David A.

Rosenberg October 15, 2010

Chief Economist & Strategist Economic Commentary
drosenberg@gluskinsheff.com
+ 1 416 681 8919

MARKET MUSINGS & DATA DECIPHERING

Lunch with Dave

NICE DATA, BUT SHAME ABOUT THE OUTLOOK
IN THIS ISSUE
Despite the lingering listless labour market and a continued contraction in bank
credit, the U.S. consumer still managed to find a way to keep chugging along in • Nice U.S. economic data,
but shame about the
September. Retail sales rose an above-expected 0.6% MoM with upward
outlook: retails sales for
revisions to the back-data, which now suggest that real GDP inched up to September and
something just a shade below 2% at an annual rate in the third quarter. And, in manufacturing activity in
the “new normal” of a post-bubble economy, as long as there is a “plus” sign in October came in better
front of any digit, that is enough for investors to load up on risk assets; all the than expected, but the
more so given the Fed’s pledge to throw more liquidity fuel into the fire. For economy is not out of the
woods yet… consumer
investors, all that matters is the economy expands, no matter the pace; for the sentiment still at
Fed, all that matters is that the economy expands, but at a pace that pulls down recessionary levels
the uncomfortably high unemployment rate.
• Interesting insights from
the Fed Chairman: in his
In contrast to last week’s employment report, today’s sales data were just as
speech today in Boston,
solid beneath the surface as they were at the headline level. The gains were Bernanke provided a
broad based even if autos did the bulk of the heavy lifting — electronics, valuable update on his
furniture, building materials, sporting goods, health and restaurants all enjoyed views regarding the
decent gains to varying degrees. Only department stores and clothing sales economy, deflation and
lagged behind with declines. The “core” measure of sales (excludes autos, non-conventional policy
responses
building materials and food) that feeds into the consumer spending portion of
GDP advanced 0.4% MoM in September on top of an upwardly revised 0.7% • Deflation risks in the U.S.
print in August and this now paints a near-2.5% growth picture for the consumer, still intact
as far as the third quarter is concerned. • A double-dip signpost?
The Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of
Tack on the New York Fed Empire Index, which is a pretty decent gauge of tech Commerce Index, a real-
activity, and today’s dual economic reports certainly did come in better than time measure of the flow
virtually everyone expected. The headline jumped to a four-month high of 15.73 of U.S. factories, retailers
and consumers, saw its
in October from 4.14 in September and was led by gains in orders, shipments
first back-to-back decline
and even employment. Both prices-paid and prices-received bounced notably. since the economy was
knee-deep in recession
To be sure, the economy did not come even remotely close to double-dipping in
• Underlying inflation trends
the third quarter, but it does not mean that it is not on shaky ground and
in the U.S. still subdued
susceptible to contraction even in the near-term. The question has to be asked;
if double-dip risks have really subsided that much, then why did consumer • U.S. trade still a net drag
sentiment fall to a three-month low of 67.9 in October? In an expansion, on GDP
consumer sentiment averages 90.4 and in a recession it averages 74.1. • Initial jobless claims back
up

Please see important disclosures at the end of this document.

Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. is one of Canada’s pre-eminent wealth management firms. Founded in 1984 and focused primarily on high net
worth private clients, we are dedicated to meeting the needs of our clients by delivering strong, risk-adjusted returns together with the highest
level of personalized client service. For more information or to subscribe to Gluskin Sheff economic reports, visit www.gluskinsheff.com
October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

Here we are supposedly more than a year into a statistical recovery and yet the
cumulative negative financial effects from underemployment punctuated by The negative financial effects
continuing turmoil in the housing market have dragged consumer confidence to from under-employment,
levels that are consistent with overall economic contraction. This could well be punctuated by continuing
the negative for the fourth quarter. The economy is not yet out of the woods, turmoil in the housing market,
and if you would like a more detailed assessment of why that is the case, just go have dragged U.S. consumer
and read Ben Bernanke’s grim assessment of the macro outlook in the speech confidence to levels that are
he just delivered in Boston (more on this below).
consistent with overall
economic contraction
Keep in mind that retail sales and the NY Empire Index are coincident, not
leading indicators of economic activity and should be treated as such. Recall
that in October 2007, the NY Empire came in at a ripping 26.03 and retail sales
expanded 0.5% MoM. Exactly two months later, and much to everyone’s
surprise and chagrin, the economy was knee-deep in recession.

INTERESTING INSIGHTS FROM BERNANKE

Fed Chairman Bernanke provided a valuable update on his views regarding the
economy, deflation and non-conventional policy responses. In a nutshell, the
Fed’s base case is still for economic recovery, but one that falls short of
redressing the massive amount of slack in the U.S. labour market. Most of the
speech actually revolves around the unacceptably high jobless rate and the
deflation risks that entails. He stated that it is perfectly appropriate for the Fed
to re-engage in quantitative easing, and is convinced that QE1 was a
success. However, Bernanke also discussed the potential costs involved and
hinted that the process would evolve cautiously, which may have been a shot
across the bow for those pundits expecting a ‘shock and awe’ $500 billion or
even a trillion dollar asset-purchase program announced at the November 2-3
FOMC meeting.

Here are some select key excerpts from Bernanke’s speech — the underlining is
ours for emphasis:

“Although output growth should be somewhat stronger in 2011 than

it has been recently, growth next year seems unlikely to be much
above its longer-term trend. If so, then net job creation may not
exceed by much the increase in the size of the labor force, implying
that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly. That prospect is
of central concern to economic policymakers, because high rates of
unemployment — especially longer-term unemployment--impose a
very heavy burden on the unemployed and their families. More
broadly, prolonged high unemployment would pose a risk to
consumer spending and hence to the sustainability of the recovery.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

The sustainable rate of unemployment may vary over time, and

estimates of its value are subject to considerable uncertainty. Fed Chairman Bernanke does
Nonetheless, with an actual unemployment rate of nearly 10 not buy into the view that there
percent, unemployment is clearly too high relative to estimates of has been a meaningful
its sustainable rate. Moreover, with output growth over the next structural reduction in the
economy’s non-inflationary
year expected to be only modestly above its longer-term trend,
growth path
high unemployment is currently forecast to persist for some time.

Overall, my assessment is that the bulk of the increase in

unemployment since the recession began is attributable to the
sharp contraction in economic activity that occurred in the wake
of the financial crisis and the continuing shortfall of aggregate
demand since then, rather than to structural factors. [ed note:
this is important — Bernanke does not buy into the view that there
has been a meaningful structural reduction in the economy’s non-
inflationary growth path].

The significant moderation in price increases has been

widespread across many categories of spending, as is evident
from various measures that exclude the most extreme price
movements in each period. For example, the so-called trimmed
mean consumer price index (CPI) has risen by only 0.9 percent
over the past 12 months, and a related measure, the median CPI,
has increased by only 0.5 percent over the same period. [ed note:
this comment is a retort to those who believe that the
deceleration in core inflation has been a one-trick pony owing to
the decline in the rent component].

Given the Committee's objectives, there would appear — all else

being equal — to be a case for further action. However, as I
indicated earlier, one of the implications of a low-inflation
environment is that policy is more likely to be constrained by the
fact that nominal interest rates cannot be reduced below zero.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve reduced its target for the federal
funds rate to a range of 0 to 25 basis points almost two years
ago, in December 2008. Further policy accommodation is
certainly possible even with the overnight interest rate at zero, but
non-conventional policies have costs and limitations that must be
taken into account in judging whether and how aggressively they
should be used.

For example, a means of providing additional monetary stimulus,

if warranted, would be to expand the Federal Reserve's holdings
of longer-term securities. Empirical evidence suggests that our
previous program of securities purchases was successful in
bringing down longer-term interest rates and thereby supporting
the economic recovery. A similar program conducted by the Bank
of England also appears to have had benefits.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

However, possible costs must be weighed against the potential

benefits of non-conventional policies. One disadvantage of asset Despite an equity market
purchases relative to conventional monetary policy is that we binge, a weakening USD, an
have much less experience in judging the economic effects of this economy that seemingly
policy instrument, which makes it challenging to determine the avoided a double-dip recession
last quarter, and a renewed
appropriate quantity and pace of purchases and to communicate
boom in commodity prices,
this policy response to the public. These factors have dictated
pricing power in the broad
that the FOMC proceed with some caution in deciding whether to
retail sector remains elusive
engage in further purchases of longer-term securities.

Of course, in considering possible further actions, the FOMC will

take account of the potential costs and risks of non-conventional
policies, and, as always, the Committee’s actions are contingent
on incoming information about the economic outlook and
financial conditions.”

DEFLATION RISKS INTACT

Despite a speculative equity market binge, a weakening U.S. dollar, an economy
that seemingly avoided a double-dip recession last quarter, and a renewed
boom in commodity prices, what continues to prove elusive in this illusory
recovery is pricing power in the broad retail sector.

How apropos it was for Ben Bernanke to utter the word “deflation”, not once, but
twice, in his Boston speech this morning. Because fifteen minutes later, the The headline rate of inflation,
September consumer price index data were released and showed a goose-egg — despite everything thrown at it,
that is 0% — on the key core CPI measure (which excludes food & energy), for sits at 1.1% today … and the
the second month in a row. In the past, this has happened but 7% of the time, core rate is now running at a
so it is a rare enough an event to at least mention.
mere 0.8% YoY pace

The headline rate of inflation, despite everything that has been thrown at it in
terms of unprecedented monetary, fiscal and bailout stimulus, sits at 1.1%
today. The core rate, proven to be the key driver for bond yields, which is why it
is a focal point, is now running at a mere 0.8% year-over-year rate, the lowest
since March 1961 when Ben Bernanke was in grade school.

While QE1 may have worked in terms of bringing mortgage and corporate
spreads out of orbit and preventing an all-out contraction in the money supply, it
has not managed to stop the economy from sputtering, the unemployment rate
from remaining near 10%, and underlying inflation from grinding lower.
Consider for a moment that when the Fed first hinted at QE1 in December 2008,
the jobless rate was 7.4% and the core inflation rate was 1.8%.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

CHART 1: CORE RATE OF INFLATION NEARLY AT A 50-YEAR LOW

United States: CPI excluding Food & Energy (Core CPI)
(year-over-year percent change)
15.0

12.5

10.0

7.5

5.0

2.5

0.0
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

While commodity prices have been firming of late with the downdraft in the dollar,
what is key is that we are seeing discernible deflationary trends evolve in many
segments of the service sector. Movies, personal care services, hotels, delivery
services, and education all deflated last month — education deflated at its fastest
pace ever. This is no longer just about rents, which are now stabilizing.

CHART 2: THIS IS NO LONGER ABOUT RENTS OR

FIRMING COMMODITY PRICES
United States: CPI excluding Food, Shelter & Energy
(year-over-year percent change)
3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Moreover, despite what the price of cotton is doing, clothing prices are still in
decline, and other “goods” such as furniture, appliances, audio-video
equipment, motor vehicles and home improvement all posted price declines last
month as well.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

For all the talk of how higher Chinese wages were going to be transmitted to For all the talk of how higher
higher prices of these imported items, it does not seem to be happening. Either Chinese wages were going to
that, or margins for several retailers are in the process of being crushed. The be transmitted to higher prices
latest National Federation of Independent Business Sentiment Survey showed of these imported items, it
that company-pricing plans are virtually nonexistent. Therefore, it would make does not seem to be
sense to assume that once we get pass this bump in the form of a weaker U.S. happening
dollar and surging commodity prices, the risks of deflation will intensify again.

All the efforts to date have only managed to slow the pace of decline in
consumer prices; they have not prevented core inflation from hitting four-decade
lows. Right now, the long bond yield provides a 150 basis point premium over
10-year Treasury notes at the price of taking on nearly nine extra years of
modified duration. Sounds like a handsome trade-off because even if the Fed is
not targeting the 30-year maturity, a 3% real yield still looks fairly attractive from
our lens.

A DOUBLE-DIP SIGNPOST?
The Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index (PCI), a real-time measure of the flow
of goods to U.S. factories, retailers, and consumers, fell 0.5% MoM in September
after sliding 1.0% in August — the first back-to-back decline since the economy was
knee-deep in recession in the opening months of 2009. The results point to a flat
reading for September industrial production, which was the lynchpin for the
modest economic rebound that has been posed in the past year. Ed Leamer, the
Chief PCI Economist and Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, and last we
heard an optimist on the outlook, had this to say about the latest data:

“The PCI tells us that inventory is stalled on the nation’s thoroughfares. The
The Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of
good months of growth are now seemingly in our rear view mirror. Our
Commerce Index (PCI) saw its
economy’s loss in traction is alarming and for the ‘Cassandras of the double- first back-to-back decline
dip,' may foretell a coming decline in GDP and spike in unemployment. since the economy was knee-
However, with residential investment, consumer durables, business spending, deep in recession in early ‘09
and other component indicators already at or near record lows relative to GDP,
it remains unlikely that we will experience an outright decline into recession.”

I’ve been called a lot of things but it’s been some time since I was labelled a
Cassandra!

UNDERLYING INFLATION TRENDS STILL SUBDUED

The runup in goods (+1.2%) and energy (+0.5%) showed through in the
September U.S. producer price data as the headline rose a stronger-than-
expected 0.4% MoM, but the inflation story basically started and ended with
these two items. Capital equipment prices barely eked out a gain at all (+0.2%
MoM) and core consumer goods prices edged up only 0.16%.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

No doubt the spike in commodity costs and weakness in the U.S. dollar is
showing up in the core pipeline measures like the PPI crude excluding food and The U.S. trade deficit numbers
energy segment, which popped 5.5% MoM in September and is now running at a have been quite volatile of late
+37% annual rate over the past three months. However, there has thus far but what is key is that most
been little in the way of any passthrough to speak of — the core intermediate economists were expecting an
improvement in August and
stage PPI was up only 2% and over the past three months this metric has
instead got a deterioration
actually deflated modestly, at a 0.7% annual rate.

Somebody is facing a margin squeeze — at least that is what the data strongly
suggests. Not just the data, but the National Federation of Independent
Business survey, which showed pricing power for small businesses declining and
weak revenues at the top of the concerns list last month.

U.S. TRADE STILL A NET DRAG

The U.S. trade deficit numbers have been quite volatile of late but what is key is
that most economists were expecting an improvement in August and instead got
a deterioration. The deficit widened 8.8% to $46.3 billion and in real, or volume
terms, it expanded 8.2%, which wipes out most of the improvement posted in
July and suggests that net exports will not be adding to Q3 real GDP growth after
the huge subtraction seen in Q2.

At best, it looks like real GDP growth will come in somewhere around a 1.5%
annual rate in Q3, and we would be expecting an even sharper slowdown and
perhaps a contraction in the current quarter. While export volumes did manage
to inch ahead 0.2% MoM, the story was imports — especially the 2.4% jump in
capital goods and the 3.5% spike in consumer goods. So once again the
contribution to growth from continued inventory building is being offset by rising
imports. The politically-sensitive bilateral deficit with China widened to $28
billion in August from $25.9 billion — we shall see how that plays in Peoria.

While we did see a nice improvement in the Canadian trade data (the deficit was
cut in half to $1.3 billion on the back of a strong 22% surge in gold and related
exports), the damage has already been done in terms of the widespread
weakening across most data-points. It looks as though Canadian real GDP growth
will actually be a tad softer than in the U.S. as far as Q3 is concerned — around a
1.2% annual rate (though up from our 1% estimate prior to the data release).

CLAIMS BACK UP
The growth bulls took it on the chin yesterday with the news that the two-week
improvement in jobless claims stalled out during the week ending October 9th —
coming in at 462k from an upwardly revised 449k for the October 2nd reporting
week. Considering that hiring rates are still exceptionally low, the fact that people
are still losing their jobs and being forced to file unemployment claims does not
leave us with a warm and fuzzy feeling for the October nonfarm payroll report.

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

While some claim that there has been a shift in the relationship between jobless
claims and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ measure of employment, the
historical record does suggest that at current levels, 459k on a four-week
moving average basis, employment has typically been flat to negative. The
backlog of existing claimants, including those on emergency extension
programs, fell sharply but that may be due more to benefits running out than
any meaningful signpost that job openings are actually turning into new hires.

Page 8 of 10
October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE

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October 15, 2010 – LUNCH WITH DAVE
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