground, crews will report for duty to

the 349th T. C. Gp Glider Officer at 0S00 EWT D-l and will be relieved by him

when their services are no longer needed.

c. Equipment,

(1) All gliders will be equipped with:

(a) Corey nose.

(b) Emergency landing lights.

(c) Deceleration parachutes.

(d) Tug-glider interphone system.

(e) Standard pyrotechnic equipment.

(£) Tail jacks.

(g) Wheel chocks.

(h) Emergency tie down kits (complete)

(i) Control locks and spoilers.

(2) 13th A/B Division will furnish lashing ropes and loading ramps

for all gliders*

<*• Lowering of Glider Tail and Nose. , Personnel of the 13th A/B Division

will lower the' tail and nose of the glider they were riding in immediately

after it has been unloaded,

e. Glider Pilots.

(1) Glider pilots will all be equipped with full field equipment and

two and one-third days emergency ration (C),

(2) After landing glider pilots will report to an initial assembly

area which will be designated later by the 13th A/B Division,

Upon reaching this area all glider pilots will come under the

command of the 13th A/B Division as members of the ground team,

f
•
Evacuation of Glider Pilots, At 1200 EOT on D/l all glider pilots

will assemble in the proximity of Base Operations at Camp Mackall reporting .

to their respective Group Glider Officers. Group Glider Officers are designa­
ted as Evacuation Control Officers and will be responsible for the evacuation

of the glider pilots with the gliders from GLZ No. 1 and 3* Glider pilots,

under the direction of their respective Group Glider Officers, will assist

with the evacuation of the gliders from GLZ No, 1 and 3.

S» Glider Marking. Gliders shall be marked serially before loading as

designated in par, 2a and 3a of this ANNEX. Numbers will be placed on both

sides of fuselage and on the lower surface of one wing. In both double tow

and single tow formations, :he glider numbers will run consecutively from

front to rear of column with even numbers on the left and odd numbers on the

right. Pilots must be assigned to gliders by number as early as possible so

that they may be properly briefed.

n
» Landing Plan. After release, all gliders will follow the air traffic

patterns designated by their squadron glider officers,

*•• Plight Form Record. The 13th A/B D:h§L«L#f%K,l[fcmsh each glider

pilot a completed Flight Form "02". T j i j - ^wa © « * • f ^ 1 l Pas* the glide** pilot

and will be checked by the£ ^ # j % % ^ ° i V ^ l K 3 V I # g & il plan.9...coiiimander.

MAMF.I

(Annex No. 3 to F.O. 9, 60th TC^ijg, Glider, 0800 EWT 1? Sept 44)

This form will be turned over to the glider pilots1 respective Group Glider

Officer before- take-off* The Group Glider Officers will make a record of the

field numbers of each tug and glider combination prior to take-off.

2. SERIAL NO. 9

a
* Group Glider Assignment. The 349th T. C, Gp, in double tow with gli­
ders numbered 100 to 119 inclusive,

b. GLZ Assignments> See attached GLZ Assignment Table No. 1,

c, GLZ Locations. See attached GLZ Overlay No. 1,

d
* Rufl~ifl Line. See attached GLZ Overlay* No. 1,

e
» Emergency Procedure. See Annex No, 4, par, 3D.

f. Field Marking, Pathfinder parties will mark Field 3A with panels and

two sets of three flare;pets each. Each panel will have a green fusee in its

center. See attached GLZ Overlay No, 1*

&• After Landing Procedure.

(1) Immediately after landing each glider pilot will move his glider

to the edge of the woods, The 13th A/B Division will provide

necessary vehicles for towing. In the event that high winds are

forecast sufficient administrative crews will be dispatched to

secure gliders in the glider landing areas.

(2) The first Slider pilot into the GLZ will be the Field Control Of­
ficer, His duties will include;

(a) Supervision of the field lighting system until the last gli­
der has landed, •

(b) Supervision of removal of gliders from Field 3A,

n
« Lights and Signals,

(1) Each glider will have a blue tail light,

(2) One green fusee will be placed in the center of each panel; making

a total of two green fusees in Field 3A.

(3) Interphone and astral dome light signal — See par. 3C (8) F. 01

No, 9> Hq 60th T. C, Wing, dated 17 Sept 1944,

(4) Approach and dispersal lights are all natural color flare pots.

(5) Bnergency Signals — See Annex No. 4, Par,'3D. Glider pilots

will make an emergency cut off upon receipt of red light from

the astral dome5.white liVrht in astral dome is specified for*par.

3C (8) F.O. No. 9, Hq 60th T. C. Wing, dated 17 Sept 1944•

i. Rope ^drop. zone-will be Maxton.AAB,

j. Any tug towing gliders becoming separated from the formation will not

make his glider drop run prior to 2105. EWT.

3. SERIALS NO. 10. 11% 12 and 13.

a
» Group Glider Assignments.

(1) The 349th T, C. Gp. in double tow with gliders numbered 120 to

217 inclusive; in single tow^itja g W f A f f t b e r e d 218 to 221;

and in double. XwtitfOAglfcefl C ^ M s ! l i ^ V 259*

 A C "

(Annex No. 3 to F.O. 9, 60th TC TIG, Glider, 0800 EWT 17 Sept 1944.)

(2) The 1st Prov. T. C. Gp. in double tow with gliders numbered 300

to 381.

b. GLZ Assignments. See? attached GLZ Assignment Tables No. 1 and 2,

c, GLZ Locations. See attached GLZ Overlays No. 1 and 2.

d
» Run-in Line. See attached GLZ Overlays No. 1 and 2,

e
» Emergency Procedures» See Annex No. 4, par, 3D.

f. Field Marking. Pathfinder parties will mark all fields with panels.

A green fusee will be lighted in the western tip of Field 3B. Th.e location

of this fusee is on the desired run-in line for the tugs,

£• After Landing; Procedure. In the event that high winds are forecast

sufficient administrative crews will be dispatched to secure gliders in th$

glider landing area.

h« Lights and Signals,

(1) Green fusee will be placed near the head of the run-in line. The

location of this fusee will be in the western end of Field 3B.

(2) Interphone and astrcl dome light signal — See par. 3C (8) F.O.

No. 9, Hq 60th T. C, Wing, dated 17 Sept 1944.

(3) Each field will have its boundaries marked off by panels. See

GLZ Overlays No, 1 :ind 2,

*•• Emergency Signals. See Annex No* 4, par. 3D. Glider pilots will make

an emergency cut off upon receipt of red light from astral dome j.whit» li&kt .irua

tral done.is specified for par. 3C (8) F.O, No. 9, Hq 60th T. C. Wing, dated

17 Sept 1944. "

j. Serial No. 12. Gliders will be towed at 400 feet above terrain. Gli­
der release altitude will be 800 feet above the terrain.

k. Rope drop zones will be the respective departure bases.

1. Any tug towing gliders becoming separated from the formation will not

make his glider drop run prior to 0730 EJT,

By order of Colonel PITTSi

Executive

OFFICIAL: A

Glider 0.

4 Incls:
Incl 1 - GLZ Assignment 'Table No. 1

Incl 2 - GLZ Assignment Table No. 2

Incl 3 - GLZ Overlay No. 1

Incl 4 - GLZ Overlay No. 2.

 MANE'

GLZ ASSIGNMENT T J » | N t ) . 1

SERIALS NO. 9 , 1 0 , 1 2 a n d 1 3
:\it
Order

of
Field Numbers

Landing
1 3A 3B 3C 3-D.

1 218 100 140 180 200

2 , 2l$ 101 141 181 201

•i: y ' • 2$Q 102 142 182 202

4 221 103 143 133 ' 203

5 222 104 144 184 204

6 223 105 145 1*5 205

7 22i 106 146 186 206

8 225 107 147 187 207

9 226 108 148 188 208

10 227 109 149 189 209

11 228 no
150 190 210

12 229 111 151 191 211

13 230 112 152 , 192 212

14 - "&ir 113 "133 193 213

15 2^2' 114 154 194 214 _

16 233 115 155 195 215

17 234 116 ' 156 196 216

117 157 197 217

19 236 118 158 198

20 237 119 159 199

21 238 120 160

22 239 121 161

23 240 122 162 . v;*J

24 241 123 163 -' '..••

25 242 124 164

• ' . ' • • • .

26 243 125 165

• ' . '

"" 2? ' - 2^4 126 " 166 "

•j

28 245 " 127 16?

2V 246 128 166

: V

30 247 129 169

31 248 130 170

- . : • .

32 249 131 171

33 250 132 172

m
.

34 251 173
_35 252 '134 174
• • - - " • ' ,

36 253 135 175

37 254 136 176 .-.: .0

38 255 137 177

39 256 138 178

" 40 257 139 179

41 258

" 42 259

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON
Executive

OFFICIAL:

 GCZ ASSIGNMENT TABLE NO, 2

SERIAL .MO. 1 1

Order
Field Numbers

of i

Landing 3E
3F

X 300
340

2
30l!
341

} . 302
31+2

5 304

343

344

"6 • /' 305'

345

7 306
346.

8 307
3V7

9 308
348

10 309
349

11 310
3?0

• 12 311
331

13 312
352

14 . 313
?53

15 ?V*
354

i6 315
355

17 316
356

18 317
357

19 33L8
358

20 . rj19
359

21 320
360

22 321
361

23 322
362

24 ?23
363

25 324
364

26 325
365

27 326 ,
366

28 327
367

29 328
368

30 ?29
369

31 330
370

32 331
371

33 332
372

34 333
373

35 334
374

36 335
375

37 336
376

38 337
377

39 338
378

40 339
379

41
380

42
381

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON
Executive

OFFICIAL:

G
BROi*N
Glider 0.
 MANEUVER
I34O

GLZ OVERLAY
114s

FIELD NO. I

D DAY

\J337 MACKALL WEST ENID

AERfAL MOSAIC
SCAL E- 1/15000
PREPARED BY: 60TH
T.C. WING A - 2
DATE- 17 SEPT 44

MANEUVER
» I J ?**£
 NEUVER

GLZ OVERLAY FIELD- NO. 3

D-l <£ D DAY

MACK ALL WEST- E;ND; AREA

AERIAL MOSAIC
SCALE-1/1500 0
PREPARED BY: 60TH TC
4H"
WING A-2
DATE: (5 SEPT. 4 4

5 ."

'• MANEUVER
 t h Troop Carrier Wing
Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C.
1000 EOT, 20 September 1944.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO ANNEX NO. 3, F. 0. NO. 9

1. Par, le (2) shall be deleted and the following substituted therefor;

1, e, (2) Immediately after landing glider p i l o t s in Serials No.

9j 10, 11, 12 and 13 will come under the conmand of the
13th A/B Division. The 33th A/B Division w i l l have a l l
glider pilots at Base Operations, Camp Lackall at 1200
EWT D/l. At t h i s time glider pilots w i l l revert to the
command of their respective Troop Carrier Organizations.
Glider p i l o t s will be briefed by the 13th A/B Division
on D-l at the respective departure bases of the 349th
T. C. Group and 1st Prov. T. C. Group, ^his briefing
w i l l include the following:

(a) Action to be taken by the glider p i l o t s immediate­

ly after landing.
(b) Specific A/B Unit to which glider p i l o t i s to be
attached,
(c) General ground mission of glider p i l o t s .
(d) Duties of glider p i l o t s .
(e) ITnere and to whom glider p i l o t s are to report if
becoming l o s t .

2. Par. 1 i s further amended to add sub-paragraphs j and k:

j. Each glider pilot shall be furnished the following aids and in­
formation contained in Supplement No. 1 t o Annex No. 1, to F. 0. No. 9., 60th
T. C. Wing:

(1) Aerial photos of assigned field,

(2) Field description of assigned f i e l d .

k. Danger areas in Field 3 will be marked with yellow flags.

3. Par. 2g shall be deleted and the following substituted therefor:

2. g« After Landing Procedure.

(1) The 60th T. C. Wing will provide necessary vehicles for
toiiing gliders t o edge of the woods. Gliders will be
moved to the edge of the woods between the hours of
2359 EWT on D-l day and 0500 EOT on D day. In the event
that high winds are forecast sufficient administrative
crev:s will be dispatched by the 60th T. C. Wing to se­
cure gliders in the glider landing area.

(2) The f i r s t glider pilot into the GLZ will be the Field
Control Officer, He w i l l supervise the lighting system
u n t i l the l a s t glider has landed.'

4- Par. 3 j i s hereby deleted,

5. Annex No. 3 i s further amended to aar par. 4:

4, TACTICAL PICK UP.

a. The Air Evacuation Glider in Serial No, 26 shall be equipped

with a complete ground glider pick-up station unit,

b, In so far as possible es.jh glider in Serial No. 13 will be

equipped with a complete ground glider pick-up station unit.

By order of Col|^ _ _ _
'TON

OFFICIAL:

Glider 0.
.___ - .1 ­
 SIXTIETH

21 September 1944

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO ANNEX NO. 3 -.P. 0, NO. 9*

1. Par. 2h (5) shall be deleted and the following substituted therefor:

2. h. (5) Emergency Signals - See par. 3D, Medical Annex No. 1 to

A. 0. No, 1, F. 0. No. 9, Hq 60th T. C. Wing, dated 1?

Sept 44 (Corrected copy). Glider pilots will make an

emergency cut off upon receipt of red light from the

astral dome; white light in astral dome is specified for

par, 3X (10), F. 0. No. 9, Hq 60th T. C* Wing, dated 17

Sept 44 (Corrected cop/),

2. Par 3i shall be deleted and the following substituted therefor:

3* !• Emergency Signals. See par. 3D, Medical Annex No. 1 to A. 0.

No. 1, F. 0. No. 9, Ho 60th T. C. Wing, dated 17 Sept 44 (Corrected copy).

Glider pilots will make an emergency cut off upon receipt of red light from

the astral dome; white light in astral dome is specified for par. 3X (10), F.

0. No. 9, Hq 60th T. C. Wing, dated 17 Sept 44 (Corrected copy).

By order of Colonel PITTS:

E. W; HAMPTON

Executive

OFFICIAL:

/§»

Glider 0.

 #4 TO JY 0, 9, 60TH T. CY WING

BESTRUCTICNS

A. The 349th Troop Carrier Group and the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier

Group operate pathfinder serials as shown on movement tables. The path­

finder crews from the 349th Troop Carrier Group and 1st Provisional Troop

Carrier Group wilX report to the 60th Troop Carrier Wing Headquarters,

A-3 Section, at 1300 B-2. Briefing of pathfinder personnel will be con­

ducted by 60th Troop Carrier Wing only at times * and places to be hereafter

designated. Routes and Pathfinder B£ f s will be specified at a later date

by 60th Troop Carrier Wing•

B. 1» Pathfinder Parachutists will familiarize themselves with indivi*

dually assigned areas so as *to be able to place visual aids and radio

aids accurately* .

2* Radio Aids? See SOI and Navigational Aids Overlay.

3. Time of operations for all radio aids se« SOI.

C. 1. Visual Aids: See Navigational Aids Overlay.

2. Time for Visual Aids: >

a. Green fusee at GL2 #3 area will be f urning from

2015 B-l to 2300 B-l.

3. Green Fusee at PDZ #3 will be burning from 2015 B-l to 2300 D-l,

4. Green fusee at PDZ #1 will be burning from 2015 to 2100 B-l,

5. Green fusee at FDZ #2 will be burning from 2015 to 2100 B-l.

6. Glider field landing lights will be lighted from 2015 B-l

to 2300 B-l.

B. Pathfinder with radar and fusee stationed at North end of GLZ #3 will

fire, a green pyrotechnic flare at 2015. This flare will be a signal for

all glider field landing lights to be lighted. Glider field landing lights

will still be lighted at 2015 if signal Is not observed. The Pathfinder

stationed at the North end of G1& #3 will count the tug ships of both groups

until all have passed* He will then wait 15 minutes before firing green

pyrotechnic flare which will be a signal to extinguish all glider*field

landing lights.

By order of Colonel PITTS:

, W. HAMPTON

Executive.

M. C. XEWIS

A-3

AB|fc #5 TO P. 0* #9., 60TH T. C. WING*

V 'y ADMINISTRATIVE! ORDj

Mft'PS: Same as P, 0* #9%

X. SUPPLY:

at Rations:

(1) Supply points; ^

(a) No change until concentration at departure bases.

(b) Army Supply Point #1 - Bragg - For all units locat­

ed at Pope or Bragg until departure* *

Army Supply Point #2 - Maxton - For all units lo­

cated at Maxton and Lumberton until departure.

Opens day of arrival in area.

(2) Schedule of Distribution:

(a) Ration Cycle: Breakfast, Dinner, Supper.

(b) Time of Issue: All units 0800 to 1700*

(3) Plan:

(a) Field ration "A" at Army, Supply Points #1 and #2.

(b) Field ration U C " at Army Supply Point #2*

(e) Ration strength for units drav/ing on Army Supply

Points #1 and #2 will be submitted to this Head­

quarters daily at 0500f beginning four days prior

to day of arrival i.n vicinity of each departure

base, indicating strength at each Army Supply

Point*

b. Ammunition:

(1) Supply Points:

(a) No change*

c» Gasoline and Oil:

(1) Supply Points: *'

(a) No change until concentration at departure bases.

(b) Motor Vehicles:

Army Supply Point #3 - Pope - For all units lo­

cated at Pope until departure - opens day of

arrival in area#

Army Supply Point #4,- Maxton - For all units lo­

cated at Maxton and Lumberton until departure ­
opens day of arrival in area*

(c) Aircraft:

Army Supply Point #5 - Pope - For all -aircraft

located thereat - opens day of arrival at Base,

Army Supply Point #6 - Maxton - For

located at Maxton and

arrival in area*

AMEX #5/ADM. 0,ffl,Cont«d«

(a) TJ&e of 100 Octane Fue>l iln

k f r ^ j . Memorandum No.. 65-79, dated 20 June
(3) Estimated requirements for gasoline and oil for period

day of arrival at departure base to D plus 4 for each

Army Supply Point and Airhead to be submitted to this

Headquarters by 18 September 1944.

d, Class II - No change,

e, Class IV - No change.

f, Water:

Water obtained l o c a l l y .
(2) All water in landing area is nonpotable until treated,

Halazone tablets will be obtained through normal chan^

nels,

2. EVACUATION:

a. No change until 1200 D-l. .

b. Emergency medical service for units of 13th Airborne Div­

ision at departure bases: See Medical Annex.

c* Casualties: See Medical Annex,

d. Burials: By units,

e. Salvage and captured materials will be evacuated by 13th

Airborne Division to Camp Mackall Airport, All returning

aircraft otherwise empty will be utilized for evacuation

of salvage and captured materials to Maxton,

. f• P, W. enclosure will be established by 13th Airborne Div­

ision at Camp Mackall Airport and evacuated by 60th T. C,

Wing in returning aircraft to Pope,

g. Priority of air evacuation: (1) Personnel casualties;

(2) P. W.; (3) Captured Material; (4) Salvage,

3. TRAFFIC:

a. Circulation;

(1) MSR: Maxton^Lumberton U.S. #74,

(2) Traffic priorities: (1) Troop movements; (2) Supplies,

(3) Traffic control: SOP Motor Vehicle driving and convoy

rules will bo followed. Control and safety all ve­

hicle movement, including traffic at supply points and

departure bases, responsibility of Group Commanders,

b. Restrictions:

(1) Blackout lights after 2100 D-l,

c. Construction and Maintenance of Roads:

(1) Rear Areas - No change,

(2) Landing Area - By 13th Airborne Divisiojsk

lieved, ^.% § " *

-2­
MANSUVB

 MANEUVE

ANNEX # 5 , ADM. 0 , # 1 , C o n t t d ,
f
4r 'SERVICE TROOPS AND TRAINS:

a. Bivouacs:

(1) Ground echelon, glider, 1st Provisional Group at Lum­

berton.

5, PERSONNEL:

a. Mail - No change*

b. Strength report - Submitted this Headquarters daily 1000

effective D-l.

c. Replacements:

(1) As needed through Air Force Channels,

6, MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Headquarters of all rear echelons will be reported this

Headquarters by 1100 D-l,

b. A-4 Periodic report (Form 18, Para, 75, FM 101-5) will be

submitted as of 0001 by 0300 daily, beginning D-3, (See

Maneuver Letter, this Hq., 14 September 1944, SubJ: Air­

craft Equipment.)

Abbreviated report indicating status of equipment, supply,

evacuation and finable aircraft will be sent by radio,

teletype or messenger to be followed by complete written

report*

c. Fraternizing with civilians, unlawful seizure of property,

and, abuse of individuals in occupied territory is forbidden,

Unit Commanders v/ill instruct all men in proper behavior,

dress, field sanitation, and that proper distinction be

made between measures of military necessity and deliberate

misconduct^

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON
Executive Officer.
OFFICIAL:

YFIELD .

A-4*

1 I n c l :

1 - Medical Annex # 1 .

 .HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

21 September 1944

SUPPLEMENT #1 TO ANNEX #5 F,O. #9

SERVICING OP AIRCRAFT

!• All final servicing of aircraft at home fields prior to

initial maneuver operations, will be full service 100 octane. This

servicing* is adequate to complete all paratroop and glider missions,

2. All subsequent servicing necessary, will be made by units

at departure 'fields, by organizational personnel and organizational

equipment.

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON,

Executive

OFFICIAL:

MAYFISLD,

A-4,

'MEDICAL ANNEX NO. 1 TO A 0 0 1 f If feltL4i'L

MAPS. Strategic Map 1/600,000 Charlotte Sheet

Road Maps Carolina Maneuver Area.

1. EVACUATION: Administrative Casualties, D-L

a. Ambulances of each group will operate in units of four.

Airdromes and ambulance outposts will be covered as

indicated below. Ambulance units will arrive at the

designated posts and establish radio and telephone

' communications with the Wing Surgeon by the hour indicated,

(1) Maxton AAB •* Two medical officers, one medical officer

1st Prov Gp' and one medical officer, Max-*

ton AAB, and four ambulances from Maxton

AAB by H - 18 hours.

(2) Pope Field - Two medical officers, one medical officer

349th Gp and one medical officer Pope

Field, and four ambulances from Pope Field

by H - 18 hours*

(5) £umberton AAB - Two medical officers, one medical offi­

cer 1st Prov Gp and one medical officer

349th Gp, and four ambulances from Maxton

AAB by H .«• 18 hours.

(4) Sanford Ambulance Outpost - Two medical officers and

four ambulances of 349th Gp by H - 12

hours.

(5) Hemp Ambulance Outpost - Two medical officers and four

ambulances of 1st Prov. Gp by H - 12 hours.

b. Communication with ambulance outposts.

(1) See Signal Annex and current SOI.

c. Evacuation will bo to nearest government hospital listed

below:

(1) Station Hospital, Maxton AAB.

(2) Station Hospital,, Fort Bragg.

(3) Station Hospital, Camp Mackall.

d# Civilian hospitals to be used only in EMERGENCY and if

transportation to government hospital would be detrimental

for the casualties.

» *

e. Each ambulance unit will be furnished the following:

(1) Litters 16

(2) Blankets 32^

(3) Kits, Medical Private 4

(4) Kits, Medical Officer . 2

(5) Crash splint units 4.

(6) Blood plasma 4 (units)

(7) Morphine Syrettos 20

,».• MANEUVER

Medical Annox #1 to

(8) Brassards, Geneva Convention 10

(9) Crash Tool Chest 1
(10) Pioneer Equipment 1
(11) Kit Motor Vehicle ; 4
f. Ambulance units v/ill stand by at respective Command Posts,

and will be available for relocation by the Wing Surgeon.

g. Units at Lumberton, Maxton and Pope respectively v/Ill be

prepared to provide dispensary care of Airborne personnel

by ! H - 18 hours. '

h. Ambulance seeking forced landed aircraft will direct

lighted spotlight to Zenith*

i. In the event that administrative casualties may be air

evacuated, it will be at the discretion of the Troop Car­

rier Surgeons at those fields,

2, EVACUATION: Tactical Casualties,

a. Every piano participating in the air landing phase will be

prepared to receive six (6) casualties which may be brought

by the Airborne to the plane upon landing —• loading of

casualties will follow S.'O.-P. Refer to Tech Order 00-75-1,

1 July 1944, for planes equipped with strap litter support .

and refer to Tech Order 01-40 NC-2, Sec 6^ 20 July 1943

for planes equippe.d with bracket type litter installations,

b* Air Ambulance Records will be made out for all tactical

casualties evacuated by planes participating in the air

landing phase, including tliose casualties by snatch glider

evacuation,

c. An Airborne representative will remove property belonging

to the Airborne organization* There will bo no resupply

of medical property to Airborne from Troop Carrier.

3, MISCELLANEOUS:

a. First Aid. .

(1) Each piano will be provided by the group concerned with

five (5) kits, First-Aid, Aeronautic;

(2) Each glider v/ill be provided by the group Concerned

with three (3) kits, First-Aid, Aeronautic,

(3) Each glider pilot v/ill be equipped with one (1) packet,

First-Aid, parachute.

All personnel will carry individual packets, First-Aid,

Sanitation:

(1) Sanitation will be the responsibility of Unit Command^

ers. Sanitary procedures and appliances will be in

accordance -with provisions of AR 40-205, FM 8-40, FM

21-*10 and othor portinont directives. ~ .

(2) All water in the field is considered non-potable,

Halazone tablets used for chlorination of water will

bo obtained from Unit Supply.

In the event that lyster bags sy^^sed in bivouac areas,

calcium hypochlorito ^iJitf^Pwiecr^pr chlorination and

will be obtaj.i^4 ff

s MANEUVER

Medical Annex #1 to A O L

c# Night Vision:

(1) Normal aids to night vision will be strictly employed*

(2) Squadron Surgeons v/ill instruct all pilots and glider

pilots in the proper uso of night vision aids.

d« Spocial instructions to Pilots:

(1) Copies of "Instructions to Tug Pilots" and "Instruc­

tions to Glidor Pilots" v/ill bo issued to each pilot

and explained at briefing by Unit Surgeons by D-2»

By order of Colonel PITTS:

HAMPTON

Exocutivo Officer

OFFICIAL:

MAYFIELD

A-4 #

 HC^, 60t;h TC Wing,

pope Field, Ft Bragg,

North Carolina,

-0800 17 Sept 1944.

ANNEX NO. 6)

TO

1> 0. NO. 9)

SIGNAL ..NNEX

MAPS: 1:20,000, TROY 22. 23,• 24, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36,

SANF0RDJL9, 25, 26,. 31, 32 sheets.

1:62,500, TROY, CANDOR, VASS, JACKSON SPRINGS,

SOUTHERN PINES, ROCKINGHAM, LAURINBTJRG sheets.

1:500,000 CHARLOTTE sheet.

a. Information yon enemy signal communication will be

distributed to those concerned as it becomes avail­

able, EBemy is capable of:

(1) jamming.

(2) sending false messages.

(3) Intercepting.

(4) RIF our stations.

(5) Tracking by radar'^

(6) Cryptanalysis of our codes and ciphers. '

b. Signal security measures to be taken:

(1) While at departure bases.

(a) Make maximum use of wire facilities,

courier messengers, and postal facili­

ties. Secret and Confidential matters

to be properly safeguarded in trans­

mission and authenticated.

(b) Existing radio stations to maintain a

certain traffic control load for Troop

Carrier units augmented by dummy traffic

as a balance so that enemy intercept will

be unaware of acceleration in operations

approaching D-Day.

(2) Enroute:

(a) Existing radio stations in departure

areas continue normal traffic load.

 MANEUVER

Sig Annex No. 6 W l n l m n i l ^ v d t l W W i n g } Pope Field,

Fort Bragg, N. G*y 3WP* ±7 September 1944 Continued.

(.to) Radio silence enforced on all other radios

of forces involved in the operation until

initial landings on D«*Day. Radio silence

may be broken in event of disaster and

requirement to divert airborne serials,

pathfinder communication facilities may

break radio silence in accordance -with

prearranged plans.

Z9 Signal Plan.

a» Full time commercial telephone and teletype circuits

will be available between Eq, 60th TC tying, Maxtqn Army

Air Base and the following points:

(1) AB/TC Maneuver HQ,, Camp Mackall, North Carolina

Three (3) Telephone Circuits.

One (1) Direct Teletype Circuit.

One (1) Conference Teletype Circuit.

(2) Hope Field, (349th TC Group)

Two (2) Telephone Circuits*

One (X) Direct Teletype Circuit.

One (1) Conference Teletype Circuit.

(3) Luiflberton (1st Provisional TC Group)

Two (2) Telephone circuits.

One (1) Direct Teletype Circuit.

One (1) Conference Teletype Circuit,

(4) Wire circuits to 1st Provisional TC Group at

Camp Mackall will be extensions of the circuits at

Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver Headquarters.

b» Wire facilities will be supplemented by radio.

e. Full time Message Centers will be established and

operated at Maxton, Mackall, Pope and Lumberton

BWT, D-14 in departure area.

df The 60th TC Wing Provisional Signal Co will install,

maintain and operate the Message Center and all

radio and wire nets of the 60th TC Wing EQ,.

e» The 60th TC Wing provisional Signal Co will install,

maintain and operate the Airborne Control, and point­

to-point stations at Mackoll upon the first air landing.

f• The 349th TC Group will install, maintain and operate

the Message Center at Pope and each CP set up by their

headquarters. •

g. The 1st provisional TC Group will install, maintain

and operate the Message Center ct Mackall and each

CP set up by their headquarters.

BAKEUVKR

Sig Annex No, 6 to F # 0* No.. 9, EQ,, oOth TC WXngf Pope Field,

Fort Bragg, N, €.•• 0800, 17 Se^te*uber 1.944, Continued..

h. Each group will install maintain and operate all

radio and wire net£ of their headquarters and

each GP set up by their headquarters.

i. Scheduled messenger service by Liaison Aircraft to

be extablished between MACKALL, MAXTON, LXJMBERTON

and POPE twice daily, 0900 and 1330, beginning

D-14 from MACKALL. Oti^er special mes^en^er serv­

ice between MACKALL, MAXTON, LUMBERTON and POPE

as required.

j. Radio.

(1) Coiaffland Nets Nos 1 and 2 will be established

between Airborne Troop Carrier Maneuver HQ,

(MACKALL), Airborne Troop Carrier HQ, (MAXTON)

and 13th Division, when landed (MACKAIX) D-Day,

These nets will be known as Task Force Nets

and will be it-1 (CW) emission^ Tactical traffic

will normally be assigned to Command Net No. 1.

Administritive and intelligence traffic assigned

to Command Net No. 2.

(•2) Ambulance Net will be operated by personnel of

the 349th TC Group. Ambulance Stations will be

in operation by the hour indicated.

(a) The Medical Officer will be in charge.

(b) Mobile Stations will move with Ambulance

Squad to which they are assigned.

(o) Ambulance Squad at SAICFORD will be in opera­

tion by H-12, Ambulance Squad at HEMf

(ROBBINS) will be in operation at H-12«

(3) Immediately upon commencement of operations all

serials in flight will maintain listening watch

in Task Force Command Net No. 1 on liaison set

SCR 287i and be prepared to act on prearranged

signals received by this channel.

(4) V f H.F. radio channels will be used for airdrome

control and inter-plane communicatinn.

(5) Single call sign procedure will be used.

(6) ^-Second Army Authentication System used throughout

(7) Common ci )her key lists for converter M-209 will

be used throughout.

k. Radio Nets; See S.O.I.

 Sig Annex N o . 6 to F . O . N o , 9, H Q , 60* ing, .,.

Pope Field,

Fort Bragg, N . C , 0300, 17 September 1944', Continued.

1, visual: See SOI.

m. pyrotechnic: See SOI.

n» smoke: See SOI.

o. Signal Lamps: See SOI.

3'. a. Signal Dumps: *

Rear Echelon - MAXTON

Forward Echelon - MACKALL

b. Captured enemy equipment or facilities:

(1) Radio stations will be taken over or disposed

of according to orders from higher Headquarters.

4# Current Index of 60th Troop Carrier Wing Maneuver SOI

governs•

5. Radio Navigational Aids.

a. Radar (Rebecca-Eureka Homing System)

(1) Ground Beacons

Eureka Radar Beacons, type AN/PPN-2, will

(a)
be dropped by pathfinder Aircraft and

operated by Paratrooper Pathfinder crews.

The following tcble of operation will be

complied with:

Operation of Beacons on D-l Day

Numoer or

Place Beacons in' Location of Beacon Time of Operction

Operation On Off
IP 2 Immediate vicinity Immediately upon 2200
of HEMP setting up
1 1 * 1337.9 : 1142.95 2000 2200
2 1 * 1339.3 : 1146.75 2000 2200
3 ,1 * 1346.2 : 1145.0 2000 2200
Glider 1 * 1344.5 : 1144.7 2000 2200
Zone 3
Operation of Beacons on D-Day

IP 2 Immediate vicinity 0600 08 30

of HEMP

GLZ 1 1 0630
* 1337.9 : 1142.95 0830

GLZ 3 1 * 1334.5 : 1144.7 0615 0830

* Grid readings taken from Aerial Mosaic Mackall, West End

Troop Carrier'Maneuver area, North Carolina - dated 14 June 44'

SCALE 1 : 15,000

One spare beacon will be carried by the pathfinder for each

DZ location. Two spare beacons will be carried for the IP

location.

 UNCLASMB

Sig Annex No, 6. to F. 0. No. 9, HQ, 60th TC Wing, Pope Field,

Fort Bragg, N. 0», 0800, 17 September 1944, Continued.

(2) Airborne (Rebecca AN/APN-2)

(a) Lead aircraft of each' serial will be equip­

ped with Rebecca (AN/APN installations.

(b) Placement of additional Rebecca equipped

ai-rcraft will be left to the discretion of

the Group Operations Officer.

(c) Rebecca equipped aircraft will be assigned

to each serial according to the following

table:

TOTAL NUMBER
SERIAL TC NO. OF RADi-J* INCLUDING DEST ARRIVAL
NO UNIT AIRCRAFT RADAR AIRCRAFT EWT •

5 1st 4 28 1 2030 D-1

prov
6 1st 6 1 2030 D-1
Prov 49
7 349th 4 38 2 2030 •D-1

8 349th 4 36 . 3 2030 D-1

9 349th 3 10 GLZ 2040 D-1
3-A
D-DAY

10 349th 6 49 GLZ-3 0648 D-DAY

11 1st 41 GIZ-3 0705 - D-DAY
Prov
12 349th 2 * 4 GLZ-1 0700 D-DAY
13 349th 3 '. 19 GLZ-1 0716 D-DAY

(d) Rebecca will be switched on when aircraft

passes over checkpoint ^SANFORD" and takes

up heading of I.P.

(e) Rebecca will be switched off when clear of

Drop Zone.

By order of Colonel PITTS:

OFFICIAL:

r
E. W, HAMPOCN

TOMES

Communications Offic

 ma.

MANEUVER

HQi/60tU TO Wins,

Pope Field, Ft Bragg,

North Carolina,

"'^1, 17 Sept 1944»

NO. 1)

ANNEX NO. 6)

TO

F* .0. NO. 9)

SIGNAL ANNEX

' SUPPLEMENT NO. 1

The information contained in this Supplement will be included

in Signal Annex No. 6 to Field Order No, 9.

Radio Navigational Aids.

b# Radio Ground Beacon.

(1) Low Power Radio Beacon, operating on frequency

of 1650 KCS, located at the IP ia the immediate

vicinity of FEiyfP. ISiis beacon will transmit

M every thirty (30) seconds.

{2) Beacon will be in operation on the following

schedule;
D-l DAY ON OFF
Immediately
Upon Setting Up 2200
D-DAY 0600 0830

By order of Colonel PITTS;

E. W. HA1CPT0N

Executive

OFFICIAL:

TOMES

Communications Officer,

JMSX #7 TO F* 0 . #« 60TH T. C. WING

OF

It Ground control at departure fields will .^ra^tft^ii&d by each Group.*

A responsible power pilot from S-3 Section will be ^a>£qnVd in the tower
to supervise a l l formation take-offs and landings.
2. Ground Airdrome Co trol will be established at
by 60th T. C. T/ing after f i r s t a i r landing s e r i a l . c
3. Navigation and bright formation lights will be usedton
and assembly. Wen formation i s one half hour out, a l l
except formation l i g h t s , Or return, navigation lights may be oK
30 miles of home base.
4.- Gliders1 will have no l i g h t s while in f l i g h t .
5. Grow navigators will maintain correct time on chronemeters by
checking time signals (5000 or 10000 KO from TOT)# Wstches of a l l officers
will be synchronized by 1800, D-l
6* Green fusees in vicinity of DZ's ere navigational aids only and will
not be used for jump or release aids*
7. Parachute jump will be SOP:
a* Speed of lead plane - 110 mph.
b. Verbal warning order will be given to Airborne by pilot passed
on by crew chief 15 minutes prior to arrival at PDZ/
c. Rod li~'-t : i l l be turned on two (s) minutes from H)Z. Crew
Chief will relay insturctions verbally.
d. Greon l i ^ t •'-.-» 11 be turned on at PDZ az>d crevr chief will
immediately give verbal signal to Airborne Commander*
9, T'ower lines and otlier obstructions in vicinity of GIZ will be
marked with red lights by friendly personnel.
10. Deadline for Group field orders will be 22 September 1944.
11. Each group will report by telephone the number of planes, gliders,
and personnel taken off and the exact time take-off started and completed.
This phone call will be confirmed by TWX.T Irnmediately after serials return,
groups will report to 60th Troop Carrier %ng Headquarters by telephone the
number of planes back, number of gliders known not released in glider drop
zones and their location and any casualties if known.
13. Gliders will be loaded with a l l loajj^&^pt*personnel # r and lined
for take-off by 1500 D-l for a l l serials ^&tf^
13*» Pilots will be instructed to drain fuel, tanlps in flight to insure

getting the full range out of fuel carried.

14. u se of 100 0ctane Fuel in this maneuver will conform with HITCC

Memorandum No. 65-79, dated 20 June 1944.

15. 60th Troop Carrier ^ing Memorandum No. 25-1, dated 3

will be complied with.

- , "X

By order of Colonel PITTS: .

Executive.

A. c.
A-3.
 SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER VVING\

19

SUPPL^ViLNT #1 TO ANNEX #7 F.O, #9

1. Paragraph 15 of Annex 7 is hereby deleted and the

following substituted therefor*

15• 60th Troop Carrier Wing Memorandum No. 35-1

will be complied with.

By order of Colonel PITTS:

E. W. HAMPTON

Executive.

OFFICIAL:

' M. C. LEWIS

A-3*

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Headquarters—- 35

1st Prov TC Gp- 5

3/<9th TC Gp- 5

60th TC Wg 10

13th A/B Div — 5

 SIXTIETH 1R0GP CARRIER WING

_ J"*J$ September 1944

SUPPLEMENT #2 TO ANNEX #7 F.O. #9 </' '1*

\ - •• ; * %

1. As soon as serial comnander returns, the fol£owiiii|^for­

mation w i l l be relayed to 60th Troop Carrier Wing CP %vtj&«f"**- ­
and later confirmed by Wft:

A. Serial.

B. Time first plane off,

C. Time last plane off,

B, Time of arrival at destination.

E, Number of planes departing base.

T. Number of planes reaching destination.

G. Time of return to base first plane.

, H. Time of return to base last plane.

I. Number of gliders released other than in GLZ.

J. Number of personnel ferried.

K. Amount of freight ferried.

L, Number of casualties.

M, Remarks.

By order of Colonel "PITtSi

E. W. HAMPTON

. Executive,

OFFICIALS

M. C. UT7IS

A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Headqui

1st Prov TC Gp MMA^-^ 5

549th TC Gp — ."^.^--^ 5

60th TC % ,­
13th A/B Div

 MANEUVER

HEADQUARTERS 60TH TROOP CARRIER WING

;>
SUPPLEMENT #3 TO ANNEX #7, IVM?. #9 September 1944

1, Paragraph 13 of Annex #7 shall be c^Lete^and the

following substituted therefor: \ ' ~"/)

13» Pilots will be instructed to drain

only to their prescribed luargin of safety.

2. Paragraph 14 will be deleted*

By order of Colonel PITTS:

E W HAMPTON

Executive,

OFFICIAL:

M C LEV/IS

DISTRIBUTION:
A/B - T/C Maneuver Hq 35
1st Prov T C Gp — - — 5
349th T C Gp 5
60th T C Wg • 10
13th A/B Div , $

^ yt

V /,

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

ANNEX #8, TO F,O r #9, 60TH T. C« WING.

MANEUVER MAXIMUMS

1. Following schedules of fuel, pay and gros

MISSION
PARA-
RACK
, —GAS~ C-47
PAY LDS
C-4?
6R IDS GRXDS;-'
'P63W.3A '
GLRS
T\a§s o. 3 500 3000. 26000 7500# «:
*
^
F t . TT
•
Tugs. , 6 1 500 3000 26000 7500
Tugs 0 y 500 5000 28000 7500 14/fbc^^
Prcht Form 6 0 8frO 5000 29000
(pis) >
Prcht Form 0 0 800 5000 29000
Air Ldg o* 0 500 5000 27000
Resupply 0 0 500 5000 27000
landing
Resupply 6 800 5000 27000
Para
o• (pis) (plus
- 1800 par ar­
(6 rks) racks
1500#)
• •'

Schedules of fuel, pay and gross loads for B-17F are forthcomings
By order of Colonel PITTS:

E. W. HAMPTON

Executive*

OFFICIAL:

LEWIS
A-3

MAKEUVEH

1» !2here are ambulances stationed at Maxton, *o|fct Lw»rton, thevicinity

of Saxxford. «a& Heafct I 0« Toucan reach y ^ o ^ ^ M i n M l 0 * TOT^ Give
them a call if you tee any of the
a, A Rod Flare) Indlc&lf ittj«lred pereetajel and
;
I •*•---• that-ati<ftlt» *^«^li^
b# A Red floaee) »0dl<Jal
o* A Greett Hare)'**•' '••'-, Indicates no i*j;ar|;e* lj£ personnel
• • / % •, . •••Mi>.w - a n d t h a t *
d* A Green Puzeo) ( required*

, e t A glidor or ship foreo land,

/ • • ' - ' _ . - • . • • • .

f« If your crew chief reports one of your gliders i s missing*. That

warn us to go to tho area unless a plane later in the serial
; BObn reports a green flare aty the spot you lpst the glider.
,6» , If you see a flare bo sure to report the color - red or green •* and
not just ^a flare". v
2* It vis important that your crow Axiof observe the gliders constantly from
the astradomo* /
3. If^ you henre, mechanical trouble and cannot reach an airport, c a l l u s on
Channel 0 •• VHF, KO} turn on a i l your l i g h t s . , \
4# If you force land, fire your wad flnro after landing to report injured
personnel, &repn flare i f no Injured personnel. TTse your radio if i t . ­
. s t i l l works* • * ..
B+ Stop heccrrhago of ony pfctSsenior,
b* Btacuate personnel to at least 100 feet from planef preferably a
; clearing*
• • . •' *

e. Build a fire in nearest clearing which will warm personnel, and

serve to guide tho raabulanco* Oover tho injured with jackets»­
Send someone to telephone tho nearest
o* If you see vertical sootli^vts they nft^iffoV^ly thoso of the
ambulanco* If ire your second red flfArJ^rfcvifft^t^them*, If someone
i s able* send him to tho nearest road tf^ifeet i t . .-v
5» In the glider propping aono you need not report fllatee or aoeid^its# There
i s a concealed ambulance at each field. •* <, :•''*"
6
* ^ ^ ^ t your passenger pgrnonnol with thlat you my oe

•* 1..­
 •""".''•. ' *&\ . , ' ; ' • • . . ' ' - . . ' \ " ' * ' • - . ' • : • ' , ' • . ' . . : • • " ' • ' • ' ' • • ".-: • . " • • » ' • ' • ' • . . • ' \ - - ' ? i

:
^ ; . v : : .•,•: s. ;-:

* ^tif

a* lomodl^tely wp*n
(1) Tire you if , B20 i f you
reqairo an th«n U £ M A r«a tusso© If thjax&LL or groon
i
iuzoe i f WttJuroOor other pAsaing planaa to see* You have
two red flsree* tuo
;
«re«n flar«a» two red fUssooe» and two
greea
(3) If personnel «r# iilittyed <to not QOTQ them tinnoOQBsarlly* Cover
thom with ooa^ts «&d inok*t&« 5hora Is a paoket; first-aid,
parachute, t**4 %«&$&& yotMP Bt«t* 7horo AT© three k i t s , aero­
nautic, flr«t*ftt&* $ft your ^lid^r* \
(3) Send a man t
(4) Build a $ood fllff ia tho Of tho nearest clearing? i t v i l l
the aoVul*a©« find you*
(5) If you seo vorti0aX 8p^Ui^its f they probably belong to our
aiabulanoej; Tlx+ ycm» other flam so -they oan fln4 you. Light
your other \
b» po not use any red oign&l juat for a rjde homo* You may thereby*
> oall^d an arobulance away from a lgjpot sihere It i s needed»
Do not fire any si^na^ i^ you h«m>en to have injured personnel.in
tho assigned landing area* gho uwplre will already know i t and
there i s an aabulance in the trees at the edge of the clearing,
in that area blind other pilots trying *o ^ t in*
d* JLoquaint your passenger personnel with; thist you iBigr be 8tunned and
th cnist loiow whai to'dW ' • • •" ' • • ''

*> I

 HA S'J 2 I S 3

>»-—»»>»..•

SIXTIETH 'IHOOO? CARRIER WI1TG

AIR FORCES

Pope Held, Fort Bragg,

Forth Carolina,
17 September 1944.

H0HB3R l ) Mi 1 I 0 A 1

I . 2he recommended, headquarters for the Sanford Wing ambulance out­

post is in the vicinity of the Fire and Police Department on Charlotte
Avenue, A blackout room i s available and a telephone, the number of which
is 799. Have auxiliary sources of light in the headquarters.

2» The roving ambulance outpost a.t Hemp is located in the vicinity

of the City Hall Building, next to post office at Kemp (Bobbins) phone,
Carthage 9-292.

3. Each, roving ambulance outpost unit should have all personnel famil­
arized with local, main, and secondary roads for the area they will cover.
Make contact with civilians who know the area as they can be of the great­
est help in search if needed in the area.

4. Two (2) radio jeeps will be available, located at Sanford and Hemp

(Bobbins).

5. In case of accident make use of local fire department equipment if

needed.

6. All k i t s , aeronautic, f i r s t - a i d , should be checked, repealed, after

the morphine and halazone has been removed and paint the seal red to comply
with present S. 0. P.

7. 5?he availability and location of supplies has been determined.

Before they are procured they will be cleared through the T?ing M. A. C.
at phone 2-7210, Pope Field. This will prevent over ordering and expedite
their procurement. The M/R will be signed by the units obtaining the
supplies.

8. Both instructions to tug pilots and glider pilots should be cloar

in the minds of tho flying personnel. This will be accomplished by breif­

ings by the unit surgeon.

9. ITight vision goggles are obtained by Toch Supply, Practice in

their use will graphically demonstrate their value to the p i l o t s ,

10. Have a l l ambulances checked immediately by the motor pool so that

there will be no doubt as to their mechanical efficiency. Carry two (3)

extra five (5) gallon cans of gasoline for the roving ambulance units.

II, Instruct your pilots as to the importance of fatigue as the

maneuver progresses close observation of pilots by unit surgeons will be

necessary.

12. Each group will be prepared to submit a. medical annex to the

administrative order of the group and sufficient copies will be submitted

to the T"Ting surgeon.

13. All administrative casualties will be reported to the Tfing

Surgeon iraiedia,tely, and a consolidated report submitted as of midnight

each day to the T"Ting Surgeon.

14. Each group will submit a report of observations, criticisms

and recommendations of the close of the a i r phase of tho maneuver.

15. Road maps for ambulances can be obtained from any gasoline
station, and should be readily available for use by the drivers^

- 1 ­
 M AI S g I £H
(Maneuver Ileno 2!o» 1, c o n t ' d )

16. A GPX w i l l TDO hold 21 September 1944 at 2000 hours at o u t p o s t s

l o c a t e d at Sanford and Heap, Heet at Hpxton AA3 at 1600 hours,

1 7 . Hcnp as shown on naps i s o f f i c i p l l y c a l l e d RoblDins.' Sign

p o s t s read t h i s way. However, school pnd s t o r e s in town and road maps
show l o c a t i o n as Ecnp.s

3y order of Colonel PITTS:

LUTHER DAHIEL,
CWO, USA,
Adjutant*
DISTHIBUTI01T:

1st P r o v i s i o n a l T C G-roup 5

349th Iroop C a r r i e r G-roup 5

Air Surgeon ITCC Maneuver Hq 5

A/3-T/C Mrneuver Eqs 35

13th A/B Div 5

60th S C Trg 10

- 2 ­
MANSUVBR
 I2OO

\400

HOFFMAN

It 50

l-UMBERTON

O V£ZL A y AMBOL ANQE L OCAT/ON

CH4BLQTTE

Soo, ooo
 HEADQUARTERS,

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER 35

ARMT AIR FORCES

MANEUVER MEMORANDUM )

NUMBER 2 )

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL AND

, EVACUATION OP GLIDERS

1. 'ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL:

a. Units lifting gliders in the forthcoming maneuvers

will submit to Wing Headquarters, Attention: Wing Statistical Offi^­

cer, by 0906 the day preceding the lift, a list of the gliders to

be lifted by Maneuver number and AAP serial number, indicating the

field and zone in which each glider is to land. This list will be

submitted in quadruplicate, using the applicable columns of the

mimeographed form which is attached to this Memorandum.

b. If there are any variations from this list at the

time of the actual lifting, the Wing Statistical Officer will be

notified by phone immediately; in the event there are no changes

in original list, a negative report will be made within 30 minutes

after last glider clears* (An extra line is provided on the form

for the insertion of changes at the time of the lift,)

Gs These lists will be used by the Chief Glider Umpire

in grading the drops, and will also be used by the Wing for evac­
uation and reporting purposes. Gliders will be picked-up on the

Wing 110 as of the time of release^'at Glider Landing Zone (or

emergency release) and will be dropped to Wing Headquarters on the

110 of the following unit, as of the time of release, the lifting

unit taking credit for the flying time up to the time of release.

d. Such gliders will then be carried on the 110 of Wing

Headquarters until notice is received from a Base or Group that it

has regained possession of a certain glider and is picking it up

on its 110.

e* In no case will a glider be dropped from the 110 of

a Group unless it has been shown on the original list of gliders

to be lifted, or has been Included in an amendment to that list,

telephoned to Wing Headquarters; nor will any such glider be ,

picked up again on the 110 of a Base or Group until the Wing Sta­
tistical Officer has been so notified by phone, and the exact time

of loss by the Wing and gain by the Base or Group agreed upon.

One phone call daily by not later than 1900 will suffice.

f. The Glider Evacuation Officer, CAPT. BARNETT, will

receive one of the lists referred to in paragraph la, and immedi­

ately upon receipt of any variations he will take the completed

information on the lift and proceed to the Glider Landing Field

to further coordinate with Zone Umpires end to ascertain the land*

ing of gliders in inspection areas. j^m

2. EVACUATION: " = <$%••''"s- %

a. Evacuation of, gliders from Glider Landing fields will

be conducted by the 349th and 1st Provisional, Trooj> Carrier Groups

and by the Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base and Pope\Field

/

Depots. . - ' •

-1­
MANEUVER

••« ' M A N E U V E R

Maneuver Memo. No. 29 Cont*d«

b. No evacuation will begin unt

(1) Glider Landing. Field No. i^^lC^Q, D Day. However,

in the event H Hour is delayed, evacuation wife: be delayed. No

evacuation in this area until 3 hours after glider landing. (See

Paragraphs 2d(4)(a) and (b).) ^ ' ")

(2) Glider Landing Field No. 3 - 1200 P plus 1 Day.

c* Gliders will be picked up by same orgari^&ati^n that

dropped them, except as set out in Paragraph 2d(2)

d. Glider Landing Field No. 1:

(1) This area will be evacuated by equipment and per­

sonnel of Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base and Pope Field Sub-Depots,

Some tactical and administrative aerial pickups (Model 80 units)

will be made as directed by this Headquarters.

(2) All CG-4A gliders from this area will be evacuated

to Pope Field. .

(3) All CG-13 gliders from this area will be evacuated

to Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base*

(4) All vehicular traffic to Field #1 will avoid the

vicinity of Camp Mackall.

(a) All evacuation equipment and personnel from

Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base Sub-Depot will not move beyond

Marston, S, C # , on Highway #1 south and west of Hoffman until a

reconnaissance has been made by an^officer to determine that glider

landing fields and roads are clear of tactical troops.

(b) All evacuation equipment and personnel from

Pope Field will move from Pope to Raeford to Wagram to Laurinburg

(Route 15A); from Laurinburg to Marston. At this point they will

halt until a reconnaissance by an officer has determined that the

glider fields and roads are clear of tactical groups,

(c) It is further emphasized that the road adja­

cent to Glider Landing Field (NE Side) will be kept clear - NO

VEHICLES OR TRAILERS WILL BE PARKED ON THIS ROADU

e. Glider Landing Field No. 3:

(1) This area will be evacuated by equipment and per­

sonnel of the 349th Group and the 1st Provisional Group to Camp

Mackall Airfield; Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base and Pope Field

Sub-Depots will provide sufficient equipment and personnel to

evacuate all gliders damaged beyond "rollaway" condition. Gliders

not considered to be in "rollaway" condition or those gliders dam­

aged to such an extent that they cannot be towed by the glider

dolly and tug will then be evacuated by Sub-Depot personnel. Such

damaged gliders of the 349th Group are to be evacuated to Pope

Field; such damaged gliders of the 1st ^^/isional Group are to be

evacuated to Laurinburg-Maxton Army Ai]• * '

(2) All gliders evacuated f^>m tiiis area by the Groups

will then be taken to Camp Mackall over t h W Glider- Road,

(3) Gliders in Zones E and F (1ST PROV. GP.) will be ,

evacuated first.

-2­
MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

Maneuver Memo. No» 2, Cont'd,

(4) Gliders In Zones A t D (-349TH GROUP) will

then be evacuated. These gliders wil be inspected and pre­
pared for aerial tow to Pope Field; s not judged flyable
will be repaired, then flown to Pope turned in to Sub-
Depot for repair.
(a) CAMP MACKALL AIRFIELD open to flyaway
glider operation 0800 D plus 2 Day*

f» Personnel and equipment from Pope be re­

sponsible for clearing the 20 gliders landed in in Glider

Landing Zone 3A at 2110 D-l Day. This landing zo be cleared

prior to 0530 D Day in preparation for Serial 10 b 0648.5

Zf SECURITY:

a. Guard personnel In Glider Landing Field #3 will be

furnished by the 316TH TC SQUADRON, and the 342ND and 343RD AIR­
DROME SQUADRONS, Four men of this guard personnel will be taken

by CAPT. GUS N, CONRAD to Glider Landing Zone A, Glider Landing

Field #3 at 2100 D-l Day; this personnel to act as security for

those gliders landed at 2110 D-l Day*

b. The balance of this security personnel will be taken

by CAPT. CONRAD at 0800 D Day to Glider Landing Field #3 for se­

curity of gliders landing in that area,

e* Security of gliders and equipment in Glider Landing

Field No*.l is the responsibility of the 349TH TC GROUP.

d. In the event of WEATHER WARNINGS OF HIGH WINDS, all

available personnel and mooring equipment (in addition to that

specified in F,0, #9 this Headquarters) will be immediately rushed

to the Glider Landing Fields or Evacuation Zones, and every effort

made to avoid damage to equipment. DEPOTS will be expected to aid

and cooperate to the fullest extent should high winds be imminent,

e. Guard personnel mentioned in Paragraph 4a will remain

in the area and serve only until 1800 D plus 2 Day, and only in

Glider Landing Field #3. As gliders are evacuated, they are

picked up, and become the responsibility of the organization carry­

ing the glider prior to the maneuver lift. (See. paragraph Id.)

4, Glider Evacuation Officer, Assistant Glider Evacuation

Officer and Security Officer for the purpose of this evacuation are

designated as follows:

a. CAPT, HERMAN K. BARNETT is designated Glider Evacua­

tion Officer. LT. JOHN B. MCGHSE is designated as Assistant Glider

Evacuation Officer,

b. CAPT. GUS N. CONRAD is designated as Security Officer

for Glider Landing Field #3, The control of security personnel and

protection of Government equipment in this area is the responsibil­

ity of this officer.

By order of Colonel ,

13UIPHER DANIEL,
CV/6,, USA, \
A d j t t

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

Maneuver, Memo No. 2 Cpnt*d,

1NCLOSURE: Check Sheet .'tot Glider L i f t , G r l M h ^ ^ v a c u a t i o n and

Report ingr ' ^ ^ ***

DISTRIBUTION:
• • • • ' • • Memo Inol
A/B-T/C Maneuver Hq. 0» « . . • .;":&S 3^ (
1 s t Prov TC G r o u p . « . . . . . . . * 4 80
349th TC Group............. 5 105
Chief Umpire flGliderstr,...« 7 150
13th A/B Division.......... 5 5
399th Sub-Depot............. 2 2
88th Sub-Depot............. 2 2
60th TC Wing............... 10 10
 FOR" GI&DSR LIPS', , EVACUATION,/ Alto'

S e r i a l No«

FOR SQUADRONS AT TIME 0P ; FOR UM ^IB-QF

GLIDER AAF SlRtAL ZOHB^

1AJIDED
NUMBER IN
' - • '

> : -

1 •< • ' " ' * • • - " - •

i

' A
-
1 --
r

< -

*
-

- -

i
/
.

1
•

I
- - • :

I .-'•.;.: 1
: : " \

. • • , ; • ' • • . - '

'. \ . ' • •' v

• • . . , ' • • - • • ' •• i

' • • • - •
. . • . • " '

:
- • ' ' . ' -

:
- • • • • ' • • : • • . . : ' . • . • : . ' ' • • ' :
r
• • : . . " • • : ; -

• .••••.' .••;; ' J

 MAHEUVE

HEADQUARTERS

'1

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

CHANGE NO.'1 )

TO :

MANEUVER MEMO NO. 2 ) 23 September 1944*

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL AND

EVACUATION OF GLIDERS

So much of Paragraph 3a, b, and Paragraph 4b as reads CAPT

GUS N f CONRAD is changed to read LT. ANDREW J, ALBERT.

By order of Colonel PITTSt

OTHER DANIEL,

CWO, USA,

ADJUTANT.

DISTRIBUTION:

A/B-T/C Maneuver Hq. •..,.•.. 35

1st Prov TC Group.#........ 4

349th TC Group,-. •»* * * « 5

Chief Umpire "Glider" ....f.# 7

13th A/B Division.......... 5

399th Sub-Depot ... 2

88th Sub-Depot 2

60th TC Wing *... 10

7 ^ ^

MANEUVER

 HEADQUARTERS
SIXTIETH TROOP GAKRIER^TING- '
AEMTAXR FOR

AAB,"

, North Carolina,

1944.

Maneuver Memo)

Number 3)

OPERATIONAL PROCEOTE
!• Standard Operating Procedure will exist in all paratroop drop

serials.

2. Single engine procedure in paratroop drop serials: The pilot

will immediately leave the formation and jump paratroops at his. own

discretion. All troops will have jumped before pilot attempts single

engine landing, providing sufficient altitude has been maintained.

1
3. As many passes as are necessary will be made over H)Z in order

to drop complete load other that refusals.

4#' Cabin lights will not be used in static hook-up or inspection

of same.

5. All crew chiefs, will wear parachutes and maintain position at

rear dodr of plane, listening, on interphone for any emergency change

in jump orders from pilot*.

6. Green fuzees at all PDZ*s will be placed to form a T.

By order of Colonel PITTS:

IWTHER
cm, trad
Adjutant
DISTRIBUTION:

A/B - T/C Maneuver Hq — - 35

1st Prov T C Gp — * — . — 5

349th T C Gp ,--.— —^ 5

60th T C % -*— ,—— 10

13th A/B Div « •*— 5

V.1I0T KEADQJURTERS

SIXTIETH TRCO? CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Field, Fort Bragg,

Carolina,

28 epteniber 1944*

60TH V/ING MANEUVER HISTORICAL REQOKD

— P A R T ONE, TC 24 SEPTEMBER,1944~

i. On 24 July 1944, 60th T* C. Wing was

letter dated 23 July 1944, HITCC, that a combined

with 13th Airborne Division was to be held. Dates specified

17 to 22 September and changed later to 23 to 28 September,

Letter acknowledged that formal directive had not yet been

received.

a. Units Participating:
349th T. C. Gp. 1st Prov. T. C. Gp.
311th T. C. Squadron 316th T. C. Squadron
312th T. C. Squadron 317th T. C. Squadron
313th T. C. Squadron 318th T. C. Squadron
314th T. C. Squaaron 342d Airdrome Squadron
1st Air Cargo Re- 343d Airdroiue Squadron
Supply Squadron
b. Route: 100 miles.
c. Departure bases: Lumber ton and iuaxton.

d. lUaximum night operation.

e. Maximum double glider tow.

f. Maximum practicable load for glider and tugs.

.ii Intended that 200 gliders to be used both single

and double tow. Both CG-4A and CG-13 - first time CG-13

gliders have been used in combined maneuvers.

,.•« The 2d Combat Cargo Group was to be used, but later

cancelled.

All squadrons of 349th and 1st Provisional Groups to

be brought up to 23 crews and planes per squadron.

j^: The fundamental purpose of this Airborne-Troop Car­

rier Maneuver is to provide the most realistic training for

the separate and joint command and staffs in planning and ex­
ecuting a realistic operation, /,

In addition, the operation is the "final test of the

ability of every subordinate unit and man concerned to smooth­

ly play his or its individual part in a complicated overall

operation under conditions as nearly simulating actual combat

conditions as possible.

v. In order to fulfill this purpose it is vital that asi

accurate record be assembled during and after the maneuver :>

that truly analyzes and records the "readiness for combat"

the combined Airborne-Troop Carrier Team, its components, an

its tactical employment and capabili

M A N E U V E R

 JVI A Sb U V £.

. Veterans of Nadzab, Oran, Tunisia, Sicilyj Salerno,

Avellino, and Normandy wait for this analysis with emotions

that only they themselves can understand,

• , The history of all past United^aSiipns .Airborne

Combat operations tends to show that tnb-^subordinate units

are capable and heroic in their exploits^ >uiTHhat coordin­

ation and staff work in all echelons coiil^be improved, this

is most true in the collection, evaluation* analysis of the

details as to what actually happens during &11 the^ phases of

the operation, the reasons therefor, and the indicated improve­

ment of the technique, equipment or personnel involved.

*t* Interrogation or ;f debrief ing" of airplane cre%£ im­

mediately after landing provides a wealth of detail, u ^

of a high order of reliability«

V! • Interrogation or detailed operational reports^from

the Airborne troops is necessarily a very fragmentary, very

delayed, inadequate intelligence source, However, in a man­

euver when nearly all participants can be traced it would seem

that all with "gripes", criticisms, questions or doubts could

be interviewed, if only for morale reasons and with the added

possibility that a large scale cross section might reveal in­

formation valuable in future exercises.

Certainly all Pathfinder chutists should be interro­

gated by experienced intelligence personnel. Troop Carrier,

with its more flexible routine, might furnish the manpower

for a large scale interrogation in the closing days of the

maneuver* A critique, with many high ranking officers pre­

sent, would never reveal the thousand little things that qui­
et, unsupervised interviews might.

MANEUVER COMMAND AND STAFF

Troop Carrier Airborne Ground

a.
Asst.

Directors Col Nichols Col Quinto G-3-2QOI Corps

b, G-l: Col Bond Lt Col Caldwell Maj Me Ginnis

c. G-2: Lt Col Moore Maj Ludeman Capt Achtenberg

d. G-3: Maj Thomas Lt Col Walsh Maj Chaille

Asst G-3: Maj French Maj Rachal Maj Me Ginnis

Capt Milan Maj Wallace

Capt Row

e. G-4: Maj Medema Lt Col Rockfeller Maj Gassaway

f. AGt Maj Dietenhofer - —

6. Sig: Maj Helcher Lt Col Brandt Maj Duiguid

h. F^: — Lt Col Huneycutt — — — — .

i. Surg: Maj Kvidera Maj Brueer To be announced

j. AA: *• Maj Ludeman Maj Wilson

k. iSngr: — — Lt

Air Engr 0: Maj Sharp

1. QJ.U: Maj Harris Lt Col Rockfeller'Maj Gassaway

m. Prov Marshal:-—— -P Lt Te^etto

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER)

Troop Carrier Airborne Ground

n. Hq Comdt: Capt Martin

o. PRO: Maj Wilbur To be announced
p. Obs Bureau: Liajor Stevens Christiansen To be
announced
q. Air Support

Officer: announced

r. Mo^or Transp

Officer: Capt. T.Vandor To be "announced

Woude .:

Training for the maneuvers went on at Pope FiaJLd, Maxton

AAB, Camp Mackall, Lumberton AAB and Air Cargo Re-sWply train­
ing of the 1st Air Cargo Re-Supply squadron going|,o.[p%o D-2 at

Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Georgia. ^c'^- %

Training was of a wide variety but in most c a s W part of

the continuous long term training program of all units concerned

rather than specifically "rigged" to "make an impression" at

the time of demonstration.

As examples^ on 12 September A-31 Section* 60th Wing, called

Maxton AAB Operations to find out if Lumberton AAB could be

available for some "double tow" practice 13 September* answer

was it was", being used daily for "pick*up" or fisnatch" practice

but that from 0930 to 1J00 it Would be open fOr ''double tow" even

though it was a ratxier "tight" field for double tow with full

ballast. On the 13th both "snatch" and "double tow" were act­
ually carried on under tactical conditions.

Major Me Cullough, Supervisor of Requirements and Plans,

stated that 349th Group and lstN1 Provisional Group were merely

the most recent of a whole series of Groups that this Wing had

trained and sent to final staging areas for overseas shipment.

Attached charts show that training actually completed prior to

1 September 1944 averaged over 96% with the 4$ to be completed

being solely due to minimum personnel turnover inherent in any

organization regardless of state of training, experience or

background.

For this record a digest of preparatory and planning act­

ivities of this Wing, particularly those revealing the in­
tricacies of the staff work is here indicated,

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

7 September.—Called Commanding Officer AATC Camp Davis

re another flak familiarization mission. AAA guns not available

S/L and Radar possible, not probable.

8 September.—Conference with Communications, Intelligence

and Engineering re maneuver preparation.

9 September,—Requested designation of Airborne Liaison

Officer. Instruction re outgoing TWX1s to be brought to attention

of all concerned in A-3 Section.

10 September.—Colonel Lampton, Director Operations and

Training, Wing Executive called Airborn^rd'flying commitments,

11 September.—Colonel Hampton called Major Thomas, G-3

Maneuver Headquarters re practice paratroop^j.umps in next ten

days.

12 September.—Lt Col Barrows requested information re ^

liaison.aircraft authorized 349th Group by TO/E. 4^*A

MANEUVER

 13 September.—A-3 Coiuraand called re storm warning, evac-f

uation of gliders. Complied.

14 September.—Informed of desire of Commanding General,

ITCC, re fighter escort in first aerial resupply mission.

Complied.

15 September.—-Colonel Hampton conference ivlajor Harris,

maneuver Headquarter Qivi, major Hay, 1st Air Cargo Re-Supply

Squadron re serial He-Supply. Agreed forty loading teams of

six iixvi. each, two Q]M Truck Companies. Jp&pply dumps as close to

flight line at Maxton and Lumber ton aai^fsible* .Airborne :

responsible for delivery to dump, 1st A^J^&rgo Re-Supply dump

to airplane, unloading Airborne. One Aiirj^argo Re-Supply

Squadron to be split in half to Maxton anc&half to Lumberton.

16 September—Maxton i*AB called, B-171 S'from Drew Field

arrived. ^

17 September•—Conference with Col Nichols dnjjl Wing Staff

details of maneuver. ^. \

Issued FO #9 to both Groups.

18 September.—Explained FO #9 to 349th Group staff offi­

cers. 1st Prov. could not attend.

19 September.--lvieeting of 1st Prov. Gp. staff officers

cancelled*

Conference at .a/B-T/C with T. C , 13th JA/B Div., Maneuver

Directorate, 22d Corps, and chief umpires in attendance. A

few adjustments made and all units left with clear, definite

information as to how we would execute maneuver.

attended luncheon with iviaj. Gen. Chapman and staff. A

clear picture of the maneuver was given to all staff officers

at that time•

20 September.—Discussed problems with all Wing staff

sections*

21 September.—.Explained maneuver plan to Col. me Cullough,

HITCC, Col. Pitts, and Col. Hampton. Then talked with iviaj*

Hayes, 1st AC Resupply Sq., on plan for setting up supply

dumps, both bases. Requested 200 more men for resupply squad­
ron for period of maneuver.

22 September.—moved to i^xton, set up Wing Maneuver Hq.

23 September.—Coordinated last minute changes with 13th

A/B Liaison Officer.

SUPERVISOR OF GLIDiSR TRAINING

7 September.—Major Brown conferred Major Bayne, Maxton,

re: CG-13 pilots for maneuvers, k'ajor Bayne requested his

squadron be used as a unit.

/ /.

 Asked A - 1 transfer five more glider pilots from Maxton

AAB to 349th Group.

Conferred with Captain Branson, 1st Provisional Group re:

full field equipment for their glider pilots. He requested

materials for more double tow ropes, also xsmudge pots from

Maxton.. Memo to Lt Col Mayfield re: dj^fe> .rope parts and smudge

pots.

advised 349th Group to turn over HUpSa tQ 812th AAF B.U.

8 September.--Discussed glider requipment's, gliders for

maneuvers with Major Mo Cullough and Col ftl^ild

Went to Mackall to confer with Captain IvTilau from KITCC

re: maneuver, k \
v \
10-September.—Flew to Lumberton. Believe it xan %andle
125 unit lift.
', V
11 September.--Flew to Mackall to check time of

light, to calculate time of take-off to hit GLZ at very first

light.

Discussed with Capt. Branson, Glider Officer, 1st Prov.

Group. He assured me all 349th Gp. glider pilots had full

field equipment, including carbines.

Checked with Major LcConnell, Dir. Opns. & Tng., Maxton

AAB, re: glider flying time of permanent party glider pilots

at Maxton..

12 September.—Called Major McConnell, Maxton, 30 machettes

from Stout Field. Checked compliance re: hurricane warning

and appropriate mooring for all aircraft.

Major McConnell later about using Lumberton, 13 Sept. for

double tow. He reminded that it was being used for pick-up

(snatch), but OK for double tow, 9 to 1100.

Called Lt. Richardson, for 5 tugs, 10 gliders to Lumber­

ton, 13 Sept., and make double tows off all runways weather

permitting. All gliders 7500 pounds, full service on tugs.

Called Capt. Branson, 1st Prov. Gp. Glider Officer, re:

mooring memo 65-84, in view of forecasted hurricane.

Capt. Branson called, confident of success of full load

double tow at Lumberton.

13 September.—Alerted Capt. Branson to prepare to evacu­

ate all flyable gliders in view of hurricane warning.

14 September,—Conference with Col. Hampton, Maj. Lewis,

Capt. Johnson to choose & better I. P. for run into glider re­
lease point, maneuver,

15 September.—Checked with Major Wallace, A/B Glider 0,,

on glider plan for maneuvers. He assured me GLZ's would be

checked for holes, wash-outs, etc.

Made a check on civil twilight* A&P aerial reconnais­

sance for new I. P. jr/:"' *-s

Checked with Major Thomas, Major Sliaxp, Capt. Milan, at

kackall to check A / B on clearing GLZ and making sure all holes

and wash-outs properly filled.

Major Wallace called from A / B glider section, ..confirnft^g

238 as number gliders needed. . i $&

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

Capt. Milau phoned suggesting glider co-pilots this

from present class at Maxton* ^ " ^ \

Published Glider Annex.3 to FO 9.

16 September.— Capt. Milau reported success of double -§ow

take-off tests at Lumberton by 1st prov. Gp. *

Conference with Col. Pitts. *

Selected aerial photos to be used by glider pilots.

18 September.— Conference Major Bayne, Maxton AAB. His

original commitment doubled. Also he is chief glider umpire.

Maj. McConnell to furnish some umpires; reminded him of

deficiencies re glider pick-up at Maxton. Saw Capt. Bronson

re maneuver. He assured me of suitability of Lumberton.

19 September.— Ordered training activities Maxton, glider

units, cease as of noon 23 September. Ordered 15 new GP T s,

with 40 or more landings to report to 349th Group with full

field equipment.

20 September.-— Issued supplement #1, to Annex 3, FO 9.

Checked landing hazards GLS #1.

21 September,-- Issued Supplement ^ 2 , Annex 3, FO 9.

Checked pyrotechnics for glider operators. Checked pick­

up (snatch) stations, 1st Prov. Gp.

Capt. Slates, 349th Gp., called. Has 16 ground snatch

outfits ready. 12 set up for maneuvers. Each weighs 124g lbs,

22 September.— Ordered GP briefing lOOOh 24 Sept M big

Rec Hall. Informed all concerned. Main briefing*

23 September.— Observed arrival of 349th Gp. gliders.

Unsatisfactory mooring. Same condition 1st Prov Gp. Reported

this to each Group Glider Officer.

24 September,~- Observed take-off of Serial No. 9- Excellent

Flew in tug a/c of this serial. Observed unauthorized lights

on GLZ, believed to belong to umpires and observers,

SUPERVISOR OF COMBAT- INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

This department anticipated September maneuver by at least

two monthsi All maps aild photos of suspected maneuver areas

rechecked, recatalogued by middle of Augustf Actual detailed

work for maneuver initiated 3 Sept. or before. Capt, Johnson

called Maj* Schull, A-2, HITCC, re: photo unit, also re: Capt,,

Elder as photo coordinator for 60th wing.

5 September.-- Conference Intelligence Officers

units, Wing Hq. Conference with Photo Lab teclinicians. ^JJjfc

photo unit, then K17 camera vital. No fields definitely* selected

r
yet. Called Capts. Anderson and Weaver re: cameras, *

• \

6 September.— Conference with Command, officers re: Coming

maneuvers. Phone from 311th Photo Wing re: unit for maneuver.

Notified them of requirements and all details. Lt, Col. Moore,

HITCC, called.

MANEUVER

 7 September.— Phoned Capt. Elder, Sedalia, re: pri^s *}

end negatives. Phone from 311th Photo Wing sending 1 a/c ^ 1

1 Officer, 3 EM, 10 September. Notified Base Photo Lab re:

photo a/c and personnel. Lt. Eaney witnessed burning lar^p 5

amount classified and out of date material accumulated. ? a

8 September.-- .Arranged Capt. Elder, Washington, for £ast 3

action necessary for "blow-ups", mosaics for maneuver. Receive^

request and dispatched mission films to A/B Center. Assisted

A/B Div. G-2 getting 1750 contact prints processed. Forwarded ')

Wing and 349th Gp. Histories to Command. Discussion Capt.. -J

Eodglns ,. 1st Prov. Gp. S-2, re: terrain models. Flat

rain and little time.

9 September.— Discussion Maj. Finnegan, 349th Gp. S-

re: Terrain models. Also called Maj. Schull of KITCC, re:

terrain models. Picked up negatives from A/B Ctr., got two

base laboratories started processing. Arranged for messing

and billeting photo a/c personnel.

11 September.— Call from S-2, 1st prov. Gp., 100 maps.

Phone to Maj. Schull, KITCC, re: Capt. Elder, Photo Officer,

re: negatives and mosaics, 2000 mosaics. Conferred Lt.Straughan

photo a/c, 3Hth Photo Wing, re: job to be done. Phone from

Maj. McCullough, Wing Liaison Officer, Camp Mackall, re: more

maps and mosaics. Department meeting for EM. Section began

work on war room for maneuver.

12 September.-- Entire staff worked on materials for man­

euvers.

13 September.— Phone from Lt. Col. Moore, A/3-TC Hq., re:

many maps. Long conference Capt. Johnson, Capt. Preston, and

Maj. Lewis re: maneuver flight plans. Lt. Col. Jacobs confer­
ence with Lt. Col. Moore, re: public relations and press during

maneuvers; to bo handled by Maj,. Wilbur at A/B-TC Hq.

14 September.— Conference Lt, Parsons,Wing Historical

Officer, re: complete coverage for Wing Historical Record for

maneuver period. Conference of Lt, Col. Jacobs, Majors Lewis

and Brown, Capts. Preston and Johnson, re: courses prepared

for D-l and D Day. Glider runs unsatisfactory, held up pending

dry run by Col. Hampton and Maj. Brown.

15 September.— Lt. Eaney presented global war situation

all theaters in war room for Wing officers.

16 September.— All of Intelligence staff working on over­

lays, photo maps, etc..

17 September.-- Draftsman and Capt. Johnson all day on

photos, labels, headings.

18 September.— Conference Capt. Johnson,> Maj, Kail, G-2,

13th A/B Div., aerial photos. Explained our photo

and which we expected to have in next 48 hours. He

with our coverage. T7e furnished him with aerial

blow-ups of each field. Discussed procedure re: messages, '^

message center SOP, etc. Discussed photo reconnaissance £$6'" „_

of maneuver. In checking 1/80,000 mosaic, West End Area ,^ & is*

covered error, agreed to use 1/20,000 mosaic with coordinates

taken by 13th A/B or else Charlotte Strategic, 1/500,000. Lt.

Col. Jacobs notified G-2, 13th A/B we expected mission reports,

all loads, oven if negative.

19 September.— TWX answer re: flak overlay, enc. 1, Supp,

3, Annex 1, F0 1, Eq. A/B-TC Maneuver. Explained overlay wpuld

not fit 1/20,000, Troy 37, due to tick marks not matching , ,,

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER.

coordinates, (1154-1341)• Corrected overlays forwarded.

Lt. Col. Jacobs, Capt. Johnson attended pre-luncheon confer

ence with Col. Karris, Chief of Staff, 13th A / B Div., also L

Col. Adair, Lt. Col. Mayfield, Maj. Brown, Camp Lackall. A

met M a j . Fertick, Asst. G-2, 13th A / B Div., for a joint A-2

G-2 conference. Prime question—sequence for paradrop.

artillery first, on "3" field, pararack loads and door loads

at the start of "3BIT with bulk of loads in C, D, E, and F Fiel

Col. Nichols discussed schedule for observers who are

expected to be here for maneuvers. Auditioned. Combat Camera

Unit arriving 20th to film maneuver for historical record and

training film.

Discussed with Lt. Col. Moore message procedure prior

to D-P2. Decided iuaneuver becomes tactical D-2.

G-2, 13th A / B Div., already had sent in requests for

various photos. Maj. Kail requested oblique shots looking

west toward Mackall. Also requested photo strip of area from

road to iwackall to Aberdeen and photo showing Mackall Airfield

immediately prior to beginning of operations in order to spot

up to date gun positions. We agreed to get Photo Reconnaissani

unit to get these photos.

20 September.—• Main job was overlays for night maps;

also checking photos.

21 September.-- Distribution made on maneuver overlays

and photos.

22 September.-*- Moved whole A-2, 3, 4 staffs bodily to

Maxton. Before going to bed, A-2 section had nearly complete

war room set up in Bldg. 923 and duplicates of most material

in Eq. Bldg. 915. Arranged for more maneuver photos. Chased

after loading diagrams, details from 1st Prov. Gp.

23 September•— Conferences, Lt. Col. Jacobs and Capt.

Johnson nearly continuous all day with G-2 f s, 3-2 f s and 3

section staff mexabers.

24 September.-- Final conferences and checks. Briefings

at 1000h, Maneuver started 1840 with departure of first

pathfinder plane.

SUPERVISOR OF HEATHER TRAINING

9 September.— Copy Sun, Moon tables to KITCG Weather

Officer.

11 September.— To Mackall, A / B - T C , conference with Maj.

Thomas, HITCC, to outline weather service requirements for

the maneuver,

12 September.— Sent Pope area climatic summary to Maj*.

Thomas, Maneuver Eq.

Sent 150 small weather maps to 1st Prov. Gp Weather Officer,

Col. Hampton ruled L-M j\AB, Weather headquarters for

maneuvers.

13 September.— Kept V/tng staff alerted re: latest

hurricane warnings made forecast for evacuation of gliders. \

-x

MANEUVER

 14 September.--^dvised V*ing staff officers that hurricane

danger had passed.

15 September,—Studied and distributed long range foff­

%
cast from Washington. l> '- '*

16 September.--.Arranged for field phone list direct \

Base weather, Mackall to \*ing Kq« Weather Station, L-M AAlf.

i.. ­

18 September.—i«ade up and phoned special forecast to*

G-2 and G-3 section, Hq. , 13th A/B Div. i

19 September.—Notified of modifications in distribution

on all forecasts for maneuvers* V >

• ^ r

20 September.—Distributed check lists for TC

21 September,—Now hurricane warnings distributed. Re
checked distribution lists,
22 September«,—^Conference at Mazton with Base, .Staff and

Command V.'eather Officers.

23 September t—-Arranged top priority -weather distributions

through message centers. Advised of precise present require­

ments liad down by Col, Nichols, HITCC. Confronted with

synoptic situation unique in 40 years of weather service.

Widely differing forecasts made by different staff and base

weather officers. Actual weather did not turn out as pre­

dicted by majority synopsis.

24 September.—.entire day and night at desk. With great

trepidation, a favorable forecast for paradrop was made.

SUPERVISOR OF TECIflJICAL TRAINING

7 September.—Checked availability Air almanacs. Straight-,

ened out two large glider missions of 1st Provisional Group.

8 September.—Set up glider practice mission for tomorrow.

Three tugs, sixteen gliders, set up with 1st Provisional. Set

up tow aircraft, 349th to Bowman to ferry freight, dope and

signal supplies. Set up four aircraft 349th Group, kiddletown

Air Depot to ferry dope to Pope Field. One aircraft 349th to

Baer Field to pick up eighty-six crew chief kits and eighty-six

R.O. kits for iuaixton Depot, bet up mission 1st Provisional

Group for five aircraft, twenty gliders at request of A / B .

9 September.—One aircraft 349th to Middle town, ferry tug

tires. Assigned 811th AAF BU to ferry newspapermen from

Vf ash ing ton to Fort Benning, 14 beptember.

10 September.—Set up one aircraft to ferry twenty-f iv e£" '

life rafts from Hunter Field, Georgia. ^r~"

Visited Maxton to check training of glider pilots in » "~"'\

1st Provisional Group, Group technical training. Captain **'*\ •*"

Preston, Wing Navigation Officer worked plotting courses, head-'

ings, overlays for maneuver flights on 7, 9, 11, 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1J

17 September. ^

11 September.—Worked on maneuver courses in P.M. £

Talked to Lt Wilson 810th PEO on planning to spot ^

floating C-47 fuselage to be delivered to iuaxton in the future.

­
Lt Wilson stated that he had worked with the C-47 mock-up at
Syracuse and he was of the opinion that the Syracuse mock-up

would be the one shipped to this area.

 Checked with Lt Blake on whereabouts of 17 ramps for C-46

laoding. They were ferried to Maxton.

12 September.—Checked with PEG, 1st Provisional Group re;

life rafts, etc., training. Checked PEO reports of 349th and

1st Provisional Groups.

Drew courses for resupply missions for maneuvers.

Lt Carrington PEO of 1st Provisional Group, 3l6th Squa-3)

ron, called and requested life raft, dinghy radio and training a

films for use in setting up a refresher course ordered by ITCO

These were arrnaged for. Requested heated suits but there axe *

none in the area, Flak suit is being traced in order to have i^

used, :'.

Wing required Personal equipment Reports received from a

349th Group. >•- |

Called Major Hayes of Resupply unit at Camp MackallF/t.£^s|

inform him Colonel Hampton desired to see him*

Mission to Middletown for tug tires was postponed until

13 September due to weather.

Ship up ship to Atlanta to ferry Colonel iidair to Pope

Field,

13 September .—Called Lt Carrington, 316th Squadron PEO

to inforiu him flak suit was available at Pope Field Base

Ordnance,

Called Major Mausert at ^BC Test and Development to

inform him Wing would not hold one aircraft for a test drop in

high winds.

Worked on courses for maneuvers.

Flew to Hemp with Colonel Hampton and Major Brown in an

attempt to evaluate the possibilities and advisability of using

Hemp for an I.P.

Tire ferrying mission to Middletown called off for the

time being because of unfavorable weather.

Ordered 1st Provisional to ferry C-46 loading ramps

from Maxton to Baer Field and to pick-up 25 C-47 racks from

Baer.

15 September.—Called 811th Base Operations on ETD of L~5 3

98795* Captain Robinson said subject aircraft will be dispatched

16 September.

Set up 349th aircraft to Patterson Field to pick-up "*J$U

rings 16 September, « >

Dispatched one aircraft to Washington, D.C ? , to pick uf

6600 lbs of maps. Ship to continue to Syracuse to pick-up "D"

rings. •••"*

16 September.—Set up two 349th Group aircraft to fly to \

Topeka, Kansas, to ferry 30,000 feet of tow rope, ^

Set up throe 349th aircraft to ferry 100 tire casings froi

Patterson Field. ' _., \

Set up two 1st Provisional aircraft to ferry an additional

50 casings from Patterson Field to 810th Base Unit. * " '

MANEUVER

-10­
 MANEUVER

Checked with 811th Base Operations on L-5 to be trans­

ferred to Maneuver Headquarters. Departed from Lawson Field

and arrived I/.axton Army Air Base

Set up 349th Gr up aircraft to ferry carbines to ,^,^

Field, 0800, 18 September 1944. "" t-*-*

18 September,—Ordered one 349th Group aircraft to Little .

Rock, Arkansas via Warner-Robbins Field to ferry maneuver

priority freight.
Called Captain Stutlz, assistant Base Operations Officer

at 812th AAF Base Unit to notify Knollwood of use of the field1

by the 1st Provisional Group 19 September.

Ordered 349th Group to pick up aircraft ,/23358 at Ivjaxtdfi

for reassignment * ' ..-. •,-i

Ordered 349th Group to ferry three aircraft to 810th^_jJ

Base Unit for permanent transfer.

Notified ITCC, aircraft #42-23771 would be ready for

transfer per TWX CT 632, by 22 September.

Cleared 349th Group aircraft to Vvichita Falls to pick

up bucket seats, thru Captain oedema, Lx ^^4 Command.

20 September.—Ordered one 349th Group aircraft to Newark,

Nevv Jersey for 500 green fuse us.

Ordered one 349th Group aircraft to ivarner-Robbins Field

to ferry supplies and personnel to 812th Sub-Depot.

Ordered one 349th Group aircraft to Patterson Field for

100 tubes to be picked up 21 September.

21 September.—Made distribution on aircraft ferried into

this area by Stout Field crews to the two Groups.

Ordered 1st Provisional to pick up four aircraft at Syracuse

22 September for use in Maneuver.

22 September.—Arranged a 349th Group aircraft to go to

Stout Field to pick up crystals necessary for Maneuvers.

Arranged for 810th Base Ur.it to give 200 13th A/B per­
sonnel qualifying lifts in CG-4iits.

23 September.—Ordered Major Earley of 1st Provisional Oper­

ations to leave five planes at Lumberton to give A / B personnel

practice in loading C-47.

Checked on plane ordered to Stout Field for VKF crystals

and learned it did not stop at Llaxton as ordered. Stout

was contacted by phone and necessary crystals secured.

24 September.—arranged with 349th Group to have pararaok'"

loads'changed on serial ^7 to avoid dropping mines after per-,

sonnel.

attempted to set up three ships with 349th to execute a

dummy drop on M G" field prior to running of scheduled maneuver

serials.

Colonel Barrow ruquusted that the 349th not bu given

iiiission, was run by 60th Vang personnel using two aircraft. '

major Hayus of thu Air Cargo Resupply unit reported that

was having difficulty with the 314th Squadron in loading oper­

ations. Meeting with Major Kurd and i.iajor Kayos ironed out

difficulties. ^

 &ANEUVE1

SUPERVISOR OF CHSMICAL WARFARE TRAINING

7 September•—Capt, Braim to Camp Mackall, checking 1st

AC Resupply Sq. and 316th TC Sq n Arranged for CY.S officer-

to help complete final training for Hvl's each of abovu.

8 September.—Final arrangements, plans, training mato£- *•,"".'

ials, arranged and forwarded to 1st AC Resupply Sq. and 31ofii

-•*

Sq. Also allotment of expendable ammoo •

Checked through Pope Field CWS, checking records CWS ^

training ammo of 3l6th and 1st AC Resupply Squadrons,

9 September.—Visited Maxton AxiB, checking CWS training^

base officers and GP f s scheduled recently. Total 138 offic

trained.

11 September,—Conference CWS Officer, 349th Group, re:

training,

12 September.—Checked 60th Wing officers' masks, previ­

ous training.

13 September.—Checked with Capt. Schrawdt-r, Wing Engine­

ering Officer, as to number of distress grenades for all a/c

to be used in maneuvers, extras on hand, etc,

15 September.—Checked with Wing Ordnance Officer dis­

tribution distress (smoke) grenades. Maxton to be used as

distribution point for grenades, flares, and fusees; for gli­

ders, these are put in canvas bags.

16-17 September.—Checking training status of subordinate

units.

18 September.--Checked a/c status reports all a/c in Wing

for smoke grenades.

19 September.-—Checked on instdllation of s^oke grenades

in all gliders.

20 September.—Checked and supervised distribution of gas

masks to Wing personnel.

Called by 3d Air Force re: smoke screen equipment and

supplies for 10 A-20 T s, which have to use Florence AAB as a

base, taking off from there to lay smoke screen for maneuvers,

22, 23, 24 September.-^At Maneuver Hq., 60th T. C. Wing,

L-M AAB.

No chemical problem in maneuver, except to see that all

a/c supplied with red and white smoke grenades, all personnel

equipped with gas masks due to maneuver enemy being supffie'dl

with large quantities of vesicant gas. Observed smoke screen

laid down by A-20's. Excellent. & '"

k-
SUPERVISOR OF MAINTENANCE AND
11 September.—Checked status reports for number flyable

a/c for maneuver• 166 ready total 349th plus 1st Prov. ,

Checked number red goggles available. Plenty. Arranged '

for 4 Pioneer equipment kits for Wing Surgeon. {.

12 September•—Checked with M a j . Kowalczewski, Pope Field ,

Depot, re; number spoilurs, glider tie down kits, etc., sy^ail*

able. This office advised that responsibility for procurement'3

of maneuver funds lay with this headquarters. i, *"

-12­
 MANEUVER

Piioned Lt. Col. Harvey, A-4,EITCCy who advised that

Washington had sent TWX authorizing priority for maneuver^

material and equipment. Advised office of Lt. Col. Fun*

Chief of Supply, Warner-Robins, urged immediate flow of

rings, sister hooks and other items urgently needed for

euver. Checked with Capt. Oliver, Sup. of Maintenance,

Maxton AAB as to major discrepancies in number of flyable^tugs?

and gliders that Base. *- ,

r
13 September.-- Set up Vttng Hq. movement plan with Mr 4 J

Seedhouse, WOJG, went to Rockingham, arranged use of Rockingham-

Lamlet Airport for emergency in maneuvers. Next checked glider-

landing zones, proposed 2 officers for Glider Evacuation

officers,, Next, conference v/ith G-4, A/B-TC on operations

1st AC Resupply Sq. Next secured action to have a glider

road graded. Then attempted unsuccessfully to arrange for

maneuver emergency fund. Call from Supply Officer, 1st AC

Resupply Sq« on supplies for 600 swing link sister hook

assemblies also 1016 D rings from Fairfield.

14 & 15 September..— Located more C-47 tires, 2500 C

rationsj 20 tents- 5 large "flies" and field equipment at

Maxton Quartermaster •.

16 & 17 September-.-- Correspondence 'and checking F0 9,

conference with Staff,

Completed last of lengthy negotiations to obtain items

from Little Rock Specialized Depot. Immediately arranged

with "3" to get a plane out there for urgently needed a/c

parts.

Conference v/ith Capt. Mohn, Statistical Officer and Capt.

Barnett on glider evacuation. Finally got emergency maneuver

fund operative. Arranged for gasoline requirements for man­

euver, 290,000 gallons. Arranged to have tank cars spotted

near fields. Lengthy glider evacuation conference, 7 other

officers. Arranged with A-l section for 160 extra glider

mechanics.

18 & 19 September.— Last major supply conference re:

A/B-TC maneuver. 17 officers present, nearly all TVing units

represented. Critical problems discussed and decisions made.

20 September,— Loading ramp, lash ropes, tail jacks,

gasoline, and glider evacuation plans arranged for at long

last.

21 September.— Routed new gliders. Routed critical

freight for maneuvers. Finished supply plans for Lumberton

AD; arranged for guard details.

22 September.— Arranged routing of new a/c into this

area. Arranged for processing a/c out of this area at &rA of,.,­
maneuver. Loading ramps arrived. ~ ' .-""-.,

(In the case of two sections Maintenance and Supply, A-4>

Communications, it is felt that a "behind the scenes" supple­

ment should be added to this report. These two sections,'^

whose importance is so frequently underestimated by soldiers, t

of limited background, are peculiarly appropriate for a "play

by play" account of maneuver preparations wholly pertinent to

an actual tactical preparation. The letter from Col. kayfield

brings out logistical situations thought of by few staff

officers. The"running play by play account" from Communications

brings out details rarely thought of except by Communications

officers.) '

-13­
 MANEUVER

SUBJECT: Historical Data, A-4 Section.

TO t Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier V/i

1.. On 22 August 1944,. at a conference with the vllng -epiu­

mander, maneuver problems were discussed and it was deWrmin^

that a minimum of 100 C-47 airplanes per Group would b«f usod

and that Groups would be nbeefed-upir accordingly. It vks de­

termined that, in addition to the 349th and 1st Provisional ^

Groups, there would be one Air Cargo Resupply Squadron movud^

into the area for use in the maneuver. Information was 'rv~ -,

ceived that Pope and Maxton air fields would be used to ^ ^

establish an air head at Camp Iviaokall, the D-Z to bu loc&tud -,

in the Derby Area. Work was started immediately to obtain j*

power planes, gliders, parts and accessories, and personm;!.^

2. All Depots, Sub-^Depots and Supply Officers were

formed of the situation by conferences, telephone calls, J*

and urged to estimate their needs as quickly as possible and

warned that due to tfbeefing-up" there would be constant changes

in their needs as some aircraft would come in from RTU requir­

ing a considerable amount of work in order to meet maneuver

requirements. This did prove to be a condition to meet.

3. a. Lt. Col. Mayfield made a trip to Washington and

Patterson Field for conferences to coordinate the glider supply

and rehabilitation situation and to make necessary arrangements

to meet the delivery of 100 gliders from factories and approx­

imately 70 from RTU - with indication for 250 always favorable,

b. The preparation of maneuver gliders became quite

a problem due to the fact that double tow training was to con­
tinue in both Groups and certain elements in this area had'

been alerted for POM inspections; these inspections were

actually Laid during pre-maneuve,r preparations.

4. Around 25 August 1944, the Sub-Depot furnishing

maintenance and supply for units in the Wing area was trans­
ferred from Middletown Air Servicu Command to Lamer Robins

Air Service Command. This required additional conferences, >

correspondence, telephone calls, etc., and did complicate and

slow down the flow of critical materials. Shortly previous

to this time, it was found necessary to set up a supply and

maintenance program for the 1st Provisional Group from the 88th

Sub-Depot at Pope Field to the 399th Sub-Depot at Laurinburg-

Maxton AAB, due to Camp Liackall Air Field being a satellite of

Laurinburg-Maxton AAB. This did create some minor problems.

These were worked out satisfactorily.

5. On 24 August 1944, Wing Engineering and tying Glider

Engineering were instructed to concentrate on maintaining a

maneuver level on all technical equipment and supplies, vj,

tie down rings, loading ramps, lash ropes, tow rope r

lights, inter-communication, radar, Model 80 pickups,

dome lights, tow rope release mechanisms, smoke grenades^,

formation lights, safety belts, and pararacks for power planes;

and loading ramps, tie down rings, litter brackets, double tow

inter-com tow ropes, fire extinguishers, safety belts, intersK

phones, deceleration chutes, pyrotechnic kits, medical aero­

nautical kits, tail jacks,.spoilers and tie down kits for gliders

6. Weekly supply and maintenance conferences were he^d at

Pope Field each Friday and personnel from Pope, Mackall anbV

Maxton were required to attend. All problems of any consequence

were brought out that otherwise could have been overlooked. ^ •

7. a»' A plan to establish a pool of gliders in the us ,

organizations, in order to assure current maintenance and als

have then available for pre-maneuver training, was put into

effect. Lt. Col. Butler, Command Engineering Officer, visited

this headquarters on 25 august 1944 and this plan was discussed

with him and he concurred in it. He stated that we could expect

approximately 140 additional gliders in this area based

from RTU and 70 from factories, with the factory flow

to reach a maximum of 12 gliders per week assembled and

in. ' The RTU gliders were found to need from 50 to 150

each, maintenance.

b. The picture at that time (25 August 1944) was asr^

follows: ^

On Hand in the Tactical Groups

.Expected from RTU and Factories

Expected from Pope Field Depot

Co In addition to maintenance on the 70 gliders

received ±rcm RTU the 40 expected to be turned out by the

and those brought it; dua to training, the two Depots were

quired to continue power plane maintenance* The personnel of

the Maxton Depot, was at this time augmented.by 29 civilians

from Iviiddletown Air Service Command and one additional Mobile

Repair Unit requested for use at Mackall,

8. A conxerence at .Airborne Center on 29 August 1944

was attended by Lt., Col. Mayfield; the maneuver directive read

to those present, and tils was followed by a conference of

interested persons at this headquarters.

9. a. On 31 August 1944, Command instructed this office

to furnish the factories a number of first-aid kits, mooring

kits and fire extinguishers for use in ferrying gliders in;

also furnish a number of single tow ropes, sister hooks and

D-rings, all of which were in tiie ?tCritical Item" category.

However, they were furnished. Notification of allocation of

maneuver gasoline was received'this date.

b. It was determined that gliders being ferried in

from RTU and factories should be brought into Mackall and Pope

Fields rather than Maxton and Pope, and this necessitated send­
ing personnel from the Maxton Depot to Mackall to inspect

gliders upon receipt and assist in maintenance. This was

accomplished, however, without undue hardship on Maxton Depot,

10, Three gliders were received from Leister-Kaufman,

St. Louis, Mo., on 2 September 1944. These were the first

gliders returned through the factory glider rehabilitation

program, RTU gliders also started coming in and 4 received

from Bergstrom in a poor condition and it was necessary to

issue orders to set aside for shipment to the factories any

requiring excessive maintenance,

11, On 4 September 1944, Col. Funston of Warner Robins

Air Service Command was contacted, and it was found tfiat due

to the sudden switch from Middletown to Warner Robins Air \

Service Command, it would be necessary for them to deal direct­

ly with Specialized Division, ASC, in order to meet our maneuver

needs, - \

12, After long distance call to Command, it was necessary

to send aircraft to Baer Field to pick up crew chief and radio

kits on 7 September 1944.

13, On 9 September 1944, a critical shortage of Corey ,\

nose skids and D-rings became apparent necessitating a call

on Command for assistance, and on 11 September 1944, the WiagJ

-15*

 MANEUVER'

Director of Supply & Maintenance attended a conference at Head­

quarters, I Troop Carrier Command, and discussed all shortages

and means of obtaining them, Among these shortages was the dire

need of 25 additional power planes, Major Sharpe, of Command

Engineering, was contacted and stated that he would ^

their procurement. The conference brought out that it

necessary for Col. Funston, Chief of the Supply Division,

Robins ASC, to visit Air Technical Service Command for theggtirpose

of establishing priority to expedite procurement from Specialized

Depots, Col. Mayfield urged that every effort would have to be

made to bolster the ftbeefed-up" group in the Wing area by taking

parts and supplies available. To this end, the 60th Wing wfes -\

permitted to send airplanes for available critical materielt

Major Scott, Warner Robins ASC, said that he would put expediters

on all maneuver requisitions on hand or in action at Warner

Robins ASC, and he> together with Col. Mayfield, rushed to

Warner Robins and carried this out, Lt, Col. Harvey, A-4, H

ITCC, initiated action with V/ashington to expedite the autho

tion of proper pr:\orit.;; for maneuversc

1/4.. On 13 September 1944, all aircraft (power and glider

in this area were evacuated to Warner Robins and Lawson Fields

due to hurricane w a n i n g , The complete evacuation and return

to their proper bases *••$& accomplished with a loss of only 3

gliders from a total 01 269 in the movemento

15. On 1$ September J944, the D~ring and sister hook situa­

tion had become acute aud approximately 1500 of each were obtain­
ed from Patterson Fiela a.id the 848th Specialized Depot at

Syracuse. However, these turned out to be worthless as they

could not stand a magniflux test. On the same date, it was

learned that C Rations would be difficult to obtain, and Major

Pittman, Q.M», at Maxton, was instructed to get not less than

2500 rations. This was accomplished,

16. On 18 September 1944, an.^ emergency fund of §2000.00

was obtained for local purchase of various critical items not

otherwise obtainable.

17. On 20 September 1944, the vital additional 25 power

planes started coming in and were all in by 23 September 1944,

giving the tactical units a total of 197 flyable power planes

and 269 flyable gliders on D-l Day. Only very minor accessories

were short at this time and everything needed was on hand by

at least H-12 Hour.

18. On D-l Day, orders were received to prepare six Squad­

rons at Camp Mackall for movement out of the area on D plus 3

and D plus 4 Days.

/ s / R. E. Mayfield

/t/ R. E. MAYFIELD,

Lt.

Dir.,

SUPERVISOR CF COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING

7 September.— Conference Camp Mackall, Maj. James, Col.

Brandt A/B, Col. Koff 13 Div Sig 0, M a j , Durgood, 22 Corps Sig.

0, M a j . Helcher, 2d Combat Cargo Comm. section and Capt. •-Hughes

22 Corps. Complete discussion of all wire and radio nets.

Planned consolidated SOI for whole maneuver. Set up another

conference 11 September.

MANEUVER

 MANffiJViCR

- Tv'/X t o HrrCG-.fQrv.signaice.quipGQXitivfroiri^Qwxuan t o P o p e ,

8 S e p t e m b e r . — L t Le F l e u r t o Camp M a c k a l l t o g e t r a d j
beacon m o d i f i e d * . - «
9 September.—Called r e : phone l i n e s , Maxton t o Pope

Major Helcher called r e : responsibility for control

operators during mancuver9

10 September 8--i«ajor James at Mackall coordinating plans

comraunications during iixaneuver.
v
12 September•—Major James in conference, Mackall as of

7 September, ­
Visited liaxton to get unit Communications Officers

ing extra equipment „

Had commercial piiones installed in 60th Wing offices*

Checked on tow rope intercom, being made by Wing Prov­

isional Signal Company. 16 complete, 20 more per day.

Discussed shortages of trained EM, Maxton particularly

trained T W A operators.

13 September,—Captain Allred went to L-M AAB and Camp

iviackall to check communications arrangements. Called Major

Helcher, HITCC Communications Officer about 6 TWX operators.

Consulted Lt Col iaayfield rs use of part of fire station

Lumber-ton, for message center. Possible.

14 September•—Request received from major Foreen, Fort

Bragg Post signal Officer for three SCR 399 radio sets for

emergency hurricane net. Later cancelled.

15 September.—Notified by Captain Hughes, Signal Officer.

22d. Corps, they loan us 5 TWX operators from 18 September to

end of maneuver. Wing 4-1 notified.

Procured one SCR 188 radio, one BD 72 switchboard and

field wire from Sub-Depot, Signal Section, Pope Field, for use

by Wing Signal Company at Ivlaxton.

Captain iillred at L-M AJ\B checking wire circuits.

Started draft of Signal ^innex 6 to F.O. # 9 .

16 Septembere—Notified by A/B their pathfinder cre.TA*e will

be ready to train with */B crews 19, 20, 21 T ^ ^

17 September.—Lt Le Fleur to Mackall to have nev/

beacon harness modified. ' •••\.A

Completed Signal Annex //6 to F, 0. # 9 . ;.->

18 September.—Captain ^llred to Lumberton and Maxton re *

wire circuits.

Major Tomes finishing SOI for maneuvers.

Lt Le Fleur at Maneuver Headquarters, to have >iN/RPN

-2 modified, also arranged to lecture a/B pathfinder teams on ,

radio navigational aids,

19 September.—Major Tomes at conference at Mackall with

Lt Col Brandt, Major Kelcher, re 13 A / B wire circuits.

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

Lt Le Fleur lectured the 18th from 0830 to 1100.

20 September.—Lt le Fleur meeting with Radar officers,

349th T C Group and 1st Provisional T C Group, 1430 to 1530

coordinating Radar procedures for maneuvers.

21 September.—Oaptain Allred still at Maxton.

Lt Le Fleur at Mackall briefing pathfinder teai

Major Tomes modifying pyrotechnics Signal

Obtained 15 miles of wire from Signal

Bragg.

Told by Signal Supply Officer that plugs, jack#..,for.

glider tow rope intercom circuits would be ready. *• * /

SECTION ONE

MESSAGE CENTER

21 S ept ain.be r „•—Officially started 24 hour operational

tenence of message cent.>r today at 0800 > Received several

formal notes rtgarim^ oall signs and frequencies,-,

22 September ,,•--'I\-'.I ;:s of 13th A/B Div o moved into bivouac

area outsiae of base. This included 515th Prcht Inf Regt.,

88th Glider Inf. Regt., 325th Glider I f , hegt., 676th Glider

FA., 513th Signal Co., 409th Qjvl Co., and 3d Platoon of 222d

Mecial Co.

Started a scheduled motor messenger service to bivouac

areas and also coordinated this with the scheduled airplane

messenger who ran from Mackall to Maxton, to Lumberton to Pope

to Mackall. Motor messenger left the message center every 2

hours on the odd hour. Airplane messenger made two trips daily

leaving Maxton at 0915 and 1345.

he handled 35 incoming messages and 113 outgoing messages

today. Lot of distribution of administrative material, warned

units that we would handle only material pertaining to maneuvers.

23 September.—Message center running smoothly, however,

administrative distribution getting heavier. Climax came when

we received distribution for training circular No. 40, "WAC

Physical Fitness Rating" at 1600 from Eq., 13th A / B Div. Major

Tomes got this straightened out with the Division Signal Officer,

and we now havo instructions to accept no distribution.

Handled 73 incoming messages and 154 outgoing messages

today.

SECTION TWO , ^.-r-\

TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH ^ \ fl

21 September.—Installed 4 extra lines to Bldg, 1033^34,

35 9 37. Installed balcony and B. Hive bds. Placed l6,ph'dh'cs

and located 8 cases of trouble- opens caused by troop vehicXfe

movement over wire on ground. Crew work till 2200. Inst.'r,-.

placed and checked all phones in Bldg, 1033, 34, 35, 37, and- 915•

Moved place all phones, field and commercial and auxiliary equip­
ment Bldg. 915, consisting of 2 buzzers and 2 wiring plans. lost

ciew worked until 2200. . 4

22 September.—Crew placed wire to No. 2 remoted 3299

quarters of a mile. Place phone balcony 46 located trouble

beehive bugle trunk cuased by jeep traffic. Trouble in at

Trouble cleared O93O. Placed phone Bldg. 921. Located and

repaired 3 opens in 2 existing lines to China board to be ex­

 MANEUVER

tended to Bulldog. Took wires out of china and spliced them

straight through. Trouble on Beehive 54 and Beehive-Bugle Trk.

1400 cleared 1445. Opens caused by jeep traffic. Finished ..-•

transferring wire to Bulldog 2200 %

23 September.—Started day at 0730. Q>I balcony 46 dut

of order* Trouble reported to bal. opr. 2225 by QJvi Captain.

Trouble not reported to Bugle until 0725 this Am. Trouble^

nature open in Qj.vi biv. area. Cause unknown one Bulldog Tr^.

open, cleared 2 cases in no. 2 Ckt wires. Crew installed t

and moved phonos in bldg. 915-914* Installed 1 phone plus t

extension at Resupply 1 at line loading. 1 at 804* Cleared

x
1 case bd trouble, cord wo. 0. 17 • ^oved extension on C211+K
6
installed 1 Bulldog 926 terminal bd. on balcony. Beehive trunks ,

developed bad cross talk. Cleared same in Cabbage Patch. fc" J

mowers caused 4 opens on B.W. line between 1400 and 1600.

Located and cleared saiub promptly. Traffic slowed aftor

Trouble all clears after PFC's leave the post, Lvurything

operating on 24 hour basis. Establishing Service to Bulldog

SECTION THREE

RADIO

Training operations with radio nets were started on

19 September at 0900, Stations included Maneuver Headquarters

at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, 13th airborne Division in

Bivouac at Laurinburg-^lA'axton Army Air Base, and 60th ^'. C» Wing,

at Laurinburg-iuaxton Army Air Base.

In this training phase two nets weru functioning,

the Command net No. 1 (tactical) and Command not No. 2 (admin­
istrative) can messages received from the 60th Troop Carrier

Message Center were passed between stations.

On the evenings of 21 and 22 September tests were made

in the ambulance net. Stations composed in the net were two

mobile SCR 193's and the control station at the Laurinburg-

Maxton Army Air Base.

Tactical frequencies were first employed on 23 Septein~

ber at 1400 at the direction of maneuver Headquarters. Can

traffic was passed on command net No. 1 and command net No, 2 0

At 0916, 24 September the not control station at Maneuver

Headquarters imposed a radio silence on both command nets which

continued until 2010, 24 September. When the silence was broken

on command net No. 1 by net control asking for authentication*

i<et operation was opuned and at 0230 contact was established

with the 13th Airborne Division.

The point to point net which included Pope Field,

Lumber ton, Camp Lackall, and Laurinburg-taxton Army Air Base

began operation at 0001Q, 2 3 September 44, Contact was establish

ed and continued until 1220Q, 26 September 44. An

station representing the forward echelon of the f

Carrier Wing which was flown to Camp ivlackall on the afternoon

of 25 September ^nterud the net by contacting maneuver-Head­

quarters at 15O4Q. •':•••

REPORT FRO/I C A P T A I N PAIiflATIER, SIGNAL ~

Left Hammer Field, Fresno, Cal, 4 September 44 with

4 officers and sixty-four enlisted men for Pope Field by

authority of TTX from Fourth Air Force, San Francisco. Arrived

this station 6 September 44•

First day here was spent in arranging administrative,;?J\

details. Major Tomes contacted us here on the 7th and re- \t *

MANEUVER

 MANEUVER

quested wen for a tow rope detail. We were to attack com­

munications lines to 120 350 foot ropes and 60 75-foot ropes.

Lt Levis of the local Sub-Depot was to coordinate the work at

this end. Contacted Lt Lev is and his information was not

very definite*. \;>ork was finally begun on 10 September after

supplies were drawn from Signal Supply and from Air C<

Few people on this base could tell us the intricacies v

job and after considerable delay Mr Brown, of Signal Ma

gave us a hand. Kept 49 men on the rope job while the 'others

were busy drawing our wire supplies. V," ',

We ordered 25 metal hooks from the Sub-Depot and althojagh

the order was RUSE we didn't get our hooks until six days -.

afterward. Coordination on the project has not been of the West.

20 men are still on the project and it is necessary that all "^

others continue in their proper places. -.

Here is a brief outline of the individual sections:**

WIRE

S.September.—Ran 12 commercial pairs from the B-Box

Bldg T-918.

9 September.—Transferred lines to T-913 and ran jumpers

in B-Box on pole.

10 September.-^-Began work on tow ropes.

12 September .--.Drew wire equipment and switchboards. In­

stalled 20 protectors on commercial lines and ran six lines

to T-915­
13 September.—Began switenboard installation. Placed

terminal and ran jumper cable to boaras. MQH helped local

lineman. Installed two phones and protectors in T-919*

Teletype men worked on their set's.

14 September.-rTerminated toll lines to Pope, Mackall and

Lumber ton. Lines were two talk and one TvVX. TWX was then in

operation for testing through.

15 September.—Installed linos to pigeon loft and to China

switchboard and surveyed route to weather station. Made bridle

rings for terminal panel.

16 September.—Ran lino to weather station. Installed

Message Center and Communications Office phono. Information

as to phone locations still not adequate. If information was

complete the time for the job could have been cut in naif.

Now have 4 TWX in operation and one spare, 3 BD 9-lTs in oper­

ation, 16 milos of field wire out and 29 field phones installed.

MESSAGE CLNTER

Drew supplies and when switchboards and TWX machines.--were

in operation was open for operation. Most of the Message Center

men have been on tow ropes. "

RADIO

All repairmen have been busy repairing and installing

equipment. Established call-up with Pope Field on 14th with

point to point station. Power units and other radio equipment

-t tnis station in poor state of repair.

Lt Col Kaughe from Airborne it Mackall visitod us and gave

us as much information as he could for the spotting of phones'.

Did not know where individual officers would be placed and he 'did

not know the locations for the combat teams so we could not run,

those lines. MANEUVER "'"

 MANEUVER

Things are progressing normally in view of the circular-

stances. Cur main obstacles are lack of information and the

tow rope detail. Captain Allred lias been very helpful

throughout our stay hero and without his assistance the j

would have been infinitely harder. He and I visited

i i t d Lumferto$i,

L f

Mackall, and Pope on Saturday and surveyed the situatiojx. ~j

PERSONNEL SECTION i « )

7 Septexubwr.—additional glider pilots to 1st Provisional

Group and 349th Group from iuaxton. \

8 September.—Major- Conrad to ivlackall to 1st Provisional

Group re additional personnel for coming iuaneuvers. ;_ _ »

9 September.—Notified PCM inspectors to be at 1st iit.C.? |

xt
usupply Sq., 3l6th and 318th T C Sq, 343d airdrome Sq on tqr -r

about 25 September. liivery effort made to have date

as not to interfere with maneuvers.

11 Septumber.—Phoned ^ajor Oakley, Earner-Bobbins, arrang­

ed for 42 EIvl, 1 WOJG to be put on temporary duty 1st provisional

Group for maneuvers.

12 September.—Officers on TD for maneuver period:

Captain Don Konnett — Wing Surgeon

Captain '•»•'. Vender V;oude — Ordnance

1st Lt. II. Schwartz-Mtod. .ndm. Officer

1st Lt. J*. V/. Mar able — Wts and Balance Officer.

13 September.-.-Talked to Captain Daily, HITCC, re 88 combat

crews at Ber$£trom to Baer Field on DS with 1st Provisional

Group. These crews to bu at Baer Field iuiiuudiatuly following

maneuvers.

14 September.—Phone to ^ajor McClure re personnel 1306

Signal Company.

15 September . — 1 6 September.—Conference, Senior Staff

u
ffieers f Maneuver^]?- movement Orders 1st Provisional Group.

18 September.—20 September.—Reorganization 316th T C

Sq., approved. Glider echelon deleted frox^ 3l6th Sq., going

as separate detacMient.

21 September.—23 September.—^Numerous last minute re­

placements, officers and Liu in alerted organization, located

and transferred.

Y/ING ORDNANCE OFFICER "

1. The major ordnance activities performed by the".Wing

Ordnance Officer during the Combined airborne - Troop Carrier

maneuvers were as follows,

2* Pyrotechnics*

a, i-^fter a conference with Wing Glider Officer and the

Ordnance Officer pope Field, Laurinburg-Maxton Army ^ir Base,

349th and 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Groups it was decided

that a pyrotechnic kit composed of the following items would be

installed in eaoh glider used in the maneuvers:

One (1) pyrotechnic pistol.

TV/o (2) signal aircraft red star parachute M - f

Two (2) signal aircraft green star blinker M-16.1*­

Two (2) red fuzees.

Two (2) green fuzees.

One (1) bag - cloth 20 x 8 inches.

MANEUVER

 h. It was directed that all pyrotechnic equipment now

on hand in the Groups be turned into the Base Ordnance Supply

Officers, , r

t 3

£. The following pyrotechnic equipment was sMppcrff;

from Laurinburg-Maxton ^rmy Air Base to Pope Field uponl; direction

fran this office: . •• *;

Fifty (50) pyrotechnic pistols.
Two hundred fifty (250) ivl-11 Signals.
One hundred fifty (150) M-16 Signals. .
Two hundred sixty (260) Red fuzees.
One hundred twenty(120) gre«n fuzees.
One hundred sixty (160) pyrotechnic bags. ­ ;;
< • > • • • , ' |

dL» arrangements were made with the 399th Sub-D%§£>"k

Supply Officer for the supply of two hundred (200) additV"'"

pyroteclinic bags.

je. arrangements were .uade with Lt Bejach, Air Corps

Supply Officer, Pope Field and the Standard Military Fuzee

Corporation, Boonton, New Jersey, for the supply of five hun­

dred (500) additional green fuzeos. arrangements nt-ide with

Captain Preston, ^-3 Section 60th Wing, for plane to pick-up

this equipment. One hundred forty-four (144) green fuzees

were issued to Lt Q'Dell and Lt Lo Fleur for use of paratroopers

Pathfinder personnel in marking landing zones.

f\ The Ordnance Supply Officer at Laurinburg-Maxton

rfmy .Air Base packed ninety (90) complete pyrotechnic kits and

issued same to 1st Provisional Group for installation in gliders*

g. The Ordnance Supply Officer, Pope *ield, packed

one hundred sixty (160) complete pyrotechnic kits and issued same

to 349th Troop Carrier Group for installation in gliders.

3# Ordnance Weapons*

a_. After a conference with Colonel Hampton, V/ing

Executive Of:icer, it was decided that all glider pilots would

be armed wit.L the Carbine, Calibre 30 Ml. arrangements were

made by this office for supply of required number of carbines

from the Ordnance Supply Officer, Pope Field and Laurinburg­

kaxton UHB, to the 349th and 1st Provisional Groups,

t>. .arrangements made for the issue of three pistols,

Calibre 45, to Communications Officer of Maneuver Headquarters

for security purposes.

4» Automotive Equipment.

c£. ^fter conference with 1st Provisional Group Oper­

ations, Supply, and Ordnance officers, and the Laurinbur"g­
luaxton AAB Supply Officers it was determined that the following

additional vehicles would be required by the 1st Provisional

Group for the maneuver:

Tun (10) truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6

Twenty (20) truck 1/4 ton 4x4

Five (5) ambulances

Ten (10) weapons carriers

Four (4) command cars.

ID. Arrangements made with Ordnance Supply Officers

Laurinburg-Maxton AAB, Fort Bragg, and 4th Service Command at

Atlanta for the supply of the vehicles listed above.

£. The following additional vehicles were procured

for the 60th Troop Carrier Wing Signal Detachment stationed

at Laurinburg-maxton AAB.

MANEUVER

 Two (2) truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6

Four (4) truck 1/3 ton 4x4

d. Upon request from Captain Medema, A-4 of Maneuver

Headquarters, arrangements were made supply of the following

vehicles:

Two (2) truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6

Fourteen (14) truck 1/3 ton 4x4

Two (2) command cars f/\," ',*

Two (2) weapons carriers. \* ^

Several of the above vehicles were used by the Ar^y Air'

Forces Photographic Unit at Camp Mackall. = 3

e. Captain Medema later requested that all available stfeff

cars T>e dispatched to Maneuver Headquarters for use of Maneuver

Observerso arrangements made with Motor Transportation Office^.;

Pope Field, and Laurinburg-maxton AAB for the dispatching of %

twelve (12) staff cars to maneuver Headquarters on 23, 24"and ®

25 September 1944. & • "*

.f. Operations and Ordnance Officers from the 349th Gr»

requested that seven (7) additional weapons carriers be

for use during the maneuver, arrangements made with Pope Field,.

Fort Bragg and Atlanta Supply Officers for supply of same,

£. Thu following aditicnal vehicles wore procured for thu

use of the motor Transportation Officer at Laurinburg-Maxton iLA3«

Five (5) truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6

Two (2) coxumand cars

Ten (10) truck 1/4 ton 4x4

Ju Ten (10) trucks, 1/4 ton 4x4, wore procured for the use

of the" motor Transportation Officer at Pope Field.

_i. Upon request frcm Wing A^k the following action was

taken for the supply of sufficient Air Corps special purpose

vehicles, for fuel servicing of the 349th and 1st Provisional

Troop Carrier Groups:

(1) ^ silrvey of all equipment available in the area

was made.

(2) Requirements of the 349th and 1st Provisional

Groups were determined,

(3) Four (4) additional truck and gasolino trailer

units wore supplies to the 349th Group from Pope

Field.

(4) Three (3) additional truck and gasoline trailer

units with crews were dispatched' to the 1st

Provisional Group at Lumberton from the Laurinburfj-

Maxton AAB motor pool for use during the maneuvers

j ^ The following vehicles wore procured for thu use of 'tL^

60th Vving whilo stationed at Laurinburg-maxton AAB;

Five (5) truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6

Eighteen (18) truck 1/4 ton 4x4

Three (3) cars (5 passenger light sedan)

Two (2) command c ars f

Five (5) jeeps were isaued to Major Church for air tower

control at Camp Mackall.

-23­
 5. The Wing Motor Pool at Laurinburg-Maxton ^rmy Air Base

was operated under the jurisdiction of the Wing Ordnance Officer.

Arrangements were made for the transportation of all personnel

and equipment from pope Field to Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air

Base. Further arrangements were made for the transportation

from Laurinburg-Maxton iiAB to pope Field upon^pmjletion of the

maneuver. _",1- -.-r*

V ' . *

6* Upon completion of the maneuver arranf^menTts were made

for the return to the proper supply agencies oj the3equipment
listed above.
•*

For the CoiLiaanding Officer:

Colonel

Executi1

-24­
 HEiiDQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina,

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO j Director, Combined Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver, September

1944, Camp Mackall, North Carolina.

1. Enclosed are reports of section heads, this headquarters, as re­

quired by letter, Airborne Troop Carrier Maneuver Headquarters, Camp Mackall,

N. C , dated 11 September 1944, subject: Request for Publications, on Air-

borne-Troop Carrier maneuvers 25 September-29 September 1944.

2. As a result of maneuver, the following conclusions and recommenda­

tions are made:

a. That units of the command were not sufficiently trained in

night formation and night navigation as units to successfuly perform mission

attempted•

b. That in future training more emphasis be placed on night form­

ation and night navigation (including use of all type radio aids).

c. That it is impractical to attempt to make additional passes

at parachute drop zone by airplanes that fail to unload on the first pass.

d. That plans should be made in sufficient time to allow both

Troop Carrier and Airborne to issue all orders and instructions at least

one week prior to D-Day, this remaining week to be used for joint training

of Airborne and Troop Carrier.

e. That on airlanding resupply missions a definite schedule of

arrivals at destination be set up according to amount of unloading facilities

and personnel available.

For the Commanding Officer:

E. 11.HAMPTON,

Colonel, Air Corps,

10 Incls: Executive.

Incl •• 1 - A-l Report

r
,/2 - ii-2 Report

j,Z - A-3 Report

:
,/4 - ^-4 Report

-,,'5 - Glider 0's Report

7}-6 - Comm 0's report

-..7 - Liaison 0's Report

%B - Airdrome Control 0fs Report

49 - Kedical 01s Report

,10 - Statistical 0's Report

 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Ft Bragg,

North Carolina

30 September 1944

SUBJECT; A-l Maneuver Report

TO Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 60th T.C. Wing,

Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1# Troop Carrier organizations, under control of

this headquarters, received additional officer and enlisted

personnel previous to D day. This was necessary since

additional airplanes were given to each squadron bringing

total of aircraft to 25 per squadron. Combat crews, main­

tenance, administrative and housekeeping personnel were

ordered in to both groups to take care of this additional

work load. Personnel started arriving on D-20, so that

by D-9 both participating organizations had received

better than 95%> of the required extra personnel. See

attached personnel breakdown which shows personnel status

as of certain periods prior to and through D day.

2. Extra personnel was received from all installa­

tions of the Troop Carrier Command on temporary duty or

detached service status. Special arrangements were also

made to secure temporarily some engineering and mainten­

ance personnel from the Air Service Command.

3. 1st Provisional T.C. Group had to function with

a provisional squadron in addition to the regular "beefing

up" of their other squadrons. Pilots and enlisted crew

members were secured from combat cargo groups and RTU

units,

4. The influx of this personnel put extra adminis­

trative burdens on the organizations. Regular squadrons

in the 1st Provisional T.C. Group were increased by ap­

proximately 59% for officers and 78% for enlisted men

over their authorized strength. The 349th T.C. Group had

an increase of 41$ for officers and 20% for enlisted men

over their authorized strength.

5. One replacement combat crew was furnished when

a fatal accident occurred during a maneuver mission.

6. The present T/O does not give the Groups adequate

personnel In glider mechanics (559) for the training opera­

tions while engaged tin glider tow. The number of men re­
quired for rope details, retrieving gliders, hook-up de­
tails, and maintenance of gliders, requires more than the

152 glider mechanics assigned by the present T/0#t Conse­

quently, during the training program, this Wing assigned

approximately thirty (30) extra glider mechanics to the

Groups engaged in glider work*

7. The two groups engaged in maneuvers were ham­

pered considerably by addition of all this attached person­
nel a short time prior to D day. Trie did not permit suf­
ficient training for this extra personnel to work together

and become efficient as a team.

A. D. ADAIR, JR..t>

Lt. Col, Air Corps

1 Incl: A-l

Incl 1 - Personnel chart.

 1 September 1944 to 8 September 1944

Permanent Attached Combined

Authorized Party Personnel

Total

Pers onnel 1 (i^neuvers)

OFF. EM | OFF. I EM OFF. OFF

i I

1st Provisional

246 791 ! 282 929 j 92 391 374 1320

349th T.C.Group 324 1139 i 346 1182 I 84 204 430 1386

9 September 1944 to 16 September 1944

Permanent Attached
Party Combined
;Authorized Personnel
Personnel (Maneuvers)_ Total
j
OFF. OFF. ELI OFF. ! EM OFF, i EM

j1st Provisional j ,

791 281 I 931 110 481 391 j 1412

JT*.CJ,...£roup
349th T.C.Group 324 1139 403 1212 156 452 I 1368

17 September I944 to 25 September I944

Permanent
Attached Comb ined

j Authorized Party
Personnel Total

Personnel (Maneuvers)

! OFF. OFF. i EM OFF, EM OFF,

1st Provisional 246 791 276 940 126 497 j 402 ; 1437
349th T.C.Group 324 1139 400 1215 59 ! 155 ! 459 : 1370
 it

H&AOQUARTERS

SIXTH&H UROOP CARRIHt WING

mm AIR FORCES

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

Pope Field, Sort

North Carolin

30 September

A/B-TC MANEUVER .1944

After "sweating out" the weather,and the perspiring weather

the maneuver actually began for Troop Carrier at I84O, 1841, 1843

the take-offs of 4 Pathfinder a/c which completed their mission wi

incident.

The weather,over DZs 1,2, and 3 from 2030 to 2045 D-lwas considered

poor on &Ctfount of ppor visibility due to sncke, haze and no moonlight.

Some consideration was given to delaying maneuvers 24 hours by v&ng and

,Maneuver Headquarters bit finally it was decided to go ahead with'serials

as planned*' • ... .
Pathfinder pilots, 2000 hours, reported: ceiling above 3000, sky
broken, visibility from 5 to 8 miles.
However, one pilot, serial 4, claims that at 1931 hrs at PDZ 2 that

paratroopers drifted with "strong wind" plus slow jumping caused 5 para-*

troopers to land in trees at edge of DZ. The probability of a strong wind

is denied by Wing leather Offiee, and is contrary to weather records at

time of drop and close vicinity of drop. ' :

c ' • «'

Eye witness descriptions of all briefings concurred that briefing was

generally excellent, with very complete objective folders for each pilot.

These folders contained a complete coverage of maps, photo$, flight plan^

instructions and pertinent data. All comments re: briefings and intel­
ligence materials were of the highest commendatory tone.

The marshaling and take-offs went smoothly and it was not until seri~

als 5, 6, 7, and 8 had some obscure difficulty getting into squadron and

group formation that any confusion or lack of precision was evident.

In contrast with the paradrop of serials 5> 6, 7, and 8, the glider

serials D-l and.D-Day were executed with precision and have been described

in all phases as excellent.

It is confidently predicted that the quality of maneuvers in general

will improve measurably with the gradual awakening on the part of zone of

£he interior personnel as to the serious nature of the next year's combat

operations.

Combat Intelligence - G-2, 13th A/B, came in 0930 to cJp^Obnemy sit­

uation. Before 1030 hrs, 24 Sept., A-2 section, 60th Wing»||*d%ed from

Maneuver Hq,, SOT, 13-1, dated 23 September 1944. *

About 1030 hrs Annex 2, FO #4, 1st Prov, Gp.,(which was iSftir air

movement table) received* '. •

•t •
• 1
At IO32 Supp* #9 of Annex 1, FO 1 received from Maneuver Hq.^posting

15 new AAA positions at Mackall Field, plus 5 intelligence additions per*

taining to the simulated ground situation. v ^

At 1035, Lt. Col. Jacobs and Capt. Johnson departed for briefinglf Q &

Glider Pilots and 13th A/B Division, "*"

At 1300 hrs Lt.,Col? Moore, Man. Hq.. A-2, visited and inspected W a r ^

Room and Administrative Hq f , 60th Wing,.

— 1 —

 M A N E tJ V E E

24 Sept. (cont'd.)

At 1343 h?s Lt. Straugliarv Photo Uec Unit, consulted Capt. Johnson,

outlining next photo mission.

At 1500 hrs, A-2 section distributed Int» Bulletin #4, with

relaying ground situation developments.

At 1502 hrs, A-2 section distributed Supp. 2 to FO 9 on Fighte]

cort for supply missions, -s.-j* ­

\ '

For the next 2 hrs and 45 minutes the section worked posting chaffges

on situation map, catching up on correspondence, checking weather bulfetir

etc. ^ - \ >

At 1743, Base Glider Operations called; in the absence of Wing Gl^- ./

der Officer a memo of phone call was made which involved information on^- ^

details of duties of a "glider landing umpire" and his location* ^

At 1755 hrs, CO, 1st AC Resupply Sq,, called with A/B loading offidir

Requested verification of the nature of serials 15 to 24, This was done

with assistance of Asst. A*-3«

At 1800 hrs, about this time numerous questions about blackout came

in from many departments, A ruling was observed that 2100 hrs be begin­
ning of blackout. Actually in a theater of operations blackout automati­
cally begins when artificial illumination becomes necessary indoors,

A call came in as to whether Rockingham was to blackout. An enemy

reserve regiment was noted as supposedly being located in that town. Re­
ply was that with our air superiority our enemies enforced blackout more

rigorously than we do.

An exception was made with approval of Col. Pitts for locality of

Hemp-Robbins on account of a "shift" at the mill there changing at 2330,

1930, Capt, Johnson went on double dummy drop.

2205, Flash report from S-2^ 1st Prov. Gp., possible a/c crash.

2230, Flash 317 Sq., 1st Prov, Gp., a/c 783 crashed and burning,

2345, Started activity summary, 24 hrs, sent to Man, Hq. 0045,

0015, 25 Sept, First clear report on crash of #783 received. Plane

evidently struck by bundle dropped from an a/c out of formation, flying

above,

0320, Gen. Chapman visited 60th Wing Hq» for late nev*s on maneuvers

from our standpoint.

0724, First mission reports arrive.. Consolidated mission report #2,

1st Prov, Gp., Serial #5..

0724, Consolidated mission report #3, serial #6, _

troopers returned, 265 dropped, losses: 1 a/c, #783 burned, cr^T^o?'four

dead, 8 paratroopers dead,

0744, Consolidated Mission Report #1, serial 3, 4 Pathfinders 0, K.

0745, Preliminary Mission Report, serial 5, 5 sticks paratroopers '"•

dropped one mile N DZ1,, Serial 6, considerable equipment accidentally1' "*

dropped N of West End. . ­

0845, Consolidated Mission Reports, serials 8, 9, 7, 1, 2.

0850, Preliminary mission report, serial 10, (a) glider cut loose

on take-off 0« K« (b) glider #864 down 3 mi,- E" of M end of Field.

1015, G-2, A/B-TC situation summary; assembly orders of attack*

final assault,,

- 2 ­
!
M A N E U V E R

 25 Sept. (cont,)

1015, 1st Prov. Periodic report covering 2000 hrs, D-l to 0800, 0.

1044, Preliminary Mission Report, 1st Prov. Serial #11, 1 glider down 7

mi.. N of Pope Field.

1100, Serial 9 - all gliders accounted for, 1 slightly

1200, Gen. Terrell phoned Col. Pitts direct, "Mackall c ^ f « i , 0. K.

to land here,"

1305, Serial 11, 2 gliders down far from GLZ, but all pei^onnel safe.

I3O7, Serial 11, accurate coordinates on 2 gliders forced ^ o w n ^

1309, Another report different channel of communications, announji&Lng

capture of Mackall, * '..*

1615, 1st Prov* Gp., Consolidated Mission Report as of 1325 nrs,

serial #11, 80 of 82 gliders landed 0* K* on GLZ #3. Coordinates «ai

released prematurely. \^

1640, Base Photo Lab. called Col, Jacobs.

1855, Consolidated Mission Reports from 316th, 317th, 318th Sqs.,

Serial #11*

2030, Consolidated Mission Reports, 349th Gp., Serials 17, 20, 26,

1, 16, 15, 18, 19, 10, 12, 13, 16.

2100, Consolidated Mission Reports, 349th Gp., Serials 1, 2, 7, 8,

9, 21, 22, 23, 26, Miscellaneous Supply #1.

2150, Maj. Finnegan called re: Mission Reports on shuttle runs.

2400, 1st Prov. Periodic Report, 0'800-2000 hrs, 25 Sept. 26 Sept.,

0100, to A-2, A/B-TC Periodic Summary Report.

1QD0, To CG-Man. Hq., our 60th Wing. C. P. closed. Moving C. P,

to Hq,, 60th Wing, Pope Field.

1500, Staff Memo-A/B-TC Hq., announcement of critique.

2130^ Maj. Sharpe sent detail map from Mackall to Pope, plus call

signs, Ledbetter supply dropping mission.

27 Sept, Supply dropping missions delayed, only 2 hrs, weather.

29 Sept., Col. Jacobs and 5 other staff officers to critique, Mackall.

30 Sept., Col. Jacobs and 5 other staff officers to critique, Mackall.

After every military operation, simulated or actua^L, a^JJew vivid im­

pressions remain* A~2 Section, 60th Wing, offers?

1. In briefing all pilots, indicated elevation

in addition to elevation of terrain at DZ's or GLZ's.

2. Planned formation must fit the DZ's, A diamond of $fces-was def- ,

initely too wide for our DZ r s* 1

r
". .
•*

V'1 v
' '

3* "Dry runs" of some nature are essential to develop jumpmaster­

pilot coordination of signals. This maneuver clearly showed the 'neces­
v
sity for this* . .'

4. Last minute "beefing up" of tactical units, with complete c

from remote organizations can create difficulties of a wide variety*

these pilots are not familiar with maneuver terrain they must be impre

with the necessity of f amiliarigflag •and orienting themselves*

A ' N E U V E R

 5. Commanding Officers all echelons, with their operations and in­

telligence officers and flight leaders should see the terrain of the

planned operational flight in an armed bomber• This bomber should simu­

late a true bombing mission^ actually bombing an appropriate

avoid alerting the enemy to unusual reconnaissance. Bomber

give Troop Carrier officers clear overall "dry run" of their pr flight

plan.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. JACOBS,

Lt Col, AC, {

A-2. v

1 Incl:

Incl 1 - Weather Report.

V* .

M A N E . . U V

 AIRWAY WEATHER REPORTS

Received a t : Camp M a c k a l l , N. C.
Date: 24 September 1944

TIME CEILING VISIBIL­ WIND WIND

SWT (Feet) SKY CONDITIONS ITY DIREC­ SPEED
(Miles) TION
0130 High Overcast ESE lO/lOfCirr'o- S t r a t u s
0230 High Overcast ENE 10/lO^Cirrd-Stratus
0330 High Overcast ENE 10/10 Cirro-stratus
0430 High Overcast ENJ3 10/10 CUrro-ltratus
0530

0630 E4000
High Overcast

Overcast lwr brkn

ENE

E
4/10
pp
10/10 Ctfrro-J&ratus

6/10 St^atoaSRinulus
0730 E8000 Overcast 10/10 Alto-Stratus
0830 E7000 Overcast 10 10/10 Alto-Stratus
Overcast l/lO Fracto-Stratus
0930 E6000 ENE 14 9/10 Stratus
800 feet Sctd
Overcast 5/10 Strator-Cumulus
1030 E6000 E 14 5/10 Fracto-Stratus
1000 feet Sctd
Overcast 5/lO Strato-Cumulus
1130 E6000 E 5/10 Tract o-Cumulus
1500 fset Sctd
Broken 6/10 Strato-Cumulus
1230 E6000 EKE 10 3/10 Fracto- Cumulus
1500 feet Sctd
Overcast 9-/10 St r a t OT-Cumulus
1330 E5000 1500 feet Sctd NE l/lO Fracto-Cumulus
Broken 3/10 Strato-Cumulus
1430 i E4000 NE 10 4/10 Fracto-Cumulus
2500 feet Sctd
Broken 3/10 Strato-Cumulus
1530 i E5000 NE 4/10 Fracto-Cumulus
2500 feet Sctd
Broken 5/lO Strato-Cumulus
1630 E5000 NE 10 2/10 Fracto-Cumulus
. 1
2500 feet Sctd
1730 i E5000 Broken NE 12 6/10 Strato-Cumulus
1830 i E5500 Broken NNE 10 6/10 Strato-Cumulus
1925 j Raffed NNE Smoke Bombs

1930 i E4000 Broken NE 10 8/10 Strato-Cumulus

2030 I E4500 Broken 6/10 Strato-Cumulus
2130 i E4500 Overcast NE 10/10 Stratus-Cumulus
2230 ! E4000 Overcast 10 IO/IO Strato-Cumulus
2330 • M2400 Overcast NE 10/10 Strato-Cumulus
;
0030 M4000 Overcast 10/10 Strato-Cumulus
Legenjd: E ­ Estimated
M­ Measured
Lwr ­ Lower
Sctd ­ Scattered
EWT ­ Eastern War Time
Under "Wind Direction" E ­ East
N ­ North
 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRDiR WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

.Ofdee *>* Assistant ghiaf of §taff^ A-2

" •**

fort

SUBJECT; Consolidated Mission Reports, 349th, 1st Provisional Troop Carrie

Groups for llaseusrsr, 24, ;^eptember to 27 S&ptsmber 1944* 4,

TO-: General, k/B - T/C Maneuver Headquarters, Camp Mackailv '

North Carolina«

SUMMARY

Groups 2

A/C Missions (C-47s) 830

A/C Missions (B-17s) 29

Single Tow Gliders, CG 13 4

Double Tow Gliders, CG 4A 238

A/B personnel carried , Paratroops *­- 2394
A/B personnel carried , Gliders — — — 1167
A/B personnel carried to Fid #4 — — — *- 2900
Total A/B carried •*——•—. • 6461
Hospital glider pick up -—•—• —— 1
Total weight carried -TT«—— 2,563,038 lbs ­ 1281.5 tons
A/C C-47S, total loss — —
C-47S, Minor a^idents
Casualties ( 8 A/B & 4 Crew members) 12

Gliders cut from tow planes and did not reach GLZ 4

A/B Refusals (Paratroopers) - « - — ~ — ~ —

k/& *&,&&&&%&£&&& .ol^im^^j^ refusals -*

Injured ( 1 prdba&Le )

Fields

Gliders total loss ­

Gliders

&%

- 1 -^

! Serial T. C. No. No. B e s t A/B Prt. Refu- Returned Casual In­

No* 1 Unit Ap, Gli- F i d . Pers'l Loads sals paratroops ties jured Remarks
ders Carried l b s other than
•

•, refusal s
1 349 1 0 Path 21 110 0 0 0 0 Successful
2
3
349
1 Pro
2
1
0
0
3
1
07
14
250
0
0
0
0
0
%° Successful
Successful
r 4 l.Pro 1 0 2 14 0 0 ' 6 See page 3x
5 1 Pro 29 0 1 419 10,750 20 22 See page 3*
6 1 Pro 49 0 3 359 64,850 5 90 12\s2 See page 3x
0 0 r
7 349 34 0 2 520 17,399 21
f * 'i Provable in
^ jury. See 3:
8 349 42 0 3 603 17,388 25 13 0 1- '"3. ~>Saine. See 3
9 349 10 20 3 63 59,085 0 0 0 ^ e e page 4:
10 349 49 98 3 630 158,990 0 0 0 ' j^ gliders
.pflt. See "4?
11 1 Pro 41 82 3 306 138,620 0 0 0 .S-^liders
!p^. See 4:
12 349 4 4 1 21 14,475 0 0 0
13 349 19 38 1 147 68,240 0 0 0 0* rsug^ssful
1-4 3 B C 10 •o 4 450 0 0 0 0 0 f^K5iss.Bl7
14 349 4 0 4 8 13,596 0 0 0 0 p J eeps

l" 15
15
1 Pro 35
349 36
0
0
4
4
215
428
144,288
55,345
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Successful
Successful
16 1 Prc 9 0 AL24 49 34,331 0 0 0 0 Successful
16 349 9 0 ALZ4 128 15,826 0 0 o' 0 Successful
i 17 1 Prc 9 0 ALZ4 38 24,234 0 0 0 0 Successful
17 349 9 0 ALZ4 51 37,451 0 0 0 0 Successful
18 1 Pro 9 0 ALZ4 53 20,349 0 0 0 0 Successful
18 349 9 0 JLZ4 132 5,455 *. o 0 0 0 Successful
19 1 Prc 9 0 ALZ4 51 28,140 p 0 0 0 Successful
19 349 9 0 ALZ4 103 19,4S5 0 0 0 0 Successful
20 1 Pro 9 0 ALZ4 51 32,283 0 0 0 0 Successful
349 9 0 ALZ4 112 5,758 0 0 0 0 Successful
•

1 Pro 9 0 ALZ4 38 18,292 0 0 0 0 Successful

£ 349 9 0 , 125 7,940 0
:
0 0 0 Successful
22 1 Prc 9 0 ! 315 21,302 0 0 0 0 Successful
22 349 9 0 4 ; ] 99 23.,016 0 0 0 0 Successful
23 1 Prc 9 0 JLZ4 44 34,490 0 0 0 0 Successful
:
23 349 55 0 *• 4 7 0 14L.296 0 0 0 0 Successful
24 1 Prc 9 5 • 4 37=6,000 0 0 0 a I t . estimat
24 349 88 0 4 \ 33 : .4*7,147 0 , : ° 0 . 0 Successful
25 1 Prc 91 0 4 'i 86 ' ; 396,647 0 0 Wt. estimat
1
26 349 1 1 l ' 4 0 0 0 Glider snat
hospital, 4
^pass., pilo
-aud co-pilo
i ' - ' •
• v^uccessful
27 3 B C 10 0 4 60 66,000 0 0 0 "0
27 3 B C 9 0 $ 54 59,400 0 0 * 0 a
28 349 6 0 24 26,800 0 0 , <>•
0

828 242 6,461 ** 71 125 12 .3 1 I^S^pr

OR See Summary
B17s not in

MAKEUV2R ••iii
Report on Maneuver, 60th T G Wing, 2 4 - 2 7 Sept 1944 (continued).

(x) Remarks:

Serial if 4, Field 2 - 1 s t Provisional Group.

Paratroops drifted with stfong wind. This plus late jump cau

troopers to hit in trees. Air discipline of jumpers good, exc

jumping. ­
Serial # 5, Field 1 - 1st; ProvjLaiQrml Group.

Lt Clegg»s ahip did not &r»op paratroopers because he was not over ^ /-^

according to his opinion, Lt Burton said his paratroopers did not' hit,,«

drop field. ' .."

Five sticks were jumped pre-mature. ^.Ting man on one flight thought J^e &I

chute open and dropped on this false signal. Men on premature dr6p

landed in clearing approximately one mile from DZ. \

Air discipline of A/B personnel satisfactory in most cases, refusals

sickness, falling in door and fainting,

Serial y, 6, Field- 3 - 1st Provisional Gro&p.

316th T C Squadron, 1st Provisional T C Group.

Ship 063 - All troopers and packs back - five passes - too vague;

. Ship 405? ** .All troopers and loads back - door load jammed*

Ship 7&0 - 2 packs dropped, door load hung up - no troopers or load out.

Ship 180 - Salvo all packs accidentally, north of west Iiind. No jumps ­
Poor air discipline throughout - lights in cabins on,all the

way, observed in many instances. Air discipline at DZ very

bad. Five- planes made more than one pass at field, jixcessive

speed by leading flights of 317th Sq, Formation scattered,

corners cut enroute. Put 125 troopers and 21 artillery pieoes

on ground at DZ. Returned 34 troopers and 2 complete pieces

to base* Lost one piece north of Meat i£nd* Dropped 2 packs of

one piece on DZ.

317th T C Squadron, 1st Provisional Group.

Formation was not completed on time over field* Some elements.never

caught up with formation. These flew course by themselves. Lt. Rose's ship .

(h- 7B3) missing* According to reports from 12. pilots, a ship crashed at the

south end of DZ at 2038, 24 Sept 44, These 12 pilots said they saw fire at

point where plane crashed. After plane crashed, planes turned to left and

right, breaking their formation and causing a confused picture over DZ* Due

to this confusion, a number of ships did not drop paratroopers* Lt. Reusche

who flew right wing to Lt* Rose-said one element flew above Lt. Rose*s element

and dropped paratroopers in front of Lt. Rose's ship. Immediately thereafter,

Lt* Rose's plane spun out and crashed at south end of DZ 7/3• Lt* Rose did not

drop his paratroopers* $: paratroops and 4 crew members burned to death.

Radar at Hemp not working satisfactorily* ( see Report of Investigation,

Incl #1).

Serial #7* Field 2 - 349th T C Group.

Stick #26 had near collision which caused confusion on light . Green

light was not given with bell and jump master refused to let st

Many ships made more thaji one pass at DZ before men jumped*

Damage to A/C cargo door and removable frame.

A/C fr 292 - Pararacks1 failed to release.

Failure of formation lights on one

Serial ffi, Field ^ - 349th T C Group.

Stick ,/49 refused to jump. Jump master claimed that ship following %ere,­
tpo low and he was afraid of dropping into props. Three men injured w h e u V '

hit air pocket. Plarue ft 4315681 had its aileron fouled by equipment

dropped from above and made and emergency landing at Pope Field*'

, - 3 ­
Serial #?..» Field; 3 - 349th T C Grotip.

One glider damaged. Hit stump. No personnel injured.

Serial #10. Field 3 - ftffith T C Group.

One glider was released on take-off due to extreme wing which
was uncontrollable, No damage in landing. No personnel i n j
One glider cut off tow ship 3 to 4 miles out of Maxton. 1^..;
injured. v

Serial #11, JkLeld } - 1st Provisional T C Group.

2 gliders cut from^tow ships; one near west End and one, 7 miles',»
of Pope Field, tfb peftrofihfel injured.

#14 and #27 > Afcfr.4 - 3rtlBogfoier Gogtfnand.

B-17s from 3rd Bomber Cofiaaand completed 29 missions and hauled J>64 men
and 125,400 lbs of ammunition.

Dummy Drop
2 C-$$s dropped 36 dumR&es at 1915, 24 Sept, 2 j miles N& of MackaH
Smoke- spreen l a i d down at 1913 by 3 A-^2Os was excellent. 5&pke s t i l l
after dropping a© A/C l e f t objective on Return t r i p . All dummies landed i n
target area.

For the Commanding JQffie er^:

F. JACOBS,
, AC,
1 Incl: A-2.
Iiicl 1 - Rpt of Investigation.

- 4 ­
 317TH trnOOP CAliniEH SQUADRON COIalANDO JBP/jnp
1ST PRQV,ISIGKAL THCCP CAIffilEa GI1OTJP
CAI.SP FACKALL, ITpIJTH C

24

Report of Investigation of Aircraf-t

TO Commanding Officer, 1st Prov. Troop

Camp liiacka 11, . North Carolina.

Attn: Intelligence Officer.

!• The crash of plane number 783 occured over drop

f
D f
on the south end of zones E and F, (see diagram),

ing to report of LtJ Robert Heusche, right man to plane $£

and report of Lt, Howard Bennett, left wing man.

PDZ
% •

2. Time of crash 2038,

3. Lt» Keusches1 r e p o r t :
055. (load element)
776 X
176

783 (Lt. Hose) 999

X
109(Bennett) 295(Reusche) 775
X
M, 4 1-1 S I :.£
 MA H E V V E H

Lt. Reusche reported that an element of three ships was

approaching Lt. Rose's element from the left at an

20 decrees and flying at an altitude of 50 feet or

This unknown element then dropped paratroopers and >pa

in front of Lt. Rose's plane. In order to avoid the

ers Lt.• Reusche swung to the right and down underneath

nients in order to avoid paratroopers and parapacks. Tl

thing Lt. Reusche saw was Lt. Rose's plane nose into

at the south edge of f D ! field and burst into flames*

blance of formation over the field was broken, since pla

broke formation and flew to the right and left of course

order to avoid the paratroopers dropping from the element

4. Lt. Bennett's report is similar to Lt. Reusche's,

though not quite as extensive. Lt. Bennett said he saw pa

troopers dropping in front of Lt. Rose's plane. Both Lt. R

and Lt. Bennett swung to the left. The next thing Lt. Benn<

saw was Lt. Rose going dpwn at the south end of DZ 'D'

• • . •

5. According to Lt. Reusche's statement the paratroopers

in Lt* Rose's plane had no opportunity to jump.

6m ^he crew of plane number 783 consisted of the follow­

ing: Pilot: 1st Lt. Wayland W. Rose, 0757288, 2n& Lt* aeorge
J* mIfend, 0760440. T/Sgt. Victor L. Graves^ 1B06B142. S/Sgt
Myron K. Shnaper, 36649659.
7. At the time of t h i s report (0200) i n j u r i e s to the
crew and damage to plane has not been determined.
v For the Squadron Commanders

/ s / j o h n R, Perraro
A/JOHN R. PERRARO
1st L t . , AC
Intelligence Officer

^-­ gSmr'

WOT HETOU/JRTERS ' MCL/dcc

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRI2R T'/ING­
ASMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Fort Bragg

North Carolina

30 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Maneuver Report- A - 3 ,

TO : Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier 'Ting,

Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

1. Pursuant to directive from Task Force, the following report of

Maneuver completed 29 September 1944 is submitted.

2. Maneuver planning in this headquarters began during the first

week of September 1944. Preliminary conferences were held with the Air­
borne Center and additional conferences were held with all sections of

this headquarters.

3. / brief outline of the maneuver activities, requirements, etc.,

at this time did not afford enough information to submit definite plans.

Plans presented for consideration were*.

a. One hundred mile circuitous routes that would allow parti­

cipating groups to roach drop zonos.^r.iid' lending zones without interfer­
ence to each other.

b. Tine schedules that would allow the reinforced groups enough

time over rendezvous and drop zones and still stay in keeping with the

tactical requirements of a compact drop and glider lending,

c. Four or five days prior to D-Day would be used solely for

ground maintenance to enable groups to furnish all assigned aircraft for

initial lifts. Approximately 75$ of aircraft would be available there­

after.

d. Only -permanently assigned trained crews would be used in

double -glider tor: serials. Intensive training necossnry to oriontr.te roooiit­

ly attached crews with paratroop formations and drops in order to meet

Airborne requirements.

e. Two hundred CG-4A gliders could land in one G-LZ. Thirty-

eight CG4A and four CG-13 gliders could land in another. The main glider

landing zone was divided into six separate fields r.fter extensive study

of turf, obstacles, and approaches,

f. The Initial Point was chosen after it was decided that it

should be approximately 25 miles from target area ^nd be in r position to

-1­
allow a direct run into DZfs and GLZ's.

g. Navigational Aids would consist of Radar at the Initial

Point and all P D Z ' S end GLZ's. A radio beacon would be operative at

the I. P. Green fusees and flare pots placed in PDZ's and GLZ's. Two

Eureka sets would be available in each position in anticipation of mech­

anical failure.

4. The Maneuver Headquarters Field Order W P S received by this head­

quarters on 12 September 1944. Final plans were then agreed upon by the

13th Airborne Division and 60th Wing, Number of planes, gliders, DZTs

and LZ's, and special equipment necessary was determined.

5. The First Air Cargo Rosupply Squadron would handle all loading

and lashing of cprgo in resupply serials.

6. The T?ing Field Order was distributed on 17 September 1944. After

which, both groups were presented with all available information at a

T T
' ing Briefing.

7. The time and weather elements did not allow sufficient time for

simulated missions or final rehearsal.

OPERATION

1. Prior to the movement of the 13th Division, trained Pathfinder

teams wore dropped into assigned areas by Pathfinder crews on D-l.

2. Dummies were dropped in the designated area prior to the move­

ment of the 13th Division. A well layod smoke screen added to the de­
ception employed in using dummies.

3. The movement of the 13th Division was accomplished in the fol­

lowing manner in accordance with the corrected copy of the Air Movement

Table.

a. D-l DayS

(1) Serial #5, consisting of 29 aircraft of the 1st Prov­

isional Group, transported and dropped Paratroops in PDZ #1.

29 aircraft flew a Vees in trail formation. 5 of these air­

craft dropped their troops 40-60 seconds short of tho DZ.

All remaining Paratroop formations were flown in a Voc of

Vocs,

(2) Serial #6, consisting of 49 aircr&ft of the 1st Prov­

isional Group, transported and dropped Paratroops in PDZ

#3. A higher than forecasted wind end an overcast sky

caused some dispersion in tho trees West of tho DZ.

(3) Serial #7, consisting of 34 aircraft of the 349th Troop

Carrier Group, transported and dropped Paratroops in PDZ {f-2,

-2­
 (4) Serial #8, consisting of 42 rircraft of tho 349th Troop

Carrier G-roup, transported rnd dropped Paratroops in PDZ #3.

This drop was successful»

(5) Serial #9, consisting of 10 aircraft and 20 gliders of

the 349th Troop Carrier Group, were flown to GLZ #3. On

schedule, all gliders modo successful landings, with one

receiving minor damage, /ll airborne equipment recovered

and used*

b. D-Day:

(1) Serial #10, consisting of 49 aircraft and 98 gliders of

the 349th Troop Carrier G-roup, were flown to GLZ #3. Scheduler:

to arrive at the landing zone at dawn, this serial was delayed

two hours by inclement weather. Serial a complete success

with only two gliders being accidentally released.

(2) Serial jfll, consisting of 41 aircraft rnd 82 gliders of

the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group, were flown to GLZ

#3. Scheduled to arrive at the landing zone shortly after

dnwn, this serial was dolaved two hours by inclement weather.

Serial a complete success, with onlj two gliders being

accidentally released,

(3) Serial #12, consisting of 4 aircraft and 4 CG--13 gliders

of the 349th Troop Crrrier G r oup, were flown to GLZ #1.

Mission a success.

(4) Serial #15, consisting^of 19 aircraft and 38 gliders of

the 349th Troop Carrier G-roup, were flown to GLZ #1. One

hour after landing a tactical pickup was made. These gliders

were picked up administratively during the afternoon of D / 1

Day.

(5) Serial #14, consisting of 10 B-17Gfs of the 3d Bomber

Command, transported and air landed four hundred and fifty

Airborne troops. A formrtion of 4 C~47fs followed immediate­

ly with Airborne Control Officer and necessary equipment.

(6) Serial 7#15, consisting of 36 aircraft from the 349th

Troop Carrier Group and 36 nircraft nf the 1st Provisional

Group, landed at the enpturod airport. These formations

accomplished rendezvous with fighter escort.

(7) Serial #16,through Serial #23 consisted of eight 9 air­

craft flights of the 349th Troop Carrier G^oup and the 1st

Provisional Troop Carrier G-roup. Serial 7#23 closed tho 13th

Division, with both groups flying in single aircraft shuttle

runs.

-3­
 (B) Serial #24 covered the resupply of the 13th Division,

with both grouns flying single aircraft shuttle flights.

This serial extended into D / 1 Day only because of the

difficulties experienced in unloading supplies at the air­

head.

(9) Serial #25, consisting of 6 aircraft of the 349th Troop

Carrier Group, dropped supplies to a lost Battalion. Mission

a success with 5$ breakage.

INCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This maneuver demonstrated that Troop Carrier O r oups must have

the benefit of unit and. team training before executing missions, specif­
ically paratroop dropping.

2. Night movement by air bo employed only with the benefit of at

least a. half moon,

3. A higher percentage of troops were dropped into the DZ from a

Vees in trail formation. That V C G of Vees formation bo used only in

flights of small numbers.

4. Losses or casualties suffered in daylight movement by air should

bo compared with casualties inflicted by a widely dispersed night para­

troop jump.

5. The great number of casualties due io glider accidents wrs reduced

tremendously by the postponed double tow glider serials being fl6wn in

early morning light.

6. More and better Navigational Aids necessary in all night oper­

ations.

7. An Air Cargo Resupply Squadron affords insufficient strength to

accomplish the task of loading and lashing rcsupplies needed by an Air­

borne Division.

M. C. LE77IS

Major, Air Corps

Maneuver A-3.

WNDM SUPPLY 5c MAINTENANCE SECTION WRB/aaa

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field,

Fort Bragg, N. C ,

30 September 1944.

FSTTBJECT: A-4 Historical Data.

TO Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing,

1. On D Day all units of the Wing reported 100^ of their sup­

plies on hand.

2. This section supervised the issue of rations and gasoline

and ample stock of both of these were available.

3. The majority of D Day was spent in the Glider Drop Zones

working and coordinating the evacuation of gliders; also assisting

the Radar Officer, Lt. LeFleur, in locating radio beacons used in

the maneuvers.

4. Pope Field Depot cleared Glider Landing Field #3 of 20

gliders landing 2110 D-l Day. The gliders were clear of the field

by 0700 on D Day» Subject gliders were parked in and near the

wooded area around Glider Landing Field #3 Zones A and B.

5. One glider, belonging to the 349th Group, went down 4 miles

from Maxton on D Day and was retrieved by Pope Field Depot on D plus

1 Day,

6. On D Day, the 349th Group made one aerial pickup from Field

#1. The Laurinburg-Maxton AAB Depot towed the balance of the gliders

to one end of the field ready for pickup.

a. On D plus 1 Day, at 1135, the first pickup was made; 12

such pickups were made from #1 Field that day, the last one being at

1515.. No Glider Pilots were available after 1515.

* b.. The Laurinburg-Maxton AAB Depot dismantled 5 gliders on

D plus 1 Day and assisted in pickup at Field #1.

c. 24 gliders were retrieved by pickup from Field #1,

starting at 1020, finishing at 1700.

d. The Laurinburg-Maxton AAB Depot convoy left Field #1

with the five dismantled gliders at 1300 D plus 2 Day.

e. Glider Landing Field #1 was clear of gliders at 1700

D plus 2 Day, a total of 42 gliders.

7* The first glider left Glider Landing Field #3 at 1245 D

plus 1 Day. Groups retrieved gliders assigned to them. Approxim­

ately 90 gliders were retrieved from #3 Field by 1800 D plus 1 Day.

I 8. Pope Field Depot assisted Groups in moving rollaway gliders

to glider road and also put jetison gear on those with washed out

landing gear.

9. All gliders were rolled from Glidor Landing Field #3 to

Mackall Field.

10. At 1700 on D plus 2 Day there were 26 gliders on the field.

A-4 Historical Data, Cont*d.

11. At 1300 on D plus 3 Day, thero wore only 4 gliders left on

Glider Landing Field #3. Two of them were off the field by 1500

and the other two by 1600 D plus 3 Day. Total 196 gliders.

12. Two gliders from the 1st Provisional Group went down on

-D Day, one near West End, N. C , and the other near Sanford, N* C.

'These gliders are being retrieved by Pope Field Depot.

13. To speed evacuation of gliders by pickup there should be

better coordination between A-3 and A-4 as to the number of pickups

to be made, equipment that is to be used and ground station crows.

14. The 1st Provisional Group, having been put under shipment

orders, caused a delay in retrieving gliders assigned to them from

#3 Field.

15. Guard personnel for gliders in the field should be fur­

nished by the Groups, as the equipment is their responsibility.

16. Making pickups from #1 Field was delayed by Group personnel

by not having available Glider Pilots.

j 17. This section returned to home station on D plus 2 Day,

R
" E" MAYFIELD

'

A Lt. C 01« , A.u•,

(J Dir., Supply & Ma int.

-2­
 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARKI AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina,

2 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Maneuver Report on Glider Missions with 13th Airborne Division, ^

TO: Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina.

I. Source of Information,

The information contained in this report is based on answers to a mimeo­

graphed questionaire completed by each glider pilot ?/ho flew the missions.

This information was supplemented by umpire reports and actual observation by

the undersigned.

II. Data.

1. Briefing.

Generally speaking the briefings were considered adequate by all gli­

der pilots,

2. Loading.

a. Loading and lashing by the Airborne troops was accomplished very

satisfactorily in CG-4A gliders. Loading and lashing was accomplished by Air­

borne troops and in very few cases did glider pilots observe actual loading*

Loading was prolonged due to shortage of tail jacks. Interrogation of CG-4A pilots

revealed that some have not been properly trained in loading and lashing. All

of the CG-13 pilots revealed that they were competent to properly load CG-13

g3.iders. Airborne personnel have not had sufficient training in loading the

CG-13 glider.

b. Glider pilots experienced no difficulty in flying the loaded gli­

ders. The loads all seemed well balanced and handled well in tow and during

landing,

c. Load manifest, form "C2" was turned in to Group Glider Officer

prior to take-off, as required,

3. Take-offs.

The take-offs were excellent in every respect. The static hook-up

and take-off was especially outstanding.

4» Communications.

a. All gliders on both missions were equipped with interphone com­

munication to the tug ship. >

b. The 82 gliders lifted by the 1st Prov. T. C. Group did not employ

intercommunication.

c. The 349th T. C. Group did employ intercommunication. Intercom­

munication between CG-4A gliders and tugs worked in approximately fifty per­
cent of the cases. The four (4) CG-13's were equipped with intercommunication

facilities which worked perfectly throughout.

5. Lights and Field Markings.

a. No glider pilot had any difficulty in following the tow ship with

formation lights on,

b. Gliders kept their lights on after the I..P, due to the very poor

visibility.

- 1­
 Maneuver Report on Glider Missions with. 13th A/B- Div. dtd g Oqt 44 (Cont'd)

c. All glider pilots recognized their field, but were confused by

the number of excess lights in the field. These lights were caused by vehi­
cles belonging to observers and umpires,

d. The day landing fields marked with yellow bunting were recognized

by all glider pilots.

6. Equipment.

|
All gliders were equipped with Corey nose skids, decelleration chutes

"
and intercommunication sets,

7. Tow.

The tow was generally good. Mo excess speeds were encountered.

The spacing between the elements was somewhat ragged* Average height of tow

approximated, eight hundred feet above terrain instead of the required four

hundred feet. The tug run was a little too far to the right of the field.

8. Landing.

a. All gliders landed in or near their assigned areas. Generally

speaking, all gliders landing during daylight flew the pattern as briefed.

Very few gliders landing at night were able to fly the pattern as briefed due

to the confusing lights caused by observers and umpires; and due to the great

^
distance of the tug run from the field.

b. Only four (4) decelleration chutes were used and in those in­
stances were incorrectly used, resulting in tk\e glider pilot undershooting.

The glider flying proficiency of the glider pilots was above average and

therefor the decelleration chutes were not used. These glider pilots parti­
cipating in the maneuver have had very little experience with these deceller­
ation chutes due to the shortage of same.

c. The roll on landing was generally very short. The small percent­
age of damaged gliders is attributable to the slow landings and Corey nose.

9. Emergency Procedures.

Gliders were equipped with a very pistol, flares end fusees. All

pilots checked were familiar with their use,

10. Dispersal in Maneuver Area.

^
a. Night Landing Mission.

20 gliders took off

20 gliders landed in GLZ No. 3

b. Dawn Landing Mission

222 gliders took off

4 gliders made forced landings enroute. Of these 4 forced

landings 3 gliders were intentionally released by gli­

der pilots and the other was apparently an accidental

release from the glider,

218 gliders landed in GLZ's

11. Accidents.

a« There were no deaths or injuries attributable to glider acci­

k
dents.

b. Eight gliders out of 242 were non-flyable for the following rea­
son:

5 Damaged landing gears

1 Nose fabric damage
1 Tail surface damage
1 Aileron damage

- 2 ­
 Maneuver Report on Glider Missions with 13th A/B 3HT. dtd 2 Oct 44 (0t>ntM)

12, Evacuation.

a. The evacuation of the gliders from GLZ No. 1 was accomplished

satisfactorily by aerial pick-up.

b. The evacuation of the gliders from GLZ No. 3 was accomplished

by towing the gliders from the GLZ to Camp Mackall via glider retrieving road,

c. Both of the above evacuations were accomplished without inci­

| dent by the respective Troop Carrier Groups.

13, Tactical Pick-Up.

A tactical medical evacuation glider pick-up was made by the 349th

T. C. Group. This was accomplished one hour and twelve minutes after the

glider had landed. This serial was not properly organized. Insufficient per­
sonnel were present to move the glider into a feasible position for pick-up

necessitating the use of an administrative vehicle for towing.

14, Glider Pilot Ground Missions.

Glider pilots were assigned specific ground missions prior to take­

off. These missions should not. be assigned at this time. It is believed

that the glider pilot should remain with the specific troops he transports un­
til it is possible for him to be returned to his parent organization,

| 15. CG-13 Glider.

This was the first tactical use of this type glider. The loading

was accomplished by Airborne personnel who were not experienced with loading

this type glider. The CG-13 pilots proved, to be well trained in loading and

lashing. These gliders landed in their designated GLZ without incidente

III, Conclusion,

1. The briefings were adequate,

2, Loading was satisfactory.

3. Take-offs were excellent. The static hook-up is much quicker than

the feed-in type of take-off,

4, The present type of interphone communication is unsatisfactory.

^ 5. The field markings were satisfactory. The lighting system on field

f 3A would have been satisfactory if no other lights had been permitted in or

near the field,

6, The tug runs were generally higher and further out from the GLZ

than designated at the briefing,

7, The tactical pick-up was unsatisfactory due to lack of organization

and pre planning,

8, Glider pilots who remained with the personnel they transported ac­
complished much more than those assigned a specific mission prior to take-off,

9, The CG-13 gliders can be used tactically during daylight hours.

This glider can land in tactical areas if towed into these areas at between

eight hundred to one thousand feet above the terrain,

| 10, All emergency glider releases in training flights should be im­

* mediately checked for mechanical failure and if no structural defects noted,

glider pilot investigated.

11, The dawn mission was by far more successful than the night mission,

12. The 349th T. C. Group and the 1st Prov. T. C. Group performed their

glider missions in an excellent manner.

IV. Recommendation.

- 3 -"

 Maneuver Report on Glider Missions with 13*h &/B tit* dtd t Oa% 44

1, That loading and lashing training be emphasized more*

2, That the present type of intercommunication system be replaced*

3, That absolutely no lights other than those prescribed in the brief­

ing be permitted in or near the night GLZ's,

4» That training in the uso of the deceleration chutes be emphasized

as far as possible. • '

5» That tactical pick-ups be practiced by all tactical Troop Carrier

organizations,

6. That glider pilots remain with the personnel they transport until

the time arrives for the glider pilots to be evacuated.

7* That glider pilots be given a list'of required equipment for the

field* This list should be approved by the Airborne organization concerned,

A thorough inspection of each glider pilot should b§ made by his commanding

officer just prior to the pertinent glider mission to determine that the gli­
der pilot is properly clothed and equipped.

8, That further tactical experiments be conducted with the CG-13 gliders,

9, That all glider pilots having unnecessary premature glider releases

fcmeet a flying evaluation boarda

10, That large glider operations be conducted when the actual landings

will occur under daylight conditions*

11 # That schedules be so arranged as to allow all glider pilots to

supervise the actual loading of their gliders.

IL R,-BROWN, JR.,

ajor, Air Corps,

Supervisor Glider Tngf

- 4.-r

 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ABmT AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina,

1 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier

maneuver, September 1944.
TO : Commanding Officer, 6.0th Troop Carrier Wing, AAF,
Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

1. ilission: To establish, maintain and operate com­

munication facilities between Headquarters, 60th Troop Carrier

Wing, Troop Carrier Groups assignedd to the 6

6-Otli TC Winf, Maneuver

Headquarters and the 13th Airborne Division.

2« Personnel: Communications personnel for this

mission were as follows:

a. Headquarters, oOth Txoop Carrier wing.

(1) l?our (4) officers and sixty four (64)

enlisted men from the Signal Corps at pinedale, California.

(2) Six (6) enlisted men (Teletype Operators)

from the 35th Signal Bn, 22nd Corps.

b. The 1st provisional Troop Carrier Group and the

349th Troop Carrier Group were at T/0 strength in Communications

personnel.

3« Equipment; Adequate,.,equipment for all operations

was available, however the equipment shipped here for the maneu­
vers required an excessive amount of maintenance and repairs

before it could be used.

*+• R e s u f t s : The following report was compiled from

reports submitted by all Troop Carrier units participating in

the maneuver.

a. Telephone Facilities.

(1) Commercial telephone circuits were used as

trunk lines between HQ,, 60th Troop Carrier TJing at i/iazton AAB

and the following points:

Two (2) full time talking circuits to

Llaneuver Headquarters at Camp Llackall.

Two (2) full time talking,circuits to

Pope Field.

Two (2) full time talking circuits to

Lumberton.

(2) Telephone facilities in all units proved

very satisfactory, all calls were handled with very little delay

i at any time. Trouble of any kind over tiie telephone system was

r
nil.

(3) The switchboard at Signal Center of the

60th Troop Carrier Wing handled an average of fifty ($0) calls

per hour.

— 1 —

Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

(4) To establish, install and maintain wire

communications it was necessary to install trunk and local

circuits from the 60th Y/ing switchboard down to and throughout

the 13th Airborne Division switchboard. Commercial facilities

for the long trunks were available from the Wing switchboard

to the various departure fields and departing areas. The

commercial trunks"consisted of two (2) circuits to Camp llackall,

itwo (2) to Pope Field, two (2) to Lumberton, and one (1) to the

Laurinburg-Llaxton Army Air Base. Besides the field telephone

system in and about the 60th Wing Headquarters area, twelve (12)

commercial circuits were available to the base switchboard. In

establishing communications to the 13th Airborne Division bivouac

area, it was necessary to lay trunk lines five-miles long and to

Install two (2) switching centrals^ BALCONY and..BEEglVE. This

was" accomplished • by laying two (2) lines to the BALCOITT switch­

board and by use of a phantom obtaining a third trunk to BEEHIVE*

Results from the phantom were excellent. At BALCONY One (1) BP­
72 in parallel with a 3D 71 was used. Hunnimg from this board,

there were twelve (12) local lines plus a lateral line to the

BEEEIVS switchboard. One (1) BD-71 was used at BEEHIVE with

four (4) locals running from it. Due to the much activity in

this area, it was a major problem to the section to install and

keep the circuits in service. Even with the commercial circuits

vailable, the section installed over fifty (50) miles of wire,

'ransportation created a problem, as the section had one (1)

jeep and shared a twa-and-one-half ton truck. It is recommended

that at least two (2) jeeps and a two-and-one-half ton truck be

available for this type of work as much of the wire was laid

from the jeep.

(5) At the 1st provisional Troop Carrier Group

at Camp Llackall, two (2) trunk lines were laid between two (2)

BD-91 switchboards at Group Operations three (3) miles away, and

two BD-91 switchboards at Group KQ,. ^hese switching centrals

were connected by trunks to switchboards in the 3l6th TC Squadron,

342nd Airdrome Squadron and the 343 r ^ Airdrome Squadron, to pro­

vide field telephone communications between Group KQ, and all

units in five (5) squadrons. This telephone system was In opera­

tion D~5, and v;as run on a 24 hour basis Irom D-l to 0001, 26

September 1944•

(6) At the 349th Troop Carrier Group at Pope

Field, the Carolina Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co brought in

Two (2) lines from LLIAAB on 14 September 1944. These lines were

"connected to the Group terminals, 1 and 15 on the switchboard

BD-91-B which had connections to all Base telephones by two (2)

class "C" lines and to all Group field system telephones through

the switchboard extensions and the squadron switchboards. Tele­

phone communications with the BUGLE switchboard was opened on

15 September. Reception was clear and distinct. Some difficulty

was found in reception from the DUKE switchboard at Camp llackall.

This trouble was corrected by 17 September and communication was

normal. A line was connected, through the POYfDER switchboard,

to the 372nd Fighter KQ, at pope Field and was used by this organi­
zation extensively. The POVJDER switchboard was kept on 24 hour

operation, starting 0001, 23 September 1944 until 2200,30 September

1944.

(7) Telephone service was furnished the follow-

g units of the 13th Airborne Division In the Bivouac Area:

KQ,, 13th Airborne Division

515th parachute Infantry Regiment

88th Glider Infantry Regiment

32oth Glider Infantry Regiment

676th Glider Field Artillery

— 2 —

 Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

513th Signal Company

409th Quartermaster Company

3rd Platoon, 222nd I.ledical Co

Detachment of 4 Engine Cargo A / C (B-17)

f 441st Air Cargo R c supply Squadron

(8) Telephone service was furnished the follow­

ing, units at Lumberton:

458th Field Artillery Battalion

667th Field Artillery Battalion

103rd Evacuation Hospital

153rd Anti-Aircraft Battalion

120th Airborne Engineers

713th Ordnance Company

Detachment of Military Police

222nd Medical Detachment

b. Teletype-writer Facilities

fe (1) The teletype station was composed of five

^ (5) TG-78 printers and one (1) BD-100 switchboard. There were

two (2) lines to each of four (4) stations located at Camp

Mackall, Pope Field and Lumberton. One (1) line to- each station

was a private line; with the use of the switchboard, making pos­
sible a direct interconnection between any two (2) stations.

The other line to each station was made up to compose a confer­

ence circuit, whereby all stations could be called at once

without the use of the switchboard. The teiepype section had

an elaborate and efficient station setup but was not used to

its full advantage. The use ox the,.telephone trunk circuits

could have been cut considerably had the teletype been used .

more.

(2) At the 349th TC Group the Carolina Tele­

phone Co brought in two (2) teletype lines for teletype stations

PMM and PAC. These lines were brought in from Lsurinbur£-!.!£xton

Army Air Base on 15 September 1944 and were both used on a ground

return circuit,

W (a) At station PAC one of these lines was

connected to the 11-19 teletype. This line ran to the teletype

switchboard 3D-100 (BOP). No trouble was encountered in lining

up this circuit, on 15 September 1944 B17G sent two (2) messages

over this circuit giving us the station call signs. These were

the only official messages over this circuit until 22 September

1944 • However there was daily communication between stations

in the net to insure continued readable reception. After this

station was closed down and the net discontinued>at 0900, 28

September 1944, it (PAC) was used in the main for weather reports,

Some trouble was encountered on the line in controlling the bias

coming in to the I.I-19. This was corrected by adding 15 points

of spacing on the Maxton end of the circuit. Otherwise communi­

cations was uninterrupted on the circuit.

(b) The M-19 teletype had the sv;it onboard

tk BOP connected to line No. 1. The four Squadrons of the 349th

Group were connected to the 1,1-19 on line No, 2. These squadrons

each have a EE-97. This loop was used to retransmit ail weather

reports to^the squadrons and to carry on the normal communication

between the Group Headquarters and the Squadrons.

— 3 —

 Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944 Continued.

(c) At station HIM the other line was

connected to the ES-97 teletype machine. This line was in the

conference circuit, ("QST" conference call sign). This circuit

(was opened 15 September 1944 and communication was established

immediately. Until the first message bringing the station call

signs was sent, the abbreviation of the units was used for call

signs. ABTC, MA, GP and PO representing Maneuver Headquarters,

Llaxton AAB, 1st Provisional TC Group and Pope Field. This

circuit was widely used throughout the maneuver. Communication

was excellent at all times on the circuit. D&ily communication

was maintained so that the circuit was checked for accurate

reception. This station was used extensively in transmitting

mission orders from AB-TC Maneuver KQ, to the 372nd Fighter Group

and in transmitting reports from the 372nd Tighter Group to

AB-TC Maneuver HQ,. No trouble was encountered in communications

on this circuit at any tiaie. Communi cat ions on a 24 hour schedule

was continued after TC mission to carry on the maneuver communi­

cation for the 372nd Fighter Group at Pope Field in contact with

Maneuver Headquarters. As of the time of this report the tele­

;ype station HUM is still standing by for any messages from

rManeuver KQ, (Station DKQ,), awaiting notification that it has

been cut off to be replaced by a machine to be hooked up at pope

Field Base Operations.

(d) During the period of the maneuver

teletype stations BjQ$ and PAC handled 129 messages.

(e) Two (2) operators and a chief

operator were on duty at all times on this 24 hour schedule,

which bas broken into four (4) six-hemr shifts. These operators

were furnished by the scuadrons of the 349th Group. Three (3)

Group Headquarters men acted as chief operator.

(3) Two (2) teletype machines EE-97 were

installed at the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group at Lumberton

on 21 September 1944, and wore put into full time operation at

1300 B-2. Two (2) teletype machines. EE-97 wore installed at the

1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group EQ, at Camp Mackall and were

>ut into full time operation starting 0800, 22 September 1944.

(a) No difficulty was encountered with

teletype communications, except, one machine at the 1st prov

TC Group IIQ, at Camp Mackall which became inoperative at 2200,

24 September 1944. Cause unknown. _Machine was replaced.

c. Message Center

(1) The 60th TC Wing message center was offi­

cially opened at 0800, 21 Septexiiber 1944. This message center

operated 24 hours per day, for the entire period of the maneuver.

(2) personnel available for the message center

consisted of ten (10) clerks, four (4) cryptographers and three

(3) messengers, who worked on three (3) eight hour shifts. These

shifts included: One (1) Message Center Chief, Two (2) clerics,

tffcie (1) cryptographer and one (1) messenger. Foot messengers

^zor local delivery were furnished by the 13th Airborne Division.

(3) Motor messenger service was established

at the 60th TC Wing Message Center at Laurinburg-Maxton AAB to

leave every two hours and was operated on a 24 hour schedule.

Communications Report, airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver

September 1944, Continued*

(4) For the period of 21 September to 26

September 771 messages were handled by the message center.

Of this number 234 were incoming messages and 537 were out

going messages.

(5) It is recommended that for future

tions of this sort, a larger allotment of message center-

personnel be made. In operating a message center in three

shifts, each shift should be composed of the following: One

(1) message center chief, two (2) cryptographers, three (3)

message center clerks and two (2) motor messengers,

(6) It is further recommended that adequate

messenger motor transportatioj be provided for the exclusive

use of the message center.

(7) It is also recommended that all adminis­

trative distribution be made through the unit mail and records

sections and not through the message center. In the event of

heavy tactical traffic handling of this distribution would

.slow the message center down to the point of inefficiency.

(3) The message center at Lumberton, during

the AB-TC Maneuver was operated by personnel of the 1st provi­

sional Troop Carrier Group.

(a) This message center was officially

opened at 0930, 22 September 1944 and was operated on a 24 hour

basis.

(b) An average of twelve (12) outgoing

messages and eight (3) inc.ojmg messages were handled and

dispatched per day Of this figure only four (4) messages were

handled by Radio, The balance being transmitted and received

by Y.K.

(c) The 11-209 Converter was the only

device employed In encoding and decoding messages. Seven (7)

outgoing messages were encoded and three (3) incoming messages.

The messages transmitted and received by radio in code were

elayed due to garbled code groups, and this was due solely to

poor reception. Messages transmitted by TVDC were successful

In every respect. There was no delay in transmitting or

receiving.

d. Radio

'1) Prior to the air phase radio was not used

extensively since the distances between headquarters made the

use of commercial and field telephone and teletype lines feasible

However, once the air movement was underway and the division

employed had been ferried into the Drop Zones all tactical and

much administrative traffic was handled by radio. Considering

locations, power used, terrain between the stations and state of

training of personnel there was no great burden imposed upon the

section operating the equipment.

(2) Four radio nets were in operation during

the maneuver:

(a) Command Ket Lumber 1

i-s. tactical net which included forward

exhelon of the Airborne Division, the Troop Carrier Wing HQ, and

the maneuver Headquarters which acted as Net Control 'Station.

The equipment used in this net was one (1) SCR-499, with, the

- 5­
 CommunicatIons Reoprt, airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

transmitter remoted to a distance of one half mile. The whip

type antenna was used on a tower twenty feel above the roof of

a fifteen foot building. The base of the antenna was thirty

five feet from the ground. Erection of the tower was in

solution of a problem presented by insufficient radiation of

whip antenna when used by itself due to power lines and terrain.

Results achieved were satisfactory with the transmitter employed

at about half of Its potential four hundred watts of power. The

• eight of the'antenna seemed to offset the loss of radiation to

the ground.

(b) Command Net No 2

Command Net Ko 2 included the same

elements as Command Net Number 1. In this case one (1) bCR-133

was used with satisfactory results. No attempt was made to

remote the transmitter. The antenna was a half wave L type

suspended thirty feet above the ground. The signal monitored

at Camp Llackall hed a clear note and was of strength classed

as four on a possible maximum scale of five. No counter poise

was used.

(c) Point to Point Net

±i net establishc to be of tactical

and administrative use should other means of communication

between Headquarters become inoperative, The net which handles

very little traffic but gave good results connected the departure

fields at Lumberton and pope i'icld with maneuver Headquarters at

Camp Llackall and the 60th TC Wing Headquarters at Laurinburg-

Llaxton Army ^ir Ease. & radio station with radio personnel

was flown into the Drop Zone to set up a forward echelon of

the 60th TC Wing. •* '

At the 60th TC v/ing Iiq one (1) SCR-399

with the transmitter remoted to a distance of one half mile main*­

taincd contact with all stations. The antenna used was that

furnished with the equipment, without modification. It was found

necessary to locate the transmitter in close proxinity to high

powered electric lines to overcome a shortage of means of auxil­

iary power. The signals however were not dampened appreciatcly

and the station was heard by all secondary stations in the net

with a signal of four Intensity in a possible scale of five.

The forward echelon station was one (1) SCR-193 mounted In a

truck 1/4 ton 4 x 4 (Jeep).

(d) Ambulance Net

To assist in the dispatching of Medical

Units to the scene of aircraft crashes which flight occur during

the air phase of the maneuver a net was established to include

Wing Headquarters and two (2) mobile radio stations. These mobile

stations accompanied ambulances and personnel of the iiedical

Department.

The 60th Wing IIQ, used as a fixed

station the elements of one (1) SCR-299 which was issued without

.the panel truck or power.unit. This equipment was set up with­

"out rcmoting the transmitter. The antenna was a duplicate of

that used with the SCR-499, the same thirty five foot tower was

mounted on the roof of the communications center. Because of a

shorted filament transformer this transmitter never put out more

than sixty watts. Both mobile secondary stations were able to

copy the signal put out by this station in spite of swampy

terrain and impeding atmospherics.

- 6 ­
 Comnunications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

The signals from the mobile stations

were very difficult to read through static and station inter­

ference. Investigation of the personnel attached from an air

force group who operated these stations showed then to be un­

familiar with the'"equipment. The SCR-193's, because of improper

tuning, were not operating at maximum efficiency.

(e) Airdrome Control Station

VHH1 Radio was used for Airdrome

Control, all departure fields v;cre on the same channel. This

caused a great deal of interference as aircraft reported hear­

ing all stations at once.

Recommend in future operations that

all departure fields be on different channels.

Results however were very satisfactory.

All aircraft wore equipped with SCR"

522 VKF and correct crystals lor all four channels. VKF was

used for airdrome control and interplanc communications. Results

were excellent..

(3) The equipment used by the airborne Division

in both Command Nets was one (1) SCR-499 mounted in truck 1/4

ton 4 ^ 4 (jeep)* power was furnished by tow power units PE-75

mounted on the front and rear bumper assemblies and operated

alternately.

(4) The single call radio procedure intended for

use in the tactical nets of the 60th,., TC Wing was not strictly

adhered to by any single headquarters. Operators knowing the

importance of the traffic being handled made multiple calls

frequently. Their zeal to clear messages prompted the longer

call-up asking for traffic, otherwise radio discipline was of

a high standard and well preserved. After first hours of radio

contacts the average speed of transmissions increased from

twelve (12) to eighteen (18) words per minute. In all nets much

of the traffic passed was in clear text.

(5) Signal equipment available for issue at the

nearest signal supply depots was of poor quality. Of the four

(4) radio sets drawn only one (1) was in a condition for imme­
diate operation. Extensive repairs and overhauling were neces­
sary before placing most of the equipment to use. Constant

preventive maintenance w&s practiced along with careful operation

to prevent breakdown which would have impeded radio coxnmuni cat ions

e. Interphone Tug to Glider

(1) 311th Troop Carrier Squadron

(a) xill glider tow; ropes in this Squadron

were new and had new three conductor wire for interphone communi­
cation. The communication system was checked in all A / C and

gliders just prior to tcJce off, and found in good condition. In

',-vcry A / C after take off, approximately forty per cent (40$) of

ihc interphone systems were inpoerative. In the case of the lead

A/C of this squadron, the entire interphone cysturn was inoperative

until after the gliders were released.

(2) 312th Troop Carrier Squadron

(a) This squadron had eighteen .(.18) double

glider tows. All interphone systems checked just prior to take

off und were all operating. Two (2) pilots reported that both

 Communi cat ions Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued-

glider interphones cut out after take off, and two (2) pilots

reported that only one (1) glider couldn f t be contacted after

take off.

(3) 313th Troop Carrier Squadron

W (a) Interphone equipment vas complete

and operative before take off between the 18 tow planes and

36 gliders from this squadron participating in Serial No. 10.

Seven out of twenty fwo glider pilots have reported to date

that interphone went out after take off. Full figures will be

compiled by Intelligence. The strain of take off rendered

thirty three per cent (33$) ox more of the interphone equip­

ment inoperative. Consensus of opinion is that slack at the

ends is needed to reduce the ill effects of the strain of

take off.

(4) 314th Troop Carrier Squadron

(a) This squadron had eighteen (IS)

double glider tows. All interphone systems were checked just

prior to take off. After take off six (6) A / C could receive

^ the gliders, but could not transmit to them. One (1) interphone

system was completely out. Eleven (11) interphone systems

worked.

(5) Recommendations

(a) All signal equipment made available

for maneuvers should be in good operating condition when

received by maneuver units.

(b) Consideration should be given type

of terrain maneuver is to cover when assigning/equipment and

frequencies.

(c) All units should be equipped with the

type equipment they will use in the Theater of Operations, as

most personnel ncod more training In the operation and use of

this c quipment.

(d) All airdrome control at departure

should be on different channels to avoid interference.

(e) Recommend that one SOI be published

for the entire operation; this should come from higher Headquar­
ters or be issued jointly be all Headquarters taking part in

the maneuver.

f. Pigeons

(1) Pigeons were used to carry messages between

Camp Mac kail and Llaxton. Pigeons used covered this distance in

thirty (30) minutes.

(2) Results were very satisfactory.

£• Navigational Aids

(1) The radio navigational aids available were

limited to:

(a) Rebecca Eureka Homing System

(b) A low7 power Homing Beacon picked up

by the Radio Compass in the airplane.

- 8 ­
 Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Llaneuver

September 1944, Continued,

(c) , Flare pots and panels were used to

guide gliders to landing, zone.

(d) Green fuzces -were set out to indicate

wind direction in all Paratroop Drop Zones.

(e) The placemen.t of all visual aids

and the operation of Radio and Radar equipment was carried out

by pathfinder Teams of the Airborne Command.

(2) Equipment.

(a) Rebecca Eureka Radar Homing

(1,) Since the Rebecca Eureka Radar

provided the most accurate means of homing, it was decided to

place a radar beacon at each Paratroop Drop Zone, Glider Landing

Zone and at the I.P.

(2) There is a disadvantage in the

Rebecca Eureka systcn in thalf, a Eureka Beacon can only handle

,a limited number of aircraft equipped with the airborne rebecca.

(3) The clement leaders of each

serial are usually radar cquTppcd, the remainder of the flight

must" follow these leaders to the Drop Zone.

(4) In order to equip as many clement

leaders with radar as possible-, two Eureka beacons set on differ­

ent frequencies were used at the I.P. This allowed the use of

tvd.ee the amount of radar aircraft without saturating the beacon.

Saturation of the other beacons did not occur since the different

serials used different drop zones after passing the I. ,P,

(J>) Approximately one in nine air­

planes was equipped with radar in the more compact Paratroop

serials, One in six aircraft was equipped in the. glider serials.

A total, of thirty'seven aircraft were radar equipped.

(_6) By careful selection of fre­

quencies, four beacons were operated within a radius of three

*uiles without interference. Each beacon w-s coded for positive

identification.

(7) A new type beacon AN/PPN-2 was

used giving greater range ancf a stronger signal.

(b) M / C R N - 4

(l) This beacon is a low frequency

radio homing beacon designed for use with the radio compass in

the aircraft. It could not be used in quantity because the

batteries necessary for its operation were unavailable.

(c) Flare pots and green fuzees were used

to mark the night glider landing areas. A green fuzec was also

used during the dawn landings to mark the cut off point of the

gliders. Yellow flags were placed around the danger areas and

yellow panels laid out to mark the daylight glider landing zones.

(d) A "T" of five green fuzoes was placed

on each Paratroop Drop zone to point the wind direction.

- 9 ­
Communi cat Ions Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier maneuver,

September L944, Continued.

(3) Pathfinder Teams.

(a) The visual and navigational aids at

the Drop Zones, Glider Landing Zones, and at the I.. P. were set

up and operated by Pathfinder units of the 13th Airborne Division.

The responsibility for training these teams was vested in the

60th TG Wing Radar Officer.

(b) An Airborne pathfinder school was set

up in the 13th Airborne Division area, Camp Llackall. Units we re

given instruction covering their mission, navigational equipment

used, and proper placement of radio and visual aids.. One team

from the 88th and 326th Glider Infantry attended.

(c) The number of men in a Pathfinder

team depends on the amount of equipment to be use, the time re­

quired for placement (Oanels and flares for gliders), and the

number of sentries deemed necessary for protection.

(d) The following is a list of the Drop

Zones, equipment carried, and number of officers and men re­

quired for proper placement and operation.

{I) Drop Zone No. 1, Glider Zone No. 1

1st Battalion, 515th paratroop Inf

2 Officers, 14 enlisted men.

Equipment:

One (1) Radar Beacon AN/PPN-2

One (1) Spare Radar Beacon

Two" (2) Yellow Panels for

Glider Landings.

Green fuzces to mark Wind Direction

(2) Drop Zone No. 2.

2nd Battalion, 414th paratroop Inf

2 Officers, 9 enlisted men.

Equipment:

One (1) Radar Beacon AN/PPN-2

One (1) Spare Radar Beacon

Green Fuzces

(3) Drop Zone No. 3

3rd Battalion, 414th Paratroop Inf

2 Officers, 10 c'nlistcd men

Equipment:

One (1) Radar Beacon AN/PPN-2

One .(1) 'Sparc Radar Beacon

Green Fuzces.

(4) Glider Zone No. 3

326th Glider Infantry

2 Officers, 12 enlisted men.

- 10 ­
Communications-Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

Equipment:

One (1) Radcr Beacon AN/PPN-2

One (1) Sparc Radcr Beacon

Twelve (12) Flare pots

Twenty (20) Yellow Panels

Yellow Flags

G-reen Fuzees

equipment for Glider Landing

Zone Uo• 3, except the radcr beacons was packed in a parachute

bundle and kicked out the door over the Drop Zone.

(5) I. P.

33th Glider Infantry

4 Officers, 17 enlisted men

Equipment: • ...

Two (2) Radar Beacons A^/pPN-2

| Two (-2) Sparc Beacons

One (1) M / C R N - 4

One (1) Spare AN/CRN-4

One Llcdical Officer is included in

the four (4) officers since this unit would be on its own for

more than two days.

(e) Equipment

• (1) The complete radar beacon AN/PPN-4

is packed in a canvas bag, ve'lght 28 pounds. It requires only

one parachute to carry it. It can be set up in less than three

minutes. The Eureka beacon is operated by two man teams.

(2) The AIT/CRN-^ Beacon has three com­

ponent parts and requires three parachutes to carry it. Three

men can assemble this beacon in three minutes,

| (f) In order to insure close cooperation

"the Airborne Pathfinder and Troop Carrier Pathfinder teams

attended a joint briefing. Airborne teams also attended the

Troop Carrier briefing before take off.

(4) Results

(a) Rebecca Eureka

(JL) The rcbecca Eureka radar homing

gave excellent results. This can partly be attributed to the

training of the radar operators and the use of the new beacon

AIT/PPN-2.

(2) There was no interaction between

beacons although four were in operation within a three mile radius

(3) Operators reported only slight

'interference and a strong, clear and easily readable signal .

(4) The following table shows the

•eported range of beacon:

- 11 ­
Communications Report, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

349TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP "• 1ST PROVISIONAL TC GP

IP 15 Miles 500 Feet 15 Miles 400 Feet

IP 17 Miles 800 Feet 20-22 Miles 800 Feet

DZ #1 17 Miles 800 Feet 20*22. Miles 800 Feet

DZ #2". 20 Miles 800 Feet

DZ #3 17 Miles 800 Feet 18-20 Miles 800 Feet

GLZ #1 No Reception

GLZ #3 17 Miles 500 Feet 8-14 Miles 400 Feet

(j?) The 349th TC Group dropped gliders

et GLZ #1 the morning of D-Day. This serial was delayed two hours

because of weather. Pathfinder teams turned off beacon before

serial arrived.

(6) All beacons were identified by a

code letter transmitted twice" every 30 seconds. Coding was easily

readable.

(b) AN/CRN-4

(_1) The output of the AN/CRN-4 was too

weak to be picked up by the radio compass,

(c) Green Fuzees

(1) Five (5) green guzees set out in a

"Tt} to mark wind direction could not be seen from the air at DZ #3»

The lights on the field and the burning airplane may have confused

the pilots and obscured these fuzees.

(d) Pathfinder Teams

(_1) Pathfinder teams carried out their

mission in a commendable manner. Radar equipment was operated

most satisfactorily. Antennas were tied above the tree tops to

increase the range of the set. All equipment wa's returned to

Airborne Center, Camp Mackall by D+l. Glider lights, panels and

flags were placed correctly.

• (5) Conclusions

(a) Due to adverse weather conditions, some

aircraft lost their formation and were forced to find the DZ with

radio aids. In the future all aircraft should be able to use their

rcbecca radar equipment in such an emergency.

(b) Coding of the beacon is necessary for

positive identification. Code letter sent twice every 30 seconds

is sufficient.

-- 12 ­
 Communications Rcoprt, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,

September 1944, Continued.

(c) Racier operators end pilots should be

trained in estimating wind drift on the radar scope to eliminate,

as jiuch as possible, tlic curved flight path caused by homing on

the beacon against a strong side wind.

(d) Drop Zones for aerial resupply should

Ihavo a radar beacon for better accuracy in night drops.

(e) The Ai:/CRN-4 when functioning properly

can be used by all aircraft for homing. It can be easily detected

by enemy direction finder stations,

(6) Radar Lurcka Beacon AKr/PPN~2

(a) A new type eureka beacon, AK/PPN-2

was used in this maneuver. Six (6) beacons were set up and

operated and six (6) were carried as spares. This beacon can be

assembled in less than three minutes.

(b) Twelve (12) beacons were tuned ;.nd tcstc<

pTior to take off D-l. All were carried down b;; paratroopers, one

beacon wa's reported inoperative by the airborne operator and the

spare beacon was i.amedictely put in operation. Beacons were sub­

mitted to considerable jaring before being returned. Ten (10)

beacons were tested after the maneuvers. Seven (7) operated

properly and were tuned toothe proper frequency, two (2) operated

properly but showed a slight shift in the transmitter frequency

one (1) was inoperative.

(c) Radar operators reported signal strength

and .readability excellent.

(d) Exceptionallyy sharp tuning accounted for

()

ki
a few aircraft not picking up th
the bbeacon, however
h thi is a desir­
this d i

able feature. There were no reports of two beacons appearing on

the scope at the same time even though four (4) were in operation

within a radius of three (3) miles.

(e) The canvas bag in which the beacon is

packed is not suitable for jumping in its present condition. The

bag has a single hook at the top attached to three webbed straps,

he straps go entirely around the bag to support the weight. The

look is snapped on the front "D n ring of the parachute harness.

This allows the bag to hand down the right side of the jumper and

is strapped against the right leg to keep it from swinging. This

position is undesirable since all the weight is on the right side

causing<_; the paratrooper to fall off balance. At the insistence of

Lt Colonel VJELCEj Parachute Officer, Airborne Command, Camp Mackall,

the following modifications were made on the bag to make it suitable

for jumping.
[X] The single hook at the top was
removed.
(.5.) 0 n c i'i0°k connected to a webbed
strap was sewed diagonally across the top of the bag and an iden­
tical hook sewed in a like manner diagonally across the bottom so

^hat the bag could be turned on its side and hooked up to both left

right "D" ring on the front of the parachute harness.

O ) The.bag hangs just under the service

parachute. The weight of the bag is distributed equally across the

front of the jumper and is high enough not to restrict the movement

of his legs.

(4) The coaxial cable strapped on the

outside of the bag should be placed inside or a closed pocket sewed

on the outside to hold it,

- 13 ­
Cor^iunic.tions Report, airborne-Troop Carrier Llancuver,

September 1944, Contineud.

(£) The bag is quite bulky due to the

felt lining. This lining is unnecessary when the beacon is to

be carried down by a parachutist. A canvas bag with, padding only

where sharp corners portrude is sufficient.

(6) A single webbed strap was sewed

around the end of the bag an"cT buckled on top to give added support

5. All phases of Co^iaunications for this Llaneuvcr

were excellent.

"0 iilvIEo ' R • j

Major, Air Corps,

\7ing Coinmuni cat ions officer.

- 14 ­
 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Fort Bragg

North Carolina

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: Maneuver Report

TO: Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope
Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

1» Although not having received the maneuver field order

and annexes, 12 September, the liaison officer from this head­

quarters reported to the Commanding General, 13th Airborne Div­
ision, on the 4th of September,

2. A preliminary conference was held between Division

G-3 and liaison officer on the afternoon of 4 September. Dis­

cussion was restricted to the duties and functions of the

liaison officer in his present capacity,

3. The staff of the Division held a conference from 1700

4 September until 0230 5 September for the purpose of formulating

two specific plans to be placed before the General for decision.

Plans ?fA" and trB" were formulated as follows: After considerable

discussion as to the present strength of the division, as a whole

all computations for both plans were made on the basis of the

Division being 7&fo full strength, Basic policy was laid down,

that rather than to try to place numbers of troops at strategic

points, troops with adequate equipment and tactical organization

would be used, .after considerable discussion as to small de­

tails such as unit of fire and rations to be carried by each

soldier, amount of resupply to be taken in on initial landings

and priority of units in landings, the conference settled down

to the formulation of Plan " A " • Parachute coiubat team of Plan

"A" will be composed of the following:

0-47 CG-4A

515th Prcht Inf 90 0

45Bth " F.A. Bn 45 0

"C" Eng Co. 7 0

222d L'ed PH 8

The glider combat team of the Division will not be

laid forth here, because Plan "B" was selected as being the

most tactically sound.

4« The parachute combat team of Plan "B" is the same as

Plan "A", The glider combat team, however, is composed of the

following:

CG-4A
1 Gl I n f . 3 . "31
1 Gl F . xi. B. 59
1 Gl Eng. Co, 9
1 Gl Med. PH. 14
Div, A r t y . Hq. 5
D i v . Kq. & Hq* 9
Supply F . A . Amm. 15
1 B t r y AT. 17
JM
5« The total of 180 CG-4A* s will carry the glider combat

team. This figure when added to the 20 gliders which will take

the administrative vehicles of the parachute combat team, brings

the gliders to a total of 200. The required number of C-47!s to

close the Division is listed as follows:

• - 1 ­
Maneuver Report dtd 2 Oct 44 (Cbnt»d)

- . CG-4A
Div Arty (Hq & Hq Bn) ' 5
Div Hq & Hq Co a
Gl Iitf.Regt- (2 Rifle Co»s) 86
Gl Inf Regt 92
Eng Bn (Less «C" Co) 26
AA-Bn 64
Sig Co 3
Med Co ' 30
Qt£ Co 30
Qrd Co 15
IIP PH 3
Svac Hosp1 (Take off from Lumberton) •ja.
400
ir
6 . Resupply f o r both Plan AH and P l a n n
B H i s t h e same and i t e m i z e d i n
t h e f o l l o w i n g manner:

Ammun 334 A/C Loads

C Rations 29
Gas . ' 19
Sig 8
Evac Hosp 5
Chem War 1
Eng 10
407
7. The condensation of both Plan "A" and Plan "B" which gives an over­
a l l picture of the two plans is submitted as follows: j

T
a. Plan "An - 150 C-47Ts will carry the parachute combat team. 180
CG-4A s will carry the glider combat team. The remainder of the Division can
be closed with 350 C-47 loads* Resupply for Plan HArf can.be carried in- 400
aircraft loads. .
b. Plan rtB" - 150 C-47fs will^carry the parachute combat team, 180
CG*-4A*s will carry the glider ccmbat team. 400 C-47 loads'will close the r e ­
mainder of the Division. 400 C-47 loads will carry the additional resupply
for Plan "B". In both plans consideration has been given to the fact that 10
tugs and 20 gliders vd.ll carry the administrative vehicles of the parachute
combat team, bringing the glider t o t a l to 200 CG-4A|s and 4 CG-13fs.
8. Resupply breakdown: .
Ammun,
tyl 264 tons . ' 108 A/C
264 tons 108
172 tons 71 \
160 tons 66
~W~A/C
Rations & Gas

D/-3

Erifi.
, D/l 10 A/C

^ 2
D/2 2
D/3 • - . 2
D/4 J

Chem.
"T55 l A/C
Maneuver Report dtd 2 Oct 44 (Cont*d)

Med.
D/1 1 A/C

Evac Hosp*.
D^l 5 A/C

Amman. 353 A/G

R a t i o n s & Gas 48
Eng. 10
Sig. 8
Chem. 1
Lied. 1
Evac. Hosp.

9. The Liaison Officer recommended that the Commanding Officer of the

Aerial Resuppljr Squadron set up his Resupply Loading Table by the day. Item­
izing all items that are desired for D/i, D/2, etc. However, if on D/l we

are able to haul D/l's table as well as D/2 and D/3 it is O.K.

10i Notes on resupply.

a. The Division will be satisfied if the complete resupply loads

of 400 aircraft are landed on D Day or on any other day thereafter. However,

in the breakdown of the loads, a proportion of the loads in parallel with" the

number of loads per item is desired. The Troop Carrier Liaison Officer will

secure manifests for the resupply loads.

b, Emergency resupply of one battalion by air was set up as fol­

lows: Resupply of 1 battalion, 4 days, 700 men, ammunition and C rations

will take a total of 40 aircraft. Resupply of 1 battalion, 4 days, 400 men,

ammunition and C rations, 37 aircraft. (NOTE: Basis for these calculations

was 2700 lbs per aircraft. However, the resupply of these battalions will

be recomputed on the basis of 500 lbs per aircraft and requirements resub­
mitted to the Wing.)

11. A breakdown plan for take-offs as per plan "B" was given to the

Division Staff by the Wing Liaison Officer merely for the purpose of staff

planning. The proposed plan is itemized as follows:

515th 90 A/C T/0 Maxton

458th 45 A/C T/C Lumber
»C" Co & 222 15 A/C T/0 Maxton
40 A/G - 80 Lumberton
50 - 100 Gl Maxton
Gl Inf Bn 51 llaxton
FA Bn 59 Lumberton
Eng Co 9 Maxton
' Pit 14 Maxton
Btn Bt 17 Maxton
Div Arty Hq 5 Lumberton
Div Hq & Hq 9 Maxton
Resupply (Aiumm) 16 Lumberton
180 A/C

12. The Liaison Officer spent from 0900 to 1700 5 Sept with the 60th

Wing briefing and discussion with Wing Staff both plans as set forth by the

13th Airborne Division. From 1900 5 Sept to 0300 6 Sept Liaison Officer

again attended a conference of the Division Staff in which they presented

the two plans to General Chapman for his decision as to which plan was to be

used. The General decided to use Plan "Bn and requested that the Liaison Of­
ficer also serve as an Air Officer on the 13th Airborne General Staff; and

that he make a survey of available fields for paradrop and air landing of gli­
ders. Recommendations were made v/ith regard to the number of fields to be

used, probability of Troop Carrier capabilities, etc.

13. The following items are examples -of the type of information desired

by the Division Staff; »

a. What tug will pull the CG-13*s? Answer: C-47*

- 3 ­
Maneuver Report dtd 2 Oct 44 (Gont*d) '

b. What are load limits on the CG-13? ' Answer: 6000 lbs, including

two pilots,

c, Airborne Command requested serials of 45 aircraft to finish clos­

ing the Division. Answer: Serials of 45 A/U not desirable.

d» The Division requested two serials from Maxton, one serial from

Pope, one serial from Lumberton. -Answer: Two serials to be run from Maxton

and Lumberton. Pope will not *be used. .

.
• • ' ' '

e. The Division stated they could load in 30 minutes, unload in 15*

f. Gave the revision a figure of 4 hours per serial per 45 aircraft

formation* However, will inform the Division that all serials for closing the

Division and resupply would be in single file, 15 second intervals that will

consume a period of 2 hours and 5 minutes per round trip*

g. Division requested that Ha jor Tomes coordinat e with them on mat*

ters of communication*

h. The Division Staff asked me the situation in regards to air sup-f

ply. Answer: Gave them complete air supply picture.

i. Availability of ramps and para-racks. First got their number

requested, then gave them our allocation. •

j, Loading officers for the Division will check all loads in tugs

and gliders but do not want to interfere with pilot*s responsibility for the

proper loading.

k. Division requested what type forms they vjould be.required to

submit for loads on gliders and tugs.

• V

1. Path-finder teams will be briefed by Troop Carrier personnel

after both headquarters have moved to Maxton on the 21st or ,22nd. By the

same token, at the same time, the Division will brief Troop Carrier glider

personnel.

m. The Division requested to know who would furnish additional

personnel needed for traffic control on the departure bases, .Answer; Divi­
sion will be required to furnish personnel for traffic control in proportion

to the number of their personnel per base.

n. Has Maxton been alerted to the possibility of actual casualties

being given them during the maneuver?. Answer: Not as yet but they will be

very shortly.

o. It was requested by both the Division Staff and the Wing Lia­
ison Officer that the communication and operations personnel decide on one

definite signal to be used in an emergency by both units. Answer; Red

flares and fusees will be used as emergency.

p. The Division requested the opinion of Troop Carrier in re­

gards to the pilots ordering equipped paratroopers to>jump whqi a crash

landing is imminent, provided the circumstances will permit a jump. Ans­

wer: See no reason why Troop Carrier personnel would not order paratroopers

to jump under allowable conditions and that we would remind pilot personnel

of this fact.

q. The Division requested if Troop Carrier • wanted to place any

safety precautions on live aranunitibn. Answer: No restrictions given.

r. Ihe Division requested that glider pilots be furnished 2-1/3

K or C rations for the maneuver.

14. The Liaison Officer attended all the conferences of both head­
quarters and served as Liaison Officer for both until the 18th September

when Lt. Hopper from the Division was assigned to Wing Headquarters.

* • 4 • * ' • ' . - < " - . ' • •.' ';••-• ' -''•

Maneuver Report dtd 2 Oct 44 (ContJd)

15b Upon the movement of both the Division and Wing Headquarters to

Maxton the liaison duties become substantially easier,

16. Complete cooperation was secured from the Division Staff during

all phases of the maneuver,

17• Recommendations.

a. That for any tactical operation a highly reliable man be assign

ed from Troop Carrier to Airborne units concerned.

b» That the .Airborne units concerned likewise select and assign,

sufficiently early in the planning, an officer to the Troop Carrier Headquar­

ters. . ' • ':

c* That the .Airborne Unit also send a reliable liaison officer to

each of Troop Carrier*s departure bases and forward airdromes.

J/iiES A. m CULLOUGH,

Maneuver Liaison Officer.

 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Field, Ft Bragg,

North Carolina

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: Maneuver Report —Airdrome Control Officer, •

TO : Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope Field, Ft Bragg, N.C.

1. Summary of Operations at Camp Mackall, North Carolina.

a. Control party arrived at Camp Mackall 1305 26 February 1944, Control of

traffic was carried out "by use of jeep equipped with radio facilities. Control

of traffic was moved to the regular control tower at 1415.

b. Operating from the control tower, traffic was carried on until 1300

27 February 1944. At this time control party turned Camp Mackall Airdrome

over to base operations.

c. At approximately one hour before darkness a message was sent to 60th

Wing Headquarters requesting what time flying was to be called off. Answer

received stated operation to continue. Resupply continued until 1200 J3? Sdpt.

1944.

d. Accidents;

(l) C-47 #42-100489 landing gear folded while landing at approxi­

mately 2300 S6 February 1944. No injuries to the crew.

2. Recommendations:

a. More coordination needed between control officer and unloading crews.

In this respect the officer in charge of these unloading crews should be in

constant contact with control officer, -%s

b. Control officer should give instructions to crash trucks and am­

bulances drivers immediately upon arrival at field. Instructions should con­
tain what to do for all types of accidents should they occur.

c. A better method should be devised to facilitate parking of airplanes

during night operations.

d. A better method should be devised for keeping a record of aircraft

arriving and departing. Method used was not adequate due to the number of

aircraft used and inexperienced personnel assigned to this job,

e. As a whole radio control of landings and take offs was good. It is

felt more cooperation between pilots and the controller can be obtained. !This

should be accomplished by instructions given to all crews in the first pre­

liminary briefing,

f. Much difficulty was experienced by radio contrdi of aircraft at Camp

Mackall due to all fields used were on same radio channel. It is recommended

that different channels be used for each field in the future.'

SHANK C. CHURCH,

Major, Air Corps,

Airdrome Control Officer.

 BEADQUtlfffEES
SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING
Office of the Surgeon

Pope Field, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina,
25 September 1944,

SUBJECT: Report of Medical Section - Maneuvers,

TO: Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope F i e l d , Fort

Bragg, North Carolina.

1. The functions of t h i s s e c t i o n during maneuvers -ere divided into

those of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e nature xh ich wouId not e x i s t in an a c t u a l opera­
t i o n of t h i s type in an a c t i v e t h e a t r e of war and those functions of a
t a c t i c a l nature which would be required of t h i s section in an a c t i v e t h e a t r e
of operations. While t h e combination of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t a c t i c a l func­
t i o n are not a burden t o Wing Staff they do deprive t h e group and squadron
medical personnel of r e a l i z i n g t h e f u l l t a c t i c a l value they are deserving
of• I t i s suggested t h a t in the future any moans t o lessen the a d m i n i s t r a ­
t i v e functions of t h e groups and squadrons and increase the t a c t i c a l
functions would be of a g r e a t e r v a l u e .

^* functions of an Administrative Nature«

a. Ambulance coverage along l i n e s of F l i g h t D-l and e a r t y D-Da^r,

(1) Organization.

Ambulance coverage for a l l g l i d e r and parachute .oarrying

missions was provided by establishment of two (2) roving ambu­
lanoo u n i t s covering outposts and t h r e e (3) ambulance u n i t s
which covered departure f i e l d s . A l l points on lines of f l i g h t s
on missions on D-l and D^Day were within about twenty-five (25)
miles of a radio and/or telephone c o n t r o l l e d ambulance outpost or
an army a i r base a l e r t e d for possible emergency c a l l s . The
coverage was provided primarily as an a d d i t i o n a l safety f a c t o r
in an overland maneuver of t h i s s o r t in friendly t e r r i t o r y •
P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n was d i r e c t e d toward adequate coverage
of t h e g l i d e r towing s e r i a l s because of the prospect of p r e ­
mature or a c c i d e n t a l r e l e a s e s .

The ambulance outposts consisted of four (4) ambulances,

cmo (1) r a d i o joop (SCR 299), tv/o (2) medical o f f i c e r s / oight
(8) n o d i c a l e n l i s t e d men, and omcrgonoy equipment ouch as orr.sh
t o o l s , crash 3 p l i n t u n i t s , pla.sr.xi, norphinc s y r c t t o e , ' l i t t e r s ,
blankets, otc.

(2) Operation*

(a) Communication.

The system of communication with ambulance outposts

worked well* During CPX p r i o r to maneuver, voice communi­
cation by r a d i o was poor. CW communication by r a d i o during
a c t u a l maneuver was more s u c c e s s f u l . Communication by com­
mercial and f i e l d telephones proved even more r e l i a b l e than
t h e radio communication. This cannot be stressed too much
for r e l i a b i l i t y from the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e viewpoint.

(^ ) Actual Service Render ed.

There was very l i t t l e occasion t o c a l l upon tho ambu­

lance o u t p o s t s . Although four (4) of the g l i d e r s did not
reach the drop zones, t h e r e were no i n j u r i e s sustained dur­
ing the force glider, l a n d i n g s .

-1­
Report of Medical Section - Maneuver, cont f d.

2. a. (2) (c) Conclusion*

In spite of the l i t t l e actual employment of these

ambulance outposts it is felt that they were worth while.
In an operation of this sort the possibility of serious
accidents are a lna.ys present. The ready availability of
medical aid is desirable both from a practical standpoint
and from a psychological standpoint with regard to tho crews
and passengers flying such mission,
(3) Functions of a Tactical Nature.
(a) Air Evacuation of Casualties.
It was planned t o evacuate approximately two hundred
fifty (250) tactical casualties by a i r . Every plane landing
at the air-head was prepared t o evacuate six (6) l i t t e r
casualties using l i t t e r bracket or web strap l i t t e r support
installations. At the time of departure of tho air evacua­
tion unit only throe (3) tactical casualties wore tagged
which did not warrant the using of the air evacuation unit.

(b) Property Exchange.

No medical property exchange occurred between Troop

Carrier and Airborne.

(c) Night Vision Aids.

Instruction in the importance and methods of obtaining
and maintaining dark adaptation were given to tug and glider
pilots by unit surgeons. Red goggles were issued to a l l
pilots. Although take-offs were accomplished in day light
the value of night vision aids cannot be over-emphasized.
(d) Pilot Rost,

Pilot rest was also discussed during briefings by unit

surgeons to tug and glider pilots. A maneuver of this
short duration however did not exert too much of the pilots 1
energy but nevertheless is an important factor in an actual
theatre of operation.
(e) Unit Medical Care and Sanitation.

Unit dispensary service for the Airborne troops on

bivouac at Lumberton and Maxton was provided by the 60th
Wing. Sanitation for Airborne unite and Troop Carrior
Command squadrons was the responsibility of unit commanders
and followed S.O.P,

It is believed that dispensary service would be im­

proved for the Airborne personnel if the Air Corps Y/ere to
supply an adequate number of strategically located and equip­
ped ambulances on the line and by having the unit surgeon
bring casualties to the dispensary at that point. This
service should be continuous for six (6) hours prior to
departure of the unit.

(f) Statistics, (possibly subject to minor changes).

(l) Number of actual casualties.
(a) Air Corps - Four (4) deaths associated with
paratroop landings resulting in
crash of plane.
(b) Airborne - Nino (9) deaths (eight (8) associa­
ted with crash in C-47. One ( l )
death attributed to parachute land­
ing.
Report of Modioal Section - Maneuver., contM.

2. a. (3) (£) (l) (c) Not associated with air Activity. ' ,

(1) Air Corps - none

(2) Airborne - Deaths -none

Inj ur ie s - f orty-tvro (4 2).

(d) Associated xvith parachute landings.

(1) Air Covps - none

(2) Airborne - Deaths - one (l) (included

in par (l) (b)

Injuries - seventy-five (75)

(e) Associated with glider landings.

(1) Air Corps - none.

(2) Airborne - none,

(f) Associated with tug forced landings.

(2) Tactical Casualties (evacuated by a i r ) .

Air Corps - none.

Airborne - none.

(3) Number of Airborne personnel delivered by Air Corps,

(a) Dropped by parachute

(t?) Landed by glider See Intelligence

Report
(c) Landed by plane
T ota 1

(g) Conclusions and Recommendations.

(1) More frequent meetings of the division and wing
surgeon would afford each surgeon of a better knovr­
ledge of the work of these a l l i e d operating u n i t s .
(2) Demonstration of usable nature of night adapta­
tion aids was not accomplished as the early serials
were run at dusk and the glider serials were post­
poned to daylight take-off because of unfavorable
weather.

Equipment* Medical supply pools have boon

established at Pope and Maxton. TCC units p a r t i c i ­
pating in maneuvers, drew required supplies direct
from these pools as they aotually would be required
to do from depots in a theatre of operations.

For the Surgeon:

i s t L t , MA.C.
 HEADQUARTERS

SIXTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING

ARMY AIR FORCES

Pope Fie Id

Ft. Bra&*, N.C.

ST A TISTIC\L REPORT
• AIRBORNE-TROOP-CARRIER COMBINED MANEUVERS
24-26 S12PTEMBER 1944
1. The pa&es which fallow p r e s e n t soas of t h e b a s i c s t a t i s t i c s
of t h e maneuver j u s t completed, A c t u a l f i g u r e s a r e shown i n
t h e column on t h e l e f t of each s h e e t , and t h e numbers are
graphically presented in charts on the right half of the sheet.
The same information is also presented, for purposes cf
comparison, on Maneuver "Bandit", conducted in December 1943,
and Maneuver "Cutthroat", conducted in January 1944.
2* In considering the comparison thus presented, i t should be
noted that different conditions prevailed in the three
maneuvers. Both the time of year and tiie time of day were
different, which would naturally have some effect on the
results,
3* Figures do not include 29 missions run by B-17Ts of the
Third Bomber Command, in current maneuver.

4
Richard £. MacFarlaiTd/" Cattain,
S t a t i s t i c a l Officer
60th, Troop Carrier Wing.
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 APPENDIX

1st Provisional Group Report

 ^S'- T ^ GX^L 5 ITo GAIiOLVlIA

VOD 2 2 Sevitember 1 9 4 4

F I 3 L D OPDEPuS)
ITO 4)

Mar>st 1/500,000 - Sectional Aeronautical Chart, dated 6 April 1944, GhME£tiff|

^ 1/500,000 - Strrtegic Map, Charlotte Sheet, 2nd Edition 1944 G ^

l/l5,000 - Photomosaic, Mackall - West 3nd Area (8 sheets) ••- - ^

1. a, (l) See Intelligence Annex #1.

(3) See Intelligence Annex #1.

v
b, (1) Friendly Ground Situation:

(a) 31ue forces consisting of 11th Infantry Division strengthened

"by the 100th Infantry Division i s expected to relieve t h ^ ^
l3th Airborne Division in the vicinity of H0P7TU1T by D %
plus 4,

(2) Friendly Air Situation;

(a) The 349th Troop Carrier Group operating from MAX . TON airdrome
will l i f t units of the 13th Airborne Division simultaneously
with this Group,
(b) The composite tactical group, 3d Tactical Air Defense, will
furnish fighter cover for i n i t i a l landing serials on D~day,
(c) B~17 units may be used in aiir landing serials on D and D-plus
days.

(d) A unit of the 311th Photo Wing will be available for aerial
reconnaissance and photography from the 60th Troop Carrier
Wing Headquarters,

2. The 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group will perform a mission of fifteen
(15) sGj;ta'.;.s "beginning at 1838 on !D~1,
The Is^ Provisional Troop Carrier Group vv.Vi.1 furnish sufficient aircraft,
glidersi. and combp-h erews to carry out v'lis mission. The mission con**
* s i s t s of two \2) pathfinder s e r i a l s , two (2) para,drop and pararack
• s e r i a l s , one (/i) double tow glider s e r i a l , and ten (10) a i r landing and
resurroly serinle*

Time Schedule:
Take Off; For s l l serials: In accordance with Operational Air
Movement Table, Annex 42, 7. 0» #4, 1st Provisional
Troop Carrier Group,

Route CT/*); • ' C y ^ i a ^ i S i - . ]£>!•& '•' JJ **yAY5WrB7ILLB'«"'.SA3JP0BI) »• HUMR

i'urlsf. %,-- OTB7HT0N - SVir^TT^ILLS « SANPOHD ­
Jer:~h' 45 •- MAXIM - SWY^T^VILLE - SANKlRD - H^MP «
W2' § ^ - SANFOHD ­

-ial, #15 .throu^i #24 « LTJI^BSRTON ~ WHITBVUi1?! ­

ALZ#4.

W Route Back: S e r i a l # 3 - PDZ-ft - LUJCB3RT01T,

^ i i ^ , $k - P^ z #2 - t u r n i n g p o i n t ( 3 4 ° 59» N - 79° £L* w)
LUifflURTON.
Sexlrj., #.5 - PDZ#1 ~ LATJR3L HILL - LTJTe^TON.
i e j ^ i . #6 - PDS#3 « t u r n i n g p o i n t ( 3 4 ° 48* ¥ - 79° 31* W)
LUlffl^^TON, *
411.*- G I' Z ^3 - turning $ o i n t (35° 00* N - 79° 32* W)- &&
LUiaSRTON, \
S e r i a l #15 through #2^ - ALZ#4 ­
Group Assembly: All Group and Sq.ua.dfOn formations: In accordance with

Training G-uide #11 keadquarters First !Eroop Carrier

Command, dated 17 j^pril 1944, with the exception that

2500! will be maintained "between Squadrons in Group

formation*

Initial Point! H3MP.

Axis of Serial #5 - 180° mag.

j g l . . #4 ~ 175° mag.
g
i °
Serial # i - 180° mag.
Serial #6 - 177%° mag.
Serial #11 - 177^
Serial #15. through 303° mag.

Method of Dropping! Serinls #3, 4, 5, and 6 will fly course a t l4p

miles per hour indicated a i r speed, 800 feet above
terrain. Standard Operating Procedure, Training
G-uide #11, Headquarters First Troop CarrierJ|jjunand,
17 April 1944 will be followed with the exc«fption
that a fifteen (15) minute warning will toe
to the Jurapmaster verbably by the pilot th]
the crew chief.
Serial #11 will fly course at 105 miles per hour
indicated a i r speed 400 feet alaove terrain. The
gliders will release at 400 feet above terrain*
The return route will be flown at 140 miles per hour
I n d i c a t e f i r speed, 800 feet above terrain dropping
ropes at LTMB35RTON. (Hope drop area at LTJMBERTON
to be given later)
Serials #15 through #24. All a i r landings and IB­
supnly flights performed on D day will be flown a t
140 miles per ,fcour indicated a i r speed 400 feet
above terrain,,
Serial #3 - Pathfinder: The 318th Troop Carrier Squadron Commando
will furnish one (1) aircraft and one (l) combat crew. See
Operational Air Movement Table0 Annex #3, P. 0, #4, 1st Provisional
Troop Carrier Group,

,^ ?aJCi5^SE T l l e <^6th Troop Carrier Squadron will furnish

one (l) aircrnft and one combat crew. See Operational Air Movement
Table$ Annex #2, Po 0o #49 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group.

Serial #16, - Mi* I^ndins:. and Hesug^L'^T' T ^ e 316th Troop Carrier Squa.dron
will furnish nine (9) aircraft and .line (9) combat crews, See
Operational Air Movement Table t Annex #2, 3T. 0* #4, 1st Provisional
Troop Carrier Group.
Serin! #4*31 - M i Landing an,d ResupTDlyt The 317th Troop Carrier Squadron
will furnish nine ^S) aircraft and combat crews. See Operational
Air Movement Table, Annex #2 t P. 0. #4, 1st Provisional Troop
farrier Group,
Serial #18 - Air Lp.ndlngs and Hesup'oly: The 318th Troopjarrier

Squadron Commando will furni "'a nine (9) aircraft and nlai (9)

combat crews, See Oper?ti /.al Air Movement Table t AnneaT^S,

P. Oo #4, 1st Provisional Troop CarrHasr Group.

Serial jg.9% - Air Landings and He supply; The 1st Provisional Troop

Carrier Squadron will furnish nine fc9) aircraft and nine (9)3

crews. See Operational Air Movement Table, Annex #2 t P. 0. #4,

Provisional Troop Carrier Groupo •

 MANST:

£• S e r i a l #20 - Air Landings and ReBUD?)l'r8 The 316th | ^ $

Squadron w i l l furnish nine (9) airex \ft and nine (9)Vo6nibar*
crews. See Operational Air Movement Table, Annex #8, ^ 0 . %4
1 s t Provisional Troop Carrier Group. /f //
h
» S e r i a l #21 - Air landing and Hesupplv: The 317th Troop d t r r i e
Squadron Commando w i l l furnish nine (9) a i r c r a f t &n& nltfe""(9
combat crews, See Operational Air Movement Table, Anneal # 2 , |
P» 0 , $4, 1 s t Provisional Troop Carrier Group. *> -™

*• S e r i a l #2£ - A i r Landings, and Resupply: The 318th Troop C a r r i e r

Squadron .Commando w i l l f u r n i ^ i n i n e ( 9 ) a i r c r a f t and n i n e (.9)
combat crews* See Operati o»l A i r Movement T a b l e , Annex # 2 * P , 01
# 4 , 1 s t P r o v i s i o n a l Troop C a r r i e r Group* \ r...jr\

«)• Serir^L #23 « Alr^ 2iSS&iM ££& MMPEl-Z* ^ e I s * Provisional Trc

Carrier Squadron will furnish sine (9) aircraft and nine (9)
combat crews• See Operational j&r Movement Table, Annex #2, F. 0.
#4, 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group.

x. 1, Serial #.§ - Paratroop Drop; The 318th Troop Carrier Squadron

Commando will furnish twenty~six (26) aircraft rnd twenty-six
(26) combat crews.
Ihe 317th Troop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish three (3)
aircraft and three (3) combat crews.
See Operational Air Movement Table, Annex #2, ?• 0# # , l e t
Provisional Troop Carrier Group.
2
» SerJLnl. •*£ - Paratroop - Parareck - Door Lord Drops.: The 317th
Troop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish twentfcfr-four (24)aircraft
equipped with six (6) pararacks ^ach, loading wrench and
manual releases in working order, and twenty-four (24) combat
crews.
The 316th Troop Carrier Squadron will furnish twenty-five (35)
aircraft equipped with six (6) pararacks each, loading wrench and
manual releases in working order, and twenty-five (25) combat
crews.
See Operational Air Movement Table, Annex #3, P. 0.. #4, 1st
Provisional Troop Carrier Group.

3 Serial #11 ~'Double, Glider Toys The 318th Troop Carrier Squadron
Commando will furnish f urteen (14) aircraft and fourteen (14)
combat crews.
The 317th. 'I'roop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish fourteen
(14^) aircraft n.nd fourteen (14) combat crews.
The 316*htt Troop Carrier Squadron will furnish thirteen (13) air**
craft and thirteen (13) combat crews.
See Operational Air Movement Table, A-nnex 48, P« 0. #4, 1 s t .
Provisional Troop Carrier Group.
4
Serial #15 ~ Air Landings and Itesupply* Vee of Veet s- yi^chter Cover
The 318th. Troop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish nine (9)
aircraft and nine (9) combat crews.
The 317th* Troop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish nine (9)
aircraft and nine (9) combat crews.
The 316th. Troop Carrier Squadron will furnisl^Ane (9) aircraft
and nine (9) combat crews. ' -"<\
The 1 s t . Provisional Troop Carrier Squadron will furnish nine (9)
aircraft and nine (9) combat crews. ^
See Operational Air Movement Table, Annex #2, F« 0« #4, 1st.
Provisional Troop Carrier Groupo s

Serial #24 ~ Air LnndiM?. §g£L Re supply» The 316th. Troop

Squadron will furnish a l l available aircraft and1 a l l available
combat crews. \
Hhe 317th. Troop Carrier Squadron Commando will furnish a l l avail­
able aircraft and a l l available comba.t crews. ^
 MAICTTOt

The 318th Troop Carrier Squadron will furnish all ai

aircraft and a l l available combat crews,
fh* 1st Provisional ftbof G£r*fet S<uMtotk will•:
aircraft and all avMlable^ combat crewsy
) See Operational Air Movement Table, Anne± #3 t ?. 0, #4f"*if| Provisional
Troop Carrier Group.
4. See Administration and Supply Order Annex#5 • ' ­

5. a» See SignaX Instructions Annex #6.

lj Groundf 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group. LTJIIBSHTON aJLrpo;

3; Alrt f l i g h t Leader in leading aircraft of each s e r i a l s
a^# Deputy Plight Leader tfti position i n leading element*

6» See Medical Annex #6,

7-» So© l e t t e r of Instructions Annex •I1?*

8* a. See Parking Diagram «>WL»

b« See Parking Diagram to annex #3 (Serial # l l t double glider tow).

. v • * v • « • • * •

By order of Major HAY: ^y ^ / ^

MelNALLT

OPPICIALj
7/ /

Operations 0,

Annexes: l i I n t e l l i g e n c e

2« Air Movement Table

3. Glider

4* Signal I n s t r u c t i o n s

5« Supply

6, Mediaal

?• Parking Diagram #L

DISTRIBUTI01T: "A"

Ttaneuver Headquarters

 23 September
^^ Supplement Ho. 1 to Field Order #4. v-cr-^
# . ;>"'
Par. 2 Method of Dropr>in£: I s amnended to read: ?•••*A
t

Serial #15 through #24: All ^ir landing and resupply f l i d i t s pei>­
formed on D day will be flown at 140 itiles per hour i ndicate d a i r
speed, 400 feet above terrain for route outo The rente back will'
be flown at 140 miles per hour indicated a i r speed, 800 feet
above t e r r a i n ,

3y order of Major HAY:

Executive

OFFICIAL:

0,
 Annex Noo 1 to F i e l d Order No. 4

P r o v i s i o n a l T# C. Gp#
JT. CAROLINA
1700 22^eptember 1944

Maps: 1/600.000 Aeronautical Chart* CHARLOTTE (&*8), 6 April 1944^

1/500,000 S t r a t e g i c Map; CHARD0TT3 Sheet
S i t u a t i o n Overlay "A"t Annex 1A to F» 0 # #4
AA Overlay,, Annex IS to I F» 0* <H
Mission Report Forms, Annex 1 0 , F e 6 , #4
R0UT3 Overlay, Glider Landing, IKL, Annex ID, F # 0 . #
ROOTS Overlay, Glider Landing, D-day, Annex l B t F. 0. #4
ROUTS Overlay,, Paradrop, I>-l p Annex I F , F. 0 . #4
ResuDoly Overlay, D and D p l u s 0 Annex 1G F# 0. <H
GLZ Overlay, F i e l d Wo. 1 , D-day, Annex 1H. F. 0 . -04
GLZ Overlay, F i e l d No. 3 , D~l and Duday, Annex I I , F# 0 . #4
NAVIGATIONAL A^PS and '«M*nG'5!NCY AISFISDDS, Overlay,
Annex 1 J , F. .0, # 4

1 . a. Summary o f Enemy Ground Situation

(1) D i s p o s i t i o n a s shown on S i t u a t i o n Overlay A, annex

1A to F c Oc Noo l o
(2) Present, b a t i l e l i n e rins from P2P5D1T3 approximately 12 miles east
of TLOXmcH, Wtieace N0R1H along P3S75D2T5 RIV3R to NORWOOD and then
turns west, &iemy0 BSD, forces are on the EAST bank of the
PK&DSE RIVERc
(3) The 376'ch Red Infantry Division located fcn the v i c i n i t y east of
BOTraTSVILLE. The 384th Red Infantry Division located i n the
v i c i n i t y southwest of HAMS/SEI?. One Infantry Co« and one AA Bn
are located at >'ACKALL9
(4) FLAK areas© Sec AA overlay, Annex IB to F# 0, #4 #

b» Summary of Bnemy Air Situation:

(1) One Sqandron of Enemy F i l t e r Bombers i t located at the

following A/i>*B! RALEIGH (35° 44« N - 78° 39» W); SALISBURY
(S5° m" IT « 80° S.« W)$ CHAPEL HILL (35° 56 f M - 79° 04' V).
(2) Eriexny held a i r f i e l d s located att

CHARuOa:'.!;2l (35° 14' N** 80° 56* W)

CONC0E3) (35° 23 3 N - 80° OlJ W)

VADSS330K0 (SS° 02^ N ~ 80° 04t W)

MAOKA:Uu (SI? P& N « 79° 29' W)

RAir-iHG-H (rS5° 44 s N ~ 78° S9' W)

(3) ioc&l OonditiKft^ The projected area of operations 1 s bounded on

•fche east and south, by 'QS highway #LV GAIOIRON to BDCKINC^Bf, end
that pprt of GAMP M/U2EALL MILITARY HSSaSRVA'CIOH South of US
I t i s bounded on the West by the l i n e : ROCKINGHAM~
and on the North by the l i n e 3ISC03UCARTHAGR*

2. Essential Elements i

a. . t i l l , 58/A attack our i/C *du«i|i^*a4r movement or

^ and In what foW.' Vl ^

''

b, Vfhat are probable new l o c a t i o n s , ealiber# and

- f i r e of enemy AA i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,
3» MeasurejB to Obtain Informations ; ['/:}•• '• • f-\\y
a. I n s t r u c t i o n s to Subordinate U n i t e .
( l ) b r i e f i n g of Payhflnder MissionsJ Pathfinder missions ere.ws w i l l
b to 60th 1'roop Carrier Vlng Headquarters, A^3 S e c t i o n , f o r
a t 1300 houra on $
 (2) A Group b r i e f i n g of a l l a i r crews will "be held &$fcl0.3p hours
a t LU££L3RT0N. <^J^:'" " '
(3) Sq.uad.ron Intelligence Officers will brief the&S?Vei>ective
Squadrons subBecpient to Group briefing on details ©remissions
pertaining to their Squadrons. "Shake down" procedure of all
a i r crew members will be followed,
(4) Squadron Intelligence Officers will interrogate a l l a$r crews
immediately up'm completion of each serial, and will follow
the mission report form i ^ued by this headquarters, asf".'-­*
Annex 10, -F, 0, #ft# ',)
(5) Reports J \
(a) Sq.un.dron Intelligence Officers will prepare missions x&ports
as soon as passible a f t e r each s e r i a l and will submitf-^ame to
Group Intelligence Officer -within two (2) hours o£if%
completion of each mission* Plash reports, whendeem^d
necessary, will be transmitted by the quickest mean
to Headquarters* 60th Troop Carrier Wing, A-»2 either d i r e c t l y
by the Squadron concerned or through the Group S~2.
Written copies of Flash reports will be filed vi t h Group

(b) Squadron Intelligence Officers will keep a complete and

current Intelligence journal during the maneuver period
l i s t i n g a l l incoming and outgoing messages*

(6) Supply of Maps, Photos, e t c .

(a) The following maps and photographs will be supplied by
Group Headquarters to the Squadrons?
1. Strategic Maps, C of 3 , CHARLOTTE, l/500,000.
2j Photomosaic, Mackall~West End Area, l/l5/000 (8 s h e e t s ) .
3.. Photomosaic» Mackall-West End Area, l/80|000,
? . Blow ups, Maneuver Area, No t s 1, 2 , & 3, l/6000«
"E, Photographs, Departure Airports:
L~M AABt 9x9, 24x20
LUMBWrON: 9x9, 24x20
Pope Field: 9x9, 24x20
6. Photcmosalcs, 0 of B, TB©Y, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 34,
35, 36, and SJOTORD, 19, 25, 26, 31, & 32. Scale: l/20,000*
2 . Photomosales, 0 cf B, CAIJDOR, VASS, JACKSON SPRINGS,
SOUTHERN PI1T7'':, LAURINBTIRG ~ i/62,500
(7) Securltyg
(a) Squadron Intelligence Officers will be charged wi th and

will provide for the proper security of all classified

material in their possess:!one

(b) Squadron I nielli gen ce Officers will arrange for and

supervise the guarding of ©11 A / O within their Squadron

equipped with confidential mat-erialo

(c) A CIC man will be assigned to the Group and will be

availrble to the Squadi'ons for security purposes^

For the Group Commander:

Executive

OFFICIAL:

Intelligence 0

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 Annex #3 to F, 0

Hq.9 1st Pfov. T. C. Group

Ca/np IfeckalKL ;
Hoffman* lTort)r Carolina
0800 W , 2 1 September. 1944

a» Departure Bases» All gliders w i l l a r r i v e at t h e i r departure

i
no l a t e r than D-2. K^r '

b.' Equipment.

(1) All gliders will be c>-dipped with:

(a) Corey nose«

(b) Emergency landing l i g h t s .

(c; Deceleration parachutes.

( d) Tug-glider intemhone system.

(e) Standard pyrotechnic equipment.

(f) Tail jacks.

(g) "Wheel chocks,

(h) Emergency tie down kits (complete)

(i) Control locks and spoilers.

(2) 13th A / B Division will furnish lashing ropes and loading ramps

for all gliders*

<*• Lowering of, Glidet; Tail. .^94. lis^e,- Personnel of the 13th A/B Div­
i s i o n w i l l lower the t a i l and nose of the g l i d e r they were r i d i n g i n
immediately a f t e r i t has been unloaded,

A. Glider P i l o t s .

(1) Glider p i l o t s will a^L be equipped with f u l l f i e l d equipment

and two and one-third days emergency ration (C).

(2) After landing g l i d e r P i l o t s w i l l report to an i n i t i a l assembly

area which will be designated l ^ t e r by t h e 13th A/B Division.
Upon reaching t h i s area a l l g l i d e r p i l o t s will come unde r the
command of the 13th A/B Division as members of the ground team*

e« 22£.cuajii2& 21. C4i^§£ 2iIi?Jii> At 1200 "WT on DH a l l g l i d e r p i l o t s

w i l l assemble a t Cnmp Maokall a i r p o r t rey>orting to theirrespective Squadron
Glider Officer c Glider -pilots under the direction of Group Glider Officer
will a s s i s t with evacuation of g l i d e r s from GLZ-3.

f« Glider llarkin^^ Gliders shall be marked s e r i a l l y b efore l o a d i n g .

ITumbers will be placed on both sides of fuselage and on 1 ower surfe ce
of one wing. The g l i d e r numbers will rim consecutively f rom f r o i t to r e a r
of column with even numbers on the l e f t and odd numbers'on the r i g h t .
P i l o t s must be assigned to gliders by number as e a r l y a s possible s 0 that
they may be properly "briefed» '*/;'

( l ) Gliders will be loaded with a l l londs except personnel e t c t

1500 ~ DKU

£• landing PJLfiJi. After r e l e a s e , a l l gliders will m ske a 270° landing

on designated LZ

Ea.rin Regfir^. The 13th A/B Division will r j r ^ s h each g l i d e r

p i l o t 'a completed Flight Form n C3". This form will 1 nclud^ the g l i d e r p i l o t
and w i l l be checked by the glider p i l o t who w i l l sign i t as plane commander.
This form w i l l be turned over to the Group Glider Officer before take-off.
The Gro$p Glider Officer will make a record of the f i e l d numbers of each
tug a.hd g l i d e r combination p r i o r to take-off. . "
2. .Squadron

(1) The 313 bh Troop Carrier Squadron in double tow

numbered 300 to 327 inclusive; The 317th Troop
in double tow with gliders numbered 328 to 355 _ „
316th Troop Carrier Squadron in double tow with glide^e numbered
356 to 381 inclusive.

Sj2. Assignments. Fields "3" and "T^ attached G1Z averifcy «^L"

Sun- »in Line« , See attached G-TJ2 overlay #U *

H e l d Marking. Pathfinder parties will mark f i e l d s .
e
» Mi§£ 2j£-S^lnS. Prp.cefly.re* In the event thpt high winds are forecast
sufficient administrative crews will be dispatched to secure gliders in the
glider landing area*

^• Eights,, and SluS9Sl&«

(l) G-reen fuses will be placed near the head of the run-in line*
The location of this fuses will be in the western end. of Field SB,

(2) JCgte:* Phogig, and^ A^ral^ Dome, L^^ht. Signal. Gild er Release Warning
Lights; •- - Interphone and astral dome l i g h t signals will be
given when five miles from the landing area, and again approx­
imately one mile from the landing area.

(3) Sach field will have 13 ts boundaries marked off by panels. This
will be done by pathfinder partiee#

(4) Gliders will have no lights during f l i g h t .

g. Emergency. SiiSS&LSL* Glider p i l o t s will make an emergency cut off upon

receipt of .red, lighji, f'^om astral dome0

Glider Sllgaag, Altitude^ 400 feet above t e r r a i n .

Rope D^SE. ^PBSJ* Lumberton.

j . Any tug towing gliders becoming separated from the formation will not
make his glider drop run prior to 0730

S7 order of Major HAT*

•Executive \

0731CIA1:

/i
Glider 0
 A,MTOH, ,-s

G-.LZ C'VTLAY #i

I & D DAY

Mackali West - Snd Area

Aerial Mosaic
Scale: l / l 5 0 0 0
Prepared byi 60th T. C0
Wing JU2
Dates 15 Sept 44
 AX SPOUT

?p.rkin£ Ei^grna t o Anna*

 MANEUVER!

ANNEX NO. 4 TO FIELD ORDER NO. 4 1ST PROVISIONAL TROOP CARRIER GROUP, 1 7 0 0 EWT,
2 3 SEPTEMBER 1944*
SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS .,A

1« a. Information on enemy signal c o i m u ^ l c a t i ^ s w i l l be d i s t r i b u t e d to

taio"se*~cb"n";errieHls"IT"betToiTGs"^aT'^Tlab'le^ "ETien^i^ capable* "of:
(1) Jamming^
(2) Sending False Signals.
(3) Intercept:. ngc
(4) E3F oar Stations*

(5>) Tr.raeld.ns by ^ a d a r ,

(6) Crypv,oanalysi3 of our codes and c i p h e r s .

• \

k» Signal security jieasures to be ha ken; . ^

(1) While at departure bcts-js.
(A) Make masdrnum use of wire f a c i l i t i e s , courier messengers
and postal f a c i l i t i e s * Secret and Confidential matters
to be properly safeguarded in transmission and authenti­
cated.
(B) Existing radio stations to maintain a certain traffic
control load for units augmented by dummy t r a f f i c as a
balance so that enemy intercept w i l l be unaware of acce­
leration in operations approaching D-Day,
2 # ENROUTE:

a. Existing radio stations in departure areas continue normal traffic

"" load.

b. Radio silence enforced on all other radios of*forces involved in

the operation until initial landings on D-Day, Radio silence may

be broken in tho event of .disaster and requirements to divert air­

borne serials9 Pathfinder communication facilities may break ra­
dio silence in accordance with prearranged plans,

3, SIGNALP U N .

a. Full time commercial telephone and teletype c i r c u i t s w i l l be a v a i ­

lable between HQ, 60th T. C. Wing, MAXTON ARMY AIR BASE, and t h e
following p o i n t s :

(1) AB/TC Maneuver Hq, CAMP LlaCKALL, NORTH CAROLINA.

(2) LUMBERTON ( 1 s t Provisional Troop Carrier Group).
(3) POPE FIELD (349th Troop Carrier Group).
(4) Extensions from AB/TC Maneuver Hq, CAMP MACKALL t o 1st Pro­
v i s i o n a l T. C. Group Hq, CMP MACKALL.
(5) See Signal Annex No. 6 t o F. 0« 9> Hq, 60th Troop C a r r i e r
Wing, for number c i r c u i t s a m i l a b l e .

b . Wire f a c i l i t i e s w i l l be supplemented by radio•

c . Full time Message Centers w i l l be established and operated a t

FAXTON, MACKALL, POPE U,D LUMBERTON.
ol* The 1 s t Provisional T C Group w i l l i n s t a l l , maintain and operate
the Message Center a t MACKALL*
e, The 1st Provisional T C Group w i l l i n s t a l l , maintain and operate
the Message Center a t LUMBERTON, This Message Center w i l l serve
both Troop C a r r i e r and Airborne u n i t s a t LUMBERTON.

f« For d e t a i l s orr Message Centers a t PORE FIELD and MAXKM MB, see
Signal Annex 6 F o 0. No* 9 , Hq, 60th T C Wing 17 September 1944*
 MAHEUV2

The 1 s t P r o v i s i o n a l Troop C a r r i e r Group w i l l i n s t a l l , maintain

and operate Airdrome Control a t LUMBERTON. *" *

h . The 60th T C Wing P r o v i s i o n a l Signal Co0> w i l l i n s t a l l , maintain

and operate t h e Airborne Control a t MACKALL, t h e f i r s t two hours
following the f i r s t landing.

i . Tnc 60th T C Wing Provisional Signal Co., w i l l i n s t a l l , maintain

"* and operate the Point-to-Point stations at MACKALL upon the f i r s t
landing 9

fa Scheduled messenger service by Liaison Aircraft t o be established

between MACKALL, MAXTCN, LUMBERTON and POPE twice daily, 0900 and
1330o One L-5 a i r c r a f t in tho 1st T C Provisional Group i s avai­
lable for messenger service. * •*.. -.

k. BADIO. ^'^"

(1) For details on command nets 1 and 2 see Signal Annex No. 6
t o F.O. 9, Hq,'60th T. C. Wing Hq*
(2) Command Net No. 1 w i l l be used to divert airborne s e r i a l s .
See SoO.Ii
(3) Ambulance Net w i l l be operated by personnel of the 349th
T C Group. See S9OoI.
(A) Medical Officer w i l l be in charge.
(B) Mobile stations w i l l move with ambulance squads.
(C) Ambulance Squads at SAN FORD w i l l be in operation H-12.
Ambulance Squad at HEMP (ROBBINS) w i l l be in operation
IKL2O
(4) V* H. F. radio channels w i l l be used for airdrome control and
inter-plane communications.
(5) Single c a l l sign procedure w i l l be used.
(6) Second army authentication system w i l l be used throughout,
(7) Common cipher key l i s t s for converter M-209 w i l l be used
throughout*
(L) Radio c a l l s ami frequencies: See S.O.I.
(M) V i s u a l : See S . O . I .
(N) Smoke: See S . O . I .
i (0) S i g n a l Lamps: See S . O . I .

4» a. SIGNAL DUMPS:
Rear Echelon - MAXTON
Forward Echelon - MACKALL
5« RADIO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS; See Signal Annex No. 6 t o F ; 0 . No. 9 , Hq
60th T C. Wing, 17 September, 1944.

By Order of Major HAY:

MCINALLY
Executive 0 .
OFFICIAL:

DONNELL
Gommunic a t i o n sO•

-2­
 LANEUVER

Annex #5 t o F . 0 . ii-k> Hqs, 1 s t Prov. T. C. Gp.

onrEit NO. I
Hq, 1 s t n ^ y v T, G. Group
Camp Mackail
Hoffman, North Carolina
1700 EWT, 22 September

1, SUPPLY: , ... •

Q.» R a t i o n s : ,C./

(1) Supply Points:

(a) No change u n t i l concentration at LUMBEETGDI, \

(b) All personnel of this Organization vail draw rations

from the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group Supply
Point locate4 at LUM3SRT0N, open day of arrival,
(2) Schedule of Distribution:

(a) Ration Cycle: Breakfast, Dinner, Supper.

(b) Time of issue: All personnel 0700 to 1700.

(3) Plan:

(a) Field ration "C" for Glider p i l o t s on missions,

(b) Eield ration "K" for a l l ether personnel.

b. Ammunition: No change.

c# Gasoline and Oil:

(1) Supply Point:

(a) No change until concentration at LUMBERTOH.

(b) Motor Vehicles:

All motor vehicles of t h i s Organization w i l l draw form t h e

1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group Pool at LULIBERTON, o pen
day of a r r i v a l ,

(c) Aircraft:
1st Provisignal Troop Carrier Group Pool - LUiiBERTON
- open day of a r r i v a l i n a r e a .

(2) Rofueling of a l l a i r c r a f t v a i l Conform with i n s t r u c t i o n s issued by

By Group Operations. •

d. Glass*'II-- No change.

e. Class IV - No change.

f. Hater:

(1) ' i a t e r obteined l o c a l l y .

2* EVACUATION;

a. Emergency iiiedicr.1 service: See Medical ^

b. Casualties: See Lfedical Anne:;,

c. Burials: See Kjclical Annex.

-1­
IANEUVER
 3; TRAFFIC:

a
« Circulation:

(1) l^SR: U . S . # 1 5 , MACKALL t o LAU1INBURG.

k U * S . # 7 4 , IAURINBURG t o 7 .IIBERTQN.
9

(2) Traffic p r i o r i t i e s : (l) Troop movements; (2) Supplies.

(3) Traffic control: SOP Motor Vehicle driving and convoy
rules will be followed. Control and safety of a l l veh­
icle movements, including t r a f f i c at IIACKALJ^ and LUMBERTON,
responsibility of Group Transportation Officer,

b» Restrictions:

(1) Blackout l i g h t s aft..:* .100 D-l f o r a l l v e h i c l e s t h a t

operate off base a t LuMBERTON.

4# SERVICE TROOPS:

a . Bivouacs:

(1) Bivouac area f o r necessary personnel t o maintain

Group and Squadron operations a t LUMBERTON.

5 . PERSONNEL:

a. Mail - No change.

b» Strength r e p o r t - Submitted t h i s Headquarters d a i l y 0900.

c. Replacements - None.

6 . MISCELLANEOUS:

a. S-4 P e r i o d i c Report w i l l be submitted upon request by t h i s

Headquarters. (Formal"--, P a r . 7 5 , FLi 101-5)* Abbreviated
r e p o r t i n d i c a t i n g s t a t u s of equipment, supply, evacuation and
flyable a i r c r a f t w i l l , be submitted immediately upon request* by
t h i s Headquarters.

b . F r a t e r n i z i n g with c i v i l i a n s , unlawful seizure of p r o p e r t y , and

abuse ox i-dl vjitua.! s :m occupied t e r r i t o r y i s forbidden. Unit
Commanders wal>. \n^yr-c;^ a] 7 .0:1 i n proper behavior, dress^
f i e l d s a n i t a t i o n , and ol. _ oper d i s t i n c t i o n be made between
measures of m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y and d e l i b e r a t e iris conduct.

By order of tiajor HAY:

, Executive

OFFICIAL:

DJKE

3-4

MANEUVER

 innex #6 to F» 0 . #'4, Has. 1st Prov. 1, C. Gp.

Hq. 1st %ov T. C# Group

Camp Mackg(Jl
Hoffman, No"£th Carolina
1700MT, 22 September 1944

M^PS: Standard Road Maps. ftHAUXOTTEStrategic 1:500,000

1* 349th TC Gp, and 1st Prov TC Gp will provide nedical service at Bepartut©

Points, miviBERTON.. MAXMJ- AND POPE j also a t CAMP JMACKAEL, and a t outposts a t . *

SANFOHET '

2. F i r s t Prov. TC Group furnishes the following personnel and eCLuipnenii*;,.

a. One medical officer (C&PT RUNYCN ) and one aid man for the IUMBERTON

Departure F i e l d .

b . One medical officer (GAPT GOULD) and one aid man for the MAX'tQN Ifep-
Field.

c . Two medical officers (CAPT.KENXSR and CAPX, SACKS..;) a n d nine Medical

Corps e n l i s t e d men with four ambulances for V\e outpost a t HEMP fiO^BINS

(1) Ambulances w i l l be equipped with a t o t a l of 16 l i t t e r s * 32 blank­

e t s , 4 crash s p l i n t u n i t s , 1 pi one ©if equipment, 4 plasma s e t s , 2 k i t s medical

o f f i c e r , 9 k i t s medical p r i v a t e , and 20 morphine s y r e t t e s .

(2.) imbulances w i l l carry 2 excbra 5-gal cans of gasoline each.

3 . The medical service for SALT >fAGKA.LL ^AF i n s t a l l a t i o n s and personnel w i l l

be provided by one medical officer (CAP^« IJ2WINNEK ) and 6 Medical Corps e n l i s t *

ted men, with one ambulance posted at the l i n e and one a t t h e Qroup Dispensary.

4. All crews w i l l wear f u l l f i e l d equipment and w i l l be furnished K-rations.

5» OAP^ RUNYOM w i l l be responsible i"or Sanitation in the Lumberton bivouac

arear.

61 The following schedule will be observed I

s # Two medical officers for MAXTON and LUMBERTON- leave (JAMP lv!IACKALL. at

0830 Sunday, 24 Sept 44? and meet their ambulance units in the rear of Medical

Supply, irMUJj Station Hospital9 by 1000.

b. Two medica.1 officers with four ambulances and nine Ml for the HEMB* out­
post depart GAMP MA.G-KAV.iL at 1700 Sunday, 2L !:f^.p:b 44? and take up their designated

position near the j^qp post ofiioe at or about l800o

(1) One sibulsnce with one medical c!':'iceir- and two EM will proceed to

the BZ3-l/Z.ml, M of $%M? aid arrive bhsr-e, rn time for a parachute drop at

1920, If no medical aid is required s i-he am! ..lance and crew will return to its.

station at HEMP upon completion of the d.m;\p.<;.

(2) Telephone reports x.- 'J'ing Hq will be made upon arrival at the out­
post, after observation of the passing of the two main serials at about 2100

Sunday and 0700 Mond ay, and at other times when necessary,'

(3) One man will be stationed at the telephone at all times to take in­
coming calls.

(4) The unit will return to r -.g? MACKALL Monday morning after having been

relieved' by Wing Kq., and will rep t fcd the Qroup ^urgeon,

c# One ambulance with two Wi will join a glider evacuation convoy at 1ARST0N

N.G., at O93O Monday, 25 kept 2|4> and will cover the operations until completed.

d# All personnel, upon completion of their mission, will stand-by for fur­
ther assignments.

MiNEUVER
 7» Adrninsitrative C a s u a l t i e s v ; i l l be evacuated t o the n e a r e s t m i l i t a r y instal-
lation if practical. I n case of emergency, the following i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be
available:

a. Bakers S-nnkiirium, LUK3ERT0N

b. Hospital on R. 1, 3 mi. W of SANFOitD
c. Moore County General Hospital, PINEHURST­
8« Administrative Casualties w i l l be reported t o the Wing sSfcpgeon immediately
•and t o the Group Surgeon upon return of the crew to CAMP MACK&LL. Emergency
Medical Tags w i l l be used and the duplicate copy of each tag turned i n to the
Group Surgeons o f f i c e ,

9» Local water supply in the maneuver area outside of m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s

w i l l be considered non-portable when properly treated* Halazone t a b l e t s w i l l
be placed in each plane and g l i d e r .

10 # Unit Surger«"s w i l l a s c e r t a i n t h a t planes are equipped with 5 and g l i d e r s

with 3 F i r s t Aid K i t s , Aernautic, each; f u r t h e r , t h a t f l i g h t crews are familiar
with the use of a l l available f i r s t aid equipment, signal communication i%i
of crash, the use of night vision a i d s , and water p u r i f i c a t i o n procedure.

By order of Major HAX:

McINALLY
Ese c u t i v e 4

OFFICIAL:

Medical 0

MANEUVER

 23 September 1944 .;•

Supplement -•*! to Medical Ann-?x #S, F« 0. «5^t l e t Provisional Troop C a r r i e r Group*

The following s h a l l "be added to Annex 46.

P a r . 11 ~ Burlalej By 1st P r o v l s l a n a l Troop C a r r i e r Group*

By order of Major HAY:

MoINALLY
Executive

OFFICIAL:

Medical 0»

f
 M/.NEUVER

IXJU ..iM'ON AIRPORT

BIG DIAGRAM #

q. 7 / \ \
Operations -r^j j \ \

vw : I

T T 7 T T T T

x I < I
1
' /
317 th Sq. J I/ xf f < /

24 a/c f

\
4 a/c for
s e r i a l 7^6
 MANEUVER

Annex # 7 t o F . 0 , # 4 , H q s , 1 s t P r o v . T . C. Gp.

IETTjSR OF INSTRUCTION

1. Ground c o n t r o l a t LUMBERTON w i l l b e m a i n t a i n e d by t h e 1 s t P r o v . T# C ,
(Group, A responsible power p i l o t from S-3 SecLion w i l l be stationed at the-Con*­
t r o l Center to supervise a l l formation take-offs and landings.

2 . Navigation and bright formation l i g h t s w i l l be used on take-offs and a s s ­

embly. When formation i s one-half hour out, a l l l i g h t s w i l l be out, except forma­
t i o n l i g h t s . On r e t u r n , nayi^ation l i g h t s may be on when within 30 miles of home
base. . ." ' *

3 . The 1st Prov. T. C. Group Navirator w i l l maintain correct time on chrono­

meters by checking time Signals (5000 r 10^000 KC fromWVJV), Watches of a l l off­
i c e r s w i l l be synchronized by 1500 D~?JL Day.

4. Green fusees in v i c i n i t y of DZ's are navigational aids only and w i l l not

bo used for jump or release a i d s ,

5 . Power l i n e s and other obstructions in v i c i n i t y of GLZ w i l l be marked wi,th

i red l i g h t s by friendly personnel,
6. Gliders w i l l be loaded with a l l loads except personnel, and lined for

take-off by 1500 D-l for -all s e r i a l s - w i t h g l i d e r s .

7. P i l o t s are i n s t r u c t e d t o drain fuel tanks only to t h e i r margin of safety,

8. 60th T. G. Wing Memo. Nq. 35rl dated 3 April 1944 w i l l be complied with f
(Dog Tags)

9© All a i r c r a f t flying s e r i a l #£ will^be chalked marked on the cargo door

i n order of take-off; 1 thru kq i n c l . All ' a i r c r a f t flying s e r i a l #11 w i l l be chal­
ked marked 1 thru 41 on the both sides of the nose,

10. Parachutes w i l l be worn by a l l a i r crew members on a l l s e r i a l s other than

g l i d e r and a i r landing s e r i a l s .

11. Operations Officers of each squadron w i l l d i s t r i b u t e t o each p i l o t p r i o r

t o ouch s e r i a l a l l s t a t i s t i c a l forms required by 1st Prov. T. C. Group S t a t i s t i c a l
Officer.

12. D-Eey: 25 Sept 1944.

H-Hour: 0600 EWT.

By order of Major HAY:

McINALLT,
Executive t

OFFICIAL:

W. G. HARIEX*

S-3. (/

-1­

MAKEUVER
 23 September 1944

Supplement <*1 to Annex «07, ?• 0. 44, lot Provisional Troop Carrier Group.

The following shall "be ndded to annex *?.

Par. 13 - The pilot is responsible for the collecting of static lines

used in pr-rat roop junps. There will "be a centrally

located dump set up at Operations to store static lines.

By order of Major HAY:

McHTALLY

Executive

OETICIAL:

Operations 0.

 APPENDIX

IRE HuPOHTS

Chief Ground Umpire

Chief Air Umpire

Chief Medical Umpire

UJ
or
 AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER HEADQUARTERS

Camp TTackall, North Carolina

30 September 1944
SUBJECT: peport of chief umpire.

TO i director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver, namp

"ackall, North Carolina.

'T'ho following report is submitted on umpire activities

during the first phase of the combined Airborne-Troop

farrier maneuver conducted from 24th through 29th September,

inclusive. Following a short break, the maneuver will

continue with the second. ph?se and a combine^ report will

be submitted covering both phases.

1. organization.

a. The Flue umpires covered by this report were

primarily interested with the ground ^hase, in view of the

fact that they joined their units after they were landed,

from gliders, planes and by parachute. The air phase was

covered by air umpires, the pnti-alrcr?ft phase by anti­

aircraft umpires, the medical phase by medical umpires, all

of whom submitted their own individual reports covering

this maneuver.

b. The Chief PQ-^ umpire supervised the training

and operation of the pod umpires and, in addition, func­

tioned as Red Commander. In view of the fact that he had

a two-fold mission, both the commr-.nrler of the limited

troops available to function as the enemy and the instruc­

tion of these unit commanders to function as Pod umpires,

he was given complete supervision of this force which

operated directly under the- control of directors Foad­

quarters•

c. Foth the P.1UO and Pod artillery umpires func­

tioned under the control of the artillery supervisor who

organized and instructed his artillery battalion umpires

end his marking teams.

d. Umpires were assigned as recommended in Field

"•Tanual 105-5. There wore no umpires provide-1 for the

glider platoons. jn tho glider regiments, assistant

battalion umpires vere assigned.

e. Umpires for this detail were or-ovided by the

464th parachute Field Artillery pattr. lion, the °ixth Read-

quarters Fpocisl Troops, XXII norps, an* the 89th division

ot Camp Putner, TJ. c.

f. The umpires organization provided for a chief

umpire who functioned mainly with the plue units ?nd an

assistant chief umpire who handled the pdministrstive and

supply problems. A chief Blue umpire to function primarily

as division umpire and, ±n addition, supervise tho activities

of the battalion and company umpires in the field. The

umpire control and map officer maintained constant contact

with the umpires in the field, both by radio and telephone.

Fe was responsible also for keeping the umpire maps up to

date and posting information as rapidly as it was received.

The communication officer was responsible for the proper

relaying of messages from tho field to Maneuver Feadquartcrs

and in the proper supervision of the communications furnished

for the umpires on this maneuver.

- 1 ­
 2. school.,

a. mho ^irectlv, from XXII C O T D S that provided

for" the: umpires to be used In this maneuver also directed

that their respective units conduct a comprehensive school

to prepare them i'or their mission. TVith this In mind, the

umolro review conducted by Umpire Head quo rters"' was brief, ­

covered all of the material in Field Manual 105-5 and the

umpire rules published by The Infantry pchool. ' The last

day of this school was occupied primarily with a number of

writt'-i.., graded tests, covering both the theory and the

practical application of Field Manual 105-5.

b. For subject matter and scope of the umpire

review, see the schedule for umpire review and administra­

tive planning, attached herewith as jnclosurc ^'1.

. c. one afternoon v"D.s given to the training of the

enlisted personnel by their own respective umpires„ The

result of this was that these men became familiar with the

way their O"TR officers oper^.te^ ar^ ma^e an orientation

period unnecessary i?rhon this umpire organization "'&s super-

imposed upon the tactical structure of the division. •
:

3. fomnurications,

a. ^cr^crfrol: rT1ho comr-iunication personnel was

provide^ by the 85th ^Igral ^attalion.

b. The unrIre communication system oeerated as

follows; A main rae!io net '-as set up with one large set,

a 399, Installed and In operation near the umpire Headquarters,

This set was the net control station anT Into It operated

another 399 which refine--"1 in the vicinity of the division

CP. At the division cv, a communications officer maintained

control of the. field eornramica tion system. Communication

was extended from this (joint to the'"battalion umpires by

610 voice radios . The corrrrrran I c a 11 on section handling this

traffic consisted of two 3/4 c^*P cars with radio equipment

making up two radio nets. The first- handling the traffic

from the pare.chute regiment ar.d having three stations, the

second handling the traffic of the t-'To glider regiments and

having four stations.

c. The FJ and c<r

T radios wore supplemented by field

pbon-'s. one lire ran directly from the 399 not control sta­
tion to Umpire Headquarters. The other line was operated

through the switchboard ard ran to the location of the Flue

TT
mpirc Headquarters in the fI:j].T n-ar the Division C°.

d.. difficulties arising in the transmission of so

many detailed reports finally nade it necessary to eliminate

the ow transmission, except in cases cf emergency. Messages

coming from tho units were Dicked up by the communication

officer at the fiojT relay station and transmitted by phone

to TTrriniro Headquarters. "^he umpire control officer at that

point transcribed the nesnages Into a message book, noting

the. time ^ate and placed iroon the umpire control map the

information receivod. '^o-^rd the end of the first phase

of this maneuver, this niethod proved highly satisfactory

and, in my opinion, the coimunicatlon set-up was capable of

handling the traffic necessary.

e. For the sec on-'1 ph^se, an umpire message center

will be set up to expedite the handling of both radio and

t e 1 e ph on I c in ess a g e s.

f. A t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s u c h as faced b y the d i v i ­
sion in the field m a d e m a n y m o v e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y . It w a s

- 2 ­
highly Important that the information received over the

umpire net was placed upon the umpire control map in order

to enable the directors, to ascertain with the least poss­

ible delay the location of all of the tactical units. The

importance of this mission made it necessary for officers

of the administrative staff of Umpire Headquarters to re­

main on duty 24 hours a day.

3. Administration.

a. *s the umpires reported for ^uty in compliance

with directives Issued by the XXII Corps, they were, with

the exception of the Chief Tiro? ire, messed rnd quartered by

the 542nd Parachute infantry Pattalion. y\ fee of fifty

cents a day was charged for the orderly service and meals

provided at fifty cents each at the umpires and observers

Mess. ^Thile in the field, for the first two days, the

umpires messed with their units, providing their own rations.

The remaining two 1a3rs of the first phase, they were messed

by the 'Division with their units.

b. No umpires jumped or rode in gliders with units

to which they were assigned. At the termination of the

first phase, umpires were returned from their units to a

classroom where they were briefed, turned in their reports

and released, after receiving instructions on when and

where to report for the second phase.

c. Transportation, such as it was, was provided

through a maneuver transportation officer. it proved

adequate in all cases and the equipment was available when

rnd where it was needed.

4. peports.

a. peoorts of the Flue umpires, Ped umuircs, anti­

aircraft umpires, artillery umpires, medical umpires and air

umpires wore submitted through channels in their respective

organizations.

5. pec ommendat!ons « n^ c ormenda ti ons.

a. in future maneuvers, it Is felt that a. larger

umpire organization coul^ nore adequately umpire and observe

the maneuvers. The high state of mobility and the multiple

missions assigned to units of an airborne division make it

necessary for small units, at times not organized under T/O

but made up similar to a small task force ; made it impossible

for the platoon end company umpires to observe and umpire

the special missions.

b. communication could have been maintained on a

higher level of efficiency had their been radio communica­

tion between platoon, company end their battalion umpires.

It is also recommended that some type of communication be

provided so that opposing umpires on the ped and Plue forces

could converse with each other, thus reducing the number of

times it would be necessary to stop the maneuver in order

to nake umpire decisions.

c. The initial contact of the ground umpires with

their airborne units was slow. This was true mainly with

the parachute elements and although the umpires were spotted

at the drop zones where the trooos were supposed to land,

contact was made difficult ^ue to the fact that sorie units

were not dropped at their predesignsted drop zones. This

situation might have been remedied had each unit had one

parachute, glider, or airborne umpire to drop or land with

the troops, with radio communication to contact Umpire Head­

quarters, giving their location.

- 3 ­
 d. ^h: coros p.. rsor: involve""1 : rici the 85th

c
ign a 1 pattalion sic ir. tr. i nv; -• a .1 tine s 9 high state of

efficiency crri any Fucc-.,.r,s .Ld b y tiv. unpire orgsniza­

tion coul;. be attributed to ? ^: .ft extent to their enthus•

iQsrn r.ni urtirir.:; efforts in. ou: b e h a l f .

/ ss
/ John F. T

JOHN F. TRUDS,

M a j o r , Infantry,

(?}-icf

 AIRBORi^-TROOP CARKUR iwiN-dJViiR

C^inp k a c k a l l , iviorth Carolina

30 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Chi of Air Umpire.

TO : D i r e c t o r , Airborne-Troop Carrier maneuver,

Camp Mack a l l , iforth Carolina.

1. All. f i e l d orders and d i r e c t i v e s were; studied and found t o be

well mad.; and planning was e x c e l l e n t , ^lthou h f i e l d orders and move­
iiwnt t a b l e were well planned they did not take i n t o consideration the
"human element of e r r o r " . There was no f l e x i b i l i t y or e l a s t i c i t y of
plan t o take care of any e r r o r s i n timin r or spacin of formations.

2. Briefin i n c l u d i n a l l information necessary WJLS considered

very s a t i s f a c t o r y with few e x e r t i o n s . At ; roup bri^fin~s specified,
indicated or sea l e v e l a l t i t u d e was not - iven nor was a l t i t u d e of t e r r a i n
' iven to crews. No mention v;as nude of Fi h t e r cover ""iven t o formations.
Statements were made t h a t SOP would be followed but tho SOP was net read
or discussed. Form i!C" manifest of each plane load was not mentioned i n
b r i - f i n ' and was not turned i n t o operations (Provisional Group).

3. The Vin; Coiiiivanrfer and his staff functioned i n an e f f i c i e n t

manner and i n close harmony. So., m-.iical umpir-'s raa:>rt attached. It
i s believed t h i s section deserves special mention for t h - i r excellent
conjraini cat ions sot-up which functioned -ihjad of win- riots.

4. ^11 D i r e c t i v e s , Orders ..nd i n s t r u c t i o n s from hi; her echelons

•vvoro corrKjli^d with i n s o f a r - s could bo learned by tho Umpires.

5. Ro;;>ort of Glider Uiupii'e subiidtted herewith.

6. Tho f o i l ova n i s a b r i e f suriiinary of a l l a c t i v i t i e s by movement

table; s e r i a l nunber as observed by x*ir Un^ir^- i n t h - formations and on
the • round. S e r i a l s on*- tnrou; h four wero ilown as p-athfinders and were
oXocut'-d i n an excellent manner oxcept for planes unnecessarily c i r c l i n ;
over area aftor drops i v i n away i n t e n t i o n s and p l a n s , a l s o within ranre
of nit fire.

3-rie.l 7 ,5:

Tako off; 1915 - 1922 - avora; e 15 seconds,

assembly - ood.

Rendezvous - 1954.

Time over IP - 2020.

Time over DZ - 2030.

ixltitude and .*IS at DZ - 760' I ED - 110 LFH.

Pattern on DZ - Scattered in t r e e s .

Radio Discipline - ood.

Landin 2054 - 2110 - 30 second i n t e r v a l .

Comment: Take off and assembly of this s e r i a l and Serial #7 w a s

too closo and routes crossed between i.;.i::ton and Roc kin ham with
oni3^ 200 feet difference in a l t i t u d e causin- 'considerable confu­
sion. Tho spacin- of -jleir^nts >.as very poor - 1000 fe^t to 2500
foot. Forraation ood within -laments. Tho f i r s t six elerr^nts
(18 planes dropped over or near DZ - Flane (Q'J thou.' ht he saw a
parachute r d o a s j from ;/:19. Tho co-pilot _.-w- the r^on l i oht
and tho troops jumped from ,-, 20 r.na also ,.-21 several minutes north
of DZ. Tho next jler:er,t sav.T tn^s-- cliutes and dropped on them
makin a t o t a l of 5 pl<--ne loads dropped north of DZ.

Serial ;/'6:
'rake off: 1930- 1944- 17 second interval.

assembly: ood.

rendezvous: OK.

Tiiue over IP: 2027.

Time over DZ: 2036-1/2 (3-1/2 minutes e a r l y ) .

- 1
 ultitudo over IAS: 1300 Feet ind, 110 LFK.

Formation andPattern: ra<_;^.ed several planes out of position.

Troops scatterad.

Radio Discipline: Good.

Landing: 2131 - 2154 - 30 second interval.

Comment: This form-tion met another 25 plane formation over St

Paul at 1000 feet at 2001 hours. Met three (3) stray C-47's 2

miles M»iT of Pope Field at 2010 at 1000' . «11 elements did not

turn out lights as directed showing very poor discipline. This

formation brought back 94 refusals and/or failures on jud. ement

of jumpmasuers that formations was notin position or attitude

for jump. Thelead d e m e n t failed to correct fora strong North­

east wind andflew a parabolic course to Radar beacon, approach-

in from Northwest instead of from North. Jump si/nals were

given too early andtroops were dropped from two miles Northwest

of DZ to DZ mostly into dense woods causing numerous injuries to

personnel. Thelast section of this serial scheduled to drop on

FDZ 3D followed same procedure as other formations ahead makinp

approach, from Northwest and dropping troops tooclose to down wind

side of field. Some troops landed in Field 3 2 and many drifted

into trees on west side of field. Others larded outside drop area

to south and west of field 3&. In this portion of the serial one

plane was seen to roll suddenly about itslongitudinal axis

immediately follovirr which it crashed andburned on field 3^

at 2045 hours.

S e r i a l rH:
Take off: 1936.
/issembly; Fair.
Rend ez vous : OK.
Tim. over DZ: 2035 (lead p i a n o ) .
Formati on & Fatt e r n : Po or - s cat t - r e d .
Di s c i p l i n - : Poor.
a l t i t u d e and I ^ S : 1600 f e e t - 110 kPH.
Comments: On f i n a l run i n from IP t h e formation did considerable
S-in and two ships broke formation.-'- I t i s not known which d i a ­
mond they broke from but were observed out and down away from t h e
formation. The l a s t diamond crossed over DZ2 a t 2037 on a head­
i n g of 130° which ; ave a curving approach and troops were not
jumped. This formation made a second pass a t DZ, the approach
approximately t h e same as the f i r s t . ^ f i r e was noted on F i e l d E
j u s t a f t e r pass i n . over F i e l d 2 f i r s t t i m e , paratroops i n Piano
z/37 of S e r i a l I n 3rd diamond were dropped on F i e l d 3-^ &t 2045
( o b s e r v e r ' s p l a n e ) . u.t t h a t time ether planes i n other formations
were noted t o bv pass i n t o r i h t and l e f t and ihead a t lower
a l t i t u d e . 3rd diamond then climbed to 2500 f e e t i n d i c a t e d and
remained u n t i l v i c i n i t y of DZ was cleared of a i r c r a f t then made
two more passes at DZ2 droppin remainder of troops on fourth pass
a t 1000 f e e t i n d . at 2106, proceeded t o home at 3500 f e e t l a n d i n ­
at 2135.
Serial ffo.
Take off: 1944 - 1957.
assembly: Fair.
Rendezvous: OK.
Timo over DZ: 2045.
altitude & i;jS: 1400 feet - 110 KPH.
Formation and Pattern: Fair.
Continents: The forr.ir.tion did not hold compass hondirr s but kept
weavin- . altitude v :.ri-,d from 900 feet to 1400 feet and air speed
from 110 to 150 I-JPH, causin very ra " ed forh^.tion. Two extra
planes joined this formation, not scheduled to b - there, flyin­
left element of l a s t diamond. The f i r s t part of t h i s formation
dropped early about h .If of the troops dropped in Field 3D. Others
drifted into the trees on west side of 3D, others dropped l a t e over
field 3^3 some troops ;oirr into field 3^, others drifting into
heavy woods and sw^iips for :.. distance of about twj miles. The
le-ter foriu-tion dropped on the east (upwind) side of Field 3C and

2 ­
 3D landing their troops in the center of these f i e l d s . ^ few
planes dropped l a t e and landed troops as far as two miles south
of Field 3F. Durin formation drops and followin them, several
individual aircraft and sx^all elements of two or three pianos
circled the drop zone and made second passes: this caused much
confusion i n the air and on the /round, indicating poor plannin;
and poor discipline for breaking formation for any reason except
^mor; oncy.

Serial ff9:
Take off: 1945 - 1950.
assembly: Good.
Rendezvous: OK.
Time over DZ; 2110 hours.
Comment: Spacin; b-tw^n tu s was too -reat (2000 to 5000 f e e t ) .
Th- approach was too wide - from 2 to 3 mil-s. The l i d e r pilots
made ood landin.- s despite t h i s , although in wron f i e l d s . There
was very poor air discipline throu; hout t h i s mission on the part
of t u p i l o t s . ^Ititude not held and interval not maintained.

Serial 77-l0:
Take off: (delayed 2 hours acct weather). 0649 - 0717 35 second.
intervals,
.issombiy: Poor.
Rendezvous: OK.
Time over GLZ: 034#•
Comments: Flarws ;y., LOO r^..t i n t e r v . l (2000 to 4000 f e e t ) .
Glider pilots achie^-d excellent r e s u l t s in landings with ,:. mini­
mum of dama ., or injury. Tu- p i l o t s iiad tendency to take up slack
too fast pullinr gliders up on nose. Tu^s were stacked up from
400 to 1200 feet with an interval of 1000 to 5000 feet, resulting
in bein intercepted over -ssembly point by both serials /fl2 and
TT~133 also causin^ the coluiun to be stretched out too long giving
trouble to Serial >-/Ll. Tu;-- p i l o t s displayed definite lack of air
discipline i n not holding assigned a l t i t u d e , interval and speed.

Serial #11:
Take off: 0730 (uelayed 2 hours account of weather), to 0821
(avera; e 1 minute 15 second i n t e r v a l ) ,
.assembly: poor.
Rendezvous: 0821-1/2.
Time over IP: 0900-1/2.
Time over OLZ- 0912-1/2.
altitude and LnSj 400 feet, 100 to 105 LJ?H.
R-dio discipline; Good.
Comment: This formation over-run the proceeding group at Rendez­
vous and had to swim., wide to North and follow a parallel course
to IP. The formation was very ragged and became separated at Pope,
Six planes flying on parallel course. The main formation was 5
miles to the east. The l a s t 3 planes of main formation bro^e away
and attached themselves to the six ships to the west. Both forma­
tions met at the IP. Four planes ag.-in broke away and flew a
parallel course to GLZ approximately two miles, on the right flank.
Altitude of formation varied from 700 feet to 1500 feet. ' Lead
planes were releasing at about r i ; h t distance but t a i l of column
was releasing from 1 to 2 miles west of GLZ. Spacing between tov/
planes was from 2000 feet to 5000 feet over GLZ'l

Serial //12:

Take off: 0724 - 0725-1/2, 22-1/2 second interval.

HS s e mbl y: Go od.

Time over GLZ; 0857.

Comments: an excellent mission, ;ood landin-s and no injuries.

Serial 7/13:
Take off: 0739 - 0749* 32 second i n t e r v a l .
assembly: Fair, Serial ,/10 had not closed up to jjroper interval.
Both serials w-re observing planned procedure.

- 3­
 Time over GLZ : 0 9 1 9 .
s: Tu^s had t o o much i n t e r v a l 1000 t o 3000
p a t t e r n and. /"ood lo.nd.infs.

S e r i a l tf

Take Off:

Landing ALZ: 1340 - 1355, 90 socond i n t e r v a l .

Tine on round: 31 minutes.

C ommont s; Non^.

S e r i a l $15: (--d.r landing operation frcm Lumber ton t o ALZ4)«

Take off; 1300 - 1311," IB Socond i n t e r v a l .
^s's ombly: Good.
Landing: 1409 - 1421, 20 second i n t e r v a l .
Radio and a i r d i s c i p l i n e - Good.
Comment: Non~.

Serial #16:

Take off: 1433 - 1435, 15 second interval.

Assembly: Good.

Landing: 1531 - 1534, 20 socond interval.

Di sc iplino: Go cd.

Comment: Non-.

Serial #17:

Tako off: 1456 - 1458, 15 second interval,

assembly: Good.

Landinr: 1555 - 1604, 1 minute i n t e r v a l .

Coninvnt: Spread out a i r landings.
S e r i a l ^1B:

Tako off: 1509 - 1511, 15 socond i n t e r v a l ,

xissombly: Good.

Landing: 1610 - l 6 l 3 , 20 second i n t e r v a l .

C oiiin­

s,jrial
Tako
7/19
off 1525 - 1527, 15 second i n t e r v a l .
Assembly Good.

L-ndd .ng: L626 - 1629, 30 second i n t e r v a l .

C ommont s
None

Sv;rial #20
Take off 1743 - 1745, 15 second i n t e r v a l .

xiSSOi.nbly Good •

Landing . - 1B14, 20 second i n t e r v a l .

Goiiiuv^nt s None.

Sv^rial n2l

Take off 1740 - 1742, 15 second interval.

Landin-: ISOC - 1811, 20 second interval.

Serial #22:

Tak- off: 1656 - 1653, 15 second i n t e r v a l .

Assembly: Good,

.: 1755 - 1758, 20 second i n t e r v a l .

S e r i a l # 2 3 :

Take o f f : 1746 - 1749, 20 second i n t e r v a l .

: 1315 - 1319, 30 socond i n t e r v a l .

Serial /r24: Resupply - c o n t i n u o u s s h u t t l e from 1926. No comments,

COUNTS ON , J R LJOIHG OPERATION:

Rwsup.ply l o a d i n ; squadron functioned i n - very s a t i s f a c t o r y mann

•ill p l a n e s were loaded i n S e r i a l ^15 two hours before take o f f . Ther

- 4 ­
was no delay of ~.ny resupply s e r i a l du<j t o l a t e loading. Some of the
men i n t h i s unit had no experience i n loading planes and consequently
were slow at times; however, they did an excellent j o b .

The f i r s t s e r i a l of a i r landing (B-17 ! s) were on ground 33 minutes.

S e r i a l #15 averared landing i n t e r v a l of 23 seconds, on the ground

one hour and 20 minutes, taking off at an average of 20 second i n t e r v a l s ,
The l a t e r small formation averaged one hour on the ground.

Unloading operations a t airhead bogged down due t o improper planninr

and coordination r e s u l t i n g i n an excessive number of a i r c r a f t on an
aiva'iced airdrome, subject t o enemy action for an excessive period.

/ s / Jerome B. McCauley
JiiROME B. MCCi'JJLEY
Colonel, iiir Corps
 «IRBORNl£-?ROOP C«RRI^R foJMJ
Cojiip iviackall, North Carolina

SUBJECT: R e p o r t o f n i r M e d i c a l Umpire ( 6 0 t h Van/' Hq)

TO : Chief .dr Umpire.

1. The overall plan for the medical care, evacuation, and emergency
hospitalization for ^ir Corps personnel v;as superiorly planned and executed,

a. adequate coverage at departure bases, along the l i n e of

f l i g h t , and at landing areas was provided.

b. Radio jeeps and ambulances kept the Ledical Corps officers

in the field in constant touch with the Wirr, Surgeon throurhout the
running of the s e r i a l s , and the Wing Surgooris office consequently provided
accurate "up to the minute" accounts of the developments throughout D-l
and D day.

c. The emergency plan of hospitalization included the provision

of beds in local c i v i l i a n hospitals within the area over which the s e r i a l s
were being f l

2. Injuries to personnel, in flifht.

a. There w^ro throe paratroopers injured in flight when their

plane war caught in prop wash during f l i g h t . Injuries included a back
injury w^th anaesthesia of the l e f t lower extremity, and two mild con­
cussions. The wearing of safety belts would have prevented these
injuries.

b. blether plane reported a casualty with diagnosis of aero­

t i t i s media. This diagnosis is probably i n error as the altitude during
the flight did not exceed c5GO feet, and the development of a e r o t i t i s in
ascending, to that altitude i s next to impot s i b l e .

3 . Comments based on observations and contacts with plane crews and

the v i s i t i n g of one briefing.

a. Provision for t h - r e s t of p i l o t s was adequate.

b. Instructions t o p i l o t s concerning the importance' of fatigue

was fuado by unit sur ; jeons.

c. Instructions in night vision and dark adaptation was adequate.

d. In general the paratroopers and crews wore d i r t y and t h e i r

clothes f i l t h y .

e. .nil administrative casualties were reported promptly to the

Winr Surgeon.

f. Medical care and hospitalization of .administrative casualties

¥\ras prompt and adequate.

g. Flan for .dr Evacuation of casualties by air was not con­

summated due to fact that there was insufficient numbers of patients
available.

4. Re c mmendati ons.

a. That the wearing of safety belts by varatroopors during

flight to drop area b- enforced.

- 1 ­
 b . That a l l piano and glider cr^ws bo r^quir^d t j bathe and put
on cloan clothes iiuaodiatwly prior to thoir missions. This would markedly
d^croaso the possibility of infections dovuloping from injuries incurred
- the mission.

/ s / Fred "„•. Sellers

FRKD ¥. SELLERS
Knjor, Lied. Corps
 ^IRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER IA1T2UVER HEADQUARTERS
Camp I l a c k a l l , North C a r o l i n a :
30 September 1944
SUBJECT: Report of G l i d e r Umpires.
TO : Director, Airborne-Troop Carrier Maneuver,
Camp Ifeckall, North Carolina.

A. INTRODUCTION.

1. Pursuant to instructions from Maneuver Headquarters,

twenty (20) glider pilots were selected to judge glider take­

offs and landings. Subject -personnel was selected, based upon

previous experience in evaluating glider exercises. The group

included:

Major C. J. Bayne

C a p t s T.j I. P. ?a r n swo r th
7. P . Hippler
S. 3 . I jailor y
CT. E. llorgan
11. Riddle
7 . 7 . P. Smith
Its. 7. S. Bell

o . II. Bue

C. A . Combs

J. 11. Devers

R. ir. Francis

JT. p . Gocke

«j . R. Hall

D. D. Iia t h ew son

Ii. lie If a

R. H . -Glutting

E . <T. Pankonin

A . D. Smith

C. Pc. 7estfall

2. This personnel was scheduled to attend a l l glider

pilot briefings, to observe marshalling, loading, take-offs,

landings and assembly after landing.

3. This report also contains a section summarizing data

obtained on various specific aspects of glider operations.

4. The final section of this report contains specific

recommendations by the glider umpires.

B. OBSERVATIONS,

^-* Aircraft Availability z_ Both the 349th and 1st Prov.

TC Groups >rovided spare towplanes and gliders and no glider

serials were incomplete for lack of aircraft.

£• After Landing llission for Glider Pilots: The consensus

of opinion among" the glider"pilots was that their services were

not required by the Airborne forces but they commended the

Airborne officers to whose organizations they were attached.

3
* Briefing: A l l principal briefings were attended by

umpire personnel. They were adequate generally, but lacked d e ­

tail on glider landing zone terrain and the Intelligence Officer

completely avoided the ground situation. The briefing personnel

in some cases, lacked a complete understanding of directives

from higher headquarters. Hatters affecting air discipline

were omitted in the final briefing of the 349th TC Group.

- 1­
 ^* CGr-4Aj^ The-successful landing of all participating

CG-4A gliders and the ability of C-47 aircraft to tow two (2)

fully loaded CG-4ii's for approximately two (2) hours flight

was conclusively demonstrated. The safety both to personnel

and materiel, was proven, by the fact that, no injuries occurred

nor WuS there any damage to Airborne loads. The dawn take-off

ana daylight landing were far more successful air operations

than the night glider landing missions,

5#
CC:-l_5f This was the first simulated tactical use of

this glider and its useful load was limited only by the type

of tug aircraft. The loading was accomplished by the Airborne

personnel, inexperienced with the CG-13 glider. The take-off

was without incident and four gliders were airborne in one and

one-half minutes. They flew on tow behind a C-47 at an IAS

of 120 mph, the gliders grossing approximately 14,500 pounds.

A normal 180 degree pattern was accomplished in the GLZ and

gliders landed across cotton furrows in soft sand with no

damage whatsoever to gliders or their loads. A l l four gliders

were unloaded within five minutes after the 1st CG-13 had

landed. Pilot personnel were average CG-13 graduates of the

Maxton course.

6. Compliance with Directives of Higher Headquarters:

There was no indication whatsoever of the glider pilot personnel

failing to comply with directives of higher headquarters. Their

p e r f or ma nee wa s c o rrnnen da b le .

7. Corey Skid; The high percentage of gliders retriev­

able by pickup demonstrated, beyond a doubt, the value of the

Corey Skid. A l l gliders were so equipped and there was no

failure observed. The Corey Skid actually facilitated the

tactical evacuation of one glider from GIZ # 1 .

8. Damage to Gliders; Eleven gliders out of 242 were

non-flyable for the following reasons---:

Damaged Landing Gears - 5

Nose Fabric Damage - 1

Tail Surfaces Damaged ^ 1

Aileron damaged - 1

Pre mature Releases - 3

Twelve gliders in GLZ ,'r!l incurred minor fabric damage as the

result of landing in the cornfield section but were definitely/

attributed to nilot error and slight damage did not prevent

being retrieved by pickup • Onl^r one glider v/as damaged in

loading and unloading and that occurred as the result of the

glider falling off the tail supports.

^ • De ce_].lerat ion Chutes or Pararresters : Of the 238

CG-4A gliders 'equipped, only four (4") were used and, in those

four (4) instances, the?/ were incorrectly used and resulted in

the glider "oilot undershooting. Obviously, there-was insuffici­

ent use to warrant opinion. The glider flying proficiency of

participating personnel was above average and possibly did not

necessitate the use of decelleration chutes. It must, however,

be borne in mind thec the participating glider pilots had prac­

tically no instruction or experience in their use.

10 • Eva_cu:.tion_ Plan_ £or Gliders : A copy of the Evacuation

plan is attached and is evidence of sound planning. It is be­

lieved, however, that so.aa damage to control-surfaces occurred

OR >VDU
Day for lack of control locks.

11. Landing Technique: Two tj'^es were employed, one type

predetermining each glider's position and the other being ;?area(l

landing. The tjnpe of GLZ made both plans "perfectly workable but

- 2 ­
had the GIZ been composed of nany separate fields, the compari­
son would have been more conclusive. Patterns were conventional

and well executed. Landing speeds were unnecessarily fast. No

alternates were provided. Tug runs were generally too far from

the desired release points and made the glider pilots employ

initiative in effecting proper landings.

-L^* Intereommunication: The external type intercom­

munication is not serviceable. The 82 gliders lifted by the

1st Prov TC Gp did not employ intercommunication although

directed to do so by Maneuver Headquarters. The 156 CG-4A

gliders lifted by the 349th TC Group were equipped for inter­

communication with a static double tow hookup, the service­
ability of which is reflected in the following table based

on 116 questionnaires:
NOT
OK ftY WORKING

Prior to take-off ­ ­ ­ - 73 13 30
Immediately after T.O.­ ­ 51 8 57
At release zone - - - - ­ - 47 7 62

The four (4) CG-13's were equipped with intercommunication

which worked perfectly throughout.

13. Loading: Loading was accomplished by Airborne

personnel and in very few cases did glider pilots observe

or supervise. Only one glider was improperly loaded and it

contained a jeep with radio that was driven in instead of

backed in. An interrogation of CG-4A glider pilots revealed

that fewer than one out of every 10 knew the center of gravity

index of their loads. All of the CG-13 glider pilots knew

their exact CG index. Considerable loading instruction for

glider pilots should be scheduled.

-^« Pickup: The tactical- evacuation of casualties was

demonstrated. Exactly one hour and twelve minutes after the

glider landed it was airborne, having been ifsnatched*? on the

first pass by the pickup aircraft. No radio contact between

tow plane and glider was available. The movement of the glider

into take-off position and erection of the station was accom­

plished by glider pilot personnel.

15. Fake-offs: Of the 242 participating glider pilots,

none criticized th take-off technique. It is believed that
excessive speed was used to take U P the slack which caused
gliders on the short tow to overrun the towline and probably
caused excessive damage to intercommunication facilities.
Ground control otherwise v/as excellent.

-^ • Tow Technique; Based upon the interrogation of

glider pilots, the following evaluation is submitted:

a. 1st Prov TC Gp (41 Glider pilot's questionnaires)

OK

TOY;, including interval 24 17

Relea se aIt it ud e 22 19
Final tug run 17 24
b. 549th TC Gp (120 Glider pilot's questionnaires)

OK UNSATISFACTORY

TOY/, including interval 114 6

Release altitude 105 15
Final tug run 73 47

- o ­
 c. The glider pilots of the j49th TC Gp had consider­
able experience as co-pilots in towplanes and- this nay account

for the better opinion of the tow technique of that Group.

Glider pilots of the 1st 3?rov TC Gp stated their towplanes did

not approach as they were briefed to and lacking inter conriunica­

tion could do nothing about it. One glider pilot in the 1st Prov

TC Gp did not.laiov; the name of his' tug crew or tug nunber.

C. REC0MIENDATI0H5;

1. The four gliders which failed to reach the.G1Z should

be further investigated, three of the four having been glider

pilot cut-offs and one accidental release.

2. Decrease towplane speeds in talcing up slack prior to

take-off.

3. Provide for use of control locks and lowering noses

in maneuver landings.

4. Prevent bundle droning in C-IZ after gliders have been

landed.

5. Include checking glider battery in preflight for night

operations.

6. Provide nore adequate briefing of glider allots on

landing zone terrain.

7. Include eneny situation in final briefing.

8. Have glider pilot check availability of tail support­

ing jacks prior to take-offs.

9. Issue equipment list for glider allots prior to D Day.

10. Provide Halizone water tablets to glider pilots.

11. Correct the attitude among some glider pilots that

they are<;tazi drivers1' and include nore Infantry tactics.

l a i n T D.-. -;r-,-| ,_,

n T i ? ' -\7i\T 7.71

i.ajor, Air Corps.

- 4 ­
 GLIDER PILOT II-3TERR0GATIGN

This form is to be turned in by each Glider pilot to his Group

Glider Officer on assembly at Mackall operations 1200 noon D+l Tuesday

26 September 1944»

Did intercommunication work?_

How we^Ll did it ^

"Then did i t stop working?_

Remarks ;.

in
as takeoff satisfactory?

^as toi7 satisfactory?.

",'as altitude sat isfactory?_

v
:*as element interval satisfactory?.

Tas tug run at G .L. Z. satisfactory?.

'"""as landing pattern satisfactory?.

Remarks:

(Glider pilots Name & Rank)

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 APPENDIX

Photographs

A. Generals Terrell, nhrpman and nolonol ^i

" • ' • ' ' ! • . • £* "

E. L T)albey an^ distinguished visitors-

. jin raterial U \7­

.-.iO •.' -L J-J. , a

 JKM HHHi• •
ZB ~^,'ffkk
- •
'Ju
r
j me

Gliders in perking ares at departure field

p0 Qliders over larding area

1. Slider Evacuation frcn G-LZ -;/3

Irbornc; troops on the move.

/ ir Transported troops leaving p-17's.

 i
K. Unlo from C-47

L. 130- u t i o n H o s p i t a l s o t up a t Camp
colzcll A i r p o r t .
 y uso- "by evacuation Hospital

ospital equipment of Fvacuation Hospital,

Locking South ovor

Field "A" on GLZ

 yv m\
/ • •
•

4r-.

AJ.3JVS 3IHd»USOdOl N V H I I V I /
A X l i V I DIHdVMDOdOl NVNXSV1
F i o l d JrB"'
on GLZ #3
t

•fi ' . .

<*

%
 i r p&&tovn on
GLZ #1 V(%£G*-13A ^ l i d o r s
on r i n h t ifejxt to road.)
 MM
j;

i ,j»

i-ifc H U B

IHd*«O0<Oi MVHXSVI
Looking ITorth
on GLZ #3
. 1

\
APPENDIX

Maps

 NORTH CAROLINA WAR DEPARTMENT NORTH CAROLINA

JACKSON SPRINGS QUADRANGLE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY

JACKSON SPRINGS QUADRANGLE
79°45'. 1125 CANDOR3.5 M/. \ \ 35'EAGLE SPGS. 5.5 Ml. HARRIS 4.5 Ml. 1145
1135 4 Ml.EAGLE SPGS. 4.5 Ml.
35°15' 35°15'

y i

I
I
I
I

35°00' 35°OO'

79'45' 1125 79-30'

ROAD CLASSIFICATION
Prepared under direction Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1941. THROUGH ROUTES ONLY
Controlled Mosaic by E.R.P., U.S.Army, A.W.C., Wash, D.C., 1941. SURFACE IMPROVEMENTS
Control by United States Geological Survey. IMPROVED DIRT ROADS
Photos for A.A.A. by Comm. Concerns, Oct.. 37; Jan. Nov., 38; Feb.Apr.,39; Jan.-Apr. 4 1 . UNIMPROVED DIRT ROADS
Polyconic Projection, North American Datum 1927.

NGINEER REPRODUCTION PLANT, U. S. ARMY, APPROX. MEAN DECLINATION 1941

JACKSON SPRINGS. N. C
HE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 18437 1941 FIRST ARMV MANEUVERS PHOTO MAPS ANNUAL MAG. CHANGE .5' DECREASE N3500-W7930/15
 ORTH CAROLINA 1:62,500

6° 5° 4° 3° 2° 1° 0°
\ i I I 1I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I
30' H4LL CREST 6 Ml. / EASTWOOD O.2 Ml. i
Z

' 1150 000 YARDS SILVER HILL 9 MI.

'repared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers,

J.S. Army, 1941.
Controlled mosaic by the Army Map Service, U.S.Army,
Washington, D. C , 1941.
Control by U.S.G.S.
,erial photography for A.A.A. by Comm. Concerns, FIRST ARMY MANEUVERS PHQ:
)ct.37; Jan.-Nov.38; Feb.-Apr. 39; Jan.-Apr.41. ROAD CLASSIFICATION

'olyconic Projection, North American Datum 1927. THROUGH ROUTES ONLY

SURFACE IMPROVEMENTS
Heavy fattJE LIKE incloses
blackout area*
 MAP

Charlotte sheet

To be placed under overlays

for orientation of areas

Areas 1 & 3 — Glider Landing Areas,

(Subdivisions A, B, 0,

' .D, E, P, of Landing

Area' #3. represent in­

dividual'glider land­
ing fields and drop

zones)

Areas 1, 2, 3 - paradrop Zones

Area 4 — Camp I'ackall Airport

Area G- — Area of dummy para­

chute drop,

ARROW indicates direction of run-in.

 NORTH CAROLINA SOUTH CAROLINA

SECOND EDITION-AMS 2 GEORGIA TENNESSEE

30' 1050 80° 1100 30' 1150 79° 1200 30' 1250 78° 1300

10

Horatio

1050 30' 1100 1200 1300 78°

ARMY MAP SERVICE. U.S. ARMY. WASHINGTON. D C 100354

1944

10.
5 / 4 4 SX

ASSEMBLAGE INDEX
D Miles NOTES
84° 78° 75°
irds
i
WINSTON-SALEM
! ° 3 O '

National and State routes wider O R

than two lanes are indicated as 27 M I L S

such except in Metropolitan areas. CHATTANOOGA

Critical road elevations at
mountain passes or summits are
shown in black. BIRMINGHAM

Fifty thousand yard grid computed from

"Grid System for Progressive Maps in the
APPROXIMATE MEAN D E C L I N A T I O N 1 9 4 4

U. S." Zone " B " , U.S.C. & G.S.

Special Publication No. 59.
ANNUAL
FOR
MAGNETIC
CENTER O F S H E E T

CHANGE l ' D E C R E A S E

CHARLOTTE
N3400-W7800/200X600
 iL

Some facts About

THE (HONE CHllEfi
and the

1 TROOP C f l H
 • • • * - *

• • • • • ' • • • • • . • . . . ' " . P a g e

THE AIRBORNE CENTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,. 1

J r / ? 0 0 P CARRIER COMMAND.. .......... *

:
OPERATIONS ... ..... . 3
DOCTRINE... .. .. . 5
f MANEUVER . . . ..: 6
MANEUVER SITUATION. ............ 8
5 < 9 ^ r T F / 5 MANEUVER. ...... 9
ORGANIZATION........ . 10
PARACHUTE TROOPS,.................. U
TROOP CARRIER GLIDERS.............. 12

CARRIER AIRCRAFT. .; . ..-*:.-„ .:».•.. 13

EVACUATION... . v . . •*•.'.'. #.-. «•.» .. .-* . t4

S/f/ffl

 THE AIRBORNE CENTER

t« The Airborne Center i s an agency of Headquarters, Army

Ground Forces, and operates directly under that headquarters.
2. The Airborne Center i s directly charged with the re­
sponsibility of the following:
a. To conduct airborne training for troops attached
to i t for that purpose.
b. To develop and recommend improvements in the or­
ganisation, doctrine* tactics and technique, and training
literature and visual aids for parachute and glider units.
c. To t e s t and develop equipment and materiel for
parachute and glider u n i t s .
d. To .act as liaison between the Troop Carrier Com­
mand, Army Air Forces, and the Army Ground Forces.
3. The accomplishments of the Airborne Center and i t s
predecessor, The Airborne Command, include the activation
and training of all airborne divisions and separate air­
borne units of the Army. Certain Infantry Divisions have
also been trained for transport by air. .
4 . The Parachute School a t Fo,rt Behning* Georgia i s an
agency of the R»placement and School Command, AGF, charged
with the mission of training and furnishing replacements
for parachute units in this country and overseas.

- I. ­

. -sv
Glider
Oper­
ations
 I TROOP CARRlBJt COMMAND
The I Troop Carrier Connand was created by the
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on April 30, 1942.
It is the youngest command in the Army Air Forces and i s
aJready larger than the whole U. S, Array Air Forces was
i» 1941* .,.-..
The Troop Carrier has a three fold primary mission:
(1) To provide air transportation for airborne
forces into combat.
(2) To supply such forces until they are with­
drawn or can be supplied by other means.
(3) To provide emergency supply and evacuation
of casualties*
The secondary missions of Troop Carrier Units are:
(1) To provide emergency supply and evacuation.
(2) To ferry troops and supplies.
(3) To provide routine transportation for per­
sonnel, supplies, and mail.

In theaters of operation, the primary missions take

priority. It i s the responsibility of theater commanders
to relieve troop carrier forces from secondary missions
in adequate time to plan, prepare for, and rehearse pri­
mary missions.

• t
 OPERATIONS
The accompanying sketch of the world shows the spots
where U. S. airborne and Troop Carrier forces have been
employed together.
(1) The first employment of American parachute troops
was in the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. For
that operation the Troop Carrier transports carried the
Airborne from bases in England to drop zones in Algieria.
(2) In July 1943 an Airborne Task Force spearheaded
the attack into S i c i l y . Parachute elements of the 82nd
Airborne Division dropped beyond the beaches, blocked the
movement of enemy reinforcements, and assisted the land­
ings from the sea.
(3) Parachute troops were used again in the late sum*
mer of 1943 to reinforce the beachhead at Salerno, Italy.
A regiment was dropped by the Troop Carrier Command to
strengthen our right flank. Other elements were dropped
beyond our lines to attack and disrupt enemy centers of
communication and control
(4) In the Southwest Pacific Theater, one of the most
carefully timed and precisely executed airborne missions
was the parachute drop of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regi­
ment in the Markham Val ley on September 7, 1943 by the
Troop Carrier Command.
(5) In March, 1944, a U. S.-British glider operation
cut the Japanese supply lines in Burma and opened the way
for the capture of Myitkyina. The Troop Carrier gliders
carried airborne engineers and equipment from bases in
India to the jungles of Burma.
(6) The largest allied airborne operation to date was
the invasion-of-Kormandy, France, on June 6, 1944. The
Troop Carrier Command transported two American airborne
divisions, the 82nd and 101st, both parachute and glider
elements* over the Cherbourg Peninsula* Initial missions
of the airborne forces were accomplished within six hours.

- a«•

m,:
 (7) In August 1944, an Airborne-Troop Carrier force
was the leading element in the penetration of Southern
France, opening the way for the advance up the Rhpne Val­
ley toward Germany.
( 8 ) During the summer of 1944 in the advance toward
the P h i l i p p i n e s , parachute troops were dropped by the
Troop Carrier Command in the" landing onr Noemfoorv- ^Ttttfse
were the same troops which had jumped in thelfarkham Valley. :
( 9 ) On September 17, 1944, the Allied Airborne Army
c o n s i s t i n g of American and B r i t i s h personnel under the
command of Lt Gen \. H BKEXFION* made a successful airborne
landing into Holland in daylight against the G»*m«n«.

I. M • Tt TMICIM •• • . * . •• MMK MUIT, rUMI •NUTlMb

k. Mtn «nicM muriM. ». MMW MUIT (UN) l« M» HMU M W I M .
•. m u m wtMTiw. •. M M MUttM.
«. H U M , IT41T, WCUTIM. t. IIWWI HUM (KMTIM.
i«. ttT m m U M M um WCMTIW, MM HI
t. M M R , mm* «»n«Tiw
 DOCTRINE
Based originally upon theory and later proved sound
in actual operation, certain points of basic doctrine have
been established for the employment of Airborne and Troop
Carrier forces. Fundamental points of the doctrine are the
following:
(1) Surprise.' This i s the greatest single factor in
favor of an airborne attack. It i s gained through secrecy
regarding projected operations and through speed in execu­
tion both of the air move and the ground attack.
(2) Employment In Mass*' The bulk of the airborne
forces should be committed in a relatively small area as
fast as possible.
(3) Part of a Combined Effort,- The airborne attack
should not be incidental to the main effort, nor super­
imposed on an effort already planned. It should be an in­
tegral part of the basic plan and closely coordinated with
a l l air, ground, sea-borne, and naval forces engaged.
(4) Contribute Most to the Major Effort.' The mis­
sion assigned the Airborne Force should contribute the most
possible to the success of the entire operation.
(5) Used Only on Missions that cannot be Performed as
Economically or as Expediously by other Ground Forces.- If
other ground forces can reach the objective easily, they
.should be used since they are better equipped for ground
operations. The airborne force should be used on import­
ant objectives beyond the immediate reach of other ground
units*

5 ­
 Glider

Trooper

Mock-up

Loading
 THIS MANEUVER

The purpose of this maneuver i s to complete and t e s t

the combined training of the 13th Airborne D i v i s i o n and
the 60th Troop Carrier Wing.

The mission of the 13th Airborne Division i s to land

in the area of Hoffman arid Camp Mackall to capture and
secure the Camp Mackall A i r f i e l d for subsequent a i r land­
ings , and to prevent the movement of Red troops through
Hoffman and v i c i n i t y .

Landings by parachute and g l i d e r w i l l be made a t

n i g h t and day.

Three departure a i r bases w i l l be u s e d .

A minimum flight of 100 miles will be made from each

departure base to the landing area.

A e r i a l resupply w i l l be accomplished by the 60th

Troop Carrier Wing on and a f t e r D plus one day.

Evacuation of c a s u a l t i e s w i l l be by a i r .

The 130th Evacuation Hospital w i l l be attached t o

the 13th Airborne D i v i s i o n for the a i r movement.

The airborne d i v i s i o n w i l l be r e l i e v e d on D p l u s
Four day by ground units attacking from the Southwest.

-6 ­
SITUATION MAP OF AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER
MANEUVER

SEPTEMBER 1944

- 7 ­
 THE MANEUVER SITUATION

1. Blue Forces which have reached the line of the Pee

Dee River will continue the attack on D-Day. The Blue
11th Division i s expected to relieve the airborne units
in the v i c i n i t y of Hoffman on D plus 4.
2. The airborne task force will attack dn D-l to seize
and hold Camp Mackal 1 Airport and to block the movement
x
of Red Forces thru the Hoffman area. ; v

3. Air reconnaissance indicates that the a i r f i e l d is

defended by antiaircraft and small ground u n i t s .
4. The terrain is generally rolling and cut up by wood­
land, stream l i n e s , and swamps.
5* Cotton fields and open a,r«as provide adequate landing
areas for parachutists and gliders*'
6. A night landing will increase the elements of security
and surprise. It also increases the difficulty of gaining
ground control.
7. The landings will be made not on the objective but
close to i t and beyond the range of small arms fire from
the airport defenses,*
8. A coordinated attack executed with speed and surprise
will be necessary to capture the objective with a minimum
of fighting.
9. Once the airfield i s secured, reinforcements and sup­
p l i e s can be landed in Troop Carrier transport airplanes.
Casualties can be evacuated in these same aircraft.
10. The eneny must be pushed back so that he cannot place
observed artillery fire on the airport.
11. A strong defensive position must be organised to block
the movement of Red Forces through the Hoffman Area.
12. After capturing the objective the initiative aust be
retained through aggressive ground action and vigorous
patrol a c t i v i t y .

- 8
 MORE ABOUT THIS MANEUVER

This maneuver i s divided into two phases. The first*

or air phase, will include the air movement, reinforce*
ment, resupply and evacuation by air.

The second phase is the ground maneuver of the 13th

Airborne Division after landing and after i t has been joined
by other ground forces and normal channels of supply have
been established.

The maneuver Command and Staff and function as a

Corps headquarters. The Commanding Officer, Airborne Cent­
er, a s s i s t e d by the Commanding General, I Troop Carrier
Command, will direct the air phase of the maneuver. The
Commanding General, XXII Corps, w i l l direct the ground
control of the maneuver successively as airborne units
land.

In tactical operations airborne units remain under

control of the theatre commander until units are in flight,
at which time control passes to the air commander. When
units are landed, control passes to the officer in command
of that area. Normally the airborne force should be re­
lieved as soon as possible following the break through of
friendly ground forces. Relief i s necessary because air­
borne forces are not equipped for e f f e c t i v e sustained
action, and because prompt r e l i e f will result in a mini*
mum of reequipping and reoi£an.ization prior to their com­
mitment again on airborne missions.

- 9 ­
Ground

Action

 ORGAMIZATIOff

An airborne division i s about one-half the sise of

an infantry division. .Its approximate strength is 8,500
officers and men.

Its weapons and transportation are necessarily limited

to those which can be dropped by parachute or landed by
glider.

The principal a r t i l l e r y weapon i s the 75-mm Pack

Howitzer, which can be disassembled and dropped in nine
parachute aerial delivery containers or landed intact
by glider.

The4-50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun on the air­

borne mount, M-63, i s the principal weapon for a n t i ­
aircraft defense.

The rocket launcher* M9A1, and the 37»mm antitank

gun are the principal antitank weapons.

The infantry has as i t s principal weapons the r i f l e ,

the machine gun, and the infantry mortars.

The division comprises one parachute and two glider

infantry regiments, the division artillery consisting of
one parachute and two glider battalions, engineer bat­
talion, antiaircraft, battalion, signal company, medical
company, quartermaster company, ordnance company, and
military police platoon.

In tactical operations the division headquarters i s

divided into a forward and rear echelon. The rear echelon
stays in the departure area. The division commander
with his staff and elements of the signal company go into
the combat area by parachute or gl ider close behind lead­
ing combat elements to establish the commend post, to gain
control, and to direct the tactical operation.
 PARACHUTE TROOPS

Parachute troops receive their basic jump training

at The Parachute School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Each parachutist jumps with a main parachute and a
reserve parachute. - • —-••
Size of the main canopy i s 28 feet in diameter.
The parachute i s made of a high grade s i l k or nylon.
The c o s t of the parachute i s about $200.00.
After a training jump, the parachute i s recovered by
members of the Parachute Maintenance Company. This may be
impracticable in combat.
As many as 18 men can be jumped from a C-47 airplane
in a s i n g l e pass over the.drop cone.
Troop Carrier p i l o t s are trained to slow the airplane
down t o about 110 miles per hour during the time of the
jump and t o keep the t a i l of the airplane h i g h .
Men jump from an a l t i t u d e o f about 800 f e e t .
The time o f descent from 800 f e e t i s about 40 s e c ­
onds .
The. parachute canopy w i l l s u s t a i n a load of 300
pounds a t 150 m i l e s per h o u r .
In t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s a l l n e c e s s a r y items o f i n d i ­
v i d u a l equipment are jumped on the i n d i v i d u a l .
Crew served weapons, additional ammunition and equip­
ment are dropped in aerial delivery containers.

• - • ! * » - •
 TROOP CARRIER GLIDERS

The glider used today in largest quantities i s the

CG-4A.
The CG-4A w i l l carry 13 men in addition to p i l o t
and c o - p i l o t .
It is designed to carry a payload of 3,750 pounds.
The cargo compartment will accommodate the tt-ton
truck, or the 37-mm AT gun, or the 75-mm Pack Howitzer,
or the crawler tractor.
Either one or two CG-4A gliders can be towed behind
one C-47.
The glider tow rope i s made of nylon - 300 to 350
feet long.
Cost of the tow rope i s about $1.00 per foot.
The glider is towed at speeds from 120 to 140 miles
per hour. Maximum safe towing speed is 150 miles per hour.
The glider pilot i s a key man in glider operations.
Safe landings are dependent to a large extent on his skill
and good judgment.
Glider landings are made at speeds as slow as pos­
s i b l e consistent with safety; this will approximate 65
miles per hour.
The great tactical advantage of the glider i s i t s
a b i l i t y to safely land concentrated loads from the air
in r e l a t i v e l y restricted areas.
 TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT

The C-4T airplane i s known as the *Wor£aorse" of

the Army Air Forces; i t i s the a i r counterpart of the
jeep.
The C-47 carries paratroopers, tows gliders, lugs
supplies; and evacuates c a s u a l t i e s .
It i s a two*engine transport.
It has seats for 27 men.
The width of i t s cargo door i s 84H inches.
Its normal useful load i s 4,900 pounds.
It can carry a tt-ton truck, or a 105-mm howitzer
113* without disassembly. It can carry the 105-mm howitser
112 disassembled. The 2)6-ton cargo truck disassembled can
be carried in two C-47's.
Cruising speed of the C-47 i s 170 miles per hour.
Maximum range w i t h n p fuel reserve .is 1660 miles.
A s t r i p approximately 2,000 feet long i s required
for the take-off and landing of the C-47.
Normally each Troop Carrier Squadron- includes 16 C-47
airplanes and twice as, many cargo gliders.
There are 256 C-47 "s in a Troop Carrier Wing.
Cargo gliders now in use are the CQ-4A and CQ-13A.
The CG-13A cargo compartment can accommodate the 105­
mm howitser M2 or the 1*4-ton 6 x 6 cargo truck without
disassembly.

- Ml
 AIR EVACUATION,

Through Air Evacuation, i f wounded, the l i v e s of

thousands of soldiers have been saved, many that other­
wise would have been forfeited.
Each transport that lands troops in combat carries
one air trained nurse assisted by a non-commissioned
technician to care for a return load of wounded sol­
d i e r s . Pay load each way.
When used for air evacuation, a C-47 accommodates
18 stretchers in t r i p l e t i e r s .
The plane i t s e l f i s convertible in a matter of eight
minutes from a troop carrier to an ambulance plane.
Morale of troops i s kept at a high level through
knowledge that hospital isat$on i s available within a few
hours from the front.
Gliders have also been equipped with stretcher hold­
ers, and used for speedy evacuation.
Newest development i s the use of "Snatch Pi<;k-up"
of glider carrying wounded patients from isolated spots
where plane could not land.

- 14 ­
Not*s»

U
il*H*i*-C1?
,1­
 ENGR RkPRO SEC

HQ AIRBORNE CENTER

CAMP MACKALL N C

SEPT 1944

-1