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JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE SPRING 1999Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS
The Role of Emotions in Marketing
Richard P.Bagozzi
University of Michigan
Mahesh Gopinath
Tulane University
Prashanth U.Nyer
Chapman University Emotionsarementalstatesofreadinessthatarisefromap- praisalsofeventsorone’sownthoughts.Inthisarticle,theauthorsdiscussthedifferentiationofemotionsfromaffect,moods, and attitudes, and outline an appraisal theory of emotions. Next, various measurement issues are consid-ered. This is followed by an analysis of the role of arousalin emotions. Emotions as markers, mediators, and mod-erators of consumer responses are then analyzed. Theauthorsturnnexttotheinfluenceofemotionsoncognitive processes,whichisfollowedbyastudyoftheimplicationsof emotions for volitions, goal-directed behavior, and de-cisions to help. Emotions and customer satisfaction arebriefly explored, too. The article closes with a number of questions for future research.
Thisarticleaddressesemotionalbehaviorinmarketing.In comparison to information processing and behavioraldecision research, we know much less about the role of emotions in marketing behavior. Much of what we doknow is confined to consumer behavior, as opposed to thebehavior of salespeople or marketing managers.Nevertheless, emotions are central to the actions of consumersandmanagersalike.Ourgoalinthisarticlewillbe to present a framework for thinking about emotions; todiscuss the measurement of emotions; to review how emo-tionsfunctionascauses,effects,mediators,andmoderatorsin marketing behavior; and to provide suggestions forfuture research.
THEORY AND FUNCTION OF EMOTIONS
Little consistency can be found in the use of terminol-ogy related to emotions. For purposes of organization anddiscussion, we begin with a definition of emotions andthen turn to a framework for interpreting emotionalbehavior.
Definitions
Theterm
affect
willbeconceivedhereinasanumbrellaforasetofmorespecificmentalprocessesincludingemo-tions, moods, and (possibly) attitudes. Thus, affect mightbe considered a general category for mental feelingprocesses, rather than a particular psychological process,per se.By emotion, we mean a mental state of readiness thatarises from cognitive appraisals of events or thoughts; hasa phenomenological tone; is accompanied by physiologi-cal processes; is often expressed physically (e.g., in ges-tures, posture, facial features); and may result in specificactions to affirm or cope with the emotion, depending onitsnatureandmeaningforthepersonhavingit.Forasimi-lar perspective, see Lazarus (1991) and Oatley (1992).The line between an emotion and mood is frequentlydifficult to draw but often by convention involves conceiv-ingofamoodasbeinglongerlasting(fromafewhoursuptodays)andlowerinintensitythananemotion.Yet,excep-tionstothisconstrualcanbefound.Stillanotherdistinction
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science.Volume 27, No. 2, pages 184-206.Copyright © 1999 by Academy of Marketing Science.
betweenemotionsandmoodsisthattheformertypicallyisintentional (i.e., it has an object or referent), whereasmoodsaregenerallynonintentionalandglobalordiffused(Frijda1993).Also,moodsarenotasdirectlycoupledwithaction tendencies and explicit actions as are manyemotions.Finally,attitudes,too,areoftenconsideredinstancesof affect,withthesamemeasuresusedonoccasiontoindicateemotions and attitudes (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant, happy-sad, or interested-bored semantic differential items). How-ever, some authors take a narrower view of attitudes anddefine them as evaluative judgments (measured, e.g., bygood-bad reactions) rather than emotional states. Cohenand Areni (1991), for instance, reserve the term
affect
for“valenced feeling states,” with emotions and moods asspecific examples. Attitudes are evaluative judgments intheir view. Nevertheless, other researchers do not make adistinction between affect and evaluative judgments. Forexample, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) point out that Fish-beinandAjzen(1975)andothersocialpsychologistshave“regarded affect as isomorphic with evaluation itself andused the terms interchangeably” (p. 12). Still others pro-pose that attitudes have two distinct, but generally highlycorrelated, components: affective and cognitive (orevaluative)dimensions.Someempiricalsupportexistsforthis interpretation (Bagozzi and Burnkrant 1979; BatraandAhtola1990;BrecklerandWiggins1989;Crites,Fab-rigar, and Petty 1994; Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto 1994).It should be recognized that the terms
affect
,
emotions
,
moods
, and
attitudes
have frequently been used inconsis-tently in the literature. We will revisit this issue when weconsider both measurement issues and customer satisfac-tion research below. For now, we stress that when readingthe literature, it is important to pay attention to howauthors define affective (and related) terminologies andhowtheymeasurethevariablestowhichtheterminologiesrefer.One’sdefinitionoftermspermitsaninterpretationof their meaning, but equally important is how the variablestowhichthetermsreferareoperationalized.Someauthorshave defined key variables as emotions, moods, or atti-tudes but have used operationalizations corresponding todifferent concepts. Other authors have used operationali-zations for a single variable that cut across two or moreinstances of affect. To make clear our definition of emo-tions and how it differs from definitions of mood and atti-tudes, we present the following point of view.
Organizing Framework
Above we noted that emotions are mental states of readiness. But so, too, are moods and attitudes. How thenmight we distinguish between these affective states? Forone thing, the state of readiness characterized by an emo-tion tends to be more intense than that characterized bymoods or attitudes. It is more intense in the sense of strength of felt subjective experience, plus magnitude of physiological response (e.g., autonomic nervous systemactivity) and extent of bodily expression (e.g., facial dis-plays),whentheselatterreactionsaccompanyanemotion.Probably the most important factor differentiatingemotions from moods and attitudes is the way emotionsarise. Emotions are said to have a specific referent (e.g., aconsumerbecomespleasedwhenanewdetergentremovesgrassstainsfromclothing;heorsheisangeredbypoorser-vice in a restaurant). Specifically, emotions arise inresponse to appraisals one makes for something of rele-vance to one’s well-being. By appraisal, we mean anevaluative judgment and interpretation thereof. By some-thing of relevance, we mean an incident or episode thathappens to oneself (e.g., an unplanned event); a behavioroneperformsoraresultoneproduces(e.g.,engaginginanactivity or receiving or failing to receive a planned out-come);orachangeinanobject,person,orthoughtthathaspersonal meaning.It is important to stress that although categories of eventsorphysicalcircumstancesarefrequentlyassociatedwith particular emotional responses, it is not the specificevents or physical circumstances that produce the emo-tions but rather the unique psychological appraisal madeby the person evaluating and interpreting the events andcircumstances. Different people can have different emo-tional reactions (or no emotional reactions at all) to thesameeventorhappening.Note,too,thatappraisalscanbedeliberative, purposive, and conscious, but also unreflec-tive,automatic,andunconscious,dependingonthepersonandelicitingconditionsforemotionalarousal.Thecentralroleofappraisalsintheformationofemotionshascometodefine what are aptly called appraisal theories in psychol-ogy (e.g., Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore, andCollins1988;Roseman1991;SmithandEllsworth1985).Appraisal theorists maintain that the critical determi-nant of any emotion is the resultant evaluation and inter-pretation that arise after comparing an actual state with adesiredstate.Twoappraisalsareparticularlycrucialatthisstage of emotion formation: goal relevance and goal con-gruence(Lazarus1991).Thatis,anecessaryconditionforan emotional response to an event or happening is that aperson has a personal stake in it and at the same time judges the event or happening to facilitate or thwart thisstake. Again, the appraisal can occur consciously orunconsciously.Adistinctivefeatureofappraisaltheoriesistheirspeci-fication of the conditions leading to discrete emotionalresponses. Forced to be brief, we focus on Roseman’s(1991) version of appraisal theories, which differs in rela-tively minor ways from other leading theories. Rosemanhypothesized that particular combinations of five apprais-alsdeterminewhichof16uniqueemotionswillbeexperi-encedinanygivensituation.Figure1summarizeshisthe-ory, where the five appraisals are labeled motive
Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS 185
consistent/motiveinconsistent(i.e.,positiveemotionsver-sus negative emotions), appetitive/aversive (i.e., presenceofarewardvs.absenceofapunishment),agency(i.e.,out-come is perceived caused by impersonal circumstances,some other person, or the self), probability (i.e., an out-come is certain or uncertain), and power (i.e., strong ver-sus weak coping potential).Forexample,prideoccurswhenoneevaluateshisorherown performance of an action or achievement of an out-come in a positive light (e.g., a feeling of having donewell). Here the positive emotion is motive consistent,either appetitive (e.g., having attained a positive goal) oraversive (e.g., having avoided a punishment), self-produced under weak or low coping potential, and eithercertainoruncertain,dependingonthecircumstances.Sad-ness happens when one experiences a loss for which onerecognizes that nothing can be done to restore it. The loss,which is of something or someone valued, is experiencednegativelyandwithhighcertaintyunderconditionsoflowcoping power. It is perceived to be caused by impersonalcircumstances.One value of appraisal theories is that it is possible toaccountformostemotions.Indeed,subtlecombinationsof appraisals yield discrete emotional responses. Anger andregret, for example, differ primarily in only one type of appraisalandshareintheotherfour,namely,angeroccurswhen a person sees another person as the source of injurytooneselfortoanotherpersonviewedasavictimofinjus-tice, whereas regret results when one’s negative outcomeis attributed to actions or inactions of the self.Not every emotion is accounted for by Roseman’sframework (or by any other framework for that matter).For instance, pride is regarded as a positive emotion inRoseman’sframework,yetexcessiveorexaggeratedpride(sometimes termed
hubris
) can invite retribution. Like-wise, shame and guilt are thought by Roseman to be pro-duced by similar appraisals, but other researchers havefound important distinctions between shame, guilt, andembarrassment (e.g., Lewis 1993). Likewise, disgust hasbeen studied extensively and found to differ from distress(e.g.,Rozin,Haidt,andMcCauley1993).Nevertheless,incontrast to other theories of emotion that conceive of it inbipolarterms(e.g.,pleasure-displeasureandhigharousal-low arousal [Russell 1980] or high negative affect-lownegative affect and high positive affect-low positive affect[Watson and Tellegen 1985]), Roseman’s framework andother appraisal theories not only allow for many discreteemotions but specify conditions for their occurrence.An elaboration of appraisal theories that is especiallyrelevantformarketingisthetreatmentofgoals,whichmaybe defined as “internal representations of desired states,where states are broadly defined as outcomes, events, orprocesses” (Austin and Vancouver 1996:338). Oatley andJohnson-Laird (1987) proposed what they termed a
com-municative theory of emotions
wherein events are evalu-ated in relation to a person’s goals. Emotions are thoughttofunctiontocoordinatepartsofone’scognitivesystemsoas to manage responses to events and in so doing changefromongoingtonewactivitiesortomaintaindesiredstatesor activities. The self-regulation of goals is believed to bethe main function of emotions:Eachgoalandplanhasamonitoringmechanismthatevaluates events relevant to it. When a substantialchange in probability occurs of achieving an impor-tant goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanismbroadcasts to the whole cognitive system a signalthat can set it into readiness to respond to thischange. Humans experience these signals and thestates of readiness they induce as emotions. (Oatley1992:50)According to Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987), emotionsare evoked “at a significant juncture of a plan . . . typi-cally . . . when the evaluation (conscious or unconscious)of the likely success of a plan changes” (p. 35). Positiveemotions(e.g.,happiness,elation,joy)areassociatedwiththe attainment of a (sub)goal, which usually leads to a de-cision to continue with the plan, whereas negative emo-tions (e.g., frustration, disappointment, anxiety) resultfrom problems with ongoing plans and failures to achievedesired goals (see also Stein, Liwag, and Wade 1996).Emotions have implications for action and goal attain-ment. Lazarus (1991) identifies coping responses asimportantmechanismsinthisregard.Whenweexperience
186 JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE SPRING 1999
FIGURE 1Roseman’s (1991) AppraisalTheory of Emotions
SOURCE: Roseman (1991:193). Reprinted with permission.
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